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Factual inaccuracies in CPDR report

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I would like to point out that I have been misquoted on a number of points and there are a number of factual mistakes in the CPDR report on the riots in Ahmedabad in July 1999, extracts of which have been published by Communalism Combat in its November 1999 issue.

 

  • In para 1 of the report on page 12 I am quoted as having said, “Members of the rally shouted anti-Muslim slogans while passing through the Muslim dominated areas”. This is factually incorrect. The rally passed through the Asarwa assembly constituency segments. As there were no Muslim dominated areas on the road, there is no question of members of the rally shouting anti-Muslim slogans during Shri L.K. Advani’s visit. What I had mentioned was the incident which had occurred near Astodia Gate, Manek Chowk and Gheekanta area during the week preceding Rathyatra when rallies were taken out which resulted in law and order problems following provocative slogans. However, this incident had no connection with Shri L.K. Advani’s visit to Meghaninagar. Shri Advani’s visit was meant for a different context.
  • The date of the Id–e–Milad procession mentioned in para 3 of the report is wrong. Also the report wrongly quotes me as having said that the procession was stoned. I only said that Muslims had a tableau depicting Kargil war and heroism displayed by Indian soldiers. By this I meant that even Muslims were as patriotic and nationalist on this issue and they went to the extent of displaying the same spirit as many Hindus did.
  • Para 4 says, “the BJP took full advantage of such an atmosphere and opened its office in the area and has stepped up its activities”. The Rathyatra did have communal overtones and also flags of certain fundamentalist organisations were displayed. But to say that an office was opened in the background of Rathyatra is factually incorrect.
  • The statement about spreading rumours during the communal riots is also far from what I had submitted before the CPDR committee. Rumour does not come out from any particular community. The same was true this time also. Certain people of both the communities were trying to spread rumours. Only a part of this came to the notice of the police and which the police verified.
  • In the last paragraph, I have been quoted as saying that “there was not even an iota of evidence to support this contention (ISI’s presence in Ahmedabad). This is also loosely drafted. What I submitted before the committee was that there is no evidence to prove the involvement of the ISI in starting the present communal riots. My statement about the involvement of ISI was only in the context of the present communal riots and not beyond this. There have been activities of ISI in the past and at present also they have activities in Ahmedabad which has been proved by evidence.

My intention was to say that while Hindu mobs were led by leaders belonging to fundamentalist organisations, Muslims had no leaders or organisations supporting the Muslim criminals committing the riots.

Lastly, my name has been incorrectly spelt in the CPDR report as DCP Vinod Mull, instead of Vinod Mall. Also, I am holding charge of deputy commissioner of police, zone-IV and not of Shahibaug police station. Shahibaug Police station is the place where my office is located.

In addition to the above, there are many other factual mistakes.

  • It has been mentioned that Rathyatra route is 30 kms long and starts from Saraspur. This is incorrect. The route is about 17 kms long and starts from Jagannath temple near Jamalpur.
  • On Page 3 the report also mentions that the Muslim women made efforts to push back the youth who were standing near the barricade so that there was no provocation from either side. This is incorrect. There were no Muslim women standing on the Rathyatra route, as there was a self–imposed “curfew” by the Muslims in the communally sensitive areas.

It is also not true that only Muslims wanted to prevent the communal trouble. People of both the communities, i.e., Hindus and Muslims were equally eager to prevent communal trouble which was evident from the fact that the Rathyatra passed off peacefully and members of both the communities congratulated each other.
Lastly I congratulate you for publishing the CPDR report.

Vinod Mall
(DCP Zone–IV, Ahmedabad City Ahmedabad)

Secularism: a mere mantra?

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The conduct of parties, political pundits and the print and electronic media during the recent Lok Sabha polls shows that secularism for them is little more than a ritual chant

 

It was an embarrassing moment for many secularists in India watching Bihar’s Laloo Prasad Yadav’s response on Star TV, prime time, as election results from his state pronounced the near rout of his party in Bihar. “Mr Yadav, do you think this is due to the voters’ disenchantment with the government for lack of any development in the state”. “No”, replied Yadav bravely, “the issue in the election was secularism, not development”.

