Ayodhya and beyond

January 31, 2002

The demolition of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya on December 6, 1992, does not symbolise the extinction or abridgment of the right of Muslims to freedom of worship, which they have continued to enjoy before, during and after the event, even in Ayodhya. Rather, the event exposed the fragile state of rule of law in the country, wherein the majoritarian composition and attitudes of the police and security forces, whose subservience to the political executive made it function as a partisan force in the service of kar sevaks.

Earlier in 1990, under direction from the then chief minister, the same PAC used excessive force against kar sevaks in the process of protecting the mosque. This illustrates the observation made by the Dharam Vir National Police Commission (1978–81) that the police in India is not organised for impartial law enforcement; it is, rather, a subordinate body for enforcement of the policy of the government of the day, which is generally based on cynical calculations by players of the game of power.

It is a great pity that the district administration perceives its role in terms of providing maximum satisfaction to the political executive even during inter–group conflict situations, making it function on occasions in a partisan manner disregarding law, as happened in Ayodhya. Because of this lack of independence of the police and the district administration from the politically motivated directions of the government, the pious resolution of the National Integration Council of the 1960s (reiterated in the Prime Minister’s Fifteen–Point Programme For Minorities 1983), that the district magistrate and the superintendent of police should be held responsible for prevention and timely control of riots can never be implemented.

The judiciary, which is the only source of hope for the weak and vulnerable groups, has failed miserably to come to the rescue of the victim group, ever since Dec. 1949–Jan. 1950, when a one–sided attachment order was passed without removing the "idols of Shri Ramchandraj… surreptitiously and wrongly put inside the (Babri Masjid)" as reported by constable Mata Prasad and testified by the deputy commissioner of Faizabad, JN Ugra, in the written statement filed in the Court on April 24, 1950 on behalf of the state of Uttar Pradesh.

Muslim worship however came to a stop, and their dispossession was legally sanctified under the plea of apprehension of breach of the peace under Section 145 of the Cr PC and Hindu parties were allowed limited right of worship under a subjectively defined status quo.

On this judicial activism, the BJP’s White Paper on Ayodhya (1) makes the following observation: "the law could not help the Hindus for more than 60 years, from 1885 to 1949. But when they physically occupied the structure after the idols of Sri Rama appeared on 22–23 December, 1949, the same law okayed it, and the same law enforcing court – the District Court in 1950 and later in 1955 the High Court — granted to the Hindus the right to worship and injuncted against removing the idols."

The following critique of the Supreme Court judgement in the Ayodhya case in 1994 by Soli J Sorabjee also needs attention. Referring to the legal sanction given in the majority judgement to the post–demolition makeshift temple with limited rights, on the ground that (for whatever reason) the worship in the mosque had come to a stop since December 1949, Sorabjee notes with distress that "The majority judgment overlooks that the reason why the worship in the mosque had come to a standstill was the surreptitious entry into the mosque and placing of idols there in a clandestine manner. Indeed that was the unequivocal admission of the state of UP in its written statement solemnly affirmed in the suit." Sorabjee, the present attorney general, concludes thus: "The distressing part is that the majority judgment countenances a situation which was the outcome of an act of national shame. The minority community is understandably disappointed with the majority judgment." (2).

Regarding the court order for opening the locks of the gate in 1986, the BJP’s White Paper on Ayodhya notes with satisfaction that "within three days of the Munsif Court order, the District Court passed an order directing the government of Uttar Pradesh to unlock the gate…." and that "within hours of passing of the above order, the temple was unlocked and even the Doordarshan cameramen were present to cover the occasion which was widely telecast all over India."

The White Paper raises the question: "How did this case move at this speed? How did the government acquiesce in this case? How did the Faizabad District Court allow the appeal ordering the opening of locks in a matter of two days when the Hindus had been pleading for nearly 37 years? How did the Doordarshan cameras click the opening of the locks within an hour of the court orders? All these questions have only one answer — when the government is not against, such things can, and do, happen. Even the courts respond." (3).

The impression that the course of law in Ayodhya in 1986 was not an independent act of the judiciary based on merits of the case gets further strengthened by Swaroop-ananda Saraswati, Shankaracharya of Dwarka and Jyotishpeeth, claiming during the Kumbh Mela, that it was at his behest that PM Rajiv Gandhi got the lock opened for political considerations. (4).

The statements, which are based on the perceived complicity of the judiciary with the executive and its acting under pressure, have not so far attracted the penal provisions under the law of contempt of court. This perception of the role of the judiciary has contributed to the climate of impunity so much so that VHP leaders have proclaimed their intention of enforcing their majoritarian will by force, disregarding the law and constructing the temple according to a schedule prepared by the Dharam Sansad (Religious Parliament) held during the Mahakumbh in Allahabad in January 2001.

The forcible entry of VHP leaders into the prohibited area in Ayodhya on October 17, 2001 marks the beginning of the schedule which is planned to reach a climax on March 12, 2001. The parivar feels confident that since nothing happened when the structure was demolished with the active connivance of the executive, nothing will happen again, if the Ram Temple is built. They have been reassured in this regard by no less a person than Justice (Retd.) Devki Nandan Agarwal, a VHP stalwart. (5).

The forcible entry by VHP leaders into the prohibited area in Ayodhya on October 17, 2001 also violated the law, in spite of the firm resolve of his government expressed by the Prime Minister in his Musings From Kumarakum on January 1, 2001, when he urged "not to remain silent spectators or adopt delaying tactics but to uphold the rule of law, should any organisation attempt to disturb the status quo".

This incident cannot be taken as an isolated case of a mere lapse by the security personnel on duty; it falls rather neatly into the pattern of political blessing, official connivance and police partisanship and impunity from 1949 to 1992.

The Prime Minister, who might well be feeling let down, as well as all other players of the political game who are making an issue of the incident on October 17, should realise that irrespective of pious intentions, the institutional machinery for impartial, effective and humane law enforcement for prevention and speedy control of any inter–community violent conflicts simply does not exist in the country.

The fragility and malfunctioning of institutions of law and order in India, has led to a denial of equal protection by law to all poor citizens and weak and vulnerable groups. It has been, however, most blatantly denied to Muslims, especially in Ayodhya and related cases from 1949 till date, including during major riots in the 1980s and 1990s that have occurred since the Meenakshipuram conversions, which provided an impetus to the Vishwa Hindu Parishad and other wings of the Sangh Parivar to mobilise Hindu solidarity, to all of which Indira Gandhi lent a helping hand.

In his deposition before the Liberhan Commission, LK Advani has admitted that their (the BJP’s) late entry into the Ram Temple campaign was thanks to their realisation of its potential for the mobilisation of Hindu nationalism, which until then the Congress had capitalised on. (6).

This phase of competitive Hindu nationalism within the Hindu ruling spectrum of varying shades, has brought untold misery to minorities, and has been further aggravated by the absence of an independent and competent, impartial law–enforcement institutional mechanism.

It is distressing to note that during the last two decades while one finds human rights groups and individuals committed to secular humanist values taking pains to document and expose the failure of the police and the political executive, the bureaucracy and the media during communal conflicts and violence, no sustained effort has been made by them to reform the system — setting attainable goals.

Legal–administrative measures and policies that need to be adopted for prevention and control of communal conflicts have been suggested by the National Integration Council (1961), the National Police Commission (1978-81), the Prime Minister’s Fifteen Point Programme on Minorities (1983), the IOS 1993, Citizens For Democracy & the Centre For the Study of Society & Secularism (1994), by the Minorities Council (1996) and by the National Commission For Minorities, (1999) and in studies by NC Saxena (1983) and VN Rai. Human Rights Watch/Asia and the Amnesty International have also been publishing reports and recommendations. (7).

Two common recommendations of all these studies and reports relate to adequate numerical representation of minorities in the police & paramilitary forces and all wings of law–enforcement machinery (such as collection of intelligence and prosecution of cases) and training of the officers and personnel of the police to include a component on eradication of communal prejudices. The third area of reform relates to humane methods of prevention and control, not using lethal weapons for controlling any unarmed mob at the initial stage for deterrence and for teaching people a lesson, as is being done under the Riot Control Schemes in most of the states.

