The Conspiracy of the Sangh Combine: Citizens Tribunal on Ayodhya

 
Image Courtesy: Pablo Bartholomew

Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy, Justice D. A. Desai, Justice D. S. Tewatia (Panel)

Premeditated attempts to gather kar sevaks, well armed and well trained to destroy the 450 year old Babri Mosque was a calculated strategy of the BJP-RSS-VHP combine

Role of Sangh Combine
(Chapter Five)
 
Clearly Stated Intentions
 
The Sangh combine had clearly decided to demolish the mosque. Repeated statements to this effect were made. The White Paper of the Union Government itself summarises some of these explicit statements. On November 9, 1992, VHP President Vishnu Hari Dalmia declared, in Delhi, that the Ramjanambhoomi temple would be constructed in the same way it was demolished by Babar. "Kar sevaks", he, said "were pressurising the leadership that they should be called not to construct the Ramjanambhoomi temple but to demolish the masjid". The BJP President, Murli Manohar Joshi, speaking at Mathura on 1 December 1992, "appealed to the gathering to assemble at Ayodhya in large numbers for kar seva and to demolish the so called Babri Masjid". The BJP Vice President, Vijaya Raje Scindia said at Patna onNovember 23, 1992, that "the Babri Masjid will have to be demolished". On  December 1, 1992, stated at Kanpur that, L.K. Advani kar seva did not mean bhajans and kirtans, and said: "kar seva would be performed with bricks and shovels on the 2.77 acres of acquired land".
 
The U.P. Chief Minister Kalyan Singh repeatedly called for the handing over of the disputed site to the Hindus for the construction of the Ram Temple. On November 19, 1992, he reiterated this demand, and advocated the removal of the mosque. He offered to provide land free of cost for the construction of a mosque 10-15 kilometers away from the present site. On the same day, Vinay Katiyar, leader of the Bajrang Dal warned: "If the Prime Minister wants to convert a temple into a mosque we cannot guarantee its protection".
 
The Sangh combine leaders repeatedly criticised the role of the judiciary, and rejected its jurisdiction in the Ayodhya dispute. M.M. Joshi in meetings at Bulandshahar, Hathras and Meerut, on December 2, 1992, criticised the Supreme Court for appointing an observer, and stated (at Hathras) The nature of kar seva would be decided by the Sants and not by a Court of Law…" Similarly, Ashok Singhal, General Secretary of the VHP, speaking in Ayodhya on December 3, 1992, asserted that "whether it was legal or illegal, VHP would follow the decisions of the S ants. The Supreme Court may take any action it likes on the report of the observer". (Appendix-XIII, pp.90-92 of the Report).
 
It is significant to note that none of the senior-most functionaries such as the President or General Secretary of the organisations cared to provide any undertaking to the Courts, nor were they called upon to do so directly.
 
Misleading the Courts
 
Significantly, the assurances given by the `sangh parivar' leaders to the courts were quite different. Swami Chinmayanand, a senior VHP and BJP leader, on November 27, 1992, stated in a statement placed before the Supreme Court by the UP government, that the kar seva would be performed on December 6, without violating the Court order. In a letter to the UP Chief Minister, placed before the apex court, Vijaye Raje Scindia, also a trustee of the VHP, concurred with this statement. Yet, within days both resiled from their earlier positions. Participating in a discussion in the Lok Sabha on 3 December 1992, Swami Chinmayanand, after averring that "We will never defy the courts", added, "I am not ready to take any responsibility for what may happen in Ayodhya". Vijaye Raje Scindia, speaking at the disputed site on December 2, 1992, disclosed that the U.P. CM was ready to face the dismissal of the U.P. Government for the cause of construction of the Ramjanambhoomi temple, and appealed to kar sevaks to be prepared for the supreme sacrifice to this cause. (ibid., p.92)
 
It appears therefore that the Sangh combine's strategy in filing false affidavits in the Supreme Court was to buy time. This was explicitly announced at the meeting held at the Ram Katha Kunj on the afternoon of December 5. VHPBJP leaders stated that the UP government had filed appeals in the courts as a "Chanakya tactic" so that their plans did not fail. This strategy was subsequently revealed in an article in the Organiser (December 13, 992), and by Govindacharya, BJP General Secretary in Frontline (January 15, 1993).
 
