In 2011, after several years of deliberation and under pressure from the Supreme Court, the Union government under the United Progressive Alliance decided to conduct a socio-economic and caste census. This followed massive protests that had broken out in 2006 against the Centre’s decision to reserve government jobs and seats in higher educational institutions for members of the Other Backward Classes. The court said that it needed concrete data on caste numbers so that it could determine whether the quota limit, which it set at 50% in 1992, could be altered.
But six years after the caste census was completed, there is no sign of the caste component of the data being released, though a small part on the economic conditions was put out in 2014.
In the meantime, state governments have begun challenging the 50% limit. In April, for instance, the Telengana government decided to increase quotas for Muslims and Scheduled Tribes. In 2015, the state government had set up the Sudhir commission to study the Muslim community’s conditions. It was found that despite constituting 12% of the state population, Muslims got only 7.6% of government jobs. The community was also lagging behind in education. By increasing the quota for Muslims to 12% from the existing 4%, the Telengana government went way past the 50% ceiling.
In order to avoid judicial intervention, the state government said the reservations for Muslims had nothing to do with religion: it contended that the quota was alloted on the basis of the community’s economic backwardness. However, the courts have struck down previous attempts to create quotas for religious groups. They have not viewed the economic argument favourably as the Constitution recognises only educational and social backwardness. Telangana Chief Minister K Chandrashekhar Rao had also cited the example of Tamil Nadu, where quotas are as high as 69%. A challenge to Tamil Nadu’s reservation policy is currently before a nine-member Constitution bench of the Supreme Court.
What does this confusion really say about India’s policy of affirmative action? First, the Supreme Court’s decision to cap reservations at 50% has been criticised widely for its arbitrariness. Some have argued that such a cap allows members of the upper castes to corner a disproportionate share of resources, since they dominate the 50% of jobs and seats left to open competition.
Secondly, the only reason that could be cited for the Centre’s failure to release the caste data is its reluctance to take on upper caste interests. In the process, not only is the Centre denying vulnerable communities their legitimate share of reservations, it is also risking the danger of the caste census being dismissed as dated. In the meantime, the absence of quality data on caste and socio-econimic condition is leading to what the Supreme Court termed as “competitve backwardness”. Even historically well-off groups, such as Patels in the Gujarat and the Jats in North India, are seeking reservations, to the detriment of weaker communities.
There was also the question of federal rights involved in this debate. By holding back the caste census data, the Centre is also indirectly limiting the powers of state legislatures from making changes to the reservation law since they are unable to get the 50% ceiling lifted in the courts.
Two judgements within a day of each other have caught national attention. The first is the Supreme Court judgement in the Nirbhaya case. The second is the Mumbai High Court judgement in the Bilkis Bano case. Two cases, two women, two standards of justice.
The Nirbhaya case aroused the conscience of India in an unprecedented way, calling into action thousands of young people who had perhaps never earlier joined street protests. The bravery and courage of the young woman, Jyoti, the brutality of the crime against her, now detailed in the judgement, the utter injustice and horror of her death symbolized so much that is rotten in our system, it reflected so many real fears and experiences of young women, it was a case with universal relevance across social boundaries. The Nirbhaya case and the public outrage forced the then government and all political parties to set up a commission led by the former Chief Justice JS Verma which made important recommendations, not only for amendments to the law, but also for steps on behalf of authorities for the prevention of sexual crimes against women and to create a secure and safe environment for women to exercise their equal right to public spaces. Some of the amendments suggested by the Verma Commission were accepted and adopted by parliament. But the measures required to make the country more secure and safe for women are far from being implemented. In our country, where the conviction rate in sexual crimes against women is as low as 20 per cent, where cases drag on for decades, it is a matter of great satisfaction that the perpetrators of the horrific crime against Jyoti could not get away with it and that the judicial process could be completed in four and a half years. There is little doubt of the guilt of those who have been sentenced in the Nirbhaya case. Some of the earlier arguments in the lower courts advanced by the defence were outrageous aspersions on the conduct of the young woman, both in court and outside, common to so many defence arguments in cases of rape and it is welcome that they were rejected.
Victims fighting for justice in cases of sexual crimes against women will be encouraged by these positive features in the judicial process concerning the Nirbhaya case and will expect that it become common rather than a rarity.
As far as the sentence is concerned, the courts, starting with the lowest, held the accused guilty and pronounced the death sentence which has now been upheld by the Supreme Court.
The defence argued that there was no previous record of criminality. This has been a legal consideration in judicial decisions on sentencing. Poverty and the brutalizing conditions of the lives of the criminals was an issue also brought up by the defence as a mitigating factor. This would be an unacceptable justification of a crime of this nature. It is true though that in a grossly unequal society like India, children of the poor often have few avenues of survival, becoming prey to the exploitation of criminal forces. Here, in the capital of the country, we have before our eyes hundreds of street children, many of them runaways, surviving in inhuman conditions. How do they grow up, what do they take with them on their path to adulthood, these are indeed deeply disturbing and relevant questions. Often criminality is born by circumstance in capitalist societies such as India. Particularly when the death penalty is on the statute books, such questions are literally a matter of life and death.
There are many cases where the Supreme Court has reversed the death sentence to life imprisonment. Often there are subjective factors that decide which case falls in the rarest of rare categories. The death sentence has been given in some cases to assuage the "collective conscience", an argument that can equally apply to justify the actions of a khap panchayat. The process is arbitrary and subjectively decided. There are compelling reasons for the abolition of the death penalty. As a society, we need to consider whether a maximum punishment of rigorous life imprisonment without parole is not more appropriate. I myself believe in principle in the abolition of the death penalty.
The arbitrary nature of decisions regarding the death penalty has been shown up in the judgement in the Bilkis Bano case. There are some who argue that if the criminals in Nirbhaya's case can get the death penalty, then why not those involved in the barbaric violence that Bilkis and her family were subjected to? Bilkis herself has been reported to have said after learning of the Nirbhaya judgement that she would appeal to the Supreme Court to pronounce the death sentence against those guilty in her case too. But the purpose of my argument in contrasting the two cases is to point out the frailty and flawed process in deciding the death penalty.
In Bilkis Bano's case, there was no national outrage. Since March 2002, she has fought virtually alone in the most adverse of circumstances, helped mainly by a band of human rights champions like Teesta Setalvad, who themselves became victims of the processes of injustice, precisely because of the help. extended in cases like Bilkis'. After 15 years, Bilkis's quest for justice is still not over.
