Over 35 locations witnessed coordinated demonstrations led by the Bombay Catholic Sabha (BCS) — one of the largest lay organisations representing Catholics in Maharashtra. The participants gathered outside churches carrying placards reading “My Faith, My Right” and “Don’t Criminalise Compassion”, expressing alarm that the proposed Bill—while claiming to curb “forced” conversions—could, in effect, criminalise voluntary expressions of faith, humanitarian work, and social service. The BCS is one of the largest organisations of the Catholic laity representing as many as 68,000 believers.

‘A Violation of Article 25’: The constitutional concern

As per the press note released by BCS, protestors underscored that the Bill represents a direct affront to Article 25 of the Constitution of India, which guarantees “freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise, and propagate religion.”

BCS spokesperson Dolphy D’Souza stated that the law’s vague and sweeping provisions could “interfere with an individual’s personal choice of faith” and “open the door for surveillance, policing, or discrimination against religious minorities.” D’Souza described the Bill as “a misnomer — there is no freedom in the so-called Freedom of Religion Bill,” adding that it risks chilling constitutional rights by blurring the line between legitimate religious activity and alleged conversion.

Newly elected President, BCS, Norbert Mendonca, stated to Sabrangindia,” We organised this this peaceful protest to affirm our commitment to constitutional values, religious freedom and  liberty, and communal harmony, and to appeal to the Government of Maharashtra to withdraw any move that infringes upon these rights.”

‘Every act of compassion could be misinterpreted’

From the people present at the protest, unifying fear emerged: that ordinary acts of kindness, charity, or social work could be weaponised as evidence of ‘inducement’ or ‘allurement’.

According to the BCS press note, the proposed Bill “threatens to criminalise compassion,” warning that “every act of kindness could be misinterpreted or maliciously portrayed as an attempt at conversion.”

This sentiment reverberated through the protest at St Michael’s Church, Mahim, one of the major protest sites, where BCS members explained that schools, hospitals, and welfare institutions run by Christian organisations serve people of all faiths. “Our work is motivated by faith and humanitarian concern — not conversion,” said one participant. “But under this Bill, even that service could be labelled inducement.”

‘Misuse and Targeting’: A familiar pattern

While the text of Maharashtra’s Bill has not yet been made public, Global Bihari noted that BCS apprehensions are informed by experiences in other states where similar “Freedom of Religion” laws have been introduced — including Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, and Uttarakhand.

In Uttar Pradesh, the 2021 Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act has led to multiple FIRs and arrests. In May 2024, the Supreme Court observed that several provisions “may seem to be violative of Article 25,” staying further proceedings in certain FIRs. In Madhya Pradesh, the High Court in November 2022 declared Section 10 of its Freedom of Religion Act, 2021 — which required prior declaration before conversion — prima facie unconstitutional, with the Supreme Court refusing to stay that order in 2023.

Community Voices: Between fear and faith

The protests were marked not by confrontation but by prayer, song, and civic solidarity. At Our Lady of the Rosary Church in Goregaon (West), Free Press Journal reported that even non-Christian citizens joined the demonstration. Among them were civic and human rights activist Prof. Arvind Nigale, Gandhian Jayant Diwan, Rashtra Seva Dal convenor Umesh Kadam, environmental activist Mannan Desai, and Abu Shaikh from Jamaat-e-Islami, Goregaon — underscoring a rare show of interfaith unity.

In Mahim, Mid-Day report captured the mood poignantly: “This is not about aggression but awareness,” said Vinod Noronha of BCS. “Many people still do not know what this Bill is about. Our protest is to awaken civic consciousness, not to divide.”

Former BCS president Rita D’Sa added, “We would have actually liked to see inter-faith dialogue and goodwill. Instead, this Bill creates suspicion.”

‘A political diversion from real issues’

Beyond religious freedom, protestors questioned the political intent behind the legislation. As per the press note, it was provided that “While the stated aim of the Bill is to prevent forced or fraudulent conversions  experiences from other states suggests such laws in practice, could be used to harass faith-based groups, charitable institutions, or individuals who are simply practising their faith, especially in minority communities.”

It was further provided that such laws can be used selectively to harass minority groups, mirroring patterns seen elsewhere. “If the intent was merely to stop coercion, there would be no need for a new law. We already have adequate provisions in the Penal Code to deal with force or fraud.”

A retired Assistant Commissioner of Police, Joe Gaikwad, summed up the mood with quiet defiance while speaking to Mid-day: “If there was any conversion, it was from hate to love, from sinfulness to salvation. This is a peaceful community.”

‘Faith Does Not Require Permission’

As the gatherings drew to a close, participants joined in hymns and prayers. D’Souza’s concluding invocation, as quoted by Mid-Day, resonated across the crowd: “We pray, Lord, in your wisdom that you enlighten the minds of our leaders. Be with us in this moment of anxiety and grief. Let there be peace on earth.”

But this was no end — merely a beginning. The BCS announced a continuing campaign, with the next awareness event scheduled for November 16 at I.C. Colony, Borivali, as reported by all three outlets.

In its official press note, the BCS stated: “Our efforts will continue. The very title of the Bill is misleading — it is not a ‘Freedom of Religion’ law but a means to harass minorities. We will network with other religious communities and citizens of goodwill to defend the constitutional right to freedom of conscience.”

A broader warning

Beyond the Catholic community, the protest has become a bellwether for civil liberties in Maharashtra. Citizens for Justice and Peace, the lead on the case challenging various State anti-Conversion laws that remains pending before the Supreme Court, has warned that anti-conversion laws — though couched in the language of protection — often rely on vague and subjective terms such as “inducement,” “allurement,” and “coercion,” which invite misuse and threaten the presumption of personal autonomy. If enacted in its current form, the organisation fears that Maharashtra’s proposed law may replicate the chilling effects seen in northern states — discouraging interfaith marriages, constraining charitable activity, and empowering local authorities to surveil minority groups.

For the citizens gathered outside churches that Sunday, the message was clear: Faith is not a crime, compassion is not a threat, and constitutional freedom is not negotiable.

Related:

Guarding culture or policing faith? Chhattisgarh High Court’s ‘social menace’ observation and the future of Article 25

Allahabad High Court directs UP Police to ensure safe return of inter-faith to their desired destination

From Victim to Accused: High Court of Gujarat’s 2025 Ruling on Religious Conversion

SC: Freedom for man in interfaith union: SC grants bail to Muslim partner

Inter-Community clashes erupt at Dehradun railway station after interfaith couple meets

By quashing the FIR against an interfaith couple accused of “conversion”, the Allahabad High Court restores jurisprudence on a constitutional path, upholds freedom of choice

The post ‘Faith Is Not a Crime’: Mumbai’s Christians rise against Maharashtra’s proposed anti-conversion bill appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Note: Meanwhile, Shah Bano’s daughter has approached the Madhya Pradesh High Court on Tuesday (November 4) claiming that the movie ‘Haq’ starring Yami Gautam Dhar and Emraan Hashmi affects the personality rights of her mother, depicts her image in a derogatory manner and must not be released. After hearing all the parties–including the producers and the Censor board, Justice Pranay Verma reserved his verdict in the matter.

In the 1970s, Shah Bano filed a suit for maintenance from her husband. As the court proceedings ensued, just to unburden himself from paying maintenance to his separated wife, Shah Bano, he (Mr Khan) divorced Shah Bano (reportedly inside the Court itself), and argued that un-Quranic Instant Triple Talaq (ITT) didn’t provide for maintenance. The litigation reached up to the Supreme Court which ruled in favour of Shah Bano, in April 1985. This created a huge furore. Muslims and the Urdu press initially welcomed it (according to Nawaz B Mody’s essay). By August 1985, the Muslim conservatives began to massively agitate asking for upturning it through legislation. Rajiv Gandhi, the then Prime Minister of India, was persuaded/misled to oblige the Muslim conservatives. Ever since then, the Ayodhya-Babri Masjid dispute took a new, sharper turn, giving an excuse to Hindutva supremacists to influence wider Indian society and the polity.

Five years ago I wrote:

….In the 1980s, the All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB)—guided forces among Muslims made their own contributions of fodder to rising majoritarianism. On January 15, 1986, in a session of the Momin Conference at the Siri Fort Auditorium in Delhi, the then prime minister Rajiv Gandhi announced his intention to amend the law to nullify the Supreme Court’s April 1985 verdict in favour of Shah Bano. A bill was introduced in March and it became the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act in May 1986. In January 1986, there were strident Muslim protests against the progressive verdict, which had granted Shah Bano, a Muslim woman, alimony after her divorce.

The approach of the conservative Muslims became pretty clear from the Urdu memoir, Karwan-e-Zindagi, published in 1988 by Maulana Abul Hasan Ali Miyan Nadvi (1914-1999). In Volume 3, Chapter 4, Page 134, Nadvi clearly narrates that it is he who had persuaded Gandhi not to accept the proposition that many Islamic countries have already reformed their personal laws. Nadvi’s narration is triumphant; he rejoices in the successful accomplishment of his effort to stymie a similar reform in India. He says his persuasion had a particular psychological impact on Gandhi and that his “arrow precisely hit the target— woh teer apney nishaaney par baitha”.

On page 157 comes Nadvi’s candid “confession”: “Our mobilisation for protecting the Shariat in 1986 resulted into complicating the issue of Babri Masjid and vitiated the atmosphere in a big way— is ne fiza mein ishte’aal wa izteraab paida karney mein bahut bara hissa liya,” he writes.

For further substantiation, one must read Nadvi’s memoir in Nicholas Nugent’s book,  Rajiv Gandhi: Son of a Dynasty, published by BBC Books, in 1990. On page 187 Nugent writes:

“…a decision had been taken by the Congress High Command in the early 1986 to ‘play the Hindu card’ in the same way that the Muslim Women’s bill had been an attempt to ‘play the Muslim card’… Ayodhya was supposed to be a package deal… a tit for tat for the Muslim women’s bill… Rajiv played a key role in carrying out the Hindu side of the package deal by such actions as arranging that picture of Hindus worshipping at the newly unlocked shrine be shown on television.”

The lock was opened within an hour of the judgment being delivered by the district court of Faizabad on 1 February 1986. As said earlier, the deal between the Prime Minister, the Muslim clergy and the Momin Conference’s Ziaur Rahman Ansari (who died in 1992) had already been struck in January 1986. There is a reference to this in his biography, Wings of Destiny, 2018, written by his son Fasihur Rahman. Yet, a nagging question remains: who wanted to open the locks, and why? After all, the elections were four long years away and so Gandhi did not have a direct electoral stake in the event…”

This biographical timeline of Shah Bano therefore attempts at capturing the journey of the India(n) republic veering around the issue of Muslim resistance to reforms in Personal (Gender) laws and surge in Hindu majoritarian influence. This timeline also provides a significant reading list, by many including some of the dramatis personae in this saga. Many of these facts pertaining to the issue remain largely unknown even to informed readers. They provide an informed reading.

1916:  Shah Bano Begum was born; [the year when Congress-Muslim League & Moderate-Extremist Pact took place at Lucknow].

1932: Shah Bano marries Indore-based advocate Md Ahmad Khan (1913-2006), her cousin. [The year Gandhi-Ambedkar Poona Pact happened].

1937 to 1939: The Shariat Application Act was enacted. Jinnah, the pork-eating non-practicing Muslim, was the pilot of the legislation. The roles of Maulana Azad, Maulana Madani, etc., in this legislative pursuit not known, so far. A daughter (of the Punjab’s Khizr & Sikandar Hayat Khan family) asks for inheritance in landed property, as per Shariat. [Tiwana-Jinnah] deny this right, invoking cunning arguments, such as, (i) Customary laws deny daughter’s share in land, and (ii) that land & agriculture was a state Subject whereas the Shariat Act was a Central law! Thus, Muslim women are made to suffer from the Shariat Act on two fronts: the marriage-divorce issue as well as the inheritance rights in parental assets.

