The Chhattisgarh High Court’s recent judgment, delivered on February 10, acquitting a man convicted of raping and sexually assaulting his wife in a horrific case is a damning indictment of India’s legal system. By extending the already regressive marital rape exception to Section 377 of the erstwhile Indian Penal Code (IPC), the court has reinforced the idea that a husband has absolute ownership over his wife’s body, regardless of consent, dignity, or bodily autonomy. The ruling exposes the brutal reality of how Indian law continues to fail married women, stripping them of fundamental protections available to every other category of rape survivors.
A heinous crime and a judicial betrayal
The case in question is as gruesome as it is tragic. A woman was subjected to brutal sexual violence by her husband, which led to severe internal injuries and ultimately her death. In her dying declaration, she explicitly accused her husband of forceful sexual intercourse, an allegation corroborated by medical reports stating that she suffered from peritonitis and rectal perforation—injuries directly linked to the assault. Despite these damning details, the Chhattisgarh High Court overturned the trial court’s conviction and acquitted the accused of all charges, including culpable homicide, rape, and unnatural sexual offences.
The trial court in Bastar’s Jagdalpur had convicted the man under IPC Sections 304 (culpable homicide not amounting to murder), 375 (rape), and 377 (unnatural sexual offences), sentencing him to 10 years in jail. However, the High Court, in a deeply flawed reading of the law, ruled that the marital rape exception under Section 375 must also apply to Section 377. Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas held that because Indian law does not criminalise non-consensual sex within marriage, it cannot criminalise non-consensual unnatural sex either. This interpretation effectively grants husbands unchecked power over their wives’ bodies, insulating them from criminal liability even in cases of brutal sexual violence.
A judicial leap of absurdity
Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas, in his ruling, contended that the marital rape exception must extend to unnatural sexual offences under Section 377 of the IPC, as recognising consent for one while ignoring it for the other would be “inconsistent.” He argued that Exception 2 under Section 375 explicitly exempts a husband from being prosecuted for rape, thereby establishing that consent is not a legal requirement within marriage. Extending this logic, the court held that if forced vaginal intercourse by a husband is not considered rape, then non-consensual unnatural sex within marriage should not be treated as an offence either.
“Thus, it is quite clear that at the same time, as per the definition of Section 375 of IPC, the offender is classified as a ‘man’. Here in the present case, the appellant is a ‘husband’ and victim is a ‘woman’ and here she is a ‘wife’ and parts of the body which are used for carnal intercourse are also common, therefore, the offence between husband and wife cannot be made out under Section 375 IPC as per the repeal made by way of amendment and in view of repugnancy between both the sections,” the bench added to the judgment.
The High Court further justified its decision by invoking a legal principle stating that when two provisions are inconsistent, the newer one takes precedence and nullifies the older law. While both Sections 375 and 377 were introduced simultaneously in the IPC, the 2013 amendment expanded the definition of rape while retaining the marital rape exception. Based on this, the court concluded that the modified provision effectively overrode Section 377 in the context of marriage, making non-consensual anal or oral sex between spouses legally permissible.
On the culpable homicide charge, the prosecution had relied on the woman’s dying declaration, which was recorded before an executive magistrate just hours before her death. In this statement, she had accused her husband of brutal sexual violence, which resulted in fatal injuries. However, the High Court dismissed this as unreliable, arguing that the declaration did not explicitly link the injuries to forced intercourse. Justice Vyas noted that while the trial court had accepted the dying declaration as evidence, the magistrate who recorded it testified that the victim had provided additional details separately. The High Court, in an astonishing twist, ruled that because a dying declaration should stand on its own without requiring corroboration, any additional statements made outside of it could not be relied upon.
Labelling the conviction under Section 304 (culpable homicide) as “perverse,” the court quashed the sentence, declaring that the trial court had failed to establish how the offence was proven beyond doubt. It criticised the lower court for convicting the accused without providing a clear basis for how Section 304 was applicable, ultimately ordering the husband’s immediate release from jail.
Further bolstering its decision, the court reiterated that since Exception 2 to Section 375 remains part of the statute, sexual intercourse between a husband and wife—no matter how violent or non-consensual—cannot be considered rape unless the wife is under 15 years of age.
“It is quite vivid that when everything is repealed under Section 375 of IPC then how offence under Section 377 of IPC would be attracted if it is committed between husband and wife,” the judgement stated.
