Trade unions all over the world were gearing up to observe the centenary, so also CITU. Janam decided to do a play to commemorate this occasion and to take the legacy of May Day to workers. Safdar wrote a play called Mai Divas Ki Kahani (‘The Saga of May Day’).

It dramatized three historic moments: the trial of the May Day martyrs in Chicago in 1886; the 1905 parade in Russia, based on Brecht’s May Day scene from The Mother; and May Day in Nazi Germany.

While the play was successful, it was hard to do – not for any other reason but simply because Janam didn’t have enough actors available, even though it was written such that it could be done with only six actors. Safdar sought to compensate for the lack of actors with innovative use of properties, including masks.

Mai Divas is probably one of Janam’s most visually interesting street plays, using nearly ninety different pieces of properties in an intricate choreography of who picks up what object from where in the circle, and keeps it down where. And workers watched the play with great interest, even though it told stories from long ago, and had characters with names unfamiliar to Indian workers. What connected, however, was the shared experience of exploitation and the struggle against it.

A couple of years later, in 1988, a Dutch theatre scholar, Eugene van Erven, visited India. He sought out Safdar and the two became friends. Eugene van Erven’s interview with Safdar (reproduced in Theatre of the Streets) is an invaluable resource for the street theatre activists and historians. Safdar invited him to the May Day performances that Janam did that year, at dawn, at the Swatantra Bharat Mill in West Delhi. Eugene van Erven took some beautiful photos of the performance, including the one below, where you see Safdar speaking before the performance.

I sometimes think that this photograph, with all the posters and the notices on blackboards, is itself source material for labour historians!

Courtesy: https://sudu26.substack.com

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Declaring on March 31, 2026, that the Maoist insurgency in central India had been defeated after six decades, Union Home Minister Amit Shah announced the redeployment of battle-hardened Central Armed Police Forces from Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Odisha, promising to end insurgency in the hills before the 2029 general elections.

Shah described the period since Narendra Modi became Prime Minister in 2014 as a golden era for internal security, covering Kashmir and the north-east alongside the defeat of left-wing extremism.

Shah has not indicated how he intends to help the Manipur government resolve the crisis that continues to grip the state, where more than 260 people were killed, mostly Christian Kuki-Zo, over 300 churches and some 10,000 houses destroyed, and a lakh of persons displaced. Around 60,000 shelter in churches and private refuges in the hills where the Kuki-Zo have lived for generations; several hundred others are scattered across Delhi, Bangalore, Shillong and Guwahati as migrant workers.

The violence began on May 3, 2023, in the Meitei-dominated valley with arson and sexual assault. Political groups loyal to then Chief Minister Biren Singh paraded through the streets alongside police as naked women, just raped, were forced to walk in public view.

Singh, compelled to resign on February 9, 2025, has not reconciled to his removal and is considered still capable of manipulating volatile public opinion; he is also allegedly in the know of the drug economy that underpins instability in this border state.

For the Kuki-Zo still in relief camps or rented accommodation in Delhi, Bangalore, Shillong and Guwahati — dispossessed, un-rehabilitated, watching the third anniversary of their ethnic cleansing pass with no arrest for rape or murder — the prospect of more boots in Manipur carries a particular, bitter meaning.

More than 270 lives have been lost since May 3, 2023, including several central and state force personnel. Not one person has been convicted.

The CRPF, the force being redeployed from Chhattisgarh, is the same force that on April 7, 2026, fired on civilian protesters in Bishnupur district, killing three. More men and weapons — without accountability, without justice, without rehabilitation — is not a peace plan.

The immediate political crisis is in Imphal. COCOMI, the most powerful Meitei civil society umbrella body, announced in mid-April a complete boycott of the BJP in Manipur, appealing to the public to refuse to participate in any party activities and demanding a statement from Chief Minister Yumnam Khemchand Singh on his government’s failure to protect civilians.

On April 25, after a statewide shutdown and processions from multiple Imphal neighbourhoods, a COCOMI delegation submitted a seven-point memorandum, warning: “We will not be submitting a memorandum anymore after this.”

The seven demands — abrogating the Suspension of Operations agreement with Kuki-Zo armed groups, updating the National Register of Citizens, securing accountability for killings since May 2023, ending narco-terrorism, and ensuring accountability for the Tronglaobi deaths — reflect Meitei political grievances.

What the Meitei group is pressing for is not justice for Kuki-Zo rape survivors but the elimination of Kuki underground groups and the exclusion of alleged illegal immigrants from Myanmar who are kin tribes of the Kuki-Zo.

The two communities’ definitions of justice are irreconcilable without political mediation that has yet to arrive. A Kuki-Zo political bloc of ten MLAs — seven of them BJP members — has said it will not re-enter government without written commitments on a separate administration.

For 864 days after violence began, Prime Minister Narendra Modi did not visit Manipur, speaking of the crisis for the first time only on July 20, 2023, more than two months after it erupted.

He finally visited on September 13, 2025 — a three-hour trip to Churachandpur, headquarters of the Kuki region, and Imphal. He promised housing for internally displaced persons without specifying location or timeline, since the return of Kuki tribals to the valley depends on talks that remain inconclusive.

Congress general secretary Priyanka Gandhi Vadra responded: “It is unfortunate that he allowed this to go on for so long, with so many killed and so much strife, before deciding to visit. That has not been the tradition of Prime Ministers in India.”

The government officially confirmed 58,821 displaced persons in 174 relief camps, 7,894 permanent houses destroyed and 2,646 partially destroyed. It had promised all displaced would return home by March 31, 2026.

That deadline passed without a single return. The Kuki-Zo cannot return to the Imphal valley — their homes no longer exist or are occupied by others. National highways between the hills and the valley function, in effect, as ethnic frontlines, with members of both communities unable to cross safely into each other’s areas.

Human rights defender Babloo Loitongbam, himself a Meitei who faced assault and threats for speaking out, stated: “Thousands are still unable to return home — not by choice, but due to ongoing fear and insecurity. Numerous homes have been destroyed, while others remain occupied by vigilante groups, making return impossible without proper state intervention and guarantees of safety.”