The ‘Sangh Parivar' obviously wanted to retain its government in UP so that it could continue its mobilisation for kar seva, while avoiding both central as well as judicial intervention. Simultaneously, its leaders had to make belligerent noises in order to retain their political legitimacy with the potential kar sevaks. Thus, they deliberately spoke in two voices. Therefore, their apparently ambiguous posture and misleading statements in public and before the Supreme Court were premeditated and politically motivated. The evidence clearly suggests that the demolition on December 6, 1992 was part of a carefully laid plan. (See below and Chapters 2, 3 and 6).
 
Cadre-based kar sevaks
 
The kar sevaks who gathered in Ayodhya from November end to 6th December were, according to all reports, almost exclusively from the RSS, VHP, Bajrang Dal, Durga Vahini and the Shiv Sena. Some of them had reportedly been trained in a VHP-sponsored training camp in Sarkhej village near Ahmedabad, under the overall supervision of Brig. Udaysingh Bhati (Retd.), in early October 1991. This was later confirmed by Rajesh Pilot, Minister of State for Home Affairs in Parliament. Specific information was not provided but there are indications that more such training centres were in operation for selected cadres mobilised for the kar seva by the `Sangh Parivar'.
 
The Sangh combine was prepared for intervention by the Centre. On November 19, 1992 Katiyar had declared that their deployment was based on the assumption that the Centre would dismiss the UP government before the resumption of kar seva on December 6, 1992. In anticipation of a police crackdown, the Bajrang pal had decided to fill all villages within a 20 kilometer radius of the disputed site with kar sevaks. On  November 24, the kar sevaks from outside the State started gathering in Ayodhya. At a meeting organized by the VHP on the same day at which where Ramchandra Paramhans, Mahant Avaidyanath and Katiyar were present, it was announced that the last battle for building the Ram temple would be on December 6, and that the kar seva could not be stopped this time. It was disclosed that the names of the leaders of the kar seva would be announced on December 5.

M.M. Joshi in meetings at Bulandshahar, Hathras and Meerut, on December 2, 1992, criticised the Supreme Court for appointing an observer, and stated (at Hathras) The the nature of kar seva would be decided by the Sants and not by a Court of Law…

 
The VHP conducted a house-to-house campaign in Ayodhya and Faizabad for the Ram temple, reiterating that the kar seva this time would not be stopped under any circumstances. According to local police reports, secret Sangh combine meetings were being held. On  November 26, the police reported that 2,000 to 5,000 trained kar sevaks were expected to participate in the 'main' kar seva, and the leaders were Ashok Singhal, S.C. Dixit, Paramhans, Katiyar and Mahant Gopaldas. It would seem, thus, that the large crowd as a whole may not have been privy to the detailed planning of the demolition, but there were groups who had been specifically assigned this task. That could explain why the task was accomplished with such precision and within a very limited time.
 
The same day, plans for a lalkar saptah' starting from November 29, were announced by the VHPBajrang Dal, which was to include 'prabhat pheris', demonstrations, street corner meetings, ringing of bells and blowing of conches at 9.00 p.m.
 
Particular cadres of kar sevaks, organised region-wise, stayed in separate camps in Ayodhya and Faizabad. They had regular drills, generally RSS-style. Their processions were organised, and often led by men in khaki shorts with whistles. Prior to the demolition, these cadres had been making their intentions clear by destroying graves and mazaars in Ayodhya since December 1, 1992. Virulent anti-Muslim slogans were raised during processions. Muslims were threatened, and Muslim houses were marked out. Kar sevaks from Andhra Pradesh staying in the Lodhi Chatri Mandir in Ayodhya started collecting tools from December 1, and openly declared that they would make bonfires of the Supreme Court judgements. ("Hum Supreme Court ke adesh ko bathi bana ke ghose denge".) Mohd. Hashim Ansari's house (he was the major litigant in cases for repossession of the Babri Masjid) in Ayodhya was attacked and damaged on December 2, despite a police guard. Because of the belligerent mood of the kar sevaks and the Sangh combine leadership, by December 3, there was widespread speculation in Ayodhya and Faizabad about the demolition of the Masjid. IPF leaders in a meeting in Ayodhya on November 20, 1992 had already warned about a preplanned demolition of the masjid. The local police also obtained this information and categorically warned the local authorities on December 1 that the kar sevaks were determined to start construction of the temple on December 6. In view of the attacks on Muslims the police warned that serious problems might occur and recommended special security measures. On  December 2, their information was more explicit. They expected 30,000 to 35,000 Shiv Sainiks to arrive and join other kar sevaks in destroying the Masjid on 6 December. Kar sevaks were also reported as obtaining details of all mazars and Muslim graves with a view to destroy them before December 6. They were also planning to destroy all mosques and Muslim homes. This information was obviously obtained from informants privy to meetings of the sangh combine and Shiv Sena where all this was planned.
 
