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The Rule of the Mob: Now Delhi, Earlier Jharkand and Uttar Pradesh

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Mob rule has well and truly been unleashed. Two weeks to the day, on a Friday March 19 two males, one barely adult, Mazlum Amsari (32) and Imteyaz Khan were hanged to death at Balumath in Latehar district of Jharkand in a brutal act that bespoke not just the rule of the mob but the unspoken immunity enjoyed by nameless cadres of the sangh parivar, now been accorded sanction to take law into their hands, lynch, kill, and if you are lucky beat up and even sexually threaten and assault.

So it does not quite matter if Mohan Bhagwat, RSS supremo — the man behind the Delhi throne leading the machine of the RSS which is the street army of the present regime – magnanimously as it were declares that ‘Bharat Mata ki Jai’ should not be coercively elicited. The repeated utterances of members of parliament, ministers and functionaries of the RSS that give sanction to exclusivist ‘nationalisms’ are signal enough for their cadres.

The latest such manifestation was Delhi. An 18-year-old madrasa student’s arm was broken, and two of his classmates injured after a group of young men allegedly assaulted them for not saying ‘Jai Mata Ki’. The Indian Express reports that the Delhi Police on March 30 arrested five persons, all in their 20s, in connection with an alleged assault on three madrasa students in Begumpur. On March 26, an 18-year-old madrasa student’s arm was broken, and two of his classmates injured after a group of young men allegedly assaulted them for not saying ‘Jai Mata Ki’.

According to Dilkash, he and his friends, Ajmal and Naeem, were walking through a park in the area when they were assaulted. “My friends and I had gone to Bans Wala park, some 300 metres from the madrasa, when we were attacked by a group of young men. They spotted us because we were wearing caps and asked us to say Jai Mata Ki,” he told The Indian Express.


Latehar Jharkand

According to Dilkash, one of the assailants hit Ajmal after they “refused to chant Jai Mata Ki. “When I intervened, they started beating me as well,” said Dilkash, adding that Naeem was also roughed up. Dilkash, Ajmal and Naeem are from Bihar’s Purnia district and came to Delhi last year to study at the Faiz-ul-uloom Ghausia madrasa in Ramesh Enclave’s Mohammadi Masjid. The trio said they managed to escape after a few minutes and flee towards the madrasa. “All are in their early 20s and are the residents of the same area,” SCP Vikramjit Singh is reported to have said.

Meanwhile, while many reports in the media reported Bhagwat’s statement as interpreted to mean that there should  be no coercion on the utterance of ‘Bharat Mata ki Jai’, another report in the Hindi media suggested that Bhagwat has visions of the whole world uttering, reverentially the slogan, ‘Bharat Mata ki Jai’ “Puri Duniyase ‘Bharat Mata ki Jai’ Bulwana Chahte hai Sangh Pramukh Mohan Bhagwat” The report dated March 27 says that, “आरएसएस के प्रमुख मोहन भागवत ने रविवार (27 मार्च) को कहा कि संगठन चाहता है कि देश शोषण मुक्त और आत्म सम्मान से पूर्ण बने और पूरी दुनिया भारत को सलाम करे।

फ्रेंड्स ऑफ ट्रायबल सोसायटी के सह संस्थापक दिवंगत मदन लाल अग्रवाल के जीवन पर लिखी गई एक किताब के विमोचन के अवसर पर भागवत ने कहा, ‘‘हम चाहते हैं कि पूरी दुनिया ‘भारत माता की जय’ बोले। हम भारत को समृद्ध, शोषण से मुक्त और आत्मसम्मान से भरपूर बनाना चाहते हैं। इसके लिए हमें अपनी जिंदगी में भारत को जीना होगा।’’

राष्ट्रीय स्वयंसेवक संघ के प्रमुख ने कहा कि बंटवारे के बाद पाकिस्तान ने ‘भारत’ के नाम पर दावा नहीं किया क्योंकि वह उन गुणों को स्वीकार नहीं कर सकता जो भारत में है। उन्होंने कहा कि वेद, ‘देव भाषा’, ‘आदि भाषा’ और संस्कृत व्याकरण की रचना भी पाकिस्तान के क्षेत्र में हुई।

भागवत ने कहा, ‘‘लेकिन उन्होंने (पाकिस्तान) अपना नाम अपनाया और ‘भारत’ नाम को छोड़ दिया क्योंकि वे वो गुण स्वीकार नहीं कर सकते जो भारत में हैं।’’ रामायण का जिक्र करते हुए भागवत ने कहा, ‘‘हम कहते हैं कि यह काफी प्राचीन है लेकिन यह इतिहास है।’’
हल्के फुल्के अंदाज में भागवत ने कहा कि वह भाग्यशाली हैं कि आरएसएस का नेतृत्व कर रहे हैं। उन्होंने कहा, ‘‘मुझे नहीं मालूम कि चुनाव होने पर क्या होगा। लेकिन यहां नियुक्ति हुई है। मैं भाग्यशाली हूं।’’

Which report may we hold the Sangh to? Or should we, as citizens owing allegiance to the Indian Constitution also ask, who the Sangh is –the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) to actually dictate or not what should be the guiding principles by whicht this country and its people function?

References:
1. 18-year-old Madrasa student’s arm broken for not saying “Jai Mata Ki”

2, Boy beaten up over refusal to chant slogan in Delhi  

Caste systems violate human rights and dignity of millions worldwide: UN report

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Syed Haider Raza / ArtKonsult
 
Click here for a pdf of the full report.

At least 250 million people worldwide still face appalling and dehumanising discrimination based on caste and similar systems of inherited status warned the United Nations Special Rapporteur on minority issues, Rita Izsák-Ndiaye, during the presentation of the first comprehensive UN report on caste-based discrimination to the Human Rights Council.

“This is a global problem affecting communities in Asia, Africa, Middle East, the Pacific region and in various diaspora communities,” the expert said while stressing that “caste-based discrimination and violence goes against the basic principles of universal human dignity and equality, as it differentiates between ‘inferior’ and ‘superior’ categories of individuals which is unacceptable.”

Ms. Izsák-Ndiaye warned that discrimination leads to extreme exclusion and dehumanisation of caste-affected communities, who are often among the most disadvantaged populations, experience the worst socioeconomic conditions and are deprived of or severely restricted in the enjoyment of their civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights.

The term ‘caste’ refers to a strict hierarchical social system often based on notions of purity and contamination. The expert report describes how people from ‘lower castes’ are often limited to certain occupations which are often deemed ‘polluting’ or menial by others, including manual scavenging, sweeping and disposal of dead animals.

“Unfortunately, in many cases, attempts to challenge these prohibitions or the unlawful consequences derived from caste systems, which are hereditary by nature, result in violence against caste-affected individuals and retaliation against their communities.” the Special Rapporteur said.
She emphasised that caste-affected women and girls are often the victims of caste-based and sexual violence, trafficking and are especially vulnerable to early and forced marriage, bonded labour and harmful cultural practices. Violence and the threat of violence against them frequently go unreported, allowing a culture of invisibility, silence and impunity.

“The shadow of caste and its stigma follows an individual from birth till death, affecting all aspects of life from education, housing, work, access to justice, and political participation” Ms. Izsák-Ndiaye said. “In many societies discussing these practices is taboo; we need not just legal and political responses but ways to change the mindset of individuals and the collective conscience of local communities.”

There have however been some positive developments, such as constitutional guarantees, legislation and dedicated institutions to monitor and overcome caste-based discrimination.

“I hope that my report will be used as an advocacy tool in supporting the efforts of caste-affected communities and others who are tirelessly working to relegate caste discrimination to history,” the Special Rapporteur concluded.

Ms. Rita Izsák-Ndiaye (Hungary) was appointed as Independent Expert on minority issues by the Human Rights Council in June 2011 and subsequently her mandate was renewed as Special Rapporteur on minority issues in March 2014. She is tasked by the UN Human Rights Council, to promote the implementation of the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, among other things.  Learn more here.

The Special Rapporteurs are part of what is known as the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council. Special Procedures, the largest body of independent experts in the UN Human Rights system, is the general name for the Council’s independent fact-finding and monitoring mechanisms that address either specific country situations or thematic issues in all parts of the world. Special Procedures experts work on a voluntary basis; they are not UN staff and do not receive a salary for their work. They are independent of any government or organization and serve in their individual capacity.
For the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, click here.