Amnesty International India’s chair Aakar Patel said in May 2025: “It is unacceptable that the Indian government has failed to address the humanitarian needs and implement a rehabilitation policy for displaced communities who remain in relief camps two years since the ethnic violence began. This inaction has left tens of thousands in limbo, forced to endure life in inhumane conditions with no end in sight.”

The thousands of Kuki-Zo in Delhi, Shillong and Bangalore receive no official recognition as internally displaced persons and have no status under any central government scheme. Their children are enrolled wherever schools will accept them; their elders are dying far from their ancestral villages. The Kuki Students’ Organisation, Delhi and NCR, has functioned as a government in exile — maintaining documentation, filing petitions, holding vigils at the Constitution Club — with no other institution stepping forward for them.

The single most damning fact, at the start of the fourth year, is that no one has been convicted for any act of violence, murder, rape or arson committed since May 3, 2023.

The Supreme Court expressed shock at the fourteen-day delay in registering a Zero FIR for two women stripped, paraded naked and gang-raped by a mob whose perpetrators were clearly visible in a viral video circulated in July 2023.

One of those survivors, aged eighteen at the time of the assault, spent nearly three years moving between hospital wards in Guwahati. She died on January 10, 2026, aged approximately twenty, from injuries sustained during the violence.

Aakar Patel said: “This woman’s death is a devastating indictment of the Indian state’s continuing failure to deliver timely justice to survivors of sexual violence.” Committee on Tribal Unity spokesman Ng. Lun Kipgen noted: “Our brave girl survived the violence, but not the silence.” No perpetrator has been arrested. No senior police officer has faced disciplinary proceedings for the delay in filing the FIR or for failing to pursue the investigation.

The Wire’s investigative correspondent Greeshma Kuthar stated: “The Arambai Tenggol led mobs to Kuki-Zo villages that were burnt down, killed people and slaughtered them. There are FIRs naming them as accused in sexual assault of Kuki-Zo women. There are viral videos of their members beheading people — with no consequences.” No Arambai Tenggol leader has been arrested. Neither the central government nor Manipur state officials condemned the group’s violence.

The PUCL Independent People’s Tribunal, chaired by former Supreme Court judge Justice Kurian Joseph, released its report in August 2025 after taking testimony across Manipur and Delhi over more than a year. It documented survivors’ deep-rooted belief that the state either allowed the violence to happen or actively participated in it.

Many deponents attributed the killings to the political and administrative decisions of former Chief Minister Biren Singh. The jury recorded its disturbance at the brutality — people killed, butchered, tortured, dismembered, disrobed and sexually assaulted in public, their suffering then displayed on social media.

Audio evidence submitted to the court suggested that Singh had prior knowledge of the village attacks. The government’s own Commission of Inquiry, headed by former Guwahati High Court Chief Justice Ajai Lamba (he resigned and was replaced by retired Supreme Court judge Balbir Singh Chauhan as chair in February 2026), has had its mandate extended multiple times and now runs to May 2026.

The Supreme Court’s observation of an “absolute breakdown of law and order,” its shock at police delays in registering FIRs for sexual violence, and its orders transferring certain cases to the CBI produced documentation but not accountability.

The International Crisis Group, in its February 2025 report, called on New Delhi to urgently address the Kuki-Zo demand for a separate administration, noting that the constitutional precedent already exists in the autonomous district councils of Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram. That call has not been answered.

More CRPF battalions were present in Manipur on May 3, 2023, than in most Indian states. They did not stop the burning of churches in Churachandpur. They did not prevent the looting of police armouries. By October 2023, an estimated 6,000 weapons and 600,000 rounds of ammunition had been seized, along with mortars, grenades and police uniforms, of which only approximately a quarter had been recovered. They did not arrest Arambai Tenggol commanders. On April 7, 2026, they fired on Meitei protesters in Bishnupur, killing three. Armed force, without political will or accountability structures, does not resolve ethnic conflict.

Benjamin Mate, chairman of the Kuki Organisation for Human Rights Trust, has stated what justice requires: “The Government of India must appoint an independent commission to thoroughly investigate the role of senior officials, state bureaucrats, police officials and armed groups during the ethnic violence. Accountability is essential, and only through a transparent and impartial inquiry can justice be delivered to the victims. By consistently failing to hold those suspected of serious human rights violations accountable, the government risks signalling that impunity will persist — ultimately paving the way for further abuses.”

Courtesy: India Currents

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Residents have also accused the state power department of pushing the rollout as part of a broader privatisation drive, while protestors have demanded a halt to the installations until their concerns about billing transparency and affordability are addressed. Protests have been witnessed in Ferozabad, Lucknow, Meerut, Agra, Kanpur, Haamirpur, Banda and Hapur indicating w widespread public backlash on the question. Protesters allege that these metres have been programmed to run fast leading to inflated electricity bills. Due to the protests, installation of these pre-paid smart metres has been temporarily suspended or stopped.

Officials have acknowledged growing resistance in multiple areas, with demonstrations continuing in towns and villages as authorities attempt to manage the escalating situation.

A wave of protests against smart electricity meters is intensifying across #UttarPradesh, with women emerging at the forefront of the agitation. In #Firozabad, women took to the streets in large numbers, in some cases removing installed meters and throwing them onto roads, as… pic.twitter.com/BXRruL9ZZf

— News9 (@News9Tweets) April 30, 2026

Related:

Villagers in UP claim their bills have doubled due to smart meters throw them in protest

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1. Lai Mohammed rejects the claim of a Christian genocide in Nigeria, noting that Boko Haram has killed more Muslims than Christians.
2. The violence in Nigeria stems from a mix of extremism, criminality, governance failures, and socio-economic issues, not simply Muslim–Christian tensions.
3. The group began by attacking Muslims who opposed its extremist ideology, showing its takfiri
4. Its actions such as killings, kidnappings, and opposition to education go against core Islamic principles, making it an adversary rather than a representative of Islam.
5. The “genocide” narrative oversimplifies reality and can mislead international responses, highlighting the need for a more accurate and nuanced understanding.

