Taking to X, CM Sarma wrote “Now playing on illegal infiltrators playlist

Assam Police take me home, to the place I belong..

33 new infiltrators have been PUSHED BACK to where they belong — Bangladesh.

BEWARE: Our stringent efforts continue and will further intensify in the coming days.”

Now playing on illegal infiltrators playlist

Assam Police take me home, to the place I belong..

33 new infiltrators have been PUSHED BACK to where they belong — Bangladesh.

BEWARE: Our stringent efforts continue and will further intensify in the coming days. pic.twitter.com/7e99AuGD5X

— Himanta Biswa Sarma (@himantabiswa) August 30, 2025

This official acknowledgement marks another significant escalation. In May 2025, civil society groups had already documented attempted and unlawful pushbacks of Bengali-speaking Muslim women from Assam, several of whom were subsequently rescued and brought back after widespread outcry. Now, CM Sarma has warned that the crackdown would only intensify. It is crucial to note that CM Sarma did not specify the exact entry point for this latest batch.

Showing Adarniya Shri @AmitShah ji the firm progress we have made in evicting illegal settlers from Assam’s lands. pic.twitter.com/hhcgNAyZa9

— Himanta Biswa Sarma (@himantabiswa) August 30, 2025

As per The Assam Tribune. Law enforcement claims a steady weekly removal of 70 to 100 individuals, enforced by Assam Police and BSF, now on heightened alert across the 1,885 km border with Bangladesh.

Due process bypassed

Revived from dormancy, the Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act, 1950 grants district commissioners the authority to expel individuals entering after March 24, 1971, without tribunal intervention. This draconian tool bypasses due legal process, enabling swift deportations both of long-resident undocumented immigrants and fresh entrants

Since mid-2025, Assam has reported weekly pushbacks ranging between 70 to 100 individuals—a ramped-up, relentless enforcement effort. Surveillance along the 1,885 km Indo–Bangladesh border has been beefed up by the Assam Police and BSF, particularly in historically vulnerable stretches.

Notable, as per Times of India, on multiple occasions, Dhaka has publicly denied accepting individuals pushed across the border by Indian authorities, insisting that only documented Bangladeshi citizens with verified proof can be received. In this context, the Assam government’s claim of pushing back “33 infiltrators” raises unresolved questions: Who verified their nationality? On what legal basis were they expelled? Were Bangladeshi authorities even informed?

Under Indian law, Foreigners Tribunals are the only quasi-judicial bodies authorised to determine questions of citizenship and foreigner status. Deportation requires central government sanction, diplomatic coordination, and formal handover to the other state. By contrast, “pushbacks” involve physically expelling people across the border without judicial or diplomatic procedure. Such actions therefore bypass both due process and constitutional safeguards, undermining the principle of rule of law.

Political messaging vs constitutional duty

Arguments have been raised against Assam government’s repeated claims of “success” in pushing back alleged infiltrators serve a political narrative rather than a legal process. Branding individuals as “illegal foreigners” without tribunal adjudication or central authorisation weaponises citizenship disputes, heightening insecurity among minority communities. This approach stands in sharp contrast to India’s constitutional guarantee of equality before law and due process, as well as its obligations under international human rights law prohibiting arbitrary expulsion.

Yet, legal resistance is growing. Habeas corpus petitions in Gauhati High Court and the Supreme Court challenge the constitutionality of such pushbacks. Families of deportees allege disappearances and forcible handovers without documentation, raising fears of statelessness.

Meanwhile, according to a report of Times of India, opposition leader Debabrata Saikia has called on the Union government to review BSF’s monitoring framework, warning of diplomatic tensions with Dhaka if India persists with unilateral expulsions.

Ultimately, while Sarma’s expulsions play well as a populist performance of strength, they expose deep fractures in Assam’s legal regime—trading due process for political spectacle, and risking human rights violations in the name of security.

Related:

Not a Foreigner! Foreigners’ Tribunal declares Sukumar Baishya Indian citizen

Assam government to withdraw ‘Foreigner’ cases against Non-Muslims under Citizenship Amendment Act

Assam’s Citizenship Crisis: How Foreigners Tribunals construct an architecture of exclusion and rights violations

The post Concerns rise along Assam’s escalating pushbacks, 33 additional alleged Bangladeshis “pushed back” appeared first on SabrangIndia.

First things first: it is necessary to clear away the red herrings. Mannan asserts that I, along with Bhavuk Sharma, “overlook that Hindu religious activities already occupy the public space in Kanwariya processions, Jagratas, Durga Pujas, Bhandaras, Matki Phodna, etc.” According to him, this ignorance leads me to celebrate JNU as “the most ideal, secular, and diverse campus” without calling those who celebrate Holi there as “Hindu right-wing.” “However, when Muslims mark their presence,” Mannan notes, “their practices are quickly pathologised, evoking a strong sense of injustice. What is celebrated as culture by the majority is often labeled communal when practiced by minorities.” This is supposed to be illustrative of the “double standards” that he later accuses me of holding. 

I have never expressed any admiration for JNU’s practice of holding Holi. However, since Mannan raises this example, I can clarify my own position. My outlook is closer to that of K. N. Panikkar, a staunch secularist who served as Professor of Modern Indian History at the Centre for Historical Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU). Panikkar’s reflections emerge from both experience and theory. He recalls an incident soon after joining JNU, when students approached him for a contribution toward an Eid celebration. His refusal, grounded in the conviction that universities should remain free from public displays of religiosity, immediately provoked hostility. He was branded a “Hindu communalist” for declining to participate in a Muslim festival. Later, when he resisted a similar attempt to celebrate a Hindu festival, he met with the same disapproval and imagined that, had he not been Hindu by birth, he would have been dismissed as a Muslim communalist instead.

For Panikkar, the episodes of campus religiosity revealed more than just the personal difficulty of being misread; they crystallised the structural impossibility of escaping communal labeling once religion enters the campus as public spectacle. His critique of the Indian model of secularism is telling here: it circumscribes “social consciousness within religious parameters and thus keep[s] the possibility open for particularistic and antagonistic tendencies to re-emerge at opportune moments…It keeps religion in play and in turn enhances religiosity; it preserves and projects religious identities and thus increases the social distance between different religious communities.” Public celebration on campus, whether Hindu or Muslim, therefore cannot achieve neutrality or solidarity. It generates a long-term dynamic towards the religiocisation of social life, thus preparing the ground for the eventual emergence of communalism. This is also why such practices hold little appeal for me. The alternative to it is pithily outlined by Panikkar: “a frontal confrontation with religion – an all-out critique of religion, with a view to its eventual negation – ‘a resolute, positive, abolition’ in the words of Marx.”

The Exclusions of Religion

Now that the red herring is out of the way, I can address Mannan’s main arguments. Basing himself upon Dr. Ishtiaq Hussain’s article “The AMU Fee Hike Agitation and a Misleading Narrative,” Mannan says that the “Friday prayer is not a festival or a political act but a religious duty, a widespread and common culture of the Muslim students at the Indian universities all over the country”. I have already critiqued Hussain’s piece in my own article “The AMU Fee Hike Agitation and the Fallacy of Harmless Faith”. 

There, I argue that Hussain is plagued by a contradiction: on the one hand, he says that the Friday prayer was a “mere manifestation of religious identity or general religiosity”; on the other hand, he praises the students’ restraint in not continuing to organise prayers at the protest site: “they rejected calls from fringe groups to organise prayers on August 15 to prevent the protest from acquiring a religious overtone.” This shift negates Mannan’s celebratory rhetoric and implicitly acknowledges that prayer in public, especially when tied to a protest, cannot be reduced to “mere obligation” but is always susceptible to political meaning. If prayer were simply harmless, its repetition would not have required avoidance. The fact that Hussain frames its absence as evidence of political maturity suggests an awareness that faith and politics cannot be neatly separated, that there is no “general religiosity”. 

Religiosity itself is historically and institutionally constituted through political antagonisms: whether through colonial governance of religion, postcolonial state regulation of minority identity, or the identitarian agendas of Muslim elites. Hussain’s need both to defend prayer as harmless and to celebrate its absence already shows that religion cannot be cordoned off from politics, but is always entangled with it. By extension, Mannan’s attempt to portray the Bab-e-Syed prayer as a “religious duty” evades the question of what this religiosity means in its concrete setting. He asks us to accept religious obligation at face value, framing it as a call for “belonging, survival, and self-respect in a hostile political environment”. But “belonging, survival, and self-respect” for whom? Mannan presumes that the Islamic community he is addressing is an unproblematic entity, grounded in the simplicity and unity of all Muslims. But this is patently untrue, as is revealed by the analysis of the patriarchal Islamism embedded in the form of the Friday prayer at AMU.

This becomes clear when set against Tahrir Square in 2011, where prayer unsettled hierarchies. Muslims prayed under the protection of Coptic Christians and reciprocated by safeguarding a Coptic Mass, transforming ritual into a civic language of solidarity. Men and women prayed shoulder to shoulder, erasing the partitions that usually govern Salat. Even the khutba shifted, as Yusuf al-Qaradawi opened with “O Muslims and Copts! O children of Egypt!” dissolving the privilege of the ummah as sole addressee. In Tahrir, the form of prayer itself changed, becoming a medium for revolutionary equality and civic solidarity. Insofar as religiosity became a mode for bringing all Egyptians together against an authoritarian, neoliberal government, it lost the doctrinal exclusivist of faith, transforming into a broad-based culture. As Panikkar remarks, “The culture of the people, when divorced from faith, would provide the necessary channel for communication.”

The impossibility of imagining such a scene at AMU reveals the limits of Mannan’s narrative. The institutional history of AMU has been structured by women’s marginalisation, both spatially and ideologically. As Amber H. Abbas notes, women’s education has never been central to the university’s corporate life, with hostels situated kilometers from the centre and students’ visibility tightly controlled. The political culture of the campus has long been punctuated by moral panics over women’s public presence: the IYF’s 2024 statement against “indecency” in cultural programs, the 2019 poster depicting women as caged birds in need of protection from feminism, and the 2018 “blasphemous” picture case that criminalised students for a Facebook post. In each instance, religious and moral rhetoric has operated as a technology of control, limiting women’s movement, attire, and speech. 

