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A Dalit MP from Gujarat, MP of the Rajya Sabha has reportedly admitted to be under “tremendous pressure” from his political bosses in Delhi not to speak out the way he did against the gruesome Una incident, in which four Dalit youths were tied with a chain attached to an SUV, and thrashed by cow vigilantes in a procession in the town.
Shambhunath Tundiya, a Dalit MP, considered dharmaguru in the community, had told a local TV channel that the BJP had failed to act against atrocities against Dalits in Gujarat, and the Una incident was the “last straw.”
In a video which went viral, he said, Dalits would not tolerate “oppression any more”, and that the authorities should realize, the Dalits have been “forced to eat dead cow’s beef for centuries because they were forced by circumstances…”
“I was made to retract. You don’t know the type of problems I faced in the party after I made that statement. I will not speak out any more”, Tundiya is learnt to have told a Dalit delegation which went to meet him to persuade him to speak out against “attacks” on Dalits across India in the recent past, especially in Saharanpur, where 56 Dalit houses were blazed by an upper caste crowd.
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Martin Macwan reading out the demands at Zanzarka rally |
The delegation, which belonged to the Dr Ambedkar Vechan Pratibandh Samiti, or Stop Selling Dr Ambedkar Committee, went to Tundiya as part of its two-week long programme across Gujarat to ask Gujarat’s Dalit MPs and MLAs as to what they have done to protect the community, in whose name they were elected from the reserved constituency.
Revealing this, a member of the Committee, Kirit Rathod – one of the organizers of a well-attended June 3 Dalit rally in Zanzarka, the “religious seat” of Tundiya about 100 km south-west of Ahmedabad – told Counterview, “We had gone to meet him on May 27 to inform him about our mass agitation programme, which ends on June 13. Tundiya was quite apologetic. He said he knew the ground realities UP, where he had gone to campaign during the recent elections.”
Following the June 3 rally, the Committee members, led by Dalit rights NGO Navsarjan Trust founder Martin Macwan met Tundiya to seek his answers on why he was not speaking out for the Dalit cause in Parliament and outside. "I will raise the issue", is all he told the delegation.
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Banner on display at Zanzarka rally |
The list of 10 questions on which Tundiya was sought answer at the Zanzarka rally included what he had done to press upon Prime Minister Narendra Modi to ban cow vigilantes. While reading out the list of questions, a member a Samiti recalled, Modi had personally insisted that there was no place of cow vigilantes who attacked Dalits, and action should be taken against them. The four Dalit youths were attacked on suspicion of cow slaughter.
Following a month of uproar across India against cow vigilantes, indirectly referring to the Una incident, which took place in July second week last year, Modi had said, “It makes me angry that people are running shops in the name of cow protection… Some people indulge in anti-social activities at night, and in the day masquerade as cow protectors.”
Other questions asked to Tundiya included whether he had accused the slogans such as “Ambedkar murdabad” and “Ravidas Murdabad”, ransacking of the Ravidas temple, blazing of 56 Dalit houses, murder of a Dalit youth, all of which happened in Saharanpur, UP, on May 5, 2017; what had he done to stop forced migration of Dalits from their villages in Gujarat and elsewhere in India; what had he done to press upon the government to act against manual scavenging, and so on.
Addressing the Zanzarka rally, Macwan announced that Dalit Valmiki community women were preparing a 16-feet soap to be delivered to UP chief minister Yogi Adityanath, whose men had handed over over shampoos and soaps to 100-odd Musahar Dalit families, asking them to “come clean” before they met him in Kushinagar district.
Here is what happened:
♦ Attackers drove van into pedestrians on London Bridge before stabbing people in Borough Market
♦ Prime minister says too much ‘tolerance of extremism’ in UK
♦ 48 injured people taken to hospitals
♦ General election campaigning suspended
Full report: Police shoot dead three suspect after London attack
In the event of a major ISIS-inspired action in Britain, what principles do far-sighted – and brave – politicians need to observe? First published on 20 January 2017.
Stefan Rousseau/PA Wire/PA Images. All rights reserved.
"A few months before the 7/7 attacks in London in July 2005, and in the wake of the Madrid bombings, I went to a meeting that the Bishop of Bradford had convened to try and think through how a multi-confessional city like Bradford might respond if there was a similar attack in the UK. He brought together representatives from the local mosques, the police, the Council, the youth service and community groups, and I think this might have been one of the factors that helped maintain a degree of calm and resilience in the city when the 7/7 attacks came. Remembering this was part of what prompted me to write the following piece for openDemocracy in January, which was republished on 23 March in the light of the attack in Westminster.
Following last night’s terrible attack at the Manchester Arena, it may be helpful to look at the original column again. Now that we are in middle of a very fractious general election campaign it may be that the final few paragraphs, especially the last one, are particularly salient."
Paul Rogers 23 May 2017
Another 7/7-type attack in the United Kingdom is likely. In the aftermath, it will be essential to respond carefully with responses that seek to explain the wider context.