In the attacks on Muslim graves, mazaars, mosques, houses and residents, the kar sevaks showed consistent organisation based on accurate information. Muslim houses even in mixed mohallas in interior areas away from the road were identified, attacked, looted and burnt on  and December 6 and 7.
 
Despite orders to the contrary, meant evidently for public consumption, many kar sevaks were armed with spears, knives, daggers, lathis, trishuls, and even countrymade firearms, some of which were procured after their arrival in Ayodhya. A large number also had tools, especially pickaxes, hammers, shovels, crowbars, iron rods, ropes, etc. Many of the tools were apparently stored near the gathering in Karsevapuram. In order, apparently to keep these arrangements as also other operational details secret, journalists were debarred from Karsevapuram from December 1. They were also barred from entering several camps where kar sevaks were staying, probably for similar reasons. The stored tools were later collected on December 5 and 6, and used for the demolition of the Babri Masjid.
 
These kar sevaks persisted in openly declaring that they had come to demolish the masjid and build the temple. On December 6 morning, groups of them shouted slogans against the proposed symbolic kar seva, "Hum mittee nahin khiskayenge, hum mandir wahin banayenge". (We won't remove the dirt, but will build the temple at the same site).
 
Three new elements in the situation made the danger apparent:
 
(1)        Mazars had been systematically attacked for the first time.
 
(2)        Neighbours had warned Muslim families that they would not be protected. As a consequence, most women and children were sent away from Ayodhya by December 4, since no protection seemed forthcoming.
 
(3)        Kar sevaks were often quartered in sensitive areas, close to Muslim inhabited localities, more so in Faizabad, where Muslims are in sizeable numbers.
 
The kar sevaks were divided into various groups and assigned different tasks. While some only participated in the daily processions, others destroyed minority properties, or permitted looting by locals, or blocked the roads and entry points to the disputed site, while a core group nerformed the critical operations for the actual demolition. There were adequate steps taken to prevent the leakage of the plans and information about the demolition, materials collected and the attacks on the Muslims. Despite this, the local police had, as we have seen, sufficient advance information.
 
Rehearsal for Demolition?
 
There was an alleged rehearsal for the demolition at the Ram Katha Kunj on the afternoon of  December 5, photographs of which were taken and widely published in the press. An eyewitness, Praveen Jain, a photographer for the Pioneer, has stated: "On Saturday afternoon a Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) Member of Parliament forewarned me of the events to follow on Sunday. He smiled as he directed me to the spot where the kar sevaks were rehearsing how to bring down the 465-year old structure. The kar sevaks, with ropes and rods had roped a rock pile and were tugging at it from different directions. As events turned out later, this was the very manner in which the three domes of the mosque were brought down the next day. Near the mosque, a concrete dias had been erected. Hordes of kar sevaks were periodically racing towards the dias. This was the run-up to Sunday afternoon. Even as we took pictures, we were accosted by belligerent kar sevaks who jostled us and said we could not take photographs. We were pushed out of the site." (Pioneer, Lucknow, December 8, 1992).

In the attacks on Muslim graves, mazaars, mosques, houses and residents, the kar sevaks showed consistent organisation based on accurate information. Muslim houses even in mixed mohallas in interior areas away from the road were identified, attacked, looted and burnt on  December 6 and 7, 1992.

 
These kar sevaks may have been from the select group that the local police had reported as having been chosen to participate in the 'main' kar seva. Umesh C. Tiwari, the former ADM in Faizabad, denied this, and claimed that the photographs were taken post-demolition. But Parveen Jain's account has been corroborated by other eyewitnesses, including journalists, and photographs were published in the Pioneer and the Indian Express on 6 December. Moreover, by all accounts, no such activity near the site would have been possible after the demolition.
 
