The scattered incidents observed around Dussehra are not, as they might first appear, spontaneous expressions of religious fervour. They are the visible markers of a deeply entrenched, highly coordinated “hate agenda.” This agenda involves a network of right-wing organisations, explicit political patronage, and the strategic co-option of state and secular institutions.

This investigation, based on an analysis of dozens of events across India in 2025, will argue that the modern Shastra Poojan campaign is a multi-pronged political project. It is designed to (1) subvert secular public spaces, including universities and police stations, (2) normalise the public display of weapons as a symbol of religious-political power, (3) provide a sanctioned platform for anti-Muslim hate speech and communal incitement, and (4) indoctrinate a new generation—targeting young girls and children—by framing violence and weapon-bearing as a religious and civic duty. This is not about faith; it is about fomenting fear, asserting dominance, and preparing the ground for future conflict.

The breach of the secular citadel: co-opting universities and state machinery

The most concerning aspect of this pattern is its audacious encroachment into spaces that are, by design, secular and non-partisan: government institutions and universities. This tactic serves a dual purpose as it legitimises the weapon-centric ritual by stamping it with the state’s seal of approval, and it simultaneously attacks the very foundations of secularism in public life.

The Rajasthan University RSS event: a microcosm of conflict

The incident at Rajasthan University (RU) on September 30, 2025, stands as a revealing example of how the ritual is being politically instrumentalised. The university administration, with the Vice-Chancellor’s approval, granted permission to the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) to hold a Shastra Poojan ceremony within the campus premises—effectively allowing a partisan socio-political organisation to occupy an academic space. This decision marked a serious institutional lapse, blurring the line between education and ideology. Reported Times of India.

The sequence that followed was both avoidable and foreseeable. Student leaders from the NSUI staged a protest against what they viewed as the communalisation of their university. The situation spiralled when a section of NSUI members reportedly vandalised the event stage set up by the RSS, triggering clashes between the two groups. 

राजस्थान यूनिवर्सिटी में RSS के कार्यक्रम के शुरू होने से पहले NSUI कार्यकर्ताओं ने मंच पर चढ़कर पोस्टर फाड़े और पोडियम गिराया

यह ताकत है कांग्रेस की संघियों देख लिया

pic.twitter.com/u4xLPyA4Xw

— Sandeep Singh (@ActivistSandeep) September 30, 2025

The police, instead of intervening impartially, allegedly stood by during the confrontation and later detained several NSUI members, including State President Vinod Jakhar. They were held for nearly 48 hours and booked under serious, unrelated charges.

Former Chief Minister Ashok Gehlot later remarked that “no action” was taken against RSS members accused of initiating the violence. 

राजस्थान विश्वविद्यालय में RSS द्वारा शस्त्र पूजा का कार्यक्रम रखना ही आपत्तिजनक है। शिक्षा के स्थान को इस तरह की राजनीतिक गतिविधियों के लिए इस्तेमाल करना कैसे उचित माना जा सकता है? जब NSUI के कार्यकताओं ने इसका विरोध किया तो पुलिस ने बल प्रयोग किया। इसके साथ ही, RSS के… pic.twitter.com/Ew6d2doKen

— Ashok Gehlot (@ashokgehlot51) September 30, 2025

The episode, in essence, reflects a chain of administrative misjudgements—had permission for such an event not been granted in the first place, the confrontation and its aftermath might never have escalated into a larger controversy. The Rajasthan University incident thus encapsulates a troubling pattern that secular institutions are being repurposed as ideological venues, dissent is criminalised, and impunity becomes institutionalised.

State sanction from law enforcement: the Gwalior police incident

If the RU incident demonstrates the subversion of education, the events in Gwalior, Madhya Pradesh, demonstrate the co-option of law enforcement itself. On October 2, 2025, At the DRP line, a Shastra Poojan event was not just permitted; it was actively participated in by the highest-ranking police officials. The Inspector General (IG), Deputy Inspector General (DIG), and Superintendent of Police (SP) were all present, firing celebratory shots from service weapons. The event was further legitimised by the presence of top political figures, including Assembly Speaker Narendra Singh Tomar, as Dainik Bhaskar reported.

This event shatters the illusion of a neutral police force. When the state’s guardians of law—those entrusted with a monopoly on legitimate violence—publicly and ritualistically worship weapons alongside partisan politicians, the line between law enforcement and ideological militia evaporates. It sends an unambiguous message to the public and to the officers themselves: the state’s power and the party’s ideology are one and the same. On many occasions, police permissions are granted because, in many cases, the police themselves are participants.

The organisational machinery:  coordinated national campaign

The incidents might appear as “scattered incidents” actually belies the reality of a highly coordinated, nationwide campaign. The list of events from September and October 2025 reveals a clear organisational footprint, dominated by a familiar network of Hindutva groups. This is not a grassroots phenomenon but a top-down strategy.

The key players: VHP, Bajrang Dal, AHP, and Durga Vahini

The key organising force behind this nationwide campaign appears to be the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) and its youth wing, the Bajrang Dal. Their operational footprint is vast, creating a dense cluster of events across Madhya Pradesh. 

On October 2, in Indore, they conducted a Shastra Pujan displaying and worshipping swords and guns. 

This was mirrored in multiple Bhopal events on October 2, including one on Vijay Dashami where dozens of guns and swords were displayed and a speaker called weapons “essential for the protection of dharma” while peddling “love jihad” conspiracies.

On October 2, at another Bhopal event participants brandished guns and swords, chanting, “Who will protect the country, women, and cows? We will.” 

The pattern continued in Sihora, Jabalpur on October 2, where members brandished guns and swords while speakers justified keeping weapons for self-defense.

On September 29, a similar event unfolded in Bina Etawa, which also featured members brandishing guns and swords as speakers justified weapon possession for self-defense.

This template was replicated across the country. On October 2, in Agra, Uttar Pradesh guns and swords were worshipped and religious slogans were raised. 

Likewise in Jammu participants worshipped guns and swords and raised religious slogans on October 2, 2025

In Odisha, VHP-Bajrang Dal events followed the same script. The event in Godabhaga, involved brandishing and worshipping weapons. 

On October 2, the ceremony in Gudbhela also involved displaying and worshipping weapons.

On October 2, in Dhanakauda, a rally was held after the puja where participants brandished their weapons.

Operating in parallel, on October 2, the Antarrashtriya Hindu Parishad (AHP) and its arm, the Rashtriya Bajrang Dal, led by Pravin Togadia, organised their own series of weapon worship events. Togadia glorified the Babri Masjid demolition, calling it “an act of bravery,” and declared, “Until we started the Ram Mandir movement, only temples were demolished and mosques built over them. This was the first time we demolished that Babri structure and made a temple.” He warned, “To the dreamers of Ghazwa-e-Hind, remember — it is on your chest we built the Ram Mandir. That is just the start; Kashi and Mathura are waiting to be constructed on your chests.”

On September 28, in Mandla, Madhya Pradesh, their ceremony involved public processions and martial demonstrations with weapons. 

On September 28, in nearby Seoni, MP, their event also included a procession with members brandishing swords, while a speaker justified violence in the name of religion by citing religious texts. 

On September 30, in Simbhaoli Hapur, Uttar Pradesh, AHP leader Gaurav Raghav explicitly linked the ritual to protecting “dharma, daughters and sisters, and cows,” peddled the “Love Jihad” conspiracy, and urged followers to arm themselves against “Jihadis.”

Targeting women and children: the role of Durga Vahini

Crucially, the concern about “young girl students being manipulated” is substantiated by the central role of the VHP’s women’s wing, Durga Vahini, and its partner group, Matru Shakti. Their involvement is a deliberate strategy to frame weaponisation as “empowerment” and “self-protection.”

• On September 28, in Rampura, Neemuch (MP), Durga Vahini and Matru Shakti members organised Shastra Puja at multiple Garba pandals, brandishing weapons.

• On September 26, in Hatta, Damoh (MP), a VHP-Bajrang Dal event explicitly “involved children in exhibiting weapons,” with Durga Vahini members in attendance

• On October 2, in Adegaon, Seoni (MP), VHP, Bajrang Dal, Matrushakti, and Durga Vahini organised a program where “young children and girls” worshipped swords.

• On September 30, in Jamshedpur, Jharkhand, a VHP-Durga Vahini event on Durga Ashtami, attended by “large numbers of women and children,” featured speakers who peddled the “love jihad” conspiracy, explicitly linking the need for such “awareness” to the Vahini’s founding.

This organisational synergy, replicated from state to state, proves that these are not isolated events. They are the planned execution of a national agenda, sharing a common script, common targets, and a common goal.

From ritual to rhetoric: the weaponisation of hate speech

This leads to the crux of the matter: these events “evolve into platforms for hate speech and inflammatory remarks.” The Shastra Poojan is merely the stage; the main performance is the propagation of communal hatred and open calls for violence. The weapons are not just symbolic props; they are a backdrop that physically underscores the violent rhetoric being delivered.

A platform for vile, anti-Muslim incitement

The speeches delivered at these events are not subtle. They are direct, eliminationist, and consistently target the Muslim community.

• Bhopal, MP (Sadhvi Pragya): On September 28, at a VHP-Durga Vahini event, former BJP MP Sadhvi Pragya Singh Thakur delivered a virulently anti-Muslim speech. She urged Hindus to “assault non-Hindu sellers” near temples, referred to all Muslims as “jihadis,” and claimed they “could never consider Hindu women as sisters”

This speech was given in front of an arsenal of displayed guns, swords, and other weapons.

• Indore, MP (Tannu Sharma): On October 1, VHP-Bajrang Dal leader Tannu Sharma used his Shastra Pujan speech to promote the “love jihad” conspiracy in its most graphic form, claiming Muslim men are “trained in mosques to target Hindu girls” for trafficking and to be used as “baby-making instruments.” He then issued a direct call for beheading: “He urged Hindu women to follow Kalka Mata and ‘behead’ anyone who dares to target them”

• Kanpur, UP (Madhuram Sharan Shiva): October 3, at a Ramlila forum, the leader of the “armed-monks group” Shiva Shakti Akhada, Madhuram Sharan Shiva, declared, “To destroy sin, the sinner must be destroyed.” He explicitly called on youth to “fight and eliminate ‘jihadis,’ likening them to demons (rakshas).”

Mainstreaming conspiracy and glorifying violence

The hate speech is built upon a foundation of well-worn conspiracy theories and the glorification of past violence.

• “Love Jihad” and “Land Jihad”: This theme is ubiquitous. On September 30, in Hapur, UP, AHP leader Gaurav Raghav linked the ritual to protecting “dharma, daughters and sisters” and peddled the “Love Jihad” theory to justify arming against “Jihadis”

October 2, in Nagod, Satna (MP), a VHP-Bajrang Dal speaker, with guns displayed on stage, targeted Muslims by invoking both “love jihad” and “land jihad” conspiracies.

• Glorifying Babri Demolition: October 2, in Surat, Gujarat, AHP President Pravin Togadia used a “Trishul Deeksha” event to glorify the Babri Masjid demolition as an “act of bravery.” He then issued a direct threat for future action: “That is just the start; Kashi and Mathura are waiting to be constructed on your chests.”

• Worshipping Godse: The glorification extends even to the assassin of Mahatma Gandhi. October 2, in Ahmedabad, Gujarat, the Hindu Sena held a Shastra Pujan “chanting slogans in praise of Nathuram Godse.” 

This was repeated in Ujjain, MP on October 2, where Hindu nationalists “worshipped weapons and a portrait of Nathuram Godse.”

This evidence confirms the analysis completely. The Shastra Poojan is the legitimising framework for events whose primary purpose is to spread hate, dehumanise Muslims, and openly call for their elimination, all while normalising violence as a sacred duty. This directly leads to events like the Cuttack clashes and other riots, as the weapons and the incitement from these events spill over into the streets.

A pedagogy of violence: indoctrinating the next generation

Perhaps the most insidious component of this agenda is the focus on “young girl students” and children. This is not about self-protection; it is a systematic “pedagogy of violence.” It seeks to indoctrinate children at their most impressionable age, severing their connection to a secular society and re-forging their identity around the twin poles of weaponry and communal hatred.

The evidence for this is widespread and deeply disturbing.

• Giving weapons to children: On October 2, in Ujjain, MP, the indoctrination was explicit: “swords were given to young girls.” 

On September 26, in Hatta, Damoh (MP), “Children were involved in exhibiting weapons” at a VHP-Bajrang Dal-Durga Vahini event.

• Martial demonstrations: On September 29, in Udaipura, Raisen (MP), a VHP-Matrushakti event featured “many children performing martial demonstrations using” weapons.

This was also seen in Mandla, MP on September 28, at an AHP-Rashtriya Bajrang Dal event. This normalises the weapon as an extension of the child’s body.

• Chants of hatred: The indoctrination is both physical and verbal. On October 2, in Maharashtra, far-right influencer Sangram Bapu Bhandare, at a Shiv Pratisthan Hindusthan Shastra Pooja, “led armed children in chanting, ‘Tu Durga ban, tu Kali ban, kabhi na burke wali ban’ (You become Durga, you become Kali, never become one in a burqa. This is a direct, hateful chant that pits one religious identity against another, taught to armed children.

• Posing with weapons: On October 1, in another event in Maharashtra, “Children, including young girls, posed with trishuls” under the guidance of an AHP leader. 

On October 2, in Adegaon, Seoni (MP), “young children and girls” were documented worshipping swords.

This strategy aims to create a future generation for whom public weapon-bearing is normal, communal hatred is righteous, and violence is a celebrated tool for religious assertion. It is a long-term project to ensure the pipeline of cadres for this extremist agenda never runs dry.

The architecture of impunity: egal legality and political patronage

The legal basis for stopping these events is clear, rooted in existing statutes that are routinely ignored. The core of the issue lies in The Arms Act, 1959, which is not just about firearms.

• Section 2(1)(c) defines “arms” to include “sharp-edged and other deadly weapons… as the Central Government may… specify.”
• Section 4 strictly prohibits the acquisition or possession of any firearm without a license.
• Section 5 controls the manufacture, sale, and transfer of arms.

The argument that trishuls are merely “religious symbols” is a deliberate smokescreen, one that has been legally challenged and documented for decades. Reports from as far back as 2003 noted that items distributed at Trishul Deeksha events were often “cleverly disguised Rampuri knives, six–eight inches long and sharp enough to kill.” This led the Rajasthan state government itself, in April 2003, to issue a notification “prohibiting people from distributing, acquiring, possessing or carrying double or multi-bladed sharp pointed weapons” as per a report in The Times of India.

This ban was openly defied by organisations like the VHP, setting a long-standing precedent of conflict between these events and state law. The illegality extends far beyond just possession. The Arms Act provides clear authority for law enforcement to act:

• Section 20 allows police to arrest anyone “carrying or conveying any arms under suspicious circumstance” without a warrant.
• Section 22 empowers the District Magistrate to order a search and seizure of any arms believed to be for an “unlawful purpose.”
• Section 25 outlines punishment for the unlicensed sale or transfer of arms.

The claim that these processions are protected as an “essential religious practice” under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution has also been tested and refuted by the Supreme Court. In the landmark 1983 case Acharya Jagdishwaranand Avadhuta v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta (1983) 4 SCC 522, the Court ruled that the Ananda Marga’s Tandava dance with items including a trishul and a knife was not an essential religious rite that could be performed in a public procession. 

The Court affirmed that such public displays are subject to regulation by the state for “public order,” a precedent that directly applies to today’s armed processions.

The copy of judgement Acharya Jagdishwaranand Avadhuta v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta (1983) can be found here

Despite this clear legal framework, attempts to enforce it on a macro level have been thwarted, contributing to the architecture of impunity. 

Following widespread communal violence during Ram Navami processions in 2022, a PIL was filed in the Supreme Court by Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP) in May 2022. This petition sought the creation of national guidelines to regulate these armed religious processions.

The plea was dismissed by the Supreme Court on December 9, 2022. The bench, led by Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, declared that law and order is a “state subject” and that the court could not be “dragged into every area.” The court also remarked that one should not “portray that all religious festivals are the time for riots.” 

This dismissal effectively denied a national-level regulatory framework, placing the onus back on the same state and district-level authorities—the DMs and police—who, as seen in Gwalior and Rajasthan University, are often participants or enablers. This judicial deference, while procedurally sound, in practice grants a free pass, ensuring that the law remains on the books but is rarely, if ever, enforced on the streets.

The argument that these are merely “religious symbols” like trishuls is a deliberate smokescreen. The evidence from 2025 shows this is patently false. These events openly and proudly feature modern firearms, transforming the ritual into a menacing display of force.

• Guns and Rifles as centrepieces: The public display of firearms is a consistent theme. 

On October 2, in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, a VHP-Bajrang Dal event on Vijay Dashami saw participants displaying “dozens of guns, swords, and other weapons.” 

On September 28, at another Bhopal event featuring ex-MP Sadhvi Pragya Thakur, the proceedings “also featured guns, swords, and other weapons” as a backdrop to her inflammatory speech.

On October 2, in Indore, Madhya Pradesh, a VHP-Bajrang Dal Shastra Pujan involved the worship and display of “swords, guns and other weapons.”

This was mirrored in Jammu, where on October 2, VHP and Bajrang Dal members organised a Shastra Pujan “worshipping swords, guns, and other weapons” 

On October 2, in Agra, Uttar Pradesh, a VHP-Bajrang Dal event was characterised by the “displaying [of] guns, swords and other weapons.”

On October 2, in Varanasi, Uttar Pradesh, an AHP and Rashtriya Bajrang Dal procession “worshipped and displayed guns, swords and other weapons.” 

On September 29, in Bina Etawa, Madhya Pradesh, VHP-Bajrang Dal members “brandished guns and swords.”

On October 2, in Nagod, Satna (MP), a VHP-Bajrang Dal event featured “several guns on stage” while speakers targeted Muslims.

• Political displays of massive firepower: This display of weaponry is not limited to militant organisations; it is also a tool for political strong-arming. On October 2, in Kunda, Uttar Pradesh, the event was a staggering show of force at the residence of a sitting politician. MLA Raghuraj Pratap Singh, popularly known as Raja Bhaiya, “held a Shastra Pujan displaying hundreds of guns and rifles at his residence.”

This act, involving an arsenal far beyond any symbolic need, demonstrates a fusion of political power and a capacity for violence, sending an unambiguous message of dominance.

The mass distribution of trishuls, particularly in states like Rajasthan, also contravenes the law, as these are often sharpened and designed as weapons. But the open display of hundreds of unlicensed (or even licensed) firearms in a public, politically charged gathering is a blatant violation of The Arms Act and provisions of the CrPC related to unlawful assembly.

The enablers: political patronage and state impunity

This illegality thrives because it is protected from above. The involvement of “influential figures—MPs, MLAs, and politicians” is not a suspicion; it is a documented fact.

