Liberalisation, Hindu ‘Nationalism’ and the Minorities: Inter-Religious Group Differentials in Gujarat, the Model Hindu Rashtra
Image: Rafi Malek
The Muslims in India constitute an odd-lot among the religious minorities. At 13.4% of the total Indian population (Census, 2001), they make up for 138 million of the Indian population and the third largest Muslim population in the world. Other than their demographic mass, the Indian Muslims are a peculiar minority due to their troubled legacy, economic deprivation and increasing socio-spatial segregation.
The scarcity of systematic and consistent study on the socio-economic conditions of Muslims is evident in the wording of Sachar Committee Report, 2006 which states that “the current effort is the first of its kind to undertake a data-base research on the Muslims in India.” Apart from the Sachar Committee Report of 2006, the Gopal Singh Committee Report (1982) and Ranganath Misra Commission (2007) are the only official reports which aim to address the socio economic condition of the Muslims to some extent.
Beyond this, the limited literature pertaining to these social indicators is sharply contradictory with narratives from right-wing largely distorting the religious and demographic characteristics to express their fear of increasing Muslim growth-rate, their suspect loyalty and economic competition while a majority of other writers focus disproportionately on merely external factors such as state’s discrimination as causative reasons of this economic backwardness. The majority of the literature at both end fails to address the transforming nature of Indian economy since independence.
In this scenario, the Indian state of Gujarat makes an interesting case study because in the recent times, it has undergone economic and cultural upheavals. The economic growth in Gujarat has been massively exalted for the state’s governance policies with many academic writers, journalists and experts tracing this stability in growth as the main reason for the landslide victory of the Hindu ‘nationalist’ party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) with Narendra Modi (ex-Chief Minister of Gujarat) at its head, in India’s 2014 general election.
Together with this persistent economic growth, Gujarat has also witnessed an unprecedented wave of religious intolerance. From the 1980s, the Christian and Muslim minority in the state have been victims of violence perpetrated by extremist Hindu groups. Thus, Gujarat makes for an interesting case study to reflect upon the political economy of India and the approach that is likely to be adopted in relation with the social and economic development of its citizens, specifically, in relation with minorities owing to BJP’s Hindu ‘nationalist’ ideology which states that “the secular India is the Hindu India.”
Gujarat is also a potent case study as its economy is uniquely placed due to its specific identity of being one of the industrialised states in India. Gujarat underwent an economic upheaval in response to the neoliberal globalisation of the 1980s.Since, the late 1980s the economic policy changed and moved towards a free-market regime and an increased flow of capital, commodity, people and ideas.
Stiglitz in his book, “Globalization and its discontents” defined this move towards dissolution of barriers and a more aggressive free-market regime as neo-liberal globalisation. In many developing countries, the endorsement of neo-liberal globalisation has led to the decline of some home-grown industries. In Gujarat, the intense shift from the traditional cotton mills and agricultural work towards rapid industrialisation and establishment of the capital-intensive petrochemicals sector led to large-scale informalisation of labour and a shift towards tertiary sector activities.
Urban Gujarat reflects a more pronounced casualisation of labour than the whole of urban India.In their book,Poverty and Vulnerability in a Globalising Metropolis Ahmedabad, Mahadevia and Kundu,show how the state experienced a gradual increase in the informal labour during the 1980s and an increaseof 5 % through the 1990s.
The proportion of workers in regular category was 45.5 % for males while only 34.7% female workers were engaged as regular workers. It is important to note that the casual wage labour among females increased by 3% during 1977-78 to 1993-94 with a more pronounced increase among self-employed females.
Therefore, Gujarat’s development model is skewed, merely providing incentives to capital, large scale industries and services. In this close relationship between the state and its dominant social groups, the poor evade the benefits of its sustained growth.
In the same book, Mahadevia reflects that “interestingly, the proportion of casual labour among males and self-employed among females increased in 1993-94 as compared to 1987-88, supporting the trend of casualisation of labour in the state.” Informal employments does not promise availability of minimum wages and therefore, this employment is highly poverty inducing. Unni’s (1999) research on the informal sector in Ahmedabad reflects that the average income of all workers was below the poverty line wage of Rs.52 in 1998. The average minimum wage for women at Rs.37 was way below the poverty line wage.
