Peace eluded Manipur in the year 2024, as no serious attempts were made by the Central as well as the state government. Manipur continued to exist on edge, with a massive deployment of security forces to separate the two conflicting communities – The Meiteis and the Kuki-Zo with buffer zones between them, and confining them to Imphal valley and hills respectively. Sophisticated weapons, including AK-47, sten guns, RPGs, Rockets, drones, etc. seemed to be freely floating around and were used in the conflict. At least one woman (31), mother of three children, was raped. The conflict spread to Jiribam district in the west, bordering Assam state in June 2024. AFSPA had to be reimposed within the jurisdiction of six police stations in 5 districts. The Ministry of Home Affairs made a weak effort to bring the Meitei and the Kuki representatives to Delhi for peace talks, however, the Kuki MLAs refused to sit in the same room as the Meiteis and the Nagas, unless their demand of separation of administration was accepted. Although there was a tiny glimmer of hope with the Meiteis and Kukis in Jiribam district reaching a peace settlement, the agreement did not hold for even a couple of days. Two Naga men were also attacked by the armed Meitei gunmen and two Bihari migrant workers were also killed in Meitei dominated Kakching district. One migrant worker from Jharkhand was killed and two others were injured in Imphal. This triggered out migration of other migrant workers. Intermittent shutdown of internet and imposition of curfew punctuated the social life in Manipur in 2025. The 60,000 internally displaced continued to live in miserable conditions in relief camps, with new IDPs joining the relief camps in the Jiribam district. In short, in the year 2025, the conflict in Manipur spread to new areas, although there were less casualties compared to the first three months of the conflict, when wore than 150 persons were killed. There was an isolated incident of fight between two Kuki militant groups over manning of bunkers.
Role of the security forces in the conflict:
Table – 1: Number of people killed
| Region | Meiteis | Kukis | Security Personnel | Unknown | Other Hindus |
| Jiribam district | 6 | 10 | 2 | 13 | 0 |
| Hills | 0 | 5 | 7 | 3 | 0 |
| Valley | 13 | 0 | 3 | 15 | 4 |
Table – 2: Number of persons injured
| Region | Meiteis | Kukis | Security Personnel | Unknown | Other Hindus |
| Jiribam district | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 0 |
| Hills | 0 | 1 | 10 | 55 | 0 |
| Valley | 65 | 0 | 28 | 48 | 2 |
In all, 81 persons, including women and children were killed and 214 persons were injured in the Meitei-Kuki conflict in Manipur in the year 2024, as reported in the 5 newspapers monitored by the CSSS – The Times of India, The Indian Express, The Hindu, Inquilab and Sahafat. Among the 81 killed, 19 were from Meitei community, while 15 were from Kuki community, 12 were security personnel, and 4 were Hindu migrant workers. Community of the rest 31 persons was not reported. Among the injured, 65 were from Meitei community, 1 injured was from Kuki community, 40 injured were security forces and the community of 106 injured persons was not reported. Two migrant Hindu workers were also injured. While some Meiteis were injured from gunfire from the hills in Kangpokpi district on the bordering villages in the valley, most were injured during protests in the Imphal Valley and in Jiribam district due to firing by the security personnel. Both – Meiteis and Kukis were killed in the conflict, and at least one Kuki woman was raped and brutally assaulted. Kuki militants’ fire on Meitei villages appeared to be with the intention to disturb the “peace” to force political negotiations around their demand of separate administration. At times, they appeared to be revenge killings.
Several houses and vehicles were burnt down, including those of unarmed members of both communities, and that of the MLAs in the valley. Five churches, a fuel pump and 272 Kuki houses and 62 Meitei houses were burnt during the year 2024. Till date, 258 people have been killed and 386 religious places have been vandalized. There are 60,000 internally displaced persons living in inhuman conditions in relief camps. 39 persons are missing since the conflict. It is also noteworthy that the CM Shri Biren Singh condemned attacks on Meiteis, he seems to have maintained silence when Kukis were killed or injured.
While no efforts worth the name were made to resolve the ethnic conflict in Manipur, 90 additional companies of the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) were deployed. With these deployments, the total CAPF deployed in the state totalled 288 – 165 companies of CRPF, 104 of BSF, 8 of RAF, 6 of SSB and 5 of ITBP. These are in addition to the deployment of Assam Rifles, which is under the Army’s operational command. With more than 60,000 armed CAPF in addition to the state police, for a population of about 3 million, Manipur must be the most militarized state in India after J&K. This level of violence has led to very high levels of polarization of the two ethnic communities. Lt. General (Retd.) Rana Pratap Kalita stated that polarization along ethnic lines has spread to government officials and police. According to him, there was easy availability of weapons and sustained misinformation by all stakeholders. The Manipur Police with overwhelming majority of Meiteis allegedly favour their community. There is one incident though, in which one Meitei ex-serviceman who was specially appointed, was suspended when the force led by him in Jiribam district fired on protesting Meiteis, leading to the death of a Meitei. Security personnel also had to pay a heavy price in this conflict.
