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Unleashing lawlessness: Citizens Tribunal on Ayodhya

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Image Courtesy: Pablo Bartholomew
 
Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy, Justice D. A. Desai, Justice D. S. Tewatia (Panel)

The political programme and deliberate escalation of the dispute while breaking the law and defying Court directives received momentum when the Babri masjid was unlocked on February 1,1986. In November 1985 the VHP had demanded the restoration of the "Ramjanmabhoomi” and threatened a national agitation if their demands were not met.

 
Further Excerpts from the Report:
The entire Report of the Citizens Tribunal Report is available at  https://sabrangindia.in/reports/1994-citizens-tribunal-ayodhya
 
The Build Up to the Demolition
 
Escalation
 
The second major change took place when the Babri Masjid was unlocked on February 1, 1986, a full 36 years after it had remained locked. At this time also the Congress party was in power both in UP and at the Centre. Senior functionaries of the government interviewed by the Commission have suggested that the government was instrumental in facilitating the unlocking of the Masjid. Two days after the unlocking of the Masjid some Muslim leaders from outside Ayodhya formed the Babri Masjid Action Committee (BMAC) and Maulana Muzaffar Hussain Kichhochhavi became its president A competitive militancy of words and action pushed the dispute at almost the top of the communal mobilisation agenda. The VHP launched a temple construction campaign to expand its mass appeal. The mahants of Ayodhya remained divided on the issue and remain so till now. The residents of Ayodhya were not a keen party in it till then. The issue was assuming the form of a movement and the Babri Masjid-Ram temple dispute was introduced on the national agenda both for Hindus and Muslims.
 
Following the unlocking of the Masjid and the establishment of the Babri Masjid Action Committee, the frequency and intensity of protests by a section of the Muslim community increased, particularly in U.P. In a particularly unfortunate incident, 16 Muslims were killed in police firing in Barabanki during a court-arrest programme in April 1986. The protests continued and the dispute escalated and moved to Delhi. Then the Babri Masjid Coordination Committee (BMCC) was formed, with Syed Shahbuddin as convener, in December 1986.
 
In early 1987, protests were held in Ayodhya, and a rally organised by some Muslim leaders in Delhi protested the unlocking of the Babri Masjid, and demanded their right to pray there. At the same time the VHP organised rath yatras and expanded their campaign over large parts of the country. This resulted in communal violence in many locations. The VHP organised a virat Hindu sammelan in Ayodhya to demand restoration of the Ramjanambhoomi in April 1987. The atmosphere was successfully communalised in Ayodhya and the issue of Babri Masjid Ramjanambhoomi taken beyond the confines of U.P. and made more complex. In the midst of this, the legal issues were complicated further when the U.P. government filed an application in December 1987, to have all the cases connected with the Babri Masjid transferred from the District Court in Faizabad to the Lucknow bench of the High Court.
 
The tempo of communal mobilisation was then accelerated. The sense of denial among the Muslims was also aggravated by the postures of some of their self-appointed leaders. The `Sangh Parivar' also launched a Shila Pujan programme all over the country which resulted in communal violence in many parts of the country. In July 1989 the Lucknow bench of the High Court transferred all suits for trial by a three judge bench. In all these years no judgement was given on any of the disputes and the problem was allowed to expand and become more complex. In October 1989 hearings started in the Supreme Court on a suit filed by the Sunni Waqf Board.
 
Then in November 1989, the Central government allowed shilanyas of the Ram temple to be performed on the disputed site in Ayodhya. Rajiv Gandhi, as Prime Minister, also launched his election campaign from Faizabad and gave a speech promising to usher in Ram Rajya. In spite of all these religious appeals, the Congress party failed to come to power both at the Centre and in U.P. The Janata Dal formed a government on its own in U.P., and at the Centre with support of the BJP from outside. The support of the BJP was crucial for the survival of the Janata Dal government at the centre.
 
The Ramjanambhoomi issue moved centre stage in the political battle for power and was pushed up to a feverish pitch by L.K. Advani, after the policy for job reservations for backward classes was announced by V.P. Singh. L.K. Advani launched a rath yatra across the country, to end at Ayodhya where kar seva was to take place to build a Ram Mandir in place of Babri Masjid.
 
All efforts at coming to an understanding between the leaders of the Sangh Parivar' and Muslim leaders were unsuccessful, both sides being unyielding. Finally, L.K. Advani had to be arrested in Bihar. But the Sangh Parivar' was successful in collecting a large number of supporters in Ayodhya in spite of the best efforts of the U.P. administration to prevent them from doing so. The government had to use force to clear the Babri Masjid area and some kar sevaks were killed and injured. The `Sangh Parivar' appeared to have made gains from this event.
 
This resulted in the BJP withdrawing support from the Janata Dal government at the centre and the V.P. Singh government lost the vote of confidence in Parliament. Internal divisions between the Janata Dal and electoral game plans of the Congress party were partly responsible for this. The government of Mr. Chandrasekhar at the centre took a constructive initiative to initiate a dialogue between the principal organisations involved in Ayodhya dispute, on an all India basis, in order to arrive at negotiated solution. The Union Home Minister became the broker. However, elections were called in June 1991 for the Lok Sabha, and also the UP (Uttar Pradesh)Assembly. The BJP gained heavily and formed a government in 11 The Congress party assumed the reins of government at the centre.
 
The above summary of events concerning the Babri Masjid shows that the issue has been inextricably enmeshed with power politics for a long time. It is not surprising, then, that matters were getting increasingly complicated, instead of being resolved. Even issues regarding ownership of land and the facts regarding history of the area in general, and the mosque in particular, were not clarified in all this time. Most politicians refused to take a clear and logical stand on the issue. This made it easier for the Sangh Parivar' to exploit the problem and change an almost non-existent issue into one of "national" pride and importance.
 
When the Congress party came back to power at the Centre, along with a BJP government in Uttar Pradesh in 1991, the power equations changed. Two political factors stood out: the ruling party at the Centre did not have a numerical majority and the BJP government in UP had made the building of Ram temple in Ayodhya an electoral pledge. This made the issue of Babri Masjid and Ram temple critical in national politics. In the judgement of the Commission, the juxtaposition of a politically weak central government, an aggressive and determined Sangh Parivar' and a duplicitous BJP government in UP, ended up deciding the course of events leading to the destruction of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya on
December 6, 1992.
 
This was still not too late to start an educational and political campaign around the country to convince the citizens about the dangers of communal politics. This was not done. No political or educational campaigns were launched to counter the aggressive BJP communal propaganda or to put non-disputable facts regarding the issue before the public. As a result the Sangh Parivar' was left free to spread half-truths and even blatant lies in an ideological vacuum. One glaring example of this kind of propaganda was the often repeated assertion by `Sangh Parivar' leaders that a large number of temples had been destroyed in Kashmir. This would have been easy to counter for the Central Government by providing facts and taking a special group of journalists to Kashmir to see for themselves. Even this was not done and the lie became "truth" by repetition.
 
The governments at Lucknow and Delhi and the parties backing them had their own compulsions to provide further credibility to the `Sangh Parivar' as well as AIBMAC or BMCC. The decision to start another edition of kar seva from December 6, 1992 was taken in this background. The VHP's commitment to negotiation was meaningless.
 
 
Decision on Kar Seva irreversible
 
The Central government continued its efforts to have the kar seva postponed but showed extreme reluctance to take any concrete action. The Prime Minister expressed the view, in a statement on November 15, 1992, at Allahabad, that he failed to understand the mystery (mayajal) behind the resumption of kar seva at the construction site in Ayodhya. However, Kalyan Singh had already urged the Prime Minister on 2 November to work on a war footing to resolve the dispute within the extended time. "All-out efforts should be made" stated the Chief Minister, "to persuade the Muslims to give up their claim over the disputed shrine to help facilitate construction of the Ram temple in Ayodhya". The BJP Party President, M.M. Joshi, stated "The party would be prepared to pay any price for the construction (of Ram Mandir)". On November 5, L.K. Advani, leader of the Opposition in Lok Sabha, demanded in Calcutta that the Centre should allow immediate resumption of kar seva on 2.77 acres of land. VHP General Secretary Singhal was more strident. He demanded, at about the same time, that the Prime Minister should recognise the contradiction in his statements to "protect the mosque" and "construct the temple," and modify them accordingly.
 
The Muslim leaders involved were getting apprehensive. Gilani reasserted on November 1, 1992 that the idols inside the mosque should he removed and the opinion of the Supreme Court on the shrine should he binding on the parties. On November 2, Sultan Owaisi of the All India Babri Masjid Action Committee urged the Centre to protect the Babri Masjid in view of the kar seva already announced. The apprehension amongst the minorities all along was that assault on the structure was a certainty and its outcome predictable. They were pinning their hopes on the central government, in view of the ground situation in Ayodhya after he IIJP took over the administration in U.P.
 
By November 16, the VHP was stating that the assertions of the Prime Minister, that government would not allow kar seva, was an affront to the religious leaders. The BJP was still continuing with its proposal that kar seva on 2.77 acres of acquired land, in dispute in the local High Court, should be delinked from the safety of the structure and the Centre should facilitate the former. It was at this stage that the Union Home Minister initiated the proposal for adjudication under Article 138 (2) of the Constitution by the Supreme Court. Both the U.P. Government and the BJP secured a written offer, and then the BJP rejected it within an hour of its receipt. In any case L.K. Advani is reported to have rejected the proposal of one point reference to the Supreme Court and wanted it to be delinked from the planned kar seva. This written offer does not form part of the Union Government's White Paper. The VHP-Bajrang Dal-RSS did not, at any time, indicate that the kar seva plans were negotiable.
 
