In a menacingly bipolar polity and society, an era of easy-labelling and stereotyping, presenting the truth and holding a mirror before two extreme poles is both a complicated and difficult task. Accusations and counter-accusations of opportunism against independent-minded interventions on a contentious issue come fast and often, in haste. Thus, commenting upon a deeply flawed, ill-intended and partisan law such as the Waqf Amendment Act, 2025 becomes as difficult as is the task of also pointing out existing flaws in the institution and management of the Waqf.
There exists a deep communication gap even among the non-partisan (voices) on the issue of the Waqf. This needs to be bridged. Every society and religion have provisions and practices, both related to charity and public welfare. In present day India, an era of majoritarian ascendance and minority-bashing, weaponising of this welfarist institutional –even noble– practice is easy. On the other hand, huge Waqf assets and proceeds have been (unfairly) controlled and siphoned off by some among the self-serving religious and secular elites among Muslims in connivance with (sic) the state and state-regulated Waqf Boards, for decades. This duality is a double whammy for the average Muslim citizen, regardless of whether the political dispensation has been overtly anti-Muslim or ostensibly pluralist.
An instance from my ancestral village
In my own native village in rural north Bihar, there are at least three to four graveyards. The largest one is, as per documentation, owned by some families, but used for community burials by all Muslim castes (biradris) and classes of the village. Another one is owned by three specific families. In the three contiguous graveyards, each family buries its own dead in their respective spots. Yet another one, adjacent to it, belongs to the Muslim communities of Mir-Shikars, Rayeens, Mansuris (Pasmanda Muslim communities). The land is said to have been donated by a Bhumihar-Brahman– Hindu upper caste — landlord of the village, the economic status of whose descendants are reported to have dwindled very significantly. What happens then if the (2025 amended provision) of “Waqf by user” is applied to these graveyards in my native village which fall under Waqf properties, without detailed documentation. As per the just legislated law (Waqf Amendment Act 2025), the Hindu inheritors of these lands may claim their ownership (!!) and one can then imagine the socio-political fallout, particularly in an era of “everyday communalism”.
The older mosque of my ancestral village stands on a piece of land which belonged to a widow without any children. The rest of the plot of the land is home to the house of the legal inheritors of the donor, who possess their document of proprietorship. On and off, some other villagers, hostile to, or envious of, the descendant who owns the house (legal inheritor), keep claiming that the rest of the plot of the land (apart from that on which the mosque stands) too belongs to the Waqf (mosque). Thus, a dispute has been kept alive, intra-Muslim. The very same widow-donor is said to have donated another plot of her land and the produce from this other plot of land is s meant for the costs and upkeep (chiraghi, i.e, lighting) of the mosque. This has been all through oral endowments, not documented. If oral practice were not followed, the legal inheritor of the widow-donor could/can always reclaim the land. Recently, certain “pious” people of the village expressed their intent to sell away that part of the land so that a tall, 80-feet tall minar (spire) could be built! Without such an imposing minar, the identity of a newly arrived, affluent (neo-rich) Muslims cannot be displayed, a phenomenon that also creates a sense of awe (and dominance) among both Muslims and Hindus of the locality. This handful of demonstrably “pious” villagers — with pretensions to religious education and knowledge of the Shariah—choose to forget the fact that a Waqf land cannot be put to use for any purpose other than for what has been specified by the donor (Waqif). They also choose to forget the fact that in the face of the non-existence of any written documentation and the lack of registration of such details with the Waqf Board; or non-registration in a court of law to that effect, their step would/could encounter a big obstacle. Who would be the “seller” in the land-registration office? The seller, in such a scenario, has necessarily to be a legal inheritor of the land. That the newly constructed tall minar on the northern wall of the mosque (the metallic road touches the northern wall of the mosque, hence, it involves another question of legality) would (or could) attract the attention of Hindu religious processions and therefore it is (also) potentially explosive– another important issue– that I put aside at the moment. [On more than one occasion, some instances of communal conflict that revolve around the “spot” of religious structures in the past have also brewed on the misplaced priorities of local Muslim communities, who otherwise perennially complain of educational and economic backwardness).
Religiosity of the Waqf
Some academic works, for instance, Khalid Rashid (1978), Gregory Kozlowsky (1985), P. Munawar Husain (2021), etc., on the theme of Waqf, also throw up some important questions:
Is the creation and existence of Waqf strictly as per the Sharia? The Holy Quran makes no mention of awqaf or any institution similar to them. Abu Hanifa (AD 699-767 AD) “disapproved of the institution”? Collections of the fatawa of religious scholars in India have contained both favourable and un-favourable statements on the institution of Waqf.