In this judgement too, the terrible details of the crimes perpetrated are recorded. According to the judgement "on February 27, death of large numbers of Hindu karsevaks took place.. at Godhra railway station…allegedly by members of the Muslim community. On account of this, large scale riots erupted in the State of Gujarat. A large number of lives were lost in the communal riots which ensued."
This is the background of the horror that Bilkis faced. Young, pregnant she had to flee her village of Randhikpur in the Dohad district with her entire extended family. On March 3, moving from one village to another, the group were spotted by gangs of men in two cars hunting for Muslims. At the time she was carrying Saleeha, her three-year-old daughter, in her arms. She recognized the men, mainly from her own village, who rushed towards her. They tore the child from her arms and smashed her head on the ground. The child died before her mother's eyes. Three men gangraped the pregnant Bilkis. Her sister and cousin sister were also raped. One of them had given birth only the day before.The baby was with her. Every single one of the group of eight was killed including the baby. Bilkis, who had lost consciousness, was left for dead, but she survived. It is not possible here to recount the dreadful story of her suffering. At every stage, her fight for justice was destroyed. The FIR was manipulated, the medical reports and postmortem of the bodies omitted all the most important details, the bodies were never given to the families but buried by the police themselves. The body of Bilkis's daughter disappeared. The lower court accepted all the lies and falsehoods and the case was sought to be closed within a year saying that although the crime had occurred, the criminals were "undetected" and therefore the case was closed. It was the NHRC team and others who recorded the details. A case was filed in the Supreme Court demanding that the case be reopened and handed over to the CBI. It was two years later, in 2004, that the CBI started its own investigation.
But it was always a small step forward and many steps back for Bilkis in her fight for justice. She was the main witness in the case. She faced threats, pressure, great hardship living in a state where the then Chief Minister and government were using state power and official resources to support and defend all the accused in hundreds of cases of killing and violence. Because of the open and defiant subversion of justice for the victims of the Gujarat riots by the Gujarat government and administration, the Supreme Court accepted her plea, and her case was shifted from Gujarat to Mumbai. 12 men had been given life imprisonment by the sessions court but others were acquitted. The police officials and doctors accused by the CBI of the direct destruction of evidence were acquitted. The charge of conspiracy was also struck down. The CBI went in appeal to the High Court.
Here too the recent judgement delivers justice only partially. The accused policemen and doctors have been found guilty and sentenced to three years in jail. This is the maximum penalty given under the present laws under Sec 217 and 218 of the IPC. This seems far too light a sentence for the extent of the crime committed, but it is indeed a welcome step that the court shredded the bogus arguments and defence put up by the earlier court judgement and has found them guilty. This is the first such judgement when police and doctors involved in a massive cover-up of the crimes committed have been brought to book.
The charge of conspiracy under Sec 120 B has been rejected by the court. Here, standards differing from those used in the Nirbhaya case are evident. The court has held that " it was on the spur of the moment." Yet in another place in the same judgement it is held that "they were hunting for Muslims…" If they were hunting for Muslims, how could the crimes be on the spur of the moment? They were not hunting for Muslims to have a dialogue with them, they were hunting for Muslims precisely to rape and kill. This could have been done only if they had all agreed to go on the "hunt." According to the Nirbhaya judgement "agreement between the accused" is the key to understand conspiracy. Yet in this case, the charge of conspiracy is struck down.
The grounds for rejection of the CBI appeal for the death sentence are also problematic. One of the grounds advanced is "after the Godhra incident…they were boiling with revenge…they are not history sheeters or hard core criminals." Can "revenge" be a cause for a lighter sentence? The Nirbhaya case criminals are not "history sheeters or hard core criminals". But this ground was rejected by the Supreme Court given the nature of the crime. Yes, Bilkis survived, but her sisters were brutally gangraped and killed. It is abhorrent to compare the extent of brutality in crimes committed against women. But can it be said that the nature of the crime against them is any less than in other cases where the death sentence has been given? The judgement describes the case as "a rare massacre manifesting ugly animosity and hostility" and "such crime is not justifiable and is shunned", but does the reasoning in the judgement not have wider implications which may result in lesser sentences for crimes motivated by communal hatred?
Some find closure at least to some extent in the judgements of the courts and for some, questions remain.
Brinda Karat is a Politburo member of the CPI(M) and a former Member of the Rajya Sabha. Disclaimer: The opinions expressed within this article are the personal opinions of the author and do not reflect the views of Sabrangindia. This article also appeared on NDTV.COM and is being reproduced here with the permission of the author
Varsha Dongre, who deleted her post later, called for introspection and has now been suspended.
A deputy jailer, posted at the central jail in Chhattisgarh’s capital city Raipur, was suspended on Saturday for a social media post alleging torture of a tribal women by the security forces in the state’s Maoist insurgency-hit Bastar region. Varsha Dongre, the deputy jailer of Raipur central jail, had claimed in a social media post last week that she had seen tribal girls being stripped at police stations in Bastar and tortured.
“I have seen the torture. The tribal girls were given electric shocks on their breasts and wrists. I have seen the marks and I was horrified. Why are such small tribal girls being subjected to third-degree torture? Our constitution and law system do not allow such inhuman torture. It’s time for us to introspect and the truth will come out. The people getting killed on both sides (during the Maoists-Security forces conflict in Bastar) are Indians. The capitalistic system is being forced into Bastar, villages are being burnt, tribal women are being raped. Is it really being done to end the Maoism?” Ms. Dongre had alleged in her post after the Maoist attack on the CRPF in Sukma which had led to the death of 25 CRPF men.
Ms. Dongre had deleted the post after it went viral on social media. However, the jail department of Chhattisgarh police had ordered an inquiry against her.
“Ms. Varsha Dongre has been suspended and charge-sheeted after it was found in a preliminary inquiry that her conduct was in violation of service rules and other rules,” Giridhari Nayak, the Director General of Police, Jail administration, Chhattisgarh police, told The Hindu.
An officer of the same department revealed on the condition of anonymity that it was Ms. Dongre’s social media post which led to her suspension as its language was “extremely offensive”. Known to be an upright officer, Ms. Dongre had also opined that the fifth schedule of the Indian constitution should be applied in tribal areas and the “so-called development” should not be imposed on tribals.