1938 to 1947: Muslim League & Savarkar led Hindu Mahasabha come together, ally, pushing India towards Partition, with the active support of the British colonial state.

1946: Mr Md. Ahmad Khan marries again (second marriage), with Halima Begum, a cousin of Shah Bano.

1946-1950: Constituent Assembly Debates (CAD) on Article 44, Uniform Civil Code (UCC), Articles 25 to 28 and 37.

1947: Partition happens; millions are raped, displaced, looted, amputated, mutilated. Jinnah’s goal of consolidating Muslims politically through the enacted Shariat Act gets accomplished and manifests in Partition, leaving an unending legacy of bloodshed, communal hatred. India’s Muslims are rendered ever more vulnerable.

January 30, 1948: Gandhiji was assassinated by Hindu bigots affiliated with radical Hindu outfits. Just ten days before, they had failed in their attempt to assassinate Gandhi and one of them was arrested. Yet, for many hours after the killing, on January 30, 1948, an apprehension prevailed about the identity of the assassin until then Prime Minister Nehru and Home Minister Sardar Patel clarified the situation, declared the reality.

1951-1961: Nehru led govt reforms Hindu Personal Laws; expects the religious minorities to initiate reforms at their own, from within. (For details see, Reba Som’s essay, “Jawaharlal Nehru and the Hindu Code: A Victory of Symbol over Substance?”, in the Modern Asian Studies, 28, 1, Feb 1994).

1962: Pakistan reforms Muslim personal Laws; the reforms which elude India’s Muslims even in 2025.

1972-1973: The Indira-led govt amends the Cr P C 1898 to help deserted women & abandoned old parents, with maintenance, and for adoption of child. Muslims protest across India against the essentially Hindu law reforms by coming out on streets– April 1973 the All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB) at Hyderabad, spearheads these protests.

(Despite the fact that the custody of Zayd, the son adopted by the Prophet continued with him till Zayd was martyred; Zayd’s son, Osama, also continued to enjoy utmost affection of the Prophet. The Quran doesn’t prohibit “adoption” per se, it only prohibits erasure of biological paternity.)

1975:  Mr Md Ahmad Khan drove Shah Bano out of her home; she had three sons and two daughters and one Bahu (daughter-in-law) who was said to have been in support of Mr. Khan in driving Shah Bano out of her home. [The same year Emergency was imposed in the country].

April 1978: Shah Bano went to the trial court (Indore) asking for maintenance; the Court issued an interim order for payment of maintenance.

August 1979: the local magistrate directed Khan to pay a sum of Rs. 25 (US$2) per month maintenance to Shah Bano who alleged that her former husband earned a professional income of about Rs.60,000 annually (US$4,600).

November 1979: Mr Khan protested this in the court invoking personal law; the judge said even under the existing interpretation of and codified Muslim Personal Law, a separated wife does remain entitled for maintenance. On hearing this, right inside the court, before the judge, Mr Khan pronounced the un-Quranic instant triple divorce. Simply to avoid payment of maintenance, of a meagre allowance of amount Rs 179/- per month.

1979: The Supreme Court verdict (in the Tahira Bi vs Ali Hasan) for maintenance to the divorced Muslim woman.

1980: Shah Bano filed a revised application for increased maintenance, and the High Court of Madhya Pradesh raised the amount to Rs.179.20 per month (US$14).

1980: Supreme Court verdict for maintenance in the Fazlun Bi vs Qadir Wali case.

Feb 19, 1981: Meenakshipuram (Tamil Nadu) Dalits Converted to Islam, en masse, and the village was renamed Rahmatnagar. This created furore and communal strife. [For details see, Theodre P Wright Jr (October 1982), “The Movement to Convert Harijans to Islam in South India”, The Muslim World, 72, 3-4, pp. 239-245]

February 1983: Nellie (Assam) Massacre [See Myron Weiner (June 1983), “The Political Demography of Assam’s Anti-Immigrant Movement”, Population and Development Review, vol. 9, Issue 2]

8 April 1984: “VHP gave a clarion call for the removal of the Babri Masjid”. [A G Noorani, 2019, The RSS, p. 207].

September 25, 1984: Former BJP President, Lal Krishna Advani-led Rath Yatra began

October 31, 1984: The Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was assassinated; Rath Yatra suspended.

April 23, 1985: The Supreme Court, hearing the appeal (High Court also retained maintenance), endorsed the verdict (for maintenance of Rs 500/- per month) given by the Lower & High Court. Justice Y. V. Chandrachud’s observations were not confined to Quran alone; the verdict subjected (the patriarchic aspects of Hinduism as well as Islam) to criticism.

Last Friday of Ramzan (1985) observed as Yaum-e-Tahaffuz-e-Shariat.

August 1985: Signing of the Assam accord, widely considered to be a political concession made at the cost of the immigrant Muslims.

Aug 1985: Arif M Khan, Union Minister of State in Rajiv cabinet, spoke in Parliament welcoming the Supreme Court verdict.

October 23, 1985: Rath Yatra resumed from 25 places. Deadline of Shivratri (March 8, 1986). Before this, discussions on the possibility of the locks of the Babri Masjid sought to be opened, by former PM, Rajiv Gandhi were discussed, according to Neerja Chowdhury’s report in the Statesman.

Nov 15, 1985: Succumbing under mass protests before Shah Bano”s house in Indore, she was forced to affix her thumb impression to a statement saying she disavowed the Supreme Court verdict. [Ritu Sarin, “Shah Bano: The Struggle and the Surrender”, Sunday, 1-7 Dec 1985].

December 1985 to January 1986: Five lakh Muslims came out on the streets of Bombay, Calicut.

The Hindu Mahasabha retaliated by handing out the same treatment to the effigies of Maulana Ziaur Rahman Ansari (d. 1992), Union minister of state for environment, who leads the fundamentalist pressure group within the Congress (I).

In the first few weeks after the Shah Bano verdict, most Urdu press welcomed the verdict and expected that the Muslims will introspect and will launch reforms (Nawaz B Mody’s research essay, Asian Survey, 1987).

December 1985: Ziaur Rahman Ansari (MoS Environment, in Rajiv cabinet) spoke against the verdict in a three-hour long speech in Parliament. He used casteist slurs against the judges: something like this, “Kya ab teli tamboli bhi Sharaiat mein dakhal dengey!” (Indian Express, December 21, 1985).

Muslims protested against the Supreme Court verdict and the observations recorded in the verdict (misleadingly propagating that Islam alone was targeted by the Supreme Court). Asghar Ali Engineer’s columns in Bombay’s Urdu Blitz kept appreciating the verdict and kept talking of the reformism.

December 1985: Shah Bano met Rajiv Gandhi at his invitation, in which Gandhi persuaded Bano to refuse the maintenance telling her the situation was very critical.

Post-verdict, till January 1986: Ali Miyan Nadvi (+ Syed Shahabuddin+Ibrahim Sulaiman Sait) led AIMPLB “bargained” with the Prime Minister to legislate against the verdict. “In exchange”, locks of Babri Masjid to be opened, via the Faizabad Court; the opening to be telecast on Doordarshan.

This is “confessed” by Ali MiyaN (1914-1999) in his Urdu memoir, Kaarwaan-e-Zindagi (1988; vol.3, chapter 4, pages 134-137, 157); corroborated by Nicholas Nugent’s biography (1990, p. 187) of Rajiv Gandhi. Neerja Chowdhury (Statesman, 20 April and 1 May 1986), “There is evidence of a connection between the opening of the doors of the disputed ram Janmabhoom in Ayodhya and introduction of the Muslim [Women] Bill in Parliament…”

Ali Miyan Nadvi had also promised the Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi that the Muslim clergy would make “some arrangement” for maintenance of divorced Muslim women out of the Waqf assets. This promise remains forgotten.

August 1985 to January 1986: Rallies and Protests in Bombay, Calicut, Indore, Assam, Patna, Lucknow, etc. against the Verdict— “Shariat Bachao!” Different responses of the Muslim civil society, academics, and politicians. Over 500 teachers of AMU and a good number of teachers in JMI (barring a few dozen teachers of Left-Liberal leanings) side with the Muslim conservatives and reactionaries.

19 December 1985: Vir Bahadur Singh, the Congress CM of UP visited Ayodhya’s Ramayan Mela organised by the government agencies.

January 1986: The deal to legislate against the Supreme Court Verdict was finalized/endorsed by Ziaur Rahman Ansari (& Momin Conference?), with the PM, Rajiv Gandhi. See the biography (2018) of Ansari, Wings of Destiny.

January 25, 1986: Umesh Chandra Pandey, a 28 years old local lawyer filed an application in the Munsif Court, Faizabad, seeking removal of restrictions on the puja at the disputed Babri Masjid site. The Munsif declined as the files were in the High Court since 1961.

January 31, 1985: Appeal was filed in the Babri Masjid dispute court of the District Judge, Faizabad;

February 1, 1986: The case was heard. Md Hashim’s application was rejected who was already a plaintiff. The District Judge (K M Pandey) heard the District Magistrate and the SSP Faizabad on the law-and-order situation.

February 1, 1986: Faizabad Court orders (at 4.40 pm) opening; within less than 40 minutes of the verdict, unlocking done (at 5.19 pm) & televised, “as per the deal between the AIMPLB & PM” (see Urdu memoir of Ali Miyan Nadvi, Kaarwaan e Zindagi, vol.3, chapter 4, p. 134, 135, 157; also read, Nicholas Nugent’s biography of Rajiv Gandhi, 1990, p. 187). 

Ali Miyan’s offer and the promise to the PM to institute a measure for looking after the abandoned, helpless women through Waqf or any other way, was a part of the deal which everybody including Ali Miyan chose to forget. The Qaum (community) never asked him about this, even after he wrote about the promise and deal in his Urdu memoir, Kaarwaan-e-Zindagi (1988, vol. 3, chapter 4). 

“There was a prior understanding between Indira Gandhi and later Rajiv Gandhi and VHP on the opening of the locks”, writes Noorani (The RSS, 2019, p. 207) citing Neerja’s two reports in the Statesman.

February 19, 1986: Bill tabled to nullify the Supreme Court verdict.

March 8, 1986: Shivratri, Deadline of the VHP’s Rath Yatra to open the locks.

March 29-April 4, 1986: The Eve’s Weekly quoted Arif Md Khan’s resignation who also said, within law, “Indian Muslim women will be the only women to be denied maintenance anywhere in the world”.

April 1986 (Muslim India monthly): “AMU Teachers Support the Bill”; “As for AMU, the few dozens of teachers who signed the petition against the Muslim Women’s Bill paled in comparison to the more than 500 teachers (including sixty-three women) who signed a memorandum to express their ‘whole-hearted suport’ for the Bill”, and stated that the Muslims were hurt by the Supreme Court judgement [Laurence Gautier, 2024, p. 379].

May 1986: Parliament legislated law on Muslim Women, against the Supreme Court Verdict.

1986: Shah Bano pressurised to refuse to take the maintenance.

1986: Ram Shila (Bricks) Pujan Rath Yatra.

1989: Kar Seva in Ayodhya and the police firings on them.

1990: Mandal Report Implemented followed by caste riots and Advani’s W(r)ath Yatra.

1991: Narasimha Rao led govt brings in neo-liberalisation

1992: Shah Bano Begum dies; hardly any obituary was published by the press.

