Even though some persons may be committed to peace in normal times, when they suffer a big person tragedy in the form of violence against a family member they can at least temporarily start speaking more in terms of anger and revenge. This is why it is important why we all have to learn so much from the family of naval officer Lt Narwal who was among those who died in the terror attack of Pahalgam. Soon after the tragedy his family somehow found the strength to organize a blood donation camp on the birthday of Lt Narwal on May 1.

No one could possibly have suffered greater distress and shock than his newly married wife Himanshi (the couple were married just a week back and were on a honeymoon trip to Jammu and Kashmir when the terrorists struck). Yet she has been speaking only in terms of peace. Speaking at the blood donation camp she appealed to people not to spread hatred against anyone. She urged the people not to go against Muslims and Kashmiris. She said, “We just want peace. No doubt we desire justice, the government must take steps against specifically those who did us wrong.” (See report in The Times of India, May 2 by Bhavya Narang titled ‘Eschew hate, pray for Lt Narwal, says his wife’).

People from all over the country who had gathered at this camp organised in Karnal to donate their blood to save human lives, were moved to tears by the words and gestures of various family members of Lt Narwal, their grace and dignity, their deep concern for peace and harmony even in the middle of great personal loss. All people committed to peace salute them and feel inspired by them. Humanity will win despite all obstacles if there are more people like them. They provide a highly inspiring example of true commitment to real patriotism and national unity.

Another report in the same issue of The Times of India also deserves our attention. This report titled ‘Despite war clouds, life remains calm in Punjab border villages’ has been filed by Yudhvir Rana from some border villages located on the India side of the border of India and Pakistan in Tarn Taran area. This report tells us about farmers and villagers going about their daily chores in relatively tension-free conditions.

To quote from this report, “The villagers expressed frustration at the portrayal of their region as a powder keg. ‘We only hear about this so-called ‘tension’ from our relatives who call us after watching the news, said Manjinder Singh, a farmer from Naushera Dhalla. “They think war is about to break out, but here we are, going about our daily chores.” In this village, where a gurudwara and temple co-exist in a single complex, people say that the only extra instruction they have received is to ensure timely harvesting of wheat in some fields, probably to maintain clearer visibility.

This provides a fine example of the ability of common people to maintain calm and avoid unnecessary panic, a tendency that can be contrasted by the efforts of some other kinds of persons to deliberately inflate tensions.

Here attention may be drawn also to an article written by Lt Gen Harwant Singh (Retd) published in The Tribune, May 2 titled ‘Avoid strike against Pakistan, It could escalate into war.” While condemning Pakistan’s numerous attempts to inflict ‘a thousand cuts’ on India using terror attacks, the learned writer has cautioned, “ Any enhanced action by India across the border has its own implications, with the possibility of an escalation of the conflict into a war-like situation or, may be, war itself. Given the situation, India’s better option is to further secure its borders with Pakistan and be prepared to effectively deal with any mischief by Pakistan across the IB or the LOC.”

Another voice that needs to be heard more widely is that of Julio Ribeiro, the former police chief who played a very important role in defeating terrorist violence in Punjab in the past. In an article titled ‘Win over locals to combat terror’, published in The Tribune dated May 2, he has written, “Local residents are central and crucial to policing even in normal times. In terrorism-affected states, they spell the difference between life and death…The importance of treating locals with the respect and dignity which every human being expects and entitled to is highlighted during times of terror activities. When they feel that they are part and parcel of the government’s fight against terrorism, they will part with the crucial information needed to plan defensive measures.”

Julio Ribeiro has advised the government strongly against steps like demolishing the houses of suspected terrorists. Instead he has stated, “What it urgently needs is to replace the muscular philosophy of policing with the age-old conclusion of experts that the only way to end terrorism is to win the hearts and minds of the community to which the terrorists belong.”

(The author is Honorary Convener, Campaign to Save Earth Now. His recent books include Protecting Earth for Children, Man over Machine, A Day in 2071 and When the Two Streams Met)

Related:

Terrorism’s Shadow: Rising hatred against Indian Muslims after Pahalgam terror attack

Homes Destroyed, Mass Detentions Following Pahalgam Attack

The post Pahalgam: Voices of peace and reason in times of war appeared first on SabrangIndia.

This long analysis by the CJP Hate Watch team examines and analyses this new and disturbing phenomenon.

Also read: Broadcasting Bias: CJP’s fight against hatred in Indian news and CJP’s NBDSA Complaints 2023: A look at the repeated violation of ethics and guidelines by Indian television channels

Through the calculated use of misleading clickbait, visuals, and text, there is a persistent effort to jeopardise the nation’s communal harmony and even directly provoke violence. Channels like Zee News, Times Now Navbharat, Aaj Tak, and News 18 India have come under scrutiny for their reporting practices. Orders passed by the NBDSA in 2022, 2023, 2024 –obtained by CJP–point to this trend.

CJP is dedicated to finding and bringing to light instances of Hate Speech, so that the bigots propagating these venomous ideas can be unmasked and brought to justice. To learn more about our campaign against hate speech, please become a member. To support our initiatives, please donate now!

Now, in what appears to be a careful bid to escape this monitoring –on the basis of guidelines that have evolved to ensure neutrality in portrayal of issues and their analysis/interpretation – channels have shifted tack: several of them are, arguably and disproportionately using images featuring prominent Muslim politicians like Asaduddin Owaisi to visually frame any news related to the Muslim community, regardless of his direct involvement in the same. This visual shorthand, clearly perpetuates a subtle yet insidious stereotype, linking diverse issues to a singular, conservative and aggressive Muslim identity. Whereas our team’s close and analytical look at the entire content in the slow, or the role of the anchor appears ‘neutral’, the trigger lies in the thumbnail, ensuring click-baits.

Another example is the say, the reporting on recent incidents like the recent Murshidabad violence (post the passage of the controversial Waqf Amendment Act of 2025) that raises serious questions about journalistic ethics. The evident overuse of Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath’s image in thumbnails and tickers, often accompanied by trigger-phrases signifying approval, like “Yogi Action” or “Yogi Style Action”– even when the news pertains to events outside his jurisdiction—points to attempts to inject a specific aggressive, bullying narrative. Given Adityanath’s strongman image and association with vituperative Hindu nationalism, this visual framing appears designed to evoke a particular triumphal and negative sentiment and moreover, to cater to a specific viewership.

Further, the alleged use of thumbnails featuring both Yogi Adityanath and West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee in reports about the Murshidabad violence, alongside reports of “forced Hindu migration” framed as a consequence of Muslim dominance in Bengal, further fuels concerns. Such visual juxtapositions and narratives, when presented in a misleading or exaggerated manner, risk creating a climate of fear and suspicion between communities. The apparent haste and lack of ethical boundaries in the pursuit of viewership, as evidenced by the language and visuals employed, paint a concerning picture of a section of the Indian news media seemingly abandoning its responsibility to report truthfully and fairly.

The coverage of the Waqf Act debates further exemplifies this trend. The consistent pairing of Owaisi’s image and the repeated use of terms like “Maulana, Maulana” in tickers during these discussions seem to reinforce pre-existing stereotypes and potentially demonise religious leaders within the Muslim community. This pattern suggests a deliberate attempt to frame issues through a communal lens, potentially exacerbating existing societal fault lines.

Selective visual communication and its negative impact

As experts on visual communication say, this is an inherently selective process. The negative effects on individuals and society of such persistent use of selective attention is emotionally skewed: such attentional bias is therefore often associated with negative or threat-related stimuli, which can impel us to focus on ‘threatening information’ over more neutral stimuli (information and news) in our environment that, in turn leads us collectively to ruminate on distressing thoughts Research suggests this may be a contributing factor to emotional disorders. None deny that over the past decade and more, Indian society has been subject to, or become a victim of such perniciously crafted negative selectivity geared cynically to ensure the alienation of, discrimination towards particular, politically targeted sections.

As this simple visual explanation on attentional bias from The Digitak Kab tells us there are four types of selective perception.

The four stages of selective perception include:
Selective Exposure, Selective Attention, Selective Comprehension, and Selective Retention

To ensure neutrality in reportage and communication, requires a committed non-partisan approach. In simple language, being open-minded. In fact, being open-minded and empathetic is known to be one of the best ways to avoid perception bias. Societally, especially in an environ that has traditionally thrived on pluralism and diversity, is to ensure constant exposure to a wide range of people, opinions and cultures. The more such depiction is rich and nuanced, the more successful will visual communication be in challenging stereotypical assumption.

CJP’s HW Team studied and analysed electronic media coverage and depiction in past weeks and here is what we found.

Zee News

Zee News, consistently vying for viewership, frequently exhibited hasty and insensitive reporting, often disregarding factual accuracy and context. The channel has faced reprimands, including fines, from the NBDSA for its communal and misleading broadcasts. Its thumbnails and clickbait tactics often amplified stereotypes and sensationalism.

Fiction over fact: Zee News’ race for ratings

In its coverage of the Waqf Act issue, Zee News employed inflammatory Hindi captions such as “Jiska Dar Tha Wahi Hua! Waqf Kanoon Par Tagda Jhatka, Muslimo Main Jashan” (What was feared has happened! Big blow on Waqf law, celebration among Muslims), “Supreme Court Ka Order! Khud He Phas Gaye Musalman” (Supreme Court’s order! Muslims themselves got trapped), and “Supreme Court Se Faisla, 21 Crore Muslimo Main Bhagdadh! Live” (Decision from Supreme Court, stampede among 21 crore Muslims! Live). These phrases aimed to create a sense of dramatic tension and portray the Muslim community in a negative light, suggesting celebration at a setback or mass panic from Supreme Court hearing. (The matter is still pending before the Supreme Court).

Polarising thumbnails: icons of power vs. the ‘other’

Furthermore, thumbnails often juxtaposed images of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, UP CM Yogi Adityanath, and AIMIM Chief Asaduddin Owaisi with text like “Waqf Bill Par Palte 24 Crore Musalmaan, Pure Desh Hadkamp! ‘3000 Crore Ki Property Jabt” (24 crore Muslims turned against the Waqf Bill, nationwide uproar! ‘3000 crore property seized’) and “Modi Ko Aisi Saja Denge! Maulanao Ne De Dali Dhamki, Lakho Muslimo Ne Ghere 6 Sahar” (They will give such a punishment to Modi! Maulanas have given a threat, lakhs of Muslims have surrounded 6 cities). The objective of these combinations was to link the Waqf Bill to a supposed nationwide upheaval by the Muslim community, framing it as a threat and invoking strong reactions against the minority group. The inclusion of Modi and Yogi Adityanath’s images likely aimed to resonate with a specific viewership that favours their political stance.

The channel further utilised aggressive and communal language in its thumbnails, such as “Ab Aar-Paar Ki Jang” (Now, a decisive battle), “Modi Ko Saja Denge” (They will punish Modi), “Waqf Gang Ko Yogi Ka Tagda Ultimatum” (Yogi’s strong ultimatum to the Waqf gang), and the derogatory “Miyan Ji Ka Naya Khoof Aa Raha” (The new fear of ‘Miyan Ji’ is coming – ‘Miyan Ji’ is a term sometimes used pejoratively for Muslim men). Other examples of sensational and stereotype-reinforcing thumbnails included “15 Minute..Musalmano Ko Court Main Devkinandan Ka Khula Challenge, Ucchal Pade Maulana” (15 minutes…Devkinandan’s open challenge to Muslims in court, Maulanas jumped up), “Danga Zone Main Lakho Musalmaan, Waqf Par Naya Plan” (Millions of Muslims in riot zone, new plan on Waqf), and “Azadi.. Karnataka Gherne Nikal Pade Lakho Musalmaan Aur Fhir..” (Freedom… Millions of Muslims set out to surround Karnataka and then…).

These captions collectively painted the Muslim community as reactive, prone to violence, and potentially threatening, thus perpetuating negative stereotypes for sensationalism and viewership. The channel’s consistent use of such language and imagery demonstrated a pattern of prioritising sensationalism and the endorsement of harmful stereotypes over responsible and factual journalism.

Times Now Navbharat

Times Now Navbharat exhibited a pattern of sensationalism and misleading reporting on sensitive topics. A key tactic involved the frequent and seemingly gratuitous use of Yogi Adityanath’s image in thumbnails, irrespective of the news story’s location or direct relevance to Uttar Pradesh. Given Yogi Adityanath’s substantial social media following, this strategy appeared to be a deliberate attempt to inflate viewership through clickbait.

Clickbait for sensation: the strategic use of Yogi Adityanath’s image

For instance, in its coverage of the Murshidabad violence, the channel employed Hindi captions like “CM Yogi Ne Khayi Kasam, Ek-Ek Hindu Ko Bachana Hai” (CM Yogi has taken an pledge, he has to save every single Hindu) and “Laato ke Bhoot, Baato Se: Murshidabad Hinsa Par Mamta Se Kya Bole Yogi” (Those who understand force, not words: What did Yogi say to Mamata on Murshidabad violence). The objective of using such text alongside Yogi Adityanath’s picture was to inject a Hindu nationalist angle into the narrative, capitalising on his image as a strong, decisive leader within that political leaning. This sensational framing aimed to attract viewers by tapping into existing social media trends where his supporters often invoke phrases like “Yogi Adityanath Style Action” in response to incidents of violence.