Waqf, in actual practice, was not necessarily and strictly either a charitable trust or a foundation of faith. Many of these, such as the Waqf-e-Aulad, were/are selfish practices too, besides of course, also being altruistic. In this specific category (Waqf-e-Aulad), the maximum proceeds of most of awqaf are theoretically and practically earmarked for the members of the family and kinship. Every Waqif (donor) wanted his or her offspring to inherit the fruits of that ingenuity of the [Waqf], to preserve the world of their founders.
The British Indian court’s approach towards following literal Quranic rules of inheritance made Muslim landholders carve out other “legal” ways of preserving the holdings by creating awqaf. Therefore, beginning in 1879, the High Courts of India handed down a series of decisions which overturned any endowment considered to benefit primarily the settler’s own family. The Privy Council in 1894 observed that Muslim endowments must be religious and “charitable”; public, not private. The Courts’ premise was: Muslims ought to follow their own Holy Scripture, Quran, to inherit parental assets.
Who were the mutawallis (managers) of the earliest Awqaf, viz., Khyber, Sawad (Iraq, which was then a part of Iran), and Ramlah in Palestine, founded in 912 AD) Waqf by Faiq, a eunuch, distinguished as having the earliest written record (on a stone tablet)? All of these three earliest awqaf (s) in Islamic history became non-existent due to encroachment by soldiers and other influential elites in the early centuries of Islam. “Military and political leaders gradually appropriated the territory’s income. Such encroachment on endowments was by no means rare. Though awqaf aimed at permanence, few attained it”. The Buwayhids, a family of Iranian, not Arab origin, had a hand in dismembering that [Sawad] endowment.
The creation of Waqf, in most cases — as observed by judges during British colonial rule –had more to do with circumventing the Quranically defined rights of inheritance and division/distribution of the properties (estates) and their proceeds among his/her heirs. Waqf-creation was a way of putting a complete restriction on sale and purchase of the assets/properties by the heirs. “Waqf is a (unique)/typical phenomenon which partakes the characteristics of endowment, gift and many such sister concepts but, at the same time, stands apart”. “The removal of encroachments upon the Waqf properties is relegated to the executive wing rather than a judicial exercise. The appointment and removal of mutawallis is another complicated issue”.
In the early years of the 19th century, a number of persons from India’s Muslim elite began to convert their property into awqaf. This was a way to protect their family’s fortunes and the social prominence which accompanied it. In both kinds of awqaf, viz., Waqf-e-Aam (exclusively for charitable purposes) and Waqf-e-Aulad, through mutawllis (managers), self-interest could be both preserved and perpetuated.
In 1879, Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan (when he was in the Viceroy’s legislative council) published an article in his Urdu journal, Tazhib- al-Akhlaq, titled “A plan for saving Muslim Families from destruction and extinction” (“Ek Tadbir: Mussalmanon ke Khandanon ko Tabahi awr Barbadi se Bachaane ki“). In this article, he noted, that a Waqf was “allowed”, or “permitted” (mujaz). Could this mean that while he did not outright disapprove of the practice, he was not a vocal supporter of the institution?
Sir Syed’s four important concerns were: (a) that the property placed in a Waqf be accurately and fully described. (b) his proposal insisted that, once drawn up, a waqfnamah (deed of Waqf) be registered with the district officer or the district collector or magistrate; (c) The shares of the waqf‘s income had to be precisely laid out in the Waqfnamah. (d) Also, the succession to the office of mutawalli had to be clearly established. He wanted the Muslim waqifs to introduce significant content of charity in their waqf so that the European judges may not “mis-read” it as lacking in charity.
Ameer Ali (1849-1928) however disagreed with Sir Syed; Shibli (1857-1914) in his 21-pages long essay on Waqf-e-Aulad (1908) argued that even this form of Waqf is charitable, which endorsed Ameer Ali. Shibli’s theologically premised argument was less convincing as the Waqf-e-Aulad does not promise charity for the ordinary, common Muslim. Eventually, bending under the pressure of the Muslim orthodoxy, Sir Syed was not able to propose the draft-bill in the Imperial Legislative Council.
Interesting facts about some Indian Awqaf: A Muslim woman in Bengal even allowed her deed of Waqf to begin with an invocation to the goddess Durga. In Tamil, a mutawalli preferred to be called Dharmakarta –indigenous usage not Persio-Arabic terminology. Najiban, a tawaif of Bareilly also created a Waqf. It was only when the British Indian State ran interference that the Hoogly College[1] was established out of the Waqf created by Mohd Mohsin. The deed of the Mohd Mohsin Waqf did not have such a provision. Since the period of Caliph Umar’s (the awqaf of Khyber and Sawad), the Awqaf were always under “direct” control of the state.