Via the UN Office of the Commissioner of Human Rights.

The journey from jihad to Islamist terrorism

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The twin bomb attacks in Brussels mark a new chapter in the unfinished book on the history of Islamist terrorism.


Brussels remains on high alert as raids continue.       Image: Christophe Petit Tesson/EPA

To understand the terrorist attacks we must examine the wider circumstances. These include the hypothesis that many of the terrorists – including the Algerian Muhammad Belkaid killed in a Brussels raid earlier in March – have been involved in the conflict in Syria and Iraq, and as a result have become radicalised. But as the investigation continues, questions will be asked about where the radicalisation of those involved took place: in Syria or Iraq, or in the back streets of the Molenbeek quarter of Brussels.

It is important, however, to note that while the terrorists appear to be Muslims, this does not equate to a relationship between the attacks and Islam. It is like equating the 1980s IRA attacks on the UK mainland to Christianity (despite the sectarian nature of that conflict, it was a political struggle). Let’s not forget that the residents of Molenbeek publicly mourned the Paris attacks.

The Syria connection

The conflict in Syria and Iraq has undoubtedly contributed to the spread of Islamist terrorism both in the Middle East and wider world. The foreign participants in this conflict have gained experienced in a violent landscape where the ostensibly noble idea of a classical style of defensive jihad in support of the Syrian people against Bashar Al-Assad, has morphed into nihilistic Islamist terrorism.

This in turn has radicalised many individuals, who on their return home, have difficulty readjusting. They return with some additional “street credibility” and may subsequently become both potential terrorists or trainers and ideologues. One man wanted by police in connection with the Brussels attack, Najim Laachraoui, is believed to have travelled to Syria in 2013.

A key point here to understand is that many individuals, both Arabs and Westerners, who go to Syria to join Islamic State are not necessarily radicalised already (in the sense of holding extreme political or religious beliefs), but that fighting and socialisation among Islamist fighters in Syria can radicalise them.

Complex routes to radicalisation

A recently published trove of Islamic State documents gave an insight into the many individuals who go to Syria and don’t join Islamic State immediately, but join other (perhaps more moderate) groups initially. To support the point that many of those travelling to Syria are not necessarily radical, a recent report was published of US citizens who went to Syria to fight against (not alongside) Islamic State. Reading their narratives confirms that they too were not considered radical.

The notion of radicalisation is complex and contested. The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation at Kings College London argues that radicalisation is a combination of grievances, ideology, and socialisation. Given that, and with the backdrop to the Syrian conflict, these factors appear to change over time.

Those who may have had initial grievances against the Assad regime in Syria, may later embrace a more extreme ideology, perhaps due to their socialisation with more extreme fighters in Syria. This transformation from fighting a classical jihad (against Syrian combatants) to one of terrorism (against civilians and non-combatants) is a much understudied phenomenon.

In this context, classical jihad is a fight to defend fellow Muslims against those who are persecuting them. The same logic was applied during the 1980s Afghan jihad, against the Soviets who were persecuting fellow Muslims in Afghanistan. This classical jihad had the full support of the United States as noted in a recent book about the war.


Syrian troops in al-Jbail Mountain, eastern Syria in March. SANA/EPA

The attacks in Brussels were largely, but regrettably, to be expected. One report noted that “one in nine foreign fighters returned to perpetrate attacks in the West”. With this in mind, and aware that at least 553 Belgians (many from the group Sharia4Belgium) have been active in Syria or Iraq, such attacks should not come as a surprise.

Islamic State, through its news agency Amaq, admitted responsibility for the Brussels attacks, perpetrated by “soldiers of the caliphate”. So the attacks in Brussels must be seen in the light of the geo-political events playing out in Syria and Iraq. They are not born out of a sectarian issue of Muslim versus Christian; but stem from groups and individuals who have been radicalised, beyond the point of involvement in defending their fellow Muslims through classical jihad, to one of Islamist terrorism.

This article was first published on The Conversation.

(Author is PhD candidate, Handa Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St Andrews)

Saudi Funding of Intolerance: The Other Face of the Indian Sufi’s Angst

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Image Courtesy: Quora.com

The issues arising from the decision of India’s Sufi Muslims to provide a platform to the ‘Hindu Nationalist’ Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the World Sufi Forum in Delhi in mid-March has earlier been addressed by SabrangIndia. But that apart there is another dimension to the Sufi angst which has to do with the petro-dollar funded, aggressive promotion in India, as elsewhere in the world, of a version of Islam which is extremely rigid, highly intolerant and hostile not only to other religions but even other sects within Islam. The All India Ulema Mashaikh Board is the response of Sufi-minded Sunni Muslims at this ongoing attempt to monopolise Muslim space in India.        
 
Exporting fundamentalist Islam (Wahhabism) to Muslims across the world emerged, particularly from the 1970s onwards, has been a major preoccupation of the Saudi regime in order to gain legitimacy for the Saudi Arabian monarchy. In India this has meant the growing clout of puritanical and rigid sects like the Ahl-e Hadith and the Deobandis. This is bad news for all those concerned with bridging the growing Hindu-Muslim divide.

Reproduced below are excerpts from a paper by written by Yoginder Sikand in 2005. If anything, its contents are even more relevant today.

Its claim of representing Islamic ‘orthodoxy’ is the Saudi regime’s principal tool in seeking ideological legitimacy. Saudi Arabia prides itself on being, as it calls itself, the only ‘truly’ Islamic State in the world, although this claim is stiffly disputed by many Muslims. Official Saudi Islam, or what is commonly referred to as ‘Wahhabism’ by its opponents, is the outcome of the movement led by the 18th century puritan Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab (1703-91), who, along with Muhammad ibn Saud, was the chief architect of the Saudi State.

Exporting Wahhabi Islam to Muslims elsewhere in the world emerged, particularly from the 1970s onwards, as a major preoccupation of the Saudi regime. This was seen as a vital resource in order to gain legitimacy for the Saudi Arabian monarchy. Transnational linkages are thus crucial in the project of contemporary global Wahhabism. Since Wahhabism is seen by its proponents as the single, ‘authentic’ and ‘normative’ form of Islam, it has an inherent tendency of expansionism, seeking to impose itself on or replace other ways of understanding and practising Islam.

As home to a Muslim population of over 150 million, India has been an important target of Saudi Wahhabi propaganda. Private as well as semi-official Saudi Arabian assistance has made its way to numerous Indian Muslim individuals and organisations.


Photo Courtesy: Clarion Project

The sort of Islam that the Saudis began aggressively promoting abroad, including in India, in the aftermath of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, had a number of characteristic features. It was extremely literalist; it was rigidly and narrowly defined, being concerned particularly with issues of ‘correct’ ritual and belief, rather than with wider social and political issues; it was viciously sectarian, branding dissenting groups, such as Shias and followers of the Sufis as ‘enemies’ of Islam; and, finally, it was explicitly and fiercely critical of ideologies and groups, Muslim as well as other, that were regarded as political threats to the Saudi regime. Accordingly, these were routinely castigated as ploys of the ‘enemies of Islam’.

Intra-Sunni rivalry and the emergence of the Ahl-e Hadith

The establishment of British rule in India had momentous consequences for notions of Muslim and Islamic identity. The widely shared perception of Islam being under threat helped promote a feeling of Muslim unity transcending sectarian and ethnic boundaries. Yet, at the same time, British rule opened up new spaces for intra-Muslim rivalry. It was in this period that serious differences emerged within the broader Sunni Muslim fold, leading to the development of neatly-defined and on numerous issues mutually opposed sect-like groups, the principal being the Deobandis, the Barelvis and the Ahl-e Hadith. Each of these groups claimed a monopoly of representing the ‘authentic’ Sunni tradition, or the Ahl al-Sunnah wal Jamaah, branding rival claimants as aberrant and, in some cases, even as apostates. This brought to the fore the deeply fractured and fiercely contested nature of Sunni ‘orthodoxy’.

The pioneers of the Ahl-e Hadith saw themselves as struggling to promote what they believed to be the ‘true’ Islam of Muhammad and his companions. Like most other Sunni ulema, they considered the Shias to be outside the pale of Islam and therefore, kafirs. In addition, they believed that the other Sunni groups too had strayed from the path of the ‘pious predecessors’ (salaf).