Waqf Act coverage: communal framing over legal nuance

Similarly, the channel’s reporting on the Waqf Act debates prominently featured Yogi Adityanath, using captions such as “Baba ‘Bulldozer Decision’ Lenge”, SC Se 555 Ka Intjaar,” (Baba will take a ‘Bulldozer Decision’, waiting for 555 from SC) and “Yogi Ki Table Par Waqf Ki 1.25 Lakh Files” (1.25 lakh Waqf files on Yogi’s table). The objective behind this consistent visual and textual association was to communalise the issue. By exclusively highlighting a Chief Minister known for his pro-Hindutva stance, the channel seemingly sought to frame the Waqf Act discussions along Hindu-Muslim lines, catering to a specific viewership segment and sensationalising the topic for increased clicks, rather than providing an objective analysis of the law.

Even when reporting on the legal challenge to the Waqf Act, the thumbnail read, “Owaisi, Sibbal, Singhvi Ka Chehra Utara, Supreme Court Ne Waqf Kanoon Par Modi Ka Kaam Aasan Kar Diya” (Owaisi, Sibbal, Singhvi’s faces fell, Supreme Court made Modi’s work easier on Waqf law). This caption, paired with the news of the legal challenge, aimed to portray it as a setback for Muslim leaders and lawyers representing them.

Engineered conflict: pitting leaders for spectacle

The channel also utilised thumbnails featuring contrasting figures like Asaduddin Owaisi and T. Raja Singh with captions such as “Waqf Bill Ke Virodh Main Owaisi Ki Hunkar, T. Raja Ne Diya Karara Jawab” (Owaisi’s roar in opposition to the Waqf Bill, T. Raja gave a strong reply). This pitting of opposing figures, along with the insensitive and incomplete phrase attributed to T. Raja Singh, “Tumhara Baap Bhi…” (Even your father…), served to create conflict and sensationalism, drawing viewers in with the promise of a heated exchange and appealing to potentially divisive sentiments. This approach prioritised sensationalism and clickbait over providing viewers with a nuanced understanding of the Waqf Act and the related discussions.

Aaj Tak

Similarly, Aaj Tak also appeared to engage in a comparable pattern of sensationalism, albeit to a seemingly lesser degree. Its thumbnails concerning the Waqf Bill, such as “Waqf Ka Waqt Aa Gaya!” (The time for Waqf has come!) and “Waqf Bill Se Musalmano ki Jameene Chinne Wali Hain?” (Will the Waqf Bill snatch away Muslims’ lands?), while perhaps less overtly inflammatory than some other channels, still employed a degree of sensationalism and potentially misleading framing. The phrase “Waqf Ka Waqt Aa Gaya!” (The time for Waqf has come!) Carries a sense of impending and significant change, potentially creating unease or excitement depending on the viewer’s perspective. The question “Waqf Bill Se Musalmano ki Jameene Chinne Wali Hain?” (Will the Waqf Bill snatch away Muslims’ lands?) Directly plays on potential anxieties within the Muslim community, suggesting a threat to their properties without providing factual context.

Even in the form of a question, such a thumbnail can contribute to the spread of misinformation and the amplification of fear for the sake of attracting clicks and viewership. While not resorting to overtly communal language or imagery to the same extent as some other channels, Aaj Tak’s use of these types of thumbnails still indicates a leaning towards sensationalism when covering sensitive religious and legal issues, potentially contributing to a climate of anxiety and suspicion.

India TV

India TV also mirrored this concerning trend in its reporting, employing provocative and misleading language that endorsed harmful stereotypes. During its coverage of the Murshidabad violence, the channel utilised phrases such as “Murshidabad…10 Hajar Dangai Nikle Jumme Ke Baad?” (Murshidabad…Did 10,000 rioters emerge after Friday?), “Owaisi Ka Ailan-e-Jung, Kitne Muslim Sang?” (Owaisi’s declaration of war, how many Muslims are with him?), “Modi vs Muslim Board”, and “Modi vs Maulana.”

Climax-oriented thumbnails: drama over depth

The objective behind these captions was to immediately frame the violence along religious lines, portraying Muslims as aggressors (“10 Hajar Dangai” – 10,000 rioters) and suggesting a confrontation between the Muslim community (represented by Owaisi and the “Muslim Board”) and the Hindu majority (represented by Modi). This sensational framing disregarded the complexities of the situation and aimed to create division

Furthermore, without official confirmation or statements, India TV aired shows with alarmist and unsubstantiated claims like “Murshidabad Se 10000 Hindu Visthapit, Muslim Sthaapit” (10000 Hindus displaced, Muslims settled in Murshidabad) and “Aaj Bengal ke Hindua Ka Kaleja Fhat Gaya” (Today, the hearts of Hindus in Bengal shattered). These emotionally charged and unverified statements served to create fear and resentment within the Hindu community, painting Muslims as displacing Hindus.

The channel’s use of the phrase “Modi Se Nafrat Sakht, Maulana Ka Waqf Waqf!” (Strong hatred for Modi, Maulana’s Waqf Waqf!) Further exemplified this pattern. By specifically highlighting “Maulana” (Islamic cleric) in opposition to the Waqf Act and linking this opposition to “Nafrat” (hatred) towards Prime Minister Modi, the channel aimed to stereotype religious leaders within the Muslim community as being inherently anti-government and harbouring animosity towards the Hindu leader. This deliberate portrayal contributed to the broader trend of media outlets using religious identity to sensationalise news and fuel divisive narratives for viewership.

News 18 India

News 18 India’s coverage of the Waqf issue employed thumbnails and titles that could be seen as sensational and potentially misleading. Phrases like “Waqf Act Ke Bahane Jute Muslim Kya Hain ‘Asli’ Agenda” (What is the ‘real’ agenda of deceitful Muslims under the guise of the Waqf Act?), “Bhu-Mafia Ya Islam, Waqf Aa Raha Kiske Kaam” (Land mafia or Islam, who is the Waqf benefiting?), “Jumme Ki Namaz, Masjid Adda” (Friday prayers, mosque as a hub), “Pradarshan Se Pahle, Delhi Main Muslimo Ka Jamawada” (Muslim gathering in Delhi before the protest), and “Waqf Ke Khilaaf Delhi Main Muslamano Ka Halla Bol” (Muslims’ outcry in Delhi against the Waqf) – these, coupled with images of figures like Owaisi and Maulana Arshad Madni, risk framing a complex matter through a narrow, potentially biased lens. This approach might inadvertently create a singular narrative that overlooks the broader context and possible repercussions of such hasty and attention-grabbing presentations.

Similarly, their reporting on the Murshidabad violence, with headlines such as “Bajrang Dal Ki Entry, Hil Gaya Pura Bengal” (Bajrang Dal’s entry, entire Bengal shaken) and “Didi..Tere Bengal Main Hinduo Ke Jaan Ki Kimat Kaya?” (Didi…what is the value of Hindu lives in your Bengal?), appears to prioritise sensationalism. Highlighting the Bajrang Dal in what seems like a ‘saviour’ role could amplify communal tones.

While the channel seemingly criticises the TMC government for allegedly failing to protect Hindus, it doesn’t appear to broadly question the government’s responsibility in preventing violence across the entire state. This particular style of reporting could unfortunately prioritise high viewership and TRP ratings by potentially communalising the narrative, possibly at the expense of fostering harmony and communal tolerance through the use of climax-oriented thumbnails and click-bait.

NBDSA and monitoring negativity on air

For the past six years or more, robust citizen’s campaigns have sought accountability from several electronic media channels in their portrayal and coverage. CJP’s HateWatch programme (HateHatao initiative) is arguably the most consistent keeping a hawk’s eye on hate violations on air. Through careful and calibrated analysis we have managed to track, complain and ensure that several of the most offending shows (videos) are pulled off air. These include those from among the very channels that have since now resorted to the use of the provocative and incendiary thumbnail and visual.

Increasingly the complaints made by CJP, to NBDSA, have, in a nuanced way been pointing out how often not the whole but a small portion (few minutes even) of a 50 minute show uses problematic language, positioning this in such a way that the entire coverage or its focus gets coloured and littered with manipulative metaphors collectively amounting to prejudice.

Now, we ask, is this the latest move, by these very same offenders to attract venality in viewer response without actually crossing the bar in either the content itself or the role of the anchor?

Narrative over nuance: missing the broader accountability

However, the examples of sensationalist reporting by certain Indian news channels raise serious concerns about the erosion of journalistic ethics and the potential for these practices to exacerbate communal tensions. The deliberate use of misleading visuals, inflammatory language, and clickbait tactics, often targeting religious minorities and framing sensitive issues through a communal lens, appears to prioritise viewership over responsible reporting. Given the pervasive reach of digital media, how can regulatory bodies and journalistic organisations effectively address this trend of irresponsible sensationalism and ensure that the media upholds its crucial role in fostering an informed and harmonious society, rather than contributing to division and discord?

Related:

From ‘Ab Hoga Khel’ to ‘Kuch Bada Hone Wala Hai’: the trap set by thumbnails

CJP urges for removal of contentious Aaj Tak show on Hemant Soren, sends complaint to channel

CJP alerts YouTube of two channels openly selling illegal firearms

The post How Indian commercial media channels are using the provocative thumbnail to boost viewers and worse, provoke vicarious viewer response appeared first on SabrangIndia.

While Poonch is reportedly the worst hit, several sectors in Kashmir Valley were also reportedly rocked by shelling. The Indian Army confirmed that a soldier had died on Wednesday. “GOC and all ranks of White Knight Corps salute the supreme sacrifice of L/Nk Dinesh Kumar of 5 Fd Regt, who laid down his life on May 7 during Pakistan Army shelling. We also stand in solidarity with all victims of the targeted attacks on innocent civilians in Poonch sector,” the 16 Corps, Indian Army, posted on X.An unconfirmed list of other civilians killed by Pakistani shelling (totalling 15) – published by Maktoob Media includes: Balvinder Kaur alias Ruby (aged 33), Mohd Zain Khan (aged 10 years), Zoya Khan (12), Mohd Akram (40), Amrik Singh (55), Mohd Iqbal (45), Ranjeet Singh (48), Shakeela Bi (40), Amarjeet Singh (47), Maryam Khatoun (7), Vihaan Bhargav (13), Mohd Rafi (40) and three identified.

#OperationSindoor | Pak Army Shelling Kills Civilians In Jammu and Kashmir’s Poonch, Tangdhar

NDTV’s @ghazalimohammad joins @maryashakil with a ground report from Rajouri pic.twitter.com/9GJgzqA8yF

— NDTV (@ndtv) May 8, 2025

The local Sikh community suffered a heavy loss as at least four of its members were killed and the wall of a gurdwara was damaged when Pakistan reportedly launched heavy shelling early Wednesday in the Poonch district of Jammu and Kashmir. Eyewitnesses described the intensity of the bombardment as worse than during the 1999 Kargil War. Social media first reported that according to officials, Amreek Singh and Ranjit Singh—local shopkeepers—ex-army official Amarjeet Singh, and homemaker Ruby Kaur were killed instantly when a shell exploded near them, sending shockwaves through the community.

Meanwhile, the family of Mohammad Iqbal, who was killed in the shelling at Poonch, and who worked as a teacher at the Jamia Zia Ul Uloom has taken strong objection at news channels ABP News, Zee News and TV 18 for dubbing the slain victim as a ‘terrorist.’ They have urged the Poonch District Collector and the Poonch police to also initiate action, and have now been reported to have decided to initiate legal action against the errant channels themselves.

This is shameful by Indian News Channels. Qari Mohammad Iqbal from poonch, India was killed yesterday in shelling from Pakistan is being portrayed as a ‘terrorist’ in multiple national Indian news channels. pic.twitter.com/8yXkUaJswd

— Mohammed Zubair (@zoo_bear) May 8, 2025

Qari Mohammad Iqbal was killed in Pakistani shelling in Poonch. He was a civilian. He worked as a teacher at Jamia Zia ul uloom, Poonch.

ABP news falsely reported that he was a terrorist killed by Indian airstrikes in POK.https://t.co/lPfnPDv53e pic.twitter.com/eJ7C20XguJ

— Alishan Jafri (@alishan_jafri) May 8, 2025

On May 7, the shelling took the roofs of Amreek Singh’s shop reducing it to rubble while the nearby gurudwara, Nangali Sahib was also struck during the shelling. Situated in the lap of a picturesque hill on the banks of the Drungali Nallah, it is situated about four kilometres from Poonch town and in Poonch distrct in the Jammu region. It is also recognised as one of the oldest shrines for the Sikhs in northern India.

Cowardly act by #Pakistanarmy !

Pakistan has targeted a Gurudwara sahib located in Poonch Kashmir.

Heartfelt condolences to the families of Bhai Amrik Singh Ragi, Amarjeet Singh (ex-Army personnel) & Ranjit Singh, a shopkeeper from #Poonch town, who were martyred in attack. pic.twitter.com/cxl4VvW9HN

— Jaspreet Kaur (@jaspreetsays) May 7, 2025

Amarjeet Singh (50), a devout Granthi who regularly performed Paath at the gurdwara is a former army person who, died in the shelling. He is survived by his wife, a son in Class 6, and a daughter. Amarjeet Singh also played the tabla at the gurdwara, while another victim, Amreek Singh, was a raagi who sang hymns from the Guru Granth Sahib at another gurdwara in Poonch. Both were killed at different locations.

Amreek Singh (39) also ran a small grocery shop below his house. He was the sole breadwinner of his family and is survived by two daughters and a son. He was with Ranjit Singh at Syndicate Chowk when a shell exploded in front of them, reported Indian Express. Both died on the spot. Amreek Singh had gone to open his shop. Meawnhile, Ruby Kaur (32), a homemaker, was killed in Mankote. She had three children, the youngest just a year and a half old.