India’s Waqf estates (Charitable endowments) earmarked for modern education, healthcare and similar welfare activities
Mohammad Mohsin (1732-1812) of Hooghly created a Waqf. It was only with the intervention of the East India Company (colonial) state, that the Waqf established a college in 1836 (Chinsura, West Bengal), now affiliated to the Burdwan University. This College produced alumni such as Bankim Chandra Chatterjee, Muzaffar Ahmed, ABM Habibullah, and many more in various fields, including films and sports. Subsequently, with interventions of the Calcutta reformist, Abdul Latif (d. 1893), scholarships and other stipends for students were also instituted, out of the income from the Mohsin Waqf estate.
In Haryana and Kashmir, some educational institutions are also run by Waqf, though, it is unclear, how much of the running costs are contributed by the financial grants of the Waqf Boards via the provincial government’s ministries of minority affairs. This is something that needs to be brought out more clearly.
There are many Waqfs within the Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) which provided land and scholarship to students. The noted Physicist Prof Wali Mohammad (1886-1968) is one such person who created Waqf for AMU. A students’ residential Hall (with many hostels) for engineering students, has been constructed on the Waqf land donated by Professor Wali Mohammad, in the 1990s. The Hall, meant for the Engineering students, got named after Nadim Tarin, for the reasons one fails to understand. Thus, the donor (Waqif) of the land, despite being a noted Physicist, has been sadly anonymized, almost completely erased from the history of AMU and its donors. This action was not performed by any anti-Muslim political party. There are many more Waqf lands within AMU which await a transparent acknowledgement and display (of inherited ownership) on the AMU website to ensure comprehensive wider public knowledge and also, accountability. The AMU has also been losing its lands frequently and intermittently, in one or other ways.
“Muslim waqfs and endowments are an old institution but like most other assets, have been generally mismanaged… generations past have been dissatisfied with the way Muslim Waqifs and Mutawallis,… and the governments, have handled waqf properties. Islamic governments have done no better, and in India” too the British imperialist and secular republican governments have fared no better, wrote, the economist and former Vice Chancellor of AMU, A M Khusro, in his Foreword to Khalid Rashid’s book (1978).
Contentious legislative histories of the Waqf in India
After the failed attempt of Sir Syed in 1879, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, astute politician that he was, jumped into the Waqf fray, ostensibly to protect the interests of the Muslim landed elites who needed the Waqf Validation Act of 1913. This Act, supported by the colonial state, aimed to safeguard the landed assets of these elites, who were seen as potential allies against a growing anti-colonial movement. The Swadeshi Movement, which opposed the religious-communal partition of Bengal, had forced the colonial state to annul the (Bengal) partition in 1911-192, necessitating a political arrangement to secure Muslim support. So much so that, unlike the Sir Syed’s draft (1879), Jinnah (1913) also succeeded in getting a clause added that stated that the registration of a Waqfnamah was not mandatory.
Subsequently, Jinnah enlisted more consolidated support of Muslims through the Shariat Act of 1937 which was based on the Aurangzeb era codification of Shariat, Fatawa-e-Alamgiri of the late 17th century. Through the Shariat Act 1937-1939, he secured hugely consolidated political support of the separatist Muslim elites and soon after, he succeeded in winning Pakistan for them. Pakistan reformed Muslim Personal Laws in March 1961. Many other Muslim countries have introduced reforms but India’s Muslims continue to resist state interference not only in the issue of the un-Quranic Instant Triple Talaq but also in the AMU’s malignant governance and gross abuse of autonomy[2]
It is also not be out of place to mention here that presently India has 32 Waqf Boards, with only Bihar and UP having separate Waqf Boards for Shias and Sunnis. The Dawoodi Bohra community, historically, has shown a preference for managing their religious properties through trusts rather than under the purview of Waqf Boards. This preference stems from their unique religious governance structure, which centralises authority in the al-Dai-al-Mutlaq.
Moral weakness of building resistance and solidarity
While the “liberal” (or, less illiberal) era of the Indian republic has often been obliging of the Muslim regressive tendencies, the current majoritarian era pursues its own divisive political agenda. For instance, it has criminalised the Instant Triple Talaq (ITT) in 2019 but did not strengthen the provisions of maintenance to the divorced women. Whereas, the Supreme Court’s verdict (in the Danial Latifi case 2001) had already clarified that the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (MWPRD) does provide for maintenance, surely the 2019 Act should have further strengthened the provision? Especially since, maintenance for the divorced women is the most crucial aspect of this issue in the sphere of both equity and rights?
Such has been the political history of India’s Muslims in the 20th century (colonial and republican eras) and their stubbornness against state intervention to any reform that they have foregone the moral strength needed to resist the Waqf Amendment Act 2025. Worse, this kind and character of Muslim politics, particularly since the 1980s, has been identified by many scholars as a contributing factor to the rise of majoritarianism in India today. Concealing the pathetic aspect of widespread mismanagement of Waqf assets for decades, will now further deplete the moral strength required to build understanding and solidarity required to resist an unwanted law.