Overall, they saw their mission as rescuing Muslims from what they saw as the sin of shirk and guiding them to the ‘pure monotheism’ (khalis tauhid) of the Prophet and his companions. Most of them were inspired by the example of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab and his companions, particularly appreciating the Wahhabis’ criticism of popular custom. Yet, they did not identify themselves as such, refusing the label of Wahhabi that their detractors used to dismiss them.

Many Hanafi ulema saw the Ahl-e Hadith as a hidden front of the Wahhabis, whom they regarded as ‘enemies’ of Islam for their fierce opposition to the adoration of the Prophet and the saints, their opposition to popular custom and to taqlid, rigid conformity to one or the other of the four generally accepted schools of Sunni jurisprudence.

Further, they also saw the Ahl-e Hadith as directly challenging their own claims of representing normative Islam. Numerous Hanafi ulema issued fatwas branding the Ahl-e Hadith as virtual heretics, contemptuously referring to them as ghair muqallids for their opposition to taqlid, which they believed to be integral to established Sunni tradition. Hanafi opposition to the Ahl-e Hadith was fierce. In many places Hanafis refused them admittance to their mosques, schools and graveyards. Marital ties with them were forbidden, and in some places followers of the Ahl-e Hadith even faced physical assault.

In recent years Ahl-e Hadith scholars have penned scores of books and tracts sternly denouncing customs that many Indian Muslims share with their Hindu neighbours, a legacy of their pre-Islamic past. These also include customs, such as those associated with popular Sufism and the cults of the saints, which enabled Islam to take root in India and to adjust to the Indian cultural context. As Ahl-e Hadith writers see it, these are all ‘wrongful innovations’, having no sanction in the Prophet’s sunnah, and hence must be rooted out.

The Saudi-Ahl-e Hadith connection: Wahhabism as an external policy tool

The 1970s witnessed a growing involvement of certain Arab states, institutions and private donors in sponsoring a number of Islamic organisations and institutions in India. This was a direct outcome of the boom in oil revenues, particularly following the hike in oil prices by OPEC members in the wake of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.

Although the precise magnitude of Arab assistance to Indian Muslim organisations cannot be ascertained, it was certainly significant, although the Indian press routinely exaggerated it, leading to a scare of petrodollars flooding the country as part of an alleged grand conspiracy to convert poor, particularly ‘low’ caste, Hindus to Islam.

In actual fact, few Muslim organisations actually engaged in missionary work among Hindus received such money. Instead, most Arab, including Saudi, financial assistance went to Muslim organisations to establish mosques, madrassas and publishing houses. To a lesser extent, money was channelled to Muslim organisations to set up schools and hospitals in Muslim localities and to provide scholarships to needy Muslim students.

Saudi funds for Muslim institutions in India have come through a range of sources, including the Saudi State, various Saudi-sponsored Islamic organisations such as the Mecca-based Rabita al-Alami al-Islami (World Muslim League) and the Dar ul-Ifta wal Dawat ul-Irshad, as well as private donors, mostly rich sheikhs, some with close links to the Saudi ruling family. Several Indian Muslims working in Saudi Arabia in various capacities also send back money to fund Islamic institutions, based mainly in towns and villages where their families live.

Monetary assistance to selected Islamic institutions is only one method through which the Saudis have sought to patronise and influence key Muslim leaders and opinion makers in India. Other forms of assistance include sponsored Haj pilgrimages for Muslim leaders, including ulema, patronising of selected publishing houses, scholarships for madrassa students to study in Saudi Islamic universities and jobs for such graduates in both the private as well as public sector within Saudi Arabia.

The largest beneficiary of this largesse is believed to be the Ahl-e Hadith, although the Jamaat-i Islami and the Deobandis are also said to have benefited to some extent. The Barelvis and the Shias, both of whom regard Wahhabism as wholly heretical, have received little or no financial support at all from Saudi sources. This itself suggests that Saudi finance to Muslim institutions in India is intended to serve and promote a particular ideological vision of Islam, one that ties in with the interests of the Saudi regime and its official Wahhabi ulema.

Saudi Arabia emerged as a significant sponsor of Islamic institutions internationally, including in India, only in the 1970s. This was a period of intense ideological struggle in the Arab world. Arab socialism and pan-Arab nationalism under Nasser in Egypt and the Baathists in Syria and Iraq and various communist parties active in numerous Arab states all called for the overthrow of monarchical regimes in the region, which they saw as lackeys of the United States and as helping the Zionist occupation of Palestine. Within Saudi Arabia itself voices of dissent and protest emerged, including from those who had been influenced by socialist trends elsewhere in the region.

The literature produced by several Ahl-e Hadith publishing houses in India helps promote a version and vision of Islam that is almost identical to that of the Wahabbis of Saudi Arabia, and hence one that fits in with the interests of both the Saudi Wahhabi ulema as well as the Saudi State. The claim of the Saudi monarchy as representing the sole ‘authentic’ Islamic regime in the world is repeatedly stressed in several Ahl-e Hadith writings, and reflects the close links, ideological as well as financial, between several Indian Ahl-e Hadith leaders and the Saudi State and its official Wahhabi ulema.

Then came the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, which led to fears of an export of revolutionary, anti-monarchical Islam to the Arab world, including to Saudi Arabia. Ayatollah Khomeini vehemently denounced the Saudi kingdom, insisting that Islam had no place for monarchical rule. He also bitterly attacked the Saudis for being American stooges and for willingly acquiescing in American support for Israel.

In his will, made public in 1989, he denounced the Saudi regime as ‘anti-Islamic’, claiming that it was in league with ‘Satanic powers’. He argued that Wahhabism represented ‘anti-Koranic ideas’ and a ‘baseless, superstitious cult’, and was aimed at destroying Islam from within. Radical appeals emanating from Tehran, including anti-Wahhabi and anti-Saudi sentiments soon captured the imagination of Muslims all over the world.

The Iranian Revolution played the role of a major catalyst in moulding Saudi foreign policy, in which the export of its official Wahhabi form of Islam emerged as a key instrument. The anti-monarchical thrust of the revolution was seen by the Saudi regime as a menacing threat. If the Shah of Iran, America’s closest and strongest ally in the region, could be overthrown as a result of the passionate appeals of a charismatic Imam, the Saudi rulers, it was painfully realised, could well meet the same fate. Consequently, the Saudis, backed by the Americans, began investing heavily in promoting Wahhabi Islam abroad in order to counter the appeal of the Iranian Revolution, both within Saudi Arabia itself and abroad.

Stressing the regime’s ‘Islamic’ credentials now came to be relied upon as the principal tool to strengthen it and to stave off challenges from internal as well as external opponents, from Muslims opposed to the regime’s corrupt and dictatorial ways and its close alliance with the imperialist powers, principally the United States. Saudi export of Wahhabism was given a further boost with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, when the Saudis, supported by the Americans, pumped in millions of dollars to fund Wahhabi-style schools and organisations in Pakistan in order to train guerrillas to fight the Russians. While such assistance, in Afghanistan and elsewhere, was presented as a sign of Saudi Arabia’s professed commitment to ‘true’ Islam, it also functioned as a thinly veiled guise for promoting the interests of the Saudi regime. In exporting this brand of Islam abroad, India, home to the second largest Muslim community in the world, received particular importance.

The sort of Islam that the Saudis began aggressively promoting abroad, including in India, in the aftermath of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, had a number of characteristic features. It was extremely literalist; it was rigidly and narrowly defined, being concerned particularly with issues of ‘correct’ ritual and belief, rather than with wider social and political issues; it was viciously sectarian, branding dissenting groups, such as Shias and followers of the Sufis as ‘enemies’ of Islam; and, finally, it was explicitly and fiercely critical of ideologies and groups, Muslim as well as other, that were regarded as political threats to the Saudi regime. Accordingly, these were routinely castigated as ploys of the ‘enemies of Islam’.