Sunday, December 6, 1992: Babri Masjid demolished, followed by massive pogroms across the country, and then a bomb blast in Bombay on Friday 12 March 1993.

April 1994: Allahabad High Court declared Instant Triple Talaq (ITT) illegal.

BJP kept rising, expanding and consolidating to emerge soon as the dominant and hegemonic political power, transforming the society, polity, administration and every other institution.

2001: Supreme Court verdict in Daniel Latifi case (after a few months of Latifi’s death) clarifying/reiterating that the law legislated in 1986 does provide for maintenance under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code of India.

Feb 2002: Gujarat pogrom.

2006: Md Ahmed Khan died in Indore at the age of 93.

May 2014: NaMo Era comes and stays.

August 22, 2017: Supreme Court verdict (in the case of Shayera Bano of Allahabad) declared the ITT (Instant Triple Talaq) unconstitutional. The AIMPLB was respondent no. 7 in this case. It had submitted its affidavit that Court shouldn’t intervene; Parliament should. Yet, even after the verdict, the AIMPLB didn’t submit its draft proposal/bill, of reforms, in the Muslim Personal Laws.

February, 10-11, 2018: While going for its 26th plenary at Hyderabad in early February 2018, the AIMPLB announced that the session would prepare a model nikahnama, but reneged on it.

August 1, 2019: The Parliament criminalised ITT (Instant Triple Talaq). Maintenance to the divorced/abandoned women remains ignored as ever.

Feb 2024: Uttarakhand legislates for UCC; AIMPLB & Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind (JUH) contemplate challenging the legislation in the court of law, without reforming the Muslim Personal Laws.

July 10, 2024: Supreme Court upholds Telangana High Court verdict for maintenance of Rs 10 000 per month to a divorced woman.

July 14, 2024: AIMPLB resolves to find ways of protesting against the verdict.

Further Readings

• Asghar Ali Engineer (1987), The Shah Bano Controversy.
• Zoya Hasan (January 7, 1989), “Minority Identity, Muslim Women Bill Campaign and the Political Process”, Economic and Political Weekly, 24, Issue 1.
• Ziya Us Salam (2018), Till Talaq Do Us Part
• Shekhar Gupta, Inderjit Badhwar, Farzand Ahmed (January 31, 1986), “Shah Bano judgment renders Muslims a troubled community, torn by an internal rift”, India Today.
• “Secularism on the Bend”, Frontline (English Fortnightly, Madras/Chennai), 11-24 January 1986.

Disclaimer: The author is unaware of the content of the biopic, Haq scheduled to be released on Friday, November 7.

Prepared by Mohammad Sajjad, Professor, Modern & Contemporary Indian History, AMU, Aligarh.

[Biography of Shah Bano: Biography of the Indian Nation-State]. Updated on 27 Sept 2024

Hindi Rendering published in Baya, Oct 2024 to March 2025

Related:

Shah Bano Lives

How the Ulema are Perpetuating Male Hegemony in the Name of Islam

The post Shah Bano Begum (1916-1992): A Socio-Political Historical Timeline appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Delivered by a Division Bench of Chief Justice Ramesh Sinha and Justice Bibhu Datta Guru on October 28, the ruling attempts to establish a fierce boundary between religious propagation (protected under Article 25) and “conversion by inducement” (termed a “social menace”), but critically fails to protect the constitutional rights of a targeted minority group. The judgment’s most scathing indictment lies not in its rhetoric against exploitation, but in its procedural abdication that validated the exclusion of citizens based on their faith, thereby establishing a worrying precedent for the fragmentation of India’s secular citizenship.

“When it becomes a calculated act of exploitation disguised as charity, it undermines both faith and freedom. The so-called “conversion by inducement” by certain missionary groups is not merely a religious concern, it is a social menace that threatens the unity and cultural continuity of India’s indigenous communities. The remedy lies not in intolerance, but in ensuring that faith remains a matter of conviction, not compulsion.” (Para 26)

Context and background

The petitions arose from a series of Gram Sabha resolutions and hoardings erected at the entry points of several villages in Kanker district, proclaiming a ban on the entry of Christian pastors and those who had converted. These villages, falling under the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution and governed by the Panchayat (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 (PESA), justified the move as a safeguard against “forced” or “induced” religious conversions allegedly targeting impoverished tribal populations.

Practising Christians challenged the resolutions, arguing that they infringed upon their fundamental rights under Article 25 (freedom of religion) and Article 19(1)(d) (freedom of movement) of the Constitution. They contended that while Gram Sabhas are empowered to preserve cultural heritage, their authority remains subject to the overarching supremacy of constitutional rights. The petitioners also cited a 2025 government circular encouraging protection of “Jal, Jangal, Jameen” (water, forest, and land), alleging that this had been misused to legitimise discriminatory hoardings.

The State, however, defended the Gram Sabhas, invoking the PESA Act and the Madhya Pradesh Dharma Swatantrya Adhiniyam, 1968, whose validity had been upheld by the Supreme Court in Rev. Stanislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1977). It argued that the Gram Sabhas were merely exercising their statutory duty to protect tribal traditions and prevent conversion through “allurement, coercion, or fraudulent means.”

Court’s Findings: Faith as conviction, not compulsion

In its detailed judgment, the Bench observed that “conversion by inducement, manipulation, or exploitation of vulnerability” among illiterate and impoverished tribal populations had emerged as a “social menace.” The Court noted that while missionary activity in India had historically contributed to social welfare through education and healthcare, certain groups had, over time, allegedly used these as “platforms for proselytization.”

“Religious conversion has long been a sensitive issue in India’s socio-political landscape. Among the various forms of conversion, those allegedly carried out by Christian missionaries among poor and illiterate tribal and rural populations have generated particular controversy. While the Constitution guarantees every citizen the freedom to profess, practice, and propagate religion, the misuse of this liberty through coercion, inducement, or deception has become a matter of grave concern. The phenomenon of mass or motivated conversions not only disturbs social harmony but also challenges the cultural identity of indigenous communities. Missionary activity in India dates back to the colonial period, when Christian organizations established schools, hospitals, and welfare institutions. Initially, these eLorts were directed at social upliftment, literacy, and health care. However, over time, some missionary groups began using these platforms as avenues for proselytization. Among economically and socially deprived sections, especially Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes, this led to gradual religious conversion under the promise of better livelihoods, education, or equality. What was once seen as service became, in many cases, a subtle instrument of religious expansion. The menace arises when conversion ceases to be a matter of personal faith and becomes a result of inducement, manipulation, or exploitation of vulnerability. In remote tribal belts, missionaries are often accused of targeting illiterate and impoverished families, oLering them monetary aid, free education, medical care, or employment in exchange for conversion. Such practices distort the spirit of voluntary faith and amount to cultural coercion. This process has also led to deep social divisions within tribal communities. Tribals converted to Christianity often adopt new cultural practices, distancing themselves from traditional rituals and communal festivals. As a result, villages become polarized, leading to tension, social boycotts, and sometimes even violent clashes.” (Para 24)

The Bench went on to say that induced conversions among Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes under the promise of material betterment amounted to “cultural coercion” and disrupted traditional systems of belief, leading to polarization, social boycotts, and even violent clashes. The Court adopted a highly charged, prescriptive stance on conversion:

• The “social menace” finding: The Bench forcefully argued that conversion ceases to be a spiritual matter when it becomes a result of “inducement, manipulation, or exploitation of vulnerability,” particularly targeting “illiterate and impoverished families” of Scheduled Tribes (STs) and Scheduled Castes (SCs). This practice, according to the Court, is a subtle instrument of religious expansion that amounts to “cultural coercion” and directly causes social polarization, tension, and violence within tribal communities.
• Reaffirmation of Rev. Stanislaus: The Court heavily relied on the Supreme Court’s landmark 1977 decision in Rev. Stanislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh, which established that the right to “propagate” religion does not include the right to convert another person by force, fraud, or allurement. This precedent was used to justify the State’s power to prohibit conversion activities.

Quoting Article 25’s guarantee of religious freedom, the Court nonetheless emphasized that this right is “not absolute” and must be balanced against the State’s duty to preserve social order and cultural integrity. The judgment reaffirmed that the right to “propagate” religion does not include the right to convert another person, as laid down by the Supreme Court in Rev. Stanislaus.

“The Gram Sabha is a constitutionally recognized body under the PESA Act and has been conferred specific powers to manage community resources and safeguard tribal traditions. These powers, however, must operate within the limits of the Constitution of India. The expression “right to propagate religion” under Article 25 of the Constitution, as interpreted in Rev. Stainislaus (supra), does not extend to converting another person through inducement, force, or fraudulent means. The Act of 1968 prohibits such activities. Therefore, a general cautionary hoarding intended to prevent illegal conversion activities cannot, per se, be termed unconstitutional.” (Para 25)

Consequently, the Court upheld the hoardings as “general cautionary measures” intended to prevent illegal conversions. It found no violation of constitutional rights in such preventive action, terming them “precautionary” and “not discriminatory.” The Court concluded that the Gram Sabhas’ action was constitutionally permissible:

• PESA empowerment: Since the Gram Sabha is empowered under PESA to safeguard tribal tradition, a “general cautionary hoarding” intended to prevent illegal conversion activities (which are already prohibited by law) “cannot, per se, be termed unconstitutional.” The Court thus accepted the ban as a necessary precautionary measure.
• Procedural non-interference: Crucially, the Court declined to exercise its Article 226 writ jurisdiction to investigate the facts, compelling the petitioners to first avail the alternative statutory remedy under Rule 14 of the Chhattisgarh PESA Rules, 2022. This process requires them to approach the very Gram Sabha that imposed the ban, followed by an appeal to the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue).

However, it allowed petitioners the liberty to approach the Gram Sabha or higher administrative authorities under PESA if they felt aggrieved or threatened, and directed the police to provide protection if any threat to life or liberty arose.

Critical Analysis: The peril of judicial expediency

The judgment, while purporting to protect cultural integrity, is fundamentally flawed in its application of constitutional principles, making it a dangerous legal precedent.

1. The Unproven Premise: Judicial assumption over fact

The most severe legal weakness is the Court’s tacit acceptance of the presumption of guilt without conducting a rigorous judicial fact-finding inquiry.

• Restriction based on suspicion: The Court validated the restriction of fundamental rights against an entire religious community based on generalized historical allegations and the potential for future wrongdoing, rather than proven evidence of coercion in the villages concerned. A constitutional court’s duty is to scrutinize restrictions, not sanction them on mere political or social apprehension.
• The shift from act to person: The judgment critically fails to distinguish between the prohibition of an illegal act (coercive conversion) and the prohibition of a person (the Christian visitor/pastor). The Stanislauws ruling limits the act of propagation; the Digbal Tandi ruling limits the entry of the propounder. This constitutes a substantial, disproportionate restriction on Freedom of Movement, treating an entire class of Indian citizens as prima facie offenders.

1. The abdication of writ jurisdiction

The refusal to interfere under the doctrine of alternative remedy represents a judicial evasion of responsibility in a matter involving the core rights of a vulnerable minority:

• Inadequate remedy: Directing petitioners to seek redressal from the Gram Sabha (the body that passed the exclusionary resolution) is a travesty of natural justice. The remedy is not just administrative but inherently political and majoritarian, guaranteeing a biased and ineffective outcome for the minority.
• The obligation of constitutional scrutiny: When an infringement of fundamental rights is alleged, particularly one arising from the action of a state or quasi-state body (the PESA Gram Sabha), the High Court’s writ jurisdiction is intended to be immediate and effective, not relegated to a lower, potentially partisan, forum. The Court’s decision elevates procedural expediency over constitutional protection.