• Elected officials: MLA Raja Bhaiya (Kunda, UP), Assembly Speaker Narendra Singh Tomar (Gwalior, MP), and ex-MP Sadhvi Pragya Thakur (Bhopal, MP) all actively participated in and legitimised these events.
• Government Llegitimisation: A key part of this legitimisation is the government’s formal decision to lift long-standing bans on employees participating in such events, removing any professional consequence for state actors who align with this agenda. This process reversed decades of policy. The initial ban, which barred central government employees from participating in the activities of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), was first imposed on November 30, 1966, and pointedly reiterated on October 28, 1980, to ensure a secular outlook in the bureaucracy. 

This 58-year-old prohibition was officially lifted by the central government via an office memorandum from the Department of Personnel and Training on July 9, 2024. This move paved the way for state governments, such as the BJP-led government in Rajasthan, which, around August 24, 2024, issued its own circular lifting a similar 52-year-old ban, thereby granting explicit permission for state employees to participate in RSS activities. As per reports in the The Hindu.

• Systemic impunity: The “no legal action” outcome is the rule, not the exception. The Rajasthan University incident is the most damning proof that the victims are jailed, and the attackers walk free. In Cuttack, as has been noted, rioters with weapons faced no consequences. This is a deliberate tactic, one that draws parallels to the Gujarat Riots: the state machinery steps back (or actively assists) to allow “religious celebrations” to morph into organised violence, knowing that the legal system will be deployed to protect the perpetrators and punish any resistance.

This is how permissions are granted. This is how the law is ignored. The agenda is state-sanctioned, protected by powerful politicians, and enforced by a compromised or complicit law enforcement and legal system.

A year of weaponised faith: the continuum from Ram Navami to Ganpati

While the Shastra Poojan events of Dussehra 2025 present the most recent manifestation of this trend, they are merely the crescendo of a year-long symphony of hate. To view them in isolation is to miss the systemic nature of the rot. An analysis of events stretching back through 2025—encompassing Ram Navami, Ganpati Visarjan, and Durga Puja—reveals that the weaponisation of religious festivals is no longer an anomaly, it has become the standard operating procedure of the right-wing outfits. 

This sustained aggression is not accidental. It is the inevitable yield of over a decade of the current regime’s governance, a period characterised by the systematic dismantling of constitutional values and the emboldening of majoritarian forces. The frequency and ferocity of these displays are direct metrics of how deeply the “Hindu Rashtra” project has penetrated the social fabric, sanctified by political patronage and shielded by a compromised state machinery.

The Ganpati festival: from devotion to macabre propaganda

The Ganpati festival in September 2025 witnessed a disturbing shift where the celebration of the deity was side-lined for the promotion of gruesome political propaganda. 

In Madhya Pradesh, a state that has become a laboratory for right-rings’ experimentation, religious tableaux (jhankis) were utilised to broadcast graphic Islamophobic imagery. In Mahidpur, Ujjain, on September 5, a tableau explicitly promoted the “Love Jihad” conspiracy theory, depicting Muslim men slaughtering women. This was not a subtle dog whistle but a visual scream designed to provoke, leading inevitably to communal tension and stone-pelting. 

In Mahadevgarh, Khandwa, on September 5, another tableau featured a refrigerator with mutilated dolls—a crude exploitation of a high-profile murder case—to suggest that Muslim men are inherent butchers of women. 

In Kasravad, Khargone, on September 7, similar gory visuals were paraded through the streets. These were not religious processions; they were mobile hate-speech units, designed to instil fear in minorities and radicalise the majority, turning a festival of joy into a procession of trauma. 

The “Decade Plus” of impunity: the state as an extension of the mob 

This was explicitly articulated in Karnataka during the Ganpati Visarjan. In Raichur, on September 16, VHP-Bajrang Dal State Convenor Shivananda Sattigeri delivered a speech that stripped away any remaining veneer of the rule of law. He did not just threaten violence; he claimed ownership of the state apparatus, asserting that “the police and army are all Hindus” and that the Prime Minister is aligned with the RSS. He threatened to “chop off the hands” of dissenters and warned that legal challengers would be “beaten and sent to Pakistan.” 

The rhetoric is echoed by elected representatives, further blurring the lines. On September 10, in Maddur, Mandya, BJP MLC C.T. Ravi publicly threatened Muslims with “beheading” and “cutting,” reminding them of the consequences of “showing strength.” When lawmakers speak the language of lynch mobs, the weaponisation of festivals ceases to be a law-and-order issue and becomes a state-sponsored project of intimidation. 

Durga Puja: the gendered radicalisation 

The narrative of 2025 also highlights how this weaponisation is deeply gendered, using the imagery of the Goddess to militarise women and children against a fabricated “other.” During the Durga Puja festivities, the VHP and its wings, Durga Vahini and Matru Shakti, intensified their campaign to frame Muslim men as existential threats. 

In Gaya, Bihar, on September 30, women were made to brandish weapons, while in Jamshedpur, Jharkhand, on the same day, speakers used the platform of Durga Ashtami to peddle “Love Jihad” conspiracies to a captive audience of women and children. The message was clear: your faith requires you to be armed. 

This indoctrination has reached the level of hate-filled conditioning for children. 

In Maharashtra, on October 2, far-right influencer Sangram Bapu Bhandare led armed children in a chant that pitted the identity of the Goddess against the identity of the Muslim woman: “Tu Durga ban, tu Kali ban, kabhi na burke wali ban” (Become Durga, become Kali, never become the one in the burqa). By weaving hate into the rhymes and rituals of children, the regime’s ideological affiliates are ensuring that the cycle of violence continues well beyond the current political tenure. 

The calendar of hate: how a decade of impunity weaponised 2025

The festivals of 2025 have ceased to be mere celebrations of faith but they have morphed into a synchronised calendar of intimidation. This year’s timeline—stretching from the aggressive posturing of Ram Navami, through the macabre tableaux of Ganpati Visarjan, to the open weaponisation of Durga Puja—reveals a terrifying new normal. 

In Madhya Pradesh, the sanctity of Ganesh Chaturthi was desecrated by floats depicting gruesomely mutilated women, designed solely to incite anti-Muslim hysteria under the guise of “Love Jihad.” In Karnataka, the mask of democracy slipped entirely when BJP leaders publicly threatened beheadings, and VHP convenors declared the police and army to be extensions of the RSS.

This unchecked aggression is not spontaneous but it is the toxic harvest of a “Decade Plus” of the current regime. Ten years of majoritarian party rule have systematically dismantled the firewall between the state and the street. 

The normalisation of a violent public square

The 2025 Shastra Poojan campaign, as documented here, is not an expression of Hindu faith. It is the tactical expression of a political agenda that views violence, intimidation, and communal hatred as legitimate tools. It is the “weapon agenda” in its most tactical form.

The evidence is overwhelming. We are witnessing a systematic effort to subvert India’s secular institutions, transforming universities into ideological battlegrounds (Rajasthan University) and police forces into partisan participants (Gwalior). We are seeing a coordinated, nationwide campaign by the VHP, Bajrang Dal, and AHP to use these events as platforms for the vilest, eliminationist hate speech, explicitly calling for the assault (“assault non-Hindu sellers”) and murder (“behead,” “eliminate jihadis”) of Muslims.

Most chillingly, we are watching the deliberate indoctrination of children. By placing swords in the hands of young girls (Ujjain), making children chant anti-Muslim slogans (Maharashtra), and having them perform martial demonstrations (Udaipura), this agenda is attempting to create a new generation for whom violence is not just normal but sacred.

This entire enterprise is shielded by a formidable architecture of political impunity, where MLAs (Raja Bhaiya), MPs (Sadhvi Pragya), and Assembly Speakers (Narendra Singh Tomar) provide cover. The law is rendered meaningless, as police either participate in the rituals or, as seen in Rajasthan, arrest the very students protesting the illegality.

This is the terrain. The ritual of Shastra Poojan has become the chosen vehicle for normalising violence, mainstreaming hate, and asserting a militant religious supremacy over the public sphere. The parallel to pre-riot tactics in places like Gujarat is not just an academic reflection, it is a clear and present warning.

When a mob leader can openly claim the state apparatus as “theirs” without fear of arrest, it proves that impunity has been institutionalised. The most chilling aspect of this year’s agenda was the targeted radicalisation of families, women brandishing swords and children chanting hate before they can fully understand faith. 

We are witnessing the solidification of a “militant piety,” where the sword replaces the prayer, and the Constitution is quietly suspended in favour of the rule of the mob. These incidents stand as a warning that the secular citadel is not just being breached, it is being dismantled, festival by festival, under the protective gaze of the state.

Related:

Speaker at VHP weapon worship event openly targets the religious minorities of India, calls them top enemies

Arm yourself with knowledge, not tridents, swords or knives

FIR over hate speech and brandishing of swords at Udupi Durga Daud event

The post The ‘Shastra Poojan’ Project: How the ritual of weapon worship is being recast as a tool of power and hate propaganda appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Relentless attacks carried out by right-wing outfits inside churches in Madhya Pradesh, resulting in violence, have surfaced this week ahead of Christmas. On Monday, December 22, a controversy over alleged religious conversion of visually impaired students escalated into a political flashpoint in Jabalpur after a video surfaced showing a local BJP functionary in a physical altercation with a visually impaired woman inside church premises.

The incident occurred at a church located behind Hawabagh Women’s College, where members of several right-wing organisations, accompanied by BJP district vice-president Anju Bhargava, entered the premises alleging that visually impaired children were being coerced into religious conversion. The allegations triggered a confrontation inside the church, culminating in scenes later captured on mobile phones and widely circulated on social media.

Viral footage available on social media shows Bhargava confronting a visually impaired woman seated inside the church. At one point, Bhargava is seen violently holding the woman’s face and engaging in a heated exchange. At this point, the woman responds by grabbing and twisting Bhargava’s arm, repeatedly asking her not to touch her and to speak without physical contact. Other people present intervene as tempers flare, following which police arrive at the spot and defuse the situation.

Meanwhile, in Odisha, lumpens on the loose are evident in a social media that shows a group of men bullied and arm twisted street vendors in Odisha, objecting to their sale of Santa hats on the occasion of Christmas. A video of this assault has gone viral on social media. It shows the men getting out of a white car, with one of them – dressed in an all-yellow ensemble – asking the vendors where they are from, what their religion is, before shouting at them for selling the hats.

The Video may be viewed here

This is what BJP’s ‘New India’ looks like in 2025. A de facto ban on Christmas in Odisha, enforced by mobs emboldened by power.

Poor roadside vendors selling Santa hats are being harassed, bullied, and threatened by self-appointed custodians of religion who arrogantly declare… pic.twitter.com/c2avKGB0Jz

— All India Trinamool Congress (@AITCofficial) December 23, 2025

In Delhi too, Bajrang Dal goons were seen abusing women who sported Santa hats

In Odisha, a group of men questioned street vendors in Odisha for selling Santa hats. In Delhi’s Lajpat Nagar, the Bajrang Dal cornered women and children in Santa caps, accusing them of attempting to convert people. In Madhya Pradesh’s Jabalpur, a BJP leader harassed a visually… pic.twitter.com/kuvJwzVa84

— Spot On (@Spotnews_media) December 23, 2025

According to police officials, related to the attacks in Madhya Pradesh –specifically the one at Hawabagh National College—the gathering involved visually impaired students who had been invited for a meal as part of Christmas-related charitable outreach by members of the Christian community. The students told officials that they had been brought from a government-run hostel for lunch and prayers, and denied any attempt at religious conversion. “At this stage, there is no evidence of forced conversion. Statements of the students are being recorded,” a senior police officer said, adding that the children were safely sent back after the commotion.

This has not deterred right-wing organisations from “lodging a complaint”, questioning how students from a government hostel were taken to a religious site without prior intimation to authorities. They have also alleged that prayers conducted at the venue were exclusively Christian in nature and claimed that non-vegetarian food was served.

This is the second such incident in Jabalpur this week. On Sunday morning, December 21, a prayer service at a church in Madhotal descended into mayhem after members of a right-wing organisation entered the premises, leading to violent confrontations and multiple detentions. The confrontation occurred around 11 am at a church near Shiv Shakti Nagar, where a prayer meeting was underway. What began as questioning about the size and composition of the congregation quickly escalated into physical violence, with chairs thrown and slogans shouted inside the place of worship.

Members of the Hindu Seva Parishad allege they approached the church after receiving information about an unusually large gathering that included attendees from outside districts. They claim they were questioning potential religious conversion activities when violence erupted.

Worshippers present at the service tell a markedly different story. They assert that 15 to 20 young men forcibly entered the church during prayers, chanting “Jai Shri Ram” and creating panic among the congregation.  According to media reports Jitendra Barman, who was present during the incident, stated: “Worship of the Lord happens in the church, not conversion. For years, people have been coming here of their own will and praying. Today when the prayer meeting was going on, young men barged in shouting. They assaulted women and children.”

Police said several youths were detained for creating a disturbance, and investigators are working to establish the sequence of events based on testimonies from both sides.

Senior journalist Rajdeep Sardesai has tweeted this on X:

Have been receiving a few videos of Christians being threatened ahead of Xmas. This verified video has shocked and angered me. A BJP district vice president Anju Bhargav assaulted and abused a visually impaired girl in MP’s Jabalpur, claiming she was enabling ‘religious… pic.twitter.com/2O4k1eqX9b

— Rajdeep Sardesai (@sardesairajdeep) December 23, 2025

Related:

No right to live, or die: Christians in Chhattisgarh, and India under attack

Christians face escalating attacks as far-right Hindu groups intensify persecution

Tensions rise as Chhattisgarh sees frequent attacks on Christians

The post MP, Odisha, Delhi, Rajasthan: Right-wing outfits barge into 2 churches ahead of Christmas, attack vendors selling X’mas goodies, tensions run high appeared first on SabrangIndia.

According to the latest available data, in 2024 alone, a comprehensive survey by India Hate Lab (IHL) documented 1,165 in-person hate-speech events targeting religious minorities across India, marking a 74.4 percent rise from the 668 incidents recorded in 2023. A significant number of these incidents occurred in states governed by the ruling coalition, underlining the geographic and political concentration of communal hate mobilisation. Many of these hate-speech events including rallies, processions, public speeches, and nationalist gatherings were accompanied by social-media amplification, transforming offline aggression into widely visible and shared public spectacle. At the same time, India is entering a high-stakes electoral cycle in 2025–2026, with state assembly elections scheduled in key states such as Delhi, Bihar, Assam, Kerala, West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, and Puducherry. This convergence of rising hate speech, online amplification and election-era mobilisation has created a volatile environment in which ordinary citizens increasingly act as self-appointed enforcers of identity and morality, often targeting religious minorities under the guise of vigilante zeal. Reported NDTV.

These dynamics now play out not only through speeches or online rhetoric, but through direct interference in everyday life. Across markets, highways, neighbourhoods, schools and private homes, civilians have increasingly taken on roles that mimic policing functions. They stop individuals from demanding proof of citizenship or religious identity, supervise what businesses may sell or display, disrupt prayer gatherings inside homes or churches, compel public chanting of religious slogans, and enforce boycotts against minority traders. In several cases, these acts escalate into physical violence, public humiliation, or forced displacement. The presence of cameras and mobile phones has added another layer to the intimidation; confrontations are recorded and circulated as proof of ideological performance, converting harassment into spectacle. Police responses frequently blur the line between enforcement and endorsement, with officers either standing by during mob action, detaining victims after vigilante complaints, or acting only once public pressure mounts. Within this landscape, the distinction between civilian vigilantism and state authority weakens, leaving targets without clear avenues of protection while aggressors operate with growing confidence that their actions fall within tolerated political behaviour.

The incidents documented across states fall broadly into six categories: vigilante violence; economic harassment and boycott; raids on prayer meetings; identity policing and forced slogans; evictions and demolitions; and patterns of state response and police complicity.

Vigilante violence

Across states, groups identifying themselves as cow-protection or majoritarian outfits have moved from episodic intimidation to repeated physical enforcement on public roads, markets and transit routes. These actions take several common forms. Perpetrators intercept transporters and vendors, they detain and humiliate people on the spot, they physically assault those who resist, and they record and circulate the confrontation to amplify the act. The incidents collected here show that such attacks are not isolated. They recur in different states, follow similar scripts, and often end with victims being punished while perpetrators face little immediate consequence.

In Maharashtra on September 24, 2025, two cattle transporters – one Hindu and one Muslim – were intercepted and assaulted; a later video shows the victims forced to apologise as their cattle were taken away. In Sambhajinagar on November 10, 2025, a vigilante named Shobhraj Patil is recorded slapping and kicking a Muslim cattle transporter and verbally abusing others who were made to sit on the ground; other Bajrang Dal members restrained Patil only after the violence escalated. On November 12, 2025, In Balikuda, Jagatsinghpur, members of the Bajrang Dal and Hindu Sena entered a Muslim neighbourhood armed with sticks and, following their complaint, police confiscated meat for “investigation”; there is no contemporaneous record of action against the groups that forced entry.

Vigilante attacks also target traders. On November 2, 2025 in Ludhiana, Gau Raksha Dal members raided a biryani shop on beef allegations, detained the owner and handed him to police. In Hisar on November 4, 2025, a Bajrang Dal activist identified by local reporting assaulted a meat vendor for opening on a Tuesday and forced the vendor to chant “Jai Shri Ram,” an episode that was filmed and circulated – The Tribune reported. In Indore on November 10, 2025, Members of the Bajrang Dal assaulted a Muslim gym trainer after seeing him driving with a Hindu woman, accusing him of “luring” Hindu women. Despite the woman defending him and no formal complaint being lodged by her, the police allegedly transferred the case between police stations citing jurisdiction issues and ultimately sent the gym trainer to jail under restrictive legal sections. No reported police action against the vigilante attackers was available at the time of documentation.

The interplay between vigilante coercion and state action is evident in Damoh, Madhya Pradesh. On November 2, 2025, following pressure from far-right groups and cow vigilantes, police publicly paraded nine Muslim men accused of cow slaughter, despite statements from local butchers that the animal involved was a buffalo. In the local butcher market, vigilantes allegedly attacked with sticks while accusing traders of cow slaughter, leading to clashes. Police action was taken only against the Muslim men, who were jailed under provisions of the Animal Cruelty Act, even as officials later described the slaughtered animal as a buffalo calf. No action against the vigilante attackers was reported at the time of documentation. That sequence shows how vigilante pressure can shape law enforcement responses and how public parading becomes a tool of humiliation rather than a neutral investigatory procedure.

Legally these incidents implicate offences such as assault, criminal intimidation, trespass and unlawful assembly. These attacks also raise serious constitutional concerns about arbitrary deprivation of liberty when arrests follow vigilante complaints rather than independent police inquiry. The recorded habit of filming and broadcasting confrontations converts private violence into public spectacle, and that publicity frequently insulates perpetrators by forcing rapid public narratives that favour the aggressors. Across the documented cases, police responses range from delayed intervention to actions that appear to prioritise complaints lodged by vigilante groups rather than protecting those they have attacked. That pattern underlines why vigilante violence in the present period cannot be treated as random crime. It must be understood as a coordinated set of practices that enforce ideological norms through force, humiliation and selective use of formal law enforcement.

