Operation Parakram and Operation Aman
The Pakistan-sponsored terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001 compelled India to contemplate punitive action. I had, just prior to this, taken over command of a Division of a ‘Strike’ Corps in September 2001. Following the blatant Parliament attack, the Indian Armed Forces were mobilised. It took us close to two weeks for the build-up in the concentration area in Rajasthan due to paucity of railway rolling stock. I was called to the Corps HQ and briefed on various offensive options. They looked very good on paper but I knew that ground realities would compel us to be more realistic. My formation was under-strength, with relief for two infantry battalions and one artillery regiment held up in Kashmir. Another problem was cross-country mobility. Fortunately, we received imported high-mobility vehicles which gave one Brigade the capability to move cross-country along with mechanized forces. There was also talk about raising a small number of camel-mounted troops for special operations. We got a draft of men from an old camel-mounted battalion, and I, an old cameleer, gave them a lesson or two.
(Photograph 55 on page no. 127)
The Chief of Army Staff (COAS), General S. Padmanabhan (Paddy), visited and addressed the formation commanders in Jodhpur sometime in early 2002 and left us in no doubt about the impending reprisal which we all felt was necessary. I had served under General Paddy as his Colonel (General Staff) in Punjab and I had no inhibitions in pointing out the abysmal deficiencies in my formation. These were speedily made up and we got down to serious training. The ambitious options I had been made privy to were rehashed according to the ground realities of the impending conflict.
(Photograph 56 on page no. 128)
While we were deployed, sharpening our sabres, we got news about the communal upheaval in Gujarat. (Photograph 57 on page no. 129) As a reaction to the Godhra carnage on 27 February 2002, a statewide bandh was organised on 28 February 2002 by right wing political organisations. Permission was given to bring the bodies of burnt ‘kar sevaks’ in a procession to Ahmedabad. This naturally inflamed passions. The bandh turned violent with large-scale communal killings, destruction of economic assets, arson and looting, targeting the minority community. The state government requested for deployment of the Army through the Union Home Ministry and the Ministry of Defence on 28 February 2002.
That evening, after I had just come back from an existence of one of my Brigades, I received a telephone call from the COAS. I was a little surprised since the ‘Chief’ would seldom speak directly to a Divisional Commander. Gen Paddy’s directions to me were, “Zoom, get your formation to Gujarat tonight and quell the riots.’ I replied, ‘Sir, the road move will take us two days.’ He shot back, ‘The Air Force will take care of your move from Jodhpur. Get maximum troops to the airfield. Speed and resolute action are the need of the hour.’
I rang up the Crops Commander and told him of the instructions I had received from the COAS. I was told that logistic support would be provided by the lodger formation HQ at Jodhpur. I was also assured that the necessary vehicles, guides, magistrates et cetera to accompany the troop columns as well as city maps would be made available when we landed at Jodhpur.
The Gujarat riots of 2002 were different from earlier riots. There were some striking dissimilarities: There were no attempts to convene Peace Committees. The inter-community chasm had become far too wide to allow this to happen. Earlier, riots were the handiwork of a handful of trouble-makers. This time rioting assumed the dimension of a mass activity, involving the middle class citizens too. The self-deluding belief that riots were the handiwork of the lumpen elements and outsiders no longer rang true. The most disturbing factor was the participation of women provocateurs. Women of the majority community, taking a cue from Jammu and Kashmir and the NE region, participated, for the first time, as instigators. The minority community too used women as ‘shields’ to discourage police incursions into minority pockets.
I gave necessary orders for two Brigades to head for Jodhpur airfield. The Brigade out on exercise had to disengage. I told my Deputy GOC to ensure expeditious movement of troops and headed for Jodhpur airfield. It was a Herculean airlift effort. The first column of troops arrived at Jodhpur airfield in three hours and was quickly transferred to the waiting aircraft. My party, comprising my ADC and communications personnel, boarded the first aircraft. I had taken the precaution of ensuring that my Gypsy vehicle also went along with us. During the two-hour journey by air, I read through the pamphlet on ‘Aid to Civil Authority 1969’. When we were approaching Ahmedabad airfield I observed that the city was aflame. There were fires burning all across the city.
We landed on a dark and deserted airfield. The Deputy GOC of the lodger formation received me. I asked, ‘Where are the vehicles and other logistic support we had been promised.’ He shrugged his shoulders and replied that the state government was making the necessary arrangements. I knew that there was only one way to energise the state government. I asked for a guide to take me to the Chief Minister’s (Mr Narendra Modi) residence at Gandhi Nagar. En route I was horrified to observe rampaging mobs, burning and pillaging with the police as mute spectators.