This patriarchal Islamism has continued in the fee hike protests. Female fence-sitters have been branded as dalals, singled out through a steady churn of Instagram reels, WhatsApp clips, and public shaming rituals. These gendered attacks go beyond ordinary political name-calling. In one case, a young woman labelled a dalal publicly apologised for her stance, only to be praised not for her reasoning but for appearing in a dupatta and mask, which are visual markers of propriety in the Islamist worldview. In another, a leading female protester who had worn an abaya but opposed prolonging the agitation became the target of AI-morphed videos, abaya-clad parodies, and relentless online mimicry. 

Mannan’s framing of prayer as “duty” effaces the religio-patriarchal codes that structure the act and that spill over into other aspects of the protests. It asks us to treat ritual as self-contained, even when its performance re-inscribes institutional hierarchies. The contrast with Tahrir makes the stakes visible: if prayer can serve as a vehicle of revolutionary solidarity in Cairo and as an instrument of patriarchal closure in Aligarh, then it cannot be reduced to “general religiosity.” Mannan’s refusal to recognise this variability is itself political, since it secures the authority of religious form by denying that its meaning is always shaped by context, exclusion, and struggle.

Protecting Religion?

Mannan rightly stresses AMU as a “blessing for marginalised Muslim students who are left out of the mainstream of the Indian education system”. Why should “standing up” for AMU be imagined primarily in terms of praying in public or asserting religiosity? How is it that “strength, hope, and the existence of Indian Muslims” is made to signify faith above all else? This conflation is visible in the equivalence that Mannan draws between the protest slogan “Islam Ki Dawat Zinda Hai” and Qur’anic verse on AMU’s insignia, “Taught man what he knew not”. 

The verse, “Taught man what he knew not” (96:5), speaks about knowledge as a universal gift to humankind. Its reference is pedagogical, epistemic, and humanistic, placing education at the heart of AMU’s mission. It is a declaration of enlightenment and learning as common goods, accessible to every seeker, irrespective of faith. When this verse becomes the motto of AMU, it does not serve as a sectarian banner but as an emblem of secular modernity grounded in a universal conception of education. Its force lies in its generality, in its refusal to delimit who can or cannot partake in knowledge.

By contrast, the slogan “Islam Ki Dawat Zinda Hai” is not a neutral affirmation of knowledge but an assertive invocation of religious community. As Mannan puts it in his article, “A truly democratic system should enable Muslims to express their reality in their own terms, whether it is religious, cultural, or political, without being imposed into a pre-packaged ideology of others [emphasis mine]”. In other words, Islam should be a self-enclosed entity, immune from any influence exerted by non-Islamic others, or those who question the centrality of Islam in public life. In contrast, the Qur’anic verse addresses the universality of education, negating religious belonging to highlight the mission of imparting knowledge to those who need it. The verse invites all to the pursuit of knowledge, while the slogan calls forth only Muslims as a collective in struggle. To conflate the two, as Mannan does, obscures the fact that the verse is secular in scope while the slogan is sectarian in thrust.

The danger in this conflation is that it justifies communal idioms in the name of institutional heritage. Mannan argues that using Islamic slogans is a continuation of AMU’s spirit, yet this argument ignores the categorical difference between Islam as a source of civilizational inspiration and Islam as a rallying cry of political identity. One can accept that AMU’s history draws on Islamic civilization without endorsing slogans that, in effect, doctrinally exclude non-Muslim students or cast political conflict in religious terms. His framing allows no distinction between cultural inheritance and religious mobilization, and thus erases the distinction required to preserve AMU’s universal educational mission.

The erasure of this distinction allows Mannan to naturalise religion/religiosity as a desirable good, whose possession has to be maintained at all costs. In fact, when Muslims occupy a position of dominance, Syed Jalaluddin Umri, former president of Jamaat-e-Islami Hind (JIH), counsels them to establish an Islamic state and govern it according to the laws of sharia. JIH’s student wing, the Students Islamic Organization (SIO), counts Mannan, its national secretary, among its leaders.

But is religion really that desirable? This question is not explored by self-assured theologians. Does the debate over AMU really concern the ability of students to protect their “Muslim Subjectivity,” or “Islam,” as Mannan insists? Put in more mundane terms, this would mean that the entire debate over AMU pertains to the Muslim youth’s right to recite Quranic verses in university premises. This seems more like the theologian’s dream, rather than a socially and economically disadvantaged student’s wish. The Supreme Court is correct in noting that what is primary in the determination of the minority character of an institution is not the “existence of a religious place for prayer and worship” or “the existence of religious symbols” but the objective of providing “benefit” to “a religious or linguistic minority community”. This means that “educational institutions could be established for minorities to provide secular education without imparting any lessons on religion”.

The Supreme Court’s observation about the general goal of providing “benefit” to “a religious or linguistic minority community,” rather than narrowly promoting faith or theology, forces us to ask the following question: is the attack on Indian Muslims really an attack on Islam as a theological system? The right to practice faith is just one among many human capacities that are being restricted. Even Muslims who are not particularly religious, who do not pray or wear visibly Islamic symbols, still face discrimination. Consider the following example. A study conducted in India tested hiring discrimination by sending out two nearly identical resumes for entry-level jobs. Both candidates had similar educational backgrounds, locations, and skills, with no photographs included to avoid visual bias. The only significant difference between them was their names: one had a recognizably Muslim name (“Habiba Ali”), while the other had a Hindu name (“Priyanka Sharma”).

Over eight months, 2,000 applications were sent for over 1,000 job listings. Despite being equally qualified, the candidate with the Muslim name received only half as many positive responses. This study underscores that discrimination against Muslims operates even in the absence of visible religious markers like dress, prayer, or religious expressions. Simply having a Muslim name, an ascriptive identity beyond personal choice, was enough to reduce opportunities, showing that the bias faced by Muslims in India is not necessarily about religious practice but about their very existence as Muslims. The issue is not about faith per se, but about the political and social vulnerability of a historically constituted, denominationally marked group. 

When the oppression is located at the level of Muslims-as-a-people, it becomes misleading to frame the defense of AMU or of Muslim students in overtly religious terms. To do so cements the very caricature produced by Hindutva, namely that Muslims are excessively, even obsessively, religious, and that every act they undertake flows from Islamic identity. This discursive trap is visible in the proliferation of “jihad” labels — “love jihad,” “population jihad,” “economic jihad,” even “corona jihad.” Hindu nationalists have already transformed ordinary social and economic practices into religious threats. In such a climate, when anti-secularists like Mannan elevate faith as the center of political self-definition, they unwittingly mirror Hindutva’s framework, reinforcing the notion that Muslim life can only be understood through the lens of excessive religiosity, as if every action was done for the sake of Islam’s theological sanctity.

The consequence of this is double-edged: on the one hand, it narrows the grounds of Muslim struggle to the defense of religiosity; on the other, it erases the broader human capacities that are being curtailed – education, economic opportunity, political participation, cultural flourishing. Faith is one dimension of human life, but not the sole or even primary capacity under siege. To focus resistance on religion alone is to surrender the universality of the claim: that Muslims, as equal human beings and citizens, are being denied the full range of their rights. 

For a genuinely emancipatory politics, the demand should shift from “protecting Islam” to “developing human capacities.” This means foregrounding the economic deprivation, lack of access to higher education, and structural discrimination that affect Muslims irrespective of their personal religiosity. It also means confronting internal hierarchies within the community: class divides, gender inequality, the marginalisation of Pasmanda Muslims, and the silencing of queer Muslims. Only such a politics can break from the religious template imposed both by Hindutva and by defensive communal rhetoric, moving toward a struggle that asserts Muslim dignity in its widest, most inclusive sense.

Indian Muslims thus are not just Muslims; they are full political, civic subjects whose rights and freedoms should not be contingent on religious identity. Instead of reacting to majoritarian pressures by asserting a religious counter-identity, the response of Indian Muslims should be: we refuse to be reduced to a religious category at all. The fight, then, is not for the recognition of Islam but for a secular space where no one – Muslim, Hindu, or otherwise – is pigeonholed by religious identity in the first place.

Questions

Given Mannan’s assertion that Muslims should “express their reality in their own terms” without paying attention the “pre-packaged ideology of others,” it is imperative to understand how such a politics of self-aggrandizement leads to the domination of those one considers to be “other”. I will attempt to show this through a series of questions for Mannan about the viewpoints espoused by his organization SIO (Student Islamic Organisation) or the parent organisation JIH (Jamaat-e-Islaami Hind). If Mannan’s vision is that Muslims should express their reality solipsistically, these questions expose the real-world implications of that worldview for gender, sexuality, and belonging.

On Sexuality and Homosexuality

• JIH describes homosexuality as “immoral and unnatural.” Do you believe that someone like Professor Ramchandra Siras of AMU deserved the humiliation, suspension, and eventual mysterious death he suffered simply for being gay?
• If homosexuality “destroys the family system,” as JIH says, do you acknowledge that many homosexuals themselves come from families, love their parents, siblings, and partners, and wish to build households of their own?
• Do you think the state has the right to police people’s private lives and consensual relationships inside their own homes?

On Women and Education

•  JIH calls for the abolition of co-education, effectively segregating women. While they are segregated, they should wear clothes that are “sober and dignified,” that “cover the body”. Can you explain why the burden of “preventing lust” falls entirely on women rather than teaching men self-restraint?
• Why should women’s dress be dictated by men in positions of authority? Does your logic not amount to blaming women for men’s violence?
• If women are forced into “separate” institutions and covered from head to toe, do you admit that what you call “modesty” is simply a system of control and surveillance over women’s bodies?