Saudi patronage and the Indian Ahl-e Hadith

A hugely disproportionate amount of Saudi aid to Indian Muslim groups in the decades after the Iranian Revolution is said to have gone to institutions run by the Ahl-e Hadith. This is hardly surprising, given the shared ideological tradition and vision of the Ahl-e Hadith and the Saudi Wahabbis. One result of the generous Saudi patronage of the Indian Ahl-e Hadith has been that there has been a growing convergence between the latter and the Saudi Wahhabi ulema, so much so that today there is hardly any difference between the two groups.

Saudi finance to Indian Ahl-e Hadith institutions has heavily influenced the contents of the vast amount of literature that they produce and distribute. In the last two decades there has been a mushroom growth in the number of Ahl-e Hadith publishing houses in India. Several of them are said to receive Saudi funds, directly or otherwise. Many of them produce low-priced books, and, now, audio tapes, video cassettes and compact discs, and some even operate their own web sites. Most of the authors whose works they publish are Indian and, to a lesser extent, Pakistani Ahl-e Hadith ulema who have received higher education in various Saudi universities.

Several of them are currently working in various official as well as private Islamic organisations in Saudi Arabia itself. Their vision and understanding of Islam is indelibly shaped by their own experiences in Saudi Arabia. They see the Saudi Wahhabi version of Islam as normative and other forms of Islam as deviant.

Much of the literature produced by Indian Ahl-e Hadith publishing houses focusses on the minutiae of ritual practices and beliefs. This is a reflection, in part, of the overwhelmingly literalist understanding of Saudi Wahhabi Islam. Scores of books penned by Ahl-e Hadith ulema are devoted to intricate discussion of what they regard as the ‘correct’ methods of praying, performing ablutions and offering supplications, as well as rules and regulations related to food, dress, marriage, divorce and so on.

A principle purpose of these publications is to attack rival Muslim, including Sunni, groups, and to sternly condemn them as ‘aberrant’ on account of differences in their methods of performing rituals and their rules governing a range of issues related to normative personal and collective behaviour.

Another interesting feature of the literature produced by Ahl-e Hadith publishing houses in India, and one that is directly linked to the close association between the Ahl-e Hadith and the Saudi Wahabbis, is a fierce hostility to local beliefs and practices. This hostility, while having been a defining feature of the early Ahl-e Hadith, has been further exacerbated with the growing Saudi-Ahl-e Hadith nexus. In recent years Ahl-e Hadith scholars have penned scores of books and tracts sternly denouncing customs that many Indian Muslims share with their Hindu neighbours, a legacy of their pre-Islamic past.

These also include customs, such as those associated with popular Sufism and the cults of the saints, which enabled Islam to take root in India and to adjust to the Indian cultural context. As Ahl-e Hadith writers see it, these are all ‘wrongful innovations’, having no sanction in the Prophet’s sunnah, and hence must be rooted out. In their place they advocate an adoption of a range of Arab cultural norms and practices which are seen as genuinely ‘Islamic’.

The publication of Urdu translations of the compendia of fatwas of leading Saudi Wahhabi ulema by Indian Ahl-e Hadith publishing houses is a reflection of this cultural alternative that they seek to provide to take the place of what they see as ‘un-Islamic’ practices widely prevalent among many Indian Muslims. This has added to the conflict with other Muslim groups, most particularly with the Barelvis, who are associated with the cults of the Sufis. The ‘Saudi Arabisation’ of Islam and Indian Muslim culture that the Ahl-e Hadith seeks to promote also inevitably further widens the cultural chasm between Muslims and Hindus.

As many Ahl-e Hadith ulema see it, and this is reflected in their writings as well, Hinduism is hardly different from the pagan religion of the Arabs of the pre-Islamic Jahiliya period. Although most of them do not advocate conflict with Hindus, some Ahl-e Hadith scholars insist on the need for Muslims to have as little to do with the Hindus as possible, for fear of the ‘deleterious’ consequences this might have for the Muslims’ own commitment to and practice of Islam.

Like other Muslim groups, Indian Ahl-e Hadith publishing houses have also paid particular attention to combating their Muslim rivals. This cannot be understood without taking into account the Saudi connection. Scores of books have been penned by Indian Ahl-e Hadith ulema, branding Sufis, Shias and Deobandis as heretical.

Tirelessly claiming in their writings to being the sole representatives of ‘normative’ Islam and, in the process, identifying themselves with the Saudi Wahhabi ulema, enables the Indian Ahl-e Hadith ulema to present themselves as faithful allies of the Saudis, which in turn helps earn them recognition as well as monetary assistance from Saudi sponsors. In addition, such publications also serve the purpose of presenting the Saudi Wahhabi version of Islam as normative, and in putting forward the claim of the Saudi regime to being the only one in the world sincerely and seriously committed to ‘genuine’ Islam.

The Iranian Revolution played the role of a major catalyst in moulding Saudi foreign policy, in which the export of its official Wahhabi form of Islam emerged as a key instrument. The anti-monarchical thrust of the revolution was seen by the Saudi regime as a menacing threat.

Access to Saudi funds has therefore led to heightened conflict between various Muslim sectarian groups in India, as Ahl-e Hadith publishing houses produce and distribute literature on a large scale bitterly attacking their rivals of being Muslim only in name.

Heightened intra-Muslim polemics within India are not unrelated to the interests of the Saudi regime. Thus, the virulently anti-Shia and anti-Sufi propaganda material churned out by various Ahl-e Hadith publishing houses in India, some of this said to be sponsored by Saudi patrons, serves the purpose of denouncing as outside the pale of Islam Muslim groups who are opposed to Wahhabism and the Saudi State, these often being branded as ‘enemies’ of Islam. In this way the literature produced by several Ahl-e Hadith publishing houses in India helps promote a version and vision of Islam that is almost identical to that of the Wahabbis of Saudi Arabia, and hence one that fits in with the interests of both the Saudi Wahhabi ulema as well as the Saudi State.

The claim of the Saudi monarchy as representing the sole ‘authentic’ Islamic regime in the world is repeatedly stressed in several Ahl-e Hadith writings, and reflects the close links, ideological as well as financial, between several Indian Ahl-e Hadith leaders and the Saudi State and its official Wahhabi ulema.

Numerous books penned by Indian Ahl-e Hadith scholars discuss in detail the ‘great’ contributions of the present rulers of Saudi Arabia to the ‘Islamic cause’, inevitably concluding with the claim that Saudi Arabia under its present masters represents the only ‘truly’ Islamic State in the world today. They also make it a point to call on God to bless the Saudi king and pray for his continued rule. The Saudi monarch is invariably presented as a pious, fully committed Muslim, whose sole concern is, so it is sought to be argued, the protection and promotion of ‘authentic’ Islam. Support for this ‘authentic’ Islam and for the Saudi rulers are presented as indivisible.

Interestingly, there is no reference at all in Ahl-e Hadith writings to the widespread dissatisfaction within Saudi Arabia itself with the ruling family. Nor is there any reference to the rampant corruption in the country, the lavish lifestyles of the princes, and to Saudi Arabia’s close links with the United States.

Nor, still, is there ever any mention of the claim, put forward by many Muslims, that monarchy is ‘un-Islamic’, particularly one like the despotic and corrupt Saudi regime. This is added evidence of the fact that Saudi-sponsored propaganda abroad is tailor-made to suit the interests of its ruling family.

Ahl-e Hadith-Deobandi polemics and the Saudi nexus

As a claimant to Sunni ‘orthodoxy’, the Ahl-e Hadith is not alone in denouncing the Shias as heretics and therefore outside the pale of Islam. In fact, many Deobandi and Barelvi ulema share the same opinion. Hence the virulent opposition to the Shias on the part of the Ahl-e Hadith is hardly surprising. Given its commitment to what it sees as ‘pure’ monotheism and its fierce opposition to ‘wrongful innovations’, its denunciation of the Barelvis, who are associated with the cults of the Sufis, is also understandable.

What seems particularly intriguing, however, is the fact that, of late, Ahl-e Hadith publishing houses in India have been devoting particular attention to denouncing the Deobandis who, while being muqallids as well as proponents of a reformed Sufism, share with the Ahl-e Hadith a commitment to strict compliance with the Shariah and the extirpation of what they describe as bidaah. In that sense, the Ahl-e Hadith are closer in doctrinal terms to the Deobandis than to any other Indian Sunni group. Despite this, it appears that in recent years Indian Ahl-e Hadith scholars have been focussing considerably more attention on combating the Deobandis than critiquing their Barelvi and Shia rivals. This seemingly puzzling development begs an explanation.