I reached the Chief Minister’s residence at 2 a.m. on 1 March, and to my great relief, found Raksha Mantri (RM) Mr George Fernandes there. Both were having a late dinner and invited me to join them. I did, but immediately got down to ‘brass tacks’. I had a tourist map of Gujarat and asked for the trouble spots. I also gave a list of immediate requirements to enable the Army columns to fan out to restore law and order.
I returned to the airfield to check out the arrival of the 60-odd flights of IL-76s and AN-32s. By 7 a.m. on 1 March 2002, we had about 3000 troops landed, but no transport, so they remained at the airfield. These were crucial hours lost. Out road columns reached us on 2 March and so did the requisitioned civil trucks, magistrates, police guides and maps.
A school building complex was allotted to us and we established the Control HQ. An Additional Director General of Police, Mr Gurdial Singh, was detailed as the Liaison Officer. This confused the men about the authority in charge. A police officer sporting three stars or a two-star Army General? In a day’s time, they knew who was in charge.
The initial deployment areas (trouble spots), as indicated by the Chief Minister, were Rajkot, Bhavnagar, Ahmedabad, Vadodara, Godhra and Surat. There were several re-deployments, as dictated by the ground situation. Saurashtra and southern Gujarat generally remained peaceful. Major violence rocked Ahmedabad, Vadodara and Panchmahal districts of northern Gujarat.
The situation was highly tense and communally charged. Armed mobs were roaming unrestrained, committing arson and murder. In the urban areas, a curfew had been ordered, but not enforced. When the Army columns reached the towns, unruly mobs were freely burning and rioting. At a number of locations people were trapped in buildings and places of worship, and were being attacked by mobs. The streets were choked with burning vehicles. Localities had been barricaded to prevent incursions by adversary mobs. These impeded the movement of the Army columns.
A question arose – why were most of the casualties members of one community. My explanation was that the soldier does not recognize the community of a person but can identify an arsonist and he deals with the situation as per orders. Large quantities of guns, country-made weapons, crude bombs and incendiary material were recovered and either destroyed or handed over to police. Other major tasks were burials and escorting affected persons of the minority community to safer places of refuge. Approximately 10,000 persons were evacuated from riot-affected areas by the troops. A large number of distress messages were being received to rescue family members of service personnel. These were promptly attended to.
Both communities were indulging in pitched battles, hurling crude improvised bombs, acid bombs and Molotov cocktails at each other. Extensive damage to property and life, primarily of the minority community, had taken place on 28 February 2002. The police, initially armed with ‘lathis’ were passive bystanders since orders for issue of rifles had not then been given. The partisan attitude of the police lay exposed when I observed that when minority-populated localities were surrounded by mobs, the police did not fire at the rioters laying siege, but into windows of surrounded homes of minorities, instead ostensibly to ‘keep the two rioting communities apart’, as sheepishly explained to me. I did not hesitate to show disapproval at this contemptible and partisan attitude.
Godhra town was extremely tense and the entire city was under curfew. Violence had spread to the neighbouring small towns of Panchmahal district. Property of the minority community and individuals were being systematically targeted and large-scale migration was taking place. The major trouble spots were minority ghettos. Successive communal riots had forced the minority community into walled communes. The mixed localities had progressively shrunk, and exclusive ethnic ghettos, with a ‘siege’ mentality, had sprouted.
The roads separating these localities were termed as ‘border’ by both communities, and were the ‘fault lines’ along which there was always major violence. The migration of the middle class to ghettos was fraught with danger. Those who had lost everything were’ripe for plucking’ by anti-national elements. An unbridgeable communal divide had been created. Pockets of majority-dominated areas had been strengthened by building barricades, gates, high-rise walls etc. these were portents of future trouble.
In the rural areas, the situation was highly tense and communally charged. These areas were earlier free of communal violence but now were afflicted. Road blocks had been established on rural roads and systematic looting and burning of vehicles of the minority community was in progress. Marauding Adivasi gangs from Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh created mayhem along the areas bordering these two states. The official figures of deaths and damage do not reflect a true picture of the actual extent of the carnage-especially in the rural areas. Armed mobs were indulging in arson and murder. The police were conspicuously absent.
