Going further it reminds the public of how, in the recent past, Rahul Gandhi of the Congress provided evidence-based public exposures of deficiencies and manipulations of the electoral rolls in previous elections in Maharashtra, Karnataka and then in Haryana. This clearly required that the ECI make itself publicly accountable to explaining these discrepancies and otherwise investigate to identify the circumstances in which such frauds took place. As an independent body, it is the ECI’s responsibility to do so and certainly not that of the Central or state governments.

However, the ECI, currently headed by Gyanesh Kumar, has simply dismissed all these exposures, in effect refusing to make the ECI accountable, as it should and must be, to the Indian public. Even a former Election Commissioner, Ashok Lavasa, has criticised the current ECI on this count. No surprise then that there is the very widespread view that precisely such electoral manipulation has played a major role in determining the outcome of the Bihar assembly polls. Moreover, the ECI has failed at another level also. It has ignored a blatant violation by the Modi-led NDA of the Model Code of Conduct for parties during elections.

Towards the end of September, Modi launched a state government scheme to make bank transfers of Rs. 10,000 to women to start self-employment ventures with one instalment transferred on the date elections were announced and others made during the election process itself! More than a crore of women in different households benefitted from this. The total voter turnout, male and female, was a little over 5 crores. Previous such pre-poll cash handouts by governments have been halted by the ECI but not this time in Bihar.

This lure to women voters turned out to be particularly important for Nitish Kumar and the JD (U). The female voter turnout at around 72% was almost 10% higher than the male voter turnout and was a key factor in raising the JD (U) vote share by 4% from the last assembly elections in 2020 and enabling a seat tally increase of 42 seats to 85 in all. The BJP had roughly the same vote share at around 20% as in 2020 but increased its seat tally this time by 50 to 89 in all. Among the NDA’s other partners, the new Chirag Paswan led party the LJP, with its vote base among Dalits, got a vote share of around 4% and 19 seats. The Congress with double the LJP’s vote share dropped 13 seats from 2020 to achieve only 6 this time. The RJD got the same vote share as in the last assembly election of 23%, higher than any other party did. However, it’s seat tally dropped by 50 from 75 to 25 this time. The CPI(ML)-Liberation fell from 12 seats to 2.

Finally the statement asks, what then are the lessons to be drawn from all this? First, that in all likelihood there was significant manipulation of rolls favouring the NDA. Second, voters faced with promises of jobs and freebies of all kinds will prefer to have a bird in hand than two in the bush, i.e., a state party backed by the Central government that has already delivered a handout and is in a better position to give more, will definitely have the edge. Third, all parties share a consensus that SC Reservations must be preserved even as it may be extended to other sections. So why should Dalits prefer opposition parties to the BJP and its political allies. The material problems of lower castes remain but a small and rising Dalit elite that provides leadership is attracted to where power already lies. Moreover, in lieu of serious material improvement, the Sangh’s Hindutva ideology offers a form of cultural compensation to lower castes in recognising them and their religious deities and practices as part of a wider Hindu fold that is being seen as the natural heir of Indian-Hindu nationalism. Fourth, the Mahagathbandan (MGB) whether in Bihar or elsewhere pursues a soft Hindutva, does not directly challenge the BJP’s Islamophobia and itself reduces the number of Muslim candidates put up.

So, says the statement, it should not be surprising that in Seemanchal, where there is a higher concentration of Muslim voters, they would have preferred Owaisi’s AIMIM than to, say, the Congress. This is disturbing because it enhances religious polarisation. However, this can only change if supposedly secular parties are prepared to act in a genuinely secular manner. Fifth, apart from anti-BJPism, what does the MGB have in common? There is not and cannot be any genuine programmatic unity since apart from the Congress and the Left, the other regional parties do not have any Pan-India, let alone any international, vision or perspective.

Sixth, always a factor in the importance of cadre-based capacity of the RSS and its affiliates to entrench themselves within the pores of civil society as a matter of daily routine and not just for the purposes of periodic mass mobilisation which of course is also greatly facilitated by having this cadre base. The lesson here is for the Left and not for the other opposition parties that do not possess an ideologically committed and disciplined cadre base but have activists as part of more traditional patron-client linkages and networks that can also more easily shift their political loyalties. The Indian parliamentary left has a cadre base but one that is much smaller and more ideologically uncertain than in the past. Even for it to achieve electoral successes, the extra-electoral terrain is where the forces of the Sangh must be confronted through sustained struggles on various fronts.

Building a newer left that is internally more democratic and that sheds the shibboleths of Stalinism and Maoism for its cadres, is vital. Such a broader united front of the Left must not be sectarian within, and it must prioritise linkages with progressive movements of all kinds that continue to exist in our continental-sized country rather than with opposition bourgeois parliamentary parties. The latter are not capable of, and will never move in the direction of forging an anti-capitalist, truly democratic and deeply egalitarian society. This should be the goal of such a Left united front that is allied with a range of progressive movements. Forging a programme and practice of left populism as an intermediate stage in pursuit of that much longer-term goal is our shorter-term need.

The statement was released today.

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The post Radical socialist statement on Bihar Election results appeared first on SabrangIndia.

At the heart of the controversy is the Special Intensive Revision –SIR — a revised method of updating electoral rolls first deployed in Bihar, suddenly since June 2025. In a sharply worded joint statement, activists allege that SIR is not an administrative exercise but a tool that has disenfranchised lakhs of legitimate voters, fundamentally altering electoral outcomes. Political Economist and husband of Finance Minister Nirmala Sitaraman, Mr Parkala Prabhakar said speaking to TNIE said, `The SIR process “bears no resemblance” to the voter-roll revision system introduced in 2003. This statement by these NGOs from across the nation points out that additions and deletions were made to the voter list with “focused intent,” possibly manipulation engineered to benefit ruling-party candidates.” In a rare show of solidarity with state-level grievances, the groups declared, “We stand with the People of Bihar in rejecting the election results.”

