IA REHMAN
Director, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan & core member, Pak–India People’s Forum for Peace and Democracy
The factors contributing to General Musharraf’s Jan. 12 declarations need to be understood. Pakistani civil society has been for long pointing out that militant groups operating under the
garb of religion were functioning like a state within a state and, therefore, it was imperative to disband them. The army top brass realised this but could not proceed against these militias for two reasons.
First, it was believed that the militants were too powerful to be disciplined, partly because of their own accumulated power and partly because of their sympathisers within the armed forces. Secondly, since the militants were being used by a defence agency in Afghanistan and elsewhere, action against them was considered contrary to the strategy the regime had inherited from Zia–ul–Haq and which it had accepted without questioning.
The US operations against Taliban brought home to General Musharraf the futility of and dangers in employing the militants anywhere. Action against them became necessary not only in the interest of Pakistan’s integrity but also for guaranteeing the survival of the Musharraf regime itself.
A more significant factor was the Pakistani people’s rejection of the Taliban and their supporters in the country. Except for small groups of people in Peshawar and Quetta who were directly associated with the Taliban, there were no demonstrations in the latter’s support elsewhere in the country.
The message from Pakistani civil society was clear — it considered the militants a grave threat to the political, social and economic interests of the population. This gave General Musharraf the confidence, as he subsequently admitted, to deal and deal directly with the militants.
Hence the Jan. 12 address. The general has followed it up with measures to placate the non-Muslim population, women activists and a section of liberal opinion through electoral reform proposals. This has far–reaching implications as it means reducing the clerics’ role in domestic politics.
Since these measures are necessary in the interest of the survival of his regime, General Musharraf’s change of course is credible to a considerable extent. But the sincerity and adequacy of these measures over a long period remains to be tested.
Urban–educated professionals, businesspersons and women’s organisations are sections from civil society who have vocally welcomed the steps against the fanatical forces. The rural masses have no way of articulating their views.
What is significant is that the religious parties have not been able to throw a public challenge to the steps that Musharraf has announced and even taken. Two of their prominent leaders — Qazi Husain Ahmad, head of Jamaat–e–Islami, and Maulana Fazlur Rahman, head of Jamiat Ulema–e–Islam, have been detained. But their parties have failed to organise any significant demand for their release.
Eventually, the success of the regime’s new look strategy will depend on the revival of the economy, increase in employment and the administration’s ability to gain public trust in its efficiency and integrity and degree of its respect for the under–privileged.
Archived from Communalism Combat, January-February 2002 Year 8 No. 75-76, Cover Story 5