1. Fragmentation of citizenship and secularism

The ruling delivers a severe blow to the principles of secularism and unified citizenship:

• Sanctioning exclusion: By validating the ban on entry based on religious identity, the judgment grants quasi-judicial sanction to social boycott and exclusion, risking the normalization of internal “no-go zones” where the rights of minorities are subject to local majoritarian veto.
• Impact on cultural choice: The judgment restricts the right to receive information and the democratic space for individuals to make informed choices about faith. While opposing coercion, the Court’s action paradoxically limits the free exercise of conscience by denying access to legitimate religious discourse and pastoral care for local Christians.

Democracy, pluralism, and the burden of proof

The Court’s invocation of cultural identity resonates deeply with the sensitivities of tribal communities, but it also raises the spectre of State-sanctioned gatekeeping of belief. India’s secular fabric, as envisioned by the framers of the Constitution, hinges on the idea that faith is a matter of individual conscience, not collective control.

By upholding village-level restrictions on the movement and presence of a particular religious group, the judgment potentially sets a precedent for decentralized discrimination — where Gram Sabhas, endowed with limited judicial oversight, can unilaterally police religious identity.

The ruling’s repeated emphasis on “conversion by inducement” as a “menace” stands on rhetorical rather than constitutional footing. It conflates missionary service work with coercion and imputes motive without inquiry. This approach, while couched in the language of cultural preservation, risks normalizing suspicion-based governance in regions already vulnerable to communal polarization.

The constitutional paradox

At its core, the judgment highlights the enduring paradox of India’s constitutional secularism: the simultaneous protection of freedom of religion and the power of the State to regulate conversion. While the Supreme Court’s precedent in Rev. Stanislaus does allow such regulation, it did not endorse blanket prohibitions or collective exclusionary acts against any community.

The Chhattisgarh High Court, by treating village hoardings as benign “precautionary measures,” overlooks the symbolic violence inherent in signage that bars a specific faith group from entering. The very idea of a “Christian-free” village space contradicts the constitutional guarantee of equality and fraternity.

A truly democratic reading of Article 25 would demand proof of coercion before restriction, not the other way around. In the absence of such proof, preventive exclusion transforms into punitive discrimination, cloaked in cultural rhetoric.

Conclusion: A troubling precedent

While the Court has refused to invalidate the Gram Sabha’s resolutions, its judgment carries implications far beyond Chhattisgarh. It redefines the limits of religious freedom by allowing collective fear to override individual liberty, and elevates cultural protection over constitutional protection.

The ruling’s caution against “conversion by inducement” echoes legitimate anxieties about exploitation, but its failure to distinguish between faith and fear, prevention and prohibition, leaves India’s constitutional secularism on uncertain ground.

In a democracy that aspires to pluralism, the line between protection and persecution must be drawn with evidence — not presumption. The Chhattisgarh High Court’s decision, though couched in legal restraint, risks reinforcing precisely the kind of intolerance it cautions against.

The complete judgment may be read below.

Related:

From ‘Tauba Tauba’ to ‘Expel the Ghuspaithiya’: The language of exclusion in Bihar’s election season

From slogan to sanction: how a Chief Minister’s words hardened into punitive policing after the “I Love Muhammad” row

Vested Rights under Threat: Tharu tribe petitions High Court against administrative harassment

Policing Autonomy: Women become the first casualty of religious extremism

The post Guarding culture or policing faith? Chhattisgarh High Court’s ‘social menace’ observation and the future of Article 25 appeared first on SabrangIndia.

This article discusses the recent Supreme Court’s interim order in the petitions challenging the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025 and examines the quantum of interim relief granted against relief prayed for and comments on whether such interim relief was indeed adequate to protect the petitioners or not.

I. The Waqf Amendment Act, 2025 in brief

Before further discussion over the interim order passed by the Supreme Court in the petitions challenging the validity of the Waqf Amendment Act, 2025, it is important to understand what the amendment did. An in depth analysis of the provisions and the consequent impact of such provisions can be read here.

First, it attempted to redefine who could create a Waqf by requiring the dedicator (donor of the property) to demonstrate they had been practicing Islam for at least five years, while asserting lawful ownership over the property. Second, the Act prospectively abolished “Waqf by User” (property becoming Waqf merely through consistent religious use as it was the case of many Islamic religious institutions that have been existing since the 1800s or even before). Third, the post-amendment Section 3C introduced a mechanism allowing a designated government officer to unilaterally declare properties identified as Waqf to be “Government property,” thereby removing them from Waqf oversight. Crucially, the law also mandated compulsory registration and applied the Limitation Act, 1963, curtailing traditional protections against adverse possession claims over Waqf land.

The Disquieting Juxtaposition: Waqf vs. Others

The critical issue of discriminatory application looms large, implicating Articles 14 (Equality) and 15 (Non-Discrimination). Petitioners argued that the rigorous state control proposed by the amendments—particularly concerning land management and the mandatory inclusion of non-Muslims in governance—was unfairly imposed upon the Muslim community compared to other religious institutions.

In the landmark Shirur Mutt case (1954), which defined much of the state’s power over religious endowments, the Supreme Court indeed recognized that the right of a religious denomination to administer its property, while regulated by law (Article 26(d)), must fundamentally leave the right of administration to the denomination itself.[1] A law that entirely removes this right and vests it in an outside authority is deemed a violation. Furthermore, the imposition of a compulsory annual contribution under the Madras Act was struck down, not as a fee for services rendered, but as a “tax,” placing it beyond the legislative competence of the state. The rationale was clear: while the state could regulate the secular administration of religious trusts to ensure they are properly managed, it could not levy a tax for the promotion or maintenance of a particular religion.

There exists a stark disparity in the manner charitable institutions of different religions are treated under law, particularly when one examines the proposed Waqf Amendment provisions that impose disproportionately stringent control over the Islamic institution of Waqf. The issue is straightforward. For decades, major Hindu temples have been administered by boards composed entirely of Hindus, and at no point has the government proposed that, since temple administration is a secular activity, persons of other faiths may be appointed to those boards. Consider the endowment legislations in Karnataka[2], Andhra Pradesh[3], and Tamil Nadu[4] — each expressly requires that the commissioners and officers appointed under their respective Acts must profess the Hindu religion. This differential treatment in which Non-Muslim participation is being proposed stands in clear violation of Article 14 of the Constitution, which guarantees equality before the law.

II. Erosion of Legal Safeguards: Property, Custom, and the Collector’s Writ

The most urgent grievances raised before the Supreme Court related to the potential for bureaucratic expropriation of historic Waqf properties, facilitated by three key amendments: the demise of ‘Waqf by User’, the mandatory registration mandate, and the introduction of a new mechanism for determining ‘Government property’.

A. The Sudden Takedown of ‘Waqf by User’ and the Time Bar

For centuries, the concept of Waqf by User acknowledged that consistent religious use of a property could establish it as a Waqf, even without a formal written deed or dedication. The petitioners stressed that many old Waqfs, lacking formalized documents, rely solely on this doctrine for their title and survival. The 2025 Amendment, however, abolished the doctrine prospectively.

The court dealt with the state’s concern saying that this doctrine had been systemically misused to encroach upon vast tracts of government land, citing instances where thousands of acres were claimed as Waqf property merely through user.

However, the sting lay in Section 36 (10) of the Amended Act, which imposed a mandatory registration requirement for all Waqfs within six months of the Act’s commencement. Failure to register within this period effectively barred the Waqf from instituting or commencing any suit or legal proceeding for the enforcement of its rights. While a proviso allows the court to entertain an application if sufficient cause for delay is shown, forcing centuries-old institutions, often poor and disorganized, to scramble for registration within a tight six-month window—after decades of varying legislative requirements and historical neglect by official bodies—constitutes a threat to rights enshrined in Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution

This provision creates precarious conditions for community rights, essentially rendering unregistered Waqfs remediless. The court’s justification was rather technical: that Mutawallis had decades to register since the 1923 Act. Yet, to adopt this technical justification would be to ignore the ground realities—the lack of formal deeds, illiteracy, and systemic administrative failures by Waqf Boards themselves—and imposing an iron-clad registration bar seems an exercise of power ill-suited to securing justice for historical endowments. The resultant inadequacy is that while the title by use remains theoretically protected for existing properties, the inability to legally defend or enforce rights over that property due to an administrative lapse effectively neuters the title. By now, the six months have passed.

B. The Usurpation of Judicial Authority by the Executive (Sec 3C)

Perhaps the most alarming feature of the amendment was the introduction of Section 3C, establishing a mechanism for determining whether property claimed as Waqf was, in fact, “Government property”. This power was granted to a “designated officer” above the rank of Collector, who, after an inquiry “as per law,” would submit a report to the State Government. If the officer determined the property was government property, they were empowered to order corrections in revenue records and direct the Waqf Board to update its records.

The petitioners vehemently challenged the provisos to Section 3C(2) and the entire mechanism of Sections 3C(3) and 3C(4). The core objection was that entrusting a revenue officer—a functionary of the executive—with the power to determine the title of property, and subsequently mandating changes in revenue records, flagrantly violates the separation of powers, an essential principle enshrined in the Constitution. The determination of property title is a function reserved for judicial or quasi-judicial bodies.

The Supreme Court, while prima facie upholding the initial clauses of Section 3C, intervened by staying the critical executive actions: the provision that the property would cease to be Waqf until the officer’s report (Proviso to Section 3C(2)), and the powers given to the designated officer to order corrections in revenue records (Sections 3C(3) and 3C(4)).[5]

The court correctly asserted that the final determination of title must rest with the specialised Waqf Tribunal, established under Section 83, which is a judicial or quasi-judicial body with appeal rights to the High Court. Furthermore, the court directed that until the Tribunal makes a final adjudication, neither the Waqfs can be dispossessed, nor can the revenue records be altered.[6]

While this stay is crucial—it halts the immediate damage of executive unilateralism—the court’s action necessarily remains an interim restraint on procedure. It does not yet nullify the underlying legislative intent, which remains an aggressive mechanism to “de-recognize” property. The final battle over whether the state can legally employ such an executive process for title investigation, even if followed by judicial remedy, awaits the final hearing.

C. The Re-imposition of Limitation

A historical protection for Waqf property, long deemed dedicated perpetually to God, was enshrined in the un-amended Waqf Act, 1995: Section 107 provided that the Limitation Act, 1963, would not apply to suits for recovery of immovable Waqf property. This immunity protected endowments from being lost through adverse possession, recognizing their unique religious and charitable status, where the owner (Allah) cannot lose title.

The 2025 Amendment, via Section 44, abolished this immunity, mandating that the Limitation Act shall apply to all proceedings related to claims or interests in Waqf property from the date of the Act’s commencement. This change was argued to be a necessary reform to align Waqf law with general property law.

For the rights under Article 25 and 26, this provision is deeply injurious, instantly exposing centuries of undocumented or poorly managed property to adverse possession claims and creating an immense burden on Waqf Boards to initiate lawsuits, many of which may now be time-barred. The petitioners did submit that the combined effect of this amendment and the deletion of the special provision for evacuee property (Section 108) means that potential recovery suits concerning historical properties, including those tied to post-Partition dislocation, could be barred by limitation.

The Supreme Court, in its interim analysis, found no prima facie case for staying this provision, arguing that applying the Limitation Act removes discrimination that existed in the un-amended Act, thereby treating Waqf property equally to other property claims.[7] This judicial stance, however, overlooks the foundational religious and jurisprudential difference: Waqf property is distinct from ordinary private property; it is permanently dedicated to a charitable or pious purpose, and management (by the Mutawalli) is merely custodial, not proprietary. To strip this perpetual immunity without offering a robust, workable transitional mechanism is an existential blow to the community’s ability to defend its patrimony.