The casualisation of labour forced more women and young males, who remained out of employment, probably in pursuit of higher education, to compensate for the loss in the family income as a result of loss of regular employment. The consequences of neoliberal globalisation on women has been argued and debated, and feminist political literature highlights the contradictory relationships between gender, globalisation, multinational capital and the IMF/World Bank/WTO policies.
A large body of this theory by Elson & Pearson, Safa and Moghadam discusses the complexity of the exploitation against women due to this feminisation of informalisation. On the one hand, it is known to provide the women with a platform to break-away from traditional patriarchy at home, while on the other hand, women are entrapped in multiple forms of discrimination in the form of sex-stereotyping, low wages and harassment.
Thus, in this context as defined by Sud in her book, “Liberalization, Hindu nationalism, and the state” of economic liberalisation on the one hand, and the state’s political ‘illberalism’ in the form of Hindu ‘nationalism’ on the other, that socio-economic status of Muslim minority constituting 9.1 % of the state’s population (Census, 2001 ) needs to be examined.
Image: Rafi Malek
Economic history of Gujarat: Liberalisation and Hindu ‘nationalism’
Gujarat has been at the front of the liberalisation process for a while, in India. When the majority of India was growing at 8.44 per cent for the period 2004-05 and 2009-10, Gujarat’s Domestic Product was a constant 10.07 per cent (Sud, 2012).
While studies have been conducted on political geography of the state and its sustained economic growth, the relationship between economic liberalisation and Hindu ‘nationalism’ and its impact on the minority communities has rarely been examined in academic discourse. Sud’s (2012) study of political economy of Gujarat critically examines the complex relationship between Hindu ‘nationalism’ and liberalisation and the subsequent marginalisation and violation of rights of minorities. On the basis of this proposition, the rest of this section is arranged to look into a brief economic history of Gujarat and then reflect upon the after effects of Hindu nationalism and liberalization on Muslim minority.
Economic History of Gujarat
Gujarat has been a historically rich state involved in trade and commerce, particularly, due to the benefits of its location on the western coast-line as well as the cotton growing belt. On its separation from the bilingual state of Maharashtra in 1960, Gujarat adopted the path of the metropolitan economies of the time and undertook to replicate Bombay’s economic growth for orderly and rapid industrial development.
The first five year plan (1951-6), emphasised for reduction of poverty at the national level. However, the focus of development approach undertaken by Gujarat was on growth rather than redistribution.
The approach to economic development in the state has remained thus, regardless of change of the party in power. Congress was in power till 1995 with a brief break, Janta Morcha (alliance of non-Congress parties, 1976-1980) and the Janta-Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP) alliance (1989-1990). The BJP has been in power since then.
Thus, Gujarat made dramatic progress in its industrial economy. The state ranked third in terms of number of industries and production in 1984-85. During the leadership of Madhavsinh Solanki, Gujarat became the second most industrialised state in India. Thus, Gujarat’s rate of growth was higher than the rest of India during the 1980s and 1990s as well. Therefore, to verify the claim that BJP’s rule has had a transformative impact on the state in terms of growth rate of per capita income, it needs to be established that the difference between Gujarat’s growth rate and that of the rest of India has increased under Modi’s rule, and more prominently in comparison with other states.
According to a survey conducted by the Guardian (2014), in the 1990s, Gujarat’s growth rate was 4.8% in comparison to the national average of 3.7%; in the 2000s, it was 6.9% against the national average of 5.6%. Thus, the difference between Gujarat’s rate of growth to that of national average indicates a marginal increase, from 1.1 percentage points to 1.3 percentage points. However, the difference between Maharashtra’s growth rate and the national average indicates an increase from 0.8 percentage points to 1.1 percentage points. More so, Bihar’s performance is striking, its growth rate was 2.7 percentage points below the national average in the 1990s but 1.3 percentage higher in 2000s. Hence, Bihar demonstrates the most dramatic turnaround in improving its economic growth rate.
Figure 1: Average annual growth rate of per capita income of selected states, by decade Source: Reserve Bank of India
Liberalisation, Hindu ‘nationalism’ and the minorities
Within religious factions, sentiments of ‘tradition’ are politicised into public discourse. This politicisation of religious affinity and narratives on “nation” and ideas of “patriotism” are expressed using global networks, global capital, global communications, etc. It is important to note, that while it has been said that religious nationalism is as a result of globalising, leading to increased insecurities and existential anxieties at the individual and group level, the promotion and intensification of religious ‘nationalism’ relies largely on globalisation.