One possible reason for this is that the Deobandis in India are far more organised and influential than the Barelvis. The Deobandis manage a number of influential organisations, madrassas and publishing houses all over India. Consequently, they have probably been more effective in critiquing the Ahl-e Hadith than their other rivals, which in turn has forced the Ahl-e Hadith to pay particular attention to the challenge they face from the Deobandi front. In addition to this factor are other developments, related to struggles over money, influence and authority, which have made for a sharp intensification of rivalries between the Ahl-e Hadith and the Deobandis in recent years. The Saudi connection seems to have played a major role in abetting these conflicts.

The Deobandis, by and large, seem to have maintained the somewhat ambiguous attitude of their elders towards the Ahl-e Hadith and the Wahabbis till at least the late 1970s, when the situation began to change with new access to Saudi funding. In the course of the Afghan war against the Soviets, the Saudis recognised that the Deobandis were far more influential and had a far larger presence than the Ahl-e Hadith in both Pakistan as well as Afghanistan. Consequently, much Saudi funding began making its way to Deobandi madrassas in Pakistan in order to train guerrilla fighters armed with a passion for jehad against the Russians. A shared commitment to a Shariah-centric Islam made such assistance acceptable to both parties.

Islam is conveniently marshalled and often interpreted in diametrically opposing ways by the Saudi regime to suit its own strategic and ideological purposes abroad. Saudi Arabia is said to have been the largest financier of radical Islamist groups abroad, some of whom, as in the Philippines, Chechnya, Bosnia and Kashmir, have taken to armed struggle and terrorism against non-Muslim States. Saudi-funded literature routinely extols such groups as mujahids engaged in a legitimate Islamic jehad.

Impact of recent developments on Saudi links with Indian Muslim groups

The 1990s were characterised by fierce polemical battles between the Ahl-e Hadith and the Deobandis in India, with each group charging the other of being ‘anti-Islamic’ and as hidden fronts of the ‘enemies’ of Islam. Although the two groups continue to regard each other as fierce rivals, the sharp polemical exchanges between them now seem to have dampened somewhat. One factor for this is probably the strong need that many Muslims feel to present a united front to combat the challenge of aggressive Hindu groups in the country.

Another important factor for the apparent decline in overt strife between the Ahl-e Hadith and the Deobandis in recent years is what seems to be a significant shift in Saudi strategy. Following the events of September 2001, Saudi Arabia came under tremendous pressure from the United States to clamp down on Wahhabi militants at home and abroad. The Saudi strategy of sponsoring radical Wahhabism seemed to have boomeranged, as a new generation of Islamist radicals emerged within Saudi Arabia itself, critiquing the Saudi regime for its corruption and for its close links with the United States. Consequently, the Saudi Arabians were forced to take action against their own internal radical Islamist opponents, realising the major challenge that they posed to the Saudi monarchy.

Simultaneously, and because of these developments, Saudi aid to Wahhabi groups abroad, including India, is said to have declined somewhat. This will naturally have a major impact on relations between different Muslim groups in India, and will most notably impact on the expansion of the Ahl-e Hadith, who have been the major recipient of Saudi assistance in recent years.

Another possible indication of the shift in Saudi strategy is the fact that of late certain Ahl-e Hadith publishing houses in India have brought out books praising the Saudi State and critiquing what they describe as the ‘terrorists’ who wish to weaken it. These books argue that the ‘correct’ method of the political ‘reform’ that Islamist opponents of the regime seek is not through violence but rather through ‘guiding’ the political authorities to follow the path of God by providing them with ‘Islamic’ advice.

This shows how Islam is conveniently marshalled and often interpreted in diametrically opposing ways by the Saudi regime to suit its own strategic and ideological purposes abroad. Saudi Arabia is said to have been the largest financier of radical Islamist groups abroad, some of whom, as in the Philippines, Chechnya, Bosnia and Kashmir, have taken to armed struggle and terrorism against non-Muslim States. Saudi-funded literature routinely extols such groups as mujahids engaged in a legitimate Islamic jehad. Yet, faced now with its own internal and increasingly vocal Islamist opposition, it considers similar movements within Saudi Arabia as major sources of ‘strife’ and as clearly ‘un-Islamic’. Whether, as a result of increasing international pressure, the Saudis will be willing to extend the same logic to Islamist groups abroad whom they have been patronising for many years is a moot point.

(This article is an excerpt from the writer’s monograph, "Intra-Muslim Rivalries in India and the Saudi Connection" which can be accessed from his web site www.islaminterfaith.org. Archived from Communalism Combat, March 2005, Year 11, No. 106).  
 

Research Scholars of India Are Under Threat: Appeal by the UGC Fellowships Forum

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UGC Fellowships Forum

Since the Narendra Modi Government has taken its charge, many students of this country are in great trouble. It’s not just because of the widely discussed issues like suicide of Rohith Vemula at UoH and incarceration of Kanhaiya Kumar and his friends at JNU. Apart from these well publicised instances of regime backed atrocities – there are several other issues like fund cuts in education and attempts at saffronisation of higher education by appointing people with RSS backgrounds in important positions are some significant matters which many are bothered about.

Further, one of the serious matters which directly affecting the researchers is fellowship. The debates regarding UGC Non Net Fellowship and UGC’s messing up with it is well known. After several protests throughout the country, the HRD Ministry did set up a committee. The report of the committee was supposed to come in December but researchers are still waiting for the same. The ‘unqualified’ humbug minister seems to be underperformer too. Further, many ongoing fellowship schemes are also in great danger since many of them are being mismanaged in the last two years. The late disbursement system and several months without any fellowships are plaguing the students.

Fellowship schemes like MANF, RGNF and so on are dysfunctional for a long time. Last year some students did visit to UGC and other concerned ministries and were promised that the schemes will run as per law thenceforth, but unfortunately it did not happen. As of now thousand scholars of the country have not received their fellowship for many months. For example the scholars under the Maulana Azad National Fellowship (MANF) scheme for minority students are without fellowship from last October – November. Other schemes like RGNF SC, RGNF ST, RGNF OBC and so on are also running late.
Most unfortunately fellowship for disabled students has not been released since last July. In these circumstances these research scholars are in great distress.

This repeated late disbursement of fellowships affect thousands of research scholars of the country. Most of the scholars solely depend on fellowship for their needs. Thus, if the fellowship amount is not credited on time, it becomes very difficult to sustain. Researchers literally witness times when they do not have money to support ourselves. Students feel really dejected that they have been pushed down to the level of beggars who have to petition every month for what rightfully deserve as legal entitlements as research scholars. Energy and time are lost much in this process which can otherwise be utilized for fruitful research. Researchers are not even able to concentrate on research, as are constantly worried about the lack of money for basic needs.

Now, whom to blame for all this? Is the assigned Canara Bank and the system or the bureaucracy of UGC responsible? Are the ministries responsible or the entire Govt. itself? Students call and beg to Canara Bank, UGC and Ministries almost every day for the pending money they deserve and when the power leaves them baffled with a mutual blame game, they do not know what to do to get the problem resolved. Researchers wait almost endlessly every month but the hostel authorities will not wait for the mess fees to be remitted; the university authorities will not wait for the tuition fees to be paid; the labs cannot wait for the essential chemicals, tools and instruments to be used from time to time.

This might sound little emotional but it’s the ground reality of the researchers in India. Sometime many wonder and regret of the choice of research over other promising career which would have at least not left them in a situation like this. Please imagine when the employees don’t get salary during the first week of the month. Students appeal not punish them more for choosing to face the challenges of a career in research to contribute to the academic development of the country. Here, it is to be noted that one of the significant reasons mentioned by Rohith Vemula in the tract going around as his ‘suicide note’ for his fatal decision was monetary problems. His pending fellowship was finally disbursed after his death. We would like to ask whether the Ministries, the UGC and the other powers that be whether they want mass suicides to occur across educational campuses of the country.

Thus, we request the concerned authorities at UGC, at various ministries, and power holders at the Govt. to look into the pathetic situation and do the needful at the earliest to resolve the late disbursement of our fellowships. Please act immediately to solve our problem; please give us our monthly fellowship at least within the first week of every month; please let us do our work peacefully and properly.