III. The State as Arbiter

The amendments also sought to heavily influence the composition and criteria for Waqf creation, bringing the state’s regulatory gaze directly upon matters of religious identity and leadership.

A. Non-Muslim Inclusion and Secular Administration

The amendments to the composition of the Central Waqf Council (Section 9) and State Waqf Boards (Section 14) allowed for the inclusion of non-Muslim members, which petitioners argued was a direct interference in the management of religious affairs (Article 26(b)). The religious character of the Board, they argued, is inseparable from its administrative duties. Conversely, the state maintained that the functions of the Board and Council—dealing with finance, property, encroachment, and audit—are predominantly “secular activities,” which the state is empowered to regulate. The Mutawalli deals with administrative matters, while the Sajjadanashin handles the religious activities.

The court adopted a middle path, reflecting a structural compromise often seen in Indian jurisprudence. It placed limits on the executive’s expansive power, directing that the Central Waqf Council (out of 22 members) shall not consist of more than 4 non-Muslim members, and State Boards (out of 11 members) shall not exceed 3 non-Muslim members. Furthermore, though it declined to stay the provision regarding the appointment of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), it directed that an effort should be made, “as far as possible,” to appoint a CEO from the Muslim community.[8]

This, while acknowledging the need to preserve majority Muslim representation, essentially validates the state’s claim that Waqf governance is a secular activity amenable to external, cross-community administrative supervision. This position maintains that the “scale of expenses” and “administration of property” are secular affairs that can be regulated by authorities. However, this judicial accommodation reinforces the state’s role as the final arbiter of what constitutes ‘religious’ versus ‘secular’ functions—a role that academics and petitioners alike have long found problematic, not only generally but also from the case perspective.

B. The Five-Year Practice of Islam Requirement

Section 3(r) of the Amended Act stipulated that a Waqf could only be created by a person “showing or demonstrating that he is practising Islam for at least five years” and who is the lawful owner of the property. This provision was challenged as arbitrary and violating Articles 14, 15, and 25.

The state defended the rule, recalling historical legislative concerns dating back to 1923, that Waqf endowments were often used as a “clever device” to defraud creditors or evade law. The new requirement, the state argued, aimed to ensure that only genuine practitioners, and not fraudulent converts seeking a legal shield for property, could dedicate a Waqf.

The Supreme Court recognised the legislative intent but stayed the operation of this condition, not on the grounds of constitutional invalidity, but due to procedural vagueness. The court noted that in the absence of a clearly defined statutory mechanism for determining whether a person has “practised Islam for at least five years,” the provision would necessarily lead to an arbitrary exercise of power. Thus, the condition remains stayed until Government frame rules to create a viable mechanism.[9] This offers temporary procedural relief but fails to address the more substantive critique: why the state feels compelled to legislate criteria for demonstrating genuine religious practice, a function traditionally far outside the boundaries of a secular state.

Moreover, the Supreme Court in its order, while dealing with the critique that defaulters are dedicating their property to the Almighty to defraud creditors, stated that a possibility of people changing their religion to Islam to defraud the creditors cannot be ruled out. This written observation is rather peculiar since it is used to close the doors on what could have been an analysis on whether an exceptional case of a provision allowing some misuse mandates that such provision be void or not. However, the Supreme Court neither goes into that direction nor does it leave a chance open for it to be discussed at a later stage. It simply puts the reason of absence of rules over how to show if someone has been practicing Islam or not as a justification for the stay over this provision.

IV. The Shadow of Exclusion: Tribal Lands

In two areas—properties dedicated by non-Muslims and properties in tribal areas—the Court refused to grant any interim stay, upholding the state’s legislative decisions that carved out exclusions, even though these raised questions of religious liberty and non-discrimination.

Prohibition on Land in Scheduled or Tribal Areas (Section 3E)

Section 3E explicitly states that no land belonging to Scheduled Tribes under the Fifth or Sixth Schedules shall be declared or deemed to be Waqf property, regardless of any other law. This restricts the religious freedom (Articles 25 and 26) of Scheduled Tribe members who practice Islam and wish to dedicate property.

The state and the court’s prima facie view supported the amendment, rationalizing it as a measure to protect the existence of “cultural minorities” whose religious practices are distinct from Islamic religion. The legislative intent was to avoid conflicting provisions and protect the constitutional autonomy granted to tribal lands.

The inadequacy of the interim order here stems from the blanket nature of the prohibition. While protecting tribal culture is a constitutional priority, preventing an individual Muslim member of a Scheduled Tribe from exercising their right to dedicate their own property as Waqf appears to be an overly broad measure. By failing to stay this provision, the court permits a form of religious restriction justified by cultural protection, without fully weighing the individual rights of practicing Muslims within those tribal groups.

V. The Opportunity Cost: Alternatives to Sweeping Invalidation

The state’s underlying intentions, prima facie, for the 2025 amendments was the misuse, waste, and systematic misappropriation of Waqf properties by some incompetent or unscrupulous mutawallis, sometimes even in collusion with government agencies.

However, the question remains whether the state, faced with misuse, chose the most appropriate and constitutionally sensitive remedy.

As early as 1923, the legislature acknowledged the “menace of mismanagement” and responded by proposing compulsory registration, penalties, audits, and official superintendence.

The pre-amendment Waqf Act specifies duties and disqualifications of mutawallis (such as failure to maintain accounts, misuse of funds, or being convicted of encroachment). Removal provisions were extensive. Furthermore, penalizing unauthorized alienation of property was addressed by Section 52A, which prescribed imprisonment and recovery of the property.

The argument that a more appropriate, less constitutionally aggressive path existed rings true: instead of fundamentally challenging the integrity of historical titles through the abolition of Waqf by User and the imposition of executive title determination (Section 3C), the state could have rigorously enforced the existing accountability, anti-encroachment, and penalty provisions against corrupt mutawallis.

By enacting sweeping structural amendments—like applying the Limitation Act to title disputes and delegating title scrutiny to the Executive—the state opted for a sledgehammer approach to solve a problem of governance and corruption, thereby endangering the legitimate, centuries-old endowments that sustain the community. The Supreme Court’s interim relief, while protecting the procedural sanctity of title adjudication (by striking down the executionary steps of Sec 3C), ultimately permits these structural, title-threatening changes (like the prospective abolition of Waqf by User and the application of the Limitation Act) to stand pending final adjudication. This approach risks resulting in a protective regime whose effect is inadequate when weighed against the magnitude of the rights, religious history, and communal identity hanging in the balance.

(The author is part of the legal research team of the organisation)

[1] The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v Shri Lakshmindar Tirtha Swamiyar of Shri Shirur Mutt 1954 SCR 1005

[2] Section 7, The Hindu Religious Institutions and Charitable Endowments Act, 1997

[3] Section 3, Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions And Endowments Act, 1987

[4] Section 10, The Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959

[5] Para 209, IN RE: The Waqf Amendment Act, 2025 (1) 2025 INSC 1116 (Waqf Interim Order)

[6] Para 209, Waqf Interim Order.

[7] Para 201, Waqf Interim Order

[8] Para 189, Waqf Interim Order.

[9] Para 140, Waqf Interim Order

Related:

Waqf Act Amendments Partly Stayed: SC blocks government control, backs registration and reforms

Amid Waqf Debate, Should Hindu Endowment Boards be Held Responsible for the Sorry Plight of Dalits?

Waqf Amendment Act 2025: SC grants some time to Centre on condition no non-Muslims appointed to Board, Council & no change in any Waqf status

SC to UoI on Waqf Amendment: ‘Are you willing to allow Muslims on Hindu endowment boards?’

The post Understanding the Supreme Court’s Interim Intervention in the Waqf Amendments, 2025 appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Social media posts suggested there was “forced conversion” or “religious mixing” happening, resulting in vigilante groups mobilising and police quickly intervening — not against the aggressors, but against individuals accused of converting others. In several districts, including Alwar, Dungarpur, and Jaipur, the people abusing Christians worked with police and other authorities, a relationship that demonstrated their collusion. The accounts below follow this trajectory — from Alwar and Dungarpur’s early raids to the violence reported in Jaipur’s Pratap Nagar — and how an entire month was essentially practice for institutionalised religious surveillance and social exclusion.

This complaint and supporting documentation derive from validated field reports and a comprehensive timeline of events built by the Coordination Committee for Protection of Freedom of Religion and Human Rights in Rajasthan — a network of civil society organisations that has been following closely incidents of harassment and hate crimes against Christians within the state. The Coordination Committee includes People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL), People’s Union for Human Rights (PUHR), All India People’s Forum (AIPF), Janwadi Mahila Samiti (JMS), Rajasthan Christian Fellowship (RCF), National Alliance of People’s Movements (NAPM), Adivasi Adhikar Abhiyan (AAA), and Bhil Pradesh Mukti Morcha (BPMM), among others. Their Joint Press Statement of September 25, 2025, chronicled targeted attack incidents, police harassment, and coercive raids in the wake of the Rajasthan Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Bill, 2025. CJP’s submission relies on that data to further triangulate it with independent media reports, HindutvaWatch documentation, and on-ground interviews to provide a detailed record of an organized campaign of intimidation conducted under the cover of “anti-conversion vigilance.”

Gelota, Alwar (MIA Thana, Alwar district)

Police conducted a raid on September 3 on a hostel for children that allegedly housed approximately 25 poor children run by a missionary in Galota (Udyog Nagar locality). The police action followed a complaint filed by a VHP activist alleged that a “conversion” was underway. The police reportedly confiscated literature, a FIR was filed; the police arrested two hostel staffers—listed in the log as Amrit (a teacher) and Sonu Rai (press reports also identify her as Sonu Singh/Garasia)—and detained them in judicial custody. Reports indicate that local Sangh affiliate groups (VHP/Bajrang Dal) coerced the authorities into arresting. Media reporting addresses the arrest and the police case; civil society groups who monitor the case remark that it is the first in a spate of incidents after the anti-conversion bill was introduced.

Khetolai Village (Bhabru Thana), Kotputli-Behror District

On September 9, less than an hour after the anti-conversion legislation was introduced in the Assembly, officers arrived on the property of a house in the family of brothers Vikram and Rajendra Kanav, who host their own satsang/prayer meetings. The brothers state they were told, rather explicitly, not to hold prayer sessions with outsiders, then were brought to the police station and interrogated, finally being coerced into signing a form, or written undertaking, indicating they would not hold their satsangs and would not “invite outsiders” to their home. The brothers’ account of the incident follows a trend being run in the community by local Sangh activists (identified in the log as Shri Ram Samiti), who have consistently threatened this family in various ways. Complaints were made, in writing, not only to the SP but also to other organizations such as the PUCL.

Paota (Pragpura Thana), Kotputli-Behror district

A similar incident took place in Paota on September 9. Believer Gajanand Kuldeep stated that the next morning after the Bill passed, the SHO summoned him, stating that if he hosted prayers, meals, or called people outside again, he would be arrested. He testified that he was forced to sign a document that indicated he would stop doing this activity. Like the Khetolai incident, PUCL passed his application on to the SP, and was kept on the record as an example of coercive policing as part of wider harassment following the Bill introduction.

Jhelana, Bichiwada, Dungarpur District

Local Hindu sangathans and a Sant Samaj group protested outside a minority-run school and its church ahead of the scheduled prayer service on September 10, claiming the school was a site for the conversion of Adivasi students and parents. Police arrived in significant numbers; the school maintained that it is a minority-run educational institution and denied that there had been any conversion activity. The incident intensified tensions, but no FIR was filed in relation to the protest. The account refers to this as an incident as an event of communal mobilization involving pressure from authorities on students and staff in the school community.