At present Muslims continue to be underrepresented at all levels and ranks of the police. In spite of periodic official directions for special recruitment of minorities, no appreciable progress has been made in this regard. VN Rai (IG, BSF) and Justice Tarkunde (8) hold the opinion that the objective of adequate representation of minorities in the present circumstances cannot be achieved without fixing a quota.

It needs to be kept in view that in certain states like Uttar Pradesh, the numerical ratio of Muslims in the police was reduced under unstated official policy. (Nikhil Chakravarty once told me that the PAC, notorious for its anti-Muslim bias, was designed by chief minister GB Pant to deal with the Muslims from whom he apprehended trouble after Partition).

The issue of adequate presence of minorities, especially Muslims, in the law–enforcement machinery has not been addressed by the human rights movement, nor by the secular political class, because of a "secular-communal" fixation. Whatever opinion one may hold about how to ensure a fair share of minorities in other sectors of public life, their presence in the police is required to enable it to enforce law more impartially by neutralising its own biases, and by inspiring greater confidence in the communities that it wants to serve.

It needs to be noted that in the UK, without fixing any ethnic quota, government departments, especially those involved in policing, have been given targets spread over periods of three, five and ten years, for adequate recruitment of ethnic minorities.

It needs to be noted that one of the thrusts of the recent Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, is for states to create a diverse police force free from discrimination and intolerance, recruiting personnel from all groups including minorities in the entire criminal justice system.

The issue of quota reservation for minorities in the police and other wings of the law–enforcement system should be addressed as part of the broader issue of democratic governance and rule of law to ensure minorities the security of life, property and places of worship, delinking it from what is perceived as "communal reservation in public services", though such reservation may have legitimacy for integrating backward minorities like Muslims into the national mainstream and for their modernisation, by expanding the space available to them in the common national domain. The greater the opportunities for participation of Muslims in the common national domain, the greater their sense of belonging and stakes in its stability.

The other human rights issue that needs attention is that of ending the impunity enjoyed by perpetrators of massacres, which is universally acknowledged as a reason for the recurrence of violence, making victims seek desperate remedies, taking, on occasion, recourse to terrorism. This chain of violence and counter–violence has been affirmed by Justice Sri Krishna in his definitive opinion about the serial bomb blasts in Mumbai in March 1993 as a reaction to the totality of events in December 1992 & January 1993 in Ayodhya and Mumbai "by angry, frustrated and desperate young Muslims keen to seek revenge for the perceived injustice done to and atrocities perpetrated on them or to others of their community."

Justice Sri Krishna noted that "the Muslims perhaps felt that the government and the police, instead of protecting their interests, had actually acted against their interests by joining hands with communal elements which took a lead in the riots. A large number of Muslim youths came to entertain this firm belief". (9).

The issue of impunity being enjoyed by perpetrators of communal violence cannot be delinked from the general issue of the reform of the criminal justice system and the rule of law. However, the course of law in Ayodhya from December 1949 till date deserves to be reviewed as a case apart. It is not only a case of delay but of perception of distortion and lack of fairness and even of will to deliver speedy justice, which has caused what the apex court itself called an act of national shame.

Human rights groups like the PUCL, the PUDR and the People’s Human Rights Commission, which have thoroughly documented the failure of the political, administrative and police departments of the law-enforcement system, need to scrutinise the role of the judiciary collectively in the Ayodhya related cases, to ascertain what has made the VHP, the Bajrang Dal and the Shiv Sena bold enough to claim that they can defy law with impunity.

Human rights groups need to scrutinise the role of the judiciary collectively in the Ayodhya related cases to ascertain what has made the VHP, the Bajrang Dal and the Shiv Sena bold enough to claim that they can defy law with impunity

If the issue is not urgently addressed, the threat of the sangh parivar to arm millions of kar sevaks and gradually build pressure through periodic celebratory Hindu mass mobilisations is likely to be countered by terrorist acts from desperate, frustrated and misguided youths from among the victim minority groups.

Having taken note of the failure of the law–enforcement and justice delivery system, and having pointed out what needs to be done to get the system repaired, it needs to be affirmed that communities in a traditional society do not live by law alone. They need to evolve a code of conduct and a mechanism for the prevention of conflicts, especially when there is likelihood of periodic conflict causing feuds and blood letting.

What is the nature of the issue/issues in Ayodhya and who are the parties? The conflict in Ayodhya is avowedly over competitive political Hindu nationalism as testified by LK Advani, the greatest beneficiary of the Ram Mandir movement, before the Liberhan Commission. But the symbol of Ram is widely shared by non–political Hindus.

Ram could easily have acquired the status of an Indian national hero, if he was treated only as an ideal king or a hero of the Indian classical epic, and not as an incarnation of God whose idol is to be ritually worshipped. If a temple is to be built with his idol for devotees, it cannot be treated as the fulfilment of even Hindu nationalist aspirations, less so of the Indian nationalist urge, because there are large sections of Hindus who do not worship idols or are not his devotees.

Among the worshippers of Ram, there are Gandhi and Gandhians, and large sections of non–political Sanatan Dharmis whose reading of history does not make them hate Muslims and seek revenge for the supposed sins of their supposed fathers. Then there is the sangh parivar which has politically appropriated Ram — envisioned as a warrior king — to avenge its sense of historical hurt and humiliation from the supposed descendants of Babar. Muslims cannot be expected to enter into any dialogue with a group of political Hindus who are not ready to treat them — their history, religion and culture — with respect.

The very reason for their insistence on building the Ram temple at the very site where the Babri Masjid stood, lies in their basic motivation for revenge. There is, therefore, no chance of any dialogue over Ayodhya with any credible Muslim section if the Hindu religio–cultural space continues to be wrongly monopolised by the sangh parivar. The problem with non–Sangh Hindus has been that they do not seem to know their mind, or at least are not ready to clearly spell out what they would like Muslims to do.

The only time one such Hindu, ie, Rajmohan Gandhi, advised Muslims to relocate the masjid, Muslims did not respond — the reason being that "secular" politicians had developed a stake in Muslims taking a hard line. The only time three senior Muslim intellectuals offered to talk to Advani over Ayodhya, the latter backed out of his call for dialogue over only one temple, instead of three (A letter was sent to Advani in this regard by Badr–ud–din Tyabji, Col. BH Zaidi and Saiyid Hamid on August 23, 1990 which remained unanswered.) (10).

Any Ayodhya cell in the cabinet secretariat, or secret talks with stray Muslim individuals or even groups is not going to yield any result. The solution lies in non–Sangh Hindu community leaders and intellectuals and enlightened Muslims — from among the ulema as well as intellectuals – taking the initiative for dialogue in a spirit of mutual respect and goodwill.

Both groups should be so intellectually equipped as to be aware of the history of Hindu–Muslim discord over ethno–religious issues, and its adverse impact on community relations. They should also have the right vision of harmonious Hindu–Muslim relations in a plural cultural set–up wherein legitimate communitarian values are accommodated and civilisation aspirations of the two are fulfilled without a clash.

I am sure this lies within the realm of the possible. Those taking the initiative for such a dialogue should be men and women with the courage of conviction to be able to take apparently unpopular decisions over all contentious issues including the issues of cow slaughter and Vande Matram in the larger interest of the communities and the country.

The government, especially the present one led by the BJP, cannot assume the role of the promoter of dialogue. It can and should take measures for reform of the system, as pointed out above, with a view to assuring the minorities that their security would not be under threat. It should also make minorities, especially Muslims, develop a greater sense of belonging by expanding avenues and opportunities for their participation in national life.

Such ‘appeasement’ of minorities is a necessary condition for creating an atmosphere conducive to a fruitful dialogue over Ayodhya and other issues. Enlightened sections of the sangh parivar should have the vision and insight to understand that such confidence building measures (CBMs), like the Urdu script getting due recognition and the community’s right to separate family laws, cannot undermine the ‘Hindu interest’ that they are seeking to protect and promote.