On Maududi and the SIO’s Intellectual Project

• Your student organization recommends Towards Understanding Islam, in which Maududi explicitly states, “there are certain women who do not mend their ways without a beating.” Do you condone the idea that men have the right to physically punish women in their households?
• Maududi asserts that men are naturally suited to govern the family because women have “natural limitations.” Given that Indian women today excel as doctors, engineers, judges, and university professors, do you claim these women are exceptions, or do you believe Maududi’s hierarchy still applies to all women?
• Maududi presents domestic confinement and withdrawal from public life as “freedom” for women. Do you agree that forcing women to stay at home, manage the household, and submit to male authority counts as true freedom?

On Equality and Democracy

• JIH advises Muslims to establish an Islamic state under sharia when they are in a position of dominance. Do you recognize that this vision is fundamentally at odds with the Indian Constitution, which guarantees equality before the law for all citizens?
• How do you justify advocating for laws that would make women second-class citizens, LGBT people criminals, and non-Muslims subjects of a religious order?
• If your worldview requires hierarchy, segregation, and surveillance to function, what place does it have in a modern secular university where equality is the very foundation?

Mannan will probably say that those who are raising such questions from a secular-liberal perspective are enacting “a kind of violence in the name of intellectualism”. His alternative, as we have seen, is to allow to “Muslims to express their reality in their own terms, whether it is religious, cultural, or political, without being imposed into a pre-packaged ideology of others.” Thus, instead of allowing the actions and thought processes of Muslims to be examined by others, Mannan wants the Muslim community to behave solipsistically, as if there is no disagreement about his religion-centric vision of politics. But I believe that it is only through democratic discussion and critique that Indian Muslims have any hope of reclaiming their future. 

 (The author is a student at the Aligarh Muslim University (AMU), India. He is the author of the book “Education in the Age of Neoliberal Dystopia” (Midwestern Marx Publishing Press, 2024) and has a forthcoming book on Palestine and anti-imperialist political philosophy with Iskra Books)

Related:

Reluctant Democrats

Political History of India’s Two Muslim Universities since 1947

The post The Solipsism of Faith: A Response to Talha Mannan appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The region’s Muslim community has historically contributed richly to India’s culture, politics, and intellectual life, but remains educationally and socially disadvantaged in contemporary times. Their contributions to education in Uttar Pradesh stretch back centuries. During the Delhi Sultanate and Mughal period, UP’s cities like Lucknow, Agra, and Fatehpur Sikri emerged as centers of Persian scholarship, Islamic jurisprudence, and cultural refinement. Later, in the nineteenth century, reformers responded to the colonial encounter in distinct ways.

One of the most influential responses was led by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, whose Aligarh Movement recognized the urgency of reconciling tradition with modernity and championed Western-style modern education as the path to progress, establishing the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College in 1875 (later Aligarh Muslim University, AMU). This institution created a generation of lawyers, administrators, and professionals who shaped Indian politics and society both within India and abroad. The institution symbolised a community deeply engaged in self-reflection and reform.

The Sachar Committee Report (2006) was a watershed in documenting Muslim marginalization in India. For Uttar Pradesh, the findings were stark: Muslims had lower literacy rates, higher school dropout rates, and weaker access to higher education than even Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in some cases. Subsequent surveys (NSS 2017–18) confirm that progress has been uneven. The literacy gap between Muslims and the state average remains significant, and Muslim representation in higher education institutions—particularly in technical and professional courses—remains disproportionately low.

The major question remains unanswered: what drives this persistent backwardness?

Poverty and economic marginalisation are considered the prime reasons. Muslim-dominated districts like Rampur, Moradabad, Bijnor, and Azamgarh often rank poorly on human development indicators. Families struggling to survive cannot (always) prioritize education. For some families, mainstream schooling appears costly and uncertain in its returns; they prioritise earning over learning. Moreover, many Muslim-majority localities lack sufficient government schools, especially for girls. Travel distance, poor-quality teaching, and inadequate facilities exacerbate dropout rates may also be deemed a factor. Subtle biases in schools and colleges also discourage Muslim children, reinforcing feelings of exclusion. This crisis is not merely statistical; it perpetuates a cycle where Muslims remain concentrated in low-income, informal-sector jobs, with little upward mobility.

Uttar Pradesh has over 16,000 registered madrasas, with numerous unregistered ones. These institutions, while essential in preserving Islamic learning and identity, face critiques. Most madrasas follow a traditional curriculum focused on theology, Arabic, and jurisprudence, with limited integration of science, mathematics, or social sciences. Graduates often find few opportunities outside religious vocations. They need to be upgraded and integrated with modern educational curricula to provide sustainable livelihoods for graduates.

Attempts at madrasa modernization—introducing computer labs, English, and vocational training—have met with mixed success. Some clerics fear dilution of religious content, while bureaucratic inefficiencies hinder consistent reform. Yet, abandoning madrasas is neither realistic nor desirable. They serve millions of the poorest children. The challenge is to integrate them with mainstream education without undermining their religious mission. For example, partnerships with state universities, digital learning modules, and parallel certification could open new doors for madrasa graduates.

If education is the most powerful tool for social reform, women’s education is doubly so. In UP’s Muslim community, gender gaps in literacy and school completion are among the widest. Social norms, early marriage, and safety concerns often restrict girls’ education, especially beyond primary school. Women’s empowerment must be at the heart of reform. A single educated mother can transform the trajectory of her entire family. Scholarships, hostels, safe transportation, and female teachers in rural schools are concrete measures that can make a transformative difference.

Education cannot succeed in isolation; it must be linked with economic empowerment and social reform. In UP, where Muslims dominate certain artisanal trades—like weaving, brass work, and handicrafts—the decline of traditional industries due to globalization has deepened economic vulnerability. To break the cycle, vocational training should be embedded within schools to prepare students for modern markets. Digital skills and entrepreneurship can help Muslim youth participate in India’s growing service economy. Microfinance and start-up support in Muslim-majority districts can create employment opportunities, reducing dependence on informal work. Without such economic linkages, education risks being a dead end—producing degrees without jobs.

Since the Sachar Committee, several schemes have targeted Muslim educational uplift: scholarships, free coaching for competitive exams, and skill-development programs. Yet implementation has been patchy in UP. Awareness about schemes is low in rural Muslim communities. Bureaucratic hurdles and political polarization often dilute impact. Too often, focus remains on token measures rather than systemic reform of schools in Muslim-majority areas.

The post-Sachar period illustrates a broader problem: policy intent without political will. Unless the UP government adopts a non-partisan, long-term vision for minority education, interventions will remain fragmented. While state responsibility is paramount, community leadership cannot be ignored. Historically, Muslim reformers—from Sir Syed Ahmed Khan to Maulana Abul Kalam Azad—understood that renewal required both government support and internal reform. Today, Muslim civil society in UP must prioritise education over identity politics in community mobilization, establish local education trusts and scholarship funds, encourage parents to enroll children in quality schools rather than settling for minimal literacy, promote a culture of reading, critical thinking, and gender equality at the family level.

The recently launched “40 Under 40” Muslim leadership initiative by the All India Muslim Development Council (AIMDC) is a positive step in grooming young leaders in law, medicine, entrepreneurship, and academia who can serve as role models. But such leadership must trickle down to village schools and mohalla committees.

Institutions like AMU, Darul Uloom Deoband, and Nadwa continue to symbolise Muslim intellectual life in UP. Yet they must ask: are they adequately serving the wider community? AMU has expanded with outreach centers, but it remains prestige-focused and geographically concentrated. It should invest more in community schools, digital platforms, and partnerships with state education boards. Deoband and Nadwa must revisit their curricula to balance religious and modern education. Global Islamic universities (e.g., in Iran, Malaysia, and Egypt) have achieved such blends more successfully. These institutions must move beyond being islands of excellence toward engines of mass uplift.

Three pathways are crucial for meaningful change in UP’s Muslim educational and social landscape:

Integration and Innovation in Education:

Merge religious and modern curricula. Use technology (EdTech platforms, mobile learning) to overcome infrastructure deficits. Introduce compulsory vocational and digital literacy in high schools.

Gender-Centered Development:

Scholarships, safe schools, and mentorship programs for Muslim girls. Role models and visibility of educated Muslim women in public life.

Community-Led Social Reform:

Campaigns against early marriage and child labour. Encouragement of critical inquiry, interfaith dialogue, and pluralism as part of Ganga-Jamuni tehzeeb (the syncretic culture of UP).

The challenges of Muslim education and social reform in Uttar Pradesh are undeniable: low literacy, poverty, inadequate access to higher education, and gender disparities. Yet these challenges are not insurmountable. History demonstrates the resilience and creativity of UP’s Muslim community—from the grandeur of Mughal institutions to the reformist zeal of Aligarh, Deoband, and Nadwa.

Today, the task is to translate that legacy into universal empowerment. This requires a synergy of state policy, community initiative, and institutional reform. Without it, Muslims in UP risk being trapped in a cycle of marginalisation. With it, they can reclaim their place as full partners in India’s democratic and developmental journey. Education is not just a pathway to jobs; it is a vehicle for dignity, equality, and citizenship. For UP’s Muslims, it is the cornerstone of social reform—and the promise of a brighter future.

(The author is a student of Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi)

The post Muslim Education in Uttar Pradesh: Pathways to Inclusion and Reform appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The venue is Egypt. The era is the reign of Abd al Malik (685-705 AD). The account that follows is extracted from Thomas Arnold’s book, The Preaching of Islam (1896, revised 1913) — that is considered one of the earliest intensively researched Western works challenging the highly misconceived notion that Islam was primarily spread by the sword. Ground-breaking in its time and for this era as well, the book offers a balanced counter-narrative to propagandist narratives presenting Islam as inherently coercive and intolerant of other faiths.

Sir Thomas Walker Arnold (1864–1930) was a British orientalist and historian of Islamic art and culture. He taught at the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College (now Aligarh Muslim University) and later at the School of Oriental Studies in London. Arnold was respected for his relatively fair-minded scholarship compared to many of his contemporaries, avoiding overt polemics in his treatment of Islam.