The local Sikh population in Poonch, is estimated between 25,000 and 30,000, has been left shaken. “We have never witnessed such heavy shelling in Poonch before. We saw the Kargil war, but civilian establishments largely remained untouched. We thought we had learned to live under shelling. Today, that illusion was broken,” said Narinder Singh.

Following the incident, Giani Kuldeep Singh Gargaj, Acting Jathedar of Sri Akal Takht Sahib, condemned the shelling. “The attack on Gurdwara Sri Guru Singh Sabha and the loss of Sikh lives is not just an event—it is a blow to humanity,” he said. He has also called for diplomacy, Jathedar Gargaj urged both India and Pakistan to reduce tensions. “Both governments must act with wisdom, not weapons,” he said. “Since 1947, this conflict has caused suffering, including to Hindus and Sikhs near the border. How many more must pay for a conflict they did not create?” asked Gargaj. “War always devours the innocent. Peace is not weakness—it is the strength we must summon.”

Related:

Homes Destroyed, Mass Detentions Following Pahalgam Attack

A Tranquil Paradise Shattered: The Pahalgam terror attack

The post Poonch Victims: Civilians as targets of shelling appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Muslims are integral to temple traditions

Speaking on behalf of the temple administration, Gyanendra Kishore Goswami, a senior priest and committee member, clarified that any call to boycott Muslims was neither practical nor aligned with the spiritual values of Brijmandal, the sacred region encompassing Vrindavan.

“It is not practical. Muslims, particularly artisans and weavers, have deep-rooted contributions here. They’ve played a major role in weaving the dresses of Banke Bihari for decades,” Goswami said. “Many of them have a strong belief in Banke Bihari and visit the temple too” he said, reported Times of India.

For generations, skilled Muslim craftsmen have produced intricate crowns, bangles, and garments for the deity. Their craftsmanship, honed over decades, is vital to the temple’s rituals and daily adornment of the idol. Their devotion, Goswami notes, transcends religious labels.

The response came after some fringe groups held protests in Mathura and Vrindavan, urging Hindu shopkeepers and devotees to boycott Muslim-owned businesses. These groups reportedly demanded that Muslim traders display the proprietor’s name on their shop signboards—an act widely perceived as coercive and discriminatory.

However, Goswami was unequivocal in his stance and said that, “Yes, those terrorists (in Pahalgam) should be punished severely, and we’re totally with the government. But in Vrindavan, Hindus and Muslims live together in peace and harmony” TOI reported.

His message was echoed by several priests and local residents, who expressed solidarity with the Muslim artisans and business owners who have coexisted peacefully in the holy town.

“Bhakti is supreme in Brijmandal”

Goswami, who also serves as the Rajbhog Seva Adhikari at the temple, further emphasised that devotion—bhakti—is the highest principle in the spiritual ethos of Vrindavan.

“Bhakti is supreme in Brijmandal. It rises above knowledge or even detachment (vairagya). If someone has faith and comes for darshan, why should we oppose it?” Goswami asked, reported The Hindu.

Support for Muslim shopkeepers

Just steps away from the temple, Javed Ali, a Muslim shopkeeper who has been selling religious items for over two decades, shared his experience of intimidation by protesters. He was asked to visibly display his name on his shop’s signboard or vacate.

“They came to my shop and asked us to put the name of the proprietor on the signboard. I’ve been running this shop for over 20 years. My father worked here as a tailor. Whenever a customer buys things, I usually give them a bill with my name and mobile number. We have nothing to hide,” Ali said. “With the blessings of Banke Bihari, this place is always peaceful” TOI reports.

His neighbouring shop owner, Nikhil Aggarwal, affirmed that the local community has never had any issues and often supports one another irrespective of faith.

“We’ve never had any problem. We work together and support each other,” Aggarwal noted.

When ‘God’ didn’t stop Raskhan or Rahim from composing bhajans

Lala Pandit, priest at the Danghati Temple in Goverdhan said that, “When God didn’t stop Raskhan or Rahim from composing bhajans, who are we to stop anyone from praying?”

“Lord Krishna is the god of love. There’s no room for hatred in his land” he added

Mahant Dinesh Chaturvedi of the Kali Temple in Mathura echoed the sentiment: “How can anyone prevent a devotee from entering a temple? Temples are public spaces. Every religion has both good and bad people.” Commenting on the impracticality of such boycotts, he added, “You can’t go around asking every shopkeeper about their religion before buying something. Besides, many Muslims have helped tourists in Kashmir. We shouldn’t paint everyone with the same brush” as reported The Hindu.

Govind Pandey, priest of the Dauji Temple in Baldev, also saw no issue with buying from Muslims.

Rejection of discriminatory demands

Earlier, temple priests had also strongly rejected a demand by Dinesh Sharma of the Shri Krishna Janmabhoomi Mukti Sangharsh Nyas to stop using garments crafted by Muslim artisans. Sharma argued that only those who followed “religious purity” should be allowed to make Lord Krishna’s attire.

Terming the demand both “impractical” and “misguided,” Goswami pointed out that about 80% of the temple’s attire—including crowns, garments, and zardozi work—are made by Muslim artisans. He also highlighted the logistical challenge of replacing such skilled labour, noting that the deity requires nearly a dozen ornamented outfits each day.

“How can we assess the personal purity of every artisan?” he asked. “If Prahlad could be born in the family of a demon king, and Kansa in the same lineage as Lord Krishna’s grandfather, then how can we judge artisans by their birth or religion?”

Goswami further emphasised that devotees themselves ensure purity when commissioning attire and offerings, reinforcing that faith, not exclusion, lies at the heart of temple customs.

A legacy of shared heritage

The involvement of Muslims in temple traditions is not new. Historically, Muslim artisans have played a vital role in creating the visual grandeur of the Banke Bihari deity. From intricate embroidery to metalwork, their contributions span generations. In similar traditions elsewhere—like the crafting of Rudraksha garlands in Kashi—Muslim families play key roles in Hindu religious life.

Even today, Goswami noted, Muslim musicians perform traditional instruments like the nafiri during festivals. Several acclaimed bhajan singers from the Muslim community continue to offer devotional service to Lord Krishna, embodying the spiritual unity Vrindavan is known for.

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The post Faith Knows No Religion: Banke Bihari Temple again rejects boycott call against Muslim artisans and businesses appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The BJP’s reaction, though seemingly focused on the Tamil Nadu vs. Governor judgement, seemed excessive in relation to the judgment itself. While the ruling does hold weight in political terms, it does not seem to warrant the level of aggression directed at the judiciary. There are numerous options to deal with the restrictions the judgement imposes on BJP’s agenda like a review or adjustments could be pursued without needing to escalate tensions with the Court in such a dramatic manner. This suggests that the real concern is not just about the Governor’s judgment but rather about broader fears over the judiciary’s increasing influence in matters closely tied to the BJP’s ideological agenda.

When viewed alongside the ongoing challenge to the 2025 Waqf Amendment, however, the intensity of the response becomes clearer. The Waqf issue is far more central to the BJP’s ideological vision, and any judicial involvement in the matter feels far more significant to the party. In this context, the backlash against the Supreme Court over the Governor case can be seen less as a reaction to that judgment alone and more as part of a broader effort to signal the BJP’s discomfort with judicial interventions in areas it views as essential to its agenda.

To fully understand this dynamic, it’s essential to also look at the history of the Waqf Act, 1995 particularly the 2013 amendment, shaped by the Sachar Committee Report and the 2008 Joint Parliamentary Committee Report. This article will explore the context of that amendment, its shortcomings and later discuss what prompts these kinds of changes in the legal regime by majoritarian governments. A detailed look examination of the 2024/25 Amendment can be read here.

The Sachar Committee Report: Unveiling disparities and untapped potential

Commissioned by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s government in March 2005, the seven-member High Level Committee, chaired by Justice Rajindar Sachar, was tasked with preparing a comprehensive report on the social, economic, and educational status of the Muslim community in India. Submitted in November 2006 and tabled in Parliament shortly after, the Sachar Committee Report became a landmark document, providing stark evidence of the developmental deficits faced by Indian Muslims relative to national averages.

The Committee recommended targeted programs for skill development, credit access, and market support, particularly in backward districts and clusters where Muslim artisans were concentrated.

Crucially, the Sachar Report shone a spotlight on Waqf properties as a vast, yet profoundly underutilised, resource for potential community development. It identified over 4.9 lakh registered Waqf properties across India, encompassing an estimated 6 lakh acres of land.^[1] While the book value was pegged at Rs. 6,000 crores, the Committee estimated the market value to be significantly higher, potentially around Rs. 1.2 lakh crores (in 2006). Despite this immense asset base, the annual income generated was a mere Rs. 163 crores, representing a paltry 2.7% return on the decades-old book value. The report contrasted this with the potential for generating at least Rs. 12,000 crores annually (a 10% return on estimated market value) if the properties were managed efficiently and put to marketable use.

The Committee implicitly and explicitly pointed towards significant mismanagement, widespread encroachment (including alleged unauthorised occupation by government agencies), and administrative inefficiencies as key reasons for this underperformance.^[2] It recommended strengthening Waqf administration, applying laws like the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 to remove encroachments, recovering rent arrears at market rates, and potentially exempting Waqf properties from certain restrictive laws (like Rent Control Acts) to unlock their potential.^[3] The Sachar Report thus framed Waqf not just as a matter of religious endowment management but as a critical potential resource for addressing the very socio-economic backwardness it had documented, creating a strong impetus for reform.

The Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2013 v/s The Waqf Act, 1995: A comparative overview

A Joint Parliamentary Committee on Waqf was constituted on 2nd January 2006 by the Rajya Sabha Chairman in consultation with the Lok Sabha Speaker to assess the Waqf Act’s implementation, to suggest amendments for retrieving encroached properties, and improve the functioning of the Central Waqf Council and State Waqf Boards.

The report of the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Waqf on Amendments to the Waqf Act, 1995 presented on March 4, 2008 suggested changes to make the 1995 Act more effective, particularly in achieving the retrieval of encroached Waqf properties. This Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC), formed in 2006, analysed numerous suggestions and proposed substantial amendments.

Key recommendations focused on tightening the Act’s framework:

• Adding clear definitions for ‘Encroacher’ and ‘Waqf Premises’;
• Mandating faster (within one year) and more frequent (every 10 years) state-funded surveys of Waqf properties, including those existing since 1947, and giving these surveys legal weight in revenue records.
• Strengthening Waqf Tribunals by expanding their composition (including a judicial chair, a civil servant, and a Muslim law expert), granting them exclusive jurisdiction over Waqf cases, and setting time limits for decisions.
• Enhancing the Central Waqf Council’s advisory role and potentially transforming it into a commission with supervisory powers.
• Restructuring State Waqf Boards with elected and nominated members and defining procedures for removing the Chairman.
• Specifying qualifications for the CEO (must be Muslim, appointed from a Board-suggested panel).
• Drastically curtailing the alienation of Waqf property by declaring sales void and allowing leases only under strict conditions.
• Significantly strengthening anti-encroachment measures by empowering the CEO with eviction powers (akin to a Collector), defining encroachment broadly, introducing hefty penalties (imprisonment and fines) for encroachers (as a cognisable offence), and penalising negligent public servants; and asserting the Waqf Act’s precedence over conflicting local revenue laws.

The JPC also suggested establishing national bodies for Waqf property development and promoting education among Muslims, leveraging surplus funds.

In pursuance of the report, an amendment was made.

Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2013

The Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2013(Amendment Act, 2013), introduced several significant changes to the Waqf Act, 1995, aiming to address issues highlighted by the Sachar Committee and other stakeholders. Here’s a comparison of key provisions altered by the 2013 amendment:

• Nomenclature and Definitions
  • 1995 Act: Used the spelling “Waqf”. Definitions did not exist for term “encroacher” and a limited definition existed for “Waqf”. ((Section 3(s)2))
  • 2013 Amendment: Standardised the spelling to “Waqf” throughout. It expanded the definition of “encroacher” to explicitly cover those occupying property after lease/license expiry or termination. The definition of “Waqf” was broadened to explicitly include certain communal land entries (Shamlat Patti, etc.). It also added the requirement for a mutawalli (manager) to be an Indian citizen and allowed states to set further qualifications. (Sections 2 and 5 of the Amendment Act, 2013)
• Survey of Waqf Properties
  • 1995 Act: Provided for the survey of Waqf properties by a Survey Commissioner appointed by the State Government (Section 4).
  • 2013 Amendment: Mandated the completion of surveys within one year if not already done, requiring the appointment of Survey Commissioners where necessary. This aimed to address the issue of incomplete or outdated property records. (Section 6 the Amendment Act, 2013)
• Protection Against Encroachment
  • 1995 Act: Section 54 outlined procedures for removing encroachers, but enforcement was often seen as weak. Tribunals had powers to handle disputes.
  • 2013 Amendment: Strengthened Tribunal powers to assess damages from unauthorized occupation and recover them as land revenue arrears. It also introduced penalties for public servants failing to prevent or remove encroachments. This was a direct response to the widespread encroachment problem (Sections 9 of the Amendment Act, 2013).
• Alienation of Waqf Property
  • 1995 Act: Contained restrictions on alienation, requiring Board sanction for leases, sales, exchanges, or mortgages.