It was under these circumstances that a meeting of the National Integration Council was called for on November 23, 1992. Simultaneously, the Supreme Court asked the Union government to "spell out its stand on the proposed VHP kar seva", as also its response to its appointment as a receiver. The BJP president, M.M. Joshi criticised the involvement of the Supreme Court in the dispute over kar seva. The BJP, followed by the U.P. government decided to boycott the NIC meeting. The planned dialogue between AIBMAC-VHP was also made meaningless by 'the sangh parivar' calling for kar seva. The NIC was denied the opportunity to openly debate with the BJP. The BJP-RSS-VHP obviously had closed their options and were no longer interested in the process of a democratic dialogue.
 
The Prime Minister stated before the NIC on November 23, 1992: "The issues on which there are differences of opinion are the plan of construction, the safety of the existing structure, and the compliance of the court order on the subject." The NIC gave a free hand to the Prime Minister to deal with the Ayodhya crisis.
 
There was no question by now that the planned kar seva could be deferred or stopped through consensus. The Sangh Parivar was obviously in the hands of its field commander, Vinay Katiyar, who had asserted in an interview in April 1992, "Might is the only law I understand. Nothing else matters to me".
 
The Entire Report is available at
https://sabrangindia.in/reports/1994-citizens-tribunal-ayodhya
 
 (The report of the Citizens Tribunal was published in May 1994; the Amici Curiae were : K. G. Kannabiran, A. G. Noorani, Lotika Sarkar; the Secretariat Members were : Anuradha Chenoy, Achin Vanaik, E. Deenadayalan, Gautam Navlakha, Raju Damle, Sumanto Bannerjee, Tapan Bose)
 

Then and Now, a brazen violation of the Rule of Law

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Image Courtesy: Pablo Bartholomew
 
We bring to you excerpts of a Citizens Tribunal report on the Demolition. The Tribunal sat soon after the Demolition and made public its report in 1994. It tells the gory and sinister tale of how the Court orders were consistently defied, of how the Supreme Court Orders were especially violated,  how the misgivings expressed by then then Attorney General of India –on the ground level situation in Ayodhya–  were brushed aside; and finally how a crime was committed, breaking Indian law and defying the Indian Constitution, in full public view on December 6, 1992.
 
The entire Report of the Citizens Tribunal Report is available at
https://sabrangindia.in/reports/1994-citizens-tribunal-ayodhya
 
Excerpts:
 
Key Observations in the Report (The following facts stand out):
 

■   Both Central and State Intelligence reports (IB) warned the Union and State administrations of the possibility of destruction of the Babri Masjid well in advance.
■   The BJP leaders' formal statements for the purposes of the Court and public speeches were at variance.
■   `Sangh parivar' leaders' speeches in Ayodhya exhorted the kar sevaks to make the "ultimate sacrifice" for constructing the Ram Mandir at the Babri Masjid site on  December 6 (1992).
■   It was widely known among the kar sevaks in Ayodhya, and reported by the U.P. police to the state administration, that the central forces in Ayodhya would not use firearms on December 6, 1992.
■   Kalyan Singh had announced that the U.P. police would not use force against the kar sevaks on December 6, 1992.
■   Local residents and the police knew that kar sevaks were collecting implements which could be used to destroy the Babri Masjid.
■   Some journalists and local residents are reported to have witnessed the rehearsals for destruction of the Babri Masjid.
■   The U.P. police warned their superiors in advance that the kar sevaks were planning to destroy all Masjids and Muslim homes in Ayodhya.
■   A very large number of kar sevaks were allowed to collect in Ayodhya and the Union government reportedly helped in this process by providing special trains.
■   Kar sevaks were considered special guests by the administration, and official machinery was used to make their life comfortable in Ayodhya.
■   Ample warning of the kar sevaks' mood was given more than five days in advance, when they started destroying and damaging mazars, mosques and Muslim homes.

 
How the BJP and Its Allies in the Parivar broke the Law
 
The Form of the Kar Seva
 
By late November (1992) the political authorities had started showing symptoms of failure and the Courts seemed to provide an escape route. There were pending contempt cases for violation of Court orders during the July 1992 kar seva. The Supreme Court, therefore, asked the UP government on November 24, 1992 to specify steps on the compliance of orders, namely, prohibiting "any construction" and "any permanent construction" on 2.77 acres of land. The Prime Minister is reported to have picked on this straw immediately on November 26, 1992, when he told the Congress parliamentary party, "No one can do kar seva now to build a temple on the proposed plot in Ayodhya since there is a stay order in force".[1] He reportedly termed the planned kar seva 'illegal' and declared the government's commitment to implement the Supreme Court orders and to uphold the Constitution. The UP government refused, in a discussion in the state legislature, to be pinned down regarding the form of the kar seva.
 
The U.P. Counsel in the Supreme Court, K.K. Venugopal, assured the court that the State government would not allow the ground situation in Ayodhya to build up to a situation which resulted in violation of court orders. However, to a suggestion by the Attorney General[2] that extensive preparations were going on for kar seva, the court announced: "Preparation is not an offence. Only on our fullest satisfaction before us that state government has failed in its duty will we pass any orders". The VHP-BJP leaders showed apparent reasonableness in stating that kar seva would not involve any violation of court orders. On  November 28, 1992, recitations from the Gita were started on the disputed site even before the court passed its final orders on kar seva. The Court asked the UP government to file an affidavit after consultation with the VHP and to provide further guarantees that construction materials and machinery would not be kept near the disputed site. The submission of the Attorney General on the ground realities cited in the affidavit on kar seva and the deteriorating situation was brushed aside. So, on November 29, 1992, the Supreme Court finally passed its order on the carrying out of 'symbolic kar seva' and provided for its own observer to monitor the situation in Ayodhya and report on the same. The separation of the Judiciary and Executive moved a stage further. A division, in the appreciation of the ground realities, between the local administration and the judicial observer was created.
 
The `sangh parivar' had succeeded in neutralising any benefit that the Union government could have claimed from the orders of the court. The VHP took the UP government assurances as a tactical move. The Bajrang Dal Chief was more emphatic: "Supreme Court ruling can apply to an individual but not to an entire society." He stated on November 29 itself that kar seva was not just bhajans but temple construction also. L.K. Advani and M.M. Joshi were to take part in the planned kar seva. A BJP press release on the same day described the movement of building a temple at Ayodhya as "not the culmination but the commencement of national reassertion" and the proposed presence of these national leaders as "symbols of the party's commitment to national reassertion". In Ayodhya, Mahant Nritya Gopal Das stated that "a section of the Janambhoomi movement is so committed to the Hindu cause that if they decide to take matters into their own hands even the saints would be powerless to stop them". He also stated that a section of the Bajrang Dal could not be controlled. A half-way court order was, thus, foredoomed to fail in its objective. In any case, there were too many organisations involved and all of them were not party to the undertaking before the court directly or indirectly.
 
The confusion regarding the contents of the kar seva continued until December  6, 1992. Thus, the main task of mobilising the kar sevaks could be carried out without any problem. L.K. Advani is reported to have launched his march to Ayodhya from Varanasi with the announcement that kar seva would not be limited to `bhajans and kirtans'. By the time he reached Ayodhya, he was reported to have said firmly: "We will really construct the temple and not confine ourselves to symbolic kar seva of bhajans and kirtans." M.M. Joshi was more forthcoming. He asserted that the "Court can define and interpret the constitution and the laws but not the nature and the format of the kar seva", and that during the kar seva "everything, right from puja to construction can be done". The sadhus-sants on December 5, 1992 told the huge gathering of kar sevaks that kar seva would begin at 12.15 pm on the next day, there would be no construction on the 2.77 acres of disputed land, and that they should follow the instructions of the sadhus in regard to modalities of kar seva. The VHP General Secretary is reported to have stated, "The construction will be carried out but at its own pace and in conjunction with the advice of experts, not on the court's instructions".
 
The kar sevaks were given a clear message that the Court order was not sacrosanct. There need not be any construction on 2.77 acres of disputed land but elsewhere. It was not necessary to have construction material and equipment at or near the site; transportation from places of storage nearby would not be a problem. The court observer's report was confined to the area of dispute and activities there, and therefore monitoring would not interfere with any of the arrangements planned. In any case, the Court had already ruled that preparation alone was no offence.
 
The Fate of the Structure
 
The failure to restore status-quo-ante in the Babri Masjid structure had made any development possible. The Puri Sankaracharya was not the only one who demanded that it should be demolished. This was implicit in the repeated efforts of Chief Minister, Kalyan Singh, to persuade Muslims to agree to relocate the mosque outside the boundaries defined by the VHP. By November 20, Vinay Katiyar announced that there was, "no guarantee for the safety of the existing structure". While RSS Joint Secretary, Rajendra Singh, promised that the masjid would not be damaged, General Secretary H.V. Seshadri announced that "pre-construction work" involving levelling of land, cleaning and watering outside the disputed area would be carried out. L.K. Advani is reported to have said in Varanasi: "We do not want to destroy any Masjid and make a Mandir. There was never a Masjid at Ramjanambhoomi Site". Simultaneously, M. M Joshi was noting unambiguously that the proposed construction of Ram temple was impossible without demolishing the Babri Masjid.
 
The implications of such stances on the local situation in Ayodhya were to create a real risk to the old structure. The Home Ministry was is aware of this risk, as is abundantly clear from the guarded language of the letter to the Chief Minister of U.P. on December 5, 1992 which was also leaked to the press. He went to the extent of stating: "The possibility of some mischievous elements using explosives to damage the Ramjanambhoomi-Babri Masjid structure cannot be ruled out". The local police were apprehending construction at the site of the Babri Masjid from November 28, 1992 onwards. On December 2, it was noted that Shiv Sainiks along with others could be expected to destroy the disputed structure. On December 3, 1992 one Manas Maharathi Tyagi is reported to have told the kar sevaks that the disputed structure should be destroyed with a blow (jhatka). In the public meeting on December 5, resentment was expressed calling the place of rest of "Ram Lalla" a Masjid, with the assertion that this would be tolerated no longer. Slogans calling for demolition of the Masjid were heard in the night of December 5-6, 1992.
 