“The tribals do not want the Maoists. They want the Maoism to end but the way our country’s security forces are targeting the dignity of their women and daughters, burning their houses and slapping false cases against them, where will they go for justice?” the suspended deputy jailer had alleged in her post.
Ms. Dongre could not be reached for her reaction despite repeated attempts.
Background
"I am a witness to the torture of minor tribal girls … In the police stations, women personnel have stripped and tortured girls as old as 14 and 16 … They were given electric shock on their hands and breasts. I have seen the marks … I was horrified … Why third-degree torture on minors? I have given directions for their treatment", Varsha Dongre, deputy jailer of Raipur Central Jail, recently wrote in a post in Hindi.
"We need to introspect, because those who are getting killed in either side of this war in Bastar are our own people. The capitalist system is being forced on Bastar, tribals are being pushed out of their lands, their villages are being burnt, women raped — all this to grab land and forests. All this isn't being done to end Naxalism", she added.
Coming in the wake of the Maoist attack on CRPF jawans in Sukma district of the state, her comments were shared widely on social media. The jail department was forced to order of a probe, based on her allegations.
"The tribals can't leave this place as it is their land but when law-enforcers target women and minor girls and false case are registered, where do the victims go for justice?" she went on. "The CBI report says it, the court says it — this is the reality. When human rights workers or journalists tell the truth, they are sent to jail. If everything is fine in tribal lands, why government is so afraid and why people are not allowed to go there?"
Dongre invoked India's constitution to say it doesn't allow anyone the right to harass and torture another citizen. "A particular kind of development can't be thrust on the adivasis," she said. "Farmers and jawans are brothers, they shouldn't kill each other."
Following in the footsteps of the United States, the French are looking to “terrible simplifications” to solve their problems as they head to the second round of their presidential election on May 7.
Activists wear masks of Jean-Marie Le Pen, founder of the National Front, with his daughter’s hair, Marine, currently the extreme-right candidate in France’s election. Gonzalo Fuentes /Reuters
Polls predict that Marine Le Pen, candidate of the far-right National Front party could take 38% of the vote. Even if she loses on Sunday, some commentators believe that this campaign has paved the way for a victory in France’s 2022 election.
Viewed from Pakistan, this situation is a direct blow to a country which, in our minds, has been the bastion of democracy, rationalism and enlightenment.
France’s embrace of Le Pen is all the more concerning because, in Pakistan, we know exactly what autocratic populism looks like, and what it can lead to.
Pakistan’s first populist ruler Founded in 1947 during the Partition with India, Pakistan started its journey into nationhood in the turbulent 1950s, after an independence bill liberated the Indian subcontinent from the British empire.
Ordinary Pakistanis were struggling to eke out an existence. But the new nation’s leaders were experimenting with an ideology, inspired by “two nation theory” of Pakistan’s main thinker, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, that advocated for separated nations for India and Pakistan based on religion. To some extent this communal approach prevented the more critical progressive left from developing in Pakistan.
The 1960s gave rise not only to industry but also to numerous economic crises that challenged the fragile young nation. By the end of the decade, frustration was on the rise among the Pakistani people. Widespread protests ultimately brought down president Ayub Khan in 1968, ending Pakistan’s first military dictatorship.
This change opened the doors for Pakistan’s first populist leader, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, whose Pakistan People Party (PPP) emerged at the end of the 1960s atop a rising tide of public approval and support. People loved its slogan, “roti, kapra, aur makan” – “bread, clothing, and a home” – and in 1970 Butto was democratically elected as Pakistan’s fourth president.
That’s how Pakistan entered the age of populist politics: at the ballot box. The PPP expounded the same goals that we hear contemporary populist parties claim, namely that of freeing the state from tyrannical and incompetent rulers.
Zulfikar Bhutto speaks as President of Pakistan on the war with Bangladesh, NFO archive.
In the troubled context of the war with India and the subsequent creation of independent Bangladesh in 1971, Bhutto maintained his grasp on power. In 1973 he was elected Pakistan’s ninth prime minister, claiming that he wanted to bring democratic changes to the country.
His populism took an anti-imperialist guise, which garnered wide domestic support given both Pakistan’s own history and the state of world affairs at the time, which included US atrocities in the Vietnam War.
But when his power was challenged, particularly on labour and trade questions, Bhutto abandoned democracy. In 1977 he imposed martial law and curfews throughout the country. The civil unrest that followed galvanised General Zia ul Haq. He deposed Bhutto in a military coup that same year and had him hanged in 1979.
A repetitive pattern of populist leaders This pattern that has been repeated in Pakistan since then. Our shaky democracy never found stability after Zia, who was killed in a plane crash in 1988.
Four successive democratic governments were unconstitutionally ousted by military leaders, truncating their five-year terms and creating a chaotic alternation between civilian and army rule. Democracy would not return until 2008, when the Pakistan People’s Party won a presidential election on a wave of sympathy for the 2007 assassination of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto (daughter of Zulfiqar). For the first time in nearly 20 years, a government was able to complete its five-year term.
Imran Khan, populist opposition leader and former star cricket player, leads an anti-government protest in Islamabad, April 28 2017. Faisal Mahmood/Reuters
Today, Pakistan once again stands at the crossroads of civilian and military rule. The unpopular sitting government lost credibility with the Panama Papers scandal – in which the huge financial assets of incumbent Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s children were exposed – and opponents like the former cricket player Imran Khan are now suggesting that the military should take over. The media’s role in populism
France is still very far from dictatorship, of course. But Pakistan’s history shows that opening the door to populist leaders is a big step towards a dangerous and unknown future. If you flirt with extremism, you have to be willing to accept its dire consequences.
Today, populism in Pakistan has a broad and idealistic agenda, ranging from sustenance for the poor to changing the world order. Its euphoric 1960s ideals failed because they assumed the possibility of change as a “push-button operation”.
Still, populism has now become a cultural norm here. It grows from the inner contradictions of a democratic power structure that’s corrupted, incapable of solving social and economic issues and prone to passing liberticidal laws. And it thrives on right-wing patriotic, xenophobic and anti-politics rhetoric. France, take note.
Populist rhetoric also suits the sensation-hungry, ratings-seeking corporate media. In Pakistan the media has openly espoused populism by regularly portraying politics as a dirty game of power-hungry politicians. This narrative gives rise to cynical and anti-politics attitudes within the general public.
To make matters worse, the press covers some of the world’s demagogues, in the US as at home, in a very light manner. Such populist extremists are, of course, happy to win more positive media spin.