2013 Amendment: Imposed a stricter regime by explicitly prohibiting the sale, gift, mortgage, or exchange of Waqf property altogether. (Section 31 of the Amendment Act, 2013)

Leases were permitted but generally capped at 30 years, requiring prior Board sanction and adherence to regulations ensuring market-based rent. This aimed to prevent the permanent loss of Waqf assets. (Section 35 of the Amendment Act, 2013)

• Waqf Tribunals
  • 1995 Act: Established State-level Waqf Tribunals for dispute resolution. Their decisions were indeed subject to High Court review. The composition included judicial and administrative officers, and often an expert in Muslim law.
  • 2013 Amendment: Formalised the three-member structure for Tribunals: (i) a judicial officer (Chairperson), (ii) a senior state civil servant, and (iii) explicitly, a person with knowledge of Muslim law and jurisprudence. The amendment maintained the status of Tribunal decisions. (Section 43 of the Amendment Act, 2013)
• State Waqf Boards and Central Waqf Council:
  • 1995 Act: Established State Waqf Boards for management and a Central Waqf Council primarily for advisory functions. Board composition varied but was predominantly Muslim.
  • 2013 Amendment: Mandated the inclusion of at least two women members in each State Waqf Board. It significantly strengthened the powers of the Central Waqf Council, enabling it to issue binding directives to State Boards on performance, record maintenance, surveys, encroachment handling, and financial reporting, aiming for greater central oversight and accountability. (Sections 11 and 13 of the Amendment Act, 2013)
• Financial Accountability:
  • 1995 Act: Under Section 72, the mutawalli of every waqf was supposed to pay an amount not exceeding 7% of waqf’s annual income to the Board.
  • 2013 Amendment: Ensured that mutawallis can claim up to 20% for farming costs as deduction from the net annual income of which 7% was to be paid to the Board —but only if they farm the land themselves, not if it’s leased out. It also reinforced the need for regular auditing of Waqf accounts. (Section 41 of the Amendment Act, 2013)

In essence, the 2013 amendments sought to tighten controls, enhance protections, clarify definitions, and increase oversight compared to the 1995 framework, largely influenced by the issues raised in the Sachar Report.

The 2013 Amendments- An examination

The Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2013, emerged from a context demanding urgent reform. The Sachar Committee Report had laid bare not only the socio-economic challenges facing Indian Muslims but also remarked on the inefficiency in leveraging Waqf properties for community benefit. Coupled with long-standing criticisms of the 1995 Act’s implementation, including issues highlighted by Joint Parliamentary Committees (JPCs), the pressure to act was significant. K. Rahman Khan, the then Union Minister for Minority Affairs, spearheaded the legislative effort, presenting it as a product of wide consultations.

While the amendments introduced seemingly positive changes like stricter alienation rules and enhanced central oversight, they failed to address the root causes of mismanagement and underutilisation in a comprehensive manner. The focus seemed skewed towards strengthening controls and administrative structures on paper, rather than ensuring practical implementation, capacity building, and, crucially, facilitating the development potential highlighted by Sachar.

A major shortcoming was the failure to translate the Sachar Committee’s vision of Waqf as a development resource into reality. The 2013 Act lacked robust mechanisms or incentives to encourage the productive and marketable use of Waqf assets. While preventing alienation is important, simply locking up properties without facilitating their development does little to generate the income needed for education, healthcare, or skill development initiatives. The establishment of the National Waqf Development Corporation (NAWADCO) under Minister Khan’s tenure seemed promising, but its subsequent failure to gain traction shows the lack of a sustained, well-thought-out strategy for development within the 2013 framework. This suggests a superficial engagement with the Sachar report’s core economic argument, possibly rushed through without adequate planning for execution.

Furthermore, the amendments enhanced the powers of Waqf Boards and the Central Council but seemingly without sufficient attention to improving their operational capacity, transparency, or accountability on the ground. The persistence of issues like incomplete surveys years after the mandated deadline , continued widespread encroachment despite new penalties, mismanagement and corruption point to a significant gap between legislative intent and administrative reality. Empowering bodies without ensuring they have the resources, skills, and robust oversight needed for effective functioning can be counterproductive. This suggests the reforms may have been pushed through without fully considering the practical challenges of implementation across diverse state contexts.

The declaration by Minister Khan, upon the Act’s passage, that it was “perfect” seems indicative of an overestimation of the legislative changes and perhaps an underestimation of the deep-seated systemic problems. Consequently, the 2013 amendments, despite being presented as a definitive solution, ultimately proved inadequate. Their failure to effectively tackle mismanagement, unlock development potential, or ensure consistent enforcement created a vacuum. This environment of unresolved issues and perceived shortcomings – stemming perhaps from a rushed legislative process that prioritized symbolic changes over deep institutional reform – arguably paved the way for the more drastic and ill-motivated amendments proposed in 2025. The legacy of the 2013 Act is thus one of missed opportunities and incomplete reform, highlighting the pitfalls of addressing complex governance challenges with hurried legislative fixes.

Why is BJP badgering for a Waqf Reform?

Despite the hawkish stance BJP has taken consistently against institutions that could hold it accountable-from media to the Election Commission and even judiciary to an extent, it never was public with its rupture with the judiciary. It found no difficulty in arranging post-retirement plum posts for some influential judges like Chief Justice (as he was then) Ranjan Gogoi, Justice Arun Misra, Justice Abdul Nazeer etc. However, this time, it has found Waqf hearings serious enough to rake up an issue that it otherwise would not have- the scope of judicial review of the Supreme Court. This is a mighty issue and a 240 seat BJP is not cut out for it. And yet, we see how the party is willing to take its chance, especially during the Waqf Hearings. Why?

Waqf has featured in BJP’s Election manifestos for a while now. In the 1998 election manifesto, the party promised that it will protect Waqf properties from being usurped by unscrupulous individuals and help Waqf boards to develop these properties for the welfare of poor Muslim families. In the 2009 BJP’s manifesto  stated that will examine the recommendations of the Joint Parliamentary Committee regarding Waqf properties, and would, in consultation with Muslim religious leaders, take steps to remove encroachments from and unauthorised occupation of waqf properties. In its 2014 manifesto, the last one which mentions Waqf, the party stated that it will empower Waqf Boards in consultation with religious leaders; taking steps to remove encroachments from and unauthorized occupation of Waqf properties. The 2019 and 2024 manifestos restricted themselves to mentioning Triple Talaq and did not have any mention of Waqf. While not giving space in the manifesto, the BJP led NDA government has given space for Waqf in its legislative agenda. This points to a deeper, ideology driven agenda.

From Locke’s labour theory of property in Two Treatises of Government to Hegel’s concept of property as the externalisation of free will in the Philosophy of Right, the Western philosophical canon has long enshrined property ownership as intrinsic to personal liberty and political agency. Liberal theorists such as John Stuart Mill and modern defenders of Rawlsian distributive justice have further situated property within the architecture of equal citizenship, whereby the capacity to hold and transfer property undergirds the social contract and democratic legitimacy. In this tradition, property is not merely a material possession but a socially sanctioned claim to recognition, status, and autonomy. Thus, the disruption of minority property rights often signals a deeper project of political unmaking and ontological negation. As Hannah Arendt articulates in The Origins of Totalitarianism, the erasure of the “right to have rights” is a revocation of a right leading to statelessness, Historically, this logic has been basis of violent projects of ethnonational purification: the Nazi regime’s Verreichlichung (Aryanization) of Jewish assets, the legal dispossession of Armenians under Ottoman decrees such as the 1915 Abandoned Properties Law show how property becomes both a terrain and instrument of racialized statecraft. Property regimes, far from being neutral or apolitical, thus emerge as critical sites where inclusion is conferred or denied.

While the Waqf Amendment, 2025 does not have the same level of intensity as the extreme laws stated above, the concerning fact is that these amendments constitute an othering of the property relations relating to charity for the Muslims. When combined with the vehemence with which the BJP has been trying to enact laws that specifically exclude or target Muslim minorities (Criminalisation of Triple Talaq, Citizenship Amendment), Waqf Amendment, 2025 is not only an opportunity missed to reform Waqf system for the better, but also a not-so-sly attempt to promote majoritarianism.

(The author is part of the legal research team of the organisation)

^[1] Pg.240, Sachar Committee Report. Available at:https://minorityaffairs.gov.in/WriteReadData/RTF1984/7830578798.pdf

^[2] Pg. 243, Sachar Committee Report

^[3] Pg. 255, Sachar Committee Report

Related:

Waqf Amendment Act 2025: An erosion of rights under the garb of reform

Amendments to the Waqf Law were needed, but the grab-and-control Waqf Amendment Act, 2025 is not the answer

The AMU Teachers’ Association (AMUTA) and Waqf Worries: Ordinary members of the Qaum are caught between a self-serving elite and a majoritarian Regime

The Waqf Bill 2024: An Open Letter to the Joint Committee of Parliament, the Opposition, and India’s Muslim Communities

The post ‘Reforms’: Sachar Committee, the 2013 Amendments and the motive behind the proposed changes in the Waqf Regime appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Addressing a press conference here on Wednesday, the Delhi state CPI(M) said the poor families were evicted despite showing valid documents.

Reminding BJP of its promise of “Jahan Jhuggi, Wahaan Makaan”, the CPI(M) demanded rehabilitation in situ, or within a 5 km radius, to ensure continued access to livelihoods, education, essential services and community.

“Construction of flats on nearby vacant DDA land should be undertaken, if no appropriate housing is available, to comply with protocols and legal obligation,” it said in a statement.

The party also called for a fair and transparent survey and appeals process, “ensuring that long-term residents—many of whom have lived in the camp for over 60 years—are not wrongfully excluded.”

Read the full press release below:

*BJP GOVT MUST FULFIL THEIR PROMISE OF ‘JAHAN JHUGGI WAHAN MAKAAN’

CPI(M) Delhi State Committee strongly condemns the inhumane demolition and forced eviction threat facing over 400 working-class families in Madrasi Camp, Jangpura-B — one of Delhi’s oldest recognised bastis. This 60-year-old jhuggi cluster near the Barapulla Drain of South East Delhi is part of the DUSIB’s notified slums list and eligible for legal protection as per the NCT of Delhi Special Provisions Act, 2011.

Despite possessing valid documentation, one-third of households have been arbitrarily denied rehabilitation, while those deemed “eligible” are being cast out to Narela—50 km away—in clear violation of all protocols. Government agencies are simultaneously pushing for demolition of the jhuggi cluster even as the rehabilitation process remains ongoing, an action that is both illegal and indefensible.

The Act clearly states that “Jhuggi Jhopri Bastis which have come up before 01.01.2006 shall not be removed (as per National Capital Territory of Delhi Laws (Special Provisions) Second Act, 2011) without providing them alternate housing. Jhuggis which have come up in such Jhuggi Jhopri Bastis before 01.01.2015 shall not be demolished without providing alternate housing.”

The Para 2(a)(iii) of the Delhi Slum & Rehabilitation and Relocation Policy of 2015 underlines: “In-situ rehabilitation – Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board shall provide alternate accommodation to those living in Jhuggi Jhopri Bastis, either on the same land or in the vicinity within a radius of five kilometers. In case of exceptional circumstances, it can even go beyond five kilometers with prior approval of the Board.

Dispossession of the Poor in the Guise of Drain Cleaning

Upon the directions of the High Court (W.P. (C) 8035/2024) in July 2024, the DDA with other government departments, incorrectly identified Madrasi Camp as an encroachment along the drain flowing into Yamuna. Following this, the issue of eviction and rehabilitation is being considered in Court. The classification of the settlement as an encroachment is an executive decision—not a judicial directive. On October 5, 2024 the Irrigation and Flood Control Department hurriedly submitted a map indicating the Madrasi Camp obstructs the flow of the Barapullah drain. However, an independent fact-finding report by senior engineer experts from IIT Delhi and IIT Bombay has identified the nearby bridges and flyover as the primary cause of drainage obstruction, not the settlement.

Jumla of BJP’s Electoral Promises 

A 2024 Housing and Land Rights Network report reveals that Delhi led India in evictions during 2022–23, with 78 clearance operations displacing roughly 278,796 people. This stark reality lays bare the hypocrisy of the previous LG-led administration and the current “triple engine sarkar” in Delhi, which campaigned on promises to protect slum dwellers. The BJP’s promises—most notably “Jahan Jhuggi, Wahaan Makaan”—now ring hollow as families face forced eviction without appropriate rehabilitation. Unless the Delhi and Central government immediately directs its agencies to halt demolitions and deliver on in situ rehabilitation, its flagship slogan will be remembered as a cruelpolitical gimmick.

Violation of Due Process & Rights

The residents of Madrasi Camp are citizens, not encroachers, as repeatedly claimed by the government and their lawyers. They vote, work, raise families, and contribute to society. Subjecting them to repeated humiliation—treating them as illegals—violates their constitutional rights. Even as the courts are deliberating on the case, the PWD and Delhi Police are issuing demolition notices in absolute disregard for protocols.

The Delhi Slum & JJ Rehabilitation and Relocation Policy of 2015 underlines under clause D(5) DUSIB will fix the date of removal of the said JJ basti and send an appropriate intimation to the local police authorities for providing security and maintaining law and order. No police will be provided to any agency in Delhi for removal of JJ bastis without the approval/letter from CEO, DUSIB.

Proper Rehabilitation Must Precede Eviction

We strongly oppose any demolition, forced eviction or relocation to Narela, which lies nearly 50 km away from their current settlement. Such a move would severely disrupt their livelihoods, cut off access to essential services like schools and healthcare, and push families further into economic hardship.