The fate of the Babri Masjid was sealed. Demolition was not off the agenda. Construction was on the agenda and it was to be on land covered by the Supreme Court judgement. Clearing, levelling, and watering had been planned. Engineering advice required had been arranged. Kar sevaks in large members were present not to do 'physical labour', but to immobilise the police and the administration, central as well as State. This was the scenario for the collapse of state authority on the eve of kar seva of December 6, 1992.
 
Central Intervention in Uttar Pradesh
 
Central government intervention would have had the potential of reducing the risks inherent in the developing situation at a number of stages. The sangh parivar' was aware of it and it took all steps to ensure that its government in UP remained in position. That was the insurance for total collaboration from the administration. That was the necessary condition for the larger mobilisation of kar sevaks.
 
The Centre could have intervened to give directives under Article 256 and 257 (1) of the Constitution for the misuse of the Land Acquisition Act in a way that heightened the communal divide, but this was not done. The Court orders were violated in July 1992, but there was no intervention as provided for under the Constitution when the State Government had failed to carry out its legal obligations. There was wholesale violation of laws, in demolishing religious structures, in terrorising mahants, in levelling land, but the administrative machinery remained collusive or, at the Union level, inactive.
 
The BJP and its allied organisations blew hot and cold to ensure that Central intervention was averted under all circumstances. As early as November 6, 1992 Chief Minister Kalyan Singh stated, "If the centre forcibly tries to confront my Government over the Mandir issue, it should be ready to face the consequences. I am not bothered about confrontation. I am ready to face it". On November 20, 1992,  Vinay Katiyar indicated that their plan was based on the assumption that the Centre would sack the U.P. government before the start of kar seva onDecember 6. By  November 22, when the BJP combine declared the boycott of the NIC, the VHP General Secretary claimed that the Centre was considering dismissal, and another functionary speculated that the UP government would be dismissed by 26 November. The Janata Dal and Left Front joined the issue on 23 November. "I see no other alternative but to dismiss the state government", said Jyoti Basu, "if it violates the Constitution and the court order". V.P. Singh added: "If necessary the Kalyan Singh government has to be dismissed". There was no response from the Union Government.
 
L.K. Advani threatened on  November 27, 1992 that his party would bring proceedings in both Houses of Parliament to a halt if the U.P. government was dismissed prior to the resumption of kar seva. The Attorney General had cited an IB report to the Supreme Court judges on November 27, to prove that the facts given by the U.P. government in their affidavit were incorrect. The Centre had, therefore, a duty to intervene as provided for in Article 355 of the Constitution. The Centre showed an extraordinary reluctance to intervene. The call for a "Challenge Day" (Lalkar Diwas) fromNovember 29, 1992 was another opportunity for intervention under Article 355. On December 4, the Home Minister was still stating in the Lok Sabha that the matter was at a delicate stage and he should be left to deal with it appropriately, stating "I do not know why such doubts are being raised. Government has no reason to disbelieve U.P. C.M who said he would protect the mosque."
 
The proceedings in the Supreme Court on November 26, when intervention by the Union Government was sought by some parties, brought the following observations from the Court: "What prevents the central government from taking such action as advised, taking into account the gravity of the situation. Why a Court Order?" Since the Union government failed to act on the basis of information at its command, L.K. Advani announced on December 3, that the BJP government would, under no circumstances, use force to prevent the kar seva from taking place. The BJP had succeeded in keeping its government in U.P. in position, to fully facilitate the implementation of the plans of the Sangh Parivar.
 
 (The report of the Citizens Tribunal was published in May 1994; the Amici Curiae were : K. G. Kannabiran, A. G. Noorani, Lotika Sarkar; the Secretariat Members were : Anuradha Chenoy, Achin Vanaik, E. Deenadayalan, Gautam Navlakha, Raju Damle, Sumanto Bannerjee, Tapan Bose)

 

[1] Narasimha Rao was the prime minister of the government controlled by the Congress party at the time
[2] Milon K. Banerji was Attorney General of India at the time

Peacekeepers: A DM and SP prevent bloodshed in the wake of the Ramjanmabhoomi yatra, 1989

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An Officer and a Gentleman

 
The Ram Shila Pujan programme launched by Hindutva in 1989 was like a hurricane which shook secular India by the roots. Braving the tornado, a district magistrate and a superintendent of police stood by their post in Khargone, a communally sensitive town in M.P. In an exclusive to Communalism Combat, Harsh Mander gives a moving account of a humane and impartial administration’s encounter with the storm-troopers of hate
 
The storm – clouds gathered over the entire country with terrifying speed. It was the autumn of 1989, and in the short space of a few tension-racked weeks, the country changed course so fundamentally that the many values and beliefs which held us together as one people seemed to be relentlessly and inexorably swept aside.
 
The Bharatiya Janata Party and its assemblage of militant Hindutva allies announced the launching of combative direct action to build a Ram Temple at the disputed site of the Babri Masjid at Ayodhya. The resort to legal and political processes to achieve this agenda were pushed to the background, now there would be an open and bloody battle if necessary.
 
This new mood of belligerence manifested itself in the countrywide Ram Shila Poojan programme. In villages and towns across the country, bricks emblazoned with the name ‘Ram’, were consecrated, worshipped and aggressively paraded through every lane and by-lane. Finally, they were transported to Ayodhya for the construction of the Ram Temple at the site of the doomed Babri Masjid, which still stood then as a forlorn symbol of India’s secularism.
 
The Ram Shila Poojan programme was launched on September 15, 1989, and was to become a watershed in modern Indian history. For, in the space of the next few days the country was seized by frenzy unprecedented since Partition. Groups of overcharged young men paraded the streets in every town, morning and evening, day after day, aggressively bearing bricks in the name of Ram, throwing acid at Muslims, shouting slogans which were astounding in their virulence, crudeness and naked aggression.
 
Huddled in their ghettos, the Muslims watched with disbelief and horror which turned quickly to cold terror and sullen anger. For many of them, their faith and hope built doggedly over tour decades soured. Avowedly secular governments across the country except West Bengal refused to ban the explosive Ram Shila Poojan programme, the media and intelligentsia were quickly infected by the communal dementia sweeping the land. Even secular voices corroborated with their deafening silence.
 
In less than ten days, town after town fell in a grim roll call of blood-drenched riot and curfew. The sequence was repeated with aching uniformity – militant processions brandishing Ram bricks shouting hate-filled slogans day after day, violent retaliation by small Muslim groups followed by carnage, deaths, arson and, finally, curfew. At one point, around three weeks after the launching of the programme, as many as 108 towns were simultaneously under curfew.
 
It was futile to expect the small district town of Khargone in western Madhya Pradesh to remain untouched by the sectarian fever that had seized the land. An undersized, haphazardly planned town with a population of less than one lakh persons, in an uneasy balance of an almost equal strength of Hindus and Muslims, Khargone is classified in official files as communally hyper-sensitive.

In villages and towns across the country, bricks emblazoned with the name ‘Ram’, were consecrated, worshipped and aggressively paraded through every lane and by-lane. Finally, they were transported to Ayodhya for the construction of the Ram Temple at the site of the doomed Babri Masjid, which still stood then as a forlorn symbol of India’s secularism

Records show that the first communal clash took place as far back as 1921 when Khargone was the capital of a tiny and modest princedom. The conflict has recurred with frightening regularity over the following decades.
 
With such an accumulated history of hatred and prejudice between the two communities of the town, it was only a matter of time before the conflagration sweeping the country also seared the town of Khargone. The pattern was the same – belligerent processions everyday charged with slogans of hate. The young DM and SP responded by calling meetings of the two communities, advising restraint, registering strong criminal charges against the processionists, energising peace committees, preventive arrests and so on. However, these measures, adequate perhaps in normal times, could not ebb the raging flood of communal hatred.
 
Flash point was rapidly approached in less than a fortnight, when the district wide Ram Shila Poojan programme was to climax in a massive procession in Khargone on September 30, 1989. Late night on the September 29, Bajrang Dal and Vishwa Hindu Parishad volunteers were busy transforming the town into a saffron stronghold, with a profusion of flags, posters, slogans and buntings. Suddenly, out of the darkness, two Muslim youth, their faces masked by burqas, appeared on a motor-cycle and flashed daggers, seriously injuring two young men who were painting slogans. In the government hospital, a night-long series of emergency operation saved the lives and limbs of the victims, but the tension in the town was acutely palpable.
 
Several arrests were made through the night. At dawn, leaders of the various Hindutva factions were summoned to the police station for an emergency meeting with the DM and the SP. The appeals of the district officers for a cancellation or postponement of the Ram Shila Poojan programme that morning were stubbornly rejected, as were the appeals for changes in route to avoid Muslim settlements and mosques altogether.
 
Already some 25-30,000 Hindutva volunteers had assembled, determined and highly charged. The DM and SP realised that any attempt to halt the procession by force was doomed to failure and would only lead to large-scale violence and killings. The only option seemed to be to let the procession pass with intensive control and regulation.
 
The procession was unprecedented in size, passion and militancy. All assurances regarding restraint in sloganeering given earlier, in writing by the organisers, were thrown to the winds as the most vulgar and vicious slogans rent the air. Trishuls and naked daggers were flashed. The leaders suddenly attempted to steer the processionists into the heart of the Muslim bastis contrary to prior agreement. But they were firmly pushed back to the agreed route.
 
The seemingly endless procession wound its way through the narrow lanes at a tortuously slow speed, as tension mounted to unbearable levels. As it passed the mosques in particular, the virulence and passion of the sloganeering acquired a new pitch. The executive magistrates and the police had to physically push the frenzied young men forward. No Muslim was seen out of doors.
 
With about two-thirds of the procession having passed by late afternoon, the DM and the SP began to believe that the explosion had been diffused, at least for that day.
 