 Can secularism ever be a one–point agenda unrelated to other concerns of people?  
In the midst of the election campaign in August, a Muslim petty trader, Rehman, was burnt alive at a village market in Orissa. One of the eyewitnesses told the police that Dara Singh — the man charged with the torching alive of Graham Staines and his two sons, in the same state earlier this year — was the man responsible for the latest incident. A week later, a Christian priest, Fr. Arul Doss, too, was done to death in the same state. 

The Bajrang Dal, the RSS and the BJP were quick to condemn such brutal killing of minorities in Congress–ruled Orissa. The Vishwa Hindu Parishad even issued a press statement, maintaining that whoever was responsible behind such killings “could not be a Hindu”. But, ironically, the Congress party — the party that swears by secularism, the only party capable of challenging Hindutva on a national plane, the party that depends crucially on minority votes — maintained a deathly silence. 

Is secularism a mere mantra  — to be enshrined in the party manifesto and chanted reverentially on convenient occasions — which has nothing to do with issues like the security of life and property of all citizens, irrespective of their faith? 

Was secularism an issue at all in the Lok Sabha polls of 1999? To begin with, what does one mean by secularism — not in the academic sense but in terms of how it relates to the lived experience of people?
In the 1991 polls, with the Shiv Sena as its only ally, the BJP secured 120 Lok Sabha seats. With three more allies on its side in 1996, the Akali Dal in Punjab, the George Fernandes–led Samta party in Bihar and the Haryana Vikas Parishad (HVP) in Haryana, the BJP’s tally climbed up to 161. Having emerged as the single largest party, the BJP was invited to form the government and given two weeks to prove its majority in the Lok Sabha. 

But it was still a different India three years ago where the BJP was a political untouchable for most politicians. In the 13 days that his government lasted, Atal Behari Vajpayee and the rest of the saffron stalwarts were unable to win over even a single MP to their side. Leave alone party politicians, even those who had fought and won as independents were unwilling to shake hands with the party whose manifesto contained ‘contentious issues’ — 

Ø Building of a Ram Mandir where the Babri Masjid once stood in Ayodhya; 

ØRemoval of article 370 from the Indian Constitution which grants a special status to the state of Jammu and Kashmir;

Ø Introducing a Uniform Civil Code (to replace the different existing personal laws for different religious communities).

Until the BJP’s electoral drubbing in the Assembly elections in UP and elsewhere in late 1993, then BJP president, L.K. Advani, used to revel in the ‘majestic isolation’ of his party. But the acute isolation of 1996 confronted the BJP and its sangh parivar with a difficult choice: retain ‘ideological purity’, remain a political untouchable and make a solo bid to power by hard–selling Hindutva. Alternatively, adopt tactical flexibility and put ‘contentious issues’ on the backburner so as to break out of political isolation.

Since the prospects of coming to power on the strength of its own divisive agenda seemed remote, at least in the current scenario, the BJP and its parivar deviously chose the latter. And reaped rich dividends in the elections of 1998 and 1999. 

The BJP entered the electoral arena for the Lok Sabha polls in February 1998 with 18 allies. Thanks to the alliances, the party improved on its own tally of seats — from 161 in 1996 to 182 in 1998 — and, more importantly, headed a coalition government. But the wafer–thin majority of the BJP–led coalition made Vajpayee hostage to some of his mercurial allies — Jayalalitha being the most obvious. 

On the eve of the 1999 polls, the BJP made yet another quantum leap. In June this year, the Janata Dal, which formed the core of the ‘Third Front’ (the Congress and the BJP being the first two), disintegrated with virtually the entire bulk of the party choosing to ally with the BJP. Leaders like Ram Vilas Paswan and Sharad Yadav, who for years had shouted themselves hoarse at the communalism of the BJP, suddenly had no qualms rallying behind the saffron bandwagon. 