CPI(M) Delhi Demands:

1. Immediate halt to all evictions and demolitions until every resident’s appeal is fairly heard and resolved.

2. Rehabilitation in-situ, or within a 5 km radius, per the ‘Jahan Jhuggi, Wahaan Makaan’ promise and government policies, to ensure continued access to livelihoods, education, essential services and community. Construction of flats on nearby vacant DDA land should be undertaken, if no appropriate housing is available, to comply with protocols and legal obligation.

3. Preservation of livelihoods and access to essential services by avoiding displacement to distant and disconnected areas like Narela.

4. A fair and transparent survey and appeals process, ensuring that long-term residents—many of whom have lived in the camp for over 60 years—are not wrongfully excluded. Initiation of direct social dialogue with residents, ensuring meaningful participation in the rehabilitation process.

5. An end to the scapegoating of working-class communities for flooding, when evidence points to flawed infrastructure as the actual cause. The government must also allow independent scientific studies to be conducted instead of blaming the poor for its failures to control and manage floods.

The bulldozer will not decide who belongs in Delhi.

The NGT’s 2019 order to clear unauthorised structures across the Yamuna floodplain or drains has been exploited by the BJP-led central government to displace working class bastis—treating longstanding communities as ‘encroachments’ and triggering largescale evictions without proper rehabilitation. Under the guise of “riverfront revitalization” and “beautification drives”, land is being cleared for 24×7 entertainment complexes and commercial developments that serve corporate interests, not public welfare.

CPI(M) condemns this grotesque inversion of environmentalism, where the rights of the working class are sacrificed to fuel real estate profits.

The CPI(M) is a working-class party dedicated to defending the rights of labourers, informal workers, and marginalised communities—whose toil sustains this city. In coalition with other Left parties and democratic organisations, we will mount a broad-based struggle against the DDA’s bulldozer politics and the BJP-led governments that treat human lives as expendable obstacles to their pro-corporate and anti-people development agenda. We stand in unbreakable solidarity with the residents of Madrasi Camp and the lakhs of marginalised families facing dispossession. The bulldozer will not decide who belongs in Delhi.

Anurag Saxena,

State Secretary, CPI(M) Delhi

Courtesy: Newsclick

The post Madrasi Camp Demolition: CPI(M) Delhi Demands Halt to Evictions, Rehab Within 5 Km appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The facts were damning. The deceased was in police custody. It was undisputed that he died of gunshot wounds inflicted by a police officer. A Magistrate’s inquiry had concluded earlier that the five policemen’s use of force was “unjustified” and noted that there were no fingerprints of the deceased on the weapon he was allegedly using. Yet, the SIT, formed by the court on April 7 under a senior, independent officer (Joint Commissioner Lakhmi Gautam), claimed it could not lodge an FIR because the victim’s father had declined to pursue the case—citing loss of faith in the system. The High Court had to remind the State that in a cognisable offence, the police are duty-bound to file an FIR suo moto. (Details of the April 7 order may be read here.)

“We all have some responsibilities. Do not let the faith of the public in the system erode,” Justice Mohite-Dere had sternly warned. Ultimately, after public embarrassment and judicial prodding, the State agreed to file an FIR by May 3, with a nominated officer from the SIT acting as complainant.

But just days later, on May 5, the Supreme Court dismantled the very framework that made the High Court’s intervention effective. Responding to a Special Leave Petition filed by the State, a bench led by Justices Bela M. Trivedi and P.B. Varale removed Joint Commissioner Gautam from the supervisory role and handed the investigation back to the Director General of Police (DGP)—a move that effectively returns control of the case to the highest ranks of the same police force being accused.

May 5: Supreme Court dilutes Bombay High Court’s SIT directive, hands probe back to police hierarchy

In a move that raises serious concerns about police accountability in custodial and encounter deaths, the Supreme Court on May 5 significantly diluted a Bombay High Court order that had mandated a court-monitored probe into the alleged fake encounter in Badlapur involving five policemen. The High Court’s order, notable for its insistence on institutional independence, had directed the formation of a Special Investigation Team (SIT) under the supervision of a specific officer—Lakhmi Gautam, Joint Commissioner of Police, Mumbai. The Supreme Court has now modified that order, transferring supervisory control of the SIT to the Director General of Police (DGP), effectively returning the investigation to the top of the same law enforcement hierarchy implicated in the matter.

The bench of Justices Bela M. Trivedi and P.B. Varale was hearing a Special Leave Petition filed by the State of Maharashtra objecting to the High Court’s decision to name a specific officer to lead the investigation. Solicitor General Tushar Mehta, representing the State, insisted that the State had no objection to the formation of an SIT but took issue with the High Court’s direction to place the probe under Joint Commissioner Gautam. SG Mehta contended that the DGP should be the supervisory authority, citing procedural norms and the need for institutional oversight.

In its order, the Court noted that “The petitioners state of Maharashtra has approached this Court by filing SLP being aggrieved by the impugned order passed by the order to the extent of constituting the SIT in the manner directed in para 32, that is, under the supervision of Lakhmi Gautam, the Joint Commissioner of Police, Mumbai. It is submitted by learned SG Mr. Mehta that the State has no objection with the SIT being constituted, but let it be constituted under the supervision of DGP, having regard to the litigations made. Since the respondent-complaint has already withdrawn himself before the High Court, we don’t see any reason to issue notice to the Respondent.”

In response, Justice Trivedi suggested a compromise—allowing either the DGP or a nominee to head the SIT. Justice Varale went further, implicitly critiquing the High Court by observing that it should not have selected specific officers for the probe.

“Under such circumstances, having regard to the nature and seriousness of the allegations and concerns expressed by the High Court, we modify the order to the extent of constituting the SIT. We direct the SIT to be constituted by the DGP and officers selected by the DGP as deemed fit. The State shall do the needful in handing papers to DGP. We may clarify that the complaint, if he has any grievance, may approach the competent court that is the concerned magistrate or sessions court for appropriate relief. As a consequence, order dated April 30 or any order passed subsequently shall also stand modified. SLP stands disposed,” the order states.

What this line of judicial reasoning ignores, however, is precisely what necessitated the High Court’s intervention in the first place: a lack of faith in the Maharashtra police to investigate its own. The allegations involved custodial abuse and a suspected staged encounter. In such cases, courts have a duty to ensure an independent investigation that does not merely recycle command structures of the same force under scrutiny. By overturning a key portion of the High Court’s order—while ostensibly upholding the idea of an SIT—the Supreme Court has gutted the central safeguard meant to ensure impartiality.

The apex court’s order notes that since the complainant had already withdrawn from the High Court proceedings, there was no need to issue notice to him in the SLP. But this legal formality sidelines the broader public interest concern in the case—the right to life and protection against extrajudicial killings, guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.

In its final direction, the Court modified the Bombay High Court’s order to state that the SIT shall be constituted by the DGP, who may select officers as deemed fit. The State is directed to hand over all relevant case documents to the DGP. It further notes that the complainant, if aggrieved, can approach the magistrate or sessions court for relief—an impractical suggestion, given that systemic police impunity is precisely what triggered the demand for a more credible probe.

This development reflects a broader trend of courts increasingly deferring to state institutions—even those implicated in serious misconduct—under the guise of procedural propriety. It signals judicial hesitancy to disturb the command structure of the police, even when there are credible allegations of rights violations by officers in that very structure.

By shifting the supervision of the SIT from a court-appointed officer to the DGP—who remains an administrative appointee of the State—the Supreme Court has diluted a rare instance of judicial courage shown by the Bombay High Court. The result is a probe that now risks becoming a bureaucratic formality rather than a meaningful pursuit of truth and accountability.

The complete order may be read here.

April 30: Maharashtra Police finally agrees to file FIR in the Badlapur fake encounter case

On April 30, after prolonged delays and repeated non-compliance, the Maharashtra Police finally informed the Bombay High Court that an FIR would be registered in the Badlapur ‘fake encounter’ case by Saturday, May 3. The assurance came during a hearing before a division bench comprising Justices Revati Mohite-Dere and Dr Neela Gokhale, which had been monitoring the progress—or lack thereof—in the investigation into the death of a man in police custody.

The commitment to file the FIR was made by Public Prosecutor Hiten Venegavkar after the court issued a stern warning to both the State Police and the court-appointed Special Investigation Team (SIT). The bench expressed serious displeasure at the continued defiance of its April 7 order, which had directed the constitution of an SIT to investigate the involvement of five police officers in what was strongly suspected to be a custodial killing disguised as an encounter. The court had emphasised that the case warranted a thorough and independent investigation, especially since it was an undisputed fact that the deceased had died from bullet wounds inflicted by a police officer while he was in custody.

Justice Mohite-Dere, during the earlier order, had observed that crimes of this nature not only affect the individual victim but also shake the public’s faith in the justice system and society at large. The bench had then directed that the SIT be led by Joint Commissioner of Police Lakhmi Gautam, who was authorised to pick his own team, to be headed by a Deputy Commissioner of Police (DCP). The State CID was instructed to hand over all relevant documents and case materials to the SIT within 48 hours.

Despite these clear directions, during the April 25 hearing, the court was shocked to learn that the CID had failed to transfer the necessary documents. It was only after a full day of tense proceedings—and threats of contempt action—that the CID finally agreed to comply. However, by April 30, it emerged that the SIT had still not registered an FIR. Venegavkar attempted to explain that the SIT was waiting for the father of the deceased to lodge a formal complaint.

The bench firmly rejected this reasoning, reminding the prosecution that the father had already declined to file a complaint, citing delayed justice and emotional exhaustion. The judges reiterated that it was now the duty of the SIT to proceed suo moto—on its own authority—and file the FIR without further delay. They made it unequivocally clear that the court expected nothing less than a fair, impartial, and independent investigation.

Venegavkar then sought to delay matters further, stating that the SIT needed either a formal complaint or the inquiry documents relied upon by the Magistrate, who had already concluded that the force used by the police was excessive and unjustified. The Magistrate’s report also noted that the deceased’s fingerprints were not found on the weapon allegedly used to fire at the police and questioned the police’s claim of self-defence, describing it as “suspicious and unjustified.”

These arguments did not go down well with the bench. The judges forcefully reminded the prosecutor that the SIT was fully empowered to act independently and had no excuse not to lodge an FIR when a cognisable offence had clearly been committed. “We only want an independent, fair, and impartial probe not influenced by anyone,” Justice Mohite-Dere said, as per a report in the LiveLaw, warning that the credibility of the justice system was at stake.

According to this report, Justice Gokhale, clearly frustrated, stated, “These are very sorry state of affairs… You ought to have complied with our orders. We have no option but to initiate contempt proceedings.” Justice Mohite-Dere added that the situation was “sheer misuse of the court’s time.”

Following these sharp admonishments, Venegavkar requested a short adjournment to consult with senior police officers. After the break, he returned with the submission that an SIT officer, Mangesh Desai, would be appointed as the formal complainant. Based on his complaint, the FIR would finally be registered.

April 25: Bombay High Court slams Maharashtra CID for brazen defiance, warns of criminal contempt

On April 25, the Bombay High Court had come down heavily on the Maharashtra Police, particularly the State CID, for wilfully defying its April 7 order directing the transfer of investigation in the Badlapur ‘fake’ encounter case to a court-appointed Special Investigation Team (SIT). A division bench comprising Justices Revati Mohite-Dere and Dr Neela Gokhale strongly criticised the State for what it called a “brazen violation” of its orders, warning that such conduct amounted to criminal contempt of court.

Notably, on April 7, the High Court had constituted an SIT under the leadership of IPS officer Lakhmi Gautam, the Joint Commissioner of Police, Mumbai, and directed the State CID to hand over all investigation papers to the SIT within two days. Despite the clear directive, the CID failed to comply.

During the April 25 hearing, amicus curiae and senior advocate Manjula Rao informed the court that the CID had not yet transferred the case papers. The bench further learned from a letter sent by a State-constituted Judicial Commission to the High Court Registry that it too had not received the relevant documents, exposing the extent of non-compliance.

Visibly irate, Justice Gokhale warned the CID of potential criminal contempt proceedings, stating unequivocally that orders of the court must be followed irrespective of whether the State agrees with them. According to the report in the LiveLaw, she noted that although the State had filed a Special Leave Petition (SLP) in the Supreme Court challenging the April 7 order, there was no stay on the order, making it binding. “The rule of law must be followed,” she said. “Whether you agree with the order or not, you have to comply with it. Otherwise, we will be constrained to issue contempt of court proceedings.”

Justice Gokhale remarked that the CID’s refusal to act constituted a “fit case” for contempt proceedings. She emphasised that if the State was so aggrieved by the order, it should have urgently moved the Supreme Court for relief—something it had failed to do despite almost a month having passed since the order. “Speaking for myself,” she said as a report in the LiveLaw, “this is actually a brazen violation of our orders.”

Justice Mohite-Dere echoed the same concern. She noted that merely filing an SLP does not suspend the effect of a court’s directive and that State authorities cannot ignore binding orders on that basis. “What prevents you from transferring the papers?” she asked, as per LiveLaw’s report. “Is there any sanctity to our orders or not? Are you not in contempt?” She further held the SIT chief, Lakhmi Gautam, accountable for not informing the court about the non-compliance, adding that he too was potentially in contempt.

The court ordered both Gautam and a senior CID officer to appear post-lunch. When the hearing resumed, Public Prosecutor Hiten Venegavkar urged the bench to defer the matter until the Supreme Court heard the SLP. But Justice Gokhale remained unimpressed, saying: “We just cannot be waiting endlessly. You can always seek urgent listing in the apex court. It is not as if you have never done it before.”