The Kendriya Margdarshak Mandal’s decision
 
The decision of the Kendriya Marg Darshak Mandal to perform symbolic kar seva of cleaning, clearing and filling of land in the disputed area, but away from the mosque, was announced on the morning of December 5. The sadhus refused even at that stage to spell out the modalities. Nor were the specific details announced to the over one lakh kar sevaks, who were only asked to follow the instructions of the (unnamed) leaders selected by the VHP, with the injunction that whatever they ordered would be in the interests of the Ram temple. This was perhaps a reference to the 17 coordinators selected to look after arrangements in the 5 sectors in which the sangh combine had divided Ayodhya. Thus the actual plans were known to a very limited number of leaders.
 
At the daily press conference that day at 3.00 P.M., Swami Ramchandra Paramhans and Ashok Singhal made defiant statements. Singhal categorically said that they would not listen to the Supreme Court ruling, and that what happened on the next day would give a message for the establishment of Hindu Rashtra.
 
Speeches on December the Fifth
 
Inflammatory speeches were made at the mass meeting at Ram Katha Kunj on the afternoon of 5 December, at which major leaders of the RSS,VHP, Bajrang Dal, BJP, and Shiv Sena were present. Those present included, Ashok Singhal, Ramchandra Paramhans, Swami Chinmayanand, Swami Vasudevanand, Mahant Avaidyanath, Acharya Vamdev, Sadhvi Rithambara, Acharya Dharmendra and Vinay Katiyar, among others. Acharya Dharmendra, a key VHP leader and reportedly a major organiser of the events the next day, repeatedly stated that they would obey the commands of the Sants which they considered the true law, and break the law of the courts. He had, from December 3, onwards, been saying "chashmen ke number badal lo, dekh lo mandir vahin banega".(Change your spectacles, the [Ram] temple will be built at that very site [where the masjid was located]). Both Dharmendra and Swami Ramchandra Paramhans, said at the conclusion of the Gita path (recital from the Bhagvad Gita) that: "Kurukshetra ki ladai prarambh hogi, mandir banega, ladai jab tak chalegi, Hindu Rashtra banega". (The battle of Kurukshetra [a reference to the epic struggle between good and evil as told in the Mahabharata] will begin, the temple will be made, and the battle will continue until the establishment of Hindu Rashtra). Dharmendra clarified that the battle would begin the following morning, which was anniversary of the original battle according to tradition.
 
Other statements were made expressing the following sentiments: condemning the description of the structure as a mosque; stating that any law that hurt Hindu sentiments would be opposed, even though they would not like to violate Supreme Court directives; to the effect that the UP government had filed appeals in the courts as a Chanakya tactic to ensure that the kar sevaks plans did not fail; stressing that Hindus would not be free until all the masjids with signs of temples were taken back, and that until three temples (at the sites of mosques in Ayodhya, Varanasi and Mathura) were taken back Ram Rajya could not be established in India; and reiterating that 70 crore Hindus loved the Ramjanambhoomi, they would construct a mandir there and offer flowers. These speeches were clearly intended to stir up the crowd in the area, which numbered in the tens of thousands. They were often asked to respond to slogans initiated from the dais. Despite the earlier announced decision of the Marg Darshak Mandal to have only symbolic kar seva, this was not relayed to the crowd. The kar sevaks present were not instructed about the nature of the symbolic kar seva, but were merely told to follow the orders of the sadhus, as the latter had the best interests of the Ram temple in mind. But, since these very same sadhus were making such fiery and provocative speeches, mass hysteria was created for the demolition of the Masjid. And on the night of 5 December, that day slogans suggesting explicitly the demolition of the mosque structure were heard in Ayodhya.
 
Attacks on Journalists
 
From around December 3, 1992  journalists were being threatened. Those photographing the demolition rehearsal on December 5, were threatened and made to leave. At 5.15 P.M. Ashok Singhal speaking at the mass meeting at Ram Katha Kunj wrongly accused the BBC of misreporting, in the previous day's broadcast that "a lathicharge had broken out". This enraged the kar sevaks, thirty of whom later attacked a German TV crew, injuring them and damaging their equipment.
 
On the morning of December 6, media persons, all of whom had been given badges by the VHP, were systematically, though perhaps selectively, attacked and their equipment destroyed. The photographers who were video recording for the VHP were not attacked. The attacks were therefore not indiscriminate, and were apparently directed at destroying evidence. About a hundred media persons, in a statement in Ayodhya the next day, blamed the RSS-VHP-BJP for these incidents, holding Ashok Singhal squarely responsible for his anti- media speeches, and regretted that H.V. Seshadri and L.K. Advani had not tried to stop the attackers. Vijaya Raje Scindia when stopped outside her hotel in Ayodhya by protesting mediapersons, allegedly retorted: "You deserve it". She later denied the statement.
 