The acceptance of the BJP by virtually the entire political spectrum today is as comprehensive as its political isolation was stark in 1996. If it was Jayalalitha’s AIADMK which teamed up with the BJP in 1998, this time it’s the DMK in Tamil Nadu. If Farooq Abdullah’s National Conference decided to extend support from the outside to the Vajpayee–led government in 1998, this time it fought elections as part of the NDA and is now a part of the government at the Centre. The Telugu Desam Party’s Chandrababu Naidu fought against the BJP in the 1998 polls, agreeing to extend support to the Vajpayee government from the outside only subsequently. This time, the TDP and the BJP jointly fought the Congress in Andhra.

The BJP, which led an 18 party alliance in 1998, now counts on 24 allies. In theory, it now has to lean on many more parties to stay in power. But in practice it also means there are over 300 MPs behind Vajpayee in the Lok Sabha against the precarious figure of 273 in a House of 544. 

What does this augur for secular politics in India?  
Even for some secularists, the present political arrangement is not such a bad thing after all. With only 182 seats of its own — exactly the same number that it had in the last Lok Sabha – the BJP depends crucially on people like Chandrababu Naidu, M. Karunanidhi, Mamata Bannerji, Ramvilas Paswan, Ramkrishna Hegde and others. None of them can afford to ignore minorities’ votes in their respective regions and constituencies. The continued dependence of the BJP on these leaders and parties for their continued hold on power also means, according to these secularists, that issues like Ayodhya, article 370 and the Uniform Civil Code continue to be kept in abeyance. Such a grand alliance also means strengthening the ‘moderates’ and the ‘liberals’ and weakening the hold of the hawks within the sangh parivar. 

If Ayodhya, article 370 and the Uniform Civil Code was all that Indian secularism was about, there may have been some merit in such wishful thinking. But the ‘evil genius’ of the sangh parivar lies precisely in its ability to have, for all practical purposes, reduced the issue of India’s secularism to the BJP’s postponed agenda. 
Be it the reporters who raised questions at BJP’s press conferences during the electoral campaign, or TV anchors and even unsympathetic expert commentators who quizzed BJP leaders before and after the election results, or political parties who in their electoral campaign charged the BJP with playing communal politics. Hardly anyone went beyond asking the BJP to state for how long the issues of Ayodhya, article 370 and the Uniform Civil Code would remain postponed. 

Responding to these queries was, at the worst, a little awkward. Being past–masters in the art of double–speak, different leaders of the BJP and different segments of the sangh parivar said different things at the same time; or the same leader said different things at different points of the electoral campaign. The net result of this was Advantage BJP – the statement of one general secretary, Venkaiah Naidu, convinced the ‘liberals’ and the fence sitters that the BJP is turning ‘moderate’; the statements of another party general secretary, K. Govindacharya, reassured the core supporters of Hindutva that the party remains committed as ever to the Hindu Rashtra ideology.  

Neither the avowedly secular political opponents of the BJP, nor the print and electronic media thought it necessary to educate the voter how in the brief tenure of the BJP at the Centre and in states like U.P. and Gujarat —
Ø Life has come to mean endless anxiety, at best, for Christians and Muslims in Gujarat for nearly two years. After several independent fact–finding teams sent by civil liberties organisations and the National Minorities Commission had established numerous instances of attacks on minorities in Gujarat, Prime Minister Vajpayee, the most ‘liberal face’ of the BJP, visited the state only to return with a call for a “national debate on conversions”.  

Ø There is a sustained effort to infiltrate, capture and pack educational and cultural institutions with men and women known primarily for their commitment to RSS ideology. One such RSS leader, who is now going to decide what children should be taught in schools, proudly asserted in his autobiography how he killed a Muslim woman in 1947 because too many Hindus wanted to enslave her for their own lust! (See Pg. 22). 

Ø For the sangh parivar, Kargil became a convenient pretext to communalise the Indian armed forces.

Ø Attacks on minorities have continued before, during and after the present polls in Gujarat, Orissa and Kanyakumari by votaries of Hindu majoritarianism.