In an era shaped by rapid information flows and polarised narratives, conflicts are often reduced to simplistic binaries; frequently framed along religious lines. Recent remarks by Lai Mohammed, former Minister of Information and Culture of Nigeria, offer a timely intervention in correcting one such narrative: the claim of a targeted “Christian genocide” in Nigeria. Speaking at Abbey College Cambridge, Lai Mohammed argued that insurgent violence, particularly by Boko Haram, has claimed more Muslim lives than Christian ones, challenging widespread assumptions about the nature of the conflict.

This assertion does not seek to minimise the suffering of any community. Rather, it compels a more comprehensive understanding of Nigeria’s security crisis: one rooted not in religious extermination, but in a complex web of extremism, criminality, governance challenges, and socio-economic distress.

The Misleading Simplicity of Religious Framing

The tendency to interpret violence in Nigeria as a straightforward Muslim-versus-Christian conflict has gained traction in global discourse, particularly in parts of the Western media and advocacy circles. Yet, as Lai Mohammed pointed out, such a framing risks distorting reality. Boko Haram, whose name loosely translates to “Western education is forbidden,” did not begin as an anti-Christian movement. Its early targets were, in fact, Muslims, particularly those who embraced modern education and rejected extremist interpretations of Islam.

This internal targeting reveals a critical truth: Boko Haram’s ideology is fundamentally takfiri, meaning it declares other Muslims as apostates and legitimate targets. In its formative years, the group’s violence was directed overwhelmingly inward, against Muslim communities that did not conform to its rigid worldview.

Over time, the group widened its scope of attacks to include Christians, driven less by theological motives and more by strategic intent. As Lai Mohammed frankly noted, assaults on Christians tend to draw greater international attention. In a media-driven age, the spectacle of interfaith violence heightens visibility, attracts funding, and enhances the notoriety of extremist organisations.

Terrorism Without Theology

To understand Boko Haram solely through a religious lens is to misunderstand its nature. As highlighted in earlier scholarly critiques, the group’s actions—from mass killings to the abduction of schoolgirls in Chibok—stand in stark contradiction to Islamic teachings. Renowned Islamic scholars and institutions worldwide have unequivocally condemned such acts as un-Islamic.

Islam’s foundational principles emphasise the sanctity of life, the pursuit of knowledge, and the dignity of women. These are the values that Boko Haram systematically violates. Its campaign against education, especially for girls, directly opposes the very first Qur’anic revelation: “Read.” Similarly, practices such as forced marriages and abductions have no legitimacy within Islamic jurisprudence.

Thus, Boko Haram is not merely a violent group operating under religious pretexts; it is, in many ways, an adversary of the very religion it claims to represent. It exploits religious language while undermining its ethical core.

Banditry and the Politics of Crime

Lai Mohammed’s remarks also addressed another critical misconception: the religious interpretation of banditry in northern Nigeria. He argued that these acts are primarily criminal, not ideological. The perpetrators and victims often share the same ethnic and religious backgrounds, predominantly Hausa-Fulani Muslims.

This observation underscores a broader point: much of Nigeria’s violence is driven by economic desperation, weak state capacity, and organised crime rather than doctrinal conflict. Cattle rustling, kidnapping for ransom, and territorial disputes are manifestations of governance gaps, not religious wars.

Reducing these issues to religious persecution not only obscures their root causes but also risks inflaming tensions that are otherwise manageable within Nigeria’s historically pluralistic society.

A Tradition of Coexistence

Despite its challenges, Nigeria has long been a model of interfaith coexistence. Lai Mohammed pointed to the example of President Bola Ahmed Tinubu and his wife, representing a Muslim-Christian household, as emblematic of the country’s social fabric. Across Nigeria, interfaith marriages, shared communities, and everyday interactions reflect a lived reality far removed from the narrative of existential religious conflict.

As Lai Mohammed aptly noted, ordinary Nigerians are more likely to disagree over economic issues than theological ones. This insight is crucial. It suggests that the primary concerns of citizens, jobs, security, and stability, transcend religious identity.

The Danger of “Fake News” in Conflict Zones

Labelling the “Christian genocide” narrative as “fake news,” Lai Mohammed raises an uncomfortable but necessary question: how do misinformation and selective reporting shape international perceptions?

In conflict zones, narratives can be weaponised. Advocacy groups, political actors, and even well-meaning observers may inadvertently amplify incomplete or skewed accounts. While highlighting human rights abuses is essential, doing so without context can lead to policy missteps and deepen divisions on the ground.

A more responsible approach requires distinguishing between targeted persecution and indiscriminate violence. In Nigeria’s case, the latter is far more representative of reality.

None of this is to deny the severity of Nigeria’s security crisis. Boko Haram remains a brutal insurgency responsible for thousands of deaths and widespread displacement. Its atrocities against Muslims and Christians alike demand urgent and sustained action.

However, effective responses must be grounded in accurate diagnosis. Mischaracterising the conflict as a religious genocide risks diverting attention from the structural issues that sustain violence: poverty, corruption, weak institutions, and lack of education.

The international community, therefore, has a responsibility to engage with Nigeria based on evidence rather than assumption. This includes supporting counter-terrorism efforts, strengthening governance, and investing in education and economic development, especially in the country’s most vulnerable regions.

The tragedy of Boko Haram is not that it represents Islam, but that it distorts it. The greater tragedy would be if the world, in its haste to categorise, fails to see this distinction. Lai Mohammed’s remarks serve as a reminder that truth in complex conflicts is rarely convenient. Nigeria’s crisis is not a story of one religion targeting another; it is a story of extremism preying on vulnerability, of criminals exploiting chaos, and of a nation striving, despite immense challenges, to preserve its pluralistic identity. Recognising this complexity is not an exercise in denial. It is the first step toward meaningful solutions.

A regular Columnist with NewAgeIslam.com, Ghulam Ghaus Siddiqi Dehlvi is a Classical Islamic scholar with a Sufi background and English-Arabic-Urdu Translator.