In a separate case in Durgapur on the same date, an Adivasi organiser with a local mazdoor sangathan said she was stopped on the road and verbally threatened by VHP/Bajrang Dal activists who accused her organisation of “converting Adivasis.” Also, the landlord of the office supposedly threatened to evict them. The organiser described it as demoralising and reported that a formal complaint was being prepared, and civil society groups mentioned that this harassment was part of the broader campaign.

St Paul’s Hostel School, Patela, Dungarpur City

On September 11, after investigation and complaints, including a health inspection in early 2023, the district authorities responded to complaints (made by the ABVP and others) by issuing an order to close the hostel/school for alleged record-keeping and sanitation infractions. The Child Welfare Committee, in collaboration with district education and administration personnel, whisked away 230 children to their families; the authorities issued show-cause notices and initiated proceedings under the JJ Act against the school authorities. The staff contends that the closure is a result of pressure from right-wing student groups and has displaced the school kids and staff; reports are that the school is seeking legal remedies to restore the school to operation.

Chak-6P hostel school (Anupgarh, Sri Ganganagar district)

On September 16, an incident log entry reported a nocturnal attack on a hostel school for orphans: students and adult supervisors were said to be frightened by an enterprising attack on the site in the middle of the night. The log entry does not provide many public details but lists the incident as one of a multitude of attacks aimed at Christian institutions in the district. Similarly, civil society narratives identify hostel attacks as part of a continuation of incidents.

Ward No. 14, Anupgarh Thana (District: Sri Ganganagar)

A local citizen complained on September 17, stating that a person who lived in the area (whom we cannot identify in the log) had been “converted” as per missionary activity; the Vishwa Hindu Parishad filed a police complaint in support of this local citizen. The officer of the law arrested two persons, associated with a missionary prayer group, by the names of Polus Barjao and Aryan, and began an investigation to ascertain the degree of conversion processes. It was reported that a third person (the landlord) was in hiding from police arrest. The two arrested were later remanded and put into judicial custody; the case file states the Indian police were undertaking active investigations into conversion processes, as per the FIR filed by the VHP.

Pratap Nagar (Sector 08/82/625), Jaipur (Rajasthan)

On September 21, approximately 40–50 Bajrang Dal activists allegedly entered a private residence where Pastor Bobas Daniel was conducting a prayer meeting of about 15–26 people. According to local sources, the Bajrang Dal group locked the doors, broke items, and physically assaulted congregants. Neighbors, including a pregnant woman and the landlady, attempted to intervene to protect the victims, but allegedly were beaten themselves. Victims state that eight were injured; the police filed the FIR only after lengthy protests and community pressure for accountability. Locals expressed concerns over delayed police responses, no prompt documentation from medical professionals, and failure to arrest persons who assaulted congregants, despite eyewitness evidence provided by victims. Media accounts confirmed both the attack and the delay of police response.

On September 23, 2025 — Hindustan Bible Institute (HBI), Pratap Nagar, Jaipur (Rajasthan)

Almost 50 Bajrang Dal activists surrounded the campus of HBI after a visit from two visiting staff members from the head office of HBI. The protesters were targeting HBI due to accusations of “forced conversions” of members of a local church. Police officers escorted the visitors from out of state to the police station after probable cause occurred from the protests. The mobile devices, Aadhaar cards, and property documents were confiscated from visitors and some local staff, and the property of the institute was detained. Guests left the facility for the night but were there after civil society intervened, although some devices and property papers were withheld. Civil society groups described the detainment as broad and the lack of property restoration as violations of their freedom of movement and association, and also demanded the immediate restoration of property and arrest of the perpetrators. National and international news services reported on the incident; civil society organized delegations to meet with senior officers and issued joint statements condemning the attacks.

Engineered Vigilantism and the Mechanics of Fear

In September 2025, an evident and purposeful pattern of inciting violence against Christians was followed. Most incidents started with rumours of “forced conversions”, often transmitted via WhatsApp groups or VHP, Bajrang Dal, or ABVP local units, targeting schools and hostels run by Christians or prayer gatherings. These allegations served as incitement to coordinated raids, mob assemblies, and police involvement, all as a rubric of vigilance. Many of the same incidents occurred across Alwar, Dungarpur, Anupgarh, and Jaipur. Pastors in Alwar and Kotputli-Behror were summoned and pressured into signing undertakings not to pray. Groups on the right stormed educational and welfare institutions for Adivasi and Dalit children in Dungarpur and Anupgarh, accusing them of “conversion through education”. The apex of these events occurred in Jaipur’s Pratap Nagar, where a mob assaulted those attending prayer, kicked several women, and destroyed public and private property while police sat by or arrived late.

Such violence was rarely spontaneous. The same three steps were followed: rumour being spread, mob assembly, and state validation of the violence through a raid or a politically motivated delay in filing an FIR. Even if the violence ended quickly, the intimidation and coercion continued – everything from pastors suspended from conducting worship, to schools sealed, to social workers leaving in fear.

While Rajasthan represented the focal point, the scenario reflected a national agenda. When combining repeat attacks by Hindutva affiliates with the targeting of marginalized groups, this wasn’t simply random aggression, but a more comprehensive policy of surveillance and social exclusion acted along with administrative acquiescence and ideological consensus.

The Rhetoric of Conversion and Cultural Purity

At the core of these campaigns rests a control ideology – an ideology that sees religious diversity as a danger, and that views women, Dalits, and Adivasis as “vulnerable bodies” who need to be protected from conversion. The rhetoric here is reminiscent of the more familiar tropes of Hindutva propaganda: the notion that Christian charity disguises “mass conversions,” that western forces undermine Indian culture, and that Hindu identity must be “defended” under the watchful gaze of vigilantism. The word “conversion” operates much like “love jihad” in anti-Muslim rhetoric – shorthand for cultural invasion and the fear of demographic change. However, the terms of conversion are also intended to implicate Christian schools and welfare Institutions in “Westernising” India’s poor through education and through care, thus recasting social uplift as social subversion. With the most recent incidents in September as one instance, foreign and local pastors were referred to as “agents.” New believers became “traitors,” and Christian education was labelled as “mental colonisation.” Such language comes out of Far-Right narratives and foretells danger while dehumanizing the minority population. Such language, too, perversely renders violence a moral obligation.

These narratives are meant to reinforce (and reproduce) caste hierarchies, wherein Dalit and Adivasi populations are painted as “vulnerable to corruption,” while maintaining caste(s) boundaries of purity-pollution under the guise of religion. The institutional forces of religion, caste, and nationalism become a single ideological and controlling matrix, which is central to Hindutva mobilisation.

In the end, it is political, not religious. As elections approach, “conversion panic” tells the story of a group working to unite the base and distract from the failures of governance. By presenting Christians as controlling the marginalized and suspicious, those invoking conversion panic can generate both moral panic and political capital, repurposing faith-based fear into electoral gold.

Silence, Complicity, and the Erosion of Protection

If there is a pattern that is as troubling as the violence itself, it is the silence—or worse, complicity—of the machinery of the state itself. All over Rajasthan, police responded to violence against Christians with bias, siding with aggressors over victims. In Alwar and Ktputli-Behror, officers pressured Christian pastoralists to sign undertakings prohibiting worship rather than offering protective services. In Dungarpur, Christian schools and hostels were invaded by police, who conducted raids without warrants, sometimes only after complaints from VHP or Bajrang Dal workers. In Pratap Nagar, Jaipur, women were assaulted and prayer halls were vandalised without the police filing any FIRs against the perpetrators. Instead, those praying were questioned as to their “conversion motives,” effectively treating them as suspects in their own community.

This pattern demonstrates not only bureaucratic indifference but collusion between law enforcement and vigilante groups. Normative lines of state duty have blurred with the mood of majoritarian sentiments in ways that create a situation of fear, putting Christians in the position of suspicion. By repeating the language of “conversion vigilance,” police and district officials not only create confusion around maintaining civic responsibility, but they also license mob violence in the name of duty.

The overall consequence is that constitutional protection is slowly torn asunder. Article 25 protects freedom of religion; Article 21 protects dignity and freedom. But the rights are now conditional – subject to majority privilege. The events of September 2025 show that when the state becomes a mechanism of ideological enforcement rather than neutrality and fairness in justice, citizenship itself becomes stratified based on faith. Unless there is accountability and equal protection can be guaranteed under the law, the glamorized promise of secular democracy will be meaningless but abiding, while hate will continue to loom under the guise of law and order.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Preksha Bothara)

Related:

A week of escalating persecution: Far-right Hindu groups target Christian gatherings in India

The Anti-Conversion Law of Rajasthan: A threat to individual liberty and religious freedom

“Anti-conversion laws being weaponised”: CJP seeks interim relief against misuse of anti-conversion laws

Everyday Atrocity: Mapping the normalisation of violence against Dalits and Adivasis in 2025

Anti-Christians Widespread hate events on the eve of X’mas, Punjab, UP, Kerala, Rajasthan

The post September of Fear: Targeted Violence against Christians in Rajasthan exposes pattern of harassment after Anti-Conversion Bill appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The complaint, addressed to NCM Chairperson Iqbal Singh Lalpura, seeks urgent intervention under Section 9(1)(d) of the National Commission for Minorities Act, 1992, requesting a full inquiry, registration of FIRs against hate speech offenders, and preventive directions to curb vigilante activity and incitement.

Background: The hate campaign after “Operation Sindoor”

According to the complaint, the rise in hate speech is not random but follows a pattern of political and administrative hostility that began after the launch of Operation Sindoor in April 2025. CJP states that post the said operation, arbitrary action officially framed as a crackdown on illegal immigration has increased, degenerating into a campaign of ethnic profiling and arbitrary expulsions, resulting in over 1,500 people being “pushed out” into Bangladesh between May and July 2025 without legal verification by Foreigners Tribunals or access to legal aid.

CJP warns that these actions have created a climate of fear among Bengali-speaking Muslims, especially migrant workers in cities like Mumbai, Delhi, and Ahmedabad, who now face harassment, eviction, and assault under the guise of “protecting the state from infiltrators.”

Scope of incidents documented

The complaint meticulously catalogues over two dozen hate speech incidents between June and September 2025, with supporting links from mainstream and independent media as well as verified social media posts.

• Assam: The epicentre of anti-Muslim rhetoric

CJP identifies Assam as the focal point of the hate campaign. Under the banner of the “Miya Kheda Andolon” (“Expel the Miyas Movement”), local organisations and political figures have launched public drives to evict Bengali-speaking Muslims, often with violent undertones.
Among those named are:

• Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma, who made inflammatory remarks alleging that “newly arrived Muslims” weaponise beef consumption and have built mosques near Satras “to drive out Hindus.”
• Situ Barua of Jatiya Sangrami Sena and Milan Buragohain of All Tai Ahom Students’ Union, both accused of stopping buses and threatening Muslim labourers to “vacate Upper Assam.”
• Bir Lachit Sen, whose followers reportedly conducted door-to-door “document checks” and forced evictions.

CJP documents 18 rallies and nine incidents of targeted violence across 14 districts of Assam in just three weeks (July 9–30, 2025), pointing to a coordinated effort to normalise vigilantism against Bengali-origin Muslims.