The troops recovered bodies from wells and gave them decent burials. At one stage, I seriously considered recommending imposition of Martial Law. I was dissuaded from taking this extreme step as it might have been construed as over-stepping my mandate.
The following reference to ‘Martial Law’ is made in the Manual of Military Law, Volume I (Chapter VII, paras 15-19) and GS Pamphlet, Aid to Civil Authority (Section 9):
“Conditions of extreme disorder may sometimes arise when the civil authorities, even with the help of the armed forces, are unable to bring the situation under control. In such cases, Martial Law may be imposed in the disturbed area by a military commander. Martial Law may also be imposed by a military commander when there is a complete breakdown of civil administration e.g., during an insurrection against the Government. Martial Law is, thus, the exercise of the right of private defence by repelling force by force.”
There is no reference to Martial Law in the Manual of Military Law (Volumes II & III) CrPC, IPC or any other Act. This created confusion in my mind about its applicability, sustainability and legality. Martial Law needs to be legislated. If not acceptable, references to it must be deleted from ‘Manual of Military Law (Volume I)’ and GS Pamphlet ‘Aid to Civil Authority, 1969’.
I visited Godhra along with the RM the next day and we were shown the burnt carriages. I advised the Railways to remove them immediately but the coaches remained in situ for many months-grim reminders and symbols of human hatred-triggering revulsion and heightening passions among those who saw them.
The RM, during the visit, asked me, in confidence, what steps should be immediately taken. I recommended an immediate overhaul of the police hierarchy and a police Director General (DG) from outside the Gujarat cadre. He agreed with me, saying, ‘You have taken the words out of my mouth.’ We waited but there was no change.
Mr K.P.S Gill was inducted as Security Adviser to the Chief Minister of Gujarat on 4 May 2002. As always, he hogged the headlines after the task had already been done by the Army. There was a feeble attempt to revamp the police and arrest ‘charge-sheeters’ and perpetrators of violence because of the clear signals emanating from the Central Government to the state that restoration of normalcy was essential.
The Corps Commander, Lt. Gen Hari Prasad, under whom I had now been placed was most supportive and visited the troops many times. (Photograph 58 on page no. 129) The Army Commander Lt Gen G.S. Sihota whom I admired and trusted also visited many times to take stock of the situation. (Photograph 59 on page no. 130)
Attempts to get community leaders to come forward and spread the message of amity yielded disappointing results. (Photograph 60 on page no. 130) Our troops performed magnificently and fairly. One night, I got a report that a Commanding Officer of one of the units in Ahmedabad was making late night visits to the home of a divorced Ghanchi Muslim woman. I asked him to explain his conduct and when I got no satisfactory explanation I recommended that he be replaced immediately. He was moved out post-haste. I did not know that this would be used as a weapon against me with the insinuation that I myself was involved with that woman and that I resented another officer taking interest in her.
There are several reasons for the uncontrolled violence. The initial reaction of the civil administration was tardy. No civil officials could be contacted on the night of 28 February-1 March 2002. The Chief Secretary was abroad and the officiating incumbent was a non-performer. The initial reception, briefing and provisioning of suitable transport and maps were inadequate and delayed. It required the intervention of the RM to nudge the civil administration into action.
Officials never said ‘no’ but seldom lived up to commitments. The civil administration appeared to lack resolve to stem the violence. They were reluctant to impose / enforce curfew because it was politically unpopular. Curfew was selective, indicating partiality. The media widely highlighted the involvement of the political hierarchy in the riots. I had mentioned in my ‘Prologue’ that I will not reopen old wounds. I will be prudent and play the role of a despicable ‘Sarkari Mussalman.’
I found the Para Military Forces (PMF) and Central Police Organisations (CPO) very ineffective. A total of 44 companies of PMF and CPO were available in Gujarat at that time. These forces, which should have acted as the middle rung of the ladder between the state police and the Armed Forces, should have been able to deal with the serious law and order situation. However, the manner of their deployment, absence of communal and control structure, and lack of professional commitment resulted in their gross under-utilisation.
A total of 18 companies of BSF were employed, distributed in penny packets and under command of various police officials. Due to Op Parakram commitments, these were pooled training companies from various BSF battalions, without any command and control structure. The BSF hierarchy was content with an arrangement where their senior ranks were not saddled with responsibility and accountability. The BSF was reduced to performing normal police functions and imbibed the worst of police culture.