A necessary component of the CBMs is the de–stigmatisation of Muslims for imagined sins of the past, including Partition, and their consequent negative stereotyping and treatment as a suspect community to be replaced by their treatment as normal Indians. This would require a commitment to educate and sensitise the average Hindu for inculcation of positive humanist attitudes.

Muslims will have to reciprocate by de–stereotyping the kafir, treating Hindus as normal humans and fellow countrymen, with whom the best of relations are recommended by Islam, ruling out any perpetual confrontation including armed struggle, howsoever desperate they might feel on occasions.

The role of facilitators and promoters of dialogue has to be played by the statutorily empowered Community Relations Commission (CRC) as proposed in the NCM Report on Communal Riots: Prevention and Control (1999), which has found acceptance of the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution. The CRC is envisaged as a body comprising eminent social scientists, jurists, and experts in community relations and conflict resolution along with distinguished publicists entrusted with the responsibility of prevention and resolution of all inter–community conflicts through dialogue.

In the event of failure of dialogue, the CRC will be empowered to initiate legal action against all hate speech and actions. The CRC will function in liaison with civil society’s organisations at the district, state & national level.

One such organisation named Inter–Community Peace Initiative (ICPI) has already been constituted, whose Mission Statement includes commitment to cultural pluralism, upholding rule of law and promoting dialogue between communities on divisive ethno–religious issues.

Let the CRC be established with such eminent members whose integrity and sagacity is unquestionable, and who enjoy the confidence of minorities. The CRC, along with bodies like the ICPI may be in a position to bring about conciliation of the communities without any sense of humiliation or unfairness to either party.

The role of facilitators and promoters of dialogue has to be played by the statutorily empowered Community Relations Commission (CRC) as proposed

Those involved in law and law-enforcement will not be abdicating their role. There may be a complementarity of roles on an issue like Ayodhya. A tribunal or arbitration council could be appointed with the consent of the parties concerned.

It all depends on whether the political parties in the government and the opposition and the non–Sangh Hindus and non–political Muslims, especially the enlightened ulema and intellectuals feel the urge to take bold initiatives for a peaceful and just order in India wherein the correctly prioritised interests of all communities may be protected.

It is rather depressing to see non–Sangh Hindus, especially Gandhians, not playing an organised active role. It is no less depressing to see the Muslim community obsessed with ‘legalism’ of a variety that will not yield any positive results in terms of their cultural and religious rights or their economic, social and political rights even if they win the legal battle in the long run (very, very long run).

Will those who stand for genuine Hindu religious values and civilisation aspirations, as creatively interpreted by Vivekananda and others, become active? Will Muslims develop a better sense of history and correctly prioritise their own collective goals and interests? Can they be inspired by a more inclusive vision of their own future in India than mere legalists are capable of?

Notes

1. BJP’s White Paper on Ayodhya And The Rama Temple Movement, BJP, April 1993, p.152.

2. Readings on Minorities: Perspectives & Documents, Vol. I, ed., Iqbal A. Ansari, IOS, New Delhi, 1996, pp. 174–75.

3. BJP’s White Paper On Ayodhya, op.cit., p. 155.

4. Times of India, New Delhi, 22 Jan. 2001.

5. Times of India, New Delhi, 19 Jan. 2000.

6. Times of India, New Delhi, 15-16 May 2001.

7. i). Second & Sixth Reports of the National Police Commission, Govt. of India, August 1979-81.

ii). Prime Minister’s 15-Point Programme on Minorities, 1983 (PM’s letter dated 11 May 1983 to the Home Minister and Other Members of the Council of Ministers regarding problems of Minorities).

iii). NC Saxena’s Inquiry Report on Meerut Riots, September — October, 1982

iv) VN Rai, Combating communal Conflicts: Perceptions of Police Neutrality During Hindu–Muslim Riots in India, LBS National Academy of Administration, Mussoorie, 1996.

v). NCM study by N.C. Saxena, 1983.

vi). Amnesty International’s Report On Allegations of Extra–Judicial Killings By The PAC In And Around Meerut, 22–23 May, 1987, AI Index: ASA 20/06/87/Distr:SC/PO/CD/GR.

vii) Iqbal A. Ansari, Ayodhya: The Failure of The System of Law – Enforcement, I.O.S, Seminar "Beyond Ayodhya" January 1993.

viii). Report of the Seminar on "Communal Riots and the Role of Law – Enforcement Agencies" organised by CFD & CSSS, Bombay, January 1994.

ix). Amnesty International’s Memorandum on The Police Procedures & Practices in India And The Bombay Riots, 1992–93, January 1994, AI Index: ASA 20/29/94

x). Human Rights Watch/Asia Report, Communal Violence and Denial of Justice In India, 1996.

xi). Communal Riots, the State & Law In India, Minorities Council, I.O.S, New Delhi 1997.

xii). NCM Report, Communal Riots: Prevention & Control, Minorities Council, New Delhi, 1997.

8. Tarkunde, VM: "Communal Harmony: A multi–pronged Approach" in Communal Riots, the State and Law In India, ed. Iqbal A. Ansari, I.O.S, New Delhi, 1997 pp.35-38.

9. Report of the Sri Krishna Commission, Vol. I Ch. VI, p. 45.

10. From Conflict to Conciliation, Inter–Community Peace Initiative, New Delhi, p. 17. I

Archived from Communalism Combat, January-February 2002 Year 8 No. 75-76, Special Report 4

Sunshine in Shekhawat

January 31, 2002

A multi-religious, multi-caste, youth group from a small town in Rajasthan dares to take the plunge. And triggers a cavalcade of protest against the latest hate campaign that Hindutva has launched against ‘anti-national’ Muslims

The slightest pretext is needed in Rajasthan by the Hindutva forces to communalise any incident of vandalism and crime. The latest issue to ignite the communal cauldron is the name of Osama–bin–Laden. While most of the countryside is oblivious of who this person is, Bin-Laden’s name on wall writings even in interior villages and mofussil towns have provoked communal tension in three places that I personally know of in the state.

While it is important for the law and order machinery to identify those responsible for these wall writings, the reaction and capital made out of it by individuals representing the BJP, Shiv Sena, Bajrang Dal and the VHP needs to be monitored.

A few shops in that kasba are forcibly shut down by the vandals, Muslim traders terrorised, the Muslim community isolated, madrassas regarded with suspicion and a spate of cases lodged against Muslims. A recent incident in Daulatgarh (Bhilwara district) illustrates the trend. An investigation carried out by PUCL members, Bhanwar Meghwanshi, Raju Jangid, Allaudin Bedal, Ganga Singh Rathore and Abdul Hamid Bagwaan, all from Bhilwara, who visited Daulatgarh on December 29, 2001 and again on January 9, 2002 to study and also initiate a process of peace in the kasba is worth recording:

Daulatgarh was a sleepy kasba town in Asind tehsil with the local Thakurs controlling the politics of the region. In the month of August and September last year (see CC, August Sept 2001) after the demolition of the Kalindri masjid, Sawai Bhoj Temple complex in Asind in July, 2001, representatives of the BJP, VHP, Shiv Sena and the Bajrang Dal first carried out a trishul diksha samaroh and then a jal abhishek ceremony in September and October (CC, November 01).

Against the backdrop of what had happened at Asind, these programmes of aggressive mobilisation were enough to terrorise the seventy odd Muslim families in a village of over five hundred families. The arrival of a 28-year-old Maulana, Anwar Hussein in the village, became reason enough for the representatives of the local BJP, VHP and SS forces to launch their propaganda, claiming that they felt threatened.

The Muslim community especially called down Anwar Husein from Jodhpur, after collecting contributions from local families, so that he could educate their children in the madrassa. This fuelled rumours that the maulana was conspiring with the youth and talibanising them.

The month of Ramzan saw unease in this kasba for the first time. According to one sympathiser of the Hindutva lobby, villager Bharat Singh, "…. it was the loud calling of the azaan and other "Quran bhajans" every morning at the time of sehri that caused tension. Since half-yearly exams were taking place, the blaring mike disturbed school students.