Venegavkar then attempted to mitigate the situation by informing the court that Gautam had constituted his SIT team. However, Justice Mohite-Dere interjected sharply: “What is the use of constituting a team when they do not have the papers? What will they do—just sit around?”

Justice Gokhale added that the failure to hand over the documents was not only deliberate but also conveyed a dangerous message to the public. “What message are you giving to the citizens? That court orders are passed just for show?” she asked. “Either hand over the documents or face contempt.”

The court then directly questioned Prashant Waghunde, Superintendent of CID, Navi Mumbai, about why the documents hadn’t been handed over. Waghunde said he was acting under instructions from his superiors, but refused to name them. This evasiveness frustrated the bench further. As per the LiveLaw report, Justice Mohite-Dere said, “Your officer may be helpless, but we are not. We’re trying to protect him, but he refuses to name his superior. We didn’t want to make him a scapegoat, but he’s leaving us no choice.”

The matter was passed over multiple times to allow senior officers to reconsider. Finally, Prashant Burde, the Additional Director General of Police (State CID), appeared virtually. He apologised for the events that had transpired and assured the court that the documents would be handed over to the SIT. The judges, accepting this assurance, held back from initiating contempt proceedings—for now.

This hearing marks a critical juncture in the Badlapur ‘fake’ encounter case, highlighting serious concerns about institutional accountability, the enforcement of judicial orders, and the State’s duty to uphold the rule of law. The court’s intervention underscores its determination to ensure that justice is neither delayed nor denied, especially in cases implicating custodial killings and potential abuse of power by law enforcement officers.

Background of the case

On April 7, 2025, the Bombay High Court had ordered the formation of a Special Investigation Team (SIT) to probe the alleged fake encounter of a young man in Badlapur. The court observed that the case warranted a thorough investigation since it was undisputed that the deceased died of bullet wounds inflicted by a police officer while in custody. Emphasising that crimes committed by law enforcement impact not just individuals but the entire society, the bench warned against brushing aside the public’s legitimate interest in such investigations.

The SIT was to be led by Mumbai’s Joint Commissioner of Police, Lakhmi Gautam, who was granted the autonomy to handpick officers for the probe, which would be supervised by a Deputy Commissioner of Police (DCP). The Maharashtra CID was directed to transfer all relevant documents to the SIT within two days.

The case originated from a petition filed by the parents of the accused in the 2024 Badlapur school sexual assault case, who was allegedly killed in a staged police encounter on September 23, 2024. The parents claimed that their son was murdered in custody.

During initial hearings, the High Court had criticised the State for its superficial investigation. The judges remarked that it was difficult to believe that the five police officers present in the van with the deceased were unable to restrain him and even suggested that the alleged shootout could have been avoided.

A significant development came in January 2025 when a Magistrate submitted a report under Section 176 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The report squarely blamed the five police officers for using excessive and unjustified force. It pointed out that there were no fingerprints of the deceased on the firearm he allegedly used, and dismissed the police’s claim of acting in private defence as suspicious and unsubstantiated.

However, in a surprising turn, the deceased’s parents sought to withdraw their petition in February, citing repeated delays in the justice process. On February 6, they told the court they no longer wished to pursue the case. Notably, in December 2024, they had informed the bench that their pursuit of justice had led to their expulsion from their village, forcing them to live on the streets and beg for survival.

The very next day, on February 7, the High Court expressed shock after learning that a Thane sessions court had stayed the Magistrate’s report—one that had validated the parents’ claims and found substance in the allegations of a fake encounter. (Detailed reports may be read here, here, here and here)

Why the Bombay High Court’s orders were essential?

The Bombay High Court’s interventions in the Badlapur fake encounter case were not merely judicial oversight—they were a necessary assertion of constitutional accountability in the face of systemic police impunity. The facts were damning: the deceased was in police custody, died of bullet injuries, and a judicial inquiry found the police action unjustified. And yet, despite this, the Maharashtra Police showed blatant resistance to lodging an FIR—one of the most basic procedural requirements in any cognisable offence. It was only under sustained judicial pressure, including threats of contempt that the State relented.

The Court’s insistence on constituting a Special Investigation Team (SIT) under the direct supervision of a specific senior officer—Joint Commissioner Lakhmi Gautam—was a deliberate choice. It was designed to break the vicious cycle of internal shielding that often accompanies custodial violence cases, where the same force accused of wrongdoing is entrusted with investigating itself. The High Court recognised that institutional independence was not an abstract virtue but a practical necessity to ensure truth, justice, and public confidence in the rule of law. Its actions served as a critical check on executive inaction and obstruction.

The Supreme Court’s decision to dilute this framework—by handing the SIT back to the Director General of Police—undermines that very goal. The DGP remains the head of the police force in Maharashtra, which includes the accused officers. While technically adhering to the idea of an SIT, this move defeats its intended purpose: an independent and impartial investigation. It signals a return to hierarchical control, where influence and pressure may once again stifle accountability.

The Bombay High Court’s orders were essential because they embodied the judiciary’s duty under Article 21—to protect the right to life and dignity, especially when the violator is the State itself. In a country where custodial deaths and fake encounters are far too common and justice remains elusive, these orders were a rare moment of institutional resolve. Diluting them not only weakens the probe in the present case but sets a troubling precedent that may discourage lower courts from taking similarly bold steps in future cases of State excess.

Ultimately, the Bombay High Court did what the law demands: it held the State to its constitutional responsibilities. Its orders were essential because they confronted not just the facts of one death, but the structure of impunity that enables many more. The Supreme Court’s retreat from that framework is not just a legal recalibration—it risks becoming a moral failure.

Related:

A Judgement of Conscience: Bombay High Court orders SIT Probe into alleged fake encounter in Badlapur

Bombay High Court directs filing of a First Information Report (FIR) against the 5 cops held responsible for death of accused in Badlapur Sexual

Biased and Preconceived: Bombay HC criticises police inquiry into Parbhani custodial death of Somnath Suryawanshi

The post Judicial Setback: Supreme Court dilutes Bombay HC’s bold stand on police accountability in custodial killing in Badlapur case appeared first on SabrangIndia.

I. Policing at a Breaking Point: Undermanned, undertrained, and underprepared

The India Justice Report 2025 presents a sobering assessment: India’s policing system, crucial to the delivery of justice and maintenance of public trust, remains trapped in a cycle of chronic under-capacity, neglect of training, weak diversity, and mounting public distrust.

At the national level, India’s police-population ratio remains alarmingly low at 155 police personnel per 100,000 population, well short of the sanctioned strength of 197.5 and far below the United Nations’ recommended minimum of 222. The disparities are even more troubling at the state level: Bihar, for instance, deploys just 81 police personnel per lakh, leaving communities drastically underserved.

This shortage is amplified by high vacancy rates. As of 2023, 22% of sanctioned posts across all ranks were vacant nationally, with states like Uttar Pradesh facing a vacancy rate exceeding 25%. Recruitment drives have been sporadic and insufficient, with training capacities unable to keep up with even existing personnel needs.

Training, the backbone of effective policing, is gravely underfunded. States on average allocate only 1.25% of their police budgets to training, with only four states exceeding the 2% threshold. Further, only five states possess fully accredited police training academies. Specialised training in crucial areas such as cybercrime investigation, gender sensitisation, juvenile justice, and forensic handling remains thin and inconsistent across the country.

The crisis in forensic staffing exacerbates poor investigative quality: Half of all sanctioned forensic posts nationally remain vacant. Without adequate forensic support, investigations falter, leading to delayed trials, wrongful acquittals, or even wrongful convictions.

Infrastructure modernisation, while visible in patches, remains uneven.

• 83% of police stations now have at least one CCTV camera, yet compliance with Paramvir Singh Saini Supreme Court standards is inconsistent.
• 78% of police stations have set up women’s helpdesks, yet no state or UT meets its internal reservation targets for women in police, where the national average stands at a low 12%. Only Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chandigarh, Ladakh, and Tamil Nadu show movement towards the 33% target.

Urban-rural divides sharpen the challenges: Between 2017 and 2022, urban police stations increased by 4%, while rural police stations declined by 7%. In rural areas, each station covers an average of 300 square kilometres, compared to just 20 square kilometres for urban stations — dramatically limiting police accessibility for rural citizens.

Community policing initiatives — vital for building local trust — remain poorly institutionalised. Few states maintain dedicated community policing units or trained officers, and even where they exist, budgetary support is minimal.

Digitisation efforts such as the Crime and Criminal Tracking Network & Systems (CCTNS) and the Interoperable Criminal Justice System (ICJS) have made gains.
However, infrastructural bottlenecks — poor internet, electricity issues, and limited digital literacy among police — undermine their potential.

Gender diversity: The national benchmark for women’s representation in the police is 33 per cent, as advised by the central government in 2009. As of January 2023, the overall representation of women in the police (the civil police, District Armed Reserve [DAR], Special Armed Police Battalion, and Indian Reserve Battalion [IRB]) across all states and UTs stood at only 12.3 per cent, a modest rise from 11.7 per cent in January 2022. Among the large and mid-sized states, Bihar, at 24 per cent, now leads in women’s representation in the police, surpassing Andhra Pradesh (22%). Bihar also recorded the highest growth, from 21 per cent in 2022 to 24 per cent in 2023. Conversely, nine states/UTs,49 including Telangana, Madhya Pradesh, and West Bengal, saw declines, and seventeen states/UTs still report women’s representation below 10 per cent. Multiple MHA advisories have recommended three women Sub-Inspectors (SI) and 10 women constables in each police station. With little change over 2022, except Delhi, no state/UT meets this benchmark for SIs

Caste representation: Representation of under-represented caste groups are set by each state in line with its population mix. As of January 2023, Karnataka stands out as the only state to consistently achieve its targets across all three reserved groups, Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Other Backward Castes, both at the officer and the constabulary levels.

• Scheduled caste- Only four states (Gujarat, Manipur, Karnataka, and Himachal Pradesh) met their SC quotas at both officer and constabulary levels. Goa is the only other state to meet its target at the officer ranks. Sikkim, Bihar, Tamil Nadu, Punjab, Andhra Pradesh, Uttarakhand, and Kerala met their quotas only at the constabulary level. Uttar Pradesh (61%), Rajasthan (52%), Tripura (47%), and Bihar (42%) faced the largest deficits in SC officer appointments.
• Scheduled Tribes- Several states have made significant strides in improving Scheduled Tribe (ST) representation within their police forces, with Bihar, Himachal Pradesh, and Karnataka demonstrating good performance by meeting their ST targets across both officer and constabulary ranks. However, Jammu & Kashmir, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and Tripura exhibit the highest shortfalls among ST Officers. Punjab has a 25 per cent quota for STs; it records only 3 ST Officers, equivalent to a 0.11 per cent representation or a shortfall of 99.8 per cent.
• Other Backward Classes: Nine states/UTs63 among those with quotas64 for Other Backward Classes (OBC) at the officer level have successfully met their targets. Tamil Nadu, Sikkim, and Kerala have over 40 per cent reservation for OBCs; in this instance, Tamil Nadu has exceeded its quota but Kerala and Sikkim have shortfalls of 7 per cent and 10 per cent, respectively.

The India Justice Report concludes bluntly: Without radical investment in human resources, serious upgrading of forensic and digital capacities, targeted gender inclusion and caste diversity, and strengthening rural policing, India’s policing system risks becoming increasingly irrelevant, reactive, and distrusted.

II. Prisons in Freefall: Overcrowded, underserved, and forgotten

India’s prison system, already strained, has now reached crisis proportions.
The India Justice Report 2025 reveals a sector overwhelmed by overcrowding, underfunding, systemic understaffing, and the abandonment of rehabilitation as a serious goal. Over the past decade, India’s prison population has expanded by almost 50%, while corresponding increases in infrastructure, medical care, or staffing have remained grossly inadequate. The national average prison occupancy stands at a shocking 131%, and 176 prisons operate at 200% occupancy or more. Several prisons house four times their sanctioned capacity.

Even more troubling is the composition of the prison population: 76% are undertrials — individuals who have not yet been convicted but are imprisoned due to sluggish police investigations, delayed trials, or systemic barriers to bail. In 20 states and UTs, more than 20% of undertrials have been detained between one to three years, without being found guilty.

Period of Detention: On average undertrials are spending more time than ever before in pre-trial detention. At the end of 2022, 11,448 or 2.6 per cent had spent more than five years in pretrial detention. This is considerably higher than the 5,011 in 2019 and 2,028 in 2012. Worryingly, Uttar Pradesh alone accounted for nearly 40 per cent of the undertrials who had spent more than five years in detention.

Infrastructure and healthcare deficits are appalling:

• According to the Supreme Court-appointed Amitava Roy Committee, only 68% of inmates have access to basic sleeping space.
• Health services are grossly underprovided: many prisons have one doctor for several hundred prisoners, whereas standards require one doctor for every 300 inmates.
• Mental health services are practically absent: out of 5.7 lakh prisoners, there are only 25 sanctioned psychologists or psychiatrists nationally, and 25 states/UTs have sanctioned none.

Staffing shortages exacerbate the situation:

• Nationally, over 33% of sanctioned prison posts remain vacant.
• Guard-to-inmate ratios in many states are as high as one guard per 80–100 prisoners, against the recommended 1:6 ratio, compromising safety and order.

Welfare spending is neglected: Less than 1% of prison budgets are allocated for rehabilitation, education, vocational training, or prisoner welfare. Funds earmarked for these purposes are often underutilised or redirected toward basic administrative costs.

Despite the adoption of forward-looking policies like the Model Prison Manual 2016 and the Model Prison and Correctional Services Act 2023, real transformation remains minimal. While 86% of prisons have introduced video conferencing facilities for court appearances, this has not significantly reduced trial delays or undertrial detention periods.