All evidence therefore suggests that this attack on the press was preplanned and coordinated. The effort was apparently to ensure that there was no evidence of the specific role of sangh combine leaders and cadres. Foreign media persons were perhaps singled out to ensure that no detailed coverage was available in the international media. For their part, the kar sevaks would have been interested in destroying such evidence, apart from those also interested in looting equipment and valuables from the journalists.
 
Crucial Meetings of the Sangh Combine
 
Late on the evening of December 5, there was a meeting at Digambar Akhara in Ayodhya, where informants claim, H.V. Seshadri, Vinay Katiyar and Ashok Singhal, among others, were present. L.K. Advani arrived at night, preponing his arrival from 1.00 P.M. on  December 6, and joined this meeting. Another meeting was held in Katiyar's residence from about 8.00 A.M. on December 6, where it is reported that Advani, Singhal, K.S. Sudarshan (RSS Joint Secretary), Seshadri and Moreshwar Save (Shiv Sena leader) were present. Pramod Mahajan, BJP MP, joined them around 10.00 a.m.
 
These two meetings appear crucial. What was to transpire later was apparently decided upon and given the final shape in these meetings. As these discussions were highly secret for obvious reasons, the Commission was able to obtain no details. According to eyewitness reports, Advani left the December 6, morning meeting grim-faced. The fact that he preponed his arrival in Ayodhya indicates the urgency and importance of the meetings.
 
Demolition of the Masjid
 
The Sangh combine had already created the atmosphere and the conditions for the demolition. Significantly, the first attempts to break past the cordon of RSS volunteers and the police occurred between 10-10.30 a.m. on December 6, when Advani and Joshi arrived on the scene. No serious effort was made by any of the major leaders to stop the demolition.
 
The systematic way in which the Babri Masjid was demolished points to prior planning and training. The old mosque's structure was not weak. Because of damages caused to it when it was attacked in 1934, the central dome and parts of the walls had been repaired at that time using cement, etc. Though the claim that there was an explosion has not received any confirmation, all eyewitness reports indicate a purposive destruction. Only about 2,000 of the kar sevaks participated in the actual demolition. A few hundreds were the main workers. The initial successful assault was by kar sevaks who had distinctive yellow headbands.

According to local police reports, and all available video records, kar sevaks attacked the Babri Masjid simultaneously from more than one direction and in more than one group. The entire operation was therefore marked by a careful division of labour.

About a hundred media persons, in a statement in Ayodhya the next day, blamed the RSS-VHP-BJP for these incidents, holding Ashok Singhal squarely responsible for his anti- media speeches, and regretted that H.V. Seshadri and L.K. Advani had not tried to stop the attackers. Vijaya Raje Scindia when stopped outside her hotel in Ayodhya by protesting mediapersons, allegedly retorted: "You deserve it". She later denied the statement.

The Babri Masjid was not the only shrine destroyed. The Ram Chabootra where Hindus had worshipped for centuries, as well as the Sita Rasoi (more recently also called Kaushalya Rasoi) were also destroyed. The destruction of the disputed structure was therefore not the only instance of demolition of a shrine at the site by the sangh combine.
 
The manner in which injured kar sevaks were taken away, and ambulances provided, with access to the hospital despite roadblocks, again point to preplanning. The way in which the routes that the central forces would have to take to get to the site, were blocked, with rubble, burning tyres and other barricades, shows that it could not have been spontaneous. The human wall formed near Saket Degree College which stopped the RAF contingent on the afternoon of December 6, was also, informants have testified, premeditated. The Principal Of the college was an active BJP sympathiser who had earlier expelled anti-BJP student activists.
 
The call by Singhal and others, to kar sevaks to come down from the domes of the masjid, may have been a pro forma effort to indicate claim of willingness to honour Supreme Court orders. But it could also have been an attempt to avoid injuries to the latter when the domes collapsed. Singhal was seen signaling some kar sevaks to move towards the mosque. While the demolition was on, Advani reportedly warned the police not to "touch kar sevaks or use force". In the early afternoon, around 2.30 p.m., he called upon the kar sevaks to block all entry points to the complex so that central troops could not enter. S.C. Dixit, Vice President of the VHP, congratulated the police forces for their "restraint" while the demolition was going on. Uma Bharati and Sadhvi Rithambara shouted inflammatory slogans, instigating kar sevaks against Muslims.
 