Harassment, Economic Intimidation and Boycott

Across multiple states, economic life has become a stage for enforcing majoritarian identity rules. Markets, roadside stalls and ordinary workplaces have turned into sites where Hindutva groups and sympathisers dictate who may trade, which foods may be sold, what symbols may be displayed and how Muslim vendors must present themselves in order to remain in business. These interventions do not involve claims of law and order. They operate through intimidation, accusations of deception and appeals to communal purity, all of which seek to restrict the economic presence of Muslims in public spaces. The incidents recorded here show that harassment often comes first, followed by pressure on police or local authorities to legitimise the exclusion.

In Ludhiana on November 2 2025, members of the Gau Raksha Dal stormed a biryani shop, accused the shopkeeper of selling beef and detained him before handing him to police. The manner of the raid reflects a broader trend in which Hindutva groups conduct their own inspections and arrests, treating Muslim-run establishments as inherently suspect while assuming the authority to punish on the spot. Police treatment of the incident focused on the allegation of beef sale rather than the unlawful detention and intimidation carried out by the vigilantes.

Economic policing is even more overt in Dehradun, where on November 14 2025, Kali Sena leaders publicly confronted a Muslim contractor who managed a dry-fruit stall. The men accused him of engaging in what they termed “mungfali jihad,” claiming that Hindu vendors and a calendar displaying a Hindu deity were being used to deceive customers. The language deployed in the confrontation draws directly from Hindutva propaganda that imagines Muslim economic activity as a covert threat. No action was taken on the leaders who staged the intimidation, although the harassment was filmed and circulated.

In Mapusa, Goa, on  October 3, 2025 far-right men harassed a Muslim shopkeeper and his staff, insisting that they present themselves as visibly Muslim by adopting green colour, changing their names and refraining from touching the picture of a Hindu deity displayed in the shop. That episode shows how Hindutva surveillance extends into everyday bodily behaviour and demands that Muslims perform identity as perceived by majoritarian norms. The threats were issued in the presence of staff and customers, yet there is no record of police intervention.

In Delhi’s Gokulpuri area on November 27, 2025, Hindu nationalist supporters forcibly shut down meat shops on the grounds that a temple was nearby. The idea that Muslim vendors should not operate in proximity to Hindu religious sites has become a recurring argument in Hindutva campaigns that seek to push Muslims out of mixed localities. The forced closures left vendors without income for the day and reinforced the message that their right to livelihood is conditional on the whims of majoritarian groups rather than equal protection under law.

These incidents illustrate a pattern in which economic activity becomes an arena for enforcing communal boundaries. They reflect a deliberate strategy within Hindutva politics to curtail Muslim economic visibility and participation. The absence of police action against harassers and the willingness of authorities to act on vigilante complaints further institutionalise these informal boycotts. Through repeated intimidation and public humiliation, these groups attempt to reshape markets into spaces that mirror and reinforce majoritarian social control.

Raids on Prayer Meetings and the Criminalisation of Christian Worship

Across several states, Christian prayer gatherings have become one of the most visible targets of Hindutva surveillance, reflecting a climate in which routine worship is increasingly cast as suspicious activity. Civil society reports show that the portrayal of Christians as agents of coercive conversion has become a central plank of Hindutva mobilisation, creating an atmosphere where even small home-based gatherings are vulnerable to intrusion and violence. This narrative has normalised vigilante entry into private spaces and produced situations where state institutions appear more responsive to the allegations of disruptors than to the rights of Christians who are attacked.

The incidents documented here show three recurring elements. Hindutva groups repeatedly enter private houses to disrupt worship, often accompanied by assault or the burning of religious books, as seen in Rohtak where, November 9, 2025 Christian participants were beaten and their Bibles burnt. These forced entries are justified through claims of “illegal conversion,” a narrative that has gained wide circulation in political speeches and local mobilisation campaigns, reinforcing the idea that Christian worship should be monitored rather than protected. The allegations themselves become tools that shift suspicion onto victims, making the act of prayer appear as evidence of wrongdoing.

A second pattern emerges through state response. In Rohtak, police allegedly questioned the victims rather than the perpetrators and later monitored their calls, reflecting a deeper institutional assumption that those who pray are the ones who require investigation rather than protection. This inversion of victim and accused also appears in Uttar Pradesh, where on November 16, 2025 members of the Bajrang Dal raided a Christian prayer meeting, alleging that illegal religious conversions were taking place. They claimed that poor Hindu women were being offered money to convert to Christianity. Following their complaint, police reached the location and arrested three individuals on charges related to unlawful religious conversion. No action against the vigilante group was reported. Similar patterns have been documented nationally wherever anti-conversion rhetoric is deployed to justify interference in Christian worship.

A third pattern concerns how the state frames these incidents. When on November 8, 2025 Hindu nationalist groups confronted a Christian gathering in Korba, Chhattisgarh, the disruption escalated into clashes after outsiders entered the residence and accused attendees of conversion. Official accounts framed the situation as a two-sided confrontation, obscuring the fact that the meeting was peaceful until disrupted. This framing aligns with rhetorical strategies that recast minority communities as sources of instability, even when they are the ones targeted.

In Agra, on November 23, 2025 members of the VHP–Bajrang Dal raided a private Christian prayer meeting and filed complaints alleging inducement to convert. Police detained a man and several women for questioning but did not act against the raiding group, entrenching the perception that majoritarian actors can intrude upon religious spaces with impunity. This is consistent with research showing that police often absorb the assumptions of vigilantes, reinforcing structural bias in how minority religious practice is policed.

Taken together, these episodes reveal a pattern in which prayer is treated as potential evidence, faith is framed as a threat and Christian worship becomes subject to the approval of hostile majoritarian actors. Hindutva groups position themselves as regulators of religious life, while police responses often validate their claims through investigation of the victims and neglect of the perpetrators. The result is a message that Christian communities can neither rely on privacy in their own homes nor on equal protection from the state.

Forced Slogans and Identity Policing

A striking feature of the current wave of communal hostility is the policing of Muslim identity in everyday spaces. These incidents do not involve allegations of crime or conversion. They revolve around humiliation, coercion and the demand that Muslims publicly affirm majoritarian slogans as proof of loyalty. National reports show that such practices have increased alongside online hate campaigns that dehumanise Muslims and frame them as permanent outsiders requiring discipline. The pattern is not incidental. It reflects a deliberate cultural project in which asserting Hindu nationalist symbols becomes a test of citizenship.

The confrontation of a Muslim fruit vendor on October 25, 2025 in Doimukh, Arunachal Pradesh, where locals accused him of being Bangladeshi and demanded NRC documentation, illustrates how identity policing collapses into racial profiling and suspicion of illegality. Research shows that “Bangladeshi” rhetoric has frequently been used to target Bengali-speaking Muslims, turning documentation status into a tool of exclusion . The vendor was forced to close his stall despite no official verification, demonstrating how communal assumptions override legal process.

Forced sloganeering further reveals the psychological dimension of this violence. In Uttarakhand, a Muslim cleric was stopped on the road and threatened when he refused to chant “Jai Shri Ram,” a moment intended to remind him of his vulnerability in public space. India Today reported that in UP, on November 25, 2025 an elderly Muslim cab driver, Mohammad Rais, was harassed near the Taj Mahal parking area by a group of young men who demanded that he chant “Jai Shri Ram.” When he initially refused, the men threatened him. The incident was filmed and later circulated on social media. Local police at Tajganj Police Station registered an FIR and said they are investigating the video evidence, though no arrests had been made at the time of the report.

Identity policing functions as a low-threshold form of violence. It does not require large groups or organised campaigns. It relies on the everyday assertion of dominance, the demand for symbolic compliance and the threat of punishment for refusal. These incidents demonstrate how Hindu nationalist mobilisation penetrates ordinary life. The pressure to chant slogans, produce documents or justify one’s presence signals a shift in which Muslim identity is treated as suspicious unless actively performed in ways that satisfy majoritarian expectations.

Evictions and Demolitions as Instruments of Displacement.

The most far-reaching form of exclusion documented in this period appears in state-led eviction and demolition drives. These actions are carried out through legal and administrative mechanisms, yet their impact falls overwhelmingly on Muslim communities, raising questions about selective enforcement and the absence of safeguards. Research on eviction patterns in Assam and Gujarat has shown that state narratives of encroachment often overlap with political rhetoric that casts certain communities as illegitimate occupants.

In Goalpara, Assam, more than 580 Bengali-origin Muslim families were displaced during a large-scale eviction operation in the Dahikata Reserve Forest on 9 November (Incident 17). Officials stated that the drive was aimed at addressing human-elephant conflict and was conducted pursuant to Gauhati High Court directions, and notices were reportedly issued fifteen days earlier. Heavy machinery entered the area under substantial police presence and demolished remaining structures. No immediate rehabilitation or resettlement measures were announced, leaving hundreds without shelter. Protests were minimal and swiftly contained, with some residents detained. Reporting from the region CNN has noted that eviction drives disproportionately affect Bengali-origin Muslim settlements and often lack clear post-eviction planning.

The Wire reported that in Gujarat’s Gir Somnath district, demolitions on 10 November focused on Muslim-owned homes, shops and a dargah (Incident 18). While several structures were removed without resistance, the attempt to demolish the dargah triggered confrontation. Residents opposed the demolition, leading to clashes with police who used crowd-control measures to disperse them. No rehabilitation measures were reported for those who lost homes or commercial property. Coverage from previous years shows a sustained pattern of demolitions in the region that disproportionately target Muslim religious structures.

A second demolition sequence that same day saw tensions escalate further when locals attempted to prevent the removal of another dargah near the Somnath Temple area. Police responded with lathi charges and tear gas and arrested thirteen people who were later paraded publicly (Incident 19). Authorities described all demolished structures as illegal constructions on government land. Details of any resettlement process were absent.

These cases demonstrate how eviction functions not only as an administrative measure but also as a tool of dispossession when applied without safeguards or rehabilitation. The selective concentration of demolition activity in Muslim neighbourhoods reinforces perceptions that state power is being deployed unevenly.

State Complicity and Biased Policing

CNN reported that across multiple states, the line between vigilante activity and state response becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish. The incidents documented here show repeated patterns in which police act on the allegations of vigilante groups while neglecting the rights of the victims. Human rights analyses have noted that policing in communal situations often reflects underlying majoritarian assumptions, leading to disproportionate scrutiny of minorities and minimal accountability for aggressors. This dynamic is visible in cases involving Christians, Muslims and those accused of violating religious norms.

In Rohtak, Haryana, on November 9, 2025 police reportedly interrogated Christian victims after an Arya Samaj group assaulted them, burnt their Bibles and injured a pastor during a prayer meeting. Rather than treating the attack as a criminal intrusion into a private residence, officers shifted attention onto the victims and monitored their phones. This reflects a broader pattern identified by rights organisations, where anti-conversion rhetoric shapes police behaviour and legitimises scrutiny of Christian gatherings.

In Uttar Pradesh, on November 23, 2025 police acted on the complaint of Bajrang Dal members who raided a Christian prayer meeting and alleged inducement to convert, arresting three attendees while declining to take action against the vigilantes. The same reversal appears in Agra, on November 20, 2025 where VHP and Bajrang Dal members entered a private home to disrupt another Christian meeting. Police detained a man and several women for questioning, again treating the accused vigilantes as complainants rather than aggressors.

In Madhya Pradesh, state complicity took a more punitive form. In Damoh, on November 2, 2025 police publicly paraded nine Muslim men after allegations of cow slaughter, even though local butchers stated that the animal was a buffalo and not a cow. No action was taken against the vigilantes who attacked the butcher market. In Indore, on November 10, 2025 a Muslim gym trainer assaulted by Bajrang Dal members was jailed despite the Hindu woman involved not filing any complaint, while no action was initiated against the attackers.

These incidents show how policing becomes aligned with vigilante narratives. When state institutions absorb the assumptions of majoritarian groups, minority communities lose access to impartial protection. The result is not simply inadequate investigation but a structural failure in which victims are recast as suspects and unlawful violence becomes socially sanctioned through official inaction.

Legal Framework: Constitutional Protections, Criminal Law and Supreme Court Guidelines

The incidents documented in this report engage multiple areas of Indian law, including constitutional guarantees, criminal prohibitions under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), procedural obligations under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) and binding Supreme Court directives on mob vigilantism. At their core, these cases reflect violations of the rights to equality, non-discrimination, personal liberty and religious freedom under Articles 14, 15, 19, 21 and 25 of the Constitution. Article 25 protects the right to freely profess and practice one’s faith, which extends to prayer meetings held in private homes or neighbourhood spaces. Evictions and demolitions without rehabilitation trigger concerns under Article 21 and the prohibition against arbitrary state action.

As per a report in the LiveLaw Under the new BNS, many of the acts witnessed here constitute clear criminal offences. Assault and causing hurt are covered under Sections 124 and 125, which penalise physical injury regardless of motive. Criminal intimidation is defined under Section 351, which applies to threats used to instil fear or force compliance. Forced entry into homes, including raids on Christian prayer meetings, falls within the definition of criminal trespass under Sections 329 and 330. The public parading of detainees undermines the constitutional guarantee of dignity and violates custodial safeguards linked to Article 21, which has been repeatedly upheld in Supreme Court jurisprudence.

Communal incitement and hate speech are addressed under Section 194 of the BNS, which criminalises acts that promote enmity between groups or deliberately provoke violence on grounds such as religion or race. This provision is directly relevant to forced slogans, threats and the circulation of humiliating videos, which mirror the trends identified in recent national analyses of hate speech escalation.

Procedurally, the BNSS continues to require prompt registration of FIRs, impartial investigation and accountability for dereliction of duty by law enforcement. These duties operate alongside the Supreme Court’s directives in Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India (2018), which remain binding. The Court mandated state responsibility to prevent mob violence, protect targeted communities, arrest perpetrators and discipline officers who fail to act. The recurring inaction or reversal of attention onto victims in the incidents documented here reflects clear non-compliance with these obligations.

Targeted demolitions and evictions further implicate constitutional protections. The Supreme Court in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation held that the right to life includes the right to shelter and that demolitions carried out without due process violate Article 21. The lack of rehabilitation reported in Assam and Gujarat contradicts these principles. Rights groups have noted that demolition and eviction in these regions disproportionately affect Muslim communities and often mirror political narratives of encroachment or demographic threat.

Taken together, the constitutional framework, the BNS and BNSS, and Supreme Court jurisprudence make clear that the acts described here violate established protections and statutory duties. The failure to act against vigilantes, the criminalisation of victims and the use of demolition powers without due process point not to isolated lapses but to structural disregard for the rule of law.

Conclusion

Taken together, the incidents documented across these states reveal a common pattern in which ordinary citizens, vigilante networks and state institutions participate in the policing of minority identity and belonging. What appears on the surface as scattered episodes of harassment, forced slogans, raids on prayer meetings or localised demolition drives becomes, in aggregate, a system of pressure that constrains the everyday freedoms of Muslims and Christians. National analyses of hate speech and communal mobilisation show that this pattern is not accidental but reflects a wider political environment in which minorities are cast as security risks, demographic threats or ideological adversaries. This environment encourages vigilantism by signalling that such conduct aligns with majoritarian expectations.

The unevenness of state response reinforces these pressures. Police often act on the allegations of vigilante groups while questioning, detaining or monitoring the victims. Eviction drives in Assam and demolition actions in Gujarat further illustrate how administrative power, when exercised without safeguards, produces large-scale dispossession that disproportionately affects Muslim communities. These practices undermine constitutional principles of equal protection and due process and violate the standards set by the Supreme Court in Tehseen Poonawalla, which requires proactive prevention of mob violence and accountability for official inaction.

As per a report in CNBC TV 18 a potential institutional response has emerged through Karnataka’s Hate Speech and Hate Crimes (Prevention) Bill, 2025, which for the first time proposes a clear statutory framework for defining hate speech and penalising organised intimidation. The Bill prescribes penalties of one to seven years for initial convictions, up to ten years for aggravated offences and empowers authorities to direct digital platforms to remove hate content. While some view this as a needed attempt to address escalating violence, its effectiveness will depend on impartial enforcement. Without structural reforms that ensure equal protection for minority victims, even progressive legal tools risk becoming instruments of selective repression.

The incidents in this report therefore point not only to unlawful actions by private actors but to a weakening of constitutional guarantees in everyday life. Restoring trust in the rule of law requires consistent action against vigilantism, accountability for discriminatory policing and a commitment to protecting the right of every community to live, worship and work without fear.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Risha Fathima)

Related:

Faith Under Fire: Coordinated Harassment of Christians After the Rajasthan Bill

Targeted as ‘Bangladeshis’: The Hate Speech Fuelling Deportations

The Architecture of Polarisation: A Structural Analysis of Communal Hate Speech as a Core Electoral Strategy in India (2024–2025)

Sanatan Ekta Padyatra: Unmasking the March of Majoritarianism

The post Documenting a national pattern of vigilantism & targeted action against minorities appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP), along with women’s rights groups, constitutional lawyers, and minority rights organisations, has repeatedly cautioned that such laws—already operational in several BJP-ruled states—have functioned less as safeguards against coercion and more as tools for communal profiling, moral policing, and the criminalisation of adult consensual relationships. Maharashtra is now being pushed to replicate a model that is not only deeply abusive in practice but also under active constitutional challenge before the Supreme Court of India.

It is essential to note that previously, the Maharashtra Government had issued a Government resolution on December 13, 2022, following the gruesome murder of Shraddha Walkar in Delhi allegedly by her inter-faith live-in partner, forming a committee to provide a platform to ‘counsel, communicate and resolve’ issues between couples and families. According to the GR, the committee can seek information of both registered and unregistered marriages. Furthermore, the committee can intervene at the behest of any person, which the plea alleges is a breach of the couple’s privacy “especially when two consenting adults are married to each other”. A challenge against the same, filed by CJP, remains pending in the Bombay High Court. Details of the petition may be read here.

A state-wide, synchronized campaign- Event by event

The scale and coordination of the recent mobilisations are striking. On November 27, in Jalgaon, the Hindu Janajagruti Samiti organised an ‘Anti–Love Jihad’ protest where speakers openly demanded that the Maharashtra Chief Minister ensure the passage of an anti-conversion law in the upcoming winter session of the Assembly. The demand was framed as a matter of urgency and inevitability. Organisers claimed support from over 35 organisations, cited more than 300 citizen statements, and referenced a petition purportedly carrying 15,000 signatures—figures repeatedly invoked to manufacture the impression of overwhelming public consensus.

As the Assembly session approached, the campaign intensified. On December 5, in Amravati, far-right organisations led by the Hindu Janajagruti Samiti submitted a memorandum to the District Collector, addressed to the Chief Minister and Deputy Chief Minister, demanding a ‘strict’ law against the alleged conspiracy of ‘love jihad’. A signature campaign claiming the support of over 3,000 citizens accompanied the submission, making explicit that the objective was legislative pressure during the session rather than redressal of any specific grievance.