The following account draws on his referenced book (p.66, 67) relates to the new churches built in Egypt in the early period of Islamic rule. The contribution of the distinguished author – who was later knighted and the Publication House are posthumously recognized and extract for the referenced book is shown under asterisk:

“a wealthy Christian of Edessa, named Athanasius, erected in his native city a fine church dedicated to the Mother of God, and a Baptistery in honour of the picture of Christ that was reputed to have been sent to King Akbar; he also built a number of churches and monasteries in various parts of Egypt, among them two magnificent churches in Fustat. Some Christian chamberlains in the service of `Abd al-Aziz b. Marwan (brother of `Abd al-Malik), the governor of Egypt, obtained permission to build a church in Halwan, which was dedicated to St. John, though this town was a Muslim creation.

“In A.D. 711 a Jacobite church was built at Antioch by order of the Caliph al-Walid (705-715). In the first year of the reign of Yazid II (A.D.720) Mar Elias, the Jacobite Patriarch of Antioch, made a solemn entry into Antioch, accompanied by his clergy and monks, to consecrate a new church, which he had caused to be built; and in the following year he consecrated another church in the village of Samada, in the district of Antioch, and the only opposition he met with was from a rival Christian sect that accepted the council of Chaldecon.

“In the following reign Khalid al-Qasari, who was governor of Arabian and Persian Iraq from 724-738, built a church for his mother, who was a Christian to worship in. In 759 the building of a church at Nisibis was completed, on which the Nestorian bishop, Cyprian, had expended a sum of 56,000 Dinars. From the same century dates the church Abu Sirjah in the ancient Roman fortress in old Cairo. In the reign of al-Mahdi (775-785) a church was erected in Baghdad for the use of the Christian prisoners that had been taken captive during the numerous campaigns against the Byzantine empire.

“Another church was built in the same city, in the reign of Haroon al-Rashid (786-809), by the people of Samalu, who had submitted to the Caliph and received protection from him; during the same reign, Sergius, the Nestorian Metropolitan of Basra, received permission to build a church in that city, though it was a Muslim foundation, having been created by the Caliph Umar in the year 638, and a magnificent church was erected in Babylon in which were enshrined the bodies of the prophets Daniel and Ezechiel.

“When al-Mamun (813-833) was in Egypt he gave permission to two of his chamberlains to erect a church on al-Muqattam, a hill near Cairo; and by the same Caliph’s leave a wealthy Christian named Bukkam, built several fine churches at Bura in Egypt. The Nestorian patriarch, Timotheus, who died AD 820 erected a church at Takrit and a monastery at Baghdad. In the 10th century, the beautiful Coptic church of Safayan was built in Fustat. A new church was built at Jiddah in the reign of al-Zahr, the 7th Fatimid caliph of Egypt (1020-1025). New churches and monasteries were  also built in the reign of Abbasid al Mustadi dedicated to Our Lady the Pure Virgin.

“Indeed so far from the development of Christian church being hampered by the establishment of Mohammadan rule, the history of the Nestorian exhibits a remarkable outburst of religious life and energy from the time of their becoming subject to Muslims.”

—–

Muhammad Yunus, a Chemical Engineering graduate from Indian Institute of Technology, and a retired corporate executive has been engaged in an in-depth study of the Qur’an since early 90’s, focusing on its core message. He has co-authored the referred exegetic work, which received the approval of al-Azhar al-Sharif, Cairo in 2002, and following restructuring and refinement was endorsed and authenticated by Dr. Khaled Abou El Fadl of UCLA, and published by Amana Publications, Maryland, USA, 2009.

First Published on newageislam.com

The post New Magnificent Churches Built Under Islamic Rule In Its Early Centuries appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Bernard Lewis, the influential British-American historian and Middle East scholar, played a pivotal role in shaping Western imperial attitudes toward Islam. His influence stretched far beyond academia, into the very heart of U.S. foreign policy. His counsel underpinned the American strategy of weaponising radicalised Islam for geopolitical ends, beginning with the Afghan-Soviet war.

Under this policy, the U.S. directly funded extremist literature and helped establish madrassas across Pakistan and Afghanistan to indoctrinate young Muslim men—drawn from over 35 countries—with a weaponised theology. Once trained, these fighters joined the CIA-backed jihad against the Soviets. When the war ended, they returned home, not to peace, but to disseminate their radicalised ideology further afield.

Yet even as Lewis helped construct the “radical Muslim” archetype, he also shaped its foil: the “good Muslim.” This ideal Muslim, according to Lewis, is a pacifist, apolitical, and docile figure—more cultural than religious, more mystical than legalistic. In this dual construction, Muslims were split into two essentialised camps: one to fight imperial battles, the other to legitimise imperial presence.

The Conference That Said It All

In a 2003 conference hosted by the Nixon Centre titled “Understanding Sufism and Its Potential Role in U.S. Policy,” Lewis openly championed Sufism—not for its theology or ethics, but because, in his words, it “reflects something more than tolerance” and holds that “all religions are basically the same.” In other words, it can be co-opted.

Sufi scholar Hesham Kabbani joined Lewis at the event, enthusiastically presenting Sufism as a depoliticised, non-threatening “social force.” He assured the audience—made up of Homeland Security officials and neoconservative hawks—that Sufis “never seek leadership” but serve as “social workers.” It was a performance for the empire, tailored to reassure Washington that there exists an Islam that does not resist.

But this was a gross erasure. Figures like Salahuddin Ayyubi, Umar Futi Tal, Abdul Qādir al-Jaza’iri, and Idris as-Senussi were Sufis—and they led political revolts, commanded armies, ruled states. Even within Kabbani’s own Naqshbandi lineage, the Jaysh Rijāl al-Ṭarīqa al-Naqshbandiyya was formed in Baghdad to fight the American invasion of Iraq. To erase these legacies is to rewrite history at the feet of power.

The Liberal-Orientalist Love Affair with Sufism

The romanticisation of Sufism by Western scholars is not innocent. Nineteenth and twentieth-century Orientalists and Islamicists—such as Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Fazlur Rahman, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, H.A.R. Gibb, and Annemarie Schimmel—created a scholarly framework that equated mysticism with moderation.

Schimmel herself admitted the absurdity of this selective love. “A good Sufi,” she once remarked, “should follow the shariah and all that it entails.” But the Western fascination with Rumi, Ibn Arabi, and the “whirling dervishes” consistently detaches their mysticism from their Islamic orthodoxy. This detachment implies that Sufism flourished in spite of Islam’s rigidity, rather than as an organic expression of it.

Tomoko Masuzawa warns that this portrayal is racialised: Islam becomes Arab, rigid, Semitic; Sufism becomes Aryan, gentle, European. Otto Pfleiderer, a German Orientalist, typified this racial dichotomy by treating Islam as tribal and inferior while elevating Sufism as universal and transcendent. This project—consciously or not—fed into a sanitised, de-Islamised, “Islam Lite” acceptable to the empire.

Manufacturing Consent for Genocide

In Good Muslim, Bad Muslim, Mahmood Mamdani critiques this binary construction. “Good Muslims” are cast as secular, apolitical, spiritual-but-not-religious liberals. They advocate gender equality, nonviolence, and Western-style democracy. They vote Democrat. “Bad Muslims” are political, militant, and resistant to imperialism.

This binary fuels military invasions, drone strikes, black sites, surveillance states, and genocides. It is not a cultural misunderstanding—it is a colonial strategy.

The primary architect of the “Islamic terrorism” narrative is none other than Benjamin Netanyahu, who has long sought to manufacture global consent for the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians. Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Yemen, Sudan, Lebanon, and Palestine bear the bloody consequences of this myth.

In this context, the imperial co-optation of Sufism is not about spirituality. It is about subjugation. It is the creation of a religious subclass willing to bless bombs and normalisation deals in exchange for visas, conferences, funding, and think-tank prestige. Today’s polished collaborators—Abdullah Bin Bayyah, Hamza Yusuf, and others backed by the UAE or U.S. State Department—have become handpicked enablers of a compliant Islam, weaponised against its more resistant, justice-oriented forms.

The Two-Faced Strategy: Wahhabis and Sufis

The imperial project thrives on contradiction. It is no surprise that both “Sufi Islam” and “Wahhabi Islam” are weaponised in tandem. These two projected as opposite poles—spiritual and severe—are manipulated to serve the same master. One is used to fight wars; the other to suppress dissent.

A legion of intellectually colonised Muslims makes this task easier by parroting imperial talking points in the name of peace, tradition, or “saving Islam.” They forget that it was the U.S., in alliance with Saudi Arabia, that funded Wahhabi madrasas to radicalise Muslim youth for its Cold War proxy battles. And yet, in the same breath, the U.S. hails Saudi Arabia—a hub of Wahhabism—as a key ally, while demonising Iran, a country with deep Sufi intellectual traditions.

Iran = evil. Saudi = friend. The absurdity is the point.

This is not a war of ideologies. It is a war of obedience. It’s not theology that divides “good” from “bad” Muslims—it’s loyalty.

Collaboration is Not Neutral

The “good Muslim” trope does not merely flatter collaborators—it provides ideological cover for genocide. Whether the branding is “Sufi Islam,” “plain vanilla Islam,” or “civilised Islam,” the core objective is control. The desire to pacify Islam, to regulate it, to make it safe for the empire, is what drives the violence, not Islam itself.

The Abraham Accords, CVE programs, Patriot Act, and Muslim Ban—across Republican and Democrat administrations—prove one thing: both sides weaponise “good Islam” to suppress resistance. Under Trump’s renewed presidency, expect more glossy initiatives promoting “peaceful Islam,” “Sufi moderation,” and “Muslim societies for progress.” These are not spiritual efforts. They are tools of colonial management.

Even the most well-meaning Sufi today must ask: have we been used? Has our spiritual tradition become a fig leaf for empire? Does our silence—or selective condemnation—manufacture consent for war?

Conclusion: The Real Struggle

Whether post-9/11 or post-October 7th, the game remains the same: pit Muslims against one another. Regulate the religion. Exalt one version. Exterminate the other.

But the consequences are not theoretical. In Gaza today, the “bad Muslims” being exterminated include poets, doctors, mothers, fathers, and children.

The tragedy is not just in bombs or policies. It is in the Muslim collaborators who, eager for Western approval, have chosen seats at imperial tables over solidarity with the oppressed. This is not just moral failure—it is complicity in genocide.