The attitude of these senior leaders was clear encouragement to the kar sevaks to launch a pogrom against the Muslim community, which was already terrified by what some of its members had seen of the demolition, and many had heard over the public address systems. Even if, for the sake of argument, allegations the widespread about specific communal slogans and speeches by prominent leaders are exaggerated and untrue, the consistent support by sangh combine leaders to the depredations of the kar sevaks which had been going on since at least December 1, was tantamount to encouraging their actions.
 
If that is indeed the case, and this would require further investigation, all these leaders are guilty not only of instigating communal passions, but also of aiding and abetting acts of murder, attempt to murder, assault, rioting, looting and arson.
 
Post-Demolition Events
 
The demolition of the Masjid, the Ram Chabootra and Sita Rasoi was followed by the systematic removal of rubble and the construction of a platform for the installation of the Ram Lalla idols. The manner in which the Ram Lalla idol was removed by the pujari before the destruction of the Masjid, and brought back later in the night also indicates careful planning. The fact that leaders like Singhal, Katiyar, Dharmendra and Vamdev supervised the construction of the platform, the erection of the canopy and the installation of the idol, late on the night of December 6, further highlights their complicity.
 
Statements of regret that followed appear to be for the record. The joint statement on  December 6, by H.V. Seshadri, Advani and Joshi, while terming the demolition "unfortunate," blamed the government, the courts and secular parties for the delays causing the outburst of "popular feeling" which led" to the demolition. It also called upon the Union government to accept the "nationalistic feeling" in Ayodhya. Singhal, in his statement on the same day, expressed no regrets. He denied that the demolition was "preplanned" but went on to claim that, "Hindu sentiments cannot be subjugated for long. This has been proved today". He also announced that kar seva would continue for the next 13 days in the first phase, and then resume and go on till the construction of the temple was complete. The manner in which the entire programme was carried out, from the initial mobilisation of kar sevaks, to the installation of the Ram Lalla in the purported sanctum sanctorum, shows meticulous planning. This level of preparation could not have been achieved in a few days or a couple of weeks. Thus, pinning the blame, for the demolition, on the delay caused by the Allahabad High Court judgement, appears to be a strategem. The die must have been cast before that.
 
The denial by the Sangh combine prior knowledge about, or participation in, the demolition is also not sustainable. And if Advani, Seshadri, Dalmia and others considered the demolition unfortunate, why didn't they make much more vigorous efforts to stop it? Why did the leadership, including Advani himself, advise kar sevaks to block the troops? And why did they direct the construction of a makeshift Ram Lalla shrine? Apart from the demolition itself, these latter acts were also against the law, and the Constitution, as well as the assurances solemnly and repeatedly given to the legislature, courts and the National Integration Council.
 
The BJP State government kept its members away from Ayodhya. In effect then, the local law and order administration was left to take its lead from the party and its associated organisations. From the evidence that has been assembled, it is crystal clear that the sangh parivar' was in full command of a highly organised cadre, a body of kar sevaks whose religious fervour was systematically aroused, a core planning group of RSS/VHP and Bajrang Dal and high level functionaries present in Ayodhya. The leadership of the Sangh Parivar' was most likely party to the events in Ayodhya from November 24 to December 8, 1992 or simply acquiesced into it out of fear for losing its support. The former seems more probable from the conduct pattern of the administration in dealing with the unfolding situation, inspite of all the local intelligence at its command. The Sangh Parivar' and its top leaders, more so those present in Ayodhya, were responsible for planning violation of law, defiance of the orders of the courts concerned, and terrorising of the minorities in Ayodhya.
 
(The report of the Citizens Tribunal was published in May 1994;  the Amici Curiae: K. G. Kannabiran, A. G. Noorani, Lotika Sarkar; the Secretariat Members: Anuradha Chenoy, Achin Vanaik, E. Deenadayalan, Gautam Navlakha, Raju Damle, Sumanto Bannerjee, Tapan Bose)

Further Excerpts from the Report:
The entire Report of the Citizens Tribunal Report is available at  https://sabrangindia.in/reports/1994-citizens-tribunal-ayodhya

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