Robertson and Chirico (1985) elaborated on the interplay of religion and liberalisation (or globalisation) almost two decades back, arguing that mere sociological study of the upsurge in religious concerns and issue is not enough, there is a need to analyse the happenings in the societies within the context of globalisation, and realise that it enhances, at least in a relatively short run, religion and religiosity.
A movement’s growth is determined largely by how well it taps into processes of globalisation. Gujarat is an important example. While, it was in early 1920s that institutionalisation and spread of “Muslim fervor” which largely codifies Hindu ‘nationalism’ first took place; in the post-colonial India, BJP’s political framework in Gujarat is based on the establishment of a Hindu rashtra or Hindu nation state.
The study conducted by Sud shows that this has been successfully pushed forward using the means of globalisation, wherein, strong communication networks have been established using audio-visual and virtual communication methods. This technology is known to have been used in Surat riots in 1992 and in various Gujarat locations in 2002.
At the same time, the satisfaction of the pro-market elite class in industrial Gujarat and the political relationship of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) -the ‘cultural’ organisation that advocates a Hindu ‘nationalist’ agenda under the banner of Hindutva) and the BJP, and its obvious involvement in various decision making development policies has contributed to the systematic marginalisation of the minorities. The phenomenon of so-called sustained economic growth is used to create a development hype which has led to a conscious overlooking of the states’ poor performance on social indicators and in general, its targeted exclusion of Muslim minorities.
In rural areas, poverty amongst Muslims is two times (200 %) higher than high caste Hindus. Despite this social and economic marginalisation of the Muslims in Gujarat, neglecting the Sachar Committee (2006) fifteen points recommendations for promotion of economic upheavel amongst Muslims, Gujarat, unlike a few other large states has not included any quota in employment and higher education for Muslims.
Therefore, Gujarat’s development model is skewed, merely providing incentives to capital, large scale industries and services. In this close relationship between the state and its dominant social groups, the poor evade the benefits of its sustained growth. Gujarat performs poorly on human development indicators and the life of its citizens is accompanied with malnutrition, infant mortality, mothers’ mortality and low wages. Thus, it is also instructive to study how various socio-religious communities, in particular, Muslims are placed in a comparative perspective and their performance in Gujarat.
Socio Religious Group differentials in Gujarat
Shariff in his 2012 study Gujarat Shining: Relative Development of Gujarat and Socio-Religious Differentials reflects upon on the differentials in poverty and human development with a specific focus on Muslims in Gujarat using the NSSO, NCAER’s human development surveys and the study conducted by Sachar Committtee. The study indicates that poverty amongst urban Muslims is almost eight times (800 per cent) higher than high-caste Hindus, around 50 per cent more than the Hindu-OBCs and the SC/STs. Muslims in Gujarat are highly urbanised, nearly 60 % of the Muslim population lives in urban areas constituting the most deprived social group in Gujarat. In rural areas, poverty amongst Muslims is two times (200 %) higher than high caste Hindus. Despite this social and economic marginalisation of the Muslims in Gujarat, neglecting the Sachar Committee (2006) fifteen points recommendations for promotion of economic upheavel amongst Muslims, Gujarat, unlike a few other large states has not included any quota in employment and higher education for Muslims. While Muslims are found to have bank accounts proportionate to the size of their population, the bank loan amount outstanding which reflects financial inclusion is only 2.6% for Muslims.
Figure 2: Poverty Ratios
Source: NSSO, 61st Round; 2004-2005, Sourced from Shariff, 2012
Education
Shariff contends that Muslims are the most deprived educationally. Despite 75 % net enrolment, almost similar to the levels attained by the SC/STs and other groups; the enrolment ratio decreases at the level of matriculation and higher levels. This trend has been reported to exist at all India level by the Sachar Committee (2006). A mere 26% is found to reach the levels of matriculation while the proportion for ‘others’ is 41 %.