Suddenly, a cluster of young men came running in panic from the direction opposite the procession, shouting that the Muslims had thrown a bomb on the crowd and that a processionist had been killed. The DM and the SP ran to the spot, barely 100 metres away. There they encountered a young man, his chest torn open by a crude bomb, his life quickly ebbing away, the crowd madly enraged. The DM quickly lifted the youth into his car which was parked nearby and asked the driver to rush him to hospital. He died before the car reached the hospital.
 
The story of the bomb attack which unfolded later was that the daily and repeated battery of vitriolic sloganeering by mobs of Hindu youth entering Muslim bastis had terrorised the community. But a small bunch of eight youth, two of them petty government servants – a forest guard and a patwari – decided to resort to a terrorist-type attack.
 
Their game-plan became clear to the DM and the SP as soon as they reached the spot after the first bomb was thrown. The bomb was hurled on the mob from a small double-storeyed house in a very narrow by-lane which branched off from the main lane through which the procession was passing. The calculation clearly was that the enraged mob would gather below the house for counter-attack when a series of bombs would be thrown on the mob from above, resulting in a large number of deaths.
 
The DM and the SP repeatedly shouted to the mob that they were taking charge of the situation and that they, the mob, should stay away. Most of the crowd listened and tentatively stayed at bay.
 
Once below the house, the best course appeared to be to fire at the house from where the bomb was thrown. The SP himself, and an ASI who accompanied him, fired a repeated volley of rounds at the house. This served several purposes. The crowd was satisfied that effective action was being taken and did not insist on taking the law into their own hands.
 
The gunfire also frightened the conspiring men from throwing any more bombs and one of the young conspirators was caught by the police as he was running away from the house. It was through him that the subsequent police case was quickly solved.

The district magistrate went to see the district judge and said: “I have never tried to interfere with the judicial process. But in this case, with the same offence committed in the same riot, how can there be two openly different standards for people of two communities – one for Hindus, another for Muslims? It is not an ordinary case, it is the question of the faith of a whole community in the system of justice in our country”. But the district judge refused to even discuss the issue with the DM

 
The crowd now began to fan out in every direction with many rushing straight to the Muslim bastis. The DM imposed curfew immediately with clear instructions to the police and magistrates on duty in pickets at all sensitive points in the town, to enforce his directive with a firm hand in the shortest possible time. He authorised them to use force, including resort to firing, if necessary to carrying out his orders.
 
The DM and the SP jumped into the latter’s jeep and drove around the sensitive bastis. The SP himself had to fire several rounds. The police resorted to firing at three other places. Curfew was fully imposed in the brief period of twenty minutes.
 
However, in these twenty minutes, four lives were lost, about a hundred Muslim houses and commercial establishments set ablaze and three mosques desecrated. The deaths were by country made rifles and daggers used by mobs while attacking Muslim bastis and one by a bomb thrown by the fleeing group.
 
Soon, an uneasy calm fell over the city. Additional forces were called from neighbouring districts and permanent pickets established at sensitive points. All executive magistrates were pressed into duty, mobile police patrols scoured the city round the clock. Large-scale preventive arrests and searches were ordered. On the first night itself, 126 persons were arrested, but most of them were Muslim.
 
There was no relaxation of curfew for 72 hours with little violation barring the extensive desecration of four mosques on the second night. The anguished Muslim community insisted that this could not have been possible without police complicity.
 
The DM and SP snatched just two hours of sleep on the second night, inside the police station. That is where they spent the next 19 nights, first on benches under the tree and later, in camp-cots under a tent, fully dressed and ready to rush if a clash was reported. The rest of the time they were out on patrol.
 
The people of Khargone were to become very familiar with the while Gypsy and its flashing red light endlessly scouring the shadowy and deserted lanes and by-lanes of the city. The control room was assailed by a continuous barrage of complaints about mob assault, all of which were checked out and most of which proved to be just rumours. The press was regularly briefed, special arrangements were made for the distribution of newspapers from the second day, in order to control rumours. The peace committee and responsible leaders of the two communities were pressed into service.
 
The DM mobilised the services of the Public Works’ Department to repair and restore the desecrated mosques with the support of moderate Muslim leaders overnight, before the first two-hour relaxation of curfew. The Muslims wound their way straight to the mosques to offer prayers. The fresh paint and mortar told their own stories to which they responded with low voices and strained, sombre faces. But except for an explosion just before the end of curfew relaxation, in which none was injured, there was no major setback.
 
The police force was stretched almost unendurably. Since the commencement of the Ram Shila Poojan programme a fortnight earlier, the armed constabulary had been on continuous vigil in neighbouring districts. With the riots at Khargone, they were hastly bundled onto buses and trucks, driven into the town overnight and immediately deputed to sensitive spots.
 
The DM and the SP made it a point to stop at each of the pickets during their night-long rounds, speak to the men about how difficult but important their mission was and occasionally share a cup of tea with them. Later, the two officers would often recall with warmth, how the weary faces of the men lit up with just this exchange as they stood erect and alert at their watch posts. Weeks later, before the men left for the next riot-torn city, the DM persuaded eminent citizens of the town to organise a thanksgiving bada khana for the policemen, in which they sat and ate as city elders served them.
 
Four days after the bomb attack, the DM from neighbouring Indore telephoned to say that one of the seriously injured riot victims, a young man named Ghulam, had died in the medical college in Indore and asked the district officers from Khargone to arrange for the disposal of the body. Communal tension had risen in Indore as well and they could not risk organising the funeral there.
 
The DM and SP decided to go the thana (police station) to other solace to the bereaved family. They encountered the mother weeping inconsolably near the body of her son. The DM said quietly, “We cannot bring back your son, but tell us who was responsible for this and we will ensure that justice is done”.
 
The mother replied angrily: “There is no point telling you the names of the killers. Every time there are riots in Khargone, the same men lead the mobs for looting, burning and killing, but nothing ever happens to them. During the last riots, we were hopeful because the police even took down our statements. We waited for four days but nothing happened. In the end the police did come, but it was we who got arrested. Therefore, we have nothing to say.”
 
The DM promised that this time justice would be done and pressed them for the names. They finally gave the names charging some of the most powerful and respected men of the district. The DM said to the SP, “Let us round them all up before the body of this boy is lowered into the grave”.
 
It was past midnight when the dead body was taken to the graveyard, a bush-covered wilderness outside the town. Before the body was lowered into the grave, the SP arrived in his jeep, rushed to the DM, who was with the bereaved family and said, “They have all been arrested”.
 
It was about three o’clock in the morning when the DM and the SP returned to their tent in the police station and wearily stretched out, fully dressed, to catch a little sleep. Barely two hours later, they were awakened by an uproar at the thana gates. Rubbing their eyes sleepily, they found that the local MLA of the ruling party had arrived with a group of her supporters, all holding curfew passes.
 
“Injustice, injustice”, she screamed along with her supporters, “We will not put up with this injustice. We will not allow the arrest of innocent people”.
 
The DM quickly understood what had happened and was furious. “Tell me”, he asked the MLA, “are you the representative of a particular community or of this town? In the last few days, when hundreds of Muslims were arrested, beaten, dragged by their beards and placed behind bars with no criminal records or complaints against them, I never heard a whimper of protest from you. But when ten persons are arrested for murder, you come charging here and complain of injustice?”
 
The MLA’s protest was only the beginning. That day, the DM came under more pressure than he had experienced in a single day on any issue during his frequently turbulent career. The chief minister telephoned to enquire why there was so much outrage. The DM replied that it was a matter of basic justice and that he would not change his decision. He was relieved that the CM did not get back to him. But from the state capital downwards, pressure continued to mount.
 
Late that night, according to their daily routine since the tension in the town had first arisen, the DM and the SP sat at the thana, reviewing the arrests and releases of the day. With great reluctance, and after considerable probing, the Station House Officer revealed that the ten men arrested the night before, which had led to the detonation of such powerful protest, had been released by the court the same morning.
 
Further questioning revealed that the police had framed charges against them, not of murder, arson and rioting, but the most minor offence of all – violation of curfew. Not surprisingly, the courts had let them off after a find of fifty rupees each.
 
The DM cannot recall being more enraged in his life. Everyone was stunned to see the normally soft-spoken and restrained officer explode, shouting about their deceit and open partisanship, and charging that they were not fit to wear uniforms. He threatened to chase them right up to hell if the ten men were not rounded up again within an hour. The police officers rushed back into town and the ten accused men were re-arrested. This time the DM and the SP personally supervised the preparation of documents for the courts.
 
However, it was now the turn of the Sessions Court to release the accused on bail within a week. On the other hand, the Muslims, who had by then been rounded up in the bomb case, were refused bail for over a year. The DM went to see the district judge and said: “I have never tried to interfere with the judicial process. But in this case, with the same offence committed in the same riot, how can there be two openly different standards for people of two communities – one for Hindus, another for Muslims? It is not an ordinary case; it is the question of the faith of a whole community in the system of justice in our country”. But the district judge refused to even discuss the issue with the DM.
 
Complaints also came in about excesses in Muslim bastis during the house-to-house searches. The DM visited these houses. It looked as if a tornado had swept through them. Everything inside – TVs, radios, mattresses, furniture, artifacts – had been smashed, torn or burnt by the police. An old woman of about 70 showed to the DM deep lathi marks all over her body, from her shoulders down to her ankles. The DM ordered strong action against the guilty policemen. The complaints did not recur.
 
Several nights after peace had returned to the rest of the town, there was a recurrent complaint from the Hindus of one mohalla that stones were being hurled at their homes every night from a nearby mosque. The residents were outraged.
 
The mosque was so far from the houses of the complainants that it was physically impossible for anyone to hurl stones at them from such a distance. But the residents stubbornly refused to listen to reason because of the blind and wanton irrationality that infects a large majority of otherwise rational citizens in any riot situation.

Finally the young man spoke, “Everytime there is a riot in this town, my hut is burned down. It has happened again and again. Tell me, how many times will you rebuild my house?”
 