On December 7, protests were held across multiple districts. In Dapoli, Ratnagiri, far-right groups once again alleged a systematic conspiracy of ‘love jihad’ and demanded immediate legislative action. The framing was uniform: inter-faith relationships were projected as demographic warfare, and state inaction was portrayed as civilisational betrayal.

The same day, in Akola, the campaign descended into overt communal abuse. At an anti–‘love jihad’ protest, a Hindu Janajagruti Samiti member used derogatory slurs against Muslims—calling them “cowards who used to be Hindus” and “jalli-topiwallas”—and invoked the trope of ‘gaddar Hindus’. Such speech is not incidental; it reveals the communal animus that animates the demand for criminal legislation and signals how such laws are likely to be enforced on the ground.

Also on December 7, in Kothrud, Pune, at a Vishwa Hindu Parishad–Bajrang Dal ‘Shaurya Diwas’ event, speakers claimed that only organisations like the Bajrang Dal could stop ‘love jihad’, religious conversions, and cow slaughter. This assertion effectively erased the boundary between state authority and vigilante power, suggesting that the proposed law is intended to legitimise extra-legal social control.

On December 8, the campaign expanded simultaneously into administrative offices and mainstream political platforms. In Chhatrapati Sambhaji Nagar, delegations led by the Hindu Janajagruti Samiti, alongside BJP leader Kamlesh Katariya, submitted requests at District Magistrate offices across Maharashtra, uniformly urging enactment of a ‘strict’ anti–love jihad law.

The same day, at Hotel Center Point, Nagpur, during a ‘Majha Maharashtra’ event organised by Anand Bazaar Patrika, BJP MLA Nitesh Rane amplified these conspiracies from a mainstream political stage. He invoked ‘love jihad’, ‘land jihad’, and ‘halal jihad’, and further referenced ‘ghazwa-e-Hind’, explicitly linking these ideas to terrorism. Such rhetoric performs a crucial legitimising function: it converts fringe paranoia into a perceived security threat, thereby manufacturing public consent for exceptional criminal law.

Core Criticisms of Anti-Conversion Laws: Why civil liberties groups oppose them

CJP and other civil liberties organisations, women’s rights groups, and constitutional scholars have consistently raised serious objections to anti-conversion laws across states—objections that apply with equal, if not greater, force to the proposed Maharashtra legislation.

1. Criminalisation of consent and autonomy: These laws operate on the presumption that adult women—particularly Hindu women—are incapable of making informed choices about relationships and faith. By treating consent as inherently suspect, the laws directly contradict Supreme Court jurisprudence recognising decisional autonomy, bodily integrity, and the right to choose one’s partner.
2. Vague and overbroad offences: Terms such as ‘allurement’, ‘undue influence’, and ‘fraud’ are undefined or expansively defined, allowing ordinary acts—companionship, emotional support, marriage, or assistance—to be reinterpreted as criminal inducement. This violates the principle that criminal offences must be narrowly and clearly defined.
3. Burden-shifting and presumption of guilt: Many anti-conversion laws invert the foundational criminal law principle of presumption of innocence by shifting the burden onto the accused to prove that no coercion occurred. This is constitutionally suspect and procedurally unjust.
4. Third-party complaints and vigilante policing: By allowing relatives—or even unrelated persons—to file complaints, these laws institutionalise vigilante interference in intimate relationships. In practice, police action is often triggered not by the alleged convert but by ideological organisations or hostile family members.
5. Discriminatory enforcement: Empirical evidence from other states demonstrates that enforcement disproportionately targets Muslim men and inter-faith couples, entrenching communal profiling and selective policing.
6. Chilling Effect on Religious Freedom: Mandatory prior notice requirements and intrusive inquiries deter individuals from exercising their freedom of conscience, effectively converting a fundamental right into a regulated privilege.

CJP has repeatedly warned that these laws do not prevent coercion; they prevent choice.

Pending Petitions Before the Supreme Court: Laws under constitutional cloud

Importantly, CJP’s challenge to anti-conversion laws in several states—including Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Uttarakhand, and Gujarat—is currently pending before the Supreme Court of India. Multiple petitions contend that these statutes violate core constitutional guarantees under Articles 14, 15, 19, 21, and 25.

Detailed report may be read here.

Petitioners have argued that the laws:

• Undermine the right to privacy and decisional autonomy recognised in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India
• Criminalise adult consensual relationships, contrary to Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M. and Lata Singh v. State of UP
• Treat women as lacking agency, in violation of equality and dignity
• Enable arbitrary, discriminatory, and communalised policing
• Invert the presumption of innocence by shifting the burden of proof

The Supreme Court has been urged to examine whether the state can subject personal faith, marriage, and belief to prior scrutiny and criminal sanction in the absence of demonstrable harm. These challenges remain pending, rendering the legal framework that Maharashtra is being urged to adopt constitutionally unstable.

Manufacturing panic, normalising surveillance, reshaping criminal law

The Maharashtra campaign exemplifies a broader shift in law making: from evidence-based policy to ideology-driven criminalisation. There is no credible data demonstrating widespread forced conversions through marriage in Maharashtra. Existing criminal law already addresses coercion, cheating, kidnapping, trafficking, and sexual exploitation. The demand for a new law is therefore not remedial but symbolic—designed to signal dominance, discipline intimacy, and legitimise social surveillance.

By framing adult women as perpetual victims, these campaigns rein scribe patriarchal control. By singling out Muslims as conspirators, they normalise collective suspicion. By demanding preventive criminalisation, they erode the basic premise that criminal law punishes acts, not identities or intentions.

What is at stake for Maharashtra

If enacted, an anti-conversion law in Maharashtra will not remain a neutral legal instrument. It will embolden vigilante groups, legitimise moral policing, and place police machinery at the service of ideological enforcement. For inter-faith couples, religious minorities, and women asserting autonomy, the consequences are likely to be immediate and severe: arrests, harassment, prolonged incarceration, and social ostracisation.

As CJP has consistently argued, the real question is not whether forced conversions should be prevented—existing law already does so—but whether the state can be permitted to criminalise choice itself. Maharashtra today stands at a constitutional crossroads: between safeguarding liberty and importing a legal regime already notorious for abuse and under active constitutional scrutiny. The street pressure is loud. The constitutional warning signs are louder still.

Related:

Gujarat High Court Widened Anti-Conversion Law: ‘Victims’ can be prosecuted as offenders

K’taka HC: Ruling on state’s ‘anti-conversion’ law, lays down precedent against potential weaponisation by third-party vigilantes

Supreme Court seeks states’ replies on pleas for stay of anti-conversion laws, to decide on interim stay after six weeks

“Anti-conversion laws being weaponised”: CJP seeks interim relief against misuse of anti-conversion laws

The post Street Pressure, State Power, and the Criminalisation of Choice: How Hindutva groups are pushing Maharashtra’s anti-conversion law appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The RSS is not registered under the Societies Act or the Trust Act. It has no PAN, files no income-tax returns, has no obligation to disclose donors, and is not accountable to RTI or FCRA. In purely legal terms, the most influential organisation in India is an organisation that, on paper, does not formally exist.

Its funding comes through “Guru Dakshina”—donations from members ranging from a few rupees to several lakhs, symbolically offered to the saffron flag rather than to a registered entity. This model allows the RSS to collect crores every year without the scrutiny applied to even the smallest NGO.

And that is the stark contrast:

• A charity feeding orphans faces compliance audits.
• A student group receives notices for minor reporting lapses.
• Even a roadside shopkeeper must justify every rupee of income.

But the ideological mother organisation of the ruling party remains exempt from the transparency required of ordinary citizens.

This raises a fundamental democratic question:

Should a body that influences national policy, political appointments, and cultural direction be allowed to operate with zero statutory oversight?

The RSS’s network—stretching through political, educational, labour, media, and cultural wings—makes it far more than a “cultural organisation.” It is a parallel power centre whose decisions shape public life, yet cannot be questioned through democratic channels. It holds influence without legal responsibility, authority without accountability.

The issue is not the lavishness of Keshav Kunj, but what it represents: a governance anomaly where an institution with enormous political reach functions beyond the mechanisms that safeguard transparency in a democracy.

If NGOs, activists, journalists, and citizens are routinely scrutinised, raided, or labelled “anti-national” over compliance issues, what then do we call an organisation that collects vast funds in the shadows and shapes the ideological spine of the state without placing a single financial document on public record?

Democracies do not weaken because people ask questions. They weaken when power becomes invisible, and when institutions that influence the nation most refuse to follow the rules applied to everyone else.

Keshav Kunj is not merely a building. It is a reminder of a deeper shift—away from democratic accountability and toward a political ecosystem where some institutions answer to no one.

And in today’s India, the reality is uncomfortably clear: The country is controlled by the BJP, and the BJP is controlled by the RSS—and that should concern every believer in constitutional democracy.

Courtesy: The AIDEM

The post RSS: The Flag, the Funds and The Missing Transparency appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The freedom movement was led by leaders who had imbibed values with democratic potential and they led the movement against colonial rule. The likes of Sardar Patel, Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Subhash Chandra Bose articulated values with inherent rights for the nation. They took the lead with great cost to their personal life. One of the examples was the inspiration derived by Jyotirao Phule was from Thomas Penn’s book ‘Rights of Man’. Ambedkar was an ardent follower of John Dewey who was steeped in democratic values.

Recently Mr. Narendra Modi went on to criticise Lord Macaulay for this transition to the values of rights, when he emphasised the traditional knowledge system as a dog whistle to highlight the concept of duty over rights.

Interestingly Modi and his ilk (Hindu Mahasabha-HMS, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh-RSS) and its communal counterpart, the Muslim League both expressed the values of ‘declining classes of landlords, Nawabs and Kings’. Modi’s Hindutva has harked back to an “ancient period” where ‘Dharma’ was the core, the Dhrama which followers of Hindutva claim to be very great and the core part of Hinduism. Dharma stands for religiously ordained duties, and this includes the rigidly exclusionary system of Caste! Hindu ideologues claim that there is no equivalent of Dharma in other religions. There is Shudra Dhrama, Stree Dharma, Kshatriya dharma and what have you. At core it is caste stratification and duties which dominated the scene.

The Muslim League emerged from the nawabs/landlords and their leaders eulogised the great rule of Muslim kings, starting from Mohammad bin Kasim who ruled for some time in Sind. Their model was based on feudal values, looking down on lower levels of society. Dominant sections were blessed with the ‘divine power’ trickling down to a few feudal lords etc. Pakistan saw an initial and welcome definition of secularism by Jinnah; however, in practice, it was feudal elements that were dominant around him. After Jinnah’s death they came out openly to impose their feudal-semi feudal values on Pakistani state and society.

Even as Hindu Nationalism (read supremacism) today appears dominant in India, what is being undermined in this onward march of Hindutva politics is the concept of ‘rights’ inherent in our national movement and embodied in the Indian Constitution. This is where the non-biological Narendra Modi begins the journey to achieve the goal of undermining rights and highlighting duties.

The call for the dumping of the education system introduced by Lord Macaulay was a subtle attempt in this direction. He put it more overtly (brazenly) on Constitution Day, November 26, 2025. Modi said, “In a recent letter to Indian citizens on Constitution Day (November 26, 2025), Prime Minister Narendra Modi heavily emphasised the importance of citizens fulfilling their Fundamental Duties. He argued that performing these duties is the foundation for a strong democracy and national progress towards his “Viksit Bharat” (Developed India) vision for 2047. Modi urged citizens to place their “duties towards the nation foremost in our minds”. This aligns with his previous statements where he suggested that “rights are embedded in duties” and that “real rights are a result of the performance of duty”.

Besides, he also tweeted “On Constitution Day, I wrote a letter to my fellow citizens in which I’ve highlighted the greatness of our Constitution, the importance of Fundamental Duties in our lives…” Shravasti Dasgupta writes “While this is not the first time that Modi has laid emphasis on citizens duties, or interlinked them with rights to suggest that duties correspond to rights, the Constitution shows that such interlinking is incorrect. According to constitutional experts and political scientists, an invocation of duties, placing primacy on them above rights, is a subtle attempt to recast the Constitution, ensure compliance in a manner seen in authoritarian regimes, and signals a danger to democratic principles”

Modi went on to invoke Gandhi on this. “…and that “real rights are a result of the performance of duty,” Invoking Gandhi is totally off the mark as Prof Zoya Hasan (Prof. Emerita, JNU) says, “Gandhi often spoke of duties, but he never treated them as a substitute for rights; duties did not supersede rights. For him, duties were a moral path for individuals, while Fundamental Rights remained essential and must be protected by the state. Gandhi’s commitment to duties did not diminish rights in any way,”

Incidentally to emphasise the concept of rights, many of these were underlined during the UPA regime (2004-2014). This was through a series of enactments, long overdue. The first and major amongst these was “Right to Information Act 2005”, a mechanism to root democracy in a deeper way. This was followed by Right to Education Act 2009, Right to Food (National Food Security Act, 2013). With the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government losing power in 2014, it is the National Democratic Alliance (NDA)—dominated by the RSS-driven Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Today, in 2025 it is the third term of the NDA, today a minority government supported from the outside. With this change in power at the centre in 2014, the constitutional, rights’-based approach to public policy has gone into cold storage and duties are being made the major part of our national policies.

Even our Constitution emphasises on rights in itself. In fact, Article 21 of our Constitution, that guarantees the ‘Right to Life’ incorporates within it, the right to health, the right to education for example. The UPA Government underlined –albeit belatedly — in an appropriate way.

Today Hindu Nationalism is totally suppressing rights, like freedom of religion, freedom of expression, freedom of expression among others. Many of these are incorporated in the wider concept of Human rights as well.

What Mr. Modi is conveying in his November 26 s letter is authenticating the suppression of the concept of ‘rights’ for all and through this relegating religious minorities to second class status, derogating questioning and dissenting citizens, academics and activists to being “Urban Naxal”. Incidentally and not surprisingly, it is the Constitutions of authoritarian states that emphasise on “duties” at the cost of rights.

Disclaimer: The views expressed here are the author’s personal views, and do not necessarily represent the views of Sabrangindia.

Related:

Sectarian nationalism and god men: Sri Sri Ravishankar attends the 75th Birthday of the RSS chief

Emergency regime and the role of RSS

Understanding the growth of European-style nationalism in India

The post Hindu Nationalism’s sectarian nationalism and its concept of ‘duties and rights’ appeared first on SabrangIndia.

“This report does not critique religion or its festivals. It examines whether public religious mobilisations are being used to spread exclusionary rhetoric and whether authorities are responding.”

Background: Sanatan Hindu Ekta Padyatra

Launched by prominent right-wing Hindutva leaders, the Sanatan Ekta Padyatra is being promoted as a socio-spiritual movement. Led by Dhirendra Krishna Shastri of Bageshwar Dham, the yatra was flagged off from Delhi with the stated objectives of establishing a Hindu nation, eradicating casteism, and fostering social unity. Scheduled from November 7 to 16, it passed through 422 village panchayats across Delhi, Haryana, and Uttar Pradesh.

As part of the campaign, seven resolutions were announced, like promoting social harmony and supporting the “grand construction” of the Shri Janmabhoomi temple. The controversy primarily stems from the first and central resolution: the demand to declare India a Hindu Rashtra. This directly conflicts with the Constitution’s commitment to a secular state and violates the guarantees of freedom of religion under Article 25 as well as equality and non-discrimination under Articles 14 and 15.

However, the publicly stated resolutions tell only part of the story. Across multiple stops in Delhi, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, and Madhya Pradesh, several speakers, including the Padyatra’s principal organisers, delivered inflammatory speeches that went far beyond calls for spiritual unity or social harmony. These speeches invoked communal conspiracy theories (“love jihad,” “land jihad”), portrayed Muslims as demographic threats, justified vigilante violence, and openly advocated for religious segregation and economic boycotts. Many of these statements raise serious concerns under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), and established Supreme Court jurisprudence on hate speech and incitement. 

Details of the Hate Speech Delivered

Below is a consolidated analysis of the most objectionable statements made during the Sanatan Hindu Ekta Padyatra, grouped under 3 main themes and mapped against the relevant legal frameworks.
The reference links of the speeches, with timestamps mentioned, are given below-

Ghaziabad, Nov 3

Palwal, Nov 10

Palwal, Nov 12

Chhatarpur, Nov 14

Faridabad, Nov 8

Banchari, Nov 12

Mathura, Nov 15

Palwal, Haryana, Nov 10

Banchari, Nov 12

A.  Direct Hate Speech (Violence, Hostility, Social Boycott)

(Statements advocating violence, hostility, coercion, or social/economic boycott; calls for expulsion; explicit majoritarian supremacy)

Across multiple stops of the Sanatan Hindu Ekta Padyatra, speakers issued direct calls that clearly cross the constitutional threshold into incitement as interpreted in Amish Devgan and Shreya Singhal. In Ghaziabad (Nov 3), the speaker declared that India “should become a Hindu Rashtra” (0:39–0:42) and added that population decline “should happen to those who follow the ‘chadar’ and the ‘father’,” (1:17–1:20) a statement which the Supreme Court would classify as high-intensity dehumanising hate speech. Similarly, in Palwal (Nov 10), a public oath was taken to ensure that “love jihad and aaved dharmantaran will not be allowed” (0:20–0:27), effectively encouraging vigilantism against interfaith couples and converts. Under Patricia Mukhim, such statements, though framed as “protection,” amount to direct incitement toward unlawful acts.

In Delhi (Nov 7), hostility was escalated through demographic-war rhetoric: “tumhari sampatti tumhari hogi, kabza unka hoga” (2:30–2:44), and by invoking civilisational conflict through “ye desh Babar ka nahi, Raghuvar ka hai” (2:58–3:02). The Court in Amish Devgan specifically flagged the use of derogatory historical figures to mobilise hatred in the present. In Faridabad (Nov 10), a speaker warned: “jab desh lutega… tumhari beti love jihad mei pad jayegi… tumhara beta jis din shukravar ko jaane lagega,” (2:34–2:56) creating a direct incentive to treat Muslim men as targets of suspicion and implying moral justifications for coercive action.

Following the Delhi car blast, Dhirendra Shastri, addressing Palwal (Nov 12), asked: “yehi (Muslims) kyu aatangwadi hote hain?” (0:27–0:39), treating the entire community as terrorists. He further warned that unless Hindus united, bomb blasts like Delhi would occur “in every gali” (0:57–1:26), which satisfies the proximity test under Shreya Singhal. In Chhatarpur, MP (Nov 14), dissenters to Hindu symbols were told to “get their ticket to Lahore” (0:00–0:13), echoing classic expulsion rhetoric the Court has treated as unprotected. The chant recorded in Faridabad (Nov 8) — “tel lagao Dabur ka, naam mita do Babur ka; jo Ram ka nahi wo kisi kaam ka nahi” — directly targets Muslims through symbolic eradication. In Banchari, Palwal (Nov 12), speakers vowed to conduct compulsory “ghar wapsi” for those who had “left Sanatan” (0:29–0:46), amounting to a call for coercive reconversion, contrary to Shafin Jahan (Hadiya), which protects decisional autonomy in matters of faith.