What 110 companies of the Para Military Forces and police could not do was done in 48 hours by six Army Battalions (24 companies). Sometimes I wonder why? The men and officers are the same with similar backgrounds. I am convinced that the police forces have become progressively communalized and un-representational. In case they had more members of the minority community it would shame them into taking a more fair and unbiased posture. What about the Army? Minority representation is even lower but there has never been a case of bias and the Army columns have always instilled confidence in all communities whenever committed on internal security duties.
To compound the problems for the Army, BSF personnel also wore combat dress. This led to serious image misrepresentation and eroded the ‘shock effect’ of the Army. This is something the Central Government needs to take a serious note of. Every security organization has adopted disruptive pattern uniforms. The deterrent effect of the Army uniform has been nullified with the Army columns now having to carry placards declaring ‘ARMY’ – disgraceful and demeaning for the men in olive green uniform.
A total of 63 companies of State Reserve Police were also available in Gujarat. The police attitude and, in most cases, their absence during crucial periods were inextricably linked to the community to which they belonged. The police, as has always happened to communal riots all over the country, was blatantly partisan and abdicated its responsibility of dealing with majority community mobs to the Army. It was observed that, on several occasions, the police melted away when faced with majority community rioters, ostensibly on the excuse that they were called away to deal with another situation elsewhere.
The higher police hierarchy was totally politicized and virtually divided along political lines. A large number of assertive officers were occupying non-consequential appointments. A further blow to police morale was inflicted by the reported reshuffle and large scale transfers of police officers who had dealt firmly with rioters. There had been an erosion of authority of senior officers with undue importance being given to Station House Officers (Junior Commissioned Officer equivalent). These junior police officers had become a law unto themselves taking directions from ‘up’ instead of their chain of command.
Small police outposts had no logistic backup and were dependent for meals on neighbouring majority pockets, which contributed to undermining neutrality. Over a period of time, the police hierarchy had become bloated and top heavy. There was a surfeit of Deputy Inspector Generals of Police (DIGs), Inspector Generals (IG), Additional DGs and DGs and very few middle-rung officers like Superintendents of Police (SP), Deputy Superintendents of Police (DSP), Assistant SPs to enforce security measures. This also skewed the working equations, to the detriment of the Army.
Police stations were manned by IG-level officers and young army majors and Captains were in a quandary dealing with them. The worst blot on the police was targeting minority members of the force itself. Newspaper reports indicated that houses of the few minority community members residing in the police lines were burnt.
The Home Guards, being part of the population of the area and even more politicized than the police, were totally ineffective. They were passive observers and, in many instances, the very instigators of violence. It was reported that most of the 25 Home Guard Commandants were primary members of right wing organisations. The services of 2,000 Home Guards were de-requisitioned by the state government on 9 April 2002. They were more of a nuisance.
Restoration of the Rule of Law was the mandate given to the Army. The guideline before committing Army troops is to compel the civil administration to first employ all police resources at their disposal. The partisan attitude of the police, however, compelled the Army to be employed and sometimes take proactive measures. The civil magistrates accompanying the troops were most supportive of these actions taken to prevent wanton bloodshed.
What 110 companies of the Para Military Forces and police could not do was done in 48 hours by six Army Battalions (24 companies). Sometimes I wonder why? The men and officers are the same with similar backgrounds. I am convinced that the police forces have become progressively communalized and un-representational. In case they had more members of the minority community it would shame them into taking a more fair and unbiased posture. What about the Army? Minority representation is even lower but there has never been a case of bias and the Army columns have always instilled confidence in all communities whenever committed on internal security duties.
I think it is the junior leadership. Young Army officers are conspicuous by their presence at the hotspot. I regret to say that middle-rank officers of the police, namely the SPs, DSPs, ASPs – already very few in number because of the top heavy organisations they have become – are conspicuous by their absence and are seen only when their political bosses are around. There is an urgent need to take police postings, at least of the Indian Police Service (IPS), out of the hands of local politicians. It is also important to keep the Army out of law enforcement duties. It is a strange quirk of reality that a District Magistrate can requisition the Army and not the Para Military Forces.
The situation was quickly brought under control by firm and impartial action, with resolute use of minimum force. We had issued orders that arsonists caught in the act were to be shot. There were 19 instances where the Army columns were compelled to fire, killing two and wounding 24 rioters. Orders to shoot below the hip were enforced. A further number of casualties due to Army firing were carried away by the mobs and could not be accounted for.