The SP’s suspicion centred on an elderly resident, a member of a Hindu communalist organization since his youth. But there was no proof. Until one night, when the DM and the SP rushed to the mohalla at 3 a.m. on a fresh complaint and the SP found a broken cup amidst the stones. Without any warning, the SP marched into the house of the elderly resident and found five other cups in his kitchen matching the broken one. And, on the second floor of his house, the SP saw something which neither he nor the DM will ever forget.
 
Near his bedroom window was a large trunk full of stones. The old man stayed up every night until everyone else in the neighbourhood had slept and then hurled stones at his neighbours’ windows. As they gathered angrily outside their homes, he would say, “Look at these hateful people. Even after all that has happened, they are still throwing stones at us”.
 
But, most of all, the DM will probably remember a young man who’s humble, thatched hovel, which stood in the most densely populated part of the old town, at the boundary of Hindu and Muslim settlements, had been razed to the ground during the riots. Days later, when some sanity had returned to the town, the DM sat with him and others among the ruins of their homes and belongings. With whatever conviction he could muster, the DM said, “Do not worry, we will rebuild your house and all will be well once more”.
 
Hearing this, the young man suddenly broke the heavy silence of the evening crying loudly like a child. He just couldn’t be consoled. The DM felt the sharp sting of tears in his own eyes.
 
Finally the young man spoke, “Everytime there is a riot in this town, my hut is burned down. It has happened again and again. Tell me, how many times will you rebuild my house?”
 
The DM pledged to himself to do all that was within his power to help rebuild the lives of the riot victims. He called the local leaders of the communal parties and told them:  “I know your aim is not merely to take lives, or loot and destroy the property of people belonging to the other community during riots. You want, even more, to see their wounds fester as they continue to suffer. I am throwing you a challenge. Those whose lives you have taken away, I cannot bring back. But I promise you the district administration will ensure that those alive who have suffered because of you are much better off than when you set out to destroy them.
 
To the young man who had wept so inconsolably, and all the other poor residents of over-crowded old bastis filled with decades of hatred and prejudice, the DM offered space in a new part of town, where new mixed colonies were planned so they could live in security.
 
A large number agreed to move. The district administration acquired land, allotted plots and sought out grants and loans for them to build new homes. Those who had lost an earning member or their commercial establishments – often no more than a rented, ramshackle kiosk in the town’s periphery – were allotted commercially valuable sites in the heart of the town, where pucca shops were built and allotted to them on an ownership basis.
 
The next change in government predictably saw the DM shifted out of the district. Some years later, when on an assignment at the state headquarters, he visited Khargone once again. That evening he made a quiet, sentimental journey to the new tenement of the young man who had wept so desolately years earlier because his home had been burnt down once again by rioters.
 
The DM asked him what happened when Khargone was rocked by riots once again after the Babri Masjid had been razed in December 1992. He replied, “For the first time in my life I felt safe during a riot”.
 
It was not the young man, now secure in his new tenement, who wept silently that evening.
 
(The writer, was in 1994 when he wrote this article, Course Co-ordinator, IAS Phase I, Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration; Archived from the Communalism Combat issue of November December 1994, An officer and a gentleman)

Bibliography:
Hindutva: the doctrine of a Hindu theocratic state (those who believe in the Hindu theocratic state
Ram Shila Pujan: the political programme using religion to collect bricks and build a temple at the north Indian town of Ayodhya; the campaign has been laced with strong anti-minority rhetoric
yatra : journey, procession
patwari: village accountant
thana: local police station
bastis: neighbourhoods, slum dwellings
pucca: means firm, signifies homes made from permanent materials
lathi: stick
burqa: black veil
trishul: tridents
bada khana: feast

The Nairobi Surrender: Modi government capitulates to the USA and the EU

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Image Courtesy: PTI

At Nairobi the dismal failure of the Modi Government to legally defend the rights of the people of India and other developing countries is nothing but an abject surrender. The Modi government failed to live up to its initial grandstanding at the Nairobi Ministerial. India failed to be firm with the developed world. The cost of this surrender cannot be hidden by merely expressing disappointment at the outcome. The Modi Government is only trying to hide the compromise made at the expense of legitimate development concerns. As at Paris,  where the Modi Government compromised in the Climate Summit Conference after a single call from Obama, India has again chosen to cave in to the pressures from the US and the Economic Union.

At Nairobi, India chose to surrender the only instrument that it had as a bargaining chip by agreeing to the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA). The TFA is nothing but an import facilitation agreement. In the World Trade Organisation (WTO) India had the option to tell the developed world  that,  since you are not ready to  negotiate the Doha agenda we will not be implementing the Trade Facilitation Agreement. In the WTO the accepted practice goes along the principle of “Nothing is agreed till everything is agreed”. The Modi Government needs to explain how India allowed the Trade Facilitation Agreement to be included in the declaration when the developed countries did not keep to their part of the commitments.

After all the noise the Modi Government had made on how the decision reached at Bali on public stockholding was wrong, India has given in unilaterally at Nairobi, without even asking for a quid pro quo in terms of a permanent solution to the public stock holding programme. It is unpardonable. No control or monitoring of the Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM), and the mere acceptance of a work programme, means not only infinite postponement of the decision, but also a heavy price that India and other developing countries will have to pay in terms of the virtually unaccountable granting of greater market access. The irony is that the developed world is allowed protection against import surges in the agriculture and food products sector when only four to eight per cent of its population are dependent on agriculture, while the developing countries where over seventy per cent of the people depend on agriculture for their livelihood, are not being allowed by the US and EU to use the SSM to protect their own people. At Nairobi, the US and EU refused to allow negotiations on the issue of their own subsidies for agriculture. In the US, domestic agricultural subsidies have risen from 60 billion to 140 billion dollars. In the developed world the cow gets more subsidy than the farmer gets in India. The Modi Government has chosen to cave in on agriculture – which is not surprising, given its treatment of agriculture. It appears that the Modi Government looked the other way in the WTO at Nairobi so that it could tell the farmers that our hands were tied by WTO! A strong government? Or a weak-kneed capitulation by the Centre after much breast-beating? We must decide.

The “Doha development Round” is dead in the water. There is no unanimity on reaffirming the Doha Mandates, approaches and modalities of addressing the negotiations (Para 30). There is no unanimity on the Doha Structures and architectures (Para 32). There is no reference to the Trade Negotiating Committee (TNC), the supreme organ conducting the Doha negotiations. The only reference is to the General Council and Director General of WTO (Para 33). The declaration adopted at Nairobi is effectively the death knell of the Doha Development Round.

India and other developing countries had the option to use the legal rights available in structure of the WTO. Rather than expressing disappointment the Minister should have mobilised the developing countries to prevent the “Nairobi Surrender” from happening.

As if this humiliation was not enough, Para 34 goes on to state that “some wish to identify and discuss other issues for negotiations; while others do not”. The subtle change from “many” and “others” in Para 32 to “some” and “others” in Para 34 not only grants parity to opposing views but also constitutes an open invitation to table all new issues in the General Council (GC). The GC is a subordinate organ to the Ministerial Meeting, and not being bound by a mandate given to the TNC, will be well within its competence to take on board all the new issues. Developing countries will find themselves in no position to stop this.

Even to the deaf and blind, it is clear how the entire process, at the Tenth Ministerial Meeting was opaque, consensus-defying and exclusionary, driven by a few members.  Para 30 redundantly states “We acknowledge strong legal structure of this organisation.” India and other developing countries had the option to use the legal rights available in structure of the WTO. Rather than expressing disappointment the Minister should have mobilised the developing countries to prevent the “Nairobi Surrender” from happening.

If the Modi Government had shown courage and defended the rights legally, the Nairobi Ministerial could have been forced to take decisions by prescribed majorities. If this was not possible the Ministerial should have been allowed to collapse. In the latter case, India would have brought back the Doha Development Round to where it was before Nairobi without any encumbrances, such as of having to accept the exploration of new architectures which involves bringing back all the new issues – investment, government procurement, competition, state-owned enterprises, environment, labour and so on.

All these issues had been raised by the developed countries at the Singapore Ministerial in 1996, but were rejected by India. The Singapore Ministerial was not allowed to include these issues in the Work Programme. India was not afraid of being isolated and stood firm. This time India failed to nip in the bud the process of the new issues.  The Modi Government was timid inside and too intimidated. The Modi government is now shedding crocodile tears. The Minister is expressing disappointment after the deal is done at Nairobi and our interests have been sacrificed. This is of little use to the Indian people.

After Nairobi, India and other developing countries have further increased their cost of participation in WTO on account of the omissions and commissions of the Modi Government. India failed to mobilise other developing countries to exercise the legal rights available to them in the WTO. Unfortunately there was no discussion in the parliament prior to the Minister’s departure for Nairobi. We call on the Indian Parliament to debate the commissions and omissions of the Modi Government at Nairobi and direct the Modi Government to take initiatives to rebuild Southern unity. 

The government should be asked to prepare a White Paper on the WTO negotiations and on the various free trade agreements (FTAs) and autonomous liberalisation to stop further erosion of development policy space so crucial to the realisation of development concerns which include the basic rights to food, employment, education, public health and safe environment. The parliament should take over the power of the executive to enter into international agreements and treaties.

The National Working Group on Patent Laws and WTO call upon the farmers’ organisations, trade unions, mass organizations of students, youth, women, dalits, adivasis and all the other social groups to mobilize the people against further damage being done by the government through executive action in international treaties.

 (The author is the Convener National Working Group on Patent Laws; his email is  dinesh.abrol@gmail.com)      

WTO Nairobi Ministerial Declaration

 
 

CBI U-Turn against its own chargesheet in the Sohrabuddin case, the caged parrot syndrome?

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Illustration: Uday Mohite DNA

Mihir Desai, advocate for Sohrabuddin in Mumbai

In December, 2005 Rubabuddin Shaikh wrote a letter to the Chief Justice of India complaining about the killing of his brother Sohrabuddin and the disappearance of his sister in law Kauser Bi at the hands of the Gujarat Police, the Anti Terrorism Squad (ATS) and the Rajasthan Police.  The Court forwarded the letter to the Director General of Police for an enquiry. During the pendency of the enquiry Tulsiram Prajapati, a witness to the abduction of Sohrabuddin and his wife Kauser Bi was, also  killed in an encounter (extra-judicial killing). Rubabuddin approached the Supreme Court seeking a CBI investigation.