Courtesy: newageislam.com

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Though often overlooked in official narratives, Shariati remains one of the most influential intellectual figures behind the Iranian Revolution. His ideas, which linked Shi’ism with modern revolutionary theories drawn from thinkers such as Frantz Fanon and Jean‑Paul Sartre, helped shape the ideological climate that culminated in 1979.

Revisiting his legacy is essential not only for understanding Iran’s modern history but also for examining the broader intersections of religion, social justice, and political transformation in the Muslim world.

Born in 1933 in Mazinan, Shariati grew up in a religious household during a turbulent era. The 1953 overthrow of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh and the Shah’s subsequent modernization drive—perceived by many as an attempt to erase cultural and religious roots in favor of Western approval—formed the backdrop of his intellectual evolution. Shariati’s activism led to imprisonment, and later, study in Paris, where exposure to existentialist and anti‑colonial thought profoundly shaped his worldview. He rejected Marxist materialism but embraced its critique of inequality, reinterpreting Islamic history to highlight figures such as Abu Dharr al‑Ghifari as symbols of resistance and social equality.

From this synthesis emerged Shariati’s concept of “Red Shiism,” a dynamic, activist Islam rooted in sacrifice, justice, and resistance, inspired by the legacy of Karbala. His slogan “Return to the Self” urged Muslim societies to break from blind imitation of the West and rediscover their intellectual heritage. His lectures and writings reframed Islam not as a passive spiritual refuge but as a force for liberation, capable of mobilizing the masses against tyranny. By the late 1970s, his ideas circulated widely among students and activists, laying the intellectual foundations of revolution.

Shariati’s critique extended beyond Marxism to liberalism and existentialism, which he faulted for neglecting the spiritual dimension of humanity. In works such as Marxism and Other Western Fallacies: An Islamic Critique, he argued that Islam offered its own emancipatory paradigm, distinct from Western secular traditions. He did not seek to make Islam socialist but rather employed Marxist sociological tools to galvanize Muslims into revolutionary action. His criticism of Iran’s Marxist Tudeh Party underscored his insistence on adapting political thought to Iran’s cultural and religious context.

Although Shariati died in 1977, two years before the revolution, his intellectual imprint was unmistakable. Pakistani writer Mukhtar Masood recorded that Iranians across social strata identified Shariati as the architect of the movement. Yet, as the revolutionary state consolidated power, charismatic leadership overshadowed intellectual activism, and Shariati’s role receded into obscurity. His story illustrates how revolutions often celebrate political victories while neglecting the thinkers who shaped their ideological foundations.

Shariati’s legacy endures as a reminder that religion, when reinterpreted through the lens of justice and resistance, can become a powerful agent of social transformation. His vision of Islam as a force for liberation continues to resonate in debates over faith, identity, and political change across the Muslim world.

Author is freelance journalist.

Courtesy: CounterView

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People were astonished when Radhika from Chandan Panchayat (then part of Raipur district) was elected sarpanch. Coming from a family of former bonded laborers recently freed by Supreme Court orders, she disrupted entrenched social hierarchies. With support from an organization of released bonded workers, Radhikabai implemented development works such as deepening tanks and constructing a school building. Villagers, especially from weaker sections, testified to her contributions. She also advanced claims for land distribution recommended by the Supreme Court. Yet, she considered her greatest achievement the closure of a liquor shop, which reduced alcohol consumption and village quarrels.

In Meethiberi Panchayat (Dehradun district), Radhadevi overcame resistance from influential villagers who attempted to buy votes with liquor and money. She won her first election when the seat was reserved for women, and later secured victory even without reservation. During her two terms as pradhan, she accelerated development works, fought successfully to restore a diverted road, and ensured benefits reached needy families. Villagers praised her compassion, with child widow Ramrati Yadav noting, “She is the only person in the village who visits me regularly.” The village demonstrated confidence in women’s leadership by electing women to six of seven panchayat posts, resulting in improved development and social harmony.

In the Patha region of Chitrakut district, Uttar Pradesh, Sonia Kol’s tenure as pradhan of Nihi village was transformative. Belonging to the marginalized Kol tribal community, she ensured benefits of housing schemes, pensions, food security cards, and scholarships reached the poorest families. She enforced land rights for landless households despite opposition from powerful villagers. Her leadership inspired women in neighboring villages to field strong candidates in subsequent elections.

In Sultanpur Chilkana (Saharanpur district), Suraiya Begum and Rajjo formed a remarkable team. Suraiya, from a traditional Muslim family, and Rajjo, a Dalit from a cobbler’s household, worked together with social activists to revitalize their indebted nagar panchayat. Their efforts won recognition as a model nagar panchayat.

These examples highlight the transformative potential of women’s reservation in panchayati raj institutions since 1993, which enabled the election of nearly one million women at village, block, and district levels. While leaders like Radhikabai, Radhadevi, Sonia Kol, Suraiya Begum, and Rajjo demonstrated exceptional capability, many women pradhans remain sidelined by “pati pradhan” practices, where husbands or male relatives dominate decision-making. Sonia Kol observed, “At block meetings, I often see men attending in place of elected women. With some support, these women could play an effective role, but family pressures hold them back.”

To strengthen women’s participation, stricter enforcement of rules ensuring their active involvement is essential. Training programs can equip newly elected women with knowledge of rights and responsibilities. Voluntary organizations and grassroots movements have also played a crucial role, as seen in Radhikabai’s collaboration with bonded laborers’ groups and Sonia’s association with the newspaper Khabar Lahariya.

Women leaders often prioritize issues overlooked by men, such as closing liquor shops, resolving conflicts amicably, supporting distressed families, and addressing sanitation needs. Their focus on nutrition, health, drinking water, and environmental protection underscores the broader social impact of women’s leadership in panchayats. Moreover, their visibility encourages ordinary village women to mobilize before elections, ensuring strong candidates emerge from within their communities.

These stories illustrate how women’s participation in rural governance not only advances development but also reshapes priorities, strengthens social harmony, and empowers marginalized voices.