A dangerous frustration Some 8,000 kms from Islamabad, frustrated men and women in France are sick of politics, too. Watching their presidential debates and TV talk shows, they want to see someone who will secure the nation to bring back their lost pride.
Le Pen’s nationalist proclamations that France should “not [be] dragged into wars that are not hers” and other Trump-style “make France great again” slogans have become popular simplifications.
When the decision is upon them, will French voters enter the populist realm of “the fantasmatic”?
Populism can be far more dangerous than it seems, taking all forms of constraints, from negating the diversity of society to censoring individual liberties and free speech.
Abstract from Charlie Chaplin’s ‘The Great Dictator Speech’
Are the French ready for that?
It would be devastating to see France – a nation built on the ideals of transparency, equality, freedom, responsibility and compassion – taken down in a tragedy of its own making. Life is not a reality show, and demagogues do not make good rulers.
Take it from a people who know: there is no glorious past waiting to be restored. There is no golden future, either.
As the prophet Zarathustra pithily put it, “Not perhaps ye yourselves, my brethren! But into fathers and forefathers of the Superman could ye transform yourselves: and let that be your best creating!”
West Bengal is going through a tectonic political shift
The TMC will remain the dominant force in West Bengal for a long time/REUTERS
A few weeks ago, Chandrima Bhattacharya of the Trinamool Congress (TMC) won a by-election to the state legislative assembly in West Bengal. This was not particularly remarkable insofar as the election took place in Kanthi Dakshin in East Midnapur district, where TMC has been the dominant party for more than a decade. It is the influential Adhikari family who leads the TMC in Midnapur.
Adhikari dominance The head of the family, the 75-year-old Sisir Adhikari, was first elected to the state legislative assembly back in 1982. He is currently a member of the Lok Sabha and was for some time the Minister of Rural Development in the second United Progressive Alliance government under Manmohan Singh. His son, Subhendu, has also been a member of the Lok Sabha and is now the Minister of Transport in West Bengal. Another son, Dibyendu, is an MP.
Since 2001 one of these three Adhikaris — Sisir, Subhendu, or Dibyendu — has represented Kanthi Dakshin in the state assembly, and so it was hardly surprising that the TMC also came out on top this time.
The margin of victory was large — Chandrima received almost twice as many votes as the runner up.
The biggest upset was rather that it was the BJP’s Sourindra Mohan Jana who came second. At the state assembly elections in 2011 and 2016, Jana’s party had received only approximately 3% and 8% of the votes in Kanthi Dakshin; now, the BJP garnered more than 30%, relegating the Left Front’s candidate Uttam Pradhan from the CPI to third place.
Pradhan received only 10% of the votes; with a little more than 1% of the votes, Naba Kumar Nanda of the Congress Party barely managed to outperform the NOTA (None of the Above) option — but not by much.
Jonesville is not America and Kanthi Dakshin is not West Bengal, but much suggests that this by-election constitutes a tectonic political shift in Bengal — the second in less than a decade. The first shift occurred when the TMC dislodged the Left Front from power after more than three decades of uninterrupted communist rule. The current shift sees the left parties relegated to a remote third position in the state, while the BJP looks set to emerge as the main opposition.
Historically, the BJP has always had a negligible presence in West Bengal, and even during the heyday of Vajpayee’s National Democratic Alliance government around the turn of the millennium, the party struggled to cross the double digit mark at elections.
However, during the last couple of years, the BJP has worked hard to extend its grassroots presence. And, it was widely expected that the Modi-wave that has swept across almost all of India would also have an impact in West Bengal. But few had expected that the BJP would capture nearly a third of the votes in Kanthi Dakshin.
The implications of this tectonic shift are likely to be as follows. First, the TMC will remain the dominant political force for the foreseeable future. Mamata Banerjee is still a popular chief minister; the left is no longer capable of mounting an efficient challenge; the BJP is not yet adequately established organisationally; and whatever remains of the Congress Party is confined to a few isolated pockets.
Tricky tactics Secondly, the Left Front’s days as a powerful political force are over. As Arild Ruud and Dwaipayan Bhattacharyya have shown us in their rich ethnographic studies of the CPI(M) in West Bengal, it was the combination of progressive political ideology, broad popular movements, and a cohort of young, educated, left-leaning activist that enabled the CPI(M) to establish itself as a political force in the villages from the 1960s.
For many decades, the party was extremely adept at combining left-wing rhetoric and politics “from above” with a strategic and more pragmatic mediation of social relations and resources “from below” in such a way that the CPI(M) appeared to many voters as either the best or the only political alternative.
However, this apparently formidable construct, which had seemed invincible for more than three decades from 1977 onward, had gradually become more fragile than it appeared.
Large sections of the CPI(M) have switched to the TMC with few transaction costs; and what was formerly party conflicts between the CPI(M) and the TMC are now played out as factional conflicts
As one can read in Bhattacharyya’s recent book Government as Practice, this construct began to crumble already in the 1990s, and when it first began to collapse around 2008, it crumbled in little time.
Large sections of the CPI(M) have in many places switched to the TMC with few, if any, transaction costs; and what was formerly party political conflicts between the CPI(M) and the TMC are now played out as factional conflicts within the TMC. In addition, the by-election in Kanthi Dakshin showed that the BJP is gaining at the expense of the Left, and not of the TMC. The left appears to be left with only its radical political rhetoric “from above,” whereas the grassroots that should translate this rhetoric into pragmatic practice “from below” is crumbling.
BJP’s conquest of West Bengal Third, the BJP is on its way to becoming the second pole in a new bipolar political system. Modi is popular among many voters, and the BJP has both the resources to and an interests in conquering Bengal. While the BJP has previously tried to establish a foothold in Bengal by adapting its hardcore Hindutva rhetoric to local conditions — for example, by downplaying the political use of the somewhat dubious figure Ram, and instead highlighting well-known Bengal icons like Vivekanda and Tagore — the BJP’s current strategy is much less oriented towards local adaptations.
Now, Ram Navami (Ram’s birthday) is celebrated with swords and machetes drawn, in combination with anti-Muslim rhetoric and fierce accusations of “minority appeasement” against Mamata Banerjee. This is a well-known recipe on the part of the BJP and it may find some resonance among some voters insofar as the roughly 25% of the population that are Muslims do tend to support the TMC.