It failed to acknowledge that the Supreme Court, in its 2017 Independent Thought ruling, had already struck down this age limit, declaring that sex with a wife under 18 years constitutes rape. The High Court, however, ignored this precedent, relying instead on an outdated and legally untenable reading of the law.
Justice Vyas took the argument even further, questioning how a husband could be prosecuted under Section 377 if every form of sexual intercourse between spouses was legally protected under the marital rape exception. He insisted that when the legislature retained the exception in 2013, it effectively nullified any conflicting interpretation that could criminalise a husband’s sexual acts against his wife. By this reasoning, he concluded that no offence under either Section 375 or 377 was made out against the accused, since the law does not recognise a wife’s lack of consent as relevant in marital relations.
The complete judgment may be read here.
A Pattern of Judicial Misogyny: The Madhya Pradesh High Court’s precedent
The Chhattisgarh High Court’s ruling is not an anomaly—it reflects a wider pattern of Indian courts failing married women. In a similarly outrageous judgment, the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Meghna Agarwal Vs. Anurag Bagadiya and another (2022) granted anticipatory bail to a husband accused of forcibly sodomising his wife, citing the marital rape exception. The court reasoned that Section 377, meant to criminalise unnatural sex, could not apply within marriage unless extreme cruelty was established. This interpretation disregards the fundamental principle that any non-consensual act—whether vaginal, oral, or anal—constitutes sexual violence.
By treating marriage as a protective shield against prosecution for sexual crimes, Indian courts are actively enabling spousal rape. These rulings institutionalise a grotesque double standard: a married woman’s suffering is deemed legally irrelevant in situations where an unmarried woman would receive full protection under the law.
Institutionalised discrimination against married women
The most glaring problem with this ruling is its blatant discrimination against married women. If the victim had been a minor or an unmarried woman, the accused would have been found guilty of rape. If the accused had committed the same acts against a stranger, he would have been punished under Section 377. The only reason he walks free today is because the victim was his wife—an outrageous legal position that strips married women of their fundamental right to bodily autonomy.
The present ruling also contradicts the Supreme Court’s Independent Thought judgment, which recognised marital rape in cases where the wife is below 18 years of age. In November 2024, in the case of S v. State of Maharashtra, the Bombay High Court ruled that sex with a minor wife is rape, reaffirming that the legal age of consent is 18, irrespective of marital status. Justice G.A. Sanap categorically rejected the argument that marriage grants automatic sexual rights over a wife’s body. Similarly, in other instances, courts have recognised that non-consensual sexual acts within marriage can be prosecuted under different sections of the IPC. Yet, the Chhattisgarh HC has chosen to take a regressive approach, doubling down on an archaic and indefensible legal exception. If forced sex with a minor wife is rape, why should force sex with an adult wife be any different? The ruling reinforces the deeply patriarchal notion that marriage gives a husband unchallenged ownership over his wife’s body, a mind-set that has no place in a constitutional democracy.
The Supreme Court’s deafening silence
This verdict also highlights the Supreme Court’s prolonged inaction on the marital rape issue. For over two years, petitions challenging the constitutional validity of the marital rape exception have been pending before the apex court. The government, instead of addressing the issue head-on, continues to argue that criminalising marital rape would be “excessively harsh” on husbands. This reluctance to act allows judgments like the Chhattisgarh High Court’s to flourish, reinforcing the idea that Indian wives have fewer legal protections than other citizens.
Worse still, the recently enacted Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), which replaces the IPC from July 2024, retains the same marital rape immunity and removes Section 377 altogether. This ensures that even the narrow protections married women had under the IPC will now cease to exist, further embedding this archaic injustice into law.
A dangerous precedent for women’s rights
The Chhattisgarh HC’s verdict is not just a legal travesty—it is a dangerous precedent that further erodes the rights of married women. By normalising the idea that consent is irrelevant in marriage, the ruling effectively sanctions sexual violence within matrimonial relationships. It also sends a chilling message to victims: the legal system will not protect you if your rapist is your husband.
If Indian courts and lawmakers truly believe in gender equality, they must abolish the marital rape exception and recognise a woman’s right to say no, irrespective of her marital status. Until then, judgments like these will continue to legitimise spousal sexual violence, condemning countless women to a lifetime of abuse with no legal recourse.
This is not just a failure of the judiciary—it is a failure of the Indian legal system to uphold the fundamental rights of half its population.
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