The writer is Honorary Convener, Campaign to Save Earth Now. His recent books include Protecting Earth for Children, Planet in Peril, Man over Machine, and When the Two Streams Met

Courtesy: CounterView

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be a tree sated with fertility, be a tree.

And if you are not a tree, my love, 

be stone saturated with humidity, be stone.

And if you are not a stone, my love, 

be a moon in the dream of your beloved one, be a moon.

(So spoke a woman to her son at his funeral.)

 Mahmoud Darwish, State of Siege (2002)

Mahmoud Darwish

To sit with these lines for five years is to realise that Mahmoud Darwish was not writing a poem. He was drafting an ontology of indestructibility. Written during the 2002 Siege of Ramallah, when Israeli forces confined him to his apartment under tanks and demolition orders, these verses are not an elegy. They are a war manual for the soul. A mother at her son’s funeral refuses to grieve as the world expects. Instead, she issues commands. She transforms her dead son into a landscape that cannot be evicted. This is the purest expression of “Sumud” (refusing to be erased or to leave one’s home), the Palestinian art of remaining, not as an act of passivity but as a furious, creative, and elemental refusal to vanish. The Arabic word “Sumud” is a crucial concept in Palestinian identity and resistance. It is often simply translated as “resilience”; it carries a much deeper meaning that bridges the gap between endurance and political defiance. At its core, “Sumud” is the act of maintaining a normal life under abnormal conditions, and refusing to be erased.

The repetition of “be” (the Arabic imperative kun) is not just a request; it is a command of creation. In the Quran, God creates the universe with the phrase “Kun fa-yakun” (“Be, and it is”).

By having a mother use this imperative at a funeral, Darwish is portraying a subversive act of creation. She is refusing to let her son vanish into nothingness. If he cannot exist as a human, his soul will be refashioned into the landscape by the power of language.

The Anatomy of a Siege: Beyond the Blockade

A siege is not merely a military act or tactic. It is a slow erasure of a people’s future. In Palestine, the “plight” is concrete. In the Palestinian context, this “plight” manifests as the systematic and brutal killing of children and young people, the uprooting of ancient olive groves, the restriction of water (the “rain” of the poem), the fragmentation of families by concrete walls, and the fragmentation of bodies by checkpoints. But Darwish teaches us that a siege is also metaphysical. It aims to reduce the human being to bare life, a hungry, terrified, statistically invisible creature stripped of history, name, and narrative.

For the Iranian people, the siege wears a different mask: economic sanctions and diplomatic strangulation. It is a blockade of medicine, knowledge, and global conversation. Yet the Zionist logic is identical: isolate, impoverish, and make the people beg for their own humanity. In both cases, the besieged are told they are temporary. Darwish’s mother replies: You have confused death with disappearance.

Global Sumud Flotilla For Palestine

The Alchemy of Elements: Resistance as Metamorphosis

When the human form is rendered illegal, when a son can be shot and his name erased from a registry, the mother refuses nothingness. She performs alchemy. She reincarnates her son into three elemental forms, each a higher degree of defiance.

The Tree (Rootedness as Land Title):

When the Zionist regime uproots ancient groves to plant Jewish settlements, the mother says: Be a tree. Not just any tree, but one “sated with fertility”, heavy with olives, with memory, with the sweat of ancestors. This is the ultimate rebellion. The tree does not hold a deed; it is the deed. Its roots argue with the bulldozer in a language that predates all modern borders. To become a tree is to say: You cannot deport geography.

The Stone (The Pulse Beneath the Weapon):

The stone is the icon of the Intifada. But Darwish does something extraordinary. He adds, “saturated with humidity.” Humidity is the breath of the living earth, the sweat of the farmer, the moisture that turns dust into clay. This is not the dry, dead stone of a ruin. It is the wet, resistant stone that grows moss and holds the coolness of the morning. For the Palestinian youth facing a military tank, or the Iranian student enduring a morality squad, the stone is the hard reality they throw back at power. But the humidity is their poetry, their cinema, their whispered jokes in the back of a taxi, the life that persists within the hardness.

The Moon (The Unreachable Sovereignty):

If the tree is cut and the stone shattered, the mother sends her son to the moon. Not the moon of astronomy, but a moon in the dream of your beloved one. This is the interior fortress. You can occupy a city, but not a dream. You can sanction a country, but not a lover’s memory. The moon represents a light that requires no passport, no fuel, no permission. It is the sovereignty of the inner life, the space where a displaced family still sings the old songs, where a Tehran artist paints in a basement, and where a refugee draws the key to a house that exists only in the mind.

Aftermath of a bombed area in Palestine

From Ramallah to Tehran: The Shared Geography of the Soul

What unites the Palestinian and Iranian resistance is not a shared history but a shared architecture of survival. Both people have learned that when the external world is blocked, you build inward and downward.

For Palestine, “Sumud” is literal: staying on the land, harvesting the olives under a military curfew, planting a sapling where a home was demolished. It is the insistence that even if the map is redrawn by force, the poetry remembers the original names.

For Iran, resilience takes the form of a cultural fortress. Facing decades of sanctions and ideological isolation, Iranians have turned to a deep well: Rumi, Hafez, and the cinema of Kiarostami and Panahi. They produce art that does not seek Western validation. They prove that their humanity is not a commodity to be granted or withheld by embassies, but a historical fact, an unbroken civilisation that has outlasted every invader, from Alexander to the narcissist Trump.

In both cases, the besieged become metamorphic. They change shape faster than the siege can adapt.

Image from the 2026 Protests in Iran

Art as the Final Frontier: The Ghazal as a Weapon

Darwish weaponises the traditional ghazal, a form of love poetry, for a funeral. He addresses a dead son as “my love”. This is not sentimentality. It is a radical humanisation. The occupier wants the dead son to be a number, a martyr statistic, a security threat even in the grave. The mother says: No. He was the rain I waited for. He was the moon in someone’s dream.