There was a huge conflict between the Meitei police commandos posted in Kuki dominated Moreh town bordering Myanmar, in January 2024, and the Kuki community. The Kuki women agitated against posting Manipuri police with Meitei commandos in which several people were killed. CSSS had prepared a detailed report on this conflict. Likewise, the Assam Rifle are alleged to be partisan towards the Kukis. However, when we talked to the Commandants of the Assam Rifle, they not only denied the allegation, they also provided data suggesting that more Kukis have been at the receiving end of their bullets, arrests, and seizure of weapons than the Meiteis.
The approach of the state towards the conflict seems to be limited to attempts to suppress it, without making any serious attempt to find a resolution. Either the Biren Singh led BJP state government has no solution, or perhaps aims to derive political benefit from the conflict, viz., strong consolidation of Meities, which form nearly 54% of the state’s population and inhabiting in the valley. The valley elects 40 out of 60 MLAs in the Manipur state legislature. However, the strategy does not appear to have worked as in the Lok Sabha elections, both the MPs elected from the state belonged to the Congress Party. The Meiteis also seem to be running out of patience for non-resolution of the conflict for over 19 months. The Meiteis are also suffering losses in the conflict. The attack on houses of the MLA, including the BJP MLAs, ministers and the CM, shows the frustration of Meiteis. Also, the Conrad Sangma led NPP, a coalition partner of NDA, with 7 MLAs withdrew their support to the Biren Singh Government, although it did not lead to the fall of the BJP led government, as the BJP has majority in the state legislature on its own. Eleven BJP MLAs did not attend the meeting called by Biren Singh and were served show cause notices.
No justice to the victims:
The wheels of justice are moving extremely slow. 42 SITs have been constituted by the Supreme Court to investigate 3,023 FIRs filed. In all, 11,892 FIRs had been filed. However, they were later consolidated into 3,023 FIRs. According to the information shared by the CM and reported in The Times of India on 1st August 2024, 11,133 houses were burnt and 4,569 others were destroyed in the conflict. Farmlands belonging to 5,554 farmers had been hit. Till 18th December 2024, according to a report in The Hindu, chargesheets had been filed only in 192 cases of heinous crimes pertaining to rape, sexual offences against women, arson, loot and murder, which constitutes only 6% of the cases investigated. Till November 20, 2024, 742 suspects had been identified, after examining 11,901 witnesses. 574 persons have been charge-sheeted, while 384 persons had been arrested. The SITs have seized 501 weapons and 13,464 ammunitions out of about 6,000 weapons ‘looted’ from the police, most of them in the valley. Although charge sheet has been filed, trial had not begun till 18th October in the case of two Kuki women mass raped and paraded naked on 4th May 2023, the day after the conflict began.
Growing power of the armed militants:
This level of conflict has strengthened the armed militants on both sides of the divide. The communities do not trust the security apparatus of the state to protect them. This has led to sprouting of bunkers manned by armed community volunteers to ensure no one from the ‘enemy’ community intrudes into ‘their’ area. Arambai Tenggol, a militant Meitei organization has armed itself with the help of over 6,000 arms ‘looted’ from the police armoury and others it might have obtained from across the border. State police apparatus seems to indulge them and look the other way in all their illegal actions. Arambai Tenggol even abducted Additional Superintendent of Police and vandalised his home and property after he arrested 6 members of the militant outfit on 27th February 2024 (ibid). The militant organisation issued summons to all the MLAs, Rajya Sabha and Lok Sabha MPs to assemble on January 24th, 2024, at Kangla Fort in Imphal, and they were made to take an oath that they would work for the interest of the Meitei community and their demands, including delisting of the Kuki community from the ST list, deportation of Kukis, withdrawal from the SoO agreement with Kuki militants and other such partisan demands (ibid). That the elected representative could not have disobeyed the summons shows how powerful these armed militants have become.
The Kuki armed militants also command similar obedience from the community. House of Michael Lamjathang Haokip, a BJP spokesperson in Churachandpur, belonging to Thadaou tribe, was burnt down in August by Kuki ultras, after he asserted that the Thadous are not within the Kuki family and wanted reproachment with the Meiteis. The guns of Arambai Tenggol and Kuki ultras terrorise, have eliminated, all moderate voices within their respective communities, and none in the Kuki and Meitei communities can go against or dissent from the positions taken by the militants.
