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The return of Pandits to the Valley has been a sordid saga of ill-conceived plans and mischief informed by a trust deficit
Last week, January 25, when the announcement of the Padma Bhushan award to the former Jammu and Kashmir governor Jagmohan was made, there were notes of both jubilation and criticism from the two major communities of Kashmir. Both these communities view his role in the flight of the Kashmiri Pandits(KPs) after militancy erupted in the Valley and the massacres of Kashmiri Muslims, in striking contrast.
The narratives are so far apart that, to date even the figures of the Pandits killed in Valley during the years of militancy and those who were displaced remain strongly contested. Official figures suggest 219 Pandits were killed and about 50,000 Kashmiris are registered as displaced families.[1] These also include some Kashmiri Muslims and non-Kashmiri speaking Hindus. However, Hindutva-driven right wing groups among the Kashmiri Pandits talk about thousands being killed and put the size of the displaced community to anything between 5 to 7,00,000. Incidentally, this number is far higher than the total population of Pandits, according to the 1981 census. [2]
A more realistic figure of the number of slain Pandits is offered by the Kashmiri Pandit Sangarsh Samiti (KPSS)—a non-migrant KP organization. The KPSS president Sanjay Tickoo, who claims to have documented all cases of Kashmiri Pandit killings since 1989 maintains that 670 Pandits have been killed in Kashmir in militancy related violence. Tickoo also deflates the theory of “holocaust day” observed by some right wing Pandit groups on January 19 when their flight from the Valley began, maintaining that only 6 Pandits were killed in 1989. “We oppose observing January 19 as ‘Holocaust/ Exodus Day’ as we stayed put in Kashmir and faced tough times along with our Muslim brethren and the day has no meaning for us,” he said in a recent interview to a newspaper. [3]
Two and a half decades after militancy began and Kashmiri Pandits fled en masse due to fear from the Valley, the events viewed from these exclusivist and coloured prisms have failed to reconcile the narratives of Kashmiri Muslims and Hindus. The greater tragedy is that it is the bitter narratives, though by no means in a majority, that have been louder and dominating. This manufactured and dominant minority voice creates barriers and totally fails in any attempt to build bridges between the two communities. Neither does it facilitate any enabling plan for the return and rehabilitation of Kashmiri Pandits who have been displaced. Many of those displaced live a sorry life in camps getting a meagre cash relief of Rs 2500 per head per month.
The return of those displaced Kashmiris, suffering for over two decades in camps or even those living in plush houses cut off from their roots, has been jinxed by many factors – the serious trust deficit between the two communities, the lack of political will and ill-conceived and poorly implemented packages. Added to this, is the vulnerability of the Kashmiris to right wing politics and petty politicking of political forces out to exploit their plight which has further closed the doors on their return.
The displacement of this minuscule population from the Kashmir Valley has hugely impacted on the social and economic fabric of the entire state. The importance of bringing back Pandits to their homes minus the ugly demand of a separate homeland or the impractical option of fully secluded safe zones cannot be underscored. The Pandits have suffered from both an identity crisis and also other factors caused by displacement –and this includes socio-economic exclusion — and thus need to return to their roots. This homecoming is as important for Kashmiri Muslims, who too have suffered a great deal with the total erosion of the Kashmiri plural culture, added to their lived trauma of experiencing an everyday gun culture and a huge rise in the graph of human rights violations.
A small and negligible population of Pandits do continue, even today, to live in the Valley but a majority of Kashmiri Muslims do not even get to interact with them. A new generation of Kashmiris in and outside the Valley, born in the last two decades, is therefore totally oblivious of their existence and in absolute ignorance of a plural culture as a way of life. Such a plurality is vital for any civilization to escape the web of stagnation.
To date, there has been no real political will to bring back displaced Pandits to the Valley, either from the governments at the State or Centre. The last decade or so has seen introduction of a slew of hurriedly thrashed out rehabilitation and return plans, none of which have been effectively implemented on ground.