The villagers got the police to intervene, who ordered that mikes could not be used. Two days later, on December 16, at about 9 am, a rumour spread through the village that someone had written pro-Osama-Bin-Laden slogans on the temple wall. According to one Shanti Lal, the wall writing said, "Mike bandh karane wale teri jagah jehannum mein – O B Laden"(Those responsible for stopping use of the microphone in the mosque shall burn in hell – O B Laden). As a result of this, villagers were up in arms and blamed the maulana for provoking the youth to write it.

The police who were close by, intervened and promptly erased the writing on the temple wall. The Muslim community told the PUCL fact-finding team that though by the time they reached the temple the alleged writing had been erased, they were willing to believe the account and were willing to punish those who did it.

The Muslim community then did what the Hindutva forces wanted them to do. Reacting under pressure, they promptly sent away the maulana. They did not want to be labelled "Laden samarthak" ("Supporters of Laden") which people in that area including the local police started calling them. They feared that the police would keep an extra watch on them.

On January 9, Muslims of Daulatgarh were declared "worshippers of Laden" by the over ten thousand strong assembly that had gathered at Sawai Bhoj Temple to hear Sadhvi Ritambhara. The erstwhile Daulatgarh Thakur, who complained that Talibanis had found their way even into the backwaters of Rajasthan, was chairing the meeting. Speaker after speaker at the public meeting condemned Daulatgarh Muslims for being Laden worshippers and demanded that strong action be taken against them. Sadhvi Ritambhara, known for spreading poison, led the attack. Her speech continued uninterrupted by the police for well over an hour.

Muslims of Daulatgarh live in great fear today. Even dispatching the maulana back to Jodhpur has not changed of people’s opinion towards them.

Shekhavati youth challenge communal forces

From January 1 to January 10 last month, more than 50 kasbas and villages in the Shekhavati region of Rajasthan, which covers the districts of Churu, Jhunjhunu and Sikar witnessed communal vandalism of a kind that the region had not witnessed before. The state home department list classifies three cities of Sikar district as "communally highly sensitive cities" and three others as just "sensitive."

In the past, riots have not erupted in this region. Even at the height of the Babri masjid demolition movement there was no violence here. According to local residents, tension did prevail in some towns but never got out of hand. The region, like other parts of Rajasthan, has also produced kar sevaks who were responsible for demolishing the Babri Masjid, but who could never indulge in similar criminal activities in their own areas.

On the night of January 1, a drunken criminal belonging to the Muslim community broke three idols of the Ram Darbar Mandir in Rolsabsar and threw them by the roadside. Rolsabsar village has a population of eight hundred families, half being kayam khani Muslims and the other half Hindus belonging to various castes. Fearing great tension, the very next morning the family of the accused Ghulam Nabi alias Rasgulla promptly handed him over to the panchayat who in turn handed him to the police.

According to the young sarpanch, Aijaz Ali, they also handed over two other notorious Muslim boys, who everybody knew were not directly involved, in a bid to demonstrate that Muslims did not encourage such acts. Ali told the fact-finding team that local Muslims did all they could to demonstrate their condemnation of this solitary act, saying that the culprits deserved the harshest punishment.

In Rolsabsar, local Muslims initiated such sensitive and salutary measures for peace, as did local Hindus in Sangarwa a few days later.

According to the deputy sarpanch, Puran Singh, and the temple priest, they, along with the entire Hindu community in the village, were satisfied by the prompt response of the Muslim community and the police. The idols were replaced and further action was left to the police. The matter was closed as far as they were concerned.

But while the people of Rolsabsar had settled the matter amicably, it became a useful rallying point for the BJP, Shiv Sena, Bajrang Dal and the VHP to mobilise the entire Shekhavati region. Capitalising on the prevalent heightened passions of nationalism, with the country’s borders less than 100 kilometres away, the act of breaking the idols was described as "anti-national" by these communal groups.

Over the next ten days, more than fifty villages and kasbas of that region saw schools, colleges, bazaars, courts and even offices of professionals like lawyers and doctors, forcibly shut down by these groups. But the law and order machinery did not intervene.

Three mosques were desecrated in the region during this period. A pig was thrown into one, the gate of another was burnt and the third was also damaged. Violence followed in some kasbas.

In Churu, police lathi-charged people when prohibitory orders were violated. In Laxmangarh town, during a bandh on January 2, a mosque was desecrated and tension followed. The Muslim community protesting the mosque desecration was dubbed anti-national by the BJP leadership. Laxmangarh remained forcibly closed for the next three days by the forces exerting pressure on the local administration to arrest the "anti-national miscreants".

Interestingly, in the sleepy village of Sangarwa, where very poor Muslims reside — and who were oblivious to any of the disturbances in the region — the door of the local mosque set on fire on the night of January 6. Members of the local Hindu community, with the help of the police, promptly replaced the door and re-painted the wall to prevent escalation of tension.

The vernacular press described these bandhs and violations as "spontaneous" and as "expression of public anger."

On the January 4, the BJP sent a high-powered team, led by former education minister and senior RSS leader, Lalit Kishore Chaturvedi, along with Gulab Chand Kataria, a former state party president. They justified the retaliation of their cadres to the anti-national incidents at Rolsabsar. They condemned the Muslim community for trying to provoke religious sentiments especially when the country was on the verge of war. Hate speech and vilification was dished out in large measures.

Where were the progressive forces? Neither the CPI(M) – who had mobilised one lakh people to protest the dismantling of the Rajasthan State Electricity Board in October 2000 — and a party that has a strong presence in Sikar (the only MLA comes from the Dhond constituency in this district) – nor the Congress — which has won a majority of MLA and MLC seats from the region — stepped forward, barring stray statements that made no impact.

Incidentally, of the 14 municipalities in the Shekhawati region, Muslims chair eight and locals speculate that the BJP is really concerned with snatching away this political control.

The first strong voice of protest against the mobilisation based on division and venom typified here by the RSS and BJP leadership, came from a group of about a hundred and fifty young boys from Ratangarh, one of the important towns of Churu. Ratangarh had a protest bandh on January 2 itself.

Mobilised under the banner of Srijan, these young men belonging mainly to the poorer and vulnerable sections of society decided that they had had enough. They would challenge the politics of lies and manipulation as epitomised in the posturings of the sangh parivar.

This was not the first time that they had been mobilised. But this time the issues were dramatically different. From relief for the Orissa cyclone victims in 1999 — (under the leadership of Rajeev Upadhaya, who hails from a family that subscribes to Gandhian values) they had raised more than fifty lakh rupees which helped in buying more than three lakh clothes for the cyclone victims — to drought relief for the residents of Barmer, to a head-on battle against the politics of venom and hatred today.

Last August, the group had protested the sale of a minor girl and ensured her rehabilitation. Their success in this case got the culprits arrested and even helped them organise a public hearing on violence against adolescent girls.

Concerned over how their region was being held victim to communal poison, these young men organised a 28-kilometre march from Ratangarh to Rolsabsar to demonstrate that both towns wanted peace. Most were unemployed youth while some were involved in small entrepreneurships. They were young boys from all communities, Muslims, Bodh, Harijans (Mehtars), as well as Brahmin, Bania, Jat, Malli and Rajput. The rally, which took six hours to cover 28 kilometres was unprecedented. It provided a platform for ordinary people to voice their views on peace and harmony.

The traders of Ratangarh expressed anger that they had been forced to close the market on January 2. They showered flowers on the marchers and made speeches. The people of the villages that were located on the way also expressed their solidarity with the rally and small sabhas were held on the way.

The rally received an emotional welcome before it reached Rolsabsar, when more than a thousand people of the panchayat, including Bhanwru Khan, the local MLA, the Zilla Pramukh, Bhagwan Singh Dhaka, the pradhan, sarpanch and upsarpanch and several administrative officials of the region joined the last kilometre of the peace march. Women joined the march when the rally went around the village and it finally culminated in a sabha in the temple compound of Jamwaya Mataji ka Mandir.

In the speeches that followed, villagers remembered how young Shahid Mohammed Ikram of their village had laid down his life in Kargil and how today they were proud that the local high school was named after him.