Earlier in August 2025, the Vote for Democracy had released its preliminary analysis of discrepancies in the Bihar SIR. This may be viewed below.

This time, these groups have also directed criticism at Opposition parties, accusing them of participating in elections conducted under the SIR framework even as they protested against it. The statement argues that by doing so, Opposition parties have inadvertently lent credibility to what the groups call a “fraudulently elected government.” It further notes that despite large-scale mobilisation during movements such as the Voter Adhikar Yatra, the Opposition has failed to build durable alliances with grassroots civil society networks. The Election Commission has come under its most severe civil society criticism in recent years. The statement accuses the Commission of: firstly, “disregarding its constitutional mandate,” secondly, becoming “an assaulter, not a protector, of electoral integrity,” and thirdly of “losing its legitimacy under its current leadership.”

The signatories pledged to push for a non-partisan and transparent Commission, indicating that an organised campaign may be in the works. Civil society groups have warned that the SIR process is now slated for rollout in 12 more states, raising fears of further large-scale voter disenfranchisement. Their slogan — “No rightful voter left behind” — is emerging as a rallying point for activists preparing for legal, political and public mobilisation.

The statement has drawn support from a broad cross-section of society, including retired judges, senior civil servants, economists, farmers’ organisations, teachers’ groups, technologists, Jesuit institutions, artists and student networks. Prominent signatories include: Justice B. Sudershan Reddy (Retd., Supreme Court), Devasahayam M.G. (Retd. IAS), Dr Parakala Prabhakar, Political Economist, Tushar Gandhi, Activist, Meena Gupta (Retd. IAS), Thomas Franco, Voters Rights Movement, Justice Shankar K.G.,K. Ramachandra Murthy, Former Editor, Their combined presence signals an emerging nationwide civil society front preparing to challenge the SIR’s expansion. Senior IAS retired MG Devasahayam speaking to TNIE said, “How can we call this Bihar election fair by any stretch of imagination.”

As the ECI fends off unprecedented scrutiny, the Opposition faces questions about its strategy, and civil society groups mount coordinated pressure campaigns, India appears headed for a high-stakes confrontation over electoral integrity. The statement ends with a stark warning — and a pledge:

Related:

Vote for Democracy: Statistical, legal and procedural irregularities dot Bihar’s controversial SIR process

Vote for Democracy: Statistical, legal and procedural irregularities dot Bihar’s controversial SIR process

The post Civil society warns, Election Commission is “Undermining Democracy” appeared first on SabrangIndia.

While the Model Code of Conduct (MCC) is in force for the ongoing Bihar Assembly elections, Choubey, a senior BJP leader and sitting MP, delivered a speech that directly targeted the state’s Muslim population. In his address, he appealed to “Muslim brothers” to “reduce their population” and claimed that “ghuspaithiye (infiltrators) are coming from across the border.” The remarks, CJP noted, deliberately conflated Indian Muslims with illegal immigrants and invoked communal stereotypes to create fear and prejudice among voters.

CJP has urged immediate intervention by both the Election Commission and state authorities to safeguard the neutrality and integrity of the electoral process.

A dangerous conflation of faith and foreignness

According to the complaint, Choubey’s remarks go beyond electoral rhetoric. They represent a calculated act of hate speech, portraying Indian Muslims as demographic threats and foreign infiltrators — a narrative that has become disturbingly frequent in election campaigns.

By stating, “Our population is also declining. I appeal to my Muslim brothers as well: reduce your population. Ghuspaithiye are coming from across the border… our government is working to remove them,” the MP collapsed the boundary between citizen and non-citizen, implying that the Muslim presence itself was suspect.

CJP’s complaint underscores that such rhetoric de-nationalises Indian Muslims, recasting them as outsiders within their own country — a move that weaponises religious identity to secure electoral advantage.

Clear violations of electoral and criminal law

CJP’s complaint meticulously details how the speech violates several provisions of law:

• Under the Representation of the People Act, 1951:
  • Section 123(3) and (3A) — forbidding appeals on religious grounds and promotion of enmity between communities.
  • Section 125 — making it a punishable offence to promote hatred in connection with elections.
  • Section 123(2) — covering undue influence on the electorate through intimidation or communal fear.
• Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023:
  • Section 196 — promoting enmity between groups.
  • Section 297 — statements conducing to public mischief.
  • Section 356 — outraging group dignity.

The organisation also cited violations of the Model Code of Conduct, which explicitly prohibits appeals to religion or acts that aggravate communal tension, and constitutional breaches of Articles 14, 15, 19, 21, and 25 — which guarantee equality, dignity, and freedom of conscience to all citizens.

A pattern of Islamophobic rhetoric

Pirpainti, a constituency in Bhagalpur district, has a mixed population and a history of communal sensitivity. In this context, CJP warned that such inflammatory remarks carry “dangerous polarising potential” — alienating Muslim citizens, normalising prejudice, and reducing the election to a contest over identity rather than policy.

The complaint places Choubey’s remarks within a wider and troubling pattern of electoral Islamophobia, where demographic myths and border anxieties are repeatedly used to stigmatise India’s Muslim citizens. It warns that this form of hate-driven politics seeks to redefine citizenship itself — who belongs and who does not — through the language of religion and fear.