If the BJP succeeds in polarising the state along religious lines, we are likely to see an increase in so-called communal clashes in the future. And yet, as the recent election in Uttar Pradesh showed, it is the BJP’s unmatched organisational ability to micro-manage elections at the local level that wins elections.
In West Bengal the BJP is not yet organisationally capable of replicating its “Uttar Pradesh model.” But, there is little doubt that the collapse of the left has offered the BJP a space from which to work towards that end.
Kenneth Bo Nielsen is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Bergen.
If you were asked to name the most important philosopher of 10th-century Baghdad, you would presumably not hesitate to say ‘al-Farabi’. He’s one of the few thinkers of the Islamic world known to non-specialists, deservedly so given his ambitious reworking of Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysics and political philosophy. But if you were yourself a resident of 10th-century Baghdad, you might more likely think of Yahya ibn ‘Adi. He is hardly a household name now, but was mentioned by the historian al-Mas‘udi as the only significant teacher of Aristotelian philosophy in his day. But ibn ‘Adi is not just a good example of how fame wanes across the centuries. He is also a fine illustration of the inter-religious nature of philosophy in the Islamic world.
Scholars in a library from the Maqama of Hariri manuscript. Courtesy Bibliotheque Nationale/Wikipedia
Ibn ‘Adi was a Christian, as were most of the members of the group of philosophers who wrote commentaries on Aristotle at this time in Baghdad. The Muslim al-Farabi, who was apparently ibn ‘Adi’s teacher, was an exception to the rule. Completing the ecumenical picture, ibn ‘Adi was involved in an exchange of letters with a Jewish scholar named Ibn Abi Sa‘id al-Mawsili, who wrote to him with questions about Aristotle’s philosophy that he was hoping to have cleared up. Admittedly, Baghdad was an exceptional place, the capital of empire and thus a melting pot that drew scholars from all over the Islamic world. But philosophy was an interfaith phenomenon in other times and places too. The best example is surely Islamic Spain, celebrated for its culture of convivencia (‘living together’). Two of the greatest medieval thinkers, the Muslim Averroes and the Jew Maimonides, were rough contemporaries who both hailed from al-Andalus. After Toledo fell into the hands of the Christians, the Jew Avendauth collaborated with the Christian Gundisalvi to translate a work by the Muslim thinker Avicenna from Arabic into Latin.
That last example is a revealing one. Philosophy in these times often involved representatives of different faiths because it often presupposed translation. Hardly any philosophers of the Islamic world could read Greek, not even Averroes, the greatest commentator on Aristotle. He and other Muslim enthusiasts for Hellenic wisdom had to rely on translations, which had mostly been executed by Christians in the 8th to 10th centuries. Knowledge of Greek had been maintained by Christian scholars in Byzantine Syria, which explains why Muslim patrons turned to Christians to render works by Aristotle, Ptolemy, Galen and many other ancient thinkers into Arabic. Thus the very existence of Hellenic-inspired philosophy in the Islamic world was a manifestation of inter-religious cooperation.
All of which is not to say that the Islamic world was free of inter-religious dispute. On the contrary, it seems that one reason those Muslim patrons were interested in Aristotle was that his logic would give them the tools to keep up with Christian opponents in theological debate. A vivid example is provided by al-Kindi, the first Muslim thinker to draw on Hellenic sources. He wrote a short refutation of the Trinity in which he used Greek logic to argue that God must be wholly one, not one and three – mentioning that Christian readers should be able to follow the argument, given their familiarity with logical concepts. A nice twist to the story is that we know of this refutation only thanks to the aforementioned ibn ‘Adi, who quoted al-Kindi in order then to rebut his attack on the Christian dogma.
While men such as al-Kindi were appropriating Greek ideas to defend Islam and attack Christianity, others disapproved of the importation of these same ideas into Muslim culture: al-Kindi responded to unnamed critics who deplored the use of pagan philosophy, and the founder of the Christian Baghdad school got into a public dispute with a Muslim grammarian over the usefulness of Aristotle’s logic. The grammarian mocked the pretensions of the Christian Aristotelians, and delighted in pointing out that all this logic had not prevented them from believing that God can somehow be both one and three.
Still, it remains the case that philosophy and the sciences more generally offered a kind of meeting point or neutral ground for intellectuals of different faiths. Muslims, Christians and Jews who shared an interest in Aristotle’s metaphysics or the medical theories of Galen read each others’ commentaries and elaborations on the Hellenic tradition. This is shown even by the disputes that they had with one another: using Greek logic to debate the Trinity implicitly suggested that this was a topic that could be resolved by appeal to reason. And many of the thinkers mentioned above argued that philosophy offered the best resource for the interpretation of sacred texts, whether the Torah, the Christian Bible, or the Quran. So it is no coincidence that in the Muslim al-Kindi, the Christian ibn ‘Adi, and the Jew Maimonides, the One God of Abrahamic tradition bears a striking resemblance to the god of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Their shared enterprise as elite philosophers meant that they had more in common with one another than they did with most of their co-religionists.
Peter Adamson is a professor of philosophy at the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich. He is the author of several books, including The Arabic Plotinus (2002) and Great Medieval Thinkers: al-Kindi (2007) and Philosophy in the Islamic World (2016), and hosts the History of Philosophy podcast.
It is easy to blame radical politicians and religious leaders for igniting the spark. But let’s not forget those who fuel the fire.
Matthew Fearnley [Licensed under CC BY 2.0]
As a child, when I visited Jagannath temple of Puri in Odisha, my mother told me how Kalapahada, a Muslim king, had attacked and destroyed much of the temple. She added how Ma Mangala, the local Thakurani (village goddess), protected the shrine, and forced Kalapahada to retreat. Eight such Thakuranis guard the temple, she told me. I was filled with awe at the image of warrior-goddesses riding lions and tigers, protecting the grand temple complex that was at the heart of my cultural inheritance.
Years later, during a tour of South Indian temples, I heard a similar tale, of a Muslim warlord called Malik Kafur who attacked and desecrated the shrines of Madurai and Srirangam. The narration had details of a fascinating adventure embarked upon by local priests who went all the way to Delhi, disguised as singers and dancers, impressed the Muslim ruler there, and convinced him to return their sacred icons. In some stories, a Muslim princess follows them and ends up deified as the Muslim consort of a Hindu deity. Were these pre-modern attempts to reconcile communal rivalry?