It is time to repent. To cease performing “good Islam” for the empire. To reclaim Islam—not as a set of talking points for think tanks—but as a living tradition of justice, resistance, and truth.

—–

مسلمانوں کو مسخر کرنے کے لیے تصوف اور وہابیت کو ہتھیار بنانا

مصنف: نصیر احمد

(مندرجہذیلتحریر،فرحالشریفکےمضمون: “اسلاملائٹکیتیاری: صوفیازمبطور ‘اچھااسلام’: ‘اچھےمسلمان’ بمقابلہ ‘برےمسلمان’ کیسیاستکسطرحنسلکشیکےلیےرضامندیپیداکرتیہے” کاخلاصہاورترمیمشدہورژنہے۔اصلمضمونیہاںپڑھاجاسکتاہے۔)

“اچھےاسلام” کیپیدائش

برنارڈلیوس،برطانوی-امریکیمؤرخاورمشرقوسطیٰکےاسکالر،نےمغربیسامراجیسوچمیںاسلامکےبارےمیںگہرااثرڈالا۔انکیآراءصرفعلمیمیدانتکمحدودنہرہیں،بلکہامریکیخارجہپالیسیپربھیاثراندازہوئیں۔انکیرہنمائیمیںامریکہنے “ریڈیکلاسلام” کوجیوپولیٹیکلمقاصدکےلیےایکہتھیاربنایا،جسکیشروعاتافغان-سوویتجنگسےہوئی۔

اسپالیسیکےتحتامریکہنےشدتپسنداسلامیلٹریچرکیمالیمعاونتکیاورپاکستانوافغانستانمیںمدارسقائمکیےجہاں 35 سےزائدممالکسےآئےنوجوانوںکوعسکرینظریاتسکھائےگئے۔تربیتکےبعد،یہمجاہدین CIA کےزیراثرسوویتوںکےخلافجہادمیںشاملہوگئے۔جنگختمہونےکےبعد،یہلوگامنکےساتھواپسنہیںلوٹےبلکہشدتپسندنظریاتکومزیدپھیلایا۔

برنارڈلیوسنےجہاں “شدتپسندمسلمان” کاخاکہبنایا،وہیں “اچھےمسلمان” کاتصوربھیانہینےپیشکیا۔انکےمطابق،مثالیمسلمانایکپرامن،غیرسیاسی،اورمطیعشخصیتہے—جسکیشناختمذہبسےزیادہثقافت،اورقانونسےزیادہروحانیتپرمبنیہے۔اسطرحمسلمانوںکودوخانوںمیںبانٹدیاگیا: ایکوہجوسامراجیجنگیںلڑے،دوسراوہجوسامراجیتسلطکوجائزقراردے۔

وہکانفرنسجسنےسبکچھواضحکردیا

2003 میںنِکسنسینٹرمیںمنعقدہ “صوفیازماورامریکیپالیسیمیںاسکاممکنہکردار” کےعنوانسےایککانفرنسمیں،لیوسنےصوفیازمکیحمایتکی—نہکہاسکیروحانیتیااخلاقیاتکیوجہسے،بلکہاسلیےکہاسمیں “برداشتسےزیادہ” کیعکاسیہےاوریہکہ “تماممذاہببنیادیطورپرایکجیسےہیں۔” یعنیاسےسامراجیمقاصدکےلیےاستعمالکیاجاسکتاہے۔

اسموقعپرصوفیاسکالر،شیخہشامقبانینےبھیصوفیازمکوغیرسیاسی،بےضرر “سوشلفورس” کےطورپرپیشکیا۔انہوںنےحاضرین—جنمیںہوملینڈسیکیورٹیکےاہلکاراورنیو-کنزرویٹونظریہدانشاملتھے—کویقیندلایاکہصوفی “کبھیقیادتکےطلبگارنہیںہوتے” بلکہ “سوشلورکرز” کاکرداراداکرتےہیں۔یہسامراجکےلیےایکپرفارمنستھی—ایکایسااسلامپیشکرناجومزاحمتنہکرے۔

لیکنیہتاریخکومسخکرناہے۔صلاحالدینایوبی،عمرفوتیتال،عبدالقادرالجزائری،ادریسالسنوسی—all صوفیتھے—اوروہسیاسیرہنما،سپہسالار،اورحکمرانبھیتھے۔یہاںتککہقبانیکےاپنےنقشبندیسلسلےمیںبھی،بغدادمیں “جیشرجالالطریقةالنقشبندیہ” کاقیامامریکیحملےکےخلافہواتھا۔انتاریخیحقائقکومٹاناطاقتکےسامنےجھکنےکےمترادفہے۔

لبرل-مستشرقینکاصوفیازمسےرومانیتعلق

صوفیازمکومغربیاسکالرزکیجانبسےرومانویتکالبادہپہنانامحضاتفاقنہیں۔انیسویںاوربیسویںصدیکےمستشرقیناوراسلامیاسکالرز—جیسےولفرڈکینٹویلاسمتھ،فضلالرحمٰن،سیدحسیننصر،گیب،اورانیمیریشمل—نےایکایساعلمیڈھانچہقائمکیاجسمیںتصوفکواعتدالپسندیسےجوڑاگیا۔

شملنےخوداستضادکوتسلیمکیا: “ایکاچھاصوفیوہہوتاہےجوشریعتکیمکملپیرویکرتاہے۔” لیکنمغربمیںرومی،ابنعربی،اوردرویشوںکیچکرداررقصکوانکیاسلامیسختیسےالگکرکےپیشکیاجاتاہے۔جیسےیہصوفیازماسلامکیسختیکےباوجودپنپا،حالانکہیہاسلامکےاندرہیایکروحانیاظہارہے۔

ٹوموکوماسوزاواخبردارکرتیہیںکہیہپیشکشنسلپرستانہہے: اسلامکوعربی،سخت،سامیقراردیاجاتاہے؛جبکہصوفیازمکوآریائی،نرم،یورپیسمجھاجاتاہے۔جرمنمستشرقاوٹوفلیڈررنےاسلامکوقبائلیاورکمتر،اورصوفیازمکوآفاقیواعلیٰبناکرپیشکیا۔یہمنصوبہ،شعورییاغیرشعوریطورپر،ایکایسا “اسلاملائٹ” تیارکرتاہےجوسامراجکوقابلقبولہو۔

نسلکشیکےلیےرضامندیکیتیاری

“گڈمسلم،بیڈمسلم” میںمحمودمامدانیاستقسیمپرتنقیدکرتےہیں۔ “اچھےمسلمان” کوسیکولر،غیرسیاسی،روحانیمگرغیرمذہبی،اورلبرلدکھایاجاتاہے—جوصنفیمساوات،عدمتشدد،اورمغربیجمہوریتکیحمایتکرتاہے۔ “برےمسلمان” سیاسی،مزاحمتیاورعسکریہوتےہیں۔

یہتصورہیفوجیجارحیت،ڈرونحملوں،بلیکسائٹس،نگرانی،اورنسلکشیکوجوازفراہمکرتاہے۔یہثقافتیغلطفہمینہیں—بلکہایکسامراجیحکمتعملیہے۔

“اسلامیدہشتگردی” کابیانیہبنانےوالےبڑےمعمار،بنیامیننیتنیاہوہیں،جنہوںنےفلسطینیوںکینسلیصفائیکےلیےعالمیحمایتحاصلکرنےکیکوششکی۔عراق،افغانستان،شام،یمن،سوڈان،لبنان،اورفلسطین—سباسجھوٹکیقیمتاداکررہےہیں۔

ایسےمیںصوفیازمکواپناناروحانیتنہیں،غلامیہے—ایکایساطبقہپیداکرناجوبموںاورنارملائزیشنڈیلزپربرکتدے،بدلےمیںویزے،فنڈنگ،اوراسٹیٹڈپارٹمنٹکیتعریفحاصلکرے۔آجکے “پالششدہ” معاونین—عبداللہبنبیہ،حمزہیوسفاوردیگر—سامراجکےلیےمنتخبکردہاسلامکےپرچارکبنچکےہیں،جومزاحمتیاسلامکودبانےکاذریعہہیں۔

دوہراہتھیار: وہابیاورصوفیاسلام

سامراجیمنصوبہتضاداتپرپلتاہے۔اسیلیےایکہیوقتمیں “صوفیاسلام” اور “وہابیاسلام” کوہتھیاربنایاجاتاہے۔ایکروحانی،دوسراسختگیر—لیکندونوںسامراجکیخدمتمیںہیں۔ایکجنگیںلڑتاہے،دوسرامزاحمتکودباتاہے۔

ایکپورینسل،جوذہنیطورپرغلامبنچکیہے،سامراجیبیانیےکو “امن”، “روایت” یا “اسلامکوبچانے” کےنامپردہراتیہے۔وہبھولجاتےہیںکہوہابیمدارسکوسبسےپہلےامریکہاورسعودیعربنےملکرفنڈکیاتھاتاکہسردجنگکیپراکسیجنگوںکےلیےنوجوانوںکوانتہاپسندبنایاجاسکے۔

اورپھروہیامریکہسعودیعربکودوست،اورایران—جسکاصوفیروایتمیںگہرامقامہے—کودشمنقراردیتاہے۔

ایران = بُرا۔سعودی = اچھا۔
یہتضادہیاصلکھیلہے۔

یہنظریاتکیجنگنہیں،فرمانبرداریکیجنگہے۔ “اچھے” اور “برے” مسلمانوںکیتقسیمکادارومدارعقیدےپرنہیں،وفاداریپرہے۔

“تعاون” غیرجانبدارنہیں

“اچھےمسلمان” کابیانیہصرفخوشامدنہیں،بلکہنسلکشیکونظریاتیکورمہیاکرتاہے۔چاہےنامہو “صوفیاسلام”، “سادہاسلام” یا “مہذباسلام”—اصلمقصدکنٹرولہے۔اسلامکوتابع،قابلِانتظام،اورسامراجکےلیےمحفوظبناناہیاصلہدفہے۔