They said that since World War II, the village had produced soldiers who laid their lives fighting for their country. In the 1965 and 1971 wars, more than 250 soldiers from all communities, including Harijans and kayam khanis (Muslims), had fought on the border and today, more than forty of their village boys were on the border facing the Pakistani forces.

Could this village be termed anti-national, the MLA asked? He said he appreciated that stringent punishment, even capital punishment, must be given to the boys who committed a heinous crime like breaking idols of Ram and Sita. He thanked the villagers of Rolsabsar for handing over the guilty Muslim youth to the police.

Other interventions made during the rally also appreciated the no-nonsense attitude displayed by the Muslim community in handing over the guilty persons but lamented that society was unable to deal with mistakes, even crimes, in a just and humane fashion.

Several young boys denounced the role of the media, which had inflamed passions but had ignored coverage of their peace march. Some said the best reply to Pakistan was for Hindus and Muslims to live peacefully together in India.

The youth from Ratangarh announced the holding of a sadbhavna mushaira as part of their next move to promote peace and harmony. The villagers of Rolsabsar arranged buses to take back the youth to Ratangarh as a gesture of gratitude.

It was only after this dynamic local initiative by village youth that the CPI (M) took out a huge peace march in Sikar and after that several other organisations were motivated to hold peace meetings in different kasbas. For the time being, at least, thanks to this local and dynamic intervention, expressions of peace are finding a platform in the Shekhawati region of Rajasthan.

Archived from Communalism Combat, January-February 2002 Year 8 No. 75-76, Breaking Barriers 1

Kashmir: The moral dimension

January 31, 2002

Civil society in India needs to awaken to the colossal dimension of the humanitarian crisis that confronts tens of thousands of young widows and orphans in the violence-hit Valley

Over the past two years, through regular visits that I have made to Kashmir, the abandonment of the ordinary Kashmiri, caught in the crossfire between militants and security forces, has come starkly to me. Each visit has made me guilty, when I see the absence of any involvement by Indian civil society in the plight of the ordinary Kashmiri.

The present conflict has gone on for almost 13 years now. The consequences of violence in Kashmir are enormous in terms of human and social costs. Look at the staggering figures — 50,000 dead, several hundred missing, around 30-40,000 young widows and about the same number of orphans. No one really has any authentic figures since proper, independent surveys of all the districts in the Valley as well as Jammu region have not been made.

Having been involved in the relief and rehabilitation process following the Mumbai riots and the serial bomb-blasts in December ’92–January ’93 and March 1993, I was keen to find out how rehabilitation work, if any, had been handled in J&K.

About 16 months ago, a visit to five villages in Baramulla district proved shattering. Of the 35 widows whom we actually met, only two had received the compensation of Rs. 1 lakh, an amount the family of a victim is entitled to. In response to our inquiries we were told that many of them had made several visits to the concerned authorities, spending a lot of time and money. In the end they were informed that there were 8,000 applications pending in the file and there was no money to pay them.

However, at another level, the chief secretary denied that the families of victims were not paid compensation or that there was no fund for this purpose. Some time ago, the state’s Rehabilitation Council was set up to address all these issues. However, the Council, strapped as it is for funds, has not made any significant interventions.

Following my repeated queries, the chief secretary arranged a meeting with the district commissioner of Baramulla. It was at this meeting that I understood the root cause of the frequent complaints. Under the government scheme, families of militants killed are not entitled to receive any compensation. This excludes a large number of widows right away. As for the others, the procedure is so complicated and cumbersome that a lot of people simply give up pursuing it.

The Divisional Commissioner of Baramulla explained the procedure involved in giving compensation to victims of militancy-related violence as described below –

Families of those killed in crossfire are entitled to full compensation of rupees one lakh.
Owners of houses destroyed during the action are entitled to receive 50% value of the house. This should not exceed the amount of rupees one lakh.
For those injured during encounters, the compensation is: Rs. 75,000 for those with permanent disability, Rs 10,000 for those with grave injury, Rs 1,000 for those with light injury.
A widow intending to remarry can receive Rs 10,000. This is apart from whatever other compensation she may receive. This provision has been made with a view to socially rehabilitate the widows.
The families of the militants are not entitled to receive any compensation.
Ø Those who harbour militants are not entitled to receive any compensation.

Twice a month, in each district, the District Level Coordinating committee (DLCC) holds a meeting. The district commissioner is the chairman of this committee. Other members include a brigadier or colonel from the army, a brigadier or a colonel from the Rashtriya Rifles, a DIG or local commandant of the BSF and the SSP of the J&K police.

The committee reviews, discusses and takes decisions regarding different issues –

1. The number of dead or injured during militancy-related violence and private or public property damaged during the month. The local units of the specific security agency operating in that area, as well as the police who have to register every incident, each give separate reports to the DLCC. Only after these agencies give no objection and the DLCC approves, do the district authorities give compensation money through a bank draft to the victims or their families.

2. Location issues – If government buildings such as schools or colleges are occupied, they are gradually to be handed back.

3. If security forces are occupying vacant houses of migrants, this is discussed at DLCC meetings and rent is fixed.

4. Civic Action – Organising medical camps, setting up of community centres, addressing drinking water and irrigation problems.

The rupees one-lakh compensation to the victim’s family does not automatically go to the widow. This is distributed according to Mohammedan law. It means one eighth going to the father of the victim, another eighth to the mother while the rest is divided between the widow and her children. If the victim has a dependant brother or sister they too get their share.

The division of compensation money is carried out by the administration according to how many members in a family are claimants. This money is put into a fixed deposit. However, this is not a fixed term deposit as is the case elsewhere in the country. In the case of the families of victims during Mumbai riots, they were not allowed to touch the fixed deposits for ten years.

In Bombay or elsewhere in the country, the compensation money was not divided amongst the family members. In Kashmir, this division has been unfair to the widows since as the amount they finally receive is very small. The widow also loses out on the interest that could have been earned, had the entire amount been put into a fixed deposit in her name.

Members of civil society from within and outside Kashmir could help the families of survivors to access rehabilitation and compensation. Today, widows and other members of survivor families are victims of terror and trauma, which prevents them from responding adequately to the humanitarian crisis they face.

In 1993, the National Foundation for Communal Harmony was set up by the then Union home minister, SB Chavan. It gives scholarships for the education of children who are orphaned during communal riots. Unfortunately, orphans of the Kashmir conflict are not included under this scheme. If we want to decontaminate the future from the poison of hate, anger and revenge, do we not need to invest in these orphans? Would our neglect and indifference not lead them to become future militants?

Archived from Communalism Combat, January-February 2002 Year 8 No. 75-76, Special Report 1

Kashmiri women speak

January 31, 2002

A group of Kashmiri women, including a Kashmiri Pandit forced to migrate to Jammu, choose to go calling on the conscience of the rest of India, starting with Mumbai

Eight women from the violence–hit state of Jammu and Kashmir visited Mumbai in late December, bringing tales of deep rupture and brutal violence to its people. “We hope that Mumbai will listen and try to understand what we undergo everyday,” said Naseem Shifai, a Kashmiri poet who was part of the group. Over the next four days, at three intense meetings held in different parts of the city, Mumbaikars tried to do just that.

“Kashmir, once romanticised for it’s beauty, peace and prosperity, is torn apart by the ruptures caused by brutal, everyday violence; our children draw guns and blood and play bunker games,” said Samia, a doctor at a public hospital in Srinagar.

Hospitals do not have sufficient blood, amputation is a severe problem, and children suffer from blindness caused by explosives and explosions. Yet the territorial dispute and the politics of the struggle there drive the images of Kashmir in the rest of India. The people are rarely remembered, their tragedies easily forgotten.

Kashmiri Women — A Time for Listening, was a programme especially undertaken by the Centre for Dialogue and Reconciliation and Sabrang to open communication between the hapless state and the rest of India, beginning with Mumbai. Three separate meetings with different sections of Mumbai’s citizens saw this vibrant group pour out their anguish and plight to an audience that was shaken each time.