Over time I encountered similar tales in Ujjain, Mathura, Kashi, Ayodhya, Kolhapur, Somnath and Kashmir. Most of these stories had many self-evident internal inaccuracies and contradictions. Such is the nature of orally transmitted lore. What was interesting is not what was said, but how it was said.
There was never any rage or bitterness in my mother’s voice, or any sense of victimhood, when she narrated the story. She did not want me to hate Kalapahada, or Muslims. In fact, she almost seemed to justify Kalapahada’s action by telling me how he was actually Hindu who was stopped by orthodox priests from entering the temple as he had either married a Muslim girl he loved, or had been forced to convert to Islam by his captors. This made him angry, because he loved Jagannath too much, and that is what made him a monster. The point of the narration, for my mother, was to impress upon me, how the glory of Jagannath survives despite all attacks and misfortunes, which is why we must have faith in him, cling to him as a raft in tempestuous waters. In other words, the narration was rooted in the paradigm of karma.
Image credit: Bernard Gagnon [CC BY-SA 3.0]
Justice for the gods
Karma, however, is often mocked in educated circles. In lecture after lecture, for the past 20 years, I have encountered young students, presenting common understanding of karma rooted in colonial and missionary discourse. Reduced to fatalism and determinism, karma is seen as a cultural excuse for maintaining caste hegemony and social stagnation, one that must be abandoned. It is never seen as a key factor for Hindu tolerance, the ability to reconcile with change and diversity.
Students of modern education are trained to be scientific and rational in their thinking. This demands rejecting the paradigm of karma and embracing the paradigm of justice, equality and revolution. We are told the latter is the rational way, the right way. No one points to the underlying Abrahamic “saviour” complex.
Revolution is seen as anti-determinism, anti-fatalism, anti-karma – as something that determines progress, and grants freedom. This makes it “the good fight”. This paradigm fuelled national building as we rose up against imperial powers, and did not just accept them. It led the founding fathers of our country, many of them lawyers trained in England, to challenge what was claimed to be old traditional (karmic? regressive?) modes of thinking and establish a constitution that would create the Idea of India. Sadly, it had unintended consequences.
What was embraced by the Left was also embraced by the Right. If the Left saw the immediate past as oppressive, the Right saw the medieval past as oppressive. If the Left sought justice and equality for the poor and the marginalised, the Right sought justice and equality for Hindu gods whose houses, they believed, had been torn down by Muslim kings and whose doctrines, they argued, had been mutilated by colonial scholars. Those who demanded an end to Brahminical privileges on grounds that they had enslaved the Dalits for centuries started being challenged by those who demanded an end to what they called state-sponsored appeasement for Muslims who, they argued, had enslaved India for a thousand years, and who had, they pointed out, wiped out all trace of Hinduism, and Buddhism, in Afghanistan, and Pakistan, and now Kashmir.
Educated members of the Right saw temple lore not in terms of karma and devotion, but as memories of social injustice. They started demanding equal treatment for Ram, and Krishna. Temple discourse was systematically changed. It was no longer about the glory of stoic and wise gods, who patiently watched the rise and fall and rise of their temples, but of devotees who wanted the glory of their gods to be restored. Hindu religious leaders who during the Freedom Struggle focussed on rediscovering and popularising Hindu philosophy were recruited to speak of the lost glory of Hinduism to evoke a sense of victimhood in their disciples and followers in India and abroad. For the Right knows, like the Left, there can be no revolutions unless there is a festering wound, and a villain.
Jannat al-Baqi in Medina Saudi Arabia. Image credit: Mardetanha [CC BY-SA 3.0]
Truth of the historians
Then came the historians. Armed with data, they claimed the Right was spreading lies, and all these temple lore, retold over generations, were myths. By myth they meant fiction. A few sensible historians prefer the use of the word imaginary, over fiction, or myth, for they realised that not a single religious “fact” however profound, from resurrection to prophethood, is based on measurable, verifiable, facts. Where one locates matters of faith, still remains a question. Rational extremists insist that all religious doctrine is essentially “fake news”. And you see this in the writings of many modern young, rather combative, historians, who want to prove that all Hindu temple lore are nothing but fabricated propaganda serving Right Wing radicals.
First, these modern historians argue that Muslim kings broke temples because temples were centres of wealth and power, and there was no religious motivation whatsoever. It had nothing to do with the Islamic contempt for shirk, or idolatry, and polytheism. These Muslim kings were actually mimicking their local Hindu counterparts, these historians argue, who were also breaking temples of rival Hindu rulers. It had all to do with wealth and power, not Ram or Allah. In other words, these historians separate the political from the religious.
Second, they point to the relative paucity of archaeological evidence of temple desecration, disproportionately low compared to the perception whipped up by temple lore. They provide evidence of how many temples were given grants by Muslim kings, how many Hindu officers worked for Muslim kings, and Muslim officers worked for Hindu kings, almost indicating the total absence of bigotry – or, at best, prevalence of cynical secularism that uses religion as a lever to secure rules, breaking and building temples and mosques as per convenience. Third, they argue that biographers of Muslim kings, not wanting their masters to appear greedy, draped the political action with a religious cloak, and went on to highly exaggerate the extent of the plunder, describing in gory details how Hindus were killed or enslaved or converted for the glory of Islam. Writing of such hagiographies began 800 years ago, and continued for nearly 500 years.
Finally, these historians show how, during the British Raj, colonial historians who were the first to apply scientific methods in the study of history, had prejudices of their own. Their uncritical examination of the hagiographies of Indo-Muslim rulers helped them to establish the idea that India was plundered and enslaved by Muslims. This was to discredit the local kings and to establish the East India Company as saviours. Later, this became a lever in their divide-and-rule policy. This discourse contributed greatly to the demands for Pakistan, the partition of India, and the clamour for Hindu Rashtra, cherished by those who subscribe to the Hindutva doctrine.
This separation of the religious from the political by historians is an interesting exercise. It almost grants legitimacy to temple breaking. It does not distinguish the difference between breaking of Hindu temples by Hindu rulers, who would move the images to their own private temples (not as trophies, but as deities), and Hindu temples by Muslim rulers, who would not do the same. For example, in Puri Jagannath temple complex, the guides point to images placed in minor temples, with full fledged rituals and priests of their own, that were as per temple lore brought by kings of Puri from Kanchi in the South after a great battle. Did Sikandar Butshikan, who 500 years ago broke the Martand temple (dedicated to the sun-god) in Kashmir, do the same?
