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When Lankan nobility invited Nayakkars from south India to rule

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Leslie Gunawardana, a leading historian, currently vice-chancellor University of Peradeniya, in an exclusive interview with ‘Communalism Combat’
 

Your work has repeatedly suggested that scholars have been coming under increasing pressure in Sri Lanka to develop a representation of the past which lends legitimacy to the claims of either the Sinhala or the Tamil nationalist projects. Since when has this trend been clearly visible?
 
If you survey the type of writings that have been published since the mid-80s, you see this trend gathering strength. It is the tendency of taking sides in the ethnic conflict that is still raging within Sri Lanka. A good example of this is a statement made by an influential speaker at a gathering of archaeologists in Colombo on July 7, 1992. He compared the role of the archaeologist in the field to that of the soldier in the ongoing war in the North, commenting that the contribution of the latter was no less important.
 

You have also repeatedly observed in your works that the worst impact of the Orientalists’ categorization of the South Asian peoples into ‘Aryan’ and ‘Dravidian’ has been felt in Sri Lanka. Could you elaborate?
 
The impact of Orientalism in South Asia seems to take varying forms. It has had its lasting impact in India, too. But out there, there has been a greater emphasis on religion. In Sri Lanka, this Orientalists’ categorisation can be identified as the single most divisive root of the current ethnic divide. Today people think that ethnic identity is the determining criteria little realizing that this is a post-19th century phenomenon.
 
The impact can be weighed especially if one looks back to see the way in which relations between the Sinhala and the Tamil communities in particular were friendly and mutually accommodative before this categorisation came to be accepted.
 
If you go back to the Kandyan period, we find the Sinhala nobility choosing an external South Indian dynasty – the Nayakkar dynasty – to govern them. This is not to present people of today in a negative light and the people of the past in positive terms but to emphasise and to remind people that the ruling ideas of different periods of history can be so different.
 
During the Kandyan period, caste was a much more important factor than ethnic identity. Between South Indian people and Sri Lankan people, the Sinhala people and the Tamil people, the same ideas and notions of caste prevailed.
 

Could you tell us a little more about this pre-19th century Sinhala nobility?
 
We had this very unusual phenomenon of kings being invited and placed on the throne, that is, South Indian rulers being invited here and placed on the throne. The lead in this was, ironically, always taken by the members of the nobility in consultation with members of the Buddhist clergy.
 
In fact, the first Nayakkar king was proposed to the throne by the chief incumbent of the Navaddha Vihara, a revered figure among Buddhist monks, the Samaka Sangha Rajja; this particular dynasty that was thus invited remained in power for about four generations and they formed close alliances with the local nobility.
 
There were much closer links between the Nayakkars and the local nobility and severe divisions between / within the local nobility.

 
What are the other main components of the communalist projects, both Sinhala ethno-nationalist and the Tamil ethno-nationalist one?
 
The Eelamist interpretation of history and the Sinhala interpretation of history, I see, as two sides of the same coin. They in fact support each other, socially and politically.
 
The historiographical project undertaken by some Sinhala ethno-nationalists has been the construction of a past in which the Sinhala language and the Sinhala ethnic identity has always been present. In this imagined past, all the Sinhala ethnics are Buddhists while their enemies who invade, create disruption and occupy their land are Tamil speaking Hindus.
 
 On the other hand, the Tamil ethno-nationalist project is nothing less than the invention of a “classical age” for the Tamils of the Jaffna Peninsula. It is presented as a time when the peninsula was united under a Tamil kingdom centred on Kantarotai, independent from “Sinhala hegemony”.
 

Buddha’s Lions and Tamil Tigers

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Just opposite the Bandarnaike Memorial Hall in Colombo stands a huge statue of Buddha behind which is a building that houses bhikkus (Buddhist monks). Published investigation reports following the July 1983 pogrom revealed that young Elle Gunawansa, a leader of Sinhala Peramuna, an organisation of Buddhist monks and others, were guilty of drawing up lists on non-Sinhala businesses prior to the state-sponsored pogrom.
 
It is this unholy alliance between the Sri Lankan state and the fanatical Buddhist-Sinhala clergy that is responsible for a deeply-entrenched communalism in Sri Lanka. Both religious and linguistic, it takes the form of violence and exclusion, politically and economically, while imposing Sinhala and Buddhist imagery culturally and linguistically on the minorities.
 
It is in this background of a deeply divided society and a severely communalised state apparatus that the present government has to outline and sell to its populace the much-debated devolution package by November. Today state-sponsored caravans (Thavalamas) are busy carrying the message of “One country, one people” to the people in the south in an attempt to convince the electorate of the devolution package.
 
“I don’t think that the situation is all that hopeless,” says Lucien Rajaka-runanayake, a senior journalist and part of the Free Media Movement. He is involved at the moment in trying to devise creative methods to take the devolution package to the people.
                                                                     
“There can be no question at all about the outline of the northern province which is and will have to be all-Tamil. The sensitive area is in the east where the aspirations of the Tamil-speaking people are that Batticaloa and Trincomalee be merged with the north. I don’t see that as impossible, yet.”
 
“The only solution in today’s Sri Lanka is that after devolution, an autonomous state for the Tamil-speaking people be carved out in the north merged with Trincomalee and Batticaloa in the east and a separate autonomous state for Muslims in the south. If there is a de-merger in the devolution package and the east is not part of the autonomous province of the north, the war will continue,” says Shanmugaratnam. “Unlike the militant leadership, the Tamil-speaking people will be quite happy with autonomy. They don’t want statehood,” he adds.
 
Is such a communalised demarcation inevitable? Does it not defy the multi-ethnic character of Sri Lankan society and reality?
 
“Regional autonomy along communal lines is a compromise, the only option that we have, the only step that can avert Partition. It is a culmination of the logic of the processes of communalization, first of the Sinhala-Buddhist majority and now of also the Tamil-Hindu and Muslim minorities,” replies Shanmugaratnam, adding, “Once such autonomy is granted concerted efforts towards a multi-ethnic society might, in the long term, overcome these divisions. In the short term, there is no alternative.”

“Regional autonomy along communal lines is a compromise, the only option that we have, the only step that can avert Partition. It is a culmination of the logic of the processes of communalisation”
 
The moot question is whether the government can with its devolution package win over the hearts and minds of both the Sinhala and the Tamil people? Will it display the skill and statesmanship to pose the issue in non-chauvinist and non-exclusivist terms even if the lines being demarcated follow communal patterns?
 
The Sinhala chauvinists, supported by the Buddhist Sangha have already begun vociferously opposing the devolution idea, trying to whip up chauvinist fears against it, arguing that if this is permitted, secession would be the next step. On September 17, 1997, the Sinhala Commission symbolically chose the birthday of Anaganika Dharmapala, a chauvinist Sinhala-Buddhist ideologue to present to the Sangha (a Constitutional Body) its detailed statement roundly denouncing the devolution package.
 
In the same week, the President made welcome noises reiterating, after a long gap, her government’s openness and readiness to talk to the LTTE unconditionally for a cessation of hostilities.
 
How will the Sri Lankan government respond to the counter pulls and pressures from Sinhala chauvinists on the one hand and the bloody-minded and corrupt LTTE leadership on the other? Will it have the courage to offer justice, equity and rights to its minorities, in the midst of a highly charged communal atmosphere?
           
The answer to these questions carries implications not merely for Sri Lanka but the entire South Asian region.