At least 30-40,000 widows and as many orphans are crying out for a massive humanitarian drive to help heal the pain of alienation and violence in the Valley. The meetings of the group, which included four social activists, including Nighat Shafi Pandit of HELP, a foundation that runs an orphanage; generated widespread response, especially from the group of Marathi, Hindi and Urdu intellectuals and writers who hosted a meeting through Akshara Publications– resulting in immediate links and offers of assistance.

More importantly, however, it has led to what may result in more enduring links with writers, journalists and artistes making plans to carry regular team visits to the state.
Among the team of eight women from J&K, who were accompanied by Sushobha Barve of the CDR, was Professor Indu Kilam, a Kashmiri Pandit who was forced to leave the valley in 1989, after sections of the militant movement turned distinctly threatening to the Pandit minority.

Living in refugee camps for years until she could obtain a house in Jammu, she still feels utterly alienated in the place that gave her refuge. “I have no address here; no one knows me or recognises me. My parents died in Jammu, heartbroken at what we had left behind. We need to have the strength to put our suffering behind us and forge a new beginning. We have suffered for sure. But the Kashmiri Muslims who stayed there have suffered in a way, much more. We need to make a new beginning.”
More meetings have followed the initiative between different groups from the Valley, elsewhere in the state and the rest of India. One of the thrusts of the campaign is the question: Will India assume moral responsibility for the widows and orphans, survivors of brutal violence? As important is the question whether different sections of the state are willing to dialogue and reconcile their differences?

Archived from Communalism Combat, January-February 2002 Year 8 No. 75-76, Special Report 2

A New Year ‘gift’

January 31, 2002

Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd suspends all public STD and ISD facilities as well as Internet services to the state

In a cynical and cruel gift to the people of Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh, the central government suspended all public, outgoing STD and ISD facilities out of the state. In one sweep, students have been cut off from the Internet, thus denying access to professional information affecting their prospects, businessmen have suffered losses from being out of touch with clients outside and thousands of STD/ISD booth-owners rehabilitated by the state government through employment in this sector have found their livelihood snatched away. Thousands of families who have their offspring studying or living outside the state have been personally affected by the severance of telecommunications.

Speaking to the media, senior libertarian and writer, Balraj Puri described this move as yet “another step in the isolation of the people of Jammu and Kashmir.’’ The ostensible rationale behind this decision, which has generated outrage in different sections of the state, was to prevent misuse of communications by dangerous militants. The December 13 attack on Parliament prompted this decision.

Lines were cut under orders from the Communications ministry. Following a decision of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) chaired by the Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd suspended all public STD and ISD facilities, as well as Internet services out of the state.

Around 2,500 PCO owners have been rendered jobless, as also hundreds of cyber cafe owners as a direct result of this move. Political parties across the spectrum have condemned the Centre’s decision.

“Whatever business was left is gone now. We cannot even talk outside the Valley,’’ said a Srinagar businessman, Muzaffar Ahmed. “If the attack on Parliament is the reason for these things then mobile phones should be banned in Delhi where the militants used the same,’’ he argued. “This is a move to push us into the Stone Age,’’ said Ishfaq Ahmed, a student.
Even the BJP’s state vice-president, Abdur Rasheed Kabuli, expressed anguish over the decision when he spoke to The Hindu. “This should not have been done’’ he said. “If there is going to be war and such steps are needed, the government should explain to the people. The ban will lead to further alienation.’’

Senior leader of the People’s Democratic Party and prominent Supreme Court lawyer, Muzaffar Hussain Beig, said the government move was a denial of basic rights guaranteed under the Constitution. “The Government cannot do this unless emergency is declared in the country,’’ he said.

While militants are still at liberty to communicate through walkie-talkies and satellite phones, a Srinagar housewife cannot use a PCO to speak to her sister in Baramulla, a pujari in Jammu cannot speak to his son in Texas and correspondents in the state can no longer file news via the Internet or PCO fax!

Private subscribers and offices can still call the rest of the country, but the majority of people in J&K who rely on PCOs to communicate with the outside world have been thrown into the telephonic equivalent of solitary confinement. The moot question on everyone’s lips is why this desire to further alienate the people of the state? This is indeed a tricky question to answer.

Archived from Communalism Combat, January-February 2002 Year 8 No. 75-76, Special Report 3

Arms and the man

January 31, 2002

Musharraf launches ‘half–a–revolution’

It is a measure of the cynicism that pervades India’s political climate today that many commentators have responded to Pakistan President General Pervez Musharraf’s major address to the nation of January 12 with the question: "But will he be able to deliver results? Can he change ground realities? Will he really be able to stop cross–border terrorism and bring Pakistan’s jehadi fanatics to heel?"

This in itself may not be an irrelevant question. But in the circumstances, it’s the wrong question to ask. More precisely, it puts the cart before the horse. The real issue is, what is the true meaning, import and significance of Musharraf’s speech? Does his address constitute a major transformatory change of intent, or a radical shift of purpose, or is it only a trivial or marginal change from the "normal" rhetoric that Pakistan’s officialdom resorts to when it is in crisis? Whether Musharraf can actually translate his intent into practical results logically comes after this question.

To honestly answer the first question, we must recognise, and frankly acknowledge, that on January 12, Pervez Musharraf did something few heads of states ever do — especially when they are beleaguered and in deep crisis. He subverted a major component, if not a pillar, of the ideological foundation which has sustained the edifice of Pakistani society and politics for two decades. He began a major surgical operation on the tumour of militant, political Islam which has long afflicted that country’s body politic. And he launched an ambitious programme of reform of society, the like of which South Asia has never seen before.

Musharraf’s January 12 address will go down as a landmark in this region’s history — even if it were to remain a catalogue of the many disorders that affect Pakistan and a list of pious intentions. But it is likely to turn out to be much more than that. It was preceded, and followed, by South Asia’s biggest–ever crackdown on communal bigots and terrorists. Already, some 2,000 "terrorist" suspects have been rounded up, five organisations including Lashkar–e–Toiba and Jaish–e–Mohammed banned, and 300 of their offices closed down, locked and sealed.

Some of our leaders have slowly, reluctantly, grudgingly, begun to acknowledge the significance of Musharraf’s reform agenda, although they see it purely in terms internal to Pakistan’s domestic politics. Thus LK Advani, fresh from a visit to the US, said (Jan. 16) the address was "path–breaking" from the internal point of view. And AB Vajpayee has finally said (Jan. 17) that Musharraf’s address has many "positive elements". Yet others, especially hawkish media commentators, have called it a successful and effective "public relations" exercise.

It will not do to minimise Musharraf’s address as a defensive or diversionary tactic aimed at appeasing Western powers on the terrorism issue. More than two–thirds of his speech was devoted to diagnosing the pathology of Pakistani society and politics and to outlining an agenda for internal reform, rather than on making concessions on "external" issues like India’s demand to take "decisive" action against its list of 20 terrorists. Of course, there was a degree of flamboyance that went with Musharraf’s much–publicised speech, but PR considerations, alone or mainly, cannot explain its thrust.

What Musharraf has unveiled is a plan to put Pakistan on the road to modernisation and secularisation by severing the links between political Islam and the state, between the military and the mullahs, and between Kashmir and terrorist violence. At the heart of the plan is trenchant criticism of Pakistan’s dangerous mix of religion and politics, and the disastrous consequences this has had on the state and civil society. Whether the general succeeds in achieving his objectives or not, and how soon, it must be conceded that his agenda represents perhaps the most ambitious reform programme undertaken in any country, barring Turkey under Kemal Ataturk, to deal with the issue of religion and politics.

It is certainly the boldest such agenda ever outlined in South Asia since Nehru’s ‘Tryst with Destiny’ speech at Independence.

Musharraf’s reform programme represents a complete reversal of the Islamisation project launched by Zia–ul–Haq to acquire a figleaf of legitimacy for his brutal military dictatorship and to transform the very character of Pakistan. The logic of Zia’s project eventually unfolded in its most developed form through the Taliban, through Pakistan’s attempt to virtually annex Afghanistan and acquire "strategic depth", and through the promotion of a variety of militant groups in West and South Asia, especially in Kashmir.