ابراہیمیمعاہدے، CVE پروگرامز،پیٹریاٹایکٹ،اورمسلمبین—ریپبلکنیاڈیموکریٹ،دونوں “اچھےاسلام” کومزاحمتکچلنےکےلیےاستعمالکرتےہیں۔ٹرمپکیواپسیکےساتھ، “پرامناسلام” یا “صوفیاعتدال” جیسےمنصوبےدوبارہسامنےآئیںگے—یہروحانینہیں،نوآبادیاتیاوزارہیں۔

آجکاہرسچاصوفیخودسےپوچھے:
کیاہمیںاستعمالکیاجارہاہے؟
کیاہماریروحانیروایتسامراجکےلیےپردہبنچکیہے؟
کیاہماریخاموشی—یاچُنکرکیگئیمذمت—جنگوںکےلیےرضامندیپیداکررہیہے؟

نتیجہ: اصلجدوجہد

چاہے 9/11 کےبعدہویا 7 اکتوبرکےبعد،کھیلوہیہے: مسلمانوںکوآپسمیںلڑاؤ،مذہبکوکنٹرولکرو،ایکشکلکوعظیمبناؤ،دوسریکومٹادو۔

مگرنتائجصرفنظریاتینہیں—آجغزہمیںجو “برےمسلمان” مارےجارہےہیں،وہشاعر،ڈاکٹر،مائیں،باپ،اوربچےہیں۔

سانحہصرفبموںیاپالیسیوںمیںنہیں—بلکہانمسلمانوںمیںہےجومغربیخوشنودیکےلیےسامراجیمیزوںپربیٹھنےکوترجیحدیتےہیں۔یہصرفاخلاقیناکامینہیں—بلکہنسلکشیمیںشراکتداریہے۔

ابوقتہےتوبہکا۔
ابوقتہے “اچھااسلام” پیشکرنےکیاداکاریبندکرنےکا۔
اسلامکودوبارہاپنالو—بطورایکزندہروایت،جوعدل،مزاحمت،اورسچائیکاعلمبردارہو۔

—–

A frequent contributor to NewAgeIslam.com, Naseer Ahmed is an independent researcher and Quran-centric thinker whose work bridges faith, reason, and contemporary knowledge systems. Through a method rooted in intra-Quranic analysis and scientific coherence, the author has offered ground-breaking interpretations that challenge traditional dogma while staying firmly within the Quran’s framework.

His work represents a bold, reasoned, and deeply reverent attempt to revive the Quran’s message in a language the modern world can test and trust.

The following is a summarised and edited version of: “Manufacturing ‘Islam Lite’: Sufism as ‘Good Islam’: How the politics of ‘Good Muslim’ vs. ‘Bad Muslim’ manufactures consent for genocide” by Farah El-Sharif. Read the original here.

First Published on newageislam.com

The post Weaponising Sufism and Wahhabism to Subjugate Muslims appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The conspiracy unveiled

Initial investigation began after the school’s headmaster, Suleman Gorinaik, filed a complaint with the Saundatti police station when several students complained of nausea and a foul smell in the drinking water. Prompt medical attention helped avert a major tragedy, and all affected students recovered quickly, according to Superintendent of Police Bheemashankar S. Guled, as per the TNM report.

As the investigation progressed, police discovered that the school’s water tank had been intentionally poisoned with pesticides. Surveillance, forensic evidence, and witness accounts led to the arrest of three individuals on August 2:

• Sagar Patil, taluk president of the Hindutva outfit Sri Ram Sene in Saundatti,
• Krishna Madar, a local resident coerced into participation, and
• Magangouda Patil, an accomplice who assisted in procuring the poison.

According to SP Guled, the entire plot was masterminded by Sagar Patil, who allegedly sought to have Headmaster Gorinaik transferred or suspended from his post, motivated purely by communal animosity. Gorinaik, a respected educator who had served the school for 13 years, was well-liked by the local community, a fact that did not sit well with certain hard-line elements, according to the report of TOI.

A child manipulated

According to the Indian Express, police investigations revealed that Krishna Madar, acting under Patil’s direction, had purchased three types of pesticides, mixed them, and transferred the toxic concoction into a soft drink bottle. He then handed this bottle to a minor student, luring the child with Rs 500, chocolates, and condiments, and instructed him to empty the contents into the school’s drinking water tank. The minor, unaware of the gravity of the act, complied.

The police have confirmed that the soft drink bottle was recovered from the crime scene, and forensic analysis detected traces of insecticide inside. The minor child will now serve as a prosecution witness under legal protection, given his vulnerable status, as per TNM.

Blackmail and coercion

One of the most disturbing elements of the investigation is the role of blackmail in furthering the conspiracy. Police have stated that Sagar Patil coerced Krishna Madar into participating by threatening to reveal his inter-faith romantic relationship. According to the Belagavi SP, Patil weaponised communal shame and social stigma around inter-faith relationships to push Madar into executing a dangerous plot that endangered the lives of children, as per The Hindu.

Arrests and legal action

All three conspirators, Sagar Patil, Krishna Madar, and Magangouda Patil, have been arrested and remanded to judicial custody. Belagavi police have invoked stringent provisions under criminal law to charge the accused with criminal conspiracy, attempt to cause grievous hurt, poisoning, and endangering life, among others.

The minor student, whose role was manipulated, will not face charges and is being treated as a victim in the broader scheme, as per media reports.

Chief Minister’s strong condemnation

Karnataka Chief Minister Siddaramaiah took to social media to strongly condemn the incident, describing it as a “heinous” and “unforgivable” act rooted in religious bigotry. “The headmaster of the government school in Hulikatti village, Savadatti taluk, Belagavi district, belongs to the Muslim community. With the malicious intent of having him transferred elsewhere, Sagar Patil, the taluk president of Shriram Sena, along with two others, has been arrested for poisoning the drinking water of school children. In this incident that occurred 15 days ago, several children fell ill, but fortunately, no lives were lost,” he stated in a post on X dated August 3.

“Religious fundamentalism and communal hatred can lead to heinous acts, and this incident, which could have resulted in the massacre of innocent children, is a testament to that. In the land of the Sharanas, who proclaimed, “Compassion is the root of religion,” how could such cruelty and hatred arise? Even at this moment, I cannot believe it,” the CM wrote, expressing disbelief that such hatred could manifest in Karnataka, “the land of the Sharanas” — a reference to the state’s egalitarian cultural heritage.

Taking aim at the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), Siddaramaiah further questioned whether senior BJP figures — including Sri Ram Sene chief Pramod Mutalik, BJP State President B.Y. Vijayendra, and Leader of Opposition R. Ashoka — would take moral responsibility for the acts perpetrated by those aligned with Hindutva ideologies. “Leaders who always support such socially destructive acts should now come forward and atone for their sins,” he declared.

A call to action against hate

The CM also highlighted the formation of a special task force to counter hate speech and prevent communal riots. “To curb hate speeches and communal riots, we have formed a special task force, and we are taking all possible legal measures against such elements. For all our efforts to bear fruit, the public must also raise their voices against such forces, resist them, and file complaints,” Siddaramaiah stated, urging citizens to report such conspiracies, resist communal forces, and stand up against sectarianism.

He concluded by praising the local police, especially the Belagavi team, for swiftly uncovering the conspiracy. “Congratulations to the police personnel who foiled the evil plot to massacre children. I have full confidence that the judicial system will deliver appropriate punishment to the culprits who committed such a heinous act”.

The complete post may be read here: 

ಬೆಳಗಾವಿ ಜಿಲ್ಲೆಯ ಸವದತ್ತಿ ತಾಲೂಕಿನ ಹೂಲಿಕಟ್ಟಿ ಗ್ರಾಮದ ಸರ್ಕಾರಿ ಶಾಲೆಯ ಮುಖ್ಯೋಪಾಧ್ಯಾಯರು ಮುಸ್ಲಿಂ ಸಮುದಾಯಕ್ಕೆ ಸೇರಿದವರು, ಅವರನ್ನು ತಮ್ಮ ಊರಿನಿಂದ ಬೇರೆಡೆಗೆ ವರ್ಗಾವಣೆ ಮಾಡಿಸಬೇಕೆಂಬ ದುರುದ್ದೇಶದಿಂದ ಶಾಲಾಮಕ್ಕಳ ಕುಡಿಯುವ ನೀರಿಗೆ ವಿಷ ಹಾಕಿದ ಶ್ರೀರಾಮ ಸೇನೆಯ ತಾಲೂಕು ಅಧ್ಯಕ್ಷ ಸಾಗರ ಪಾಟೀಲ ಸೇರಿದಂತೆ ಒಟ್ಟು ಮೂವರನ್ನು…

— Siddaramaiah (@siddaramaiah) August 3, 2025

SP Guled had noted that the police solved the case using a combination of scientific evidence, interrogation of students, and surveillance records.

Conclusion

The poisoning plot in Belagavi is a stark reminder of how hate-driven ideology can metastasize into lethal violence, even targeting children. The police’s timely intervention prevented what could have been a mass poisoning. But the incident raises larger questions about the rise of communal vigilantism, the weaponisation of school spaces, and the moral decay that accompanies unchecked religious extremism.

Related:

“Sambhal: Anatomy of an Engineered Crisis”- How a peaceful Muslim-majority town was turned into a site of manufactured communal conflict

Bengal arrests expose communal plot by members of Santani Ekta Manch, Punjab sees similar incident

Anatomy of Nagpur Riots: A communal bio politics that thrives on the graded inequalities of religion, gender and caste(s)

‘High-Handed, violation of the SC orders’: Bombay HC pulls up Nagpur Civic Body for demolishing homes of accused in communal violence

The post Communal Conspiracy in Karnataka School: Sri Ram Sene leader orchestrates poisoning to target Muslim headmaster appeared first on SabrangIndia.