The doctrine which prevailed in the conflict was that of deterrence, and not justice. Security of the community, according to this doctrine, lies in inflicting equal, if not more, damage to life and property of the rival community in order to deter them from attacking one’s own community. In Jiribam district, the cycle of revenge killing was more apparent. 22 persons were killed in Jiribam alone in 2024. Unarmed members of both the communities were targeted by armed groups to ‘send a message’ to the armed militants of the rival group and to demonstrate their prowess. The state appeared too weak to uphold democracy, protect the citizens and run the writ of democratic institutions and seek to do justice. The state found extremely challenging to ensure transportation of essential goods from the valley to hills and vice versa, in spite of heavy presence of armed security forces. The Meitei police commandos posted in Moreh town had to be flown by helicopter to avoid transporting them through Kuki dominated territory. Assam Rifle commandant told us that he had to remove his uniform and put it in his bag as he was approaching the checkpoint monitored by Meitei militants. Another AR commandant was asked to produce his ID card issued by the army which he took it as an insult to his post and refused to do so for checking by (Meitei) civilians. However, the negotiation took a long time for him to be allowed to proceed without showing his ID.
The issues that triggered violence were:
1) Demand of the ‘integrity of Manipur’: while the Meiteis staunchly defend the ‘integrity of Manipur,’ the Kukis were equally firm about their demand of ‘separation of administration’, which they defined as creation of a Union Territory with legislature as the only solution to the resolution of the conflict. The exchange of population now having been complete, and no Kuki left in the valley, they are strong votaries of separation of state.
2) Claim over the Thangjing hill range in Churachandpur district: while the Meiteis have their sacred deity and perform pilgrimage in Thangjing hill range according to their Sanamahi faith, the Kuki National Front renamed the place as Thangting, and put up a gate declaring it as “Thangting Camp of the Kuki National Front – Military Council”. The intention was to reclaim the hill exclusively and prevent pilgrimage by Meiteis.
3) ST status of both the communities remained contentious. The Arambai Tenggol administered oath to elected representatives from the valley that they would work for the withdrawal of ST status of Kukis. One of the Meitei demands is that they should be enlisted as a Scheduled Tribe community as otherwise they are confined to about 10% of Manipuri territory in the valley, and do not have right to own land in the hills. The Kukis and Nagas are opposed to their demand.
4) There were accusations of partisanship of security forces, and consequent reliance on armed militants to protect the community. Posting of Meitei police commandos in Kuki dominated Moreh town became very contentious. The police commandos had killed three Kuki women, even though not a single Meitei living in Moreh was killed on 3rd May, when the conflict had started. Similarly, suspension of a Kuki head constable in Kuki dominated Churachandpur also triggered protests and violence. There is complete lack of trust on the Assam Rifles in the valley and similar lack of trust on the Manipuri police force in the hills.
5) Both communities nurtured prejudicial attitude towards and nurtured mistrust and hatred towards each other. Meitei community think that the Kukis are intruders and illegal immigrants, which would be proved by preparing NRC. Being illegal immigrants, they should be deported. Kukis are alleged by them to be narco-terrorists, growing poppy. Although, according to Vrinda, a former IPS officer residing in Imphal, everyone is involved in the poppy trade, and drug was promoted by the Indian state in the 1970s and 80s to get the youth hooked and dissuade them from join the separatists and armed militants demanding independence of Manipur from the Indian state. The Meiteis also accuse the Kukis of nurturing a desire for Zalingam or greater home land for Kukis. For the Kukis, the Meities would deprive them of their homeland, grab land their hills, grab their jobs, livelihood, and funds for the development of the hill districts.
Neither the Meitei armed organisation – Arambai Tenggol, patronised by some ruling party politicians, nor the Kuki armed militants seemed to be gaining any ground in this conflict. The Kukis have not been able to move any further in their demand of separate administration, nor the Arambai Tenggol and Sanamahi extremists have been able to gain more hegemonic position over the Kukis than they already were in – attaining ST status to buy land in the hills, monopolise state jobs, get Kukis deported from the state. None party in the conflict seemed to have moved an inch towards their objective. Both are tiring each other out. These levels of conflict are harmful to both communities, and indeed, to human society and to the country in general. The Central government and the government of Manipur have to undertake serious and urgent efforts to establish and facilitate a dialogue between the two communities and resolve the conflict. It is their Constitutional responsibility and duty. Representatives of both the communities must also realise that these levels of conflict cannot be sustained and are self-destructive. Conflict fatigue does not seem to have set in. The marginalised and poorer sections in both communities are suffering more. Civil societies, human rights organisations must also take initiatives to promote a dialogue between the two communities at various levels. The state needs to create jobs for Kukis and the Meiteis. There is imbalance in development of the Valley and the hills, which need to be addressed in terms of infrastructure like roads, educational institutions, universities, health infrastructure, including multi-speciality hospitals, markets for agricultural produce, financial infrastructure etc. The hill district area councils need more autonomy, regular functioning, and higher budgets for development of the hills. These could be the first steps.
Disclaimer: The views expressed here are the author’s personal views, and do not necessarily represent the views of Sabrangindia.
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