Musharraf has started cutting the umbilical cord between the Pakistani state and jehadi terrorism. One can argue that this is only the beginning of what is likely to be a prolonged process which will inevitably involve purging the army of pernicious religious–political influences, and even cleansing the ISI. It is by no means certain that Musharraf will succeed. The Pakistan situation is fraught with uncertainty, strife and danger. His agenda will antagonise some of his own military colleagues. He has hit out at the bigoted mullahs who for years have been the mainstay of fanatical groups. Successive governments, including Musharraf’s, have found it hard to rein in such men. Numerous jehadi militants, inflamed by the Taliban’s defeat in Afghanistan, are only waiting to get their claws into Musharraf.

Musharraf has thus embarked on an extraordinarily bold and risky mission. He may have done so under pressure, even compulsion. But that should not detract from the importance of his endeavour and coherence of his purpose. Far–reaching changes are sometimes brought about not because there is a "genuine" change of heart, but because "soft" options vanish, and there is a compelling need to change.

It is tempting to argue, as some Pakistani commentators have themselves done, that only a General (Musharraf) could have undone the legacy of another General (Zia). It is also easy to draw parallels between Musharraf and Algeria’s secular military junta, which a decade ago prevented radical Islamicists from taking power despite their clear victory in elections.

However, that would be trivialising the importance of the overall plan for Pakistan’s political reform, which started unfolding within a week of Musharraf’s address. This has a strong democratisation component, linked as it is with preparations to hold elections by the Supreme Court-stipulated October 2002 deadline, the abolition of communal electorates, and a 48 percent increase in the strength of the National Assembly, along with a new political initiative on Kashmir. So, while Ataturk never succeeded in democratising but only in secularising Turkey, and the Algerian junta forcefully snuffed out democracy, Musharraf’s broadly secular reform comes coupled with a momentum in favour of democratisation of Pakistan’s polity.

Therefore, it would be sheer nitpicking and pettifogging to fault Musharraf for the many omissions in his speech. True, he didn’t refer to the "Lahore process" or the "Shimla agreement". Of course, he didn’t own up the damage that Islamabad militants have caused to Kashmiri civilians, or apologise for it. But that was hardly the function of his address. Did Jaswant Singh and Vajpayee ask if he apologised for what the Taliban had done in Afghanistan when he joined the US-led "anti–terrorist" coalition which New Delhi uncritically supports? What is relevant is that Musharraf unconditionally condemned all forms of terrorism and the "Kalashnikov culture" of all religious extremism. Of equal significance was his insistence that Pakistani groups must not mess around in other countries — no matter what the cause.

It is wrong to make a rigid separation between the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ components of Musharraf’s address. They are strongly, organically, inter–connected or related. Implicit in the insistence on limiting Pakistan’s external role is the view that the country has paid dearly because it pandered to pan–Islamic ideas and the vision of an ummah or Islamic brotherhood at least in this region. Musharraf wants Pakistan to be seen as a ‘normal’, moderate, non–aggressive, responsible nation in the region and the world.

Backing this up is Musharraf’s internal agenda, including the redefinition of jihad as a fight against poverty, illiteracy and backwardness, and strict regulation of madrassas and mosques through a system of registration. His radical plan can potentially transform Pakistan into a modern, forward–looking, open society which is no longer obsessed with religion, or crude, intolerant, interpretations of it. He has clearly posed the choice between this future, and a grim fate for Pakistan if it chooses to be a paranoid, closed, religion-obsessed, backward society.

And yet, despite all its far-reaching, courageous, bold and radical content, Musharraf’s agenda is flawed on two counts. One, it lacks the strong energies that can only come from a "perspective from below", one that arises from the struggles and daily activities of the working people. It is thus very much a revolutionary reform "from above". Secondly, it relies for its self–actualisation on the agency of the Pakistani state, itself a thoroughly corrupt, compromised and unreliable entity. Thus, on a demanding view, Musharraf is attempting only "half–a–revolution" although it is infinitely more ambitious than the conservatism and timidity of Vajpayee & Co.

Musharraf of course asserts that Kashmir "runs through our blood". But he has been careful to decouple Kashmir’s "freedom struggle" from terrorist militancy. And he has offered a dialogue on Kashmir. India must accept this in a spirit of openness, good faith and generosity. It just won’t do to acknowledge — as New Delhi does — that Kashmir is an issue, a dispute, a problem, albeit a bilateral one, and then refuse a bilateral dialogue on one pretext or other. There is a real danger today that failure to discuss Kashmir bilaterally, which India agreed to do at Lahore and Agra, will invite external intervention, with unpalatable consequences.

The US is in a uniquely powerful position today as a hegemonic power which is courted by both New Delhi and Islamabad. India has used the US as the central interlocutor in its post–December 13 strategy of brinkmanship. Having allowed America such a pivotal role, it cannot easily resist its friendly (or not–so–friendly) involvement in Kashmir — if bilateralism fails. Bilateralism must be made to work in its authentic spirit.

Equally important, India must immediately de–escalate its military build–up on the western border. It would be ill–advised to wait for Pakistan to "surrender" any of the 20 terrorists it has named. Musharraf cannot be easily pressurised into handing over any of the Pakistani nationals in that list to Interpol, leave alone to India. Equally unlikely is the surrender of Dawood Ibrahim or Chhota Shakeel, who in any case are gangsters rather than terrorists. India could perhaps get some former Khalistanis exiled in Pakistan handed over to some external agency. But that would be a minor consolation in relation to the substantial gain from Musharraf’s outlawing of JeM and LeT.

It would be unwise as well as unrealistic for India to cast itself in the mould of a superpower by demanding that Pakistan give up the 20 suspects, or else… For one, India has not established convincing links between them and the Parliament attack; it has just cited or raked up old cases. For another, the US was itself wrong, as this writer has earlier argued, to use military force in Afghanistan, without exhausting legal and diplomatic possibilities. It has ended up killing at least 3,700 innocent Afghans — 500 more people than were killed in New York’s Twin Towers. And for a third, India cannot bend its near–strategic equal Pakistan to its will, as the US could with its adversaries in Afghanistan. India is not a superpower which can arrogate to itself the "right" to crush terrorism outside its borders.

It is in New Delhi’s own interest to de–escalate the current eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation. The present build–up is the largest ever, with half a million armed men pitted against one another. Anything can go wrong: a terrorist attack inspired by a rogue agency out to sabotage Musharraf’s plans, an overzealous local commander on either side getting hyperactive, or a plain South Asia–style goof–up. The consequences would be disastrous.

The longer India waits, the greater the chances of a mishap. Today, the Vajpayee government can draw some satisfaction from the fact that Musharraf has taken concrete action against JeM or LeT — although not entirely under India’s muscle-flexing. Colin Powell during his visit has delivered a message in favour of dialogue and de-escalation. If the government acts on its own, rather than under US goading, it might even claim a minor victory and hope that this will help BJP a little in Uttar Pradesh. But Vajpayee must draw the line here. Instead of indulging in more brinkmanship, he should try to find an imaginative solution to the Kashmir issue by widening the opening that has emerged in the Valley both as a result of the Taliban’s ignominious defeat and Musharraf’s new turn against jehadi terrorism. But first of all, Vajpayee must de–escalate.

Archived from Communalism Combat, January-February 2002 Year 8 No. 75-76, Cover Story 1

Thank you, Osama!

January 31, 2002

"We may in the not too distant future be able to go to our Masajid and our Imam-bargaahs without police protection"

If September 11 had happened ten–years–ago Pakistan would have be come a better coun-try by now. Thanks to Osama, we were hauled back to senses from the strategic depths of the Taliban. If September 11 were to happen in the next decade then we would have been even poorer by virtue of sending additional billions down the same Afghan hole. Thanks to Osama, again, we may in the not too distant future be able to go to our Masajid and our Imam–bargaahs without police protection.

The unprecedented crackdown on the extremist elements within our society is on. It must be awfully painful. Just ask anyone who had to put his favourite Doberman to sleep.