The Supreme Court first asked the Gujarat Police to investigate the matter. Certain police officers (prominently, Vanzara), were arrested. Charge sheets were filed and eight Action Taken Reports were produced before the Supreme Court by the State of Gujarat. Unsatisfied, the Supreme Court in 2010 came to the following conclusion:

“From the above factual discrepancies appearing in the 8 Action Taken Reports and from the Charge Sheet we therefore feel that the Police Authorities of the State of Gujarat had failed to carry out fair and impartial investigation as we initially wanted them to do."

The Supreme Court directed the CBI to carry out the investigation including on the issue of a larger conspiracy. The CBI started investigating the case and, on the basis of call records of the police officials and other evidence, submitted a chargesheet on 23.7.2010 in which Amit Shah was named as a co-conspirator. The chargesheet states that Amit Shah was the lynchpin in the conspiracy. Amit Shah was arrested. On 29.10.2010 Amit Shah was granted bail by the Gujarat High Court, The CBI appealed to the Supreme Court against this order. The bail was not cancelled but Amit Shah was asked to not enter Gujarat.

In its charge sheet, the CBI claimed that Amit Shah presided over an extortion racket and that it was under his pressure and at his behest that the Gujarat police tried to cover up his involvement in the killings. Phone records of the police officials at the time of killings of Sohrabuddin, Kauser Bi and Tulsi Prajapati were used to show that these police officers were in constant touch with Amit Shah. The trial was transferred to Mumbai.

Subsequently, Amit Shah filed a Discharge Application in the Sessions Court at Mumbai. The evidence that the prosecution had (CBI) was damning. G.C Raigar, Additional Director General of Police (ADGP) Home Guard, Gujarat who had the  Additional Charge of ADGP CID Crime, and was in charge of the  investigation into the case, had stated that Amit Shah personally told him not to involve high level police officials in the crime. Obviously if high level police officials were not involved, the link to Mr. Shah could not be established. The Patel brothers of Popular Builders, whose statements were also recorded, have stated that Amit Shah personally told them to give a false statement against Sohrabuddin and that they paid a large amount of money to a senior police officer for being paid to Mr. Shah so as to ensure that they are not falsely implicated in a crime.
There were also the call records between Amit Shah and the officers involved in the murder, during the killings. There were certain other allegations too against Mr. Shah.

It was the CBI’s investigation which led to his arrest and to the transfer of the case outside Gujarat…… Shockingly however, it chose not to challenge the order of the Sessions Court.

However, it was now 2014 and, by now the CBI had decided to do a U turn. The case was not effectively defended in the Sessions Court.  The Sessions Court discharged Amit Shah on 30.12.2014. According to me, there is sufficient material against Mr. Shah to put him on trial. It was the CBI’s investigation which led to his arrest and to the transfer of the case outside Gujarat. At the stage of discharge the Court is not required to weigh the evidence in detail. The Court is only required to see whether it is a fit case for proceeding on trial. CBI had found it a fit case to proceed on trial  by filing the charge sheet. In fact, ordinarily the CBI would have challenged the discharge order of the Sessions Court in the High Court – more so in a sensitive case like this where it had been appointed by the Supreme Court as the Investigating Agency and the trial had been transferred at the instance of the CBI due to the involvement of Amit Shah.

Shockingly however, it chose to not challenge the order of the Sessions Court. 

Rubabuddin,  Sohrabuddin’s brother challenged the order in the High Court.  He was the person who had brought the case to light 10 years ago by writing to the Supreme Court. He had diligently followed it up in the Supreme Court and in the Sessions Court for all these years. Suddenly, within months after filing against the discharge, he decided to withdraw the case from the High Court. I am reasonably certain that this was due to extreme pressure brought on him. I can never forget the terror in his eyes and the helplessness when he did it. The question still remains. Why did the CBI not adequately defend the case in the Sessions Court and why did it refuse to file an appeal. Is it the caged parrot syndrome?

SOHRABUDDIN CASE FILE

(The author  is a senior advocate in Mumbai)
 
References:

1. Gujarat Home Minister Amit Shah called cops arrested for killing Tulsi Prajapati, http://www.tehelka.com/2010/07/gujarat-home-minister-amit-shah-called-cops-arrested-for-killing-tulsi-prajapati-2/
2. The Amit Shah Files, Charge, No Charge, February 16, 2015, Outlookindia http://www.outlookindia.com/article/the-amit-shah-files/293300
3. Sohrabuddin case: How Patel bros were ‘fleeced’ http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-sohrabuddin-case-how-patel-bros-were-fleeced-1420791 
4. CATCH NEWS (Rubabuddin) October 10 2015 :I was threatened before I withdrew case against Amit Shah: Rubabuddin http://www.catchnews.com/india-news/yes-i-was-threatened-before-i-withdrew-the-case-sohrabuddin-s-brother-1445261071.html

Stop Killing Us: the Bhim Yatra of India’s Manual Scavengers tells the Indian government

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No Justice Delivery, India’s forgotten Safai Karmacharis have started a protest yatra that is traversing 500 districts in 30 states

 
Does a Supreme Court judgement ensure that the fundamental rights of Indians who die while cleaning for a living will be protected? No say India’s Manual Scavengers who die in filth, cleaning our dirt, despite a judgement passed to ensure that a law enacted in 1991 (and revised and re-enacted in 2013) is actually implemented. Over 1327 persons lost their lives in the year since the Supreme Court judgement and less than three per cent received any compensation.
 
On March 27, 2014, the Supreme Court passed a judgement —  twelve years after a public interest litigation (PIL) was filed by the Safai Karmachari Andolan— and issued specific directions to prevent and control this illegal practice as also to prosecute the offenders. The Judgement can be read here.

Despite the judgement of the Supreme Court that directs that such deaths in sewer holes and septic tanks should be stopped immediately,19 months after the judgement, deaths have continued to occur, with impunity, in sewer holes across the country.  The Safai Karamchari Andolan has reported 1327 sewer and septic tank deaths in the period since the judgement was passed in March 2014. Less than three percent have received compensation.
 
In December this year, faced with this reality, India’s safai karmacharis have been forced to resort to the streets to protest. A country wide yatra, the Bhim Yatra is a journey of pain and anguish, to tell the country and the government to ‘STOP KILLING US (the manual scavengers)’ in dry latrines, sewers and septic tanks. The Bhim Yatra will criss-cross across the country for 125 days passing through 500 districts in 30 states. It began its journey on International Human Rights day from Delhi on December 10, 2015 and will end back in the capital, on April 13, 2016. This is the eve of the 125th birth centenary of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar (April 14, 2016). 

Days after the Yatra began, tragic deaths of such workers, all migrants to Bengaluru, were reported. All three had died after descending into a sewage treatment plant in a residential apartment complex in Bengaluru’s Electronic City area. Ranjan (32) was from Odisha, Jagadish Kumar (28) from KR Nagar in Mysuru, and Mahesh (30) from Nepal (December 16, 2015). On October 25, 2013, two workers from Bihar died in the Peenya industrial area in Bengalaru.[1] Tamil Nadu reported 150 deaths due to this practice [2]. The Madras High Court is now reportedly monitoring the implementation of manual scavenging laws in the state. "In our view, it is necessary to take expeditious steps to implement the provisions of the Prohibition of Employment as Manual Scavengers & Their Rehabilitation Act, 2013, coupled with the directions of the Supreme Court in letter and spirit promptly," the Court has said on a petition filed PIL filed by Change India director A Narayanan in June 2015.

According to the report in Indiaspend.org, “While the (railway) ministry denies employing manual scavengers officially, the affidavits it has submitted in the court in the past nine years suggest that barring a few trains, the railways does not employ any technology to keep its 80,000 toilets and 115,000 kilometres of tracks clean,” according to Down To Earth magazine.
 
On November 18, 2015, Indiaspend.org reported how the state in India was the biggest offender. The report said that “Maharashtra has more than 63,000 households dependent on manual scavenging, followed by Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Tripura and Karnataka, according to a question answered by Minister of State for Social Justice and Empowerment Vijay Sampla in the Lok Sabha.” [3]  In September 2015, the Delhi High court ordered a survey in the capital to determine the extent of manual scavenging. The Ministry of Railways told the court that manual scavenging cannot be completely eradicated until stations get washable aprons and sealed toilet systems. According to the report in Indiaspend.org, “While the (railway) ministry denies employing manual scavengers officially, the affidavits it has submitted in the court in the past nine years suggest that barring a few trains, the railways does not employ any technology to keep its 80,000 toilets and 115,000 kilometres of tracks clean,” according to Down To Earth magazine.
 
Hence the Bhim Yatra
 
Since 1982, there has been a strong movement against this violence and discrimination. The movement was a demand for the demolition of the dry latrines that are the visible structures of an inhuman caste system and its link with this de-humanising occupation.
 
In 1993 the Indian Parliament passed the “The Employment of Manual Scavengers and Construction of Dry Latrines (prohibition) Act 1993, with imprisonment for up to one year and/or a fine of Rs 2,000. This law has never been effectively implemented and no convictions have taken place under this law during the first 20 years it was in force. The government has given many false assurances but not in any way worked actively to stop this practice.
 
It was the Safai karmachari Andolan that consistently exposed the hypocrisy of the government surveys and schemes. In year 2000 when the government counted only 679,000 manual scavengers, the movement came out with documented figures of 1.3 million, that too from a survey randomly conducted in states and districts. There is a long list of dates when India’s Prime Minister (s) and chief ministers (of various states) have made token statements of setting deadlines to end this illegal and de-humansing practice : 1995, then 2000, then 2003, then 2005, then 2010, and then 2012. But, nothing has changed.
 