In London, the inquest has opened into the deaths of thirty British beach tourists in Sousse, Tunisia in June 2015. Eight others were killed in the ISIS-facilitated attack. Many questions remain over the warnings given and the levels of security offered.
The assault, as well as causing great grief to family and friends, had a substantial national impact. Yet this was less than the bombings of London's transport network on 7 July 2007, when fifty-two people were killed on a bus and three underground trains. (The four perpetrators also died). It remains the defining event for Britain in relation to political violence, closely connected to the Iraq war although this was strenuously denied by the Blair government at the time.
This “disconnect” has remained a feature of British attitudes to al-Qaida, ISIS and other extreme Islamist groups, even if some people pointed out at the time that the loss of life on "7/7" was no higher than the daily loss of life in Iraq.
Now, nearly twelve years later, the war goes on with a similar disconnect – there is simply no appreciation that Britain is an integral part of a major war that started thirty months ago, in August 2014. It may take the form of a sustained air-assault using strike-aircraft and armed-drones, but its intensity is simply unrecorded in the establishment media. This is a straightforward example of “remote warfare” conducted outside of public debate.
Thus, when another attack within Britain on the scale of 7/7 happens, there will be little understanding of the general motivations of those responsible. People will naturally react with horror, asking – why us? Politicians and analysts will find it very difficult even to try and explain the connection between what is happening "there" and "here".
The straightforward yet uncomfortable answer is that Britain is at war – so what else can be expected? It may be a war that gets little attention, there may be virtually no parliamentary debate on its conduct, but it is a war nonetheless.
There are several factors which underpin this approach.
The post-9/11 western-led wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya have left three countries as failed or failing states, killed several hundred thousand people and displaced millions. This causes persistent anger and bitterness right across the Middle East and beyond. While the Syrian civil war started as the repression of dissent by an insecure and repressive regime, it has evolved into a much more complex "double proxy war" which regional rulers and the wider international community have failed to address. This adds to the animosity.
The situation in Iraq is particularly grievous, given that it was the United States and its coalition partners that started the conflict and also gave rise directly to the evolution of ISIS. The Iraq Body Count project estimates the direct civilian death-toll since 2003 at more than 169,000. After a relative decline over 2009-13, an upsurge in the past three years has seen 53,000 lose their lives through violence.
Since the air-war started in August 2014 the Pentagon calculates that over 30,000 targets have been attacked with more than 60,000 missiles and bombs, and 50,000 ISIS supporters have been killed. But there is abundant evidence that western forces have directly killed many civilians. AirWars reports that:
"As ISIL was forced to retreat in both Iraq and Syria, the year [2016] saw a dramatic jump in reported civilian deaths from Coalition airstrikes. A total of between 2,932 and 4,041 non-combatant fatalities are alleged for 2016, stemming from 445 separate claimed Coalition-caused incidents in both Iraq and Syria."
ISIS, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (JFS), and other groups have no air-defence capabilities yet are determined to continue the war, seeing themselves as guardians of Islam under attack by the “crusader” forces of the west. At a time of retreat they will be even more determined than ever to take the war to the enemy, whether by the sustained encouragement and even facilitation of individual attacks such as Berlin or Nice, or more organised attacks such as in Paris and Brussels.
The aims of these groups are threefold:
* Retribution via straightforward paramilitary actions, responding especially to the current reversals in Iraq.
* Demonstrating to the wider world, especially across the Middle East, that they remain a force to be reckoned with.
* Inciting as much anti-Muslim bigotry and hatred as possible in the target countries.
In the last of these they are greatly aided by the attitudes of Trump, Le Pen, Wilders, UKIP and other western political phenomena, especially the incitement of fear of refugees which reached its height in Britain in the closing days of the Brexit campaign.
A repeat 7/7–level attack in Britain is probable, although when and how is impossible to say. Again, it will not be easy to respond. But in trying to do so, two factors need to be born in mind.
First, the aim of ISIS and others will be to incite hatred. Any tendency to encourage that is doing the work of ISIS. This can and should be said repeatedly.
Second, the links between the attack and the ongoing war in Iraq and Syria must be made. That Britain is still at war after fifteen years suggests that some rethinking is required.
Politicians who make these points will face immediate accusations of appeasement, not least in the media. But however difficult the case, it needs to be made if the tide of war is to be turned.