Calling Choubey’s statements “hate propaganda delivered under the cover of governance and nationalism,” the complaint asserts that such conduct corrodes the very spirit of democracy. It notes that communal appeals not only distort voter choice but also legitimise bigotry as a form of governance, thereby eroding India’s secular foundation.

CJP invoked key Supreme Court precedents, including Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen (2017), which forbids religious appeals in elections, and Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. Union of India (2014), which recognised hate speech as an assault on equality and fraternity.

CJP’s prayer and demands

Through the complaint, CJP has urged the Election Commission of India and Bihar’s election authorities to:

1. Take immediate cognisance of the complaint.
2. Register an FIR against Ashwini Kumar Choubey under relevant provisions of the Representation of the People Act and Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita.
3. Debar him from further campaigning pending inquiry.
4. Issue a public censure and advisory to all political parties to desist from communal appeals.

The complaint concludes by calling upon the Election Commission to ensure compliance with the constitutional mandate of free, fair, and secular elections under Article 324.

The complaint may be read here.

Related:

From Despair to Dignity: How CJP helped Elachan Bibi win back her identity, prove her citizenship

Two Hate-Filled Speeches, One Election: CJP complaints against Himanta Biswa Sarma and Tausif Alam for spreading hate and fear in Bihar elections

From ‘Tauba Tauba’ to ‘Expel the Ghuspaithiya’: The language of exclusion in Bihar’s election season

CJP urges YouTube to remove content targeting CJI Gavai from Ajeet Bharti’s channel

The post Hate Has No Place in Elections: CJP moves State EC against BJP MP Ashwini Choubey’s communal speech appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Given that most anti-Hindutva critiques in the media emerge from the more privileged Brahmin–Bania perspectives, they inadvertently reinforce this diversion—keeping the focus on “Rajput history” and “Muslim history” while avoiding deeper discussions about present-day skewed representation, social engineering, and economic power in the state.

The real project is social engineering to secure Brahmin dominance in politics, bureaucracy, and culture. Crucially, this dispensation operates in tandem with Bania corporates, who reap massive economic benefits while Brahmins provide ideological legitimacy.

Cabinet and Leadership: It is numbers that matter

In early 2024, the BJP’s elevation of Bhajan Lal Sharma as Rajasthan’s Chief Minister, C.P. Joshi as state party chief and Babulal Sharma as Jaipur prantpracharak, signaled a clear shift towards Brahmin-Raj: three top Brahmin leaders at the helm, despite Brahmins being a small fraction of the state’s population. Although, after some uproar, C.P. Joshi was replaced by Madan Rathore (from OBC Teli) as the State president.

RSS Supremacy and Institutional Capture

The RSS, dominated by Maharashtrian Brahmin leadership, directs this design.  Mohan Bhagwat, personally presided over major coordination meetings in Jodhpur held between September 5 and 7 this year, underlining Rajasthan’s importance in the evolution of a national Hindutva strategy. These gatherings link the BJP’s governance in the state directly to Sangh priorities: temple projects, Sanskritisation drives, and rewriting cultural narratives to affirm Brahmin custodianship of tradition. Rajputs, OBCs and SCs are recast as auxiliary players in a story authored by Brahmin ideologues.[1]

The increased focus on Maratha figures from the Peshwa period, despite their irrelevance or controversial relation with the state’s history. The state-level celebration of Ahilyabai Holkar, despite her irrelevance to the state’s history, illustrates this strategy. This can be contrasted with the state government’s ambivalence towards the NCERT’s recent Hindutva led revisions, although disfavouring the State’s own history which only exemplifies this attitude.

Bureaucracy: The Quiet Arm of Hegemony

It is within the bureaucracy is where the real engineering occurs. National studies confirm that Brahmins are heavily over-represented in senior IAS/IPS ranks despite being a demographic minority. Rajasthan has seen repeated controversies around promotions and selections, with Brahmin-Bania candidates favored over Rajput, SC, ST, and OBC aspirants. For instance, the chief secretary of Rajasthan, Sundhansh Pant and the Finance Secretary Vaibhav Galariya are both Brahmins. Further, nine of the 24 Officers deputed at the Chief Minister’s Office (CMO) are Brahmins — that is more than one-third. This pattern also reflects in appointments of Vice Chancellors & Judiciary. At Rajasthan University, 5 out of 8 Deans are Brahmins. Out of 32 government-run universities in Rajasthan, Brahmins were appointed as Vice-Chancellors in 11 — a striking overrepresentation for such a small demographic group.

Similarly, while several Brahmin and Bania officers currently serve as District Superintendents of Police, there is only one Rajput—and not a single Muslim—holding that position.

These administrative patterns influence which textbooks are printed, which religious boards receive funds, and which police cases are prioritised. The dominance of Brahmin officers ensures Hindutva’s agenda is implemented with sympathetic pro-Brahmin filters. For instance, both Sharma and Joshi (although no longer BJP State president but still highly influential) frequently attend events promoting Parshuram as a cultural icon — recently Sharma inaugurated a Parshuram Gyanpeeth.

Hence, institutional capture through selections ensures policy-shaping and policy enforcement in favour of the concerned castes — increased State funding towards the Vipra Boards, Vipra foundations, Brahmin-controlled Gyanpeeths, promotion of vegetarianism and selective application of cow protection laws highlight this policy-shift.

The Brahmin–Bania Axis

Recently, Shikhar Agrawal, the Additional Chief Secretary was given additional charge as chairman of RIICO. Rajasthan, particularly the Marwar region and Jaipur-Shekhawati belt, has been the traditional home of major capitalist Bania houses like the Birlas, Bajajs, Mittals, Godrejs, Jhunjhunwalas, Agrawals and Khatris. The Hindutva order in Rajasthan rests not only on Brahmin dominance in ideology and bureaucracy but also on the economic muscle of Bania corporates. Brahmins provide ideological legitimacy and administrative control; Banias provide capital, campaign financing, and media ownership.