A question arose – why were most of the casualties members of one community. My explanation was that the soldier does not recognize the community of a person but can identify an arsonist and he deals with the situation as per orders. Large quantities of guns, country-made weapons, crude bombs and incendiary material were recovered and either destroyed or handed over to police. Other major tasks were burials and escorting affected persons of the minority community to safer places of refuge. Approximately 10,000 persons were evacuated from riot-affected areas by the troops. A large number of distress messages were being received to rescue family members of service personnel. These were promptly attended to.
The Gujarat riots of 2002 were different from earlier riots. There were some striking dissimilarities: There were no attempts to convene Peace Committees. The inter-community chasm had become far too wide to allow this to happen. Earlier, riots were the handiwork of a handful of trouble-makers. This time rioting assumed the dimension of a mass activity, involving the middle class citizens too. The self-deluding belief that riots were the handiwork of the lumpen elements and outsiders no longer rang true. The most disturbing factor was the participation of women provocateurs. Women of the majority community, taking a cue from Jammu and Kashmir and the NE region, participated, for the first time, as instigators. The minority community too used women as ‘shields’ to discourage police incursions into minority pockets.
There is an urgent necessity for a review of Legal Provisions and Methodology of Conduct of Operations to deal with large-scale riots. The earlier concept of ‘Aid to Civil authority’ envisaged dealing with ‘crowds’ and mobs’. The security environment has since deteriorated. The intensity of the carnage in Gujarat and the Army’s experience during Op Aman, in dealing with ‘intimidatory gangs’ operating with widespread public support and a passive and inactive police, necessitate a review of the legal provisions to give more powers to the Army when on internal security duties. Existing legal provisions are inadequate for the Army to eliminate violence, especially when there is apathy. The state governments should be compelled to first requisition Para Military Forces with their command and control structure. They should not be placed under control of the police. The use of the Army should be the weapon of the last resort.
It took two months of firm and even handed measures by the Army for passions to be brought under control and peace and sanity restored. My Division was de-inducted in two phases. The Divisional HQ and one Brigade moved back to Operation Parakram location by a rail and road move between 20 and 24 April 2002. The second Brigade de-inducted between 20 and 24 May leaving behind a surcharged situation but marked absence of violence. In the wake of the Army withdrawal, additional companies of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) were inducted into the state, especially in Ahmedabad. Cosmetic changes were also made to the police set-up.
There were important lessons learnt from Op Aman. There is a need to strengthen the hands of the Army to enable it to act decisively, firmly and with dispatch against perpetrators of violence. This alone will negate criticism that disorder continues despite prolonged deployment of the Army. It will also discourage ‘ad lib’ requisition by the state government and facilitate rapid de-requisition. The existing legal provisions cater only for routine law and order problems that are dispersal of unlawful assembly. These are inadequate to deal with widespread ethnic conflict and need to be revised. Prolonged deployment diminishes the deterrent value of troops and in detrimental to their morale. Prolonged deployment also makes troops susceptible to extraneous, undesirable influences. If prolonged deployment becomes necessary, units must be ‘switched’ periodically.
On our de-induction from Gujarat in April/May 2002, we found that the war clouds had dissipated. We got back to training which had been neglected. We also needed some rest and recuperation and laid special stress on games and afforestation of the environment. We planted thousands of trees, but on my return several years later I found that the locals had not looked after the valuable assets we had left behind. The stone ‘sanghars’ we had made to protect the trees had been used for construction of houses and stray cattle had eaten up all the trees we had planted. I also spent a lot of time visiting the villages of my regimental retired personnel. What a great experience it always was for all of us. (Photographs 61 and 62 on page nos. 131, 132)
Since I had more leisure time on my hands, I compiled a piece titled ‘Prelude to the Charge- Ruminations of a Bison’. This was to relieve tensions and bottled up steam which had reached boiling point.
(See page no. 132)
Postscript: After my retirement I was informed by a person of unimpeachable integrity and honesty and in the know of things that my command of troops during Op Aman had raised eyebrows. Questions were asked as to how a person bearing a Muslim name had been given the responsibility to quell communal riots. The reply given was that ‘The Army doesn’t look at names. It entrusts responsibility to the Commander of the formation committed.’ That apparently closed the issue. My formation did their job and because of them I was awarded a Sena Medal for restoring peace and sanity in Gujarat.
(Chapter 7 of the The Sarkari Mussalman, The Life and Travails of a Soldier Educationist
The Memoirs of Lt Gen Zameer Uddin Shah PVSM, SM, VSM (Retd)) reproduced here with the permission of the author)