About the author:
Paul Rogers is professor in the department of peace studies at Bradford University, northern England. He is openDemocracy's international security adviser, and has been writing a weekly column on global security since 28 September 2001; he also writes a monthly briefing for the Oxford Research Group. His latest book is Irregular War: ISIS and the New Threat from the Margins (IB Tauris, 2016), which follows Why We’re Losing the War on Terror (Polity, 2007), and Losing Control: Global Security in the 21st Century (Pluto Press, 3rd edition, 2010). He is on Twitter at: @ProfPRogers
A raging fire broke out about 15 hours ago in Lucknow's Kanshiram Echo Park situated in front of the Ramabai Ambedkar Jail road Masjid
Some Videos on You-Tube
Lucknow: A fire in Eco Garden situated in front of the mosque of Ramabai Ambedkar Jail Road
कांशीराम ईको पार्क में लगी आग
The Indian Writers' Forum participated in the Dharwad Literature Festival held on 6-7 May, 2017. The IWF Team spoke to Dr. Muzaffar Assadi, Professor of Political Science at the University of Mysore about the slow rise of communalism in Karnataka and the gradual co-option of local icons into the Hindutva fold. The aim, Professor Assadi explains, is to convert the masses into Hindus, mainly from the marginalised communities, into cultural and finally into political Hindus.
Cultural Syncretism and Tolerance
When compared to other parts of India, whether it’s Uttar Pradesh or Bihar, or Haryana and other places, Karnataka has been relatively free from communal tension and communal ideology. Karnataka remained unaffected by the Partition. It never had any memories of the Partition. In fact, memories of Partition came to Karnataka through texts or in the form of textual memories.
The first instance of communal tension can be traced back to 1920. It started on a small pretext that is the Ganesha Festival. In fact, one may recall that there is a long absence of communal tension in the history of Karnataka. The reasons were: Karnataka had a tolerant society and it celebrated cultural syncretism. Some examples of its cultural and religious syncretism are represented by the ritual practice of Naga Pantha and the influence of Sufism. As a result, this syncretic culture gave rise to a “fuzzy” community where identities were blurred.
The State was not only tolerant, it was also receptive. One remembers the Bahmani Kingdom/ Bahmani Sultanate around the Bijapur area which not only upheld Islamic tradition, they also extended their support to literature, the arts, and languages from the other princely states.
In the 1920s, a non-Brahmin movement set the stage for an affirmative action to secure reservation for marginalized groups in the princely state. Not only was there a strong alliance between communities and the State but also among the different communities. There was no division based on communal identities. Watch the interview here and read the transcript below.
Communal Ideology enters Karnataka in 1980
But in the late 1980s, the scene changed. Karnataka was on the verge of major communal shake up. Since then, certain pockets have been treated as experimental labs of the Hindutva. The coastal belt of Karnataka is the best example. What led to this transformation were the land reforms of 1970s.
These land reforms were progressive in nature and they provided social security to backward classes in the coastal region. They created a category of cultivators who were not landlords. Prior to this, their economy was in doldrums. They were given small patches of land. But after the land reforms, they were able to secure their own social identity. But in the 1980s this changed. There was widespread social and economic crisis. The BJP took advantage of this crisis and tried to appropriate the disillusioned lot which in turn created many fringe groups. Therefore, communal violence in the coastal belt was mainly engineered by the Hindutva groups.
The fringe groups comprised people from the Other Backward Classes. If one observes the structure of communal tension in Karnataka, three things become evident. Communal tension is primarily engineered by Hindutva groups in the coastal belt, the bashing category consists of people from the OBCs; and finally, the ideological apparatus for this was provided by the upper castes. However, this does not mean there was no backlash.
Competitive Communalism
This further gave rise to competitive communalism in the region. Islamic Fundamentalist groups such as the Popular Front of India and the Socialist Democratic Party of India (SDPI) are results of the aforesaid competitive communalism.
Any kind of dialogue between Muslims and Hindus has nearly stopped in the coastal region. Competitive communalism has also penetrated the public sphere. One sees saffron flags everywhere—in bus stands, tied to poles, rickshaws, etc. Communal tension has seeped into everyday life—one rarely sees people from these two communities get together in the coastal belt.
Communal ideology is increasingly appropriating Karnataka’s syncretic culture. Liberal spaces are shrinking in Karnataka. They are also trying to influence civil society groups and trying to mobilise and organise them.
Converting Hindus into Cultural-Political Hindus
Most importantly, political defeat is not the primary concern of communal politics in Karnataka. What is more important is the task of converting a Hindu into a cultural Hindu, especially people from the Other Backward Classes. In order to do this, they have started appropriating local symbols like Narayan Guru, Ambedkar, Rani Abbakka (the freedom fighter from a place called Ullal) and Kittur Rani Chennamma (by naming a university after her).
In fact, Hindutva forces are also slowly appropriating the corporate sector. In the malls, they supply the security guards.
Multifaceted Fronts to Counter Communal Ideology
Who is countering this rapidly growing communal politics in Karnataka?
There are five or six groups. However, they are not strong enough to confront or counter communal politics in Karnataka. Since communal politics has penetrated everyday life practices: culture, lifestyle, texts, etc, one has to build a strong counter-culture. Strong multifaceted civil society and institutional collectives should be formed to counter communal ideology with ideas of secularism, liberalism, and freedom. Only heterogeneous, multifaceted fronts can help rebuild a tolerant and communally free Karnataka.
Courtesy: Indian Cultural Forum