By using the intimate, erotic language of the ghazal, Darwish smuggles tenderness into a war zone. He reminds the world that every political casualty is first a beloved person. The siege cannot calculate grief, and that is its fatal weakness.

The Invincible Landscape

The final reveal: (So spoke a woman to her son at his funeral)- is the most devastating line. It reframes the entire poem as a whisper over a grave. But it is also the ultimate act of defiance. The mother tells the occupier: You have killed a man, but you have given birth to a landscape.

The son is no longer a body that can be buried. He is a tree that will keep fruiting, a stone that will keep striking, a moon that will keep haunting every dream. The siege, for all its military tanks and sanctions, cannot kill what can become something else.

Whether it is the farmer in Gaza planting saplings under drone surveillance, or the student in Tehran memorising Hafez in a blacked-out apartment, they are all following the mother’s command. They are becoming the rain, the tree, the stone, the moon. They are proving that the architecture of survival is not made of concrete and steel. It is made of metamorphosis. And that is why they are impossible to ignore and even more impossible to conquer. The mother in the poem is not just a mourner; she is the custodian of a history the occupier can’t erase. She is the pillar of strength and the stream of the nation’s collective sorrow. The poem is ultimately about refusing the silence of death. In a “State of Siege”, where people are threatened with erasure, the mother performs a ritual of metamorphosis. She ensures her son is never gone, but simply translated into the rain, the trees, and the stone of the home they are defending.

Courtesy: The AIDEM

The post The Metamorphic Resistance: Mahmoud Darwish, Resilience (Sumud), and the Architecture of Survival appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The issue was the discrepancy in the rise of population in Northern and Southern states. Roughly in Northern states the TFR (Total Fertility rate) being higher than the one in Southern states, this delimitation exercise will give more weightage to Northern states, where the hold of Hindu nationalist BJP is higher. The southern states are wary of this and so came out in full strength to oppose it. BJP is crying hoarse that opposition parties are humiliating the women by opposing the amendment. This apparent support of BJP to Women’s representation is just a façade. The other steps in the empowerment of women have generally been taken up by the Indian National Congress in general. We see that right from the freedom movement when it was leading the national movement against colonial powers INC gradually ensured that women are not only part of the process of ‘India Nation in the making’ but also part of the movements opposing British rule.

It did encourage women’s being part of the various phenomena of national life. After the marathon efforts by Jyotiba Phule and Savitribai Phule to give education to women, they did start coming to social space and played an important role in the struggle for independence. Chayanika Shah points out that INC had several women Presidents, then a woman Prime minister, woman Chief Minister, and woman President in its trajectory. Taking this process of empowerment at grass root level structures, Rajiv Gandhi was keen not only in Panchayati Raj but also for increased representation of women in these institutions.

Let us contrast all this with the hyperbole of Narendra Modi. There is no record of any affirmative action of women during the BJP (i.e. NDA) rule of Vajpayee years or Modi years. There seems to be an ideological connection between the BJP politics of Hindu Nationalism and their agenda of the role of women in politics. BJP is the political progeny of RSS, which is an exclusively male organization. When Laxmibai Kelkar (1936) requested the then RSS Chief Hedgewar to let women be part of RSS, she was advised to form a subordinate organization, Rashtra Sevika Samiti (Rss) and not permitted to join the RSS.

The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh stands for Volunteers, while Rashtra Sevika Samiti stands for servants. This tells us that the Swayam (being) of women is in control of men. This is in tune with the mandate of Manu smriti. This holy book was upheld by RSS all through and even now this RSS combine holds that Indian Constitution is based on Western values and so should be scrapped (Rajendra Singh, Rajju Bhaiyya’s statement) and be replaced by a Holy Indian book, i.e. Manu Smriti (as per Sudarshan, another Sarsanghchalak of RSS)

In BJP’s policies, this is also reflected in the awarding of Gandhi Peace Prize to the Gita Press, Gorakhpur a year ago. This was done by a jury headed by Narendra Modi. While giving the award Modi stated that “They have done commendable work over the last 100 years towards furthering social and cultural transformations among the people,”  Akshaya Mukul in his masterly study of Gita Press shows how Gita Press has played a major role in transforming the teachings of Manu Smriti into popular small booklets which are sold in lakhs of copies. These uphold husbands’ beating of wives, glorifying playing second fiddle to men and total subordinating to men in their lives, Father; Husband and Son in different phases of life. Reported ACADEMIA.

BJP’s own history is full of such humiliating statements from their office bearers, which uphold the abominable practices against women including Sati. In the context of the Roop Kawar incident, the then BJP Vice President Vijaya Raje Scindia took out a procession supporting the practice of Sati. The slogan of the procession was that committing sati is not only a glorious tradition of Hindu women, it is also their right!

Another leader Mridula Sinha, (BJP Mahila Morcha) who was Governor of Goa a few years back had given an interview to Savvy Magazine. (April 1994) In this she upholds the wife beating by husband and dowry system.

The 2021 data of the National Crime Records Bureau reveals that on average, eighty-six women were raped every day in India, while forty-nine cases of crimes against women were lodged every single hour. The overall number of crimes against women per one hundred thousand of the population increased from 56.3 in 2014 to 66.4 in 2022.

During the present regime how the cases of sexual violence and harassment have been handled become clear in the cases of women’s sexual harassment. Several of these cases found their way into the mainstream news, such as the gang rape of a minor girl by a BJP legislator in Unnao, Uttar Pradesh, in 2017; the repeated gang rape and murder of an eight-year-old Muslim girl in Kathua, Kashmir, in 2018; and the gang rape of a Dalit girl in Hathras, Uttar Pradesh, in 2020” Women wrestlers complaints against Braj Bhushan Sharan Singh were ignored in toto. The case of women’s plight in Manipur is beyond words. As per reports in the JACOBIN.

While women MPs of BJP and others are making a lot of noise over the fall of this amendment bill the issue is why link it with delimitation. Why no move that with present strength of MPs only; why it should not be implemented with 2023 bill? We need to raise our voice to delink delimitation from the Women’s reservation bill and to call for its implementation right away as per the 2023 bill.