• Bihar: Hate speech for electoral gain

As the Bihar Assembly elections approach, CJP notes a strategic deployment of hate speech to polarise voters. Union Home Minister Amit Shah, Union Minister Giriraj Singh, and several BJP leaders including Jagannath Sarka and Samik Bhattacharya are cited for using communal rhetoric in public rallies. CJP highlights a disturbing pattern — speeches describing Bengali-origin Muslims as “demons,” “Rohingya infiltrators,” and “threats to Hindu women” — all couched in the language of demographic panic and cultural invasion.

The complaint underscores that no voter deletions have occurred on the basis of foreign nationality in Bihar’s updated electoral rolls, exposing the falsehood behind the “infiltrator” narrative. Instead, the rhetoric has dehumanised entire groups of internal migrant workers.

• Hate speech spreading nationwide

The complaint lists similar hate-laced incidents across Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Delhi, and Maharashtra, including:

• Kapil Mishra’s speech at Delhi’s PGDAV College claiming a “Rohingya and Bangladeshi settlement conspiracy.”
• Nitesh Rane’s rally in Navi Mumbai urging Hindus to avoid “goltopis and dadiwallas.”
• Mahadev Baba’s hate-filled tirade in Lucknow describing Muslims as “cannibalistic infiltrators.”
• A mob attack at the Constitution Club of India that disrupted a civil society event on Assam’s detention and eviction crisis with chants of “Desh ke gaddaron ko, goli maaro saalon ko.”

Legal and constitutional analysis

CJP’s complaint goes beyond documenting hate speech — it situates these acts within the framework of criminal and constitutional law, citing the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Sections 196, 197, 352, 353) and Section 125 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
The organisation argues that these offences are cognisable and non-bailable, and must invite suo motu action by police in compliance with the Supreme Court’s directives in Shaheen Abdulla v. Union of India (2023).

The complaint draws on key judicial precedents:

• Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan (2014) – defining hate speech as an act of marginalisation and de-legitimisation of vulnerable groups.
• Tehseen Poonawalla (2018) – directing states to curb vigilante violence and appoint nodal officers to monitor hate crimes.
• Amish Devgan (2020) – establishing a higher standard of responsibility for influential figures in public life.

CJP contends that the repeated participation of ministers and legislators in inflammatory campaigns represents a violation of constitutional morality and betrays the secular fabric of the Indian state protected under Articles 14, 15, 19, 21, and 25–30 of the Constitution.

CJP’s key demands to the NCM

The complaint calls upon the Commission to:

1. Take legal cognisance under the NCM Act and initiate an inquiry.
2. Direct registration of FIRs against individuals and organisations spreading hate.
3. Curb vigilante activity by outfits like Bir Lachit Sen and All Tai Ahom Students’ Union.
4. Ensure police compliance with Supreme Court orders on suo motu action.
5. Enforce preventive measures, such as videographing rallies and banning repeat hate offenders.
6. Urge social media platforms to remove hateful content.
7. Launch a fact-finding mission on the profiling, harassment, and eviction of Bengali-origin Muslims nationwide.

Conclusion

CJP’s complaint represents one of the most exhaustive compilations of hate speech documentation in recent months, combining legal precision with humanitarian concern.
It frames the current climate not as a communal clash but as a “systematic campaign of hate speech that slurs, stigmatises, and instigates violence against lawful citizens.”

By appealing to the National Commission for Minorities, CJP has sought to reclaim the constitutional promise of equality and secularism, urging that the language of hate not become the language of governance.

The complete complaint may be read below:

Related:

CJP calls for action by NCM against hate speeches at Dharam Sansad and Trishul Deekha events, files 2 complaints

CJP moves NCM against arms training camps, weapon distribution events in Assam and Rajasthan

CJP complains to NCM over Uttarakhand Muslim exodus; seeks urgent action

CJP moves NCM against Shiladitya Dev for targeting the ‘Miya Muslim’ community of Assam

The post CJP urges NCM action against hate speech campaign vilifying Bengali Muslims as ‘Infiltrators’ appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Bulldozers arrived early, and one by one, the structures came down. Shahid’s house — built in the 1920s and considered a symbol of pride for local sports lovers — was also reduced to rubble.

Why the demolition took place

The demolition was part of a planned 3.3 km four-lane road widening project in Varanasi, in the Prime Minister’s parliamentary constituency. The area affected includes a 300-metre stretch near Court Road intersection, where 70 houses are marked for removal. So far, 35 structures have been taken down.

Officials from the district administration stated that the affected families were given compensation in advance and were also issued a one-week ultimatum to vacate.

Varanasi, Uttar Pradesh: Bulldozers were deployed at Court Chowk for road widening from Court to Sandaha. About 13 houses, including that of hockey player Padma Shri Mohammad Shahid, were demolished pic.twitter.com/MH6EDqEFvB

— IANS (@ians_india) September 28, 2025

“We have provided the compensation to the families and also gave an ultimatum a week before. We had told them that they should get their parts of the homes removed from the area designated for the road project, or the administration will do it. When the families did not take action, we had to,” a senior official told reporters, as The Free Press Journal reported

Shahid’s home: A landmark with history

Mohammad Shahid was one of India’s greatest hockey players. Known for his unmatched dribbling, he was a key member of the Indian team that won gold at the 1980 Moscow Olympics. He later captained the team in 1985–86 and was honoured with the Arjuna Award in 1981 and Padma Shri in 1986.

His home in Varanasi, where he was born and grew up, was more than just a house. It was a symbol for young athletes, especially aspiring hockey players. The house had become part of local memory — a place where people would often stop and speak of his achievements.

Family response: ‘we will miss this place’

According to the City ADM, Shahid’s family has nine legal heirs, out of which seven accepted the compensation. However, two family members were still staying in the house, unable to leave due to lack of alternative accommodation.

“Our memories are there in this home. This is our home. We will miss this place,” said Nazneen, a relative of Shahid. “The administration has given us the compensation; seven shareholders took it, but we have no place else to go, so two shareholders still stay at this home.”

In Kashi, authorities used a bulldozer to demolish the house of Padma Shri hockey player Mohammad Shahid. Despite pleas from people for a one-day delay, the police administration went ahead with the demolition. pic.twitter.com/pezTDf64HT

— The Observer Post (@TheObserverPost) September 28, 2025

The demolition took place despite their presence and their request for just one more day.

Bulldozer politics: A rising pattern

This incident adds to a growing trend across many Indian cities where bulldozers are being used aggressively as a tool for enforcement — from illegal encroachments to urban development. While authorities call it necessary, critics say it often comes without enough sensitivity or dialogue.

In Shahid’s case, despite legal procedure being followed, the emotional weight of the demolition was heavy, given the stature of the person once living there.

Request for memorial

Though the family has come to terms with the demolition, they have now made a humble appeal to the administration — to build a memorial or square in Shahid’s name at the same spot.

“Let something remain here that tells future generations that this is where a hockey legend lived,” said Nazneen.

PWD Executive Engineer KK Singh responded positively to the request that “It’s a great suggestion. Shahid was a national icon. We’ll speak to the District Magistrate about creating a memorial in his name.”

The road will soon be wider, traffic may ease, but Varanasi has lost more than a few walls. It has lost a place tied to its sporting history.

On September 28, a bulldozer didn’t just remove a structure — it closed a chapter. Now, the city must decide how it wants to remember the man who brought it Olympic glory.

Related

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The post Ancestral home of Olympic Gold Medallist & Padma Shri Mohd. Shahid demolished in Varanasi Road widening drive appeared first on SabrangIndia.

According to a Newslaundry investigation, Gaud framed the order as a safeguard against “love jihad,” claiming that Muslim salesmen could use interactions with women customers to form relationships. He gave traders a September 25 deadline. By the eve of the deadline, the impact was visible: more than 50 Muslim employees had already lost their jobs, and at least four Muslim shopkeepers had been forced to vacate their spaces. The market has around 500 shops, with between 100–125 Muslim salesmen and 10–15 Muslim shop renters, many of whom have now been displaced.

Human Cost: “Jobless just because I am Muslim”

The consequences of the campaign have been devastating for those who built their lives in the market.

• Gabbar Ghori (52), who has worked in the bazaar for four decades, told Newslaundry: “I was only 12 when I started here. Since then, I’ve never left. Both my sons also worked here. Now, all three of us have lost our jobs. We earned ₹50,000–60,000 together, with ₹21,500 going towards our flat’s EMI, ₹3,500 for a bike loan, and ₹5,400 for a personal loan. Suddenly unemployed, we don’t know how to survive. For the past 25 days, I haven’t eaten or slept properly.” His employer, he said, was sympathetic but afraid, asking him to either take leave or work secretly until “things calm down.”
• Mohammad Gulzar (42), another salesman with 30 years in the market, said he earned ₹22,000 a month, with ₹7,000 going towards rent and the rest supporting his two children’s schooling. “Now I am jobless just because I am Muslim. Employers are compelled to remove us under political pressure. Despite being citizens of this country, we are forced to endure this,” he told Newslaundry and later repeated during a protest march covered by the Free Press Journal.
• Rahmat Khan (32, name changed) explained that Muslims have worked in the market for decades. “Suddenly political leaders accuse us of being part of so-called ‘love jihad.’ They are forcing our employers to remove us. The most painful part is that no one—police, politicians, or social workers—is helping. Who will give us jobs now?” he asked in his complaint, cited by Newslaundry.
• Shakir Mohammad, the sole earner for his mother, wife, sister, and two children, told Newslaundry: “Tomorrow is the deadline. Around 50–60 people have already been removed.”
• Mohammad Harun (55), who has run a rented shop in the bazaar for 20 years, told Newslaundry that Gaud’s supporters demanded ID cards of all his eight employees—six Muslims and two Hindus. Days later, his landlord asked him to vacate by September 25. “My owner was kind to me, but he was under pressure. They would have targeted him if he had refused.”

Association’s endorsement of “cleansing”

Rather than resisting, the Sheetla Mata Bazaar Vyapari Association has largely endorsed Gaud’s diktat. In a report by ThePrint, association president Hema Panjwani defended the order, saying: “Muslim salesmen would stand on the road to call in customers and stare at women passing by. Now Aklavya bhaiya has tightened the noose. Nobody should have rented their shops to Muslims in the first place; all of them will have to vacate. Once this succeeds, we will implement it in other markets too.”

Association member Anil Sharma, described as a close aide of Gaud, told ThePrint that Aadhaar details of shop employees are being collected to note their religion. The campaign has been named “bazaar ka shuddhikaran” (purification of the market), with Sharma adding: “The second step would be to investigate each Muslim employee’s involvement in ‘love jihad’ cases.”

Another member, Pappu Maheshwari, confirmed to ThePrint: “Bhaiya has requested us to politely ask retailers to remove Muslim salesmen.”

Police cite “no video evidence”

When Newslaundry asked Indore Police Commissioner Santosh Singh about the issue, he claimed no one had approached him and referred queries to the local DCP. DCP Anand Kaladgi said no FIR could be filed against Gaud because “he has not made any statement openly, and there is no video evidence except what is in the media.” This, despite Muslim workers submitting a written complaint to the commissioner’s office on September 15, explicitly alleging that they were being targeted for political gain.

Two traders told Newslaundry anonymously that no action would be taken since the market lies in the constituency of Gaud’s mother, BJP MLA Malini Gaud.

Protests and political reactions

As the deadline approached, Muslim workers staged silent protests inside the market and later held a march from Bajaj Khana Chowk to Rajwada, reported by the Free Press Journal. Carrying placards, they demanded the right to continue their work without religious discrimination. “We are Hindustani and have been doing business here for decades,” Gulzar told FPJ. “Business should be business, not politics. For 30–35 years we lived peacefully here, and now we are being pushed out just because we are Muslims.”