Deregulation in mining, real estate, and energy overwhelmingly benefits Bania-controlled enterprises. Contracts in solar parks, cement, and infrastructure disproportionately go to groups like Adani, Birla, and Mittal. GST centralisation, championed by Bania networks has weakened smaller competitors while favouring large corporates.

The Adani Group’s explosive expansion into Rajasthan’s mines, solar projects, and logistics under BJP, the interests of the Birlas & Mittals in Cement, telecom, and education sectors safeguarded by policy, and Local Khatri & Mahajan networks thrive under SME-friendly reforms while enjoying bureaucratic protection, exemplify this. On the other hand, Rajasthani Muslims, historically strong in art, culture, handicrafts and local trade, are vilified to marginalise them economically. Similarly, ownership of farms and orans (grasslands) by small Rajput farmers and traditional heritage by Rajput elites is often attacked under the rhetoric of samantwad.  Thus, while the state actively promotes the economic hegemonies of Brahmins, Banias, and Jats — and popular civil society discourse normalises these — the same socio-political channels stigmatise Muslim businesses and undermine Rajput property ownership.

In short, Brahmin–Bania synergy ensures that while Muslims are scapegoated and Rajputs are historically and politically side-lined, the real beneficiaries are the Brahmin-Bania elites who monopolise both state power and wealth.

Mechanisms of Social Engineering

This institutional capture and policy favouritism, is guarded by many strategies of social engineering like controlling information, culture, and using media and cinema to mislead public discourse.

The control of information and culture has played a pivotal role in social engineering.
Curricula and festivals are increasingly tilted towards Sanskritic, Brahminised traditions, side-lining Rajasthan’s syncretic and regional heritage. Similarly, Rajput-Muslim syncretic culture, exemplified by Sufi-Nathjogi traditions like that of Gogapir, are disfavoured for a more Brahmin-centric orthodox traditions like that of Parshuram. Similarly, Rajput-Dalit heterodox traditions of Ramdevji Tanwar and Rani Bhatiyani remain under constant attacks of Brahminisation by the State. This helps clear more space for Brahmin social influence over other communities — normalizing both institutional capture and policy favouritism.

However, what is more discomforting is the means and strategies employed to protect this hegemony, especially the social ramifications on the communities projected as social-punchbags for narrative decoys.

Muslims and Rajputs as the Mobilising “Other”

Unlike the Persian-origin Ashraf elites of Lucknow and Hyderabad — Rajasthani Muslims are either SC and ST convert or Rajput converts. While Kayamkhanis of Marwar & Bikaner, Sindhisipahis of Jaisalmer, and Khanzadas of Mewat are Muslim Rajputs, others like the Mirasis, Rangrezs, Langhas, Meos have been part of the traditional culture of the Hindu Rajputs.

Anti-Muslim mobilisation remained difficult in most pre-accession princely states due to the Muslim proximity to the Rajputs. However, that has dramatically changed in the last few years with various social engineering strategies, particularly Sanskritisation and Kshatriyaiaation. Hence, despite being local ethnic groups and despite being well-integrated contributors to the pre-accession Rajput States, including the modern armies — the Muslims are projected as the Turkic or Mughal “other.”

Furthermore, Muslim-othering has been followed by self-contradictory anti-Rajput rhetoric — the samantwad rhetoric by Brahmin and Jat politicians on one hand, and the violent conflicts over identity of medieval-era Rajput kings and other feudal lords on the other. The militant claims by Jats and Gujjars over Mihirbhoj Pratihar, Anangpal Tomar, Prithviraj Chauhan are not spontaneous social phenomena but politically-planned social engineering, termed “Rajputisation”. In this, different historical Rajput warriors and saints are assigned to different OBC communities to create social clashes between Rajputs and various OBC castes.

Hindutva’s obsessive appropriation of Maharana Pratap serves three key objectives. First, it eclipses the broader social, economic, and cultural contributions of Rajput dynasties, from the Pratiharas of Mandore onward. Second, it casts the rest of the Rajputs as collaborators with the Muslim ‘other.’ Third, it diverts attention from Hindutva’s ongoing project of Rajputisation.

Hence, BJP-RSS’s social engineering protects its policy of allotting more political space to Brahmins and economic space to Bania corporates. However, such social engineering is further compounded by narrative decoys (eg. Haldighati inscription debates) planted in media and films.

Discourse Deflection: Karauli Riots and the Afwaah Irony

During the run-up to the 2022 State elections, the State witnessed communal tensions and riots in Udaipur, Jodhpur and Karauli.

In Udaipur, the gruesome murder of Kanhaiyalal Sahoo was milked by BJP for anti-Muslim social-tension, while Karauli witnessed communal clashes triggered by rumours during a procession. Amid the fear, Madhulika Singh Jadaun, and her relative Sanjay Singh sheltered Muslims in her home and saved lives. Being the real heroes against Hindutva polarisation, they are reported to have said “This is Hindustan and we are Rajputs, we are known to protect people and we will always do it. Irrespective of faith,”

This irony deepens when we turn to the cultural sphere. Set in a Rajasthan town, Sudhir Mishra’s film Afwaah (2023), portrayed how rumours and political manipulation escalate into violence. However, both Madhulika, a garments seller, and Sanjay, a technician, are forgotten a year later. Instead, the film starring Bhumi Pednekar and Sumit Vyas, cleverly placed Rajputs at the centre of anti-Muslim violence.