While Hinduism is the majority religion, Muslims constitute a substantial minority in the district says Wikipedia. Specifically, in the town of Kishanganj, Hindus make up 55.48% of the population, while Muslims account for 42.67%, according to a Wikipedia page. Other religions like Jainism (1.07%) and Christianity (0.30%) are also present,

Kishanganj town is also the district headquarters, and is one of the six constituencies in Kishanganj district. The expected higher number deletions of electors in Kishanganj will have significant implication as Kishanganj is one of the seven Seemanchal districts spread in Mithila region of North eastern Bihar. 

Ironically, the ECI, earlier this week, had stated that it has received enumeration forms for 91.69% electors in Bihar (7.24 crore electors) but as many as 65 lakh electors are unlikely to make it to the draft electoral roll for a variety of reasons. While 22 lakh people were found deceased by the poll body, another seven lakh electors have been found enrolled at multiple places. A crucial segment of concern is the 36 lakh electors of Bihar — 4.59% of total electors — who have been categorised as permanently shifted/not found as the BLOs could not locate them or did not get back their form. The draft electoral roll will give a clearer picture on the spread and concentration of such cases.

Ahead of the publication of the draft roll, Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar stated on Thursday that physical and digital copies of the draft will be given to all recognised political parties in Bihar in all 38 districts by the District Election Officers (DEOs).
“The Chief Electoral Officer of Bihar and 243 Electoral Registration Officers will also be inviting any elector of that assembly constituency or any recognised political party in Bihar to come forward and give claims and objections from August 1 to September 1, 2025, for adding names of any missing eligible elector, removing names of any ineligible elector or correction of any entry in the draft electoral rolls,” the CEC said.

The area also borders Nepal and West Bengal and attracting the bogey of “outsiders” in rolls then connected to allegations, unproven, of “influx of illegal immigrants in the region.” Without providing an details, it may be recalled that, on July 13, ECI sources had even said that “a large number of people from Nepal, Bangladesh and Myanmar” have been found by booth level officers (BLOs) during the house-to-house visits during the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) and these persons had been able to procure “all documents including Aadhaar, domicile certificate, ration card, etc”. They said that “after proper enquiry to be conducted from August 130, if found true, such names shall not be included in the final list to be published on September 30, 2025”.

The post Bihar SIR: Kishanganj, with a high poverty index & Muslim majority in focus as 65 lakh deleted from electoral rolls appeared first on SabrangIndia.

According to The Wire, on July 19 the police detained at least 74 migrant workers — 11 from West Bengal and 63 from Assam — whom they suspected were undocumented Bangladeshis. These numbers just kept rising as the days proceeded. While nearly all have since been released following sustained public outcry, Hindustan Times reported that ten individuals remain in custody, alleged to be “confirmed Bangladeshis,” with deportation proceedings underway. Gurugram Police PRO Sandeep Kumar, according to Hindustan Times, said these ten are “confirmed Bangladeshis” and immigration proceedings have begun. However, officials have failed to provide clarity on the basis for these designations or the total number detained beyond the approximate figures.

“They said we are from Bangladesh. I had my Aadhaar card and voter ID, but they didn’t care,” said Hafizur Sheikh, as reported by Kashmir Media Service, a cleaner from West Bengal’s Nadia district, who was taken into custody on July 19 despite offering to procure physical copies of his documentation.

A campaign marked by fear and prejudice

The operation has induced widespread panic in migrant-dense neighbourhoods. NewsLaundry and other outlets documented how nearly 400 out of 500 Bengali-speaking workers in Sector 49’s “Bengali Market” fled the area in fear of police action, many carrying luggage by their doors in case they were detained at night.

In interviews, detainees described being picked up solely due to language or origin — Bengali speakers from Assam or Bengal targeted, held for days, denied legal counsel or phone access, forced to sign unexplained documents, and often stripped of mobile phones permanently, as per the reports of The Wire and Hindustan Times.

Fatima Begum, a domestic worker detained en route to work, recounts evenings of her children crying unanswered in the absence of her. “No one told us why we were held,” she said. According to the report of Hindustan Times, Aisha Khatun added: “Even after being released, we are scared to step outside”.

The drive has also sown panic in migrant-dense neighbourhoods. The Wire found that Khatola village, home to nearly 2,000 Assamese Muslim workers, was eerily deserted, with only a handful of women left. “We stayed because our husbands are inside [detention centres],” said Rohima. “But most have fled to Dhubri in Assam.”

In interviews with The Wire, detainees described being picked up based solely on their language or place of origin. Some said they were held for days, denied access to communication or legal aid, and forced to sign papers before being released without explanation. Mobile phones were confiscated and, in many cases, never returned.

In Palam Vihar, landlords have started evicting Bengali-speaking tenants under police pressure. Migrants are boarding buses to Murshidabad, Malda, Barpeta, and Karimganj, afraid that their turn will come next, according to The Tribune.

A drive rooted in Delhi’s directives

The detentions align with a May 2, 2025 directive from the Union Ministry of Home Affairs mandating states to identify and deport undocumented Bangladeshis and Rohingyas, granting a 30-day window for verification under specified guidelines, according to the report of Times of India. In keeping, Gurugram set up four operational holding centres, a move confirmed by Deputy Commissioner Ajay Kumar in the Kashmir Media Service report, though detailed detainee counts and procedural transparency remain undisclosed.

Gurugram police have claimed the drive was part of ongoing verification operations and that most detainees were released after district-level identity confirmation. Arpit Jain, DCP (Headquarters), said suspects were “kept in holding areas till verification completed,” though he did not define the exact criteria or process for such determinations, as reported in The Week.

Voices of Resistance and Anguish

West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee condemned the crackdown, calling it targeted, discriminatory and an attack on Bengalis across India. 

The second most spoken language in the country, Bangla, is also the second most spoken language of Assam.

To threaten citizens, who want to coexist peacefully respecting all languages and religions, with persecution for upholding their own mother tongue is discriminatory and…

— Mamata Banerjee (@MamataOfficial) July 19, 2025

Have been increasingly receiving reports of detentions of and atrocities on our Bengali-speaking people from different districts of West Bengal in Gurgaon, Haryana. West Bengal police is receiving these reports from Haryana police in the name of requests for identity searches.…

— Mamata Banerjee (@MamataOfficial) July 24, 2025

TMC MP Mahua Moitra, likened the situation to “living in Nazi Germany.” 

Nazi BJP targeting Bengalis. We will not tolerate these brazen attacks on our linguistic & ethnic identity. My interview on @timesofindia pic.twitter.com/jRXPreIozd

— Mahua Moitra (@MahuaMoitra) July 28, 2025

Attention! Migrant workers from Bengal being picked up illegally by @gurgaonpolice, is Sector 10 A community center an illegal detention camp? Maids, cooks, menial workers living in complete terror. #NaziGermany pic.twitter.com/uTaSQIK3s0

— Mahua Moitra (@MahuaMoitra) July 24, 2025

Asaduddin Owaisi, MP from Hyderabad, called the mass detentions illegal and classist: “This government acts strong with the weak, and weak with the strong. Most of those who are accused of being “illegal immigrants” are the poorest of the poor: slum-dwellers, cleaners, domestic workers, rag-pickers, etc.”

Police in different parts of India have been illegally detaining Bengali-speaking Muslim citizens and accusing them of being Bangladeshi. There have been disturbing reports of Indian citizens being pushed into Bangladesh at gunpoint. This government acts strong with the weak, and… https://t.co/wtQEKiDAaL pic.twitter.com/9BRSWsf31k

— Asaduddin Owaisi (@asadowaisi) July 26, 2025

On July 21, CPI-ML’s Supanta Sinha visited one of the Gurugram detention centres and described conditions as “inhumane.” The party has threatened legal action, calling the entire operation unconstitutional. Sinha told The Wire that “These are illegal detentions, people are being held with no charges, no legal counsel, and no due process – only because they speak Bengali or are Muslims from Assam or Bengal.”

Cases of coercion and corruption

Multiple families report coerced release only after bribes or influence. In Khandsa’s ragpicker colony, Mijanur Molla claimed his father-in-law was released only after paying ₹6,000, despite valid documentation. He alleged beatings occurred in custody, as reported by Hindustan Times.

Another case involved Ashraful Islam, son of an Assam Industrial Security Force constable, detained on July 19 along with eight others. Despite presenting Aadhaar, PAN, school certificates, and even his father’s service ID, they were called “Bangladeshi” and held on suspicion — though local officials later intervened to seek his release, as per the report of Scroll.

‘We’re cooked for their kids, now we’re criminals’

Physical and psychological trauma continues: “This wasn’t just about legality — it was about dignity. We cook for their children, clean their houses, but they treat us like criminals,” reflected Aisha Khatun while speaking to Hindustan Times.

Meanwhile, Hindustan Times reported at least 10 trucks hauling migrants’ belongings out of Gurugram slum clusters — signalling early signs of a labour shortage in domestic and sanitation services.

Data Denied, Rights Denied

The entire operation also reveals a systemic absence of reliable migrant data. In Parliament, TMC MP Samirul Islam raised pressing questions to the Union Ministry of Labour and Employment on the status and deaths of migrant workers in the last five years. The Ministry failed to provide comprehensive data. “I sought data from the last five years, and we all know about the plight of migrant workers who were forced to walk long distances during the COVID-19-induced lockdown. There was no data available — or perhaps the BJP government is deliberately trying to hide its inefficiencies in protecting the rights of these migrants.” he wrote on X.

Islam also accused BJP-ruled states like Odisha, Maharashtra, and Delhi of unlawfully detaining and deporting Bengali migrants, with zero coordination with West Bengal. “I just want to warn the BJP: you cannot conceal your anti-Bengali attitude by hiding the data. Under the leadership of Mamata Banerjee, we will continue to fight for the rights of these people.,” he said.

I asked a few questions to the Union Ministry of Labour and Employment regarding migrant workers. If you go through the questions and answers (the document is attached below), it becomes clear that we live in a country where the government does not maintain a timely or reliable… pic.twitter.com/c0gHh6PPLE

— Samirul Islam (@SamirulAITC) July 26, 2025

Conclusion

This is not the first such episode of mass detention in India. In recent weeks, a chilling pattern has emerged across multiple Indian states, including Odisha, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, Delhi, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, where Bengali-speaking migrant workers, most of them Indian citizens, have been rounded up in mass raids, detained without proper inquiry, denied recognition of valid Indian documentation, and in some cases, forcibly deported to Bangladesh. (Detailed report may be read here.)