Finally, in 2003, the Safar Karmachari Andolan filed the Public Interest Litigation in the Supreme Court. There was an ironic pattern to the government responses before the Court. First, a total denial of existence of manual scavenging, next a partial admission when the petitioners produced photographic evidence and finally, faking a compliance by dubiously destroying (dry latrines) only in those places, presented by the petitioners in their evidence in Court. 

It was in 2007, with the solidarity and support of many citizens groups and public leaders, that the Andolan launched the Action 2010 campaign to end manual scavenging by December 2010. Still, nothing moved. So the Andolan started out on the historical bus yatra in October 2010. This Samajik Parivartan Yatra which was the first of its kind, and journeyed through the entire country. Many Women and men were able to come free from this practice of manual scavenging. The women in the yatra had taken to the stage and their powerful speeches had shaken the conscience of the country, somewhat.
 
Then there were a series of more protests and actions. The demands included the implementation of the 1993 Act and a rehabilitation package. The National Advisory Council (NAC) of the last government passed a resolution on 23 October 2010, vowing to end manual scavenging by March 31, 2012.  Following further mobilisations with the central government, the Ministry of Social justice and Empowerment convened the national consultation on January 24-25, 2011 which resulted in the setting up of four task forces – to review the act, conduct a national survey, revise the rehabilitation package and sanitation solutions. The President of India in her speech to the Parliament at the start of the budget session, in March 2012 announced the draft for a new bill for prohibition of manual scavenging. The Government of India finally passed the new ‘Prohibition of Employment as Manual Scavengers and their Rehabilitation Act 2013’ in September 2013 and issued Government notification in December 2013.
 
It was after 12 long years, the Supreme Court passed the Judgment order on March 27, 2014 on the writ petition (civil) no. 583 of 2003, Safai Karamchari Andolan & Ors Versus Union of India & Ors., directing all the State Governments and the Union Territories to

  1. fully implement and take appropriate action for non-implementation as well as violation of the provisions contained in the 2013 Act,
  2. to prevent deaths in sewer holes and septic tanks and make the manual cleaning of sewers and septic tanks a crime even in emergency situations and
  3. to give compensation of Rs.10 lakhs to families of all persons who have died in manholes and septic tanks since 1993. 

 
The government has been negligent in implementing the Prohibition of Employment of Manual Scavengers and their Rehabilitation Act 2013 and in following, and implementing, the Supreme Court order. It is the experience of the protesting groups that, when deaths do occur, FIRs (First Information Reports of the crime) are rarely ever filed. Only after heavy pressure and agitation, if FIRs are filed, deaths are recorded “due to negligence” and never under the Manual Scavenging Prohibition Act and SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act (which have severe punitive measures). This blatant violation of the law is sucking away at the lives of the safai karamcharis, who die in sewers and septic tanks. It is extremely disturbing that these deaths which are not decreasing, possibly increasing, are treated with such callousness by the government.
 
Indian Parliament held a discussion on the country’s "Commitment to the Constitution" to mark the 125 birth centenary of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar. To give real meaning to this celebration would be to protect the Constitutional rights of the Manual Scavengers. The Bhim Yatra, say the organisers, "is a journey to protest this intolerance, this violence and discrimination against this forgotten section of our society. It is a cry for the Constitutional and Fundamental rights of Manual Scavengers." The Bhim Yatra will simultaneously spread Ambedkar’s ideas of social justice, liberty, equality and fraternity while proclaiming his war cry ‘educate, organise and agitate’.

 

[1] Manual Scavenging: Pushing manual scavengers into death holes, when will Bengaluru learn? http://www.thenewsminute.com/article/pushing-manual-scavengers-death-holes-when-will-bengaluru-learn-36843
[3] Jobs Outlawed, But State Main Employer Of Manual Scavengers http://www.indiaspend.com/cover-story/jobs-outlawed-but-state-main-employer-of-manual-scavengers-47324
 

Black Out – The West Bengal Police prevent screening of a film, Jai Shree Ram

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Echoes of the deep schisms caused by and around the demolition of the Babri Masjid on December 6, 1992, and the movement for building a temple in the name of Rama were felt on this December 6, 2015, 23 years later in West Bengal’s Behrampore. Jai Shree Ram, (Hail to Lord Ram) a film that was scheduled for a closed-door screening and at the hall that belongs to the Murshidabad People's Relief Committee was stopped as the police suddenly stepped in and prevented the event from going ahead.
 
A young film maker, Jul Mukherjee's 'Jai Shree Ram', is a full length feature film made over 24 months of hard work and individual contributions sourced through crowd funding. Why was this screening suddenly stopped by the West Bengal Police? The state’s chief minister, Mamta Banerjee has been quick to come out in support of Aamir Khan when he was targeted by rabid followers of Hindutvawaadi supremacist thought, recently.
 
There are four clips available on the film on You-Tube. Three are short trailers and the fourth is a fascinating discussion by the team behind the film titled, “Jai Shree Ram: Stories and Ideas behind the making of the film.”


 
One of the major protagonists for the film is a young Muslim, an atheist who is suddenly confronting an identity that is being thrust upon him “Are you a Bengali or a Muslim?” is a question that sums up the tragic-irony of the times. One of Jul’s team said he experienced every day what has been scripted in the film. The other major protagonist is a “Bahurupi Hanuman” who becomes a fundamentalist (read supremacist tool) of the masters behind the (Ramjanmabhoomi) movement.
 
Jul Mukherjee was 10-11 years old that Sunday in 1992, when the Babri Masjid was demolished. He recalls with chilling horror the conversations within his home, at Howrah, that had suddenly (following through the trajectory of the Ram Janmabhoomi movement)legitimised hatred against Indian Muslims.  Jul remembers being very scared that day, Sunday December 6. “Those B…they have arms,” he overheard his father telling his mother that afternoon, referring to a Muslim locality not far from where they lived.
 
The childhood of most urban Indians that day was shadowed by this discourse of othering and hatred. So the Rabindrasangeet sung by Ezaz Ahmed became for Jul, and his team, a rallying point even as Bengalis, fully showcasing that the Muslims (a significant percentage of West Bengal’s population) among them had always been wholehearted participants in the cherished Durga Pooja. Never mind that the amnesia generated by the Ramjanmabhoomi hysteria had Jul’s mother wondering how an Ezaz could sing this traditional Bengali song so well?
 
The team behind this innovative and courageous venture will go to the censor board for a certificate. The film maker feels that there are two scenes in the film that might have made the ruling party in Bengal uncomfortable with its screening. One is where the protagonist says he is the son of the Prophet. The other is a slaughter scene whom some have called gory.
 
Though made out mistakenly to be a documentary, Jai Shree Ram, is an independent full length feature film, shot over a period of two years with the financial help and contribution of innumerable persons. Post production took another year.
 
“Social” media trolls belonging to the Hindutvawaadi camp have been violently trashing the film and threatening its director and team. “We are a Hindu state” and such a film cannot be shown, is their claim.  
 
The creative team behind this venture however is committed to screening it all over the country. “If nothing else, “says Jul talking to us, “by just projecting it on a white wall, breaking all the code of "CINEMA".
 
The link of English subtitled trailers of the film are available on You-Tube:

First trailer
 

Second trailer 
 

 

Third trailer
 

 
Bibliography:
Bahurupi: The term Bahurupi is came from the Sanskrit Bahu means many and Rupa means form. Bahurupis in Bengal are a group of folk performers who enact and depict different characters.
Hanuman: Signifying devotion and humility to a superior God, this form of the Monkey God is worshipped and also seen as leading the ‘army’ of Lord Ram in some dominant versions of Hinduism
Sree Ram: One of the revered Hindu Gods; also one of the re-born forms of Lord Vishnu, the Hindu Triumverate and in recent times (over three decades) both the focal and rallying point of a highly militarised and supremacist Hinduism
Hindutvawaadi: Derivative from Hindutva, the doctrine of a Hindu theocratic state (those who believe in the Hindu theocratic state)
Rabindrsangeet: Tagore Songs, written and composed by Rabindrnath Tagore; these renderings have distinctive charecteristics in the music of Bengal and are popular in both India and Bangladesh

Its time for a Bahujan rethink

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Image Courtesy: Hindustan Times
 
Understand the political and social construct

Bahujan politics is not new to India. Based on the reality of caste and social backwardness a (political) strategy (for organisation) appears to have been developed, based on crucial factors. While the fundamental issue behind the mobilisation was the opposition to the upper castes, the goal set included earning a share in political power. The kindling of caste identities among followers of Bahujan formations was also important.
 
(Over the past decades), this Bahujan politics has been getting considerable support. A process has been evident: the coming together of various backward castes on a strong identity and sentiment, entering the electoral fray, and thereafter, also splitting on similar grounds;  leading to the inevitable political splintering. The sense of identity of respective castes or sub-castes works as the common factor in forging unity and (causing) disunity, cohesion and dispersal.
 
The splintering of the Republican Party of India in Maharashtra is a case in point. The sub-groups within the Mahar caste are considered to be the reasons or basis behind this splintering. Dr. Ambedkar was himself defeated in the elections to the Bhandara  Loksabha constituency in Vidarbha! One main reason for this is purported to be the difference between Dr. Ambedkar’s sub-caste and that of the bulk of the voters there.
 
History
 
If we are to understand a concept properly, we need to understand its history; we should know the changes in it and the causes behind those changes. We should be able to separate circumstantial causes from subjective causes. We should be able to separate the right tendencies from the wrong ones and point to a further advancement.  To develop this kind of understanding, we need to go back to Mahatma Phule.
 
The concept of Bahujan becomes amply clear even if we map it in terms of inclusion, exclusion and opposition. Phule advanced three pivotal points (axis’) for his definition – the shudra, the atishudra and women. He opposed what he called “Shethji and Bhatji”, the  moneyed class and the Brahmin priest.
 