Furthermore, the obsessive discourse around the change of the Rakt-talai inscription accompanied by a complete silence over Rajput protests against NCERT’s recent revisions fuels a misleading narrative that positions Rajput history as a beneficiary of Hindutva revisionism—a claim flatly contradicted by the recurrent protests Rajputs themselves have mounted against Hindutva’s distortions of their history in recent years — which can be read here, here, here & here.

The BJP-RSS machinery in Rajasthan has pursued Brahmin dominance with remarkable consistency, yet this reality remains conspicuously absent from most critiques of Hindutva in the state — deflecting discourse towards Rajput-Muslim history and the false binary instead.

Conclusion:

The real dangers of Hindutva lies not merely in the hate it spreads, but in the social order it entrenches: a system where Brahmins and Banias, wield an outsized supremacy over Rajasthan’s politics, economy, and culture — while constantly scapegoating the Muslims and the Rajputs through popular literature and cinema.

(The author is a mechanical engineer and an independent commentator on history and politics, with a particular focus on Rajasthan. His work explores the syncretic exchanges of India’s borderlands as well as contemporary debates on memory, identity and historiography; he can be contacted on adityakrishnadeora@gmail.com)

1. https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2025/Sep/03/rss-all-india-coordination-meet-in-jodhpur-from-sept-5-to-7
2. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/jaipur/ahilyabai-holkar-statue-unveiled-on-jmc-h-initiative/articleshow/121541829.cms

Disclaimer: The views expressed here are the author’s personal views, and do not necessarily represent the views of Sabrangindia.

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According to the NCRB, suicide remains most prevalent among daily wage earners, housewives, and students. These descriptions are not only about occupational status, but reflections on India’s social hierarchies. The “daily wage earner,” who made up 26.4% of all suicide victims in 2023, is the precarious worker, buried in debt, inflation, and insecure employment. The “housewife,” at nearly 14.7%, is a symbol for unpaid domestic labour under patriarchal control and social isolation. The “student,” accounting for 8.5% of total suicides, demonstrates the systemic public and private failure to provide a humane education and mental health support. For the NCRB, these are merely descriptive occupational categories, yet they carry moral and political significance; they are indicators of whose despair is acknowledged and whose is not.

Numbers without Context

The NCRB identifies “family problems” (32%) and “illness” (18%) as primary contributors to suicide. This seems simple on paper – family dysfunction and health issues. However, these classifications conceal more than they disclose. What the Bureau calls “family problems” may include domestically violent behaviour, dowry harassment, or control related to one’s gender. “Illness” likely includes untreated depression among other illnesses, stigma related to disability, and traumatic, life-changing events. Then, stripped of the structural analysis, we easily convert the collective suffering to private pathology in the data.

There is no clearer example of this than student suicides. In 2023, India reported 13,044 student suicides, or about 36 a day, with Maharashtra (2,578) and Tamil Nadu (1,982) having the highest number, followed by Madhya Pradesh (1,668). These states have the largest educational ecosystems, or competition for schools, outside of state-controlled educational ecosystems. Similar patterns recur beneath the statistics: students migrating from rural to urban centres; that caste-based discrimination continues as students are excluded to elite institutions in various ways, if they are even included; and pressures from family about economics that bar a young person’s choice to attend school prevent their abilities to enjoy school, carry their anxieties into learning spaces when they keep “school pressures” from family. The NCRB does not ask whether “academic pressure” is systemically tilted “equal” – it is not.

In February 2024, the Supreme Court released its comprehensive Guidelines on the Mental Health of Students, citing what it referred to as an “epidemic of psychological distress” on campuses across India. The Court called upon universities and colleges to create counselling cells, train faculty to identify early indicators of distress, and implement systems that can protect students from discrimination that may take place on the basis of caste, gender, or the socio-economic status of their family of origin. These Guidelines were developed as an extension of the Court’s findings in Sukdeb Saha v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2024), in which it explained that the State has a “positive constitutional obligation” under Articles 21 and 21A to ensure mental well-being in educational and workplace environments. A detailed summary done by CHMLP can be read here. In that case, the Court condemned the State’s failure to create a coherent national framework for the prevention of student suicides, in particular to direct the states to view student suicide as a consequence of policy failure rather than a private tragedy.

These pronouncements reaffirm a simple truth that the NCRB’s data failed to reveal: student suicides are not individual personal crises but expressions of collective neglect, of caste hierarchy, and of inadequate mental health infrastructure. Nonetheless, and despite these judicial interventions, implementation remains inconsistent, as most such institutions continue to treat mental health services as optional, rather than as the institutional responsibility they need to understand it as.

The Silence around Farmer Suicides and those of Workers

The way the NCRB handles farmer suicides chillingly captures the politics of omission. In 2023, 12,567 farmers and agricultural labourers died by suicide — a 5% increase from 2022. Maharashtra, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, and Madhya Pradesh made up over 60% of these suicides. Yet again, for every year, the report does not discuss structural causes: falling crop prices, shocks due to climate change, debt, and neglect in policy.

Organisations from civil society, such as the All India Kisan Sabha and P. Sainath’s People’s Archive of Rural India, have documented hundreds of farmer suicides that are absent from the NCRB report. Many suicides are coded under “other professions” or not included at all due to technical reasons of land ownership. Tenant farmers, sharecroppers, and women farmers who do the vast majority of agricultural work are missing. The NCRB’s silence about these deaths is a political act that removes the agrarian crisis from public consciousness by rendering structural violence into an absence in administrative categories.

In a similar vein, the cadre of “daily wage earners” has increased dramatically in the last five years, subsuming what was a more distinct representation of labour distress. It now includes construction workers, gig workers, sanitation workers, and small artisans who are all trapped in elements of insecurity. That nearly one in four people who commit suicide in India are daily wage earners, should not be an observation of a statistical trend, but a reproach of an economy that cares more for productivity than for people.