Finally, in Mathura (Nov 15), spiritual leader Devkinandan Thakur invoked the Babri Masjid demolition (“4:20–4:50”) while urging the crowd to “move toward Mathura and Vrindavan,” hinting at mobilisation to claim the Shahi Idgah Mosque. The Supreme Court in the Ayodhya judgment warned that religious disputes must not be weaponised for incitement. These statements collectively amount to direct hate speech under Indian constitutional and criminal jurisprudence.

B. Discriminatory / Exclusionary “Othering”

(Normalising prejudice, othering minorities, delegitimising citizenship, religious tests for belonging)

Several speeches sought to redefine citizenship and community belonging in expressly exclusionary terms. In Ghaziabad (Nov 3), the speaker framed Hindu women as victims of Muslim men by warning that “our daughters fall into love jihad” (0:44–1:01), establishing a stereotype that casts Muslim men as predatory. He also suggested that Hindus “are not extremist,” implying that extremism is inherent to other communities (1:32–1:39). Such rhetorical othering aligns with what Patricia Mukhim describes as hate speech that delegitimises equal citizenship.

In Delhi (Nov 7), converts were described as outsiders: “Hindu issai mei converted hota hai toh ‘sister’ aur ‘sir’ kehlata hai… Hindu Musalman mei converted hota hai toh ‘bhai-jaan, amma-jaan’ kehlata hai,” followed by a suggestion that Hindus should first identify only as “Hindu” before any caste label (1:47–2:22). This constructs religious identity as the sole marker of national legitimacy. In Haryana (Nov 10), the crowd was asked if they want to see their children “wearing topi” or “going to church on Sunday” (0:04–0:25), depicting basic religious expression by minorities as inherently undesirable. The line “jab topi walo ki ekta ho sakti, toh tilak walo ki kyu nahi” (0:30–0:37) frames religious groups as competing blocs, contradicting the constitutional ideal of fraternity.

Kajal Hindusthani, in Palwal (Nov 10), urged the crowd to “be Hindus, buy from Hindus, employ only Hindus” (0:20–0:33), an explicit economic boycott. Section 196 of BNS emphasises that no citizen can be coerced into religious conformity; here, exclusion is extended to everyday economic life. In Chhatarpur (Nov 14), slogans like “jo Ram ka nahi, wo kisi kaam ka nahi” (0:24–0:33) reduce non-Hindus to second-class status. The DNA-testing analogy used to delegitimise dissenter’s mirrors what Amish Devgan classifies as dehumanising metaphors, which have no constitutional protection. In Banchari (Nov 12), Nagendra Maharaj’s line— “those who object to Vande Mataram or Ram should go to Pakistan or Afghanistan” (0:33–0:41)—constructs a religious test for belonging, contrary to the secular character upheld repeatedly by the Supreme Court.

Such statements normalise hostility and social exclusion, and the Court in Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan explicitly warned that such majoritarian narratives fuel discrimination and justify vigilantism, attracting Sections 196 (Promoting enmity between different groups), Section 197 (assertions prejudicial to national integration), and Section 299 (Deliberate acts, intended to outrage religious feelings).

C. Fearmongering & Demographic Conspiracy Claims

(Alarmist misinformation about population, survival, territorial takeover; invoking existential threat narratives)

A consistent theme throughout the padyatra was the portrayal of Hindus as being on the verge of demographic extinction. In Ghaziabad (Nov 3), the speaker claimed that Hindus are “khatam ho rahe hai” despite India’s overwhelming Hindu majority, and that once “Hindus do not unite, they will not be safe” (1:55–2:06). He also asserted that Hindus are declining “day by day” (1:04–1:16), ignoring census realities. This comes under spreading demographic conspiracy narratives constitutes incitement because it fosters suspicion and hostility against minorities.

In Delhi (Nov 7), the crowd was told that “20 saal baad, Bharat ka Hindu apne astitva ki ladai lad raha hoga” (0:38–), and that minorities would seize Hindu property: “sampatti tumhari hogi, kabza unka hoga” (2:30–2:44). Such claims resemble classic “replacement” conspiracy theories. When combined with militaristic lines like “na toh pad rehna hai, na kad rehna hai” (0:55–0:58), the rhetoric urges mobilisation against an imagined security threat. In Haryana (Nov 10), Partition was invoked (“Jinnah ki leadership mein… alag Pakistan bana”), followed by an analogy that if “Sanatan Dharma ke naam par” India does not become a Hindu Rashtra, it will face a “Bangladesh-like situation” where “haq kisi aur ka hoga” (1:53–2:06). The Supreme Court in Pravasi Bhalai explicitly noted that selective historical parallels are often used to trigger fear and justify majoritarian aggression.

After the Delhi blast, Dhirendra Shastri claimed that unless Hindus unite, “aisa har gali mein hoga” (0:57–1:26), and asserted that the arrested individual— “doctor, musalman… crore-o ki jaan lene ki tayaari”—was preparing mass murder, furthering the narrative that Muslims pose a blanket existential threat. Fear of demographic loss was also invoked repeatedly: in Delhi (Nov 7), the claim that Hindus have become minorities in “9 states” is factually incorrect yet presented as imminent collapse. In Banchari (Nov 12), Nagendra Maharaj warned that Hindus could be “expelled from their homes like Srinagar,” framing political developments as religious persecution.

Such narratives fall squarely within the Supreme Court’s treatment of misinformation that has a proximate connection to public disorder (Shreya Singhal). Fearmongering of this kind shifts the public mindset from coexistence to hostility, creating conditions for violence without issuing explicit violent commands.

Legal Framework

India’s constitutional and statutory framework places clear limits on speech that promotes enmity, incites violence, or undermines the country’s secular structure. Several statements delivered during the Sanatan Ekta Padyatra appear to contravene these provisions.

Constitutional Provisions

Various provisions of the Indian Constitution safeguard against hate speech and communal othering.

1. Article 14 — Equality before law

Communal othering, demographic fear-mongering, and calls for exclusion (“be Hindus, buy only from Hindus”) violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection to all communities.

2. Article 15 — Non-discrimination on grounds of religion

Calls for a ‘Hindu Rashtra’, alongside statements urging economic segregation, employment discrimination, or “ghar wapsi” of all converts, contradict the constitutional prohibition against discrimination on religious grounds.

3. Article 19(1)(a) & 19(2) — Freedom of speech and its reasonable restrictions

Speech that threatens public order, incites violence, or promotes communal disharmony falls squarely within the restrictions permitted under Article 19(2).
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that advocacy crossing into incitement is not protected speech.

4. Article 25 — Freedom of religion

Sections of the BNS

1. Section 196 of BNS: Promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, etc., and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony

(1) Whoever—

• by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or through electronic communication or otherwise, promotes or attempts to promote, on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community or any other ground whatsoever, disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities; or Liability of owner, occupier, etc., of land on which an unlawful assembly or riot takes place. Affray. Assaulting or obstructing a public servant when suppressing a riot, etc.
  (b) commits any act which is prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities, and which disturbs or is likely to disturb the public tranquillity;

2. Section 197 of BNS: Imputations, assertions prejudicial to national integration.

(1) Whoever, by words either spoken or written or by signs or by visible representations or through electronic communication or otherwise, —

(a) makes or publishes any imputation that any class of persons cannot, by reason of their being members of any religious, racial, language or regional group or caste or community, bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India as by law established or uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India; or

(c) makes or publishes any assertion, counsel, plea or appeal concerning the obligation of any class of persons, by reason of their being members of any religious, racial, language or regional group or caste or community, and such assertion, counsel, plea or appeal causes or is likely to cause disharmony or feelings of enmity or hatred or ill-will between such members and other persons; or

3. Section 299: Deliberate and malicious acts, intended to outrage religious feelings of any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs. 

Whoever, with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of any class of citizens of India, by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or through electronic means or otherwise, insults or attempts to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of that class, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.

4. Section 352: Intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of peace.

 Whoever intentionally insults in any manner, and thereby gives provocation to any person, intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation will cause him to break the public peace, or to commit any other offence, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.

5. Section 353: Statements conducing to public mischief.

 (1) Whoever makes, publishes or circulates any statement, false information, rumour, or report, including through electronic means—

(b) with intent to cause, or which is likely to cause, fear or alarm to the public, or to any section of the public whereby any person may be induced to commit an offence against the State or against the public tranquillity; or

(c) with intent to incite, or which is likely to incite, any class or community of persons to commit any offence against any other class or community, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.

Judicial Precedents

Indian constitutional jurisprudence has consistently sought to balance freedom of expression with the imperative of preserving public order, equality, and the secular fabric of the nation. While there is no universally accepted definition of ‘hate speech’, the Supreme Court has laid down clear principles that define when speech crosses the boundary from protected expression into unlawful incitement or communal hatred.

The foundational judgment in Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar (1962) affirmed that criminal provisions affecting speech must be interpreted narrowly. The statute is constitutionally valid only to the extent it punishes speech that has the intention or tendency to create disorder or incitement to violence or disturbance of law and order.

The Padyatra speeches, alleging demographic conquest, “love jihad,” and calling for social boycotts and vigilante resistance, demonstrate a direct intention to cause disharmony between religious groups travelling through communally sensitive regions of Delhi, Haryana, and Uttar Pradesh. The route’s culmination at Banke Bihari Temple, Vrindavan, a site recently embroiled in controversy, heightens the imminent potential for communal mobilisation.

A decade later, Kesavananda Bharati v. Union of India (1973) reaffirmed the inviolable constitutional commitment to secularism, equality, and fundamental rights by introducing the Basic Structure doctrine. Through this, the Court held that any attempt, legislative or otherwise, that undermines the secular character of the Republic would be unconstitutional at its core. This principle shapes the broader legal environment within which communal speech is assessed.

On debates around ‘love jihad’ and ‘illegal conversion’, the Supreme Court in the Hadiya Marriage Case (2018), held that the right to marry a person of one’s choice is integral to Article 21, and the choice of a partner lies within the exclusive domain of an individual, and is a part of the core zone of privacy, which is inviolable.

The modern understanding of hate speech was articulated in Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. Union of India (2014), where the Supreme Court held that

Hate speech is an effort to marginalise individuals based on their membership in a group. Using expression that exposes the group to hatred, hate speech seeks to delegitimize group members in the eyes of the majority, reducing their social standing and acceptance within society. Hate speech, therefore, rises beyond causing distress to individual group members. It can have a societal impact.

Responding to this mandate, the Law Commission’s 267th Report proposed a structured framework for understanding hate speech. Para 5.2 laid down the criteria for identifying hate speech:

(i) The extremity of the speech

(ii) Incitement

(iii) Status of the author of the speech

(iv) Status of victims of the speech

(v) Potentiality of the speech

(vi) Context of the Speech

The Court’s earlier ruling in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) further clarified that only speech amounting to “incitement to imminent lawless action” can be legitimately restricted under Article 19(2), reinforcing the centrality of context, intent, and likely consequences.

In Patricia vs State of Meghalaya (2021), the Supreme Court quashed a FIR against a journalist, concluding that the post was a genuine plea for justice and equality rather than an attempt to promote hatred or communal discord. In Amish Devgan v. Union of India (2020), the court further stated that: the mode of exercise of free speech, the context and the extent of abuse of freedom are important in determining the contours of permissible restrictions.

Aftermath of Padyatra

The Sanatan Ekta Padyatra triggered immediate political and social pushback across several states. The Azaad Samaj Party (ASP) condemned the march on constitutional grounds, arguing that India’s identity as a secular republic cannot be undermined by a public movement openly calling for a “Hindu Rashtra.” ASP formally petitioned the President to halt the yatra, while the Dalit Pichda Samaj Sanathan (DPSS) joined ASP in filing a PIL before the Supreme Court seeking a complete stop to the march and a ban on its “inflammatory” speeches. In response, Gwalior-based politician Damodar Singh Yadav announced a counter-mobilisation titled the Samvidhan Bachao Yatra, set to begin on November 16, framing it as a defence of constitutional values.

On the ground, several areas witnessed unrest directly linked to the padyatra. Samagra Bharat reported that on 9 November in Indergarh (Datia district, MP), residents gathered at Ambedkar Park and attempted to burn an effigy of Dhirendra Shastri, alleging that his speeches promoted caste humiliation and communal hatred. Members of the Hindu Sangathan retaliated with stone-pelting, leading to a police lathi-charge when tensions escalated. Locals later filed an FIR against Shastri, but authorities have taken no concrete action. A week later, on 17 November, Patrika reported a scuffle at Vrindavan’s Banke Bihari Temple during Shastri’s visit, where a confrontation between temple priests and the police resulted in torn garments and allegations that the padyatra’s politicised presence compromised the sanctity and security of the temple premises.

Broader Pattern of Impunity towards Hate Speeches

The fallout from the padyatra reflects a broader pattern in which communal mobilisation and hate speech by far-right Hindutva leaders are met with minimal institutional response. India has witnessed repeated episodes of religiously charged violence—such as the 2019 lynching of Tabrez Ansari in Jharkhand, where the victim was forced to chant “Jai Shri Ram”—and mass events like the 2024 Ayodhya Ram Mandir consecration have increasingly become sites for majoritarian mobilisation. Despite this backdrop, police responses remain inconsistent, especially when politically influential individuals are involved. NDTV reports that although five FIRs were filed over two years against BJP legislator T. Raja Singh for comments such as “The Old City of Hyderabad is a mmini-Pakistan” two were closed, and the remaining three have seen no decisive progress.

Legal scrutiny has extended to Baba Dhirendra Shastri as well, with multiple complaints for delivering hate speeches in Udaipur, Maharashtra, and Madhya Pradesh. In 2023, a PIL before the Gujarat High Court sought enforcement of the Supreme Court’s Tehseen Poonawalla guidelines—requiring preventive intelligence units, immediate action against hate speech, and punitive steps against officials who fail to curb mob violence—but the petition was declined. This pattern of judicial reluctance, combined with police inaction, underscores a systemic tolerance toward inflammatory communal rhetoric, even when it directly violates constitutional guarantees and statutory prohibitions under the BNS. The result is a public environment where speeches like those delivered during the Sanatan Ekta Padyatra, openly calling for a Hindu Rashtra and targeting minority communities, continue largely unchecked, emboldening majoritarian mobilisation while eroding constitutional safeguards.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this has been worked on by Shyamli Pengoriya)

Related:

Targeted as ‘Bangladeshis’: The hate speech fuelling deportations

India Hate Lab Report 2024: Unveiling the rise of hate speech and communal rhetoric

2024: CJP’s battle against communal rallies before and after they unfold

Exclusion at the Gate: Navratri becomes the new front for communal politics

Hate Has No Place in Elections: CJP moves State EC against BJP MP Ashwini Choubey’s communal speech

The post The Politics of Processions: How the Sanatan Ekta Padyatra amplified hate speech in plain sight appeared first on SabrangIndia.

A broad comparative reading of speeches, videos, rallies, slogans, media patterns, complaints, and reports reveals something deeper than mere rhetorical excess. It reveals a political order that increasingly depends on the manufacture of an existential threat. The political message has fused with social fear. Social fear has fused with administrative paralysis. Administrative paralysis has fused with electoral advantage. In this fusion, the very meaning of democracy is being reconfigured: elections no longer offer competing futures but competing hatreds; political legitimacy no longer flows from representation but from the ability to summon and sustain anger.

In this transformed landscape, hate speech functions as infrastructure. It builds worlds. It shapes consciousness. It reorganises neighbourhood markets, influences police behaviour, triggers vigilante assertion, and fractures interdependence at the most micro levels. It is not ephemeral. It is lived, circulated, absorbed, and enacted. In addition, its long-term damage is not only to India’s minorities, but also to India’s democratic capacity itself. Hate becomes not only an electoral weapon but also a method of governance; not only a tactic of polarisation but also a technique of population management.

This article takes stock of this new political order. It examines the imagery and stereotypes deployed across electoral contexts; the fears they stoke; the patterns of mobilisation they generate; the administrative silences that empower them; the media networks that amplify them; and, most importantly, the differential ways in which states like Maharashtra, Delhi, and Bihar adapt this infrastructure to their own socio-political terrains. In Bihar especially, hate speech became a tool to reorder caste configurations—an extraordinary strategic shift with profound implications for the state’s political future.

The fundamental objective of this “Architecture of Polarisation” is two-fold: first, to successfully consolidate a majority (read Hindu) vote bank through the construction of an existential threat narrative; and second, to systematically blur socio-economic realities and caste equations—particularly in states like Bihar—by substituting governance failures with religious conflict. This piece argues that electoral hate speech has evolved from fringe outbursts into an essential, multi-stage campaign strategy, aiming to consolidate a majority vote bank by constructing a fear-driven narrative of existential threat to the majority community.

Notably, along with the article, documents containing communal and provocative speeches delivered during Delhi, Maharashtra and Lok Sabha elections has been attached separately.

CJP’s Election Hate Watch operates as a specialised monitoring system designed to track, document, and challenge hate speech that corrodes the fairness of India’s electoral process. During election cycles, CJP’s conduct daily scans of speeches, election rallies, roadshows, religious gatherings, local WhatsApp circulation, hyperlocal events, and media broadcasts. Every instance of communal incitement is timestamped, transcribed, archived, and assessed against the Model Code of Conduct, RPA, and hate-speech jurisprudence. The process is meticulous: the team captures not only explicit slurs or violent calls but also dog-whistles, coded conspiracies (“love jihad,” “land jihad,” “vote jihad”), ritualised slogans, vigilante mobilisation, and election-season communal rumours. The emphasis is on understanding how hate operates as a political technology—where it originates, who amplifies it, how quickly it spreads, and how it shapes the emotional climate of the constituency.

A core function of the Election Hate Watch is formal accountability. Each verified violation is filed with the Election Commission as a structured MCC complaint—supported with evidence, legal references, URLs, transcripts, and explicit analysis of how the speech violates electoral norms. As complaints accumulate, CJP identifies deeper patterns: repeat offenders who face no consequences; fringe groups that act as advance agents of polarisation months before polling; the transition of hate speech from local agitators to star campaigners; the silence or selective inaction of District Magistrates; and the seasonal spike in anti-minority mobilisation whenever elections approach. The Hate Watch therefore does more than document abuse—it exposes the systemic, cyclical nature of hate-mongering during elections and highlights how institutional indifference enables its escalation.