Related:

Women’s Reservation – 13 Questions to Modi And His Associates in Government – Just Asking !!

Womens Reservation Bill 2026: Women’s Rights & the RSS

Procedure for tabling bills on women’s reservations & delimitation both opaque and non-consultative: Experts and Citizens

The post Amendment to Women’s Reservation Bill: BJP’s hyperbole on women appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Samrat Choudhary has been saying, on no less than half a dozen occasions that the Bihar government has struck of 22-lakh names off Bihar’s electoral rolls (a power only with the Election Commission!). He goes further to state that Aadhar and other benefits of these ‘22-lakh persons’ will also be snatched away.  Who are these 22-lakh persons anyway?

Three days after he was appointed as CM of the state on April 15, replacing the doyen of the Janata Dal United (JD-U), Nitish Kumar, Choudhary made this extraordinary claim as reported by The Indian Express. Prior to this appointment, since late February 2026, during campaign stints in West Bengal he had been boastful of this ‘achievement’ by the new Bihar government. “So far, we have struck off the names of 22-lakh people and stopped their ration as well in Bihar. We will cancel their driving licenses and other cards as well,” Choudhary has stated emphatically.”

Ironically, antithetical to these hysterical claims are the facts from the ground. Bihar was the first state, pre-assembly poll to conduct a hurried and unchecked Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of its electoral rolls in 2025, an exercise that came under sharp criticism and much scrutiny. During this controversial process, while approximately 65-lakh deletions took place without sufficient time for independent adjudication of the action, the 22-lakh figure only corresponded to “deletions.” Now deletions are usually on account of duplicate enrolment, shifting of voters or the fact that they may be deceased. The media had widely reported between June-November 2025 that no largescale existence of “illegal immigrants” was identified or noticed by the Election Commission of India (ECI).

One issue of crucial concern therefore then is ‘where has the figure of 22-lakhs being projected by the Bihar CM come from?” Second, what about the adjudication process for the entire 65-lakh exclusions in the state? Third, the  moot question of whether or not an elected government in secular, democratic India is empowered to simply deny the right to an Aadhar card, or government scheme benefits to any person previously accessing these benefits without application of mind or independent judgement?

Before, during and after the SIR exercise in Bihar the Election Commission of India (ECI) under CEC Gyanesh Kumar has been squarely accused of partisan conduct, conduct unbefitting a Constitutional body since its actions aligned squarely with the ruling dispensation.

Ironically, but not coincidentally, the first week of April 2026, also saw a spate of “news reports” from Bihar around union home minister, Amit Shah’s visit to the Seemanchal areas of the state. As reported by ETV Bharat, Shah’s visit to the Seemanchal region during which he reviewed border security, the issue of illicit foreign settlers, law and order and other security-related situations in Kishanganj, Araria, Purnea, Katihar and other adjoining districts.

In line with this development, the news channel quoted a senior official of the state’s home department, additional chief secretary, Arvind Kumar Chaudhary stating that a ‘fresh letter had been written to all districts to identify suspected foreigners in their jurisdiction and if such persons are not living with valid documents, ‘their process of deportation would begin!’  Bihar government officials also ‘revealed that biometric data of those identified would be collected and uploaded to a central database maintained by the Union Home Ministry to streamline identification and prevent their re-entry.’

Where does the 22-lakh figure come from?

In early 2026, Vote for Democracy’s report on the Bihar polls, “An Audit of the Stolen Mandate” Bihar 2025 VFD Report Findings had recorded details of what the report termed “Mass disenfranchisement by design.” These stated that, according to official ECI data, the numerical impact of a hastily conducted SIR was staggering:

• On June 24, 2025, Bihar had 7.89 crore registered electors.
• By the Draft Roll of August 1, 2025, this fell to 7.24 crore, reflecting 65.69 lakh deletions.
• The Final Roll of September 30, 2025 stood at approximately 7.42 crore electors.

Yet, the report found that only 3.66 lakh voters were actually confirmed as ineligible. The scale of deletions was therefore grossly disproportionate, pointing not to routine correction but to electoral roll engineering.

Between July 21 and 25 alone, over 21.27 lakh voters were deleted in just three days—an implausible figure by any administrative standard. During this period, 5.44 lakh voters were marked ‘dead’, while 14.24 lakh were labelled ‘permanently shifted’. The number of voters marked ‘untraceable’ rose by 809% overnight, while not a single “foreigner” was identified—despite this being cited as a key justification for the revision.

Opaque ‘rectification’ and mathematical impossibilities

The report further exposed deep inconsistencies in the ECI’s claims of rectification. While the Commission stated that approximately 17 lakh objections or applications were received, the actual changes reflected in the rolls affected around 22-lakh entries. Even after accounting for corrections, the final voter count should have mathematically stood at approximately 7.38 crore, yet the ECI declared 7.42 crore electors, leaving an unexplained excess of 3.24 lakh voters.

No independent audit, reconciliation statement, or transparent explanation has been provided for this discrepancy.

Pre-poll manipulation after election notification

Electoral norms require that voter rolls be effectively frozen once elections are notified. However, the report documents that even after notification:

• On October 6, 2025, Bihar had 7.43 crore electors.
• By poll day, this had increased to 7.46 crore.

This means 3.34 lakh voters were added in just ten days, including a sudden and unexplained spike in youth voters—raising serious questions about roll sanctity during the election period.

1.3 The “Rectification” Fraud

• Discrepancy in Objections: ECI claimed only 17,00,000 (16,56,886+ 36,475 = 16,93,361)
• Applications were received by the September 1 deadline. However, actual changes were
• Performed on as many as 22-lakh entries.

The Calculation Anomaly:

• ECI reported additions of 16,56,886 (Form 6) + 36,475 (Claims) and exclusions of

2,17,0493.

• Net Addition Calculation: Should have been 14,76,312 added to the 7.24 Crore

base, totalling 7.38 Crore.

• Actual Figure (Sept 30): ECI declared 7.42 Crore (No. ECI/PN/313/2025)—a

hike of 3.24 Lakh over the calculated figure without explanation.