Are we on the verge of breaking the status quo? If PTV is any guide then we are not. PTV’s propaganda is not conducive to peace at all. It’s like one arm of the government goes out to shake Vajpayee’s hand while the other is trying to sabotage the whole effort. If the government leads the people to believe that "Kashmir will become Pakistan" and then fails to deliver there is bound to be a backlash. Ayub learnt the hard way and Tashkent finally brought him down.

My legal eagle tells me that all the people who are being arrested or who have been arrested under MPO (Maintenance of Public Order) in the on–going crackdown would have to be released. The last time he looked at the Pakistan Penal Code, keeping a beard or belonging to a madrassa was not against the law. They can be tried under the anti-terrorism law but the government of Pakistan would come short on evidence, as it always does.

To be certain, the state of Pakistan is fully capable of taking care of any non–state actor within its geographical boundaries. In a country like ours where the writ of the central government is reasonably strong, sustenance of on–state actors is actually more of a ‘host–parasite’ phenomenon.

The unprecedented crackdown on the extremist elements within our society is on. It must be awfully painful. Just ask anyone who had to put his favourite Doberman to sleep.

The host almost always gets sick (read: sectarian killings within Pakistan) but there always is an underlying state policy that governs most host–parasite interactions. In our case, the long–held policy has been to facilitate germ–cell migration through the LoC.

Welcome to Dr. Musharraf’s new chapter on parasite management and disease control (the ban on the Lashkar and the Jaish has been extended to Azad Kashmir). Identification of the parasites is easy and the right vaccine has been in store for long. Unfortunately, the state was either unwilling to administer it or our real decision makers thought that it was not in their institutional interest to do so.

Here are four questions sent in by a long–distance scribe. First, Kashmir runs in our blood–a biological analogy — but how can that be if Kashmir has never been part of our body? Second, if Pakistan is a ‘Fortress of Islam’ then why are there police squads outside each mosque? Third, in the age of information superhighways why do we want to remain a fortress (something that only has a heritage value and no military significance whatsoever)? Fourth, we advocate self– determination for seven million Kashmiri Muslims but why do we forget 140 million Pakistanis?

Moinuddin Haider claims that the vaccine has now been injected intravenously. Powell is of the opinion that the doctor should be given a chance because the vaccine needs time to work. Deep down, Jaswant suspects that the vaccine is actually a placebo.

The other issue is that of the adaptive capability of the parasites. Every parasite uses strategies to counteract and ensure survival. The only thing that the mullahs want is a war with India just so that what they now consider as their internal enemy can be humiliated. How equipped are we to fight the parasites? On a scale of 1 to 10, I would say, an 8.

In response to the January 12 "historic" address, the Indian print media exhibited a lot of political maturity. On January 14, The Hindu, in an editorial, said that the "political courage exuded by the Pakistan President, Pervez Musharraf, in addressing India’s concerns raises the vision of a truly promising turn in the crisis–ridden bilateral relationship." The Hindustan Times wrote, "Now that India will have to wait patiently for Pervez Musharraf to turn over a new leaf to begin, hopefully, a new and more moderate phase in his career…."

The American media, however, was less forgiving. The Washington Post wrote, "There were heroic flourishes in his January 12 declaration. But Musharraf’s role in creating the disasters that led to the need for that speech cannot be simply forgotten or forgiven, or compensated."

The divide is getting clearer by the day and the future less cloudy. Within Pakistan, one is either with the status quo or against it. All that the status quo brought us was misery and illiteracy. "Kashmir runs in our blood" represents status quo. Agreeing to resolve Kashmir through blood–less means amounts to breaking the status quo.

Have the Dobermen been put to sleep or have they gone into hibernation? The answer really depends on whether the defenders of the Land of the Pure shall continue to be the defenders of the status quo or are they now sincere in breaking away from the status quo. Is the crackdown a bid to cool off pressure from all sides or does it mean a genuine change in state policy? The settled issue is that what we have achieved so far we couldn’t have without Osama.

Courtesy: The Friday Times, Pakistan.

Archived from Communalism Combat, January-February 2002 Year 8 No. 75-76, Cover Story 2

Jihadis vs. ‘professionals’

January 31, 2002

The army’s attitude towards jihadi groups was in large part a response to the fact that the proliferation of armed jihadi groups was a direct challenge to the army’s monopoly of armed force in society

To understand what has been going on, to be gin with, we should recognise and analyse the divisions and tussles within the Pakistani army itself. There are two trends in the army. During the British period, because the colonial power wanted Indian officers in the army to be unaffected by nationalist ideology, they promoted instead an ideology of army ‘professionalism’.

When Pakistan was created, that ideology continued in a slightly modified form. The top brass in the army added to the notion of ‘professionalism’ the idea of supremacy of the army over society, especially politicians whom they had learnt to despise during the colonial period itself. This ideology is by its nature ‘secular’, or I might say ‘not ideologically religious’.

When Zia came on the scene he went to great lengths to promote Islamic ideology in the army… For a time this trend was quite strong. But the Islamists, strong as they became at the time, had not yet succeeded in pushing the ‘professionals’ (as I would call them) out from positions of control in the army.

Fed up with that and impatient, the Islamists attempted a coup in 1995, led by one Major General Zahirul Islam Abbasi. They wanted to ‘Islamise the army and the country. That attempt by the Islamists gave an opportunity to the professionals to remove quite a few of the Islamists. But, by and large, many Islamists remained, some in senior positions. Some Islamists were, of course, more fanatical than others.

Musharraf clearly belongs to the category of ‘professionals’. He is a pragmatist, for whom army interests are uppermost. But he does use the vocabulary of secularism. That vocabulary is currently quite useful for them. In the name of secularism (and Jinnah) they bolster their position vis–à–vis the Islamists.

Let us not forget that Musharraf was the author of Kargil. I would say that the Kargil episode, foolish and counter–productive as it was, was anti–Indian rather than Islamist. When Musharraf seized power, you might recall his speech when he said that Kamal Ataturk was his personal hero and he also tried (unsuccessfully) to modify the Blasphemy law.

The Islamists were too powerful then… The spate of sectarian killings in the summer of 2001 (months before the US declared its ‘War Against Terrorism’) gave Musharraf the opening that he was waiting for. He read the riot act to the mullahs at a Seerat conference in June 2001 and again on August 14 (Pakistan’s Independence Day). He banned the Lashkar–e–Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Mohammad and also put Sipah–e–Sahaba on notice.

I would point out that the army’s attitude towards jihadi groups was in large part a response to the fact that the proliferation of armed jihadi groups was a direct challenge to the army’s monopoly of armed force in society. That, I believe was a major factor impelling the army on a warpath against jihadis.

America’s ‘War on Terrorism’ after Sept. 11, gave the professionals an opportunity to deal effectively with the Islamists. With American backing, they retired or transferred Islamist officers some of whom were very powerful indeed, such as Lt. Gen Mahmud Ahmad, the head of ISI, who was an extremely powerful ideological Islamist, with ambitions of becoming the top man in the army.

There is a general absence of analysis and recognition of such conflicts and contradictions within the army. It would be facile to say that the actions against Islamist and Jihadi groups by the Musharraf government, beginning from the summer of 2001 (if not Musharraf’s declarations from the outset) are due simply to American pressure. That would be a gross over-simplification. The struggle between the two groups of army officers was much older than that. As for the Jaish–e–Mohammad and Lashkar–e–Toiba, they were blamed by the Indians for the Dec. 13 attack on the Indian Parliament. Leaders and activists of both were promptly arrested by Musharraf. But he said they had been arrested not for the Delhi attack but for unspecified ‘other reasons’. Try and believe that!

(Excerpted from Hamza Alavi’s intervention in a group discussion on the Internet).

Archived from Communalism Combat, January-February 2002 Year 8 No. 75-76, Cover Story 3

1...2,6722,6732,674...2,698 Page 2,673 of 2,698

Ayodhya and beyond

Sunshine in Shekhawat

Kashmir: The moral dimension

Kashmiri women speak

A New Year ‘gift’

Arms and the man

Thank you, Osama!

Jihadis vs. ‘professionals’

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