What began as a bureaucratic drive for “verification” has morphed into a surveillance campaign against linguistic and religious identity, disproportionately targeting poor Bengali-speaking Muslims. The absence of legal transparency, arbitrary detentions, and disregard for basic rights reveal deep fissures in the fabric of India’s constitutional promise.

Until procedural safeguards, accountability, and respect for dignity are restored, those who migrate for work risk living in a perpetual state of suspicion — their citizenship conditional, their humanity contested.

Related:

Gauhati High Court demands Centre’s deportation order amid mounting legal questions over re-detention of bail-compliant individuals

Under Siege for Speaking Bengali: Detentions, deportations and a rising pushback against the targeting of Bengali migrant workers across India

No breach, no recall, yet detained again: Gauhati HC seeks affidavit from State for re-detentions of COVID-era released detainees

“Illegal detention cannot be allowed even for a minute”: Gauhati HC orders release of Goalpara man picked up despite complying with bail conditions

Foreigner in Life, Indian in Death: The cruel end of Abdul Matleb in assam’s detention camp

Pushed Out of Sight: The covert deportation and detention crisis at Assam’s Matia detention centre

The post Under Suspicion: Bengali Migrant workers face mass detentions, fear, and statelessness in Gurugram crackdown appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The leaders also denounced the Hindu right-wing Bajrang Dal’s “coercive role” in the arrest of Sister Vandana Francis and Sister Preeta Mary of the order of the Assisi Sisters of Mary Immaculate. Both nuns, Preeti Mary and Vandana Francis, and Sukaman Mandavi from Narayanpur were arrested on Friday, July 25 after a local Bajrang Dal member, Ravi Nigam, filed a complaint with the police, saying that Mr. Mandavi had brought three women to the Durg railway station, from where they had to go to Agra with the two nuns.

Meanwhile, the Hindu reported that the Union Minister of State for Minority Affairs George Kurian said that the matter was sub judice and he was therefore not hazarding an opinion until the court processed the nuns’ arrest. He stated that BJP’s Kerala president Rajeev Chandrasekhar was “working closely with the Central and Chhattisgarh governments, as well as the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of India, to secure the early release of the nuns.”

Even as Kerala Chief Minister Pinarayi Vijayan wrote a strong letter to Prime Minister Narendra Modi demanding justice for the “unfairly incarcerated” nuns, a delegation of left leaders led by leaders like Brinda Karat and Annie Raja has left for Chhattisgarh on the matter. Leader of the Opposition V.D. Satheesan also stated the attacks against Christians in BJP ruled States had multiplied after Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to power at the Centre. Kerala Pradesh Congress Committee president Sunny Joseph, MLA, said Christians in the BJP-ruled States lived in fear of persecution.

A delegation of Left MPs led by senior Left leaders like
@BrindaKarat and @AnnieRaja are leaving for Chhattisgarh. Our struggle for democracy and secularism shall continue, inside and out of the Parliament. pic.twitter.com/dLVZxk0T3l

— A A Rahim (@AARahimdyfi) July 29, 2025

Nuns are “innocent”, say family members of tribal women

Even as the arrest of the Keralite nuns in Chhattisgarh made national headlines, siblings of the purported victims reject allegations of trafficking and forcible conversion; they say the tribal women were accompanying the nuns to Agra for a job with the consent of family members. However BJP’s Chhattisgarh Chief Minister has defended the arrest.

Only days after the Chhattisgarh Police arrested three persons, including two Keralite nuns, on charges of trafficking and forcibly converting a few tribal women, the latter’s family members have denied the police claim. Family members clearly stated that the women accompanied the nuns and a man from Narayanpur of their own volition, and that they are innocent.

However, Chief Minister Vishnu Deo Sai, on Monday (July 28, 2025), backed the arrests, saying that “through inducement, an attempt was being made [by the arrested persons] to engage in human trafficking and conversion”.

‘They are being framed’

The younger sister of another woman who was in Narayanpur also demanded the release of the nuns and said her sister left home on July 24, and that the family had converted to Christianity five years ago. Besides, post the arrests, all three families gave a written submission to the Narayanpur Police on July 26 saying that they were aware that the women were being taken for jobs, said Narayanpur Superintendent of Police Robinson Guria.

Related:

Targeted by Mob, Arrested without Cause: Two Catholic nuns jailed in Chhattisgarh despite consent documents and no evidence of conversion

The post As protests intensify in Kerala over arrests of nuns, family members of Adivasi women say nuns are innocent, left national leadership to visit Chhattisgarh appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The arrest, which followed a public mob intimidation led by Bajrang Dal activists, is being widely condemned as a blatant case of targeted harassment of religious minorities under the guise of anti-conversion and trafficking laws.

Mob tip-off, not law, triggered arrest

The incident was triggered not by any formal complaint or police investigation, but by a train ticket examiner (TTE) at the station who questioned the group and then contacted local Bajrang Dal members rather than railway authorities. According to Father Sebastian Poomattam, Vicar General of the Raipur Archdiocese, who spoke with The News Minute, the women told the TTE they were travelling to Agra under the care of the nuns, and the nuns had their tickets. But soon, a Bajrang Dal mob gathered and began harassing the group.

The nuns were accompanying the women to secure employment as kitchen helpers in convents in Agra, with salaries between ₹8,000 and ₹10,000, as confirmed by Fr. Poomattam. “They were all over 18 and had consent letters from their parents,” he said, as reported in the The News Minute report.

Despite this, the railway police detained the group. Bajrang Dal activists gathered outside the police station and allegedly pressured authorities into registering an FIR. The women were later sent to a state-run shelter, while the nuns and the young man were remanded to judicial custody until August 8.

Police inaction against Bajrang Dal despite harassment

Sister Asha Paul, from the Congregation of the Holy Family in Delhi, alleged that no Church representative was permitted to meet the arrested nuns. “We believe the young women were coerced into changing their statements. The nuns had all required documents—IDs, consent letters—yet they were treated as criminals,” she said, as reported by The News Minute.

Multiple eyewitness accounts and Christian organisations confirmed that the nuns were publicly humiliated by Bajrang Dal members, led by Jyoti Sharma, even before their arrest, with police officers reportedly standing by. Videos shared by Anti-Christian Tracker Watch on social media show the group being harassed on the platform.

Before their arrest, the Catholic nuns were illegally detained, harassed, and humiliated by Bajrang Dal’s Jyoti Sharma and her team, all in full view of the police, who stood by in silence.

No FIR against Jyoti Sharma yet.

Is this democracy or mobocracy? https://t.co/JdUCnb19NY pic.twitter.com/UnGevvou2q

— Anti Christian Tracker Watch – ACT India (@ACTWatchIndia) July 27, 2025

Despite this, no FIR has been filed against Sharma or other members of the vigilante group.

Systematic targeting of Christians, say Church and civil society

The Catholic Bishops’ Conference of India (CBCI) condemned the arrests, stating that the women were legal adults, their travel was voluntary, and there was no evidence of conversion. “This is a violation of their constitutional rights. The Church will raise the issue on all appropriate platforms,” CBCI said in a press statement, as reported by The New Indian Express.

The Kerala Catholic Bishops’ Council’s (KCBC) Social Harmony and Vigilance Commission said the police action was based on “false and baseless allegations” from Bajrang Dal members. According to The New Indian Express, the KCBC warned that the incident fits a broader pattern of intimidation and misuse of anti-conversion laws to target religious workers. “This distressing incident is part of a broader and deeply troubling pattern of increasing hostility towards Christians and missionary personnel across various Indian states. The weaponisation of anti-conversion laws by extremist groups is not only unjust but also poses a serious threat to the constitutional rights of religious minorities in the country. We affirm that Catholic missionaries do not engage in forced conversions,” their official statement noted.

Notably, the United Christian Forum (UCF) had reported that incidents targeting Christians have surged from 127 in 2014 to 834 in 2024—a near sevenfold increase—highlighting what it called “a coordinated campaign of intimidation against minorities.”

Call for action

Congress leaders from Kerala sharply condemned the arrests. AICC General Secretary K.C. Venugopal wrote to Union Home Minister Amit Shah and Chhattisgarh Chief Minister Vishnu Deo Sai, highlighting that the present incident is a blatant case of mob intimidation and wrongful imprisonment. When written consent and documentation are ignored, and police act under pressure from fringe elements, it is a breakdown of law.

Attacks on minorities have seen a rampant increase under BJP-ruled States, be it Chhattisgarh, Odisha or MP.

The latest attacks by Bajrang Dal goons on 2 Catholic nuns in Durg, Chhattisgarh point to a tacit support for such hate crimes from the ruling establishment.

I have… pic.twitter.com/zcwSMVUHLJ

— K C Venugopal (@kcvenugopalmp) July 27, 2025

John Brittas, Member of Parliament from CPI-M, also addressed a letter to the Chhattisgarh CM stating that the arrest of Kerala nuns Sr. Vandana Francis & Sr. Preethi at Durg on baseless trafficking & conversion charges is a disgrace, and a blatant misuse of the law to target minorities.

The arrest of Kerala nuns Sr. Vandana Francis & Sr. Preethi at Durg on baseless trafficking & conversion charges is a disgrace. This is blatant misuse of the law to target minorities. Free the nuns & stop the hate campaign against those serving society! pic.twitter.com/JF0k839AjX

— John Brittas (@JohnBrittas) July 28, 2025

The KCBC has demanded intervention from Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Union ministers, stating: “The Centre must not stay silent. Mob rule cannot override constitutional rights. This is a moment of reckoning for India’s commitment to democracy and religious freedom.”

Related:

United Christian Forum submits memorandum to UP Governor Anandiben Patel; demands repeal of UP anti-conversion law and its recent amendment

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The post Targeted by Mob, Arrested without Cause: Two Catholic nuns jailed in Chhattisgarh despite consent documents and no evidence of conversion appeared first on SabrangIndia.