Legal aid services inside prisons are patchy:

• Only 67% of prisons have functional legal aid clinics.
• Where available, lawyers are poorly compensated (between ₹500–₹1000 per case), leading to low commitment and high absenteeism.

Open prisons — proven internationally to reduce recidivism — exist in only 16 states, covering a minuscule fraction of eligible inmates.

The situation for women prisoners is even worse:

• Sanctioned budgets for maternity and childcare are inadequate.
• Many prisons lack gender-sensitive facilities like private counselling spaces or sufficient women staff.

Deaths in custody, both natural and unnatural, have risen between 2017 and 2022 — a grim indicator of the system’s growing brutality.

The India Justice Report warns unambiguously: Until governments prioritise prison reforms with serious budgetary commitment, robust healthcare staffing, expanded rehabilitation services, and genuine decongestion measures, prisons will continue to be spaces of injustice, suffering, and lost human potential.

Conclusion: A justice delivery chain under threat

India’s police and prison systems form two vital links in the chain of justice.
Today, both are stretched to breaking point — one unable to protect citizens effectively, the other compounding injustice by warehousing them indefinitely.

The India Justice Report 2025 demands nothing less than a structural overhaul:

• Massive recruitment drives and specialised training
• Scientific and gender-diverse policing
• Investment in forensic and digital infrastructure
• Aggressive decongestion of prisons
• Rehabilitation-driven prisoner management
• Guaranteeing legal aid access and prison healthcare

The complete report may be read here.

Related:

India’s Free Speech Crisis Deepens: 329 violations recorded in just four months of 2025

Underfunded, Overburdened, and Unjust: The national verdict from the India Justice Report 2025

Echoes of Hate: Online anti-Muslim hate spreads against Muslim businesses and workers after Pahalgam attack

The post A System Under Strain: India’s police and prisons in crisis shows Indian Justice Report 2025 appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The petitioner, who had already been declared an Indian citizen by a Foreigners Tribunal in 2016, was again dragged into a fresh proceeding on the same allegation without any new material—exposing her to renewed trauma and the looming threat of statelessness. The Supreme Court’s decision to quash this second proceeding not only provides much-needed relief in her individual case but also sets an important precedent against the misuse of the Foreigners Act, 1946, as a tool for repeated harassment. This ruling strikes at the heart of Assam’s flawed citizenship adjudication process and re-establishes critical safeguards against bureaucratic overreach.

Citizenship cases: Double jeopardy, a tool used by the state in Assam

The order concerns Tarabhanu Khatoon @ Tarabhanu Bibi, a resident of Nalbari district in Assam, who became the subject of repeated proceedings under the Foreigners Act, 1946. She was first served notice in FT Case No. 269/2016 before the Foreigners Tribunal, Nalbari (at Mukalmua), on the suspicion that she was an illegal migrant from Bangladesh, having allegedly entered India after the cutoff date of March 25, 1971—a date fixed by the Assam Accord and adopted into Section 6A of the Citizenship Act.

In her defence, Tarabhanu submitted strong documentary evidence, including:

• Names of her father and grandfather in the 1966 and 1970 electoral rolls, predating the 1971 cutoff.
• Her own name appearing in voter lists since 1985.
• Oral testimony corroborating her ancestry and residence in India.

Crucially, the State failed to lead any evidence—no witness appeared, and no documentation proving illegal entry was produced. Consequently, the Tribunal on August 31, 2016 declared her to be not a foreigner, effectively affirming her Indian citizenship.

Despite this adjudication, she was again issued a notice on December 15, 2018 in FT Case No. 695/2018, accusing her of being a Bangladeshi national—based on the same allegation and without any fresh material evidence. This triggered a fresh round of litigation and mental trauma, prompting her to challenge the second proceeding.

The Gauhati High Court’s Error: Failure to quash repetitive proceedings

The matter was first heard by the Gauhati High Court, which refused to quash the second FT proceedings, instead stating that she was free to raise her defence before the Tribunal again. The High Court appeared to treat the second notice as if it were procedurally valid, overlooking the fact that a final and binding decision had already been passed in 2016 on the very same issue.

This approach effectively undermined the principle of legal finality, suggesting that citizenship could be questioned ad infinitum, thereby exposing individuals to repeated harassment, legal costs, and potential detention.

Supreme Court’s Ruling: Finality, fairness, and res judicata in citizenship adjudication

A bench comprising Justice Manoj Misra and Justice K.V. Viswanathan delivered a decisive ruling in favour of the appellant. It held that once a Foreigners Tribunal had given a final finding after providing due opportunity to both sides, the State could not initiate a second proceeding unless it had either:

1. Challenged the original order before the High Court, or
2. Sought a recall of the Tribunal’s order on valid legal grounds.

As no such challenge or recall was made, and no provision for review had been brought to the Court’s attention, the earlier 2016 order stood final. The Supreme Court cited its own precedent in Abdul Kuddus v. Union of India (2019), reiterating that Foreigners Tribunal decisions have binding effect and attract the doctrine of res judicata.

“Once it is not in dispute that on a previous reference the Tribunal after giving opportunity to both sides, on appraisal of evidence, found the appellant not a foreigner, the only course available for the respondent was either to challenge the order before the High Court or seek for its recall on grounds permissible for recall. As no provision for review exists, at least not shown to us, so long the earlier order stands, it is not open to initiate fresh proceedings as the same would be hit by principles of res judicata as held by this Court in Abdul Kuddus.” (Para 9)

In scathing terms, the Court stated in its order that:

“…the subsequent proceedings were nothing but an abuse of the process of law, and therefore, the High Court ought to have interdicted the same.” (Para 9)

The Court’s key observations include:

• There is no provision in the Foreigners Act or allied rules that allows the government to reopen a decided case without following due legal procedures.
• The Tribunal’s 2016 decision was final and binding, having been rendered after due process and full opportunity of hearing to both parties.
• The Supreme Court reaffirmed its precedent in Abdul Kuddus v. Union of India (2019), where it had held that Tribunal orders are quasi-judicial in nature and attract the doctrine of res judicata.

The order rejected the Assam government’s argument that the earlier order was “cryptic”, observing that even if the State found the Tribunal’s reasoning inadequate, its remedy lay in challenging the order legally—not by launching a parallel proceeding. The Court emphasised that allowing multiple and unregulated proceedings on the same issue would destroy the rule of law and severely erode individual liberties.

The complete order may be read here.

Wider significance: A critical check on state overreach in citizenship verification

This order is pivotal, especially in the context of Assam’s fraught citizenship verification machinery, which includes:

• Thousands of cases of double or multiple notices being issued against the same person.
• Use of ex parte orders when individuals fail to appear, sometimes due to lack of notice or financial hardship.
• Detention centres housing individuals for years based on flawed or unchallenged tribunal findings.
• Misuse of Border Police references, often without investigation, disproportionately targeting Bengali-speaking Muslims and other minorities.

It is essential to note that the State of Assam had every opportunity to challenge the 2016 order of the Tribunal, either by filing a review, a recall, or a writ petition, but did none of these. By clearly articulating that re-litigation is impermissible unless prior orders are overturned through proper legal avenues, the Supreme Court has sent a strong message to both the State of Assam and the Foreigners Tribunals to operate within constitutional bounds.

Moreover, this ruling reaffirms that citizenship is a fundamental right, not a bureaucratic uncertainty, and legal finality must be respected to ensure dignity and security of individuals. It also strengthens the rule of law in an area often marked by arbitrariness, communal bias, and procedural irregularities.

Conclusion: A shield against bureaucratic harassment

The Supreme Court’s decision in Tarabhanu Khatoon is more than just a personal victory for the petitioner—it is a significant verdict that draws a firm line against state overreach in citizenship determination. It ensures that once nationality is established, it cannot be questioned endlessly, especially by the same state machinery that failed to prove its case in the first instance.

In a region where identity, citizenship, and belonging have become matters of constant suspicion and state scrutiny, this order restores an essential balance between state power and individual rights, laying down that citizenship cannot be treated as a moving target—especially for India’s most vulnerable.

Related:

Uttarakhand High Court slams police and authority for failure in maintain law and order

Foreigner in Life, Indian in Death: The cruel end of Abdul Matleb in assam’s detention camp

28,000 cases withdrawn or votes secured? Assam CM’s move to drop ‘Foreigner’ cases against Koch Rajbongshi promise under scrutiny

Assam govt to SC: 33/63 of those marked for ‘deportation’ are contesting ‘foreigner’ status in courts

The post “Nothing but an abuse of the process of law”: SC bars second Foreigners Tribunal case against same person, reinforces finality of citizenship verdicts appeared first on SabrangIndia.

There exists a deep communication gap even among the non-partisan (voices) on the issue of the Waqf. This needs to be bridged. Every society and religion have provisions and practices, both related to charity and public welfare. In present day India, an era of majoritarian ascendance and minority-bashing, weaponising of this welfarist institutional –even noble– practice is easy. On the other hand, huge Waqf assets and proceeds have been (unfairly) controlled and siphoned off by some among the self-serving religious and secular elites among Muslims in connivance with (sic) the state and state-regulated Waqf Boards, for decades. This duality is a double whammy for the average Muslim citizen, regardless of whether the political dispensation has been overtly anti-Muslim or ostensibly pluralist.

An instance from my ancestral village

In my own native village in rural north Bihar, there are at least three to four graveyards. The largest one is, as per documentation, owned by some families, but used for community burials by all Muslim castes (biradris) and classes of the village. Another one is owned by three specific families. In the three contiguous graveyards, each family buries its own dead in their respective spots. Yet another one, adjacent to it, belongs to the Muslim communities of Mir-Shikars, Rayeens, Mansuris (Pasmanda Muslim communities). The land is said to have been donated by a Bhumihar-Brahman– Hindu upper caste — landlord of the village, the economic status of whose descendants are reported to have dwindled very significantly. What happens then if the (2025 amended provision) of “Waqf by user” is applied to these graveyards in my native village which fall under Waqf properties, without detailed documentation. As per the just legislated law (Waqf Amendment Act 2025), the Hindu inheritors of these lands may claim their ownership (!!) and one can then imagine the socio-political fallout, particularly in an era of “everyday communalism”.

The older mosque of my ancestral village stands on a piece of land which belonged to a widow without any children. The rest of the plot of the land is home to the house of the legal inheritors of the donor, who possess their document of proprietorship. On and off, some other villagers, hostile to, or envious of, the descendant who owns the house (legal inheritor), keep claiming that the rest of the plot of the land (apart from that on which the mosque stands) too belongs to the Waqf (mosque). Thus, a dispute has been kept alive, intra-Muslim. The very same widow-donor is said to have donated another plot of her land and the produce from this other plot of land is s meant for the costs and upkeep (chiraghi, i.e, lighting) of the mosque. This has been all through oral endowments, not documented. If oral practice were not followed, the legal inheritor of the widow-donor could/can always reclaim the land. Recently, certain “pious” people of the village expressed their intent to sell away that part of the land so that a tall, 80-feet tall minar (spire) could be built! Without such an imposing minar, the identity of a newly arrived, affluent (neo-rich) Muslims cannot be displayed, a phenomenon that also creates a sense of awe (and dominance) among both Muslims and Hindus of the locality. This handful of demonstrably “pious” villagers — with pretensions to religious education and knowledge of the Shariah—choose to forget the fact that a Waqf land cannot be put to use for any purpose other than for what has been specified by the donor (Waqif). They also choose to forget the fact that in the face of the non-existence of any written documentation and the lack of registration of such details with the Waqf Board; or non-registration in a court of law to that effect, their step would/could encounter a big obstacle. Who would be the “seller” in the land-registration office? The seller, in such a scenario, has necessarily to be a legal inheritor of the land. That the newly constructed tall minar on the northern wall of the mosque (the metallic road touches the northern wall of the mosque, hence, it involves another question of legality) would (or could) attract the attention of Hindu religious processions and therefore it is (also) potentially explosive– another important issue– that I put aside at the moment. [On more than one occasion, some instances of communal conflict that revolve around the “spot” of religious structures in the past have also brewed on the misplaced priorities of local Muslim communities, who otherwise perennially complain of educational and economic backwardness).

Religiosity of the Waqf

Some academic works, for instance, Khalid Rashid (1978), Gregory Kozlowsky (1985), P. Munawar Husain (2021), etc., on the theme of Waqf, also throw up some important questions:

Is the creation and existence of Waqf strictly as per the Sharia? The Holy Quran makes no mention of awqaf or any institution similar to them. Abu Hanifa (AD 699-767 AD) “disapproved of the institution”?  Collections of the fatawa of religious scholars in India have contained both favourable and un-favourable statements on the institution of Waqf.

Waqf, in actual practice, was not necessarily and strictly either a charitable trust or a foundation of faith. Many of these, such as the Waqf-e-Aulad, were/are selfish practices too, besides of course, also being altruistic. In this specific category (Waqf-e-Aulad), the maximum proceeds of most of awqaf are theoretically and practically earmarked for the members of the family and kinship. Every Waqif (donor) wanted his or her offspring to inherit the fruits of that ingenuity of the [Waqf], to preserve the world of their founders.

The British Indian court’s approach towards following literal Quranic rules of inheritance made Muslim landholders carve out other “legal” ways of preserving the holdings by creating awqaf. Therefore, beginning in 1879, the High Courts of India handed down a series of decisions which overturned any endowment considered to benefit primarily the settler’s own family. The Privy Council in 1894 observed that Muslim endowments must be religious and “charitable”; public, not private. The Courts’ premise was: Muslims ought to follow their own Holy Scripture, Quran, to inherit parental assets.