Babri masjid being demolished on December 6, 1992. Image credit: Vimeo
Not bigots but cynics
If non-religious but merely political breaking of Hindu temples is not such a big deal, could it be argued that the breaking of Babri Masjid, had it happened in medieval times, would have been fine as long as it was a Hindutva, hence political, exercise, and not a Hindu, hence religious, one?
Right now, holy and historical monuments around Kaaba in the holy city of Mecca, in Saudi Arabia, are being torn down to make way for five-star hotels. This is being done by the local government, and the royal family, who are guardians of the shrine. Protests by Shia Muslims and historians of Islam are falling on deaf ears.
Are these religious actions of the Wahabi theocracy, or simply economic activity to cater to the vast number of pilgrims entering the holy city, as is being claimed? Will these historians declare mosque-breaking in Mecca legitimate if inspired by economic ambition, may be even political, but illegitimate if inspired by religious sentiments? If it is alright for Muslims to break mosques, can Hindus break mosques too? Or will such thoughts be dismissed as false equivalence, and reckless whataboutery?
Many have argued that Islam is being treated with kid gloves in academic circles, almost the same way as so-called “cow protectors” seem to be treated by the current government. While it is perfectly fine for educated liberals of the West to mock Christianity or even (pagan?) Hinduism, the very same people take pains not to appear Islamophobic, going to the extent of arguing that hijab is empowering. Why, Saudi Arabia has even been included by United Nations Women’s Rights Commission.
I wonder if this has something to do with collective Euro-American guilt at turning a blind eye to the Holocaust or to the role the West played in establishing the Jewish state of Israel in Muslim-controlled regions thus triggering the Palestinian tragedy that haunts us to this day. Or does it have to do with American military interests in West Asia – what they call the Middle East. After all, only in the United States, are educational institutes mapped on geographical grounds, mirroring military divisions. Thus we have Departments for South Asian, or for African, studies, for example.
Balustrade entrance to ornate open mantapa at Vittala temple, Hampi. Image credit: Dineshkannambadi [CC BY-SA 3.0]
If these modern historian commentaries on pre-modern history is to be believed, then religion played no role in the fall of the Vijayanagar empire in the 16th century at the hands of the Deccani sultans. Likewise, the rise of the Maratha Empire spearheaded by Shivaji in the 17th century was recast as religious only during the freedom struggle, not before. And kings like Tipu Sultan were just complex politicians, destroying some temples, supporting others, and cynically using Islam only to make alliances with the Ottoman Empire, never letting their private faith interfere with their public policies.
It almost seems these historians are trying to tell us that modern secularism is a re-discovery of medieval secularism, and that religious fanaticism is a recent invention. Medieval Muslim – or Hindu – kings, were not bigots. Religion played no role in their decisions. That is like saying that religion played no role in the migration of Protestants to America, or in the rise of England as a nation-state. Or that Evangelical Christianity plays no role in the political decisions of Singapore and South Korea. Or that religion was not the core issue for the Crusades, that horrific war between Christians and Muslims that lasted for centuries.
This character-certificate-giving approach of some modern historians, who it would seem, like to see themselves as warriors against fake news, makes me wonder how scientific these historians are in attitude. Why do they seem to function with an agenda in mind? Why do their writings appear to presuppose a villain over whom they are trying to intellectually triumph? Does that not make them activists, rather than social scientists?
Scholarship in the humanities has today become about identifying privilege and exploitation. It is about reframing the past in terms of injustice and inequality. It is driven by the demand for social justice. There is an increasingly evangelical tone in historical writing, as if to assert relevance, and guarantee research grants.
Recently, there was news of local Indian historians who traced vast metal bells taken from Portuguese churches and placed in Hindu temples by Maratha warlords. From all accounts in the public domain, these historians have neither tried to give their scholarship a communal twist as the Right tends to do, nor have they pretended to to call this a secular exercise, as the Left tends to do. There is an acknowledgment of the intense Maratha-Portuguese rivalry along the Konkan coast 300 years ago, but there is no attempt to define the battles as political, economic, or religious – or to declare them legitimate or illegitimate. It is simply acknowledging a historical fact, and letting the readers wonder about motivation and drive. There is no defendant or prosecution here, just a tone of mature scholarship, aware of contemporary political realities.
Naro Shankar Ghanta on Banks of River Godavari. Image credit: IANS Photo
History, myth and memory
Culture is not shaped only by history. It is also shaped by memory of people. And their myths, their truths, their notions of God and pollution, which inform their identity. In the quest for what they define as truth, smug historians remain clueless about emotions that cannot be captured in epigraphy or archaeology, which carry forward over generations in complex ways. Will those historians eager to see Ashoka’s edicts as truth, not royal propaganda, also see Modi’s ‘mann ki baat’ as the material on the basis of which he has to be understood by future generations? As I write this essay, I am well aware that the Left will slot me as a Hindu sympathiser (which is true) hence Hindu fanatic (which is false). But it is important to spotlight the deep and dark and insidious prejudice of many scholars in the humanities, who have reduced science into religion and rationality into activism. Let us not forget that words like “developed”, “progress” and “privilege” are not factual, but emotive adjectives, designed to manipulate the mind, enforce a value judgement and evoke a particular kind of reaction. Political correctness is an obstacle to systematic thought. It stops us from understanding the root cause of crisis in contemporary times. Missionary zeal of historians often mimics the missionary zeal of Christian Evangelists. Both want to save the world with truth. They just differ on what truth is.
To dismiss emotions of a people, to reduce what my mother told me as “fake news”, or seen as no different from Right Wing propaganda, can be very annoying. Mocking a community’s cherished truths as disingenuous and inauthentic can irritate the most mature and sensible of people of that community who understand the complex nature of inherited communication. When this irritation dips into rage, rationality evaporates. And that is when the politician sweeps in and argues for a “post-truth” world, where the traditional is respected in the most grotesque way. As the world hurtles towards rage and violence, a sense of misunderstanding prevails. It is easy to blame radical politicians and religious leaders for igniting the spark. But let these truth-seeking academicians who create a storm over memory and myth in the name of objectivity also take responsibility for collecting the fuel.
In a decade to 2016, the incidents of molestation reported in Bengaluru increased more than four-fold, statistics compiled by the Commissioner of Police, Bengaluru, on cases of molestation (under Section 354) show. Yet, according to our analysis of police data, of the 4,241 complaints filed between 2006 and 2016, the conviction rate was 0.37% (16 cases).