The Unseen Intersections of Caste, Gender, and Mental Health

By refusing to break suicide data down by caste identity, the NCRB obscures an understanding of mental distress in terms of social humiliation and exclusion. For instance, the case of Darshan Solanki, a student at IIT Bombay, who died by suicide in 2023, was widely identified in news reports as a death resulting from caste discrimination, but it would not be categorized under anything official. Likewise, the suicides of Dalit and Adivasi students across medical and technical institutions in India, who endure daily micro-aggressions from their peer groups in the form of “competition,”, also go undocumented in suicides that become of relevance to national statistics.

Gender issues exacerbate susceptibility. The relation between domestic violence, demands for dowry, and emotional abuse remains the most consistent factor for women in suicide. Yet, the label “housewife” that the NCRB has categorized those women under is a clear indication of biased and patriarchal categorization that sits below the level of humanity when suffering is reduced to a bureaucratic category. By neglecting to label intimate partner violence and coercion within marriage as a cause, the Bureau also erases the structural violence that is encountered in everyday life.

Despite the passage of the Mental Healthcare Act of 2017, mental health continues to be an undercurrent in policy and also data collected for the report. Governments allocate less than 1% of total health spending to mental health for community mental health services, which should be alarming. The NCRB noted “mental illness” as a cause for suicide in only 4.1% of suicides recorded in the annual report, and experts recognize this figure is severely understated. What this illustrates is not a rethinking of resilience, but denial. The state can measure death, rather than despair.

Disappearing the Crisis

Data manipulation encompasses not only the omission of unpleasant cases but also the reclassification of data. In 2023, several states, including Maharashtra and Telangana, reported a decline in farmer suicides due to “better welfare delivery,” although independent reports indicated a mostly correspondingly higher number. Similarly, the circumstances leading to a decline in cybercrime in Mumbai were simply reclassified to generate an 11.7% decrease in cybercrime. Suicides are often reclassified into other occupations or left unqualified to further the claims of administrative success.

The sanitization of statistics is part of a larger pattern: the act of withholding documentation to showcase progress. In Jammu & Kashmir, in 2023, the NCRB reported zero counts of communal violence and non-sedition prosecutions, while hundreds of detentions were conducted under the Public Safety Act.  Further, the NCRB stopped collecting data on lynchings and hate crimes from 2017 onwards, stating that the data collected was “unreliable”. By deciding what “counts,” the state ultimately will dictate what “counts” as a national issue.

Toward a Politics of Care

While the NCRB’s Crime in India report quantifies violence enacted by other people, Accidental Deaths and Suicides in India quantifies violence enacted by systems — by poverty, patriarchy, and policy. Still, states treat these deaths not as a social emergency, but as a statistical inevitability. A humane interpretation of the numbers insists that we view suicide not as the failing of an individual, but as the failing of governance.

There are still signs of resilience. Grassroots organizations like Kisan Mitra Helpline, Students’ Collective for Mental Health, and SNEHA have sought to offer mental health counselling, debt mediation, and legal aid to communities at risk. The Supreme Court’s latest directions to improve student mental health are also positive, but without an investment in a mental health infrastructure, these are largely symbolic.

To address India’s suicide epidemic, policy needs to shift from counting deaths to preventing deaths. This requires an acknowledgement of the structural nature of despair, deeply rooted in inequity of wealth, caste humiliation, and gendered violence, and a reimagining of the welfare state as one of care, rather than control. Until then, each number in the NCRB’s ledger will remain an indictment of a country that is still growing but not healing.

The Accidental Deaths and Suicides in India report serves a dual purpose, chronicling suffering and depoliticizing it. Each suicide occurs as an isolated act, separated from the systems that created it. The result is a perception of neutrality; the data is both the proof and the excuse.

The judgment in Sukdeb Saha v. State of Andhra Pradesh can be read here.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Preksha Bothara)

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The petitioner Masoom Raza, practicing advocate in Bihar, told the Sabrang India that the scheme as an “arbitrary sanction and timed execution” of a 2,500 Crore fund aimed at 25 lakh women beneficiaries. The petitioner further said that this action is not a “legitimate welfare measure” but a “calculated exercise in electoral inducement” designed to “destroy the ‘level playing field'” for the election.

The petition names the State of Bihar, the Election Commission of India (ECI), the Chief Electoral Officer of Bihar, the Department of Rural Development, and the Bihar Rural Livelihoods Promotion Society (JEEVIKA) as respondents.

What is the scheme and why is it being challenged?

The PIL provides a detailed timeline to support its claims. The MMRY scheme was given Cabinet approval on August 29, 2025, to provide a non-refundable grant of 10,000 rupees to one woman per family for self-employment.

The petitioner’s challenge focuses on the timing of the implementation:

September 20, 2025 – The Rural Development Department (RDD) issued a letter confirming a “high-profile online launch” for the first instalment transfer, scheduled for September 26, 2025, with the presence of the Hon’ble Prime Minister and Chief Minister.

September 29, 2025 – JEEVIKA issued an office order scheduling a “single, massive Direct Benefit Transfer (DBT) of 2500 Crore” to 25 lakh beneficiaries on October 3, 2025.

October 6, 2025 – The Election Commission of India announced the schedule for the Bihar Assembly Elections, 2025, bringing the Model Code of Conduct (MCC) into “immediate effect”. The MCC, Part VII, Clause (v), prohibits ministers and authorities from sanctioning “grants/payments out of discretionary funds” after elections are announced.