Pertinently, the need for a satisfactory political arrangement to safeguard any monopoly on landed assets is equally applicable for Hindu Mahanths and their Mutths. The current dispensation is not concerned about these Hindu institutions which also suffer from similar ills of non-transparent mal-functioning. Unfortunately, it is also true that the institution of Mahanths and Maths remains under-explored academically by historians of Peasant and Agrarian Relations. [Prakash Jha’s film Mrityudand (1997) attempts to depict some of the degenerative aspects of the institution of Mahanth, but this was a melodramatic depiction on celluloid].
The BJP-dominated regime has no intention of introducing a similar law to reform this Hindu institution of Mahanths’ Muths. This is therefore an additional reason why Muslim communities and justice-loving people look upon the Waqf Amendment Act 2025 with alarming concern. The legislative control that it seeks to seize gives a clear impression of targeting only Muslims with this discriminatory treatment.
Specifically, there is a real apprehension that the (amended) Act –presently under challenge—will turn into a tool to harass Muslims by the sinister and wide network of local majoritarian forces and outfits in those smaller villages and mohallas where the written deeds of Waqf and mosques are not available, as is the case with the abovementioned instance from my own ancestral village. Another alarming aspect of the Act is the Places of Worship Act, 1991 falling under the Ancient Monuments Preservation Act, 1904. According to Kapil Sibal[3] , this specific aspect was also concealed from the Members of Parliament from the Opposition, right until the day it was finally debated in the two Houses of Parliament.
Many scholars also feel that Israel –in West Asia—has also played this politics of usurping available Waqf land and thereby pursuing the politics of dispossessing the Arabs by illegitimate means. Haitam Suleiman and Robert Home in their 2010 essay demonstrate that most Waqf property within Israel has been expropriated by the Israeli state under Absentee Property Laws, a sensitive and complicated issue within the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This instance justifiably alarms India’s Muslims further, about the BJP’s intent.
Briefly, to sum up. India’s Waqf urgently need reforms in terms of actualising the maximum potential of revenue, proceeds, and its use for charitable purposes, that is, towards capacity-building for the weaker sections of the citizenry. Khalid Rashid (1978) estimated that Waqf assets actualise only a mere 3.5% of its actual promise in terms of use for charitable purposes. Waqf land need to be protected from encroachers. Waqf-loot happens with the connivance of both the state and the Muslim elite controlling the Waqf Boards.
The Act legislated in 2025 doesn’t promise any such reformatory intent not does it reflect any sincerity towards breaking this nexus (between the state and the Waqf-looting elites). Protecting the Waqf and realizing its basic objective of charity and welfare remains as elusive as ever. A more thorough and sincere implementation of the Waqf (Amendment) Act 2013 –with some amendments– would have been a more constructive step rather than legislating a new law.
Finally, it must also be notes that a large proportion of Waqf property comprises graveyards (Qabristan) which do not yield any income. A paltry section (mostly orally endowed and unregistered) Waqf assets are owned by village/Mohalla mosques (which are maintained through meagre resources or no income). These “assets” add to the quantum of property of Waqfs, but do not yield returns. This is the point that the Sachar Report (2006), which highlighted the poverty of India’s Muslim minority, failed to note. However, the Sachar Report did reveal that, “There are more than 4.9 lakh registered Wakfs [Waqf estates and assets] spread across the country but the current annual income from these properties is only about Rs.163 crores, which amounts to a meagre rate of return of 2.7 percent…. The current… market value (income to be generated out) of [these] Wakf properties can be put at Rs.1.2 lakh crore.
The present, BJP-dominated NDA-III regime, therefore, should have considered emulating Turkey whose laws of 1868 and 1924 make the Waqf institutions more robust in terms of education, healthcare, municipal and civic amenities and even in disaster relief. Politically, such an emulation may have helped the BJP outsmarting the Opposition, without creating the attendant social friction.
The author is a professor, Modern and Contemporary Indian History, Aligarh Muslim University, and author of Muslim Politics in Bihar: Changing Contours.
(This article is an expanded version of Outlook’s May 1, 2025 issue ‘Username Waqf’ where it appeared under the title, ‘A Fractured Timeline’; this is an expanded version being published at the specific request of the author, a regular columnist with Sabrangindia)
[1] Two decades later than their first venture, the British rulers made another effort to engage Muslims in their pattern of education by taking control of the Imambada Madrasa at Hooghly run under the endowment made by Haji Mohammed Mohsin in 1806. Now it is functioning as the oldest law college in the country, named as Hooghly Mohsin College in 1937.
[2] https://www.academia.edu/127645531/UGC_Draft_Regulations_2025_Question_of_Univ_Autonomy_and_AMUs_Abuse_of_Autonomy).
[3] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VYQEyPP-A2M; Kapil Sibal Calls Waqf Bill Unconstitutional, Alleges Political Agenda