Phule used the language of those whom he wanted to organise. Therefore we need to understand the meaning of the words he used and update them from the present time and context.
 
Shahu, the people’s king, advanced his own concept, which is evident in his 1902 ordinance giving 50 per cent reservation in his state to backward castes. He defined the Bahujan in this ordinance as ‘all those excluding Brahmins, Prabhus and Shenvis’. The followers of Mahatma Phule established the first Non-Brahmin Party in Maharashtra and began organising non-Brahmin castes. Shahu was the leader of this movement. The formation was based on the opposition to Brahmin caste and unity of all the remaining castes.
 
Vitthal Ramji Shinde was against the division along this axis of ‘Brahmin – non-Brahmin’. We need to discuss this in detail.
 
Dr. Ambedkar founded different political parties at different times To further different objectives. His concept of the Bahujan becomes clear from the names he gave to those parties – the Independent Labour Party, Scheduled Castes Federation and the Republican Party.
 
Speaking to G. I. P. Railway Workers at Manmad in 1938 he said, “Brahminism and Capitalism are our two enemies”. One recalls Phule’s terms – Shetji and Bhatji. We must not forget that Dr. Ambedkar used Brahminism and not just Brahmins. Similarly, Phule’s terms point at the professions of those castes or classes. Shetji suggests the profession of money lending and Bhatji suggests the ‘priestly’ profession (not Brahmins, the people/individuals).
 
The first manifesto of the Dalit Panther Party takes Dr. Ambedkar’s definition further to clarify concretely his concept of Brahminism and Capitalism.
 
Kanshiram–Mayavati’s concept becomes clear from a slogan Kanshiram developed before he founded the Bahujan Samaj Party. The slogan was: Baman, Baniya, Thakur Chor; Baki sab DS4. DS4 meant Dalit Shoshit Samaj Sangharsh Samiti. Although the name of the organisation contains the word Shoshit, the exploited, the meaning of the slogan is very clear. There are no exploited, shoshit, among the Baman-baniya-Thakur castes, and if at all there are exploited among them we are not concerned with them. Everybody among the castes belonging to Brahmin, Kshatriya, Vaishyavarnas are exploiters; none of them is exploited. If at all there are any, we are not bothered; such is this position.
 
Basing the strategy of uniting Bakward Castes (BC’s) and Other Backward Castes  (OBC’s) and opposing the rest, Kanshiram founded the Bahujan Samaj Party(BSP) on April 14, 1984. The BSP is a distinct political party, especially in electoral politics. Since it uses the word, its intention of widening its base and scope becomes evident.
 
Congress, Socialists, Communists and other parties have been claiming to further politics of the downtrodden, even for the emancipation of the Dalits. They have been raising their (Dalit) issues and fighting for them. But that is a different discussion. They do not base their politics on only ‘caste’ as a unit and have never been confined to doing politics of raising the issues of the backward castes alone.
 
Vitthal Ramji Shinde’s concept of the Bahujan
 
V. R. Shinde published the manifesto of the Bahujan Samaj Paksha on September 1,  1920. In it he has defined very clearly the scope, organisation, objective etc. of this party.
 
It is necessary to explain the background of the foundation of this party. The programme of elections to the provincial assembly, which had limited powers,  had been declared. The electoral roll of the voters too was very limited. Members to general and reserved seats were to be elected. The reserved seats included a group consisting of ‘Maratha and similar castes’. There were seven seats reserved for this group in Bombay Province. There were also reserved seats for other categories.
 
There is an interesting anecdote. The elections to the Provincial Assembly were in the November of 1920. A meeting of various groups from the Maratha community was held at Jedhe Mansion in Pune. V. R. Shinde firmly declared at the meeting that “I will not contest on the reserved seat since I am against the caste system”. Actually, Shinde was Maratha by caste. But he was opposed to contest on the seat reserved for the Maratha caste. Another leader, N. C. Kelkar, a follower of Tilak, was Brahmin, but he was the editor of the journal Maratha. He claimed that since he ran a paper called Maratha he should be selected for that seat. This is an example of the typically Poona-ite logic.
 
On the other hand, Shahu’s reaction to Kelkar’s claim is typically Kolhapuri. He wrote a letter to Shinde in which he made fun of Kelkar. Shahu writes, “(I can answer Kelkar’s logic.) Suppose I name my bullock ‘Britannia’, my favourite horse ‘Turkish Flag’ and my cow ‘Japanica’ would it be proper for me to claim the leadership of Japan or Turkey?”
 
Shahu tried to persuade Shinde to contest from the reserved seat. But Shinde stood his ground, inspite of Shahu’s insistence. He contested from the general seat and was defeated. Shahu supported another candidate, one Gupte, and got him elected. This action on part of Shinde indicates his concept of Bahujan. This was already clearly defined in his manifesto of the Bahujan Party and it left no scope for ambiguity.

The concept of Bahujan becomes amply clear even if we map it in terms of inclusion, exclusion and opposition. Phule advanced three pivotal points (axis’) for his definition – the shudra, the ati-shudra and women. He opposed what he called “Shethji and Bhatji”, the moneyed class and the Brahmin priest.

Shinde founded the Bahujan Party against the background of these elections. His manifesto is actually an exposition of various ‘interests’. He pointed out that the parties and organisations founded on the basis of castes and sub-castes orient their practice towards ‘sentiments’ (identity, in contemporary parlance). Their practice was not based on their social and economic interests. The castes brought together by these parties have their respective interests, and also within the castes there are various separate interests. Yet, they unite as castes. There are sections within castes outside them which have identical interests with the sections in another caste. But there was a general tendency of ignoring these identical interests dispersed in various castes.
 
That is why Shinde wrote in his manifesto, “the Bahujan Party does not stand merely on vacuous sense of identity but on solid interests. The Party undertakes to unselfishly support and encourage those interests. . . . Our colleagues may be Brahmins or non-Brahmins, they could be moderates or extremists, and they could be even Indians or foreigners . . . as long as they honestly and strongly support these interests we would cooperate with them. Otherwise we will bid adieu to them.”
 
The breadth of vision of his Party is evident when he identifies the sections he wants to organise: “Indian populace can be divided politically in two parts. One class advanced in knowledge, wealth and authority; and the other class backward in all these respects, or, Bahujan samaj.”
 
Shinde’s division is very clear. It is not based on the varna or caste distinction alone. It is based on the possession of three powers – knowledge, wealth and authority. It is obvious that the so-called advanced castes also have sections within them which do not possess these powers of knowledge, wealth and authority. These sections also become part of Shinde’s definition of the Bahujan. This is important. Some sections within the backward castes are also acquiring the powers of knowledge, wealth and authority. These cannot be included in Shinde’s concept of Bahujan. This is the reason why he firmly rejected to be called Brahminetar – Non-Brahmin.
 
Concepts like non-Brahmin, non-Maratha are once again being advanced in Maharashtra. These words are being used to indicate castes determined by birth. As the use of caste words/descriptions have become problematic owing to the constitutional provisions, political parties are wary of using them in in their names. They try to circumvent constitutional constraints. The fact is that there are separate political parties and organisations in Maharashtra championing the sectarian interests of various castes, both advanced and backward. Once the veil is thrown open, the caste concealed within is laid bare.
 
Shinde included eight classes (varga is Shinde’s word) within the ambit of his Bahujan Party. They were:
 

1. Peasantry: This did not include landlords and feudal lords at all;
2. Soldiers: This excluded officers, sardars;
3. Teachers: Brahmin priests were not part of this;
4. Entrepreneurs: Carpenters, goldsmiths, weavers, tailors, gardeners, oil extractors, street entertainers, folk-singers, soothsayers, balladeers, mendicants etc.
5. Traders: Moneylenders are excluded;
6. Labourers: This includes, along with menial class, intellectual workers like lawyers and doctors who can become leaders of the Bahujan society because of their education and wealth. Although workers in principle, they are not backward. But Shinde stresses that they are not exploiters and opponents of the Bahujans.
7. Untouchables: Shinde writes, “It is the most holy task of this Party to assimilate this section in the Bahujan society giving them equal status completely abolishing  untouchability and their helplessness without advancing any excuses, true or false, relating to custom or tradition.”
8. The Maratha leaders who are now trying to organise the Marathas should take note of these words of Shinde, himself born in Maratha caste. The Dalits should not be treated as tools in terms of their numerical strength to be used in the struggle against Brahmins.
9. Women: Shinde appears to emulate Phule who had combined Together shudra, atishudra and women. He writes, “The class of women is our cradle! If they are ignored, the cradle itself will turn into our rocking grave. We are quite aware of this.”

 
We have noted how Shinde excluded the powerful and dominant sections among these categories from his concept of Bahujan.
 
The task ahead
 
Various parties basing on caste identities are trying to test their electoral strength even today. They are dividing society on the basis of caste and religious identities instead of uniting them around common ‘interests’. They use the names of Phule and Ambedkar. Let them do so. But they should seriously take into account Vitthal Ramji Shinde’s concept of Bahujan. If they do not find it useful, they are free to reject it. But they should reject it after serious consideration. They should reject it on empirical evidence; if it is possible to do so. My only appeal is Vitthal Ramji Shinde should not be ignored. It will not be in the interests of the Bahujans. Many do not include Shinde’s name along with Phule–Shahu –Ambedkar. This is being unjust to him.
 
(Translated from Marathi by Dr. Uday Narkar; excerpted from The Republic of Reason published by SAHMAT, New Delhi and released on November 1, 2015; we have edited the copy)

Bibliiography:
Bahujan: the majority of the people
Brahmin: priestly “upper” caste with a powerful hold on all fairs of society and state including access to education, resources and mobility
Prabhus and Shenvis:  caste names
Shetji and Bhatji : Moneyed and Priestly class
Baman, Baniya, Thakur: Caste terms for the powerful castes, the Brahmins, the Trader and the Militrary class
DS4: Dalit Shoshit Samaj Sangharsh Samiti
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