Ø It is not for nothing that both in the previous government and yet again, the home ministry (crime and punishment), the human resources development ministry (education and culture) and the information and broadcasting ministry (mass communications) were retained by the BJP at the insistence of the RSS. 
There can be no doubt that through Vajpayee’s earlier tenure as Prime Minister, and now, the saffron project continues to be advanced through other means, even while ‘contentious issues’ have been put on the back–burner — postponed agenda. Avowedly secular parties, political pundits and the print and electronic media have no perspective of building mass campaigns to raise public awareness on these very concrete issues that directly concern people. They could also be used to mount pressure on many of the BJP’s allies who still claim to have nothing in common with saffron politics. Otherwise, secularism will be progressively reduced to a mere chant, while the sangh parivar increases its stranglehold over society, and state. In preparation for the future Hindu Rashtra..

Archived from Communalism Combat, November 1999, Year 7  No. 53, Polls 99 1

The Story of Polls ’99

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The results of the 1999 Lok Sabha polls are evident – the BJP’s Atal Behari Vajpayee, who ran his government after the February ’98 polls with a bare majority is now far more comfortably placed with over 300 MPs occupying the Treasury benches in a House of 544. In the first–past–the–post system that Indian democracy is wedded to, result is what matters — there is a clear winner and a clear loser. But there are many interesting messages contained in the story of the same election. And that story blasts many myths surrounding the present polls that the BJP in particular would like people not to remember.

Here are some messages that the result of the 1999 polls conceals:

l The entire campaign of the BJP was hinged on the tried, tested and trustworthy leadership of Vajpayee, the Prime Minister who had delivered — ‘The man you can trust. In Peace and in War’. In short, the BJP would have us believe that a Vajpayee–wave, thanks to his statesman-like handling of the Kargil crisis, won the day for the NDA. The fact is that in his own constituency, Lucknow, Vajpayee’s victory margin was reduced by over a lakh compared to the ’98 polls.

Besides, in U.P., the state from where Vajpayee contested, and the state which was crucial to the BJP’s meteoric rise in the ’90s — 51 out of the BJP’s 120 seats in 1991, 52 out of 161 seats in ’96, 57 out of 182 in ’98 — the BJP received a severe drubbing. Against the 60 seats in UP last year (its allies won three), it was down to a mere 32 seats this time.

UP is just one example of the story of many other states where the Vajpayee and his handling of Kargil factor, failed to work.

l With a mere 112 seats in its kitty, this was the worse performance of the Congress since independence. Yet, Sonia Gandhi, the Congress president whose foreign origin was a major campaign plank for her opponents, romped home from Amethi with the highest margin — over three lakhs — of victory.

Nationally, her party which had secured 25.82 per cent of the total votes in ’98, logged in 28.4 per cent this time. The BJP, on the other hand, went down somewhat — from 25.59 per cent in ’98 to 23.7 per cent now.

l Andhra Pradesh is touted as the example where Vajpayee’s national stature combined with Chandra Babu Naidu’s reforms, resulted in the TDP–BJP sweep of the state. The fact, is that the Congress polled four per cent more votes in the state this time, and but for the last minute seats agreement between the TDP and the BJP, the Congress would have dealt a drubbing to Naidu.

l As many analysts have pointed out, victory for a party in the different states this time was determined by a combination of two factors — the arithmetic of alliance and the chemistry of governance. The Congress lost out because it believed it could come to power on its own; the BJP alliance won only in states where people were not too unhappy with the state government’s performance.

l Before and during the electoral campaign the media and political pundits were full of stories about how Indian politics is finally moving towards a bi–polar system — Congress and the BJP. The fact is that this time as in 1998, between them, the Congress and the BJP could pool just around 50 per cent of the popular vote, the remaining being spilt between a plethora of parties. Of the over 300 Lok Sabha MPs rallied behind Vajpayee, only 182 belong to his own party.

Moral behind the story of Polls ’99: One, none can take the Indian electorate for granted; two, the victory of ‘secular forces’ is impossible, if secularism is not even posed in a meaningful way before the people, which must include their other day–to–day concerns.

Archived from Communalism Combat, November 1999, Year 7  No. 53, Polls 99 2