The National Template of Hatred: How stereotypes become strategy

Across every state examined—Maharashtra, Delhi, Bihar, and during the Lok Sabha campaign—one encounters a startlingly consistent repertoire of imagery. It is a set-piece performance, travelling effortlessly from district to district, from rallies to WhatsApp forwards, from street-corner speeches to prime-time studio screens. The central character of this repertoire is the Muslim figure cast entirely outside the domain of citizenship: the eternal infiltrator, the calculating seducer, the demographic schemer, the territorial conspirator, the economic parasite, the cultural invader.

Protagonists employed to spew this hatred by the ideological majoritarian formation that most benefits from it, the RSS led-Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) are the constitutional CEOs of the party’s most polarised states (Uttar Pradesh, Assam and Uttarakhand). The carry forward or trickle down circulation of this hate is then by local level, recognised functionaries of far right formations, closely allied with the regime.

The term “infiltrator” is the axis around which this ecosystem revolves. It appears not merely as an insult but as a political doctrine. Hatred does not operate by merely expressing dislike; it operates by constructing the “Other” as an enemy so dangerous that even constitutional protections must bow before national survival. The infiltrator trope achieves this by collapsing legal categories—foreigner, migrant, refugee, citizen—into a single undifferentiated target. A Muslim man walking with his daughter to school becomes indistinguishable from a Bangladeshi terrorist. A Muslim vendor selling tomatoes becomes indistinguishable from a Rohingya infiltrator. This collapse is not a misunderstanding; it is a deliberate political intervention that renders all constitutional protections fragile.

Alongside the infiltrator, we see the proliferation of “jihad” conspiracies. These conspiratorial logics—love jihad, land jihad, population jihad, vote jihad—are a masterstroke of rhetorical engineering. They allow entirely ordinary, mundane aspects of life—love, marriage, land purchase, childbirth, voting—to be reinterpreted as part of a sinister plan. The beauty of a conspiracy theory is not that it is credible but that it is expansive. It can absorb anything, interpret everything, and justify whatever violence follows. For electoral actors, this is strategic gold.

This vocabulary is supplemented by dehumanising metaphors: termites, snakes, demons. Dehumanisation functions as the precursor to violence, lowering the psychological barrier between rhetoric and action. The use of such animalistic vocabulary across Maharashtra and Lok Sabha speeches shows a clear attempt to create a moral universe in which harming the target feels like cleansing, not cruelty.

Then there is the linguistic architecture of purity and contamination. In Delhi, vendors are forced to display saffron flags or publicly assert their Hindu identity. The underlying claim is that Muslim bodies carry impurity—social, cultural, or even culinary. If a Muslim vendor hides his identity, he is framed as deceitful; if he reveals it, he is ostracised. It is a no-win situation designed to make minority livelihoods precarious.

The repetition of identical metaphors across states shows a powerful truth: hate is being standardised.

The thematic trinity of existential threat

The communal campaign strategy relies on a narrow but potent set of themes, which are tailored locally but consistent nationally. These themes function to dehumanise the minority community, primarily Muslims, and position them as a singular, monolithic threat that transcends local governance issues.

1. The ‘Infiltrator’ and Citizenship Trope: Stoking demographic fear

Across Bihar, Maharashtra, and the Lok Sabha campaign, the core message is that the opposition parties are enabling “Bangladeshi infiltrators” and “Rohingya refugees” to undermine the nation’s security and steal local resources.

• Commonality- The threat to resources and identity: The core claim across all these elections is that “Bangladeshi infiltrators” and “Rohingya refugees” are being enabled by opposition parties to usurp local resources, jobs, and land, thereby changing the demography of border districts. This rhetoric is deployed to stoke the fears of demographic replacement and economic dispossession.

• Top-down amplification: This is not limited to local functionaries; it has been mainstreamed by the highest-ranking “Star Campaigners.” The Prime Minister, for instance, used the term ghuspaithiya (infiltrators) in Bihar, alleging demographic changes in border districts and announcing a mission to deport them to prevent the theft of livelihoods and resources from the youth of Bihar. In the Lok Sabha campaign, the same narrative was used to claim the opposition planned to redistribute the country’s wealth to these “infiltrators”.
• Targeting indigenous communities (Jharkhand): In Jharkhand, this narrative was explicitly used to divide and mobilise the Adivasi and indigenous communities. BJP leaders accused the ruling JMM-Congress coalition of enabling these “infiltrators” to settle illegally, thereby “stealing” resources, jobs, and land from the Adivasis. The rhetoric successfully frames the election not as a choice on development, but as a defense of indigenous culture and territory against an external Muslim threat.
• Delhi and Maharashtra: Local leaders in Delhi utilised the same language, warning residents that if the opposition won, the city would “turn into Dhaka” and that the opposition was busy making Aadhaar cards for these “Bangladeshis”. In Maharashtra, the demand for NRC/Janta NRC was raised with the promise to throw out all Bangladeshis/Rohingya.

The fear stoked: This theme directly stokes the fear of demographic replacement, economic dispossession, and national security compromise, making the electoral choice one of survival rather than policy.

2. The ‘Jihad’ Conspiracy Matrix: Fuelling moral panic and segregation

The term ‘Jihad’ is weaponised as a prefix to various social and economic activities to generate a state of perpetual moral panic within the majority community.

Certain instances of hate speech targeted Muslims in Bihar are as follows:

1. Raghunathpur, Bihar

Assam CM & BJP leader Himanta Biswa Sarma says, “Before I came to Raghunathpur, I thought I would see Lord Ram, Lord Lakshman and Goddess Sita, but I was told that there are many Ram, Laxman and Sita here and there is also Osama. So I asked, who is Osama? This Osama is like the earlier Osama Bin Laden. We have to ensure the elimination of all Osama Bin Ladens in the state. What was Osama’s father’s name? He was called Shahbuddin…”

2. Keoti, Darbhanga, Bihar

Top themes from Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath’s campaign speech: “Bihar’s security is being compromised by letting ghuspaithiya (infiltrators) into Bihar’s land — these are the same people who divide you on caste lines, invite ghuspaithiya (infiltrators), play with your faith, and then work to undermine national security. We must not allow these ghuspaithiya (infiltrators) to enter. Just as Article 370 was ended in Kashmir and Pakistani elements were pushed out, we will remove ghuspaithiya (infiltrators) from our border areas, seize the property of anyone involved in criminal activities, and distribute that property among the poor — the NDA government will do this. Elect NDA candidate Shri Murari Mohan Jha again; do not allow any element that shelters ghuspaithiya (infiltrators), breeds anarchy, or insults Mithila’s culture during festivals and celebrations.”

3. Hajipur, Vaishali, Bihar

Top themes from Union Home Minister Amit Shah’s campaign speech delivered virtually at a public rally: “Should ghuspaithiya (infiltrators) have the right to be on Bihar’s electoral rolls? I know your answer — it should not be. Congress leader Rahul Gandhi took out a ‘Ghuspaithiya Bachao’ yatra in Bihar, because all these parties fighting elections against us see these ghuspaithiya (infiltrators) as their vote bank. And I believe these ghuspaithiya (infiltrators) are snatching jobs from our youth, taking a share of the poor’s grain, and making the country insecure. Rahul ji, hold as many ‘Ghuspaithiya Bachao’ yatras as you want — we will pick out every infiltrator from Bihar and the country and send them out, and we will also work to remove their names from the electoral rolls. This is the decision of the Bharatiya Janata Party, this is the decision of the NDA.”

4. Harsidhi, Purvi Champaran, Bihar

Top themes from CM Pushkar Singh Dhami’s campaign speech: “We have taken strict action against counterfeiters, religious conversion, riots, and against ‘love jihad,’ ‘land jihad,’ and ‘thook jihad.’ Additionally, to curb the operation of illegally functioning madrasas and religious extremism, we have decided to dissolve the Madrasa Board in Uttarakhand. In the coming days, only those madrasas in Uttarakhand that teach the syllabus prescribed by our education board will operate. After winning Bihar, these same measures will be implemented here to ensure its safety. Who do you stand with? Will you stand with the BJP-NDA that puts the national interest above all, or will you stand with those who support ghuspaithiya (infiltrators)? Will you stand with the Uniform Civil Code, or with those who bring Shariat laws and openly give license to the oppression of women?”

5. Chapra, Saran, Bihar

Key themes from Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s campaign speech: “Remember this — the RJD and Congress, drowned in appeasement and vote-bank politics, can do nothing except protect ghuspaithiya (infiltrators). These ghuspaithiya (infiltrators) have become their maai-baap (masters). They have invested all their political strength in saving them.”

This matrix directly translates into violence against vulnerable sections and the enforcement of social and economic apartheid. A BJP Councillor in Delhi, for instance, not only demanded a Muslim vendor display his name but also installed saffron flags on Hindu vendors’ stalls to facilitate identity-based commerce, explicitly propagating the slur that the “other community” spits on food.

3. Dehumanisation and Direct Incitement: The slur-to-violence pipeline

The final, most dangerous thematic stage involves the deployment of dehumanizing language that makes violence against the target community palatable and justified.

• Dehumanising slurs: Instances include a BJP member inside the Lok Sabha using Islamophobic and threatening slurs like “terrorist” and “pimp” against a Muslim MP. A BJP leader in Maharashtra, Nitesh Rane, threatened to burn someone and other leaders openly called for gruesome violence, threatening to “kill you like Insects” and chanting, “Danda uthao, Lande baghao“.
• Incitement to violence: Rallies in Maharashtra, led by figures like BJP MLA T Raja Singh, have featured anti-Muslim slurs and direct incitement. In one instance, a leader threatened to “burn someone,” while others openly chanted, “we will also cut people here and throw them in drains”. Another leader explicitly threatened, “we will kill you like Insects”. The CM of Assam, Himanta Biswa Sarma, while delivering a speech in Bihar, likened a person to “Osama Bin Laden” and explicitly called for their “elimination”. This constant use of extreme rhetoric (e.g., “cut people here and throw them in drains”) serves to normalise a climate of hostility, making actual violence against vulnerable sections an anticipated outcome. This rhetoric aims to condition the public to accept violent elimination as a righteous act.

The Emotional Infrastructure of Fear: How hate speech manufactures threat

Hate speech may appear to be about anger, but its true currency is fear. Anger mobilises crowds; fear sustains movements. Across states, four carefully constructed fears appear repeatedly.

The first is economic fear. In poor, agrarian states such as Bihar—or in working-class belts of Maharashtra—the rhetoric focuses on infiltrators stealing government benefits, occupying land illegally, taking jobs, receiving welfare they do not deserve. This rhetoric is powerful because it taps into real economic frustrations but diverts them away from structural inequality and towards minorities. It converts legitimate anger over unemployment or deprivation into communal resentment.

The second is cultural fear. This fear takes the form of a narrative of civilisational decline. Hindu culture is portrayed as under siege; traditions are framed as endangered; festivals are depicted as battlefields. Rituals like Chhath Puja—once shared by communities—become arenas of policing and communal signalling. What was once a festival of rivers and devotion becoming a theatre of antagonism.

The third is demographic fear. It appears most explicitly in national-level speeches during the Lok Sabha campaign. By exaggerating Muslim fertility and framing demographic change as a Muslim conspiracy, politicians create a sense of population panic. Demographic fear is one of the most potent tools of ethnic majoritarianism globally—it transforms the majority into a frightened minority in their own imagination.

The fourth is sexual fear. Women’s bodies become sites of communal anxiety. “Bahu-beti ki izzat” rhetoric casts Muslim men as sexual predators and Hindu men as protectors. It converts women’s autonomy into a communal battlefield and legitimises violent moral policing. This fear is especially weaponised in Maharashtra, where love jihad rhetoric saturates both street-level speeches and high-profile rallies.

Together, these fears produce a moral panic in which majoritarian self-defence becomes not only political strategy but civic virtue.

The operational playbook of mobilisation and division

The communal escalation follows a meticulous, three-stage operational pattern designed to build momentum while providing plausible deniability to the main political party.

The three-stage escalation model: A remarkable consistency emerges across state after state: hate speech follows a three-stage escalation pipeline. This pipeline is not theoretical. It is empirically visible across the Maharashtra file, the Delhi dossier, and Bihar’s hate-speech archive.

In the first stage, fringe actors begin the work of seeding hatred. These actors are often small, semi-obscure organisations—vigilante groups, local religious fronts, hardline cultural outfits. They operate without restraint, testing the boundaries of permissible speech. Their role is to sow the initial seeds of anxiety.

In the second stage, local political leaders elevate these narratives. Their speeches are strategically targeted, naming places, identifying supposed threats, and calling for exclusion or boycott. They do the work of translating fringe slogans into electoral messaging.

In the third stage, national leaders adopt the same rhetoric. This is the most crucial moment, where language becomes law-like, carrying the weight of authority. When senior ministers repeat terms like “infiltrator”, they confer legitimacy on the entire ecosystem. What begins as street-level rumour becomes a central campaign theme.

This pipeline ensures that hate speech does not remain marginal. It becomes mainstream political messaging, producing a nationwide vocabulary of resentment. (Read: Elections 2024: The lead up to the first two phases of voting have seen far right leaders deliver anti-Muslim hate speech across India and April: CJP’s hate watch campaign analyses several hate incidents reported across the country in the last week)

Stage 1: Fringe elements get active (the groundwork)

The process begins 3-4 months before the elections with dedicated far-right organisations laying the groundwork.

• In Maharashtra, groups like the Sakal Hindu Samaj and Hindu Janjagruti Manch organise Hindu Jan Akrosh rallies, peddling the most extreme versions of the ‘Jihad’ conspiracies, including calls to take up arms. In Bihar, it was the “I Love Mahummad” campaign that led to chaos and violence.
• In Bihar, groups like the Bajrang Dal and VHP host events where convenors openly reject slogans of communal harmony and urge Hindus to take up weapons (shastra) to defend their identity. This fringe content serves as an ‘out-of-syllabus’ test balloon for later, more moderated main-party rhetoric.

Instances from Bihar:

1. Gaya, Bihar

Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP), Matrushakti, and Durga Vahini conducted Durga Ashtami and Shastra Poojan (weapon worship) programs at multiple locations. During the event, women brandished weapons and raised religious slogans.

2. Kaimur, Bihar

Bhagwati Shukla, national president of Rashtriya Sanatan Sena, speaking at a religious conference organised by the group, promoted the anti-Muslim conspiracy theory of “love jihad” and falsely claimed that over 3 lakh Hindu girls are killed every day in its name. He also declared that they will cut those who slaughter cows.

3. Bettiah, West Champaran, Bihar

During a Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) Foundation Day event, leader Ambarish Singh made anti-Muslim remarks, claiming Muslims seek separate laws and identity. He said those who refuse to say “Bharat Mata ki Jai” “may be citizens but are not our brothers,” mocked slogans of communal harmony, and linked the VHP’s mission to ending “love jihad,” cow slaughter, and religious conversions.

4. Bhagwanpur, Vaishali, Bihar

At a Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) Sthapna Diwas event, Bajrang Dal state convenor Prakash Pandey rejected slogans of communal harmony and spread anti-Muslim conspiracy theories around “love jihad,” “land jihad,” religious conversions and cow slaughter. He also urged Hindus to take up weapons (“shastra”) to defend their identity.

Stage 2: Local leaders build-up (the designated agitators)

The next stage involves “designated agitators”—one or two individuals per state who consistently make hateful statements. These leaders test the boundaries of acceptable rhetoric and generate the initial media traction.

Instances:

1. Maharashtra- Nitesh Rane peddles conspiracy theories and threaten violence in Dongri. Caught on camera threatening to burn someone and peddled conspiracy theory of ‘land jihad’

https://cjp.org.in/nitesh-rane-peddles-conspiracy-theories-and-threaten-violence-in-dongri-thane

2. Maharashtra- CJP files complaint before Maharashtra Police against serial hate offender Kajal Hindustani. In complaint, CJP urged to take strict action and seek prosecution under sections 196, 197(1), 352 and 353 of the BNS, 2023 for communal, hate speech

https://cjp.org.in/cjp-files-complaint-before-maharashtra-police-against-serial-hate-offender-kajal-hindustani

3. Maharashtra- CJP lodges additional police complaints against Nitesh Rane and Ashwini Upadhyay for hate speeches. Incendiary remarks by Nitesh Rane and Ashwini Upadhyay span multiple locations in Maharashtra

https://cjp.org.in/cjp-lodges-additional-police-complaints-against-nitesh-rane-and-ashwini-upadhyay-for-hate-speeches

4. Maharashtra- Hindu Jan Akrosh rally in Mumbai sees conspiracy theories being peddled against Muslims. Leaders like Nitesh Rane, made speeches calling out ‘Jihadis’ and accusing people of bringing in ‘Bangladeshis’, and ‘Rohingya’ to conduct riots

https://cjp.org.in/hindu-jan-akrosh-rally-in-mumbai-sees-conspiracy-theories-being-peddled-against-muslims

Stage 3: Star campaigners take over

Once the ground is polarised and the themes are established, the main national leaders (PM Modi, Amit Shah, Rajnath Singh, Yogi Adityanath) step in, adopting the subtext of the hate speech—shifting from local incitement to national security and resource threat—to legitimize the narrative and reach a mass audience. This also involves the tactic of “catching” one or two Maulanas to make statements that fit the narrative, ensuring the rhetoric is framed as a response to minority aggression (e.g., the use of Imran Masood’s statement in Bihar).

Blurring caste equations and weaponising Dalits

A key analytical dimension in Bihar and the Lok Sabha elections is the calculated effort to fracture social justice coalitions by pitting Dalits, Adivasis, and OBCs against Muslims. A critical function of communal hate speech is the calculated effort to blur Caste Equations/Realities and divert attention from governance failures.

• The reservation theft narrative: This is achieved by framing any potential minority benefit (like reservation for backward Muslims, as done in Karnataka) as a direct theft of resources earmarked for Dalits, Scheduled Castes (SCs), and Scheduled Tribes (STs). Senior leaders, including Home Minister Amit Shah, systematically framed any potential reservation for Muslims as a direct theft from Dalits, Adivasis, SCs, and OBCs. The explicit claim that Congress would take reservations “out from the Dalits… and give it to Muslims” is designed to create a zero-sum communal conflict, fracturing the socio-political alliance built on caste-based identity and social justice.
• Diverting from joblessness and poverty: By focusing campaign energy entirely on ‘Infiltrators,’ ‘Love Jihad,’ and ‘Reservation Theft,’ the political discourse successfully diverts attention from the real issues plaguing Bihar, such as poverty, unemployment, and lack of development.

Communalising shared public and festival spaces

The strategy of division extends to hijacking shared cultural symbols and spaces.

• Festival polarisation: Festivals traditionally celebrated by both communities are being communalised, such as Chhath Puja in Bihar, where the use of VHP stickers is a new tactic to stake exclusive claim over shared cultural rituals.
• Economic segregation: The use of festivals or local gatherings to enforce economic boycotts and social separation (e.g., the paneer vendor incident in Delhi).
• Infiltrating secular institutions: Even educational institutions are being targeted, with reports of Hindutva activities like Gaushalas and Shobha Yatras being brought into college campuses like IIT-B in Mumbai, symbolically mirroring the ‘Land Jihad’ narrative in cultural and academic domains.