The SC/STs are found to have the same count as Muslims in Gujarat. Muslims are found to drop out in huge numbers at about fifth grade. At higher levels, particularly, at the level of graduate studies, the trends are quite disturbing. Muslims, with same level of education in the past are now lagging behind, in contrast, more SC/STs are seen to be attaining higher education. This could also be due to the affirmative action which exists for them in the Consitution of India (Sachar Committee Report, 2006).
This disparity in access to higher education seems to be increasing over time. High caste Hindus have historically benefitted from the provision of higher education, in recent years, the SCs/STs are largely catching up, while Muslims are left behind. This clearly reflects discrimination in providing equal access to higher education, infrastructure and other services. On the recommendation of Sachar Committee (2006), the Government of India launched a nationwide scholarship scheme with effect from April 1, 2008. While all states in India have responded to this, Gujarat is the only exception, where pre-matric scholarships for minorities have not been implemented. 55,000 scholarships were allocated to Gujarat, from which, 53,000 were required to be given to Muslims, however, Gujarat has not implemented this programme.
Source: Shariff, 2012
Employment
The work participation rate (WPR) is used to measure employment. Muslims WPR at 61% is 10 percent lower than Hindus who have a ratio of 71%. The unemployment rates of Muslims in Gujarat are found to be lower than Muslims in West Bengal. It is important to note that, prior to the neo-liberal policy adoption and the closure of the textile-mills, Muslims dominated the state’s textile industry and were involved in power loams, textile mills and handlooms. Muslims were also involved in diamond cutting and polishing industry, chemican, pharmaceuticals processing industries. Thus, Muslims have been the most vulnerable section in the informalisation of labour. However, Muslim participation in the organised sector in Gujarat is now seen to be negligible.
Muslims are traditionally known to be artisan and skilled works, with relative advantage at handling mechanical and tool work (Sachar, 2006). Therefore, their participation in industrial labour and manufacturing & organised industry across India is found to be high against Hindus. Gujarat is the only exception, where the trend is totally reversed. Muslim participation in this sector at an all India level is 21%, in Gujarat merely 13% Muslims are involved in this section, much lower than Maharashtra (25%) and West Bengal (21%).
Additionally, Gujarat is the only state where Muslims have not accessed organised and public sector employment. Shariff notes that ‘this finding was counter-checked by a second set of data in a multivariate analysis. The fact that Muslims do not draw income from the formal organized (including public employment) sectors is negative, large and highly significant; this is the only community which records this negative and significant coefficients.’ While, it has been argued that as reported by Sachar Committee (2006) Muslims are found to be employed in government services in numbers larger than those employed in West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh. While, this is true, however, Shariff (2012), who was the member-secretary on the Committee notes that, ‘such employment has taken placed during the last 5 decades or so, these are not recent appointments. Gujarat government must come for ward to publish figures as to how many Muslims have been appointed in government employment during the last 5-10 years in employment categories such as group A to group D and in the state PSUs.
Figure 4: Occupational Differentials of Selected State
Source: Sachar Committee Report, 2006
Petty Trade and Self-Employment
Gujarat is also seen to reflect a wider gap between Muslims and Hindus in petty trade and self-employment. Data from Sachar Committee (2006) shows a huge disparity between Muslims and Hindus. 54 percent of Muslims against 39 percent Hindus are found to be self-employed in the State. This difference is much lower in West Bengal, with 53 percent Muslims as against 45 % Hindus engaged in self-employment. Thus, Muslims are largely self-employed or undertake petty trade. It is important to note that, sectors such as petty trade and self-employment reflect a marginal income growth in the last two decades in comparison with other sectors of economy. Moreover, in Gujarat, FDIs and public investments are mostly channelled into the organised sector where Muslims are rarely employed.
Conclusion
The simultaneously increasing economic growth has provided the platform to BJP to create an enigma about Gujarat’s “model of development”, to conveniently, shed a cover over the communal tensions in the state and the Government’s systematic exclusion of minorities against its so-called development.
A study of Gujarat’s performance on social indicators shows a picture dramatically contradictory to its sustained economic growth. The benefits of the economic growth do not seem to have trickled down to the population with only political and industrial elite benefitting from its growth. Moreover, in terms of inter-religious differentials between Hindus and Muslim, Muslim condition reflects issues of inaccessibility to education and regular wage employment, alongside, poor health and livelihood options having led to a condition of social marginalisation and forced poverty.