Victory for now, but the Resistance Continues: Hyderabad Central University (HCU)

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Jail ke Taale Toote Hai

Humaare Saathi Choote Hai

Over 50 members of the faculty of the Hyderabad Central University (HCU), belonging to the SC/ST Association went on a mass, one day casual leave yesterday, March 29 protesting against the police action on campus and the return of vice-chancellor P Appa Rao.

A day after 25 people were granted bail and released from jail for the violent protests held on campus last Tuesday, teachers, including those from Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, applied for the leave in protest, an assistant professor said.

The university campus was thrown out of gear on March 22 when Rao resumed office after a two-month leave following the suicide of Dalit scholar Rohith Vemula. Students alleged Rao was responsible for Vemula’s suicide, and demanded his immediate arrest. Appa Rao’s return was viewed as an unprecedented move with the specific backing of the Modi government at the Centre since an MHRD inquiry against him is still on. The university registrar had suspended classes till March 28 due to the ensuing violence. Appa Rao belongs to the powerful Kamma caste, which is speculated to be one of the reasons behind the support he has found from the powers that be in Delhi.

The Joint Action Committee (JAC) for Social Justice that is pursuing Vemula’s case, however, asked students to resume their academic schedule while protesting as the semester was ending and this is a crucial time for them. “We appeal to the students to use blue ribbons as a means of protest, declaration and reminder of the fact that our fight is still on while going about their classes, labs and other activities.” There have been serious concerns about the blockade link atmosphere within the HCU/UOH.

Yesterday evening as the time came close to the release of 25 students and two professors, KY Ratnam and Tathagata Senguptam the air was electric with anticipation and messages on social emdia were eager and excited in solidarity As the university campus was still blocked out from the entry of 'outsiders', the JAC streamed the return of the jailed students and faculty and the long march live.

Last evening Updates regarding the release of the detainees of Uoh:

The lawyers have reached the jail and the process of release in underway. Our friends are expected to reach by 9pm!

Jail ke taale toote hai
Humaare saathi chhoote hai!

Udaya Kumara Jai Bhim Inquilab Zindabad

Demands of the Joint Action Committee (JAC)

1. Dropping of all charges against students, faculty and media persons in UoH and all other places in the country.
2. We demand the university administration to withdraw all the cases filed upon the students and faculty.
3. Immediate removal and arrest of Appa Rao under Prevention Of Atrocities Act
4. Demilitarisation of the campus
5. End University of Hyderabad blockade and students’ imprisonment and allow free mobility of lawyers, journalists, and family members.
6. Action against the police and those that they are answerable to for the unnecessary and targeted violence, false detention, misinformation about the detained people, and physical and sexual assault of women students and faculty.
7. Constitute a non-MHRD judicial commission to look in the cases of social discrimination and harassment of Dalits, Adivasis, OBCs, religious minorities and women students across campuses in the country.
 

Testimonies of the One week in jail

Professor Anjali Gupta on Facebook

When I met my students Munsif and Deepak at the Cherlapally Jail

“As the horde of visitors – students, family members and me – entered the space meant for meeting inmates at the Cherlapally Jail, an immediate and eager cacophony ensued. Two layers of meshed grills about half a meter apart meant you had to shout. We cupped our faces and our eyes scanned keenly for faces we'd come to cherish a bit more in these five days. All members of UoH community – some on that side of the grills, some on this.

I asked, "Where is Munsif?" Someone pointed at the other end, and shouted above the mixture of sounds, "Munsif, come here!" He came hobbling, his steps quick, his grin wide. He had a thicker mop of hair, and his beard had grown since I last saw him.

"Thank you so much Ma'am for coming here and meeting us," said Munsif, my student who's in judicial custody for merely asking the police to not beat up a fellow student.

Another student of Department of Communication Deepak Sudevan, whom I haven't taught yet, came forward. Dishevelled hair, shiny eyes! "Ma'am, I am Deepak. Thanks so much for coming."

Everyone on that side of the mesh was agog to tell what had been done to them. It was as if they were saying: Please tell the world what they did to us.

Policemen had hit Munsif's legs severely with lathis on the campus itself the evening of March 22, 2016, and then abruptly pushed him into an ambulance. "They hauled us in an ambulance so no one outside would know they were taking us away. It was a kidnapping."

At Narsingi Police Station, a constable gave his cell phone on the quiet so the students could make one call. He got caught by his seniors. "He was a good man," said Munsif. So characteristic of this student of mine to spot goodness in a human even at a time of crisis! "The Circle Inspector mercilessly beat up that poor constable. We could hear the screams in another room." Within minutes they were shifted to another station.

"When we said we'd like to exercise our right to make calls to our family, or a lawyer, they said – For 24 hours your human rights have collapsed." Student leader D Prashanth who was standing next to Munsif spoke, "It is worth remembering that they said our human rights have collapsed.”“They also said you are guilty till you are proven innocent,” he added.

In another bus, 17 students, including Deepak, a filmamaker Moses Tulasi and Political Science Professor KY Ratnam were being taken to Miyapur Police Station the same evening of 22 March. While the bus was moving the policemen hit the students hard with their fists and elbows. Some were slapped. When Prof. Ratnam intervened, they punched him, when others in the bus said please don't hit our professor, the policemen turned and rained some more blows on the young students.

“You organize Kiss of Love, and beef festivals, and you grow a beard – they kept saying this while hitting us," said Deepak.

Recollecting a cardinal principle I had taught in class for the Feature writing course, Munsif said he is writing everything down. I said: Yes, do write! Don’t rely on memory. Write everything down.

Soon it was time to say bye. Outside at another enclave people were depositing packets and packets of food, and clothes for their loved ones inside. I had taken six bars of Cadbury Silk for I remember how excited Munsif was about them when I’d brought chocolates for my students on a field visit last month.

I was struck with how happy the students were to see their friends and well-wishers. None of the despair that you associate with prisons.

A political science student who’d come to meet his friend Mathew and his teacher, Professor Ratnam, later said, “Ma’am my friend Mathew said that right now their spirits are up, because all of us were there to meet them, but by night their mood fluctuates.”

I have been thinking about how a society decides what is criminal. Yes, we must condemn ransacking, pelting stones, trespassing, destroying property and striking fear in the hearts of people who have gathered for a meeting.

But what is the constitutional response to these acts? Surely, it isn’t the extrajudicial manner in which the police picked up students and faculty. Surely, it isn’t punching and kicking and slapping and raining blows and threatening students with rape. Surely, it isn’t suspending human rights. Our rulebook, our Constitution doesn’t allow that. If we justify police excesses because a certain kind of wrongdoing has happened we shift the definition of what constitutes a crime from the Constitution to those who wield lathis and guns. India is a police state for many Indians. Let’s not endorse that even as we may agree that vandalism is condemnable.”

 
Antinationals have no human rights : Police told Dontha Prashanth and friends

Prasheel Anand Banpur

Location: Cherlapally Mulaqat Enclosure

Date and Time: 4.15 pm to 4.40 pm (appr.) on March 24, 2016

People: Prasheel Anand Banpur, Vinesh Recharla Kondra, Moses John Paul

Met With: Dontha Prashanth, Manne Krishank, Goutham Uyyala, Mudavath Venkatesh

Apart from requesting us to call their parents or to safeguard their vehicles which were parked in

campus, the following are the statements from the 4 arrested students.

Journey Since Arrest:

The protesting students were Lathi Charged and at 5pm were taken in two groups to Gachibowli PS remanded for some time and biodata was taken, then transported to Kukkatpally PS and held for a while, then taken to Miyapur PS, then taken to Narsingi PS where the night was spent, transported then to Moinabad PS, then transported through inroads of villages, then waited for a long time near Nacharam, apparently near magistrate’s house, and then to Cherlapally Jail at 12.30 am on March 24, 2016.

Treatment during Arrest :

The arrested students were beaten continuously by the police while being transported from one police station to another, their phones were snatched, not given any information regarding their arrest or where they were being taken. The FIR and cases filed without intimation and knowledge of the arrested students; All the time during the arrest the arrested students were abused constantly, humiliated, and were called insulting names and labelled as naxalites and vandals.