Targeting religious and political spaces

• Religious sites: Speeches included promises to remove mosques from Kashi and Mathura if the BJP wins a supermajority in the 2024 Lok Sabha elections. The destruction of the Babri Mosque was openly glorified in Maharashtra.
• Parliamentary attacks: A Muslim MP, Kunwar Danish Ali, was called a “terrorist, pimp” by a BJP member, Ramesh Bidhuri, inside India’s parliament.
• Political rivalry: Assam CM Himanta Biswa Sarma made a deeply communal remark in Bihar, linking a local leader to Osama Bin Laden and his father to Shahabuddin

Instances from Bihar:

1. Gaya, Bihar

At a government event inaugurating development project, Prime Minister Narendra Modi targeted those he referred to as “ghuspaithiya” (infiltrators), alleging demographic changes in Bihar’s border districts. He asserted that infiltrators would not be allowed to steal livelihoods and resources from the youth of Bihar and Indian citizens, and announced the formation of a demography mission to deport each “ghuspaithiya” from the country.

2. Barauni, Begusarai, Bihar

Home Minister Amit Shah delivered a speech targeting those he referred to as “ghuspethiya” (infiltrators). He questioned whether they should receive voting rights, be included in voter lists, or be entitled to free food rations, employment, housing, or medical aid, claiming that Rahul Gandhi prioritises them over the people of Bihar. He further alleged that “ghuspethiyas” serve as vote banks for opposition leaders and vowed to remove each one of them.

3. Dehri, Rohtas, Bihar

Home Minister Amit Shah delivered a speech targeting those he referred to as “ghuspethiya” (infiltrators). He mocked Congress leader Rahul Gandhi’s campaign as a “Ghuspethiya Bachao Yatra” and asked attendees whether infiltrators should have voting rights, access to free rations, jobs, housing, or medical aid. He alleged that infiltrators are receiving these benefits instead of Indian youth, warning that if the opposition wins, “every house in Bihar will have only ghuspethiyas.”

4. Danapur, Patna, Bihar

Top themes from Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath’s campaign speech: “The INDI Alliance has started a new campaign– development vs ‘burqa’. When Bihar and its youth are talking about development, Congress and RJD are trying to expand their reach through ‘burqa’. Should they be allowed to conduct fake polling? Should ‘foreign ghuspaith’ (infiltrators) be given a free hand to rob the poor, Dalits, and citizens of Bihar? Anywhere in the world, one must show their identity and face, but they want to let anyone vote without revealing their faces.”

From Rhetoric to Rupture: How hate speech reorders everyday life

Across Maharashtra, Delhi, and Bihar, hate speech produces concrete, lived consequences. It reorganises public space. It transforms markets into segregated zones. It forces everyday interactions to become declarations of identity.

In Delhi, the pressure on Muslim vendors to display saffron flags is not simply symbolic. It is a form of coercion that destroys anonymity, exposes vulnerability, and renders economic life contingent on communal compliance. In Maharashtra, boycott campaigns led to assaults on shops, disruption of livelihoods, and humiliation of workers. In Bihar, rumours about “Bangladeshi vendors” have triggered spontaneous harassment of ordinary labourers. Panchayat resolutions in various states have attempted to exclude Muslim traders from local markets—a practice that mimics apartheid structures where economic participation becomes conditional on identity.

Violence follows predictably. Mob assaults, harassment of couples, vandalism of shops, threats to imams, surveillance of Muslim-majority localities—these are not “law and order incidents”. They are direct outcomes of a discursive environment engineered for hostility.

When hate speech saturates public space, violence becomes not a deviation but an expected response. A society trained to see neighbours as infiltrators is a society primed for confrontation.

The Systemic Enablers: Media and institutional inaction

The final, critical piece of the pattern is the widespread belief that the Model Code of Conduct (MCC) is a functionally dead instrument, a perception reinforced by consistent inaction on complaints against powerful figures. The piece must highlight that despite the existence of electoral laws and the MCC, enforcement remains critically weak, thus encouraging repeat offenses.).

1. The media multiplier and the digital battlefield

The media ecosystem acts as a critical force multiplier, ensuring maximum saturation of the divisive narratives.

• The role of media in propagation: The media acts as a critical force multiplier. The search results confirm that social media platforms (Facebook, YouTube, X) are key instruments for amplifying and mainstreaming hate speech, with top BJP leaders’ speeches often live-streamed across official accounts.
• AI-generated content and deepfakes: As anticipated, the Bihar election has become a test case for the use of AI Deepfakes, hate posters, and malicious Bhojpuri songs, “blurring the line between propaganda and parody”. The attempt to create an AI Deepfake targeting Colonel Sofia Qureshi and falsely linking Trishul drills to the Bihar polls is a clear example of using sophisticated technology to manufacture a crisis narrative.
• “Paid” hardliners: A crucial pattern is noted: the existence of “paid” Muslim hardliners whose provocative clips are used by the political machinery to validate the “existential threat” narrative. This creates a false equivalence, framing the majority community’s rhetoric as a justified defensive reaction. 

2. The MCC Paradox: A functional impunity

One of the most troubling revelations across states is the consistent institutional inaction. MCC complaints filed by civil society groups in Maharashtra resulted in little to no prosecution. Delhi administrators took no meaningful action against blatant hate speech. Even where the Election Commission issued notices, follow-up was weak.

The paralysis is not bureaucratic inefficiency—it is political choice. District Magistrates, legally empowered to act suo-moto, routinely fail to intervene. Police forces often behave not as neutral protectors but as silent spectators or selective enforcers. Voting-day advertisements—clearly illegal—continue year after year with complete impunity.

The absence of enforcement does not merely fail to stop hate speech. It incentivises it. (Read: From Welfare to Expulsion: Bihar’s MCC period rhetoric turns citizenship into a campaign weapon)

• Lack of consequence for star campaigners: The most damning evidence comes from the 2019 Lok Sabha elections, where the Congress party explicitly petitioned the Supreme Court, stating that the Election Commission’s (ECI) “continued silence” on complaints of hate speech and MCC violation against the Prime Minister and Home Minister amounted to a “tacit endorsement” of their statements and was a form of “invidious discrimination”. The Supreme Court was eventually forced to direct the EC to decide on these complaints.
• The DM’s suo-moto power failure: District Magistrates (DMs) possess the suo moto power to initiate action against violations of law and order, including hate speech, without waiting for the ECI’s directive. The consistent failure of DMs to utilise this power effectively creates a security vacuum and raises a fundamental question: What is the purpose of the MCC if its own local enforcement arms refuse to exercise their legal authority?
• The silence period violation: A consistent tactical violation is the use of full-page newspaper advertisements on the day of voting—a direct breach of the legally mandated “silence period”. Complaints are filed every year, yet nothing ever happens, turning a legal restraint into a predictable, unpunished final campaign flourish. Complaints were explicitly filed against the BJP, MNS, and the Shiv Sena (Shinde faction) in Maharashtra for silence period violations, specifically citing political ads in major newspapers. (Read: How BJP is accused of violating 48 Hours-Silence Period even on Poll Day?)

How MCC violations become a license for electoral hate: One of the most disturbing features of India’s contemporary electoral landscape is not merely the explosion of hate speech, but the near-total collapse of institutional response to it. The Model Code of Conduct—once regarded as a moral compass and a boundary-marker—is now little more than a symbolic pamphlet. Across Maharashtra, Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and during the 2024 Lok Sabha cycle, repeated, documented, and widely circulated instances of explicit hate speech, communal incitement, and even direct calls for violence were flagged to the Election Commission of India with urgency and precision. Yet the ECI’s response oscillated between silence, non-committal notices, or bureaucratic platitudes. This selective inertia has effectively rewritten the MCC: instead of a code meant to regulate elections, it has become a code that politicians can violate with impunity once they understand that consequences are unlikely, uneven, or easily deflected. The absence of deterrence becomes a form of permission.

The judicial system’s response—especially from constitutional courts—has only deepened this institutional void. High Courts routinely dismiss or defer petitions concerning hate speech at election time, often on procedural grounds, or by sending complainants back to the very authorities that have already refused to act. Even more worrying is the Supreme Court’s posture, which has increasingly adopted a stance of non-intervention, repeatedly expressing “helplessness,” “constraint,” or “reluctance” to issue proactive directions. This judicial passivity is not neutral. By refusing to treat communal hate as an urgent constitutional injury, the courts inadvertently normalise its presence in electoral politics. When the highest court of a democracy signals that it cannot act unless someone else acts first, hate becomes embedded as an acceptable mode of political communication.

This institutional abdication has profound consequences for the democratic process. It creates a political marketplace in which the loudest, most inflammatory actors gain the greatest advantage. It rewards radicalisation, emboldens repeat offenders, and silences vulnerable communities who lose faith in the very institutions meant to protect them. The MCC becomes a decorative façade, the ECI a passive spectator, and the judiciary an absentee guardian. What remains is a hollowed-out electoral field where hate speech does not merely occur—it thrives under the protective cover of institutional silence. When the state signals that hate is politically useful and legally inconsequential, it corrodes not only public discourse but the constitutional foundation of elections themselves. In such a climate, communal propaganda is not an aberration; it becomes the new grammar of democratic participation.

Some of the MCC complaints sent by CJP during these four election cycles may be read here, here, here and here.

Bihar: The strategic communalisation of caste politics

Bihar stands out for a deeper, more consequential transformation. Unlike Maharashtra or Delhi, where communal polarisation has been cultivated for years, Bihar has historically been governed by caste equations. Political coalitions were built on OBC solidarity, Dalit assertion, and the arithmetic of caste-based identities. Muslims, though electorally significant, were integrated into caste-based alliances rather than positioned as central antagonists.

In the recent Bihar cycle, hate speech has been weaponised to redraw this landscape. The infiltrator narrative is used to redirect OBC and EBC economic frustrations toward Muslims. Hate speech in Bihar functions not merely as communal rhetoric but as caste engineering. By portraying Muslims as beneficiaries of welfare schemes, as land-grabbers, as demographic threats, hate speech fractures long-standing solidarities between marginalised castes and Muslim communities. The constructed rhetoric also blurs or diminishes issues of caste deprivation and discrimination of the most marginalised where the systemic exploiters are from the dominant ‘Hindu’ fold.

This transformation is visible in the communalisation of Chhath Puja, one of Bihar’s most syncretic cultural spaces. It is visible in the circulation of AI-generated videos designed to provoke OBC anger. It is visible in the increasing recruitment of Dalit and OBC youth by Hindutva groups seeking to expand their caste footprint.

In Bihar, like elsewhere, hate speech is not simply dividing communities. It is restructuring them.

Democracy in Decline: The erosion of rights, citizenship, and public reason

The cumulative effect of election hate speech is the erosion of India’s constitutional framework. Hate speech violates Articles 14, 15, and 21 by producing inequality, discrimination, and insecurity. It corrodes the idea of citizenship by creating a two-tier system: those who belong fully and those who must constantly prove their belonging.

The damage is not simply legal. It is epistemic. Hate speech erodes the ability of citizens to think democratically. The utter failure of constitutional institutions, conceived as safeguards –be it the constitutional courts or the infamous Election Commission of India (ECI) to act decisively and punitively ensures further impunity and normalisation. Result: hate speech and its impact, crowds out substantive debate, reduces governance to identity warfare, and delegitimises political disagreement. In such an environment, elections cease to be democratic practices and become theatres of domination.

Conclusion: Reclaiming democratic integrity

The analysis demonstrates that the current surge in electoral hate speech is neither random nor reactive; it is the product of a highly organised, multi-layered, and financially supported political architecture designed to achieve communal mobilization.

India’s contemporary elections reveal a political landscape where hate speech is not an aberration but an organising principle. It structures campaigns, mobilises voters, reorganises identities, and shapes governance. It transforms neighbours into enemies and turns public space into a battlefield. It reorders caste politics in places like Bihar. It destroys livelihoods in places like Delhi. In addition, it legitimises violence in places like Maharashtra.

Most dangerously, it normalises a new political order in which fear is the principal currency of power.

India now stands at a critical juncture. If hate remains the central grammar of elections, then elections themselves cease to be instruments of democratic renewal. They become mechanisms of social control. The future of India’s democracy depends not merely on recognising this transformation but on confronting it with legal, political, and moral urgency.

Hate is not a speech act.

It is a system.

Moreover, systems do not collapse on their own—they must be dismantled.

The pre-election hate machinery that turned Maharashtra into a communal battleground:

Capital city became a laboratory for pre-election communal polarisation:

2024’s election rhetoric and weaponisation of hate across India:

References:

https://www.outlookindia.com/elections/hate-speech-surges-in-bihar-polls-the-return-of-communal-and-caste-divides-in-campaign-rhetoric

https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/tamil-nadu/cpim-slams-pm-modi-for-remarks-against-tamil-nadu-during-bihar-poll-campaign/article70224918.ece

https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/ahead-of-bihar-polls-union-minister-and-begusarai-mp-giriraj-singh-sparks-controversy-2805440-2025-10-19?utm_source=chatgpt.com

https://news.abplive.com/elections/pm-modi-speech-purnea-congress-rjd-yatra-infiltrators-bihar-election-2025-bihar-sir-1800488?utm_source=chatgpt.com

https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2025/Oct/22/political-islam-undermined-hindu-faith-largely-overlooked-in-history-cm-yogi

https://www.newslaundry.com/2025/09/24/indian-muslims-not-equal-abp-show-allows-hate-speech-slurs-as-ragi-vs-pathan

https://www.freepressjournal.in/mumbai/mumbai-hindu-groups-call-for-restricting-non-hindus-from-garba-venues-citing-love-jihad-concerns-during-navratri

https://cjp.org.in/mtra-elections-on-cjps-complaint-on-an-mcc-violation-fir-has-been-registered-against-kajal-hindustani-for-hate-speech

https://cjp.org.in/cjp-stands-against-hate-seeks-preventive-action-against-hate-driven-events-in-maharashtra

https://cjp.org.in/cjp-complaints-to-the-maharashtra-election-commission-over-communal-posters-featuring-up-cm-yogi-adityanath

https://cjp.org.in/cjp-highlights-mcc-violation-urges-maharashtra-election-commission-to-act-on-hate-speech

https://cjp.org.in/cjp-files-complaint-against-bjp-mns-and-ss-shinde-faction-silence-period-violations-in-maharashtra-elections

https://cjp.org.in/cjp-files-5-hate-speech-complaints-before-ceo-maharashtra-as-violated-mcc

https://sabrangindia.in/hindutva-enters-mumbai-college-campuses-gaushala-shobha-yatra-in-iit-b-restriction-to-freedom-of-speech-at-tiss

https://sabrangindia.in/chhattisgarh-maharashtra-sc-directs-police-to-ensure-no-hate-speech-by-bjp-mla-raja-singh-hindu-jan-jagruti-samiti-rallies

https://cjp.org.in/bjp-mla-t-raja-singh-at-mira-road-hurls-anti-muslim-slurs-incites-violence-at-rally-permitted-by-bombay-high-court

https://cjp.org.in/hindu-jan-akrosh-rally-in-mumbai-sees-conspiracy-theories-being-peddled-against-muslims

https://sabrangindia.in/is-mumbai-becoming-a-hotbed-of-hate

https://sabrangindia.in/bjp-mla-nitesh-rane-leads-hindutva-rally-in-govandi-demands-demolition-of-illegal-masjids-and-madrasa

https://sabrangindia.in/environmental-interest-converted-into-communal-tension-madras-high-court-refuses-to-quash-criminal-case-against-bjp-state-head-annamalai

https://cjp.org.in/hindu-jan-akrosh-rally-in-mumbai-sees-conspiracy-theories-being-peddled-against-muslims

https://sabrangindia.in/ground-report-protests-erupt-in-assam-after-portrayal-of-muslims-as-criminals-in-rally-by-bodoland-university

https://cjp.org.in/cjp-files-complaint-against-bjp-leader-nazia-elahi-khan-over-hate-speech-in-delhi/

https://sabrangindia.in/cjp-calls-for-electoral-action-against-bjp-leaders-hate-speech-at-rohini-chetna-event/

https://www.newslaundry.com/2025/01/21/denial-and-deflection-how-the-bjps-bidhuri-walked-off-when-asked-about-crude-remarks

https://www.indiatvnews.com/delhi/delhi-assembly-elections-2025-police-registers-over-1100-cases-of-mcc-violations-model-code-of-conduct-detained-35516-people-latest-updates-2025-02-07-975130

The post The Orchestrated Extremism: An analysis of communal hate speech in India’s election cycle (2024–2025) appeared first on SabrangIndia.

“WE, THE PEOPLE OF INDIA, having solemnly resolved to constitute   India into a      SOVEREIGN SOCIALIST SECULAR DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC and to secure to all its citizens: JUSTICE, social, economic and political;

LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; EQUALITY of status and of opportunity; and to promote among them all;

FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the Nation;

IN OUR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY this 26th day of November 1949, do HEREBY ADOPT, ENACT AND GIVE TO OURSELVES THIS CONSTITUTION.”

RSS demanded Manu Smruti as the Constitution

The two underlined ideals merely formally added in 1977, ‘Socialist and Secular’, only strengthened the resolve of the Constitution of India would apply to a non-sectarian polity with only the people of India, all of its people, sovereign. How many Indians however know that the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) that has today affected a stranglehold on Indian politics and democracy, through its political appendage, the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) had, at the time, mourned the birth (coming into effect) of the Indian Constitution? Outraged when the Indian Constituent Assembly (CA) adopted a democratic- Secular Constitution under the supervision of Dr. BR Ambedkar, their organs protested.

We know that when the Constituent Assembly of India passed the Constitution on November 26, 1949, the RSS organ Organizer came out with an editorial on November 30, 1949 titled ‘Constitution’ declaring its firm rejection of Constitutional Values:

“The worst about the new Constitution of Bharat is that there is nothing Bhartiya about it…There is no trace of ancient Bhartiya constitutional laws, institutions, nomenclatures and phraseology in it…Manu’s Laws were written long before Lycurgus of Sparta or Solon of Persia. To this day his laws as enunciated in the Manusmriti excite the admiration of the world and elicit spontaneous obedience and conformity. But to our constitutional pundits that means nothing.”

How fundamentally, the RSS denigrates the Constitution of India can be gleaned through the following statement of the most prominent ideologue of the RSS, Golwalkar:

“Our Constitution too is just a cumbersome and heterogeneous piecing together of various articles from various Constitutions of the Western countries. It has absolutely nothing which can be called our own. Is there a single word of reference in its guiding principles as to what our national mission is and what our keynote in life is? No!”

[MS Golwalkar, Bunch of Thoughts, Sahitya Sindhu, Bangalore, 1996, p. 238.]