This communal move was not only protested by Muslims, but also Hindus. Many came out to resist this forceful eviction, like Balwant Singh Rathore (40), a shopkeeper in Indore.

“The harmony between Hindus and Muslims should not be shattered, and they should be given equal opportunities to earn a living,” he said.

#Indore #Islamophobia

Balwant Singh Rathore (40), a shopkeeper in Indore, is opposing the forceful eviction of Muslim shopkeepers and salesmen from the city’s historic Sitla Mata Market.

“The harmony between Hindus and Muslims should not be shattered, and they should be given… pic.twitter.com/FSSiSx0RSQ

— काश/if Kakvi (@KashifKakvi) September 24, 2025

The Congress also intervened, with city chief Chintu Chouksey submitting a memorandum demanding an FIR and warning that Gaud’s statement was an attempt to “disturb communal harmony” in Indore (FPJ Shorts).

Gaud’s controversial record

This is not the first time Eklavya Singh Gaud has found himself in controversy. As Newslaundry noted, he was accused of roughing up a police constable during a temple visit, booked for assaulting Congress workers, and was the complainant in the case that landed comedian Munawar Faruqui in jail for over a month over a joke he reportedly never cracked. According to FPJ, he even warned that the Hind Rakshak Samit would take “direct action” if his directive was ignored.

A chilling precedent

The Sheetla Mata Bazaar episode reflects a broader trend where livelihoods and businesses are targeted through the lens of communal identity. As September 25 arrived, scores of Muslim families were left jobless—not for misconduct or inefficiency, but because of a political ultimatum backed by the local trade association and tolerated by police inaction.

Related:

Two Sons, One Spirit: Muslim men perform Hindu mothers’ last rites in Rajasthan and Kerala

Tilak, ID Checks & Religious Tests: what’s happening at Garba events?

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The post Indore’s Bazaar Purge: Muslim workers and shopkeepers forced out under BJP leader’s ultimatum appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The most recent incident took place on September 23 in Pratap Nagar, Jaipur—a constituency represented by the Chief Minister himself. What should have been a routine visit by religious leaders to a Christian training institute quickly turned into a scene of fear, aggression, and misuse of police authority.

This has prompted civil society groups to issue a joint statement, condemning the violence, demanding justice, and urging the state government to uphold the rule of law and protect constitutional freedoms.

What happened at Hindustan Bible Institute in Jaipur?

The Hindustan Bible Institute (HBI) in Jaipur, established to train pastors and Christian leaders, has been functioning peacefully for years. But on the afternoon of September 23, around 3 PM, it was surrounded by nearly 50 members of the Bajrang Dal, who accused the institute of engaging in religious conversions.

At that time, two guests—one from HBI’s head office in Chennai and another from Bagidora, Banswara—were present at the institute for a scheduled inspection visit. Without any proof or official complaint, Bajrang Dal members began protesting aggressively, claiming the two were in Jaipur to carry out conversions.

Instead of protecting the visitors or dispersing the crowd, the local police from Pratap Nagar Thana detained the two HBI guests for “questioning.” Their mobile phones were seized. The police also confiscated the institute’s laptops, landline phone, pen drive, and even official documents, including property papers.

“The police took the two Guests from outstation HBI offices to the Police station in the name of enquiry and seized their phones as if they had committed a crime,” — Joint Civil Society Statement

This action—without any legal warrant or confirmed wrongdoing—has shocked many and highlighted the growing misuse of police power in religious matters.

Christian families living in fear

The HBI centre in Jaipur is run by two local Christian families, who were also present during the incident. Civil society members who later visited them reported that the families were shaken and afraid for their safety. They had simply been hosting two guests for an official inspection—something that any organisation does regularly. Yet, after this incident, they now live in fear of further targeting or retaliation, despite doing completely legal and constitutionally protected work.

“They were terrified as to what may befall them when they were doing absolute legal work under the Indian constitution,” — Delegation after meeting the HBI families

Second attack in CM’s own constituency in just three days

Shockingly, this wasn’t an isolated case. Just two days earlier, on Sunday, September 21, Pastor Daniel was attacked while leading a Christian mass in a private house in Pratap Nagar. His prayers were disrupted, and he was assaulted.

Despite protests by the local community, an FIR was registered only after several hours. As of now, no arrests have been made in that case either. Civil society leaders pointed out that both attacks occurred within the Chief Minister Bhajan Lal Shamra’s constituency, showing a complete disregard for peace and communal harmony, even in areas under direct state leadership.

“This was the second incident in the CM’s constituency in three days,” — Civil Society Statement

The role of the anti-conversion bill: law or license to harass?

According to the joint statement, these incidents are not random—they are part of a larger pattern that began after the Anti-Conversion Bill was tabled and passed in the Rajasthan Vidhan Sabha earlier in September.

Since then, nine incidents targeting Christians have been reported:

• 2 attacks in Dungarpur
• 1 in Alwar
• 2 in Jaipur (including the HBI incident and Pastor Daniel’s attack)
• 2 cases of police harassment in Kotputli-Behror district
• 2 incidents in Anupgarh, Hanumangarh, including a break-in at a children’s hostel and assault of two Christian staff

Civil society groups argue that the Anti-Conversion Bill has created a climate of suspicion and intolerance, where any religious gathering or activity is falsely framed as an attempt at forced conversion, leading to mob violence and police misuse.

Civil society responds: urging accountability and justice

In response to the Pratap Nagar incident, a delegation of civil society organisations met with DCP Sanjiv Nain, ACP Vinod Kumar Sharma, and SHO Manoj from Pratap Nagar Thana. The delegation included Sawai Singh, John Mathew, President of Jaipur Christian Fellowship (JCF), Father Vijay Pal Singh, Joint Secretary of JCF, Kavita Srivastava of the PUCL.

They condemned the police actions and mob aggression and demanded:

1. Immediate release of the two HBI guests detained unlawfully
2. Return of all confiscated items, including phones, laptops, and documents
3. Arrest of the Bajrang Dal members responsible for the protest and disturbance
4. Strict action to prevent further attacks on minorities

“Till strict action is not taken, such incidents will continue,” — Civil Society Delegation

United stand: who signed the statement?

The joint press statement was issued by multiple rights and minority organisations across Rajasthan, including Jaipur Christian Fellowship, Rajasthan Samagra Sewa Sangh, PUCL (People’s Union for Civil Liberties), APCR (Association for Protection of Civil Rights), Rajasthan Baudh Maha Sangh, NFIW (National Federation of Indian Women), AIDWA (All India Democratic Women’s Association), Daman Pratirodh Andolan, Rajasthan, Buddhist Society of India, Jamat-e-Islami Hind, Rajasthan, Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind and Dalit Muslim Ekta Manch.

This shows that the issue is not just about Christians, but about the broader erosion of civil rights and religious freedoms in the state.

An urge for rule of law, not rule of fear

The repeated attacks, police overreach, and growing fear among Christian families in Rajasthan are more than isolated incidents—they represent a systemic problem that is threatening India’s constitutional values. If religious minorities cannot carry out their daily prayers or official inspections without being accused, detained, or threatened, then the rule of law itself stands compromised.

The civil society groups are clear in their message: This must stop. Now.

“Such communal incidents and attacks on minorities need to stop now,” — Joint Statement

They call upon the Rajasthan government to act decisively—not just to protect the rights of one community, but to preserve the secular, democratic fabric of India.

Related:

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“Shielding their own”: Supreme Court slams Madhya Pradesh police, transfers custodial death probe of a tribal man to CBI

“No One is Above the Law”: Supreme Court demotes Deputy Collector for demolishing a slum settlement by flouting HC order

The post Rajasthan: Civil Society demands arrests, rule of law and end to minority targeting under anti-conversion law appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The victim serves as the imam of the village mosque and also teaches Urdu to local children. On the day of the incident, he was returning home on his bicycle after class when, he says, he was intercepted by a group of young men who had been harassing him over several days.

“Some boys had been bothering me for the past few days,” Mustakeem told

“They stopped me on Saturday when I was returning home on my bicycle and told me to chant ‘Jai Shri Ram’. When I refused, they took out sticks and beat me, and also asked me to go to Pakistan” as Times of India reported

The assault, which reportedly lasted nearly two hours, left him severely injured and hospitalised.

Imam beaten, told ‘bury him here’

The imam’s testimony reveals a grim picture of targeted violence. According to him, the group not only beat him but made chilling remarks during the attack.

“They wouldn’t let me get up and said, ‘Yahi dafnado’ (Bury him here),” he recalled.

Local bystanders eventually intervened and rushed the injured imam to a nearby hospital. Several others who came to his aid were also reportedly hurt in the fracas. Mustakeem stated that he had earlier refrained from reporting previous harassment in hopes that it would subside on its own. “I didn’t want to cause tension in the village,” he said

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Link: https://x.com/iamharunkhan/status/1969609117888098571

Police deny communal motive, call it a simple scuffle

Responding to the allegations circulating on social media, City Superintendent of Police (SP) Mrigank Shekhar Pathak stated that the incident appeared to be a case of minor conflict and not communal in nature. 

He said that “A case has come to our notice through social media, in which   person is stating that he was forced to chant some religious slogans and was beaten up. In this regard, it is informed that yesterday, dated 20.09.2025, at Lodha Police Station, under Gram Bulakgarhi, a person named Mustkeem was going on his bicycle when some children came in the way, and during the process of removing those children, he had an argument with a person named Jishan who was standing nearby. This led to a scuffle between the two individuals, resulting in injuries.”

Pathak added that both individuals were treated medically and were stable. 

“The police attended the incident on the spot and also conducted a scene inspection. In this connection, it is also informed that both individuals have been sent for treatment; both are stable now, and their medical examinations have been conducted” he added

Dismissing the claims of religious coercion, he said:

“Upon investigation, the matter appears to be a case of simple assault; no element of any religious angle or forcing to chant religious slogans has emerged in this case. This claim is completely false, and the Aligarh Police refutes it. Legal proceedings are being followed in this matter, statements from both parties have been received, and there is peace at the scene.”

थाना लोधा- सोशल मीडिया के माध्यम से एक प्रकरण संज्ञान में आया है, जिसमें एक व्यक्ति द्वारा बताया जा रहा है कि उसे कुछ धार्मिक नारे लगाने को मजबूर किया गया था और उसके साथ मारपीट की गई थी, इस संबंध में अवगत कराना है कि कल दि0 20.09.2025 को थाना लोधा में ग्राम बुलाकगढ़ी अन्तर्गत… pic.twitter.com/w6C66VHg67

— ALIGARH POLICE (@aligarhpolice) September 21, 2025

Community leaders said UP Police trying to brush the incident under the carpet

Local Muslim leaders have decried what they perceive as a deliberate effort to downplay the incident’s communal overtones. Among the most vocal is Sayyed Abdullah, president of the Aligarh unit of Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind.

“Imam Mustakeem suffered injuries and is in hospital. The police are trying to brush the incident under the carpet,” Abdullah told The Times of India. “We are planning to meet the SSP to ensure that an FIR is filed in connection with the case” as TOI reported

Abdullah said that the delay in legal action is a reflection of a growing trend where victims from minority communities face systemic indifference.

Patterns of intimidation

Notably, the imam’s ordeal is not an isolated incident but part of a wider pattern where religious minorities are coerced into displaying loyalty to the majority faith — or face brutal consequences. The chant “Jai Shri Ram”, while a common religious invocation for many Hindus, has increasingly been used by extremist elements as a litmus test for patriotism or allegiance to majority community ideals.

When refused, such slogans have, in many past instances, preceded mob assaults — particularly against Muslims and Dalits. Videos of these confrontations have frequently surfaced on social media, though legal consequences often remain elusive.

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