When asked why they are being treated as if they were hardcore criminals, the police replied that they were anti-nationals and that they had no Human Rights. They reiterated that all their Human Rights had collapsed and no negotiation was possible. The Police did not even allow phone calls to be made and created a complete isolation for the arrested students. The Police also took videos and photos of the students when they were eating and talking amongst themselves.

The Muslim students who were arrested were beaten and accused of being Pakistanis and labelled them as anti national wanting to destroy India. The arrested students were also repeatedly accused of possessing drugs and indulging in drug related activities despite the students denying it outright.

The arrested students were then asked to sign on the cases that they were accused of, post which all the students had to sign on this document but mentioned it clearly that they were doing it under force and not voluntarily. The two professors were slapped repeatedly, their shirts torn and were humiliated in the worst of ways regarding their profession and duties.

Arrival at Jail and stay :

Around 12.30 am on March 24, 2016 they were brought in 2 police trucks amidst high security and put up in the barracks as ISI terrorists, hawala mafia, murderers, mafia, and others serving rigorous imprisonment were put up. When Dontha Prashanth and Krishank Manne wanted to fast in the jail to protest the inhuman, unjust, and undemocratic treatment of the arrested students, the authorities blackmailed them saying they would publicize the videos taken by them of students when they were eating the night before.

Message from Jail:

It should be known to people outside regarding the inhuman and sadistic treatment of the arrested students by the police authorities till they reached the Cherlapally Jail. They also said it is important to keep the struggle on for ensuring democratic rights of the students and the people of India.

On Kanhaiya, 1984, 2002 and Fighting Fascism: Ayesha Kidwai

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March 30, 2016
From Ayesha Kidwa’s facebook wall

I have no desire whatsoever to get caught in between the spats on 1984 vs 2002 (CPI vs CPI ML) but I think this has become important because the left really has to find a new way to having a conversation with each other if there is going to be united resistance against fascism (which is of primary concern here). It is absolutely correct that one has to have a proper understanding of the past, and that unity of intent to defeat the fascists cannot be created by agreeing to set aside differences, as such a unity will not last.

In the narrative thus far, it appears that it’s only Kanhaiya who had the wrong characterisation of 1984 vs 2002, then gave a ‘I have been misrepresented’ clarification, which many have not deemed satisfactory by many. I don’t agree, but not because I am rooting for Kanhaiya (I am also rooting for Shehla, for Richa, for Dontha Prashanth, for Kishlay, and the scores of other student leaders emerging across the country). Rather, there are many mistakes all around, as we are increasingly infected by a whataboutery discourse that involves very lazy uses of the term fascism. If we continue down this path, we shall not end up even recognising the monster that is upon us, let alone fighting it.

The corrective that is necessary is to consider critically our understanding of the exceptionalism of 1984 and 2002. In fact, whenever large scale communal violence has been organised, agencies of the state are heavily embedded in organising it. Anis Kidwai writes of the communal violence in Ajmer thus:

“People I met in the city told me of the build-up to the riots of 25 December 1947—the quarrel that began over the gramophone on 5 December, the convention of wealthy and educated insurgents in Kishangarh a few days later, the partisanship of the officials, and then on 14 December, the burning of seven persons alive. The food supply and rationing department played a vital role; information about the city layout, accurate maps of the neighbourhoods where Muslims lived, their population and numbers of their men and women, even their names, were all provided by the rationing officer to the goons. This information proved crucial for the rioters to plan and sustain their assaults on a wider scale than elsewhere.

And then on 25 December, the massacre of 5,000 humans, the plunder of homes and belongings. I was told the mobs were really assault battalions, comprising inhabitants of seven villages each. Here too (like Delhi) was news that cannons had been used, but this time the rioters had pressed them into service. Here too, a wealthy landowner was said to have raised his sword and two large village communities forced to become Hindus. The fervour shown in these attacks by the brave Rajputs on these villages of ‘Mughals’ and ‘Mirzais’ befitted ancient battles. As did the cruelty—a landowner ordered the massacre of unarmed, captive Muslims, which was accomplished in a trice.”

This ‘grammar’, if you will, of pogrom-matic violence (terrifying as it is) in my view, is not fascist in itself, as fascism lies in the goals that such violence is oriented to — the installation of a totalitarian regime that can freely use such violence as necessary to forge ‘national unity’ behind one party, one leader. That’s what differentiates 1947, 1984 from 2002, and not the identity in the suffering of the victims or in the complicity of state machinery. The great betrayal of the Congress is that it has, particularly since Indira Gandhi’s time, cynically created a security machinery that can easily be bent towards the needs of a totalising regime.

I am absolutely sure that all the Left parties make this important distinction between 1947, 1984 and 2002, so the question for me is why in correcting Kanhaiya’s clumsy formulation of this difference, why the Left has not sought to explain to him what the correct understanding of the distinction is? Surely, an understanding of what fascism is essential to our armoury.

If we do not understand what fascism is, we shall just be unable to fathom the connection between the imposition of Presidents rule in state after state, the beef lynchings, the internet trolls, the suspension of Dr. Bhattacharji, the institutional murder of Rohith Vemula, the incarceration of student leaders, the attempts to cancel Richa Singh’s admission, and the hundreds of other things we don’t even know are happening. In each of these, there is an unambiguous role of one or the other arm/instrument of the state is being perverted. While such perversion has been ‘normalised’ by decades of Congress misrule, the important point is that all these perversions are now being carried out IN COMPLETE CONCERT, directed to a SINGLE goal of totalitarian control by one leader, one party.

If solidarities are to be achieved in the face of this terrifying reality, they must be built on a common understanding of fascism. I do not think that the Congress is capable of such an understanding at all, and even less so in acting upon it, but I think the Left does, and it MUST engage in a conversation that is deeper than the superficial issues of tactics.
 
(The writer is a professor at the Jawaharlal Nehru Univeersity, JNU, Delhi)

Proud to be ‘anti-national’: Gurpreet Singh

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Gurpreet Singh / Image: Charlie Smith
 
“You are a lion, Mr. Singh. We Indians are proud of you”. I still remember those kind words of a Vancouver-based leader of the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), a Hindu nationalist group that is currently in power in India. He showered praises on me after listening to my speech on Sikh separatists active in Canada.

I pulled no punches while criticising the Sikh extremists at the launching ceremony of the Punjabi edition of my book on the Air India victims’ families, back in 2013. Air India Flight 182 was bombed mid-air in 1985, killing all 329 people aboard. The crime was blamed on Sikh separatists seeking revenge from the Indian government for attacking their holiest shrine in Amritsar in 1984, and engineering anti-Sikh pogroms following the assassination of then-Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by her Sikh bodyguards later that year.

Posted on social media, my speech had grabbed the attention of this self-styled patriotic Indian leader. He was excited to see how an Indo-Canadian journalist like myself, was “boldly” criticising “anti-India” separatists who have always been considered very powerful and influential in Canada.   

He kept phoning me from time to time to give updates about BJP activities in Vancouver, and I as a reporter continued reporting them. But something went terribly wrong after the BJP came to power with a brute majority in 2014 under Narendra Modi, a controversial political figure.

Modi was the chief minister of Gujarat state when an anti-Muslim massacre took place in 2002. The massacre followed the burning of a train carrying Hindu pilgrims. Over 50 of them died. The Modi government blamed Islamic extremists for the incident, after which the Muslim community was targeted across Gujarat by mobs led by the BJP activists. Human rights groups and the survivors maintain that Modi was complicit in the crime.

The scenario was no different from the one witnessed across India in 1984, when the Sikh community was targeted after the murder of Indira Gandhi. The only difference was that the anti-Muslim violence was orchestrated by an outright Hindu nationalist party, whereas Indira Gandhi’s Congress party claims to be secular.

Being a secularist, my criticism of all the religious extremist ideologies has been alike. I used to work with Surrey-based Radio India as a talk show host at that time. I had joined the organization in 2001 after emigrating from India where I used to work with The Tribune.
The Sikh separatists seeking Khalistan – an imaginary Sikh homeland to be carved out of Punjab, India – had been very active in Canada and I was frequently warned to stay silent against them. Nevertheless, I kept bringing up crimes committed by the Khalistanis in Punjab, such as killings of Hindus and political critics, including many leftists.