People stage a demonstration against molestation of women in Bengaluru. Of the 4,241 complaints of molestation filed between 2006 and 2016 in Bengaluru, the conviction rate was 0.37% (16 cases).
The number of complaints under under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code (assault to outrage the modesty of a woman) rose from 150 in 2006 to 776 in 2016. Experts say this could be because of an increase in the number of incidents as well as greater willingness on the part of women to register complaints.
The data were compiled by Bengaluru Commissioner of Police for the Karnataka Legislature Committee on Prevention of Violence and Sexual Abuse of Women and Children. This data project could serve as a template for how police in India’s burgeoning cities can make sense of their crime data in public interest.
Section 354 includes sexual harassment (354A), use of criminal force with intent to disrobe (354B), voyeurism (354C) and stalking (354D). The data obtained from the Bengaluru commissionerate group these offences under ‘molestation’.
Bengaluru–India’s IT capital–entered 2017 with reports of mass molestation of women in the city’s bustling MG Road and Brigade Road areas despite deployment of thousands of police personnel. The reports came as a shock to Bengaluru residents and for people across the country who believed the city to be safe for women.
Bengaluru’s conviction rate for molestation is indicative of the larger problem nationwide. “Few women who survive sexual assault have a pathway to justice and recovery from their horror,” said Meenakshi Ganguly, South Asia director at Human Rights Watch, an advocacy, in a statement issued after the Supreme Court upheld on May 4, 2017, the death sentence to four men who were part of the gang that raped in 2012 a Delhi physiotherapy student now known as Nirbhaya.
‘A stranger tried to kiss me in front of dozens of people! No one came to my help’
Kavya S, 24, was on her way to work when a stranger attacked her in public. “It was around 8:30 am in broad daylight, I was walking to work in Kormangala when a stranger grabbed me and tried to kiss me in front of dozens of people! No one came to my help but when I screamed and kicked him, they yelled at me and asked me to leave him,” she recounted.
Kavya immediately filed a complaint with the local police under Section 354, but did not pursue the case once she shifted her residence. “Police officials were very cooperative,” she recalled, “but I couldn’t follow up on the case as I had to shift my house and job.”
Cases such as Kavya’s are increasingly common, although Bengaluru police say they are working to improve the law and order situation for women. “We have identified areas that are hotspots for crimes against women and launched 51 Pink Hoysalas (mobile units) that are dedicated to women. We have also launched an app called ‘Suraksha’ last week (April second week). Anyone can inform us if they are in danger and we would reach the spot in 10 minutes,” S Ravi, Additional Commissioner of Police (Crime), told IndiaSpend.
Bengaluru’s criminal justice system is marred by delays, as with the rest of India’s (discussed here, here and here). Of the 4,241 molestation cases reported, 2,248 (53%) are pending trial, according to data from the Bengaluru City Police Commissionerate.
Among the cases tried, there have been 523 acquittals (12%) and 16 convictions (0.37%)–even as the police consider 97% of cases to be “true” after investigation. A decade earlier, the figure for “true” cases was 84%, indicating more open-mindedness in dealing with women’s complaints as well as better effort on the police’s part to investigate.
However, lawyers and activists believe the large proportion of acquittals are due to shoddy investigation. “In most crime against women cases, especially the molestation cases, the accused get acquitted or the cases are kept pending for years,” Pramila Nesargi, a noted lawyer and a well-known women’s rights activist, said. “The main reason for all these is the reluctance of police in getting proper evidence.” She said the government needs to appoint well-trained investigative officers.
Source: Bengaluru City Police Commissionerate Note: Figures are for cases under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code. Totals may not tally as some cases may be under investigation.
The government needs to think from women’s perspective, Rani Shetty, coordinator of Vanitha Sahayavani, a government agency that provides rescue and support services for women in distress, and operates from the office of the Commissioner of Police, told IndiaSpend. “I have met many victims of molestation whose cases have been pending for years. The legal system needs to be strong, there should be fast-track judgment for any cases related to women,” she said.
As per law, the police have to file a chargesheet within 90 days of a crime being reported. “[I]n most cases, they fail to do so, and this in turn affects the court proceedings,” Ugrappa VS, a member of the Karnataka Legislative Council and chairperson of the expert committee to prevent crimes against women and children, told IndiaSpend.
At the same time, public prosecutors, who are responsible for presenting the case in court, are overworked. “The main reason for cases pending for years is because public prosecutors are given too many cases,” public prosecutor SN Hiremane, who has been in the field for over 20 years, said. “I myself have 450 molestation cases pending so far.”
Judicial delays, which make it easy for the accused to get bail, can be extremely dangerous for victims of sexual assault. In one case, a grade IX student was molested by her 25-year-old neighbour. Her family filed a Section 354 case at the Peenya police station and the accused was arrested immediately. On his release on bail within four months, he kidnapped the girl and raped her. He is back in jail now.
“What happened to me shouldn’t happen to any girl. He has to be punished,” the girl told IndiaSpend.
“If the police had taken strict action on his first crime, they could have prevented the second incident. Now he is in jail but he might do the same thing when he comes out,” her father said.
The city’s burgeoning population, with a massive influx of immigrants, could be one of the factors behind molestation cases such as the one that took place on New Year’s eve, former Lokayukta Justice (Retd) N Santosh Hegde said speaking at a private college in the city in March 2017. The 2011 census had pegged Bangalore city’s population at 84.4 lakh. By 2016, it had risen to more than 1.15 crore.
“They come alone. They stay alone. And the manly desire is always there,” he said at the discussion about immigrants, adding that the benefit of anonymity in an overcrowded city apparently emboldens them to pursue their pervert desires. He also cited a lack of morals as one of the reasons.
She said cases of sexual violence against women have their root in the society’s mindset towards gender and it depends on how boys and girls are raised in home and school, Monisha Srichand, noted psychologist and Director of TalkItOver Counselling Services, explained.
“From childhood, boys are taught they are better, superior to girls, while the latter are seen as sex objects. They see it all around them in the media, movies… There’s a lot of gender inequality and as men see women walking around freely, being independent, working outside the house, being out late, they subconsciously want to assert their power over her,” she added.
(Mani is a Bengaluru-based independent journalist and a member of 101Reporters.com, a pan-India network of grassroots reporters.)