Who were the mutawallis (managers) of the earliest Awqaf, viz., Khyber, Sawad (Iraq, which was then a part of Iran), and Ramlah in Palestine, founded in 912 AD) Waqf by Faiq, a eunuch, distinguished as having the earliest written record (on a stone tablet)? All of these three earliest awqaf (s) in Islamic history became non-existent due to encroachment by soldiers and other influential elites in the early centuries of Islam. “Military and political leaders gradually appropriated the territory’s income. Such encroachment on endowments was by no means rare. Though awqaf aimed at permanence, few attained it”. The Buwayhids, a family of Iranian, not Arab origin, had a hand in dismembering that [Sawad] endowment.

The creation of Waqf, in most cases — as observed by judges during British colonial rule –had more to do with circumventing the Quranically defined rights of inheritance and division/distribution of the properties (estates) and their proceeds among his/her heirs. Waqf-creation was a way of putting a complete restriction on sale and purchase of the assets/properties by the heirs.  “Waqf is a (unique)/typical phenomenon which partakes the characteristics of endowment, gift and many such sister concepts but, at the same time, stands apart”. “The removal of encroachments upon the Waqf properties is relegated to the executive wing rather than a judicial exercise. The appointment and removal of mutawallis is another complicated issue”.

In the early years of the 19th century, a number of persons from India’s Muslim elite began to convert their property into awqaf. This was a way to protect their family’s fortunes and the social prominence which accompanied it. In both kinds of awqaf, viz., Waqf-e-Aam (exclusively for charitable purposes) and Waqf-e-Aulad, through mutawllis (managers), self-interest could be both preserved and perpetuated.

In 1879, Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan (when he was in the Viceroy’s legislative council) published an article in his Urdu journal, Tazhib- al-Akhlaq, titled “A plan for saving Muslim Families from destruction and extinction” (“Ek Tadbir: Mussalmanon ke Khandanon ko Tabahi awr Barbadi se Bachaane ki“). In this article, he noted, that a Waqf was “allowed”, or “permitted” (mujaz). Could this mean that while he did not outright disapprove of the practice, he was not a vocal supporter of the institution?

Sir Syed’s four important concerns were: (a) that the property placed in a Waqf be accurately and fully described. (b) his proposal insisted that, once drawn up, a waqfnamah (deed of Waqf) be registered with the district officer or the district collector or magistrate; (c) The shares of the waqf‘s income had to be precisely laid out in the Waqfnamah. (d) Also, the succession to the office of mutawalli had to be clearly established. He wanted the Muslim waqifs to introduce significant content of charity in their waqf so that the European judges may not “mis-read” it as lacking in charity.

Ameer Ali (1849-1928) however disagreed with Sir Syed; Shibli (1857-1914) in his 21-pages long essay on Waqf-e-Aulad (1908) argued that even this form of Waqf is charitable, which endorsed Ameer Ali. Shibli’s theologically premised argument was less convincing as the Waqf-e-Aulad does not promise charity for the ordinary, common Muslim. Eventually, bending under the pressure of the Muslim orthodoxy, Sir Syed was not able to propose the draft-bill in the Imperial Legislative Council.

Interesting facts about some Indian Awqaf: A Muslim woman in Bengal even allowed her deed of Waqf to begin with an invocation to the goddess Durga. In Tamil, a mutawalli preferred to be called Dharmakarta –indigenous usage not Persio-Arabic terminology. Najiban, a tawaif of Bareilly also created a Waqf. It was only when the British Indian State ran interference that the Hoogly College[1] was established out of the Waqf created by Mohd Mohsin. The deed of the Mohd Mohsin Waqf did not have such a provision. Since the period of Caliph Umar’s (the awqaf of Khyber and Sawad), the Awqaf were always under “direct” control of the state.

India’s Waqf estates (Charitable endowments) earmarked for modern education, healthcare and similar welfare activities

Mohammad Mohsin (1732-1812) of Hooghly created a Waqf. It was only with the intervention of the East India Company (colonial) state, that the Waqf established a college in 1836 (Chinsura, West Bengal), now affiliated to the Burdwan University. This College produced alumni such as Bankim Chandra Chatterjee, Muzaffar Ahmed, ABM Habibullah, and many more in various fields, including films and sports. Subsequently, with interventions of the Calcutta reformist, Abdul Latif (d. 1893), scholarships and other stipends for students were also instituted, out of the income from the Mohsin Waqf estate.

In Haryana and Kashmir, some educational institutions are also run by Waqf, though, it is unclear, how much of the running costs are contributed by the financial grants of the Waqf Boards via the provincial government’s ministries of minority affairs. This is something that needs to be brought out more clearly.

There are many Waqfs within the Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) which provided land and scholarship to students. The noted Physicist Prof Wali Mohammad (1886-1968) is one such person who created Waqf for AMU. A students’ residential Hall (with many hostels) for engineering students, has been constructed on the Waqf land donated by Professor Wali Mohammad, in the 1990s. The Hall, meant for the Engineering students, got named after Nadim Tarin, for the reasons one fails to understand. Thus, the donor (Waqif) of the land, despite being a noted Physicist, has been sadly anonymized, almost completely erased from the history of AMU and its donors. This action was not performed by any anti-Muslim political party. There are many more Waqf lands within AMU which await a transparent acknowledgement and display (of inherited ownership) on the AMU website to ensure comprehensive wider public knowledge and also, accountability. The AMU has also been losing its lands frequently and intermittently, in one or other ways.

“Muslim waqfs and endowments are an old institution but like most other assets, have been generally mismanaged… generations past have been dissatisfied with the way Muslim Waqifs and Mutawallis,… and the governments, have handled waqf properties. Islamic governments have done no better, and in India” too the British imperialist and secular republican governments have fared no better, wrote, the economist and former Vice Chancellor of AMU, A M Khusro, in his Foreword to Khalid Rashid’s book (1978). 

Contentious legislative histories of the Waqf in India

After the failed attempt of Sir Syed in 1879, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, astute politician that he was, jumped into the Waqf fray, ostensibly to protect the interests of the Muslim landed elites who needed the Waqf Validation Act of 1913. This Act, supported by the colonial state, aimed to safeguard the landed assets of these elites, who were seen as potential allies against a growing anti-colonial movement. The Swadeshi Movement, which opposed the religious-communal partition of Bengal, had forced the colonial state to annul the (Bengal) partition in 1911-192, necessitating a political arrangement to secure Muslim support. So much so that, unlike the Sir Syed’s draft (1879), Jinnah (1913) also succeeded in getting a clause added that stated that the registration of a Waqfnamah was not mandatory.

Subsequently, Jinnah enlisted more consolidated support of Muslims through the Shariat Act of 1937 which was based on the Aurangzeb era codification of Shariat, Fatawa-e-Alamgiri of the late 17^th century. Through the Shariat Act 1937-1939, he secured hugely consolidated political support of the separatist Muslim elites and soon after, he succeeded in winning Pakistan for them. Pakistan reformed Muslim Personal Laws in March 1961. Many other Muslim countries have introduced reforms but India’s Muslims continue to resist state interference not only in the issue of the un-Quranic Instant Triple Talaq but also in the AMU’s malignant governance and gross abuse of autonomy[2]

It is also not be out of place to mention here that presently India has 32 Waqf Boards, with only Bihar and UP having separate Waqf Boards for Shias and Sunnis. The Dawoodi Bohra community, historically, has shown a preference for managing their religious properties through trusts rather than under the purview of Waqf Boards. This preference stems from their unique religious governance structure, which centralises authority in the al-Dai-al-Mutlaq.

Moral weakness of building resistance and solidarity

While the “liberal” (or, less illiberal) era of the Indian republic has often been obliging of the Muslim regressive tendencies, the current majoritarian era pursues its own divisive political agenda. For instance, it has criminalised the Instant Triple Talaq (ITT) in 2019 but did not strengthen the provisions of maintenance to the divorced women. Whereas, the Supreme Court’s verdict (in the Danial Latifi case 2001) had already clarified that the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (MWPRD) does provide for maintenance, surely the 2019 Act should have further strengthened the provision? Especially since, maintenance for the divorced women is the most crucial aspect of this issue in the sphere of both equity and rights?

Such has been the political history of India’s Muslims in the 20^th century (colonial and republican eras) and their stubbornness against state intervention to any reform that they have foregone the moral strength needed to resist the Waqf Amendment Act 2025. Worse, this kind and character of Muslim politics, particularly since the 1980s, has been identified by many scholars as a contributing factor to the rise of majoritarianism in India today. Concealing the pathetic aspect of widespread mismanagement of Waqf assets for decades, will now further deplete the moral strength required to build understanding and solidarity required to resist an unwanted law.

Pertinently, the need for a satisfactory political arrangement to safeguard any monopoly on landed assets is equally applicable for Hindu Mahanths and their Mutths. The current dispensation is not concerned about these Hindu institutions which also suffer from similar ills of non-transparent mal-functioning. Unfortunately, it is also true that the institution of Mahanths and Maths remains under-explored academically by historians of Peasant and Agrarian Relations. [Prakash Jha’s film Mrityudand (1997) attempts to depict some of the degenerative aspects of the institution of Mahanth, but this was a melodramatic depiction on celluloid].

The BJP-dominated regime has no intention of introducing a similar law to reform this Hindu institution of Mahanths’ Muths. This is therefore an additional reason why Muslim communities and justice-loving people look upon the Waqf Amendment Act 2025 with alarming concern. The legislative control that it seeks to seize gives a clear impression of targeting only Muslims with this discriminatory treatment.

Specifically, there is a real apprehension that the (amended) Act –presently under challenge—will turn into a tool to harass Muslims by the sinister and wide network of local majoritarian forces and outfits in those smaller villages and mohallas where the written deeds of Waqf and mosques are not available, as is the case with the abovementioned instance from my own ancestral village. Another alarming aspect of the Act is the Places of Worship Act, 1991 falling under the Ancient Monuments Preservation Act, 1904. According to Kapil Sibal[3] , this specific aspect was also concealed from the Members of Parliament from the Opposition, right until the day it was finally debated in the two Houses of Parliament.

Many scholars also feel that Israel –in West Asia—has also played this politics of usurping available Waqf land and thereby pursuing the politics of dispossessing the Arabs by illegitimate means. Haitam Suleiman and Robert Home in their 2010 essay demonstrate that most Waqf property within Israel has been expropriated by the Israeli state under Absentee Property Laws, a sensitive and complicated issue within the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This instance justifiably alarms India’s Muslims further, about the BJP’s intent.

Briefly, to sum up. India’s Waqf urgently need reforms in terms of actualising the maximum potential of revenue, proceeds, and its use for charitable purposes, that is, towards capacity-building for the weaker sections of the citizenry. Khalid Rashid (1978) estimated that Waqf assets actualise only a mere 3.5% of its actual promise in terms of use for charitable purposes. Waqf land need to be protected from encroachers. Waqf-loot happens with the connivance of both the state and the Muslim elite controlling the Waqf Boards.

The Act legislated in 2025 doesn’t promise any such reformatory intent not does it reflect any sincerity towards breaking this nexus (between the state and the Waqf-looting elites). Protecting the Waqf and realizing its basic objective of charity and welfare remains as elusive as ever. A more thorough and sincere implementation of the Waqf (Amendment) Act 2013 –with some amendments– would have been a more constructive step rather than legislating a new law.

Finally, it must also be notes that a large proportion of Waqf property comprises graveyards (Qabristan) which do not yield any income. A paltry section (mostly orally endowed and unregistered) Waqf assets are owned by village/Mohalla mosques (which are maintained through meagre resources or no income). These “assets” add to the quantum of property of Waqfs, but do not yield returns. This is the point that the Sachar Report (2006), which highlighted the poverty of India’s Muslim minority, failed to note. However, the Sachar Report did reveal that, “There are more than 4.9 lakh registered Wakfs [Waqf estates and assets] spread across the country but the current annual income from these properties is only about Rs.163 crores, which amounts to a meagre rate of return of 2.7 percent…. The current… market value (income to be generated out) of [these] Wakf properties can be put at Rs.1.2 lakh crore.

The present, BJP-dominated NDA-III regime, therefore, should have considered emulating Turkey whose laws of 1868 and 1924 make the Waqf institutions more robust in terms of education, healthcare, municipal and civic amenities and even in disaster relief. Politically, such an emulation may have helped the BJP outsmarting the Opposition, without creating the attendant social friction.

The author is a professor, Modern and Contemporary Indian History, Aligarh Muslim University, and author of Muslim Politics in Bihar: Changing Contours.

(This article is an expanded version of Outlook’s May 1, 2025 issue ‘Username Waqf’ where it appeared under the title, ‘A Fractured Timeline’; this is an expanded version being published at the specific request of the author, a regular columnist with Sabrangindia)

[1]  Two decades later than their first venture, the British rulers made another effort to engage Muslims in their pattern of education by taking control of the Imambada Madrasa at Hooghly run under the endowment made by Haji Mohammed Mohsin in 1806. Now it is functioning as the oldest law college in the country, named as Hooghly Mohsin College in 1937.

[2] https://www.academia.edu/127645531/UGC_Draft_Regulations_2025_Question_of_Univ_Autonomy_and_AMUs_Abuse_of_Autonomy).

[3] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VYQEyPP-A2M; Kapil Sibal Calls Waqf Bill Unconstitutional, Alleges Political Agenda

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