By demanding Manusmriti as “constitution of India”, RSS, in fact was following the belief of its darling Hindutva icon, VD Savarkar who had declared long back:

“Manusmriti is that scripture which is most worship-able after Vedas for our Hindu Nation and which from ancient times has become the basis of our culture-customs, thought and practice. This book for centuries has codified the spiritual and divine march of our nation. Even today the rules which are followed by crores of Hindus in their lives and practice are based on Manusmriti. Today Manusmriti is Hindu Law”.

[VD Savarkar, ‘Women in Manusmriti‘ in Savarkar Samagar (collection of Savarkar’s writings in Hindi), vol. 4, Prabhat, Delhi, p. 416.]

The faith of RSS brass in Manusmriti, naturally, leads them to believe in Casteism too which gave birth to the debased practice of Untouchability. For RSS Casteism is the essence of Hindu Nationalism. Golwalkar did not mince words in declaring that Casteism was synonymous with the Hindu Nation. According to him, the Hindu people are no one but,

“The Hindu People, they said, is the Virat Purusha, the Almighty manifesting Himself. Though they did not use the word „Hindu‟, it is clear from the following description of the Almighty in Purusha-Sukta [in the 10th book of Rig Ved] wherein it is stated that the sun & the moon are His eyes, the stars and the skies are created from his nabhi [navel] and Brahmin is the head, Kshatriya the hands, Vaishya the thighs and Shudra the feet. [Italics as in the original text] This means that the people who have this fourfold arrangement, i.e., the Hindu People, is [sic] our God. This supreme vision of Godhead is the very core of our concept of „nation‟ and has permeated our thinking and given rise to various unique concepts of our cultural heritage.”

[Golwalkar, M. S., Bunch of Thoughts, collection of writings/speeches of Golwalkar published by RSS, p.36-37.]

What kind of a Hindutva civilization the RSS wants to build by enforcing the laws of Manu, can be known by having a glimpse of the laws prescribed by Manu for the lower castes, Untouchables and women. Some of these dehumanizing and degenerated laws, which are presented here, are self-explanatory.

A selection of Laws of Manu denigrating Dalits/Untouchables

1. For the sake of the prosperity of the worlds (the divine one) caused the Brahmana, the Kshatriya, the Vaisya, and the Sudra to proceed from his mouth, his arm, his thighs and his feet. (I/31)
2. One occupation only the lord prescribed to the Sudras, to serve meekly even these (other) three castes. (I/91)
3. Once-born man (a Sudra), who insults a twice-born man with gross invective, shall have his tongue cut out; for he is of ‘low origin’. (VIII/270)
4. If he mentions the names and castes (jati) of the (twice-born) with contumely, an iron nail, ten fingers long, shall be thrust red-hot into his mouth. (VIII/271)
5. If he arrogantly teaches Brahmanas their duty, the king shall cause hot oil to be poured into his mouth and into his ears. (VIII/272)
6. He who raises his hand or a stick, shall have his hand cut off; he who in anger kicks with his foot, shall have his foot cut off. (VIII/280)
7. A ‘low-caste’ man who tries to place himself on the same seat with a man of a high caste, shall be branded on his hip and be banished, or (the king) shall cause his buttock to be gashed. (VIII/281)

As per the Manu Code if Sudras are to be given most stringent punishments for even petty violations/actions, the same Code of Manu is very lenient towards Brahmins. Shloka 380 in Chapter VIII bestowing profound love on Brahmins decrees:

“Let him never slay a Brahmana, though he has committed all (possible) crimes; let him banish such an (offender), leaving all his property (to him) and (his body) unhurt.”

A selection of Laws of Manu demeaning Hindu women

1. Day and night woman must be kept in dependence by the males (of) their (families), and, if they attach themselves to sensual enjoyments, they must be kept under one’s control. (IX/2)
2. Her father protects (her) in childhood, her husband protects (her) in youth, and her sons protect (her) in old age; a woman is never fit for independence. (IX/3)
3. Women do not care for beauty, nor is their attention fixed on age; (thinking), (It is enough that) he is a man, ‟ they give themselves to the handsome and to the ugly. (IX/14)
4. Through their passion for men, through their mutable temper, through their natural heartlessness, they become disloyal towards their husbands, however carefully they may be guarded in this (world). (IX/15)
5. (When creating them) Manu allotted to women (a love of their) bed, (of their) seat and (of) ornament, impure desires, wrath, dishonesty, malice, and bad conduct. (IX/17)

[The above selection of Manu’s Codes is from F. Max Muller, Laws of Manu, LP Publications, Delhi, 1996; first published in 1886. The bracket after each code incorporates number of chapter/number of code according to the above edition.]

The reproduced parts of the Manu Code above need no further elaboration and commentary. They are too glaringly venomous, fascist and derogatory of marginalized sections, the Untouchables who are referred to as Sudras by Manu. Perhaps this was the reason that the German philosopher, Friedrich Nietzsche who contributed immensely to the growth of totalitarian ideas in Europe in the 20th century, fell in love with this work.

It is to be noted here that a copy of Manusmriti was burnt as a protest in the presence of Dr. BR Ambedkar during the historic Mahad agitation on December 25, 1927. Dr Ambedkar called upon Dalits to commemorate each December 25 as the Manusmriti Dehen Diwas (Manusmriti burning day) in future. In fact, Brahmanism as basis of the RSS world-view is the original Fascism in the history of human civilization.

[https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/andhra-pradesh/manusmriti-dahan-divas-protest-staged-at-collectorate/article30396588.ece]

RSS’ deep hatred for democracy

It is true that when RSS faced the wrath of the Indian State when Sardar Patel was the home minister of India it criticised the detention laws without trial. In an editorial in Organizer it wrote:

“Section 21 and 22 providing for detention without trial reduce all the wordy assurances about liberty, equality and fraternity to just near meaningless verbiage.”[Organizer, November 30, 1949]

But once in power the RSS-BJP rulers led by the present leadership have returned to Hindutva’s Fascist and Nazi heritage. They have converted Indian democratic-secular polity into a totalitarian Hindutva oligarchy where any kind of dissent is treated as anti-national and anti-Hindu. It is the continuation of hatred for democracy as decreed by Golwalkar as early as 1940. Golwalkar while addressing the 1350 top level cadres of the RSS declared:

“RSS inspired by one flag, one leader and one ideology are lighting the flame of Hindutva in each and every corner of this great land.”

[Golwalkar, M.S., Shri Guruji Samagar Darshan (collected works of Golwalkar in Hindi), Bhartiya Vichar Sadhna, Nagpur, nd., volume 1, p. 11.]

November 26, 2025

Disclaimer: The views expressed here are the author’s personal views, and do not necessarily represent the views of Sabrangindia.

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The post November 26: How RSS mourned the passage of India’s Constitution by the Constituent Assembly appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The matter might have ended at this stage requiring the respondents to file a counter affidavit. However, the matter cannot be treated to be so simple inasmuch as this Court is deluged with such matters on the basis of First Information Reports being filed left and right by the authorities and complainants under the provisions of the Act, 1955. (Para 15)

In this case, officers intercepted the transportation of nine living and healthy progeny of cows within Uttar Pradesh. Even though a slaughter or transport across state lines was not in issue, the owner of the vehicle was charged under Section 3, Section 5A, and Section 8 of the 1955 Act and Section 11 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960.

In determining that no offense had occurred, the Court ordered protection for the petitioner and went even further, directing the Principal Secretary (Home) and Director General of Police to personally file affidavits explaining this misuse pattern. The bench also asked for an explanation as to why the State has not issued a formal Government Order (GR) to carry out the Supreme Court’s binding directions from the judgment in Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India (July 2018) to prevent mob violence and cow vigilantism.

The Preventive Measures mandated by the apex court in the Tehseen S. Poonawalla  case have been encapsulated in this action-oriented pamphlet widely disseminated by Citizens for Justice and Peace that may be read here.

For over a decade, CJP has systematically documented and intervened against the abuse of the “cow protection” laws. Since 2017, CJP’s legal and advocacy teams have tracked the rise of mob vigilantism, along with its legal facilitators, all over India — fact-finding, litigation, and public education being the methods of doing this work. Investigations like India: The New Lynchdom (2018, CJP) and Cow Vigilantism: A Tool for Terrorising Minorities (2020, CJP) have mapped hundreds of instances where such laws have reportedly been used to sanction mob, extrajudicial violence, and have documented how the criminal justice system has been captured, even driven, by majoritarian agendas. Against this background, this becomes an important moment of judicial awareness of what CJP and other human rights defenders have been implementing for years.

It is important to note that this order is not limited to a single petitioner. It represents a judicial and legal recognition that the ongoing misuse of the 1955 Act occurs as part of a broader culture of impunity that encourages vigilantes, criminalizes livelihoods, and undermines the rule of law.

Statutory Background of the UP Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act, 1955

The 1955 Act was made to ban the killing of cows and their offspring and to control the transport of cows, all for the purpose of implementing Article 48 of the Constitution. The Act defines three regular aspects, where slaughter is banned under Section 3, transport within U.P. out-of-state is restricted under Section 5A, and punishment of three to ten years’ rigorous imprisonment and fine of ₹3–5 lakh is introduced under Section 8 for violations. Section 2(d) defines “slaughter” as “killing by any method whatsoever, and includes maiming and inflicting physical injury which in the ordinary course will cause death.” This definition shows that there must be some form of harm that would ultimately lead to death.

The Court emphasised that this requirement is routinely overlooked. It quoted Kaliya v. State of U.P. (2024 126 ACC 61), in which the Allahabad High Court cautioned that the conveyance of cows or calves in Uttar Pradesh does not invoke Section 5A since it only prohibits transport outside of that state. It also relied on the case of Parasram Ji v. Imtiaz (AIR 1962 All 22), a 1962 decision from the Allahabad High Court, which held that there is a difference between mere preparation and an attempt to slaughter. Preparation does not constitute an offence under the Act if the cow is tied up, for example. By citing Parasram Ji, the Bench emphasized that there was more than sixty years of settled law that the police were ignoring.

In this case, where slaughter, maiming, or interstate transportation was not charged, none of the violations applied. The judgment reminded us again of the Court’s own earlier warnings. In Rahmuddin v. State of U.P.(Criminal MISC. Bail Application No. – 34008 of 2020), the Court noted that the Act was being “misused against innocent persons” when it mentioned the meat was recovered, but often claimed all the meat to be cow meat without a laboratory test. In Jugadi Alias Nizamuddin v. State of U.P. (Criminal MISC Anticipatory Bail Application U/S 438 CR.P.C. No. – 182 of 2023), bail was granted before an arrest, as only cow-dung and a rope were recovered, but it was branded a “glaring example of misuse of penal law.” These rulings serve the greater purpose of demonstrating the number of mechanical FIRs that are being registered, even before investigation, and the abuse and incarceration that innocent people continue to experience.

Ambiguous legal provisions and ineffective procedural safeguards enable police overreach and selective police power against certain communities, mostly Muslims and Dalits. Consequently, the findings of the Allahabad High Court lend judicial authority to what human-rights defenders have been calling, for a long time, a systematic abuse of “cow-protection” laws.

This detailed legal explainer prepared by CJP in 2018 de-constructs how such laws have become a source of victimization.

The Court’s reasoning: From Casual FIRs to Vigilantism

After concluding that there was no offence made out, the Bench stated it was “deluged with such matters” resulting from indiscriminate First Information Reports (FIRs) under the 1955 Act (para 15). It directed the Principal Secretary (Home) and the DGP to show cause why the officers continue to lodge these FIRs in spite of the clear judicial precedent, in particular, the cases of Kaliya and Parasram Ji refer to cases in para 15. The Court required that the affidavits submitted by the officers included relevant affidavit material as to the taking of proposed disciplinary action by the State against the complainants and police personnel for making unwarranted FIRs, and if not, the Court required explanation for why the State did not issue a formal “Government Order” to legally preclude any such future FIRs, which served, in proportion, to undue disadvantage of cost in furthering the FIR towards frivolous case of prosecution.

In a serious observation, the Bench did not merely engage in procedural fault-finding; it also uncovered a more pervasive social consequence:

Yet another connected aspect of the matter under the garb of the Act, 1955 is vigilantism which is being practiced by various persons. Why we say this is because a few days back, a Bench of this Court was seized of a matter in which the car of the person was stopped by vigilantes and thereafter, it was not traceable. (See- Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 9152 of 2025 Inre; Bablu Vs. State of U.P and Ors). In the said writ, instructions have been called for by the Court. Violence, lynching and vigilantism is the order of the day. (Para 30).

The Court relied on Bablu v. State of U.P. (W.P. No. 9152 of 2025), where vigilantes encircled a vehicle, which later went missing, to illustrate how misuse of the statute invites disorder. Moreover, it established the illustration of occurrence within the wider phenomenon of “mob violence” by linking directly with the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India that “vigilantism cannot, by any consideration, be allowed to take shape… it ushers in anarchy, chaos and disorder.”

National Legal Framework: The Tehseen S. Poonawalla Mandate

In the case of Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India, the Supreme Court remarked on the very real and concerning increase in lynchings and violence related to cows. The Court, speaking through Chief Justice Dipak Misra, A.M. Khanwilkar, and D.Y. Chandrachud, found that lynching was “a failing of the rule of law and of the lofty ideals of the Constitution itself.” The Court noted that State agencies have the “primary responsibility” to protect against cow-vigilantism or any type of mob violence.

In paragraph 40 of the judgement, the Supreme Court gave a thorough set of preventative, remedial, and punitive directions: every district must appoint a nodal police officer (not below the rank of Superintendent) for oversight for prevention of mob violence; identify sensitive areas; establish fast-track courts for lynching cases; develop compensatory schemes for victims under Section 357A of the CrPC; and identify negligent officials and hold them accountable.

Despite these unequivocal mandates, however, the Allahabad High Court found that Uttar Pradesh had taken no action to meaningfully operationalise the Supreme Court directions. It found that a circular issued by the DGP on 26 July 2018 could not substitute for a Government Order issued under Article 162 of the Constitution, as such an order would reflect Government policy. The Bench thus required an explanation for the non-compliance and required affidavits showing compliance, on the basis that the lack of the Government Order undermined the prevention and punishment framework contemplated by the Supreme Court.

Notwithstanding these clear directions, the Allahabad High Court noticed that Uttar Pradesh had taken no decisive steps toward operationalizing the guidelines. Its finding was that a circular issued by the DGP on 26 July 2018 was not an adequate alternative to a Government Order issued pursuant to Article 162 of the Constitution. Only a Government Order could adequately reflect the policy of the Government. The Bench mandated a rationale of non-compliance and required affidavits evidencing compliance, noting that, absent an order from the Government, the preventive and punitive framework envisaged by the Supreme Court simply could not be accomplished.

Constitutional Implications: Articles 14, 19, and 21

The aggressive and arbitrary usage of the 1955 Act violates the equality, liberty, and due-process guarantees of the Constitution. Article 14 guarantees equality before the law, and this equality is violated when FIRs are lodged with no basis in fact or when officers exercise their discretion to target only particular communities. The equal protection principle is breached when FIRs are lodged “left and right” (para 15) when there are no fundamental elements of an offence. Therefore, non-arbitrariness, which is at the heart of Article 14, is violated.

Article 19 protects against arbitrary seizure of vehicles or criminalizing intra-State cattle transport, colloquially known as the “anti-cow slaughter provisions,” which interfere with unreasonable restrictions on the lawful trade, profession, and movement of citizens. Kaliya v. State of U.P. explicitly clarified that intra-State transport is not an offence. It is clear how restrictions on engaging in an occupation, profession, or trade when they are established directly restrict citizens’ economic liberty.

Under Article 21, the arbitrary actions are a further deprivation of liberty and dignity without due process of law. In Rahmuddin, the Court noted that accused persons languish in prison because meat samples are rarely sent for analysis and dispose of the need for due process. The combination of legal negligence and social malice undermines the conception of equal citizenship and uses the protection of cows as an excuse to persecute people. The High Court, accepting that using the 1955 Act has “wasted precious judicial time” (para 41) and that citizens should not have to “spend valuable money and time” to seek relief, demonstrates that this violation is both an individualized violation and a burden on the judiciary.

As CJP’s analyses have frequently stated, police impunity and informally inflicted violence contribute to the sense that “there are two sets of citizens: one protected by the law and the other punished by law.”

The judgment’s call for the most senior officials to be held individually accountable brings back an important idea behind constitutional governance: that executive negligence in the enforcement of the fundamental rights of every citizen cannot be excused by the silence of an institution. When the authorities of the State ignore orders made by the Supreme Court and allow vigilantes to act, the authorities of the State cease to execute their constitutional duty to uphold the rule of law.

Misuse, Vigilantism, and the Rule of Law

The Allahabad High Court’s ruling in Rahul Yadav exposes that the U.P. Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act has transitioned from a regulatory instrument to a tool for arbitrary prosecution. The Court explicitly points out that “under the garb of the Act is vigilantism,” giving judicial voice to what human-rights reporting has documented for some time—that the selective enforcement of cow-protection laws legitimizes mob violence to the detriment of threatened communities.

In reports like Divide and Rule in the Name of the Cow, CJP documents how false charges of cow slaughter/transport have been aimed at Muslims and Dalits. Sabrang’s investigations show that even after Tehseen Poonawalla, most States have not yet implemented mandatory measures as required, such as putting in place effective nodal officers or monitoring hate crimes regularly. This collection of ground reports gives both the socio-legal context to what the High Court has now acknowledged formally: the misuse of the 1955 Act has become institutionalized.

The Bench’s instruction that the Principal Secretary (Home) and DGP provide personal affidavits marks a moment when the judiciary will demand institutional accountability, not just individual relief. Whether this results in real change will depend on what the State does, if it finally issues the long-overdue Government Order required by Tehseen S. Poonawalla and takes corrective action with respect to the errant officials.

The abuse of the 1955 Act, therefore, remains a legal and moral paradox—a law intended to protect life but used under circumstances that inhibit liberty, equality, and the viability of constitutional democracy.

The judgment in Rahul Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh can be read here

The judgment in Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India can be read here

The judgment in Kaliya v. State of U.P. can be read here

The judgment in Parasram Ji v. Imtiaz, can be read here

The judgment in Rahmuddin v. State of U.P. can be read here

The judgment in Jugadi Alias Nizamuddin v. State of U.P can be read here

The judgment in Bablu v. State of U.P. can be read here

Related:

Cow Vigilantism: The primary cause of persecution of Muslim minority in India

India: The new Lynchdom

Right wing groups indoctrinate Hindu youth to wield Trishuls to protect religion, cows

Cow vigilantism, a tool for terrorising minorities?

SC urged to formulate guidelines to curb Cow Vigilantism

Cow Slaughter Prevention Laws in India

Divide and Rule in the Name of the Cow

28 States and UTs have appointed nodal officers to curb hate speech in compliance with 2018 Tehseen Poonawalla verdict :Union Home Ministry to Supreme Court

“Vigilantism is not permissible, needs to be checked”: SC, following up Tehseen Poonawalla case

Several steps forward but miles to go in the battle for a hate-free India: Supreme Court in 2023

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