For the record I have been equally critical of the Indian government for its high handedness in dealing with the militants and repression of Sikhs in 1984. Also I had criticised Modi for allowing the anti-Muslim violence a year after my joining Radio India. But I was still branded as “anti-Sikh” and “an Indian agent” by the supporters of Khalistan.

The leader of a Hindu temple that honoured me for my book on Air India actually accused me of having an agenda against Modi. During a radio interview when I grilled him about his support for Modi, he just hung up the phone. He is a die-hard supporter of Modi, but highly critical of Sikh fundamentalists.  

The threats started when I began criticising those involved in the Air India bombing. Luckily at that time, my employer, Maninder Singh Gill, supported me whole heartedly in spite of pressure on him to get rid of me. He also used to complain that my commentary was causing financial loss to the organisation, as advertisers who subscribe to the Khalistani ideology were reluctant to sponsor our programs. Still he stood behind me like a rock. 

When Modi became the prime minister, the situation completely changed. Not only in India, but in other countries too, his critics began facing the heat. Hindu extremists became emboldened. They started harassing anyone who questioned Modi and his politics of hatred.

In India, media persons who were critical of Modi began to be pushed around. Some felt that an era of censorship had been ushered in under a right wing government. With the BJP assuming power after getting elected, it gained legitimacy around the world. Modi, who had been denied visa by various countries for repression of Muslims in Gujarat, was free to go anywhere.

On top of that, the BJP and its supporters also gained the upper hand within the Indo-Canadian community and increased its influence over Indian consulates. In those circumstances, several groups decided to organise protest rallies against Modi during his first official visit to US.

One of them was Sikhs For Justice (SFJ), a human rights advocacy group that supports Sikh sovereignty. As a host, I decided to highlight the contentious tour of Modi and gave some airtime to SFJ. Although I strongly disagree with their political agenda of Sikh sovereignty, as a journalist I felt it necessary to talk to their leader about the upcoming visit of Modi and the planned protest in September 2014.

This enraged my employer, who did not want any anti-Modi voice to be given air time. He was particularly annoyed over my interview with someone who supports a Sikh homeland. The story did not end there, as he also wanted me to start endorsing Modi’s visit on behalf of the radio station. I was suggested a change in nature of my duties if I could not handle this. This led to an argument and I rather decided to quit.

This small step made me an alien among the very people who earlier appreciated my stance against Khalistan. The same BJP leader who earlier used to call me a lion and often stated “you are always in our hearts” began avoiding me, to the extent that he did not invite me to cover an event organised for a visiting BJP leader, the chief minister of Haryana state, Manohar Lal Khattar.  

When another senior politician from Punjab Prem Singh Chandumajra came, I could see a pattern behind slighting me. Chandumajra’s party, Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD) is an alliance partner of the BJP. Its supporters have known me for years. Nobody invited me to his media conference, despite the fact that both the BJP and SAD supporters know that I still  write for India-based publications, including Hindustan Times, for which the visits of Khattar and Chandumajra were important. 

Notably, the leader of a Hindu temple that honoured me for my book on Air India actually accused me of having an agenda against Modi. During a radio interview when I grilled him about his support for Modi, he just hung up the phone. He is a die-hard supporter of Modi, but highly critical of Sikh fundamentalists.  

The Indian agents in Vancouver also started to eye me with suspicion. I often hear from sources close to them that they are upset over my comments, which are obviously not favourable to the ruling party, because of its right wing policies against religious minorities and growing attacks on Muslims and Christians under Modi.

Those who violate the principles of secularism and democracy enshrined in the national text are the biggest anti-nationals. If questioning Sikh separatists alone makes you a patriot, and challenging Hindu separatists makes you seditious, then the apologists of India should openly admit that the current Indian state is really a Hindu nation in the making, and not the secularist and pluralist India I loved and I was born in

Some sources tell me that they now refer to me as “friend-turned-enemy” and I never get any personal invitation to attend any of their official events, although they had recommended my name for coverage of the annual Indian Diaspora event held in India in 2010. In the years of my frequent criticism of Khalistani extremists, before Modi came to power, I used to get calls from them appreciating my journalism. Back then I was seen as a friend of India.    

When I joined Spice Radio, some of the Indian officials expressed their displeasure with my current employer, Shushma Datt, who did not buckle under any undue pressure and gave me freedom to work fairly and fearlessly. After all, she is a seasoned broadcaster who understands how to run a media outlet with integrity.

Whenever I had Sikhs For Justice activists on air to speak their mind against Modi, or interviewed those who protested against Modi’s visit, she never interfered. It’s a shame that in spite of her open-mindedness, even some so-called progressives in our community questioned me: being a Hindu, will she allow me to criticise Modi? Just because she is a Hindu woman, one cannot presume her to be a BJP supporter. How many times have such questions been raised about the ethnicity of the male Sikh owners of South Asian radio stations? 

So much so, the moderates and secularists within the local Sikh community, who have been opposed to Sikh fundamentalism and often sided with India, also started neglecting me. This was despite the fact that I had defended them in an event of ostracising by the orthodox Sikh clergy at the behest of fundamentalist forces on religious matters.

Some even went out of their way to meet Modi in the US, and were among those who accorded him a heroic welcome during his visit to Vancouver in 2015. Others, who call themselves Marxists, affiliated with the mainstream communist parties in India that are opposed to Modi, have remained indifferent towards any activity or demonstration in Vancouver against Modi’s government. Notably, they have been supporting moderates in maintaining control over Sikh temples, to keep Sikh separatists at bay. They too continue to enjoy cordial relationships with Indian agents.

It seems that the commitment of the grand moderate coalition towards secularism is sham and selective. It conveniently overlooks the fundamentalism of Modi’s party, while only targeting Sikh extremists, either due to their blind patriotism or with an agenda to please their political masters in New Delhi.
As the Modi government completes almost two years in office, the threat of Hindu extremism has grown enormously. Anyone who challenges their ideology and anti-minorities’ stance is branded as anti-national. Interestingly, the Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh, the ultra Hindu nationalist body of which BJP is a part, never participated in the freedom struggle when India was under British occupation.

Rather its supporters had helped the British rulers in continuing with their policy of divide and rule, by asking for a separation of Hindus and Muslims into two distinct nations. They stand incriminated in the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi, the towering leader of the passive resistance movement, in 1948, for standing up against both violence against Muslims and the untouchability that was permitted in orthodox Hindu society.

Gandhi has always been known as the father of the Indian nation. Since Modi came to power, demands have grown for the installation of statues of Naturam Godse, a staunch Hindu separatist and the assassin of Gandhi. Anyone who questions the BJP and Hindu extremists is quickly branded as anti-national.

It seems that “anti-national” has become a synonym with anything that is anti-BJP. This year witnessed a spate of incidents in which students, scholars, journalists, activists and even elected officials who are critical of the growing threat of religious intolerance and Hindu nationalism were either intimidated, assaulted or slapped with sedition charges.

Student leaders at Delhi’s Jawaharlal Nehru University were thrown into jail after being charged with sedition for questioning the government. When I had to quit Radio India and suffer the silent social boycott, I sometimes found myself very lonely. But today, when I look at the resistance being given to the Modi government by people with a burning conscience, I feel vindicated. I rather feel proud of standing up against Modi mania. If one is branded as anti-national for standing up for reason, pluralism and humanity, then I am definitely very proud to be an anti-national.

But here is my question to those who claim to be nationalists: how do they describe a nation? Is it just a territory, a piece of land, or a composition of political borders and land mass represented by a symbolic flag or a constitution? Or is a nation is represented by people? By human beings, who have dreams for a better future and who want to live with dignity?

If anyone is anti-national, it’s definitely not those who fight for the rights of the people, but those who lick the shoes of those in power and work against people, and divide them for their political survival. How can a person like me, who actually respects the values enshrined in the Indian constitution, be seen as anti-India?

Those who violate the principles of secularism and democracy enshrined in the national text are the biggest anti-nationals. If questioning Sikh separatists alone makes you a patriot, and challenging Hindu separatists makes you seditious, then the apologists of India should openly admit that the current Indian state is really a Hindu nation in the making, and not the secularist and pluralist India I loved and I was born in.

(The writer is a senior journalist with radio in Canada)
 

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