The petition alleges that despite the MCC coming into force on October 6, the state continued to execute the disbursement in a “staggered manner”. The PIL cites a Direct Benefit Transfer timeline, showing that post-MCC fund transfers were initiated on October 17, October 24, and October 31, 2025.

The petition argues this demonstrates a mala fide decision to ensure the financial grant operates as an inducement during the polling phases. It also notes that the same timeline indicates a further disbursement is scheduled for November 7, 2025, necessitating “urgent judicial intervention”.

What are the specific allegations of wrongdoing?

Beyond the timing, the petition also raises serious questions about the scheme’s implementation, alleging it was procedurally flawed and led to corruption.

The PIL argues that the scheme’s guidelines improperly delegate the core executive function of ground-level beneficiary verification to “non-governmental” and “non-statutory” functionaries known as “Community Mobilisers (CMs)”. The petition claims this delegation is arbitrary and ultra vires (an act done without legal authority), creating a fundamental flaw in the scheme’s governance.

This hurried and unchecked process, the petition alleges, has resulted in “widespread illegality and mismanagement,” including demands for bribes for application verification. The petition includes multiple news reports as evidence.

These news reports allege that irregularities and extortion demands have marred the implementation of the scheme across several districts. In Bettiah, four employees were dismissed following complaints of “illegal recovery.” In Jamui’s Chakai block, a “Jeevika Didi” (Community Mobiliser) allegedly demanded 250 rupees to process a form, while in Barhat, similar allegations surfaced of demands ranging from 100 rupees for a form to 2,000 rupees from the 10,000 rupees grant, with an audio clip of a CM allegedly seeking money reportedly going viral.

In Beldaur, women from multiple Self-Help Groups in Sukhaybasa village claimed they were denied benefits after refusing to pay a “nazarana” (offering or bribe) of 1,000 rupees per member to a Jeevika employee.

Prevent the misuse of “money of the taxpayers” and protect the “sacrosanct fundamental right of fair election

The petitioner, states that he has no “personal interest” in the case and is acting in the public interest to prevent the misuse of “money of the taxpayers” and protect the “sacrosanct fundamental right of fair election”.

The PIL prayed High Court to issue several directions:

1. Stop further payments: an order directing the State of Bihar, the RDD, and JEEVIKA to “immediately cease and desist” from all further fund disbursements under the MMRY scheme until the election process is concluded.
2. Enforce the MCC: a direction for the Election Commission of India (ECI) to take “prompt, decisive, and mandatory action” against the state for the “egregious breach” of the Model Code of Conduct. The PIL also notes the ECI’s alleged “failure to act” on a formal complaint filed by RJD Leader Shri Manoj Jha on October 31, 2025.
3. Investigate corruption: an order to constitute an “Independent Fact-Finding Committee” to inquire into the scheme’s verification process, the delegation of authority to CMs, and the “widespread allegations of illegal demands, corruption, and bribery”.
4. Demand records: a direction for the state to file a “detailed Compliance Affidavit” providing all original administrative records, including a complete list of beneficiaries sanctioned before the MCC was enforced (October 6, 2025) and a separate list of all beneficiaries who received payments after that date.

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The post PIL filed in the Patna High Court, claims the MMR Yojana was used to influence voters by making payments after the MCC was in effect appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The complaint, addressed to the Chief Electoral Officer (Telangana), the Director General of Police (Telangana), and the Chief Election Commissioner, details how Kumar used the BJP’s roadshow at Borabanda Crossroads, Jubilee Hills, to launch a series of public remarks that demeaned Islamic religious practices while glorifying Hindu identity as a test of authenticity and courage.

Among his most inflammatory statements were:

“If a day comes when I must wear a skull cap for votes, I’d rather cut off my head.”

“I’m an unapologetic Hindu — I won’t insult other faiths by faking a namaz.”

He further mocked Chief Minister Revanth Reddy and a Congress candidate for wearing skull caps, questioning their sincerity and daring them to “prove their Hindu courage” by visiting temples with Muslim leaders.

CJP’s complaint deemed these remarks to be “a textbook example of hate speech” and a direct violation of the Model Code of Conduct (MCC), the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (RPA), and the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS).

Religious mockery as political appeal

According to the complaint, Kumar’s statements do not merely express religious pride — they constitute a deliberate and divisive appeal to religion for electoral gain. By contrasting “unapologetic Hindu authenticity” with “fake Muslim gestures,” the speech urges voters to make electoral choices based on religious identity rather than policy or performance.

CJP has alleged violations under:

• Section 123(3) (appeal on religious grounds) and Section 123(3A) (promotion of enmity) of the RPA,
• Section 125 (offence of promoting enmity between classes in elections),
• and Sections 196, 297, and 356 of the BNS, which criminalise promoting enmity, public mischief, and deliberate insult to religion.

The complaint notes that these remarks, made at a public, recorded, and widely disseminated campaign event, fall squarely within the ambit of hate speech and constitute both a criminal offence and an electoral malpractice.

Erosion of Constitutional values

CJP’s complaint situates the incident within the constitutional mandate of secularism and equality, citing Articles 14, 15, 19, 21, and 25 of the Constitution. It argues that by mocking the skull cap and namaz, Kumar has not only insulted the religious sentiments of a community but has also degraded the dignity of Muslim citizens, violating their rights to equality, dignity, and free profession of religion.

Quoting the Supreme Court’s judgment in Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen (2017), CJP reminds the ECI that “religion cannot be used to influence the choice of voters — even indirectly.” Kumar’s remarks, it states, are not “expressions of faith” but “acts of public provocation designed to divide voters and delegitimise inclusivity.”