One reasonable exercise was started by the UPA-II government at the Centre with the creation of Committee for Action Plan for Return and Rehabilitation of Kashmiri Migrants, in which several members from both communities were involved in a consultation process with the government. However, the Committee became the victim of usual official boredom and procrastination among policy makers. No serious effort was put in after the first few rounds of meetings. Corresponding to this move, the government announced 3000 jobs for displaced Kashmiris willing to return as part of the Prime Minister’s package in 2011. The scheme has not been effective because of the poor and shabby arrangements in flats reserved for the beneficiaries of the scheme. The flats are inadequate, in terms of quality and quantity. 723 flats for transit accommodation had been constructed at various locations in the Kashmir valley which were then being utilised for accommodating migrant employees.
The1981 census put the population of Pandits to less than 1.25 lakh (1,23, 828). According to 1941 census, the Kashmiri Pandit population was 76,868 as against the Muslim population of over 17 lakh. (quoted by Kulbhushan Warikhoo in his book Cultural Heritage of Kashmiri Pandits, page 339)
Under the recent plan for Kashmiri migrants, and as part of the Prime Minister’s Rs 80,000 crore package for Jammu and Kashmir, the construction of 6000 additional units for transit accommodation in the Kashmir valley for migrants to whom state government jobs had been provided was also approved. The accommodation for these employees is scattered across the Valley – Vessu Qazigund, Sheikhpora (Budgam), Hawal (Pulwama), Khanpora (Baramulla), Nutnussa (Kupwara) and Mattan, (Anantnag).
As part of this fresh package, 3000 additional jobs have also been approved. However, what is not much talked about is the fact that the 3000 posts created through the earlier package, have yet to be filled in.
These 3000 posts had been created within various government departments in 2011 for providing employment to Kashmiri migrant youth, who were interested in serving in the valley. Out of 2184 selections made by the recruiting agencies, 1446 candidates have so far already joined various departments. Of the remaining 1554 vacancies, 1443 posts had been referred to the Jammu and Kashmir Services Selection Board (JKSSB) and 111 Class-IV posts to the Relief Organization (M) in 2012. JKSSB had since issued a select list of 430 candidates while the Relief Organization issued a select list of 87 candidates against the 111 Class-IV posts referred to them.
The return policy is ineffective due to several reasons. The main one being that there are few takers for the job opportunities being created. The package has come too late in the day. Many youth among displaced Kashmiri Pandits families, including some still living in camps in Jammu, Udhampur and Delhi, have already dispersed to other parts of the country and joined a world outside of Kashmir –be it in education or employment — many of them are well settled and not keen to return. Secondly, the reports of beneficiaries of the employment package reeling under neglect and poor living conditions has further discouraged others to embark on this adventure. Thirdly, a feeling of insecurity exacerbated by suspicions of Muslims continues to exist.
This trust deficit, instead of being bridged, has widened ever since the BJP took over the reins of power in New Delhi and later also entered into an alliance with PDP to rule in Jammu and Kashmir. Last year, the present government under prime minister Narendra Modi, announced cluster colonies and separate safe townships for Kashmiri Pandits. The announcement was met with stiff resistance in the Valley because it invoked fears among the Muslims of the BJP pursuing a saffron agenda.
The fears were enhanced as the announcement came in the backdrop of similar reports in the media, quoting union home ministry sources. No official then made any clarification about such reports that played a huge role in arousing misgiving and suspicions and created perceptions among moderates in both communities that such policy further damages the sanctity of secular and plural traditions of Jammu and Kashmir, the Kashmir Valley in particular. The media reports defined the broad elements of the policy as creating three separate cities within the Valley for Kashmiri Pandits and of further extending its benefits to all refugees by obliterating the difference between the refugees from Pakistan Administered Kashmir, who are state subjects of Jammu and Kashmir, and the West Pakistan refugees, who are historically not residents of the state. If this proposal was ever conceived or existed in the minds of Delhi’s policy makers, it is one laced with not just ambiguity but by blatant mischief.