Multiple petitions were filed before the Supreme Court in July 2025 challenging the SIR process. These were moved by the Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR), People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL), RJD MP Manoj Jha, TMC MP Mahua Moitra, and Social Activist Yogendra Yadav among several others. These petitions alleged that the SIR lacked statutory backing

under the Representation of the People Act, 1950 and Registration of Electors Rules,

1960, imposed onerous documentation requirements, and risked large-scale

disenfranchisement, particularly of migrants, the poor and marginalised communities.

Petitioners had also argued that the SIR effectively resembled a citizenship-style verification exercise

Unfortunately, while the irregularities in the Bengal SIR continue to be scrutinised by the Supreme Court of India due to an assertive role played by the Trinamool Congress ruling that state, Bihar’s excluded voters –whatever the actual number—remain abandoned and forgotten. By both the political Opposition and the Institutions of Democratic Governance. Even as the new CM makes boastful claims of ‘disenfranchising’ a staggering 22-lakh persons!

Related:

Bihar’s SIR process reveals an exercise of illegitimate powers, ECI forcing district machinery to resort to unethical practices: CCG’s Open Letter

Bihar SIR: 65 Lakh electors flagged for deletion, SC said “if there is mass exclusion, we will immediately step in”

ECI to SC: Voter ID insufficient for Bihar roll, defends citizenship verification power

Punjab University’s former dean writes to CJI: Bihar SIR threatens democracy, alleges ECI overreach & voter disenfranchisement

Non-Electors Within Electors: ECI reports over 61 lakh potential exclusions

The post Bihar “Infiltrator” Hysteria: Samrat Choudhary’s claims of disenfranchising 22-lakh people corresponds to ECI’s “deceased voters” figure appeared first on SabrangIndia.

These 13 questions – sharp, insistent, and impossible to brush aside – cut through the carefully crafted and cunning narrative on women’s empowerment projected by Narendra Modi and his government. Shivasundar is not merely interrogating policy; he is challenging the very intent, timing, and political calculus behind this charade of a law

Through this Shivasundar exposes how the women’s reservation issue has been transformed from a long-awaited democratic reform into an electoral instrument — announced with fanfare, deferred with design, and deployed in moments of political convenience. Here are the questions. Read On.

Question #1

After amending Article 334A of the Constitution in 2023 with unanimous support of all parties and making women’s reservation a law, what was the need for another constitutional amendment?

Question #2

As demanded unanimously by opposition parties in 2023, why was 33% reservation not implemented within the existing 543 seats? Why were unnecessary conditions added—such as implementing it only after delimitation based on the 2026 census—making it impossible to enforce women’s reservation until 2034?

Question #3

Why was the Act, passed in both Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha in 2023, approved by the President and gazetted, not notified until April 16, 2026?

Question #4

If the intention of bringing the 2026 constitutional amendment bill was to implement women’s reservation quickly, why were manipulative sub-conditions like delimitation based on the 2011 census included?

Question #5

Even knowing that adding highly controversial delimitation conditions would prevent securing a two-thirds majority in Parliament, why was this process initiated?

Question #6

Even now, why is your government unwilling to call a special session and introduce a simple amendment to provide 33% reservation within the existing 543 seats?

Question #7

In 2023, you introduced a women’s reservation bill that could not be implemented until 2034—just one year before elections.

Now, during ongoing elections in five states, despite clearly knowing the bill would fail (due to delimitation conditions), you deliberately introduced and ensured its defeat. You have also started a false and divisive campaign blaming opposition parties for this failure.

Was this bill introduced merely to defame the opposition?

Does this not mean you have consistently betrayed women’s reservation for petty electoral gains?

Question #8

Since 1996, proposals for women’s reservation have been repeatedly introduced in Parliament by Congress governments, United Front governments, your own Vajpayee government, and later the UPA government. One major reason as to why they were not passed was the objection that there was no sub-quota for OBCs within women’s reservation.

Why did even the Vajpayee government not attempt to implement women’s reservation with an OBC sub-quota, like other governments?

Why does the 2026 bill you introduced also not include an OBC sub-quota?

Question #9

One of the reasons why attempts between 1996–2014 failed was coalition governments. But in 2014 and 2019, the Modi government had a full majority. Why did you not use that to pass women’s reservation without delimitation conditions, as you did for EWS reservation for upper caste?

Instead,

a) In 2023, you ensured it could not be implemented until 2034

b) In 2026, you added malicious delimitation conditions and ensured the bill’s defeat

Does this not make the Modi government the most anti-women and opposed to women’s reservation?

Question #10

If the BJP truly has commitment to women’s empowerment, why not voluntarily give 33% tickets to women in Lok Sabha and Assembly elections without waiting for a law? Except for TMC, why does BJP—like most other parties—still limit women’s tickets to around 12–15%?

Question #11

After the bill’s defeat, Prime Minister Modi allegedly misused government machinery and, acting like a BJP leader, delivered hate-filled election speeches falsely branding opposition parties as anti-women. Since institutions like the Election Commission and Supreme Court are not acting against this, does this not further prove that the bill was introduced just to label opposition parties as anti-women and gain women’s votes?

Question #12

In yesterday’s speech, Prime Minister Modi called himself a protector of women.

But over the past 11 years, in cases like Manipur, Kathua, Unnao, harassment of women wrestlers, and honoring of Bilkis Bano case convicts by BJP leaders—why has he remained silent, even when BJP MPs and leaders themselves were accused of crimes against women? Why protect such perpetrators instead of speaking out?

Question #13

Modi compared the failure of women’s reservation to female foeticide. Female foeticide reduces the proportion of women in society compared to men.

In reality, why do states like Gujarat (long ruled by BJP), and Haryana and Uttar Pradesh (with strong BJP and Sangh influence), have among the lowest female-to-male ratios in the country?

Conversely, why do states like Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Telangana, and West Bengal—where BJP influence is relatively weaker—have higher female population ratios compared to “Hindi-Hindu” states?

Just asking.

Courtesy: The AIDEM

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