This brand of mischief finds continuity within the overall narrative within which the official word is missing or wanting. In more recent times, Kashmiri Pandit leaders with right wing leanings (the latest to join the bandwagon is Bollywood actor Anupam Kher)[4] have begun to link the revocation of Article 370 with the return of Kashmiri Pandits. Such voices inspire fears of the BJP trying to fulfill its Hindutva agenda of artificially changing the demography of the only Muslim majority state in the country.
The return of the Pandits is an essential, though not the only component, to conflict resolution in Kashmir. Official plans and packages will always have their limitations. The exodus of the Pandits from the Valley happened within the general feeling of mistrust between communities and ultimately created even more mistrust, fuelled by right wing elements on both sides, including hawks within the government. Therefore, any policy for return and rehabilitation requires a more comprehensive policy of facilitating and laying the ground work for building bridges for which communities need to be involved, not turned antagonistic to each other through confusions, whisper campaigns and unverified media reports.
It would be important to revive the UPA government’s half-hearted attempt to involve communities and all stake holders through the creation of a Committee for Action Plan for Return and Rehabilitation of Kashmiri Migrants. The present union government, if it is sincere about the return of the Pandits to the Valley, could do well to pick up the threads from where this last official attempt was left off, because any plan of return and rehabilitation rooted in a policy of segregation would ultimately breed more malice, animosity, mistrust and othering, especially if it was imposed from above without the involvement of all communities.
It is also important to make a real beginning by preserving the vital link between the two communities who remain in Kashmir — the Pandits who refused to flee in the face of all odds and Kashmiri Muslims. Protecting them and their interests can effectively aid the process of building bridges. Sight cannot be lost of the fact that the valley Pandits are reeling under a deep fear psychosis, far greater than the Muslims of the Valley by virtue of there being a minute, negligible minority. They are also suffering due to acute economic distress stemming from years of neglect. This is where the government needs to step in.
While, the lure of jobs and building flats can be good inducements to bring back the Pandits, their stay can sustain only with a re-doubled, genuine community level effort, for which the government ought to play the role of facilitator, not aggravtor. The active involvement of the communities in any return plan will ensure the necessary opinion building which will in turn create a more conducive, amicable and welcoming atmosphere for not just the Pandits but all other minorities.
In any normal situation, where the trust deficit between communities has been seriously damaged, the onus of restoring confidence apart from the government lies with the majority community. However, the majority community of the Valley battered and shattered by the conflict, is today extremely powerless. The Kashmiri Muslims themselves live amid a stifling atmosphere of excessive militarization and it would not be easy for the Muslims to play the normal role of pro-active engagement, without genuine efforts made by officialdom. Despite and inspite of their plight, however, Kashmiri Muslims ought to rise to the occasion and show the magnanimity of accepting Pandits warmly, irrespective of what their ideologies are. Pandits have been and continue to be a part and parcel of Kashmiri society.
The Pandits willing to return would also need to keep these limitations of local Muslims in mind, rather than being hamstrung with their own victimhood. They have suffered immensely but they are not the only sufferers. The two communities need to come together on an equal footing, start at the minimal level of trust and build on from there, not view each other within the equation of perpetrator and victim, as some hardliner right wing KPs are trying to do. Such ‘othering’ and demonising of an entire community is a dangerous position to begin from. Breaking out of the miasma requires both commitment and vision.
A community level participation is the most vital component of any return plan. Such genuine participation should highlight the need for continuing dialogue(s) at the community level, would require initiatives to move out of conference halls into the homes of people. The good thing is that many people at an individual level have maintained that contact. Besides, many Kashmiri Pandits, Sikhs and non-Kashmiri speaking Hindus have continued to live in Kashmir through the years of conflict. So, all that is required is the significant move of building further, multiplying in a sense the contact between the two major communities. This will then ensure that this dialogue percolates down from one generation to another – with greater focus on the generation that has grown up oblivious to each other’s existence. That is where the key to any return of the Kashmiri Pandit lies.