Impact on the electoral climate

The Jubilee Hills constituency, home to a diverse and interfaith electorate, has already witnessed heightened polarisation. CJP provides that Kumar’s remarks risk inflaming communal sentiments, intimidating minority voters, and damaging the fairness and integrity of the election.

The complaint further asserts that the remarks have the potential to chill interfaith coexistence by equating expressions of respect (like wearing a skull cap) with betrayal, while valorising exclusivist religious assertion as political bravery.

CJP’s demands

CJP has urged the Election Commission and state authorities to act swiftly and decisively:

1. Take cognisance of the video evidence of the Jubilee Hills roadshow and register an FIR under relevant provisions of the RPA and BNS.
2. Debar Bandi Sanjay Kumar from further campaigning pending inquiry.
3. Issue a public censure to the BJP and all political parties to refrain from religiously provocative campaigning.
4. Forward the complaint to the ECI for further constitutional action under Article 324.

Reclaiming the secular spirit of elections

CJP emphasised the dangerous descent into hate-driven politics as dangerous by providing that when a political leader declares that wearing a skull cap merits decapitation and ridicules namaz as performance, it ceases to be political speech — it becomes humiliation, hate, and a constitutional offence. Through this complaint, CJP calls upon the Election Commission to reaffirm its constitutional duty to keep elections secular, equal, and dignified — ensuring that faith remains a matter of conscience, not a tool for votes.

The Complaint can be read here:

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The post From Campaign Trail to Communal Provocation: CJP files complaint against Bandi Sanjay Kumar for divisive campaigning in Hyderabad by-election appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Over 35 locations witnessed coordinated demonstrations led by the Bombay Catholic Sabha (BCS) — one of the largest lay organisations representing Catholics in Maharashtra. The participants gathered outside churches carrying placards reading “My Faith, My Right” and “Don’t Criminalise Compassion”, expressing alarm that the proposed Bill—while claiming to curb “forced” conversions—could, in effect, criminalise voluntary expressions of faith, humanitarian work, and social service. The BCS is one of the largest organisations of the Catholic laity representing as many as 68,000 believers.

‘A Violation of Article 25’: The constitutional concern

As per the press note released by BCS, protestors underscored that the Bill represents a direct affront to Article 25 of the Constitution of India, which guarantees “freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise, and propagate religion.”

BCS spokesperson Dolphy D’Souza stated that the law’s vague and sweeping provisions could “interfere with an individual’s personal choice of faith” and “open the door for surveillance, policing, or discrimination against religious minorities.” D’Souza described the Bill as “a misnomer — there is no freedom in the so-called Freedom of Religion Bill,” adding that it risks chilling constitutional rights by blurring the line between legitimate religious activity and alleged conversion.

Newly elected President, BCS, Norbert Mendonca, stated to Sabrangindia,” We organised this this peaceful protest to affirm our commitment to constitutional values, religious freedom and  liberty, and communal harmony, and to appeal to the Government of Maharashtra to withdraw any move that infringes upon these rights.”

‘Every act of compassion could be misinterpreted’

From the people present at the protest, unifying fear emerged: that ordinary acts of kindness, charity, or social work could be weaponised as evidence of ‘inducement’ or ‘allurement’.

According to the BCS press note, the proposed Bill “threatens to criminalise compassion,” warning that “every act of kindness could be misinterpreted or maliciously portrayed as an attempt at conversion.”

This sentiment reverberated through the protest at St Michael’s Church, Mahim, one of the major protest sites, where BCS members explained that schools, hospitals, and welfare institutions run by Christian organisations serve people of all faiths. “Our work is motivated by faith and humanitarian concern — not conversion,” said one participant. “But under this Bill, even that service could be labelled inducement.”

‘Misuse and Targeting’: A familiar pattern

While the text of Maharashtra’s Bill has not yet been made public, Global Bihari noted that BCS apprehensions are informed by experiences in other states where similar “Freedom of Religion” laws have been introduced — including Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, and Uttarakhand.

In Uttar Pradesh, the 2021 Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act has led to multiple FIRs and arrests. In May 2024, the Supreme Court observed that several provisions “may seem to be violative of Article 25,” staying further proceedings in certain FIRs. In Madhya Pradesh, the High Court in November 2022 declared Section 10 of its Freedom of Religion Act, 2021 — which required prior declaration before conversion — prima facie unconstitutional, with the Supreme Court refusing to stay that order in 2023.

Community Voices: Between fear and faith

The protests were marked not by confrontation but by prayer, song, and civic solidarity. At Our Lady of the Rosary Church in Goregaon (West), Free Press Journal reported that even non-Christian citizens joined the demonstration. Among them were civic and human rights activist Prof. Arvind Nigale, Gandhian Jayant Diwan, Rashtra Seva Dal convenor Umesh Kadam, environmental activist Mannan Desai, and Abu Shaikh from Jamaat-e-Islami, Goregaon — underscoring a rare show of interfaith unity.

In Mahim, Mid-Day report captured the mood poignantly: “This is not about aggression but awareness,” said Vinod Noronha of BCS. “Many people still do not know what this Bill is about. Our protest is to awaken civic consciousness, not to divide.”

Former BCS president Rita D’Sa added, “We would have actually liked to see inter-faith dialogue and goodwill. Instead, this Bill creates suspicion.”

‘A political diversion from real issues’

Beyond religious freedom, protestors questioned the political intent behind the legislation. As per the press note, it was provided that “While the stated aim of the Bill is to prevent forced or fraudulent conversions  experiences from other states suggests such laws in practice, could be used to harass faith-based groups, charitable institutions, or individuals who are simply practising their faith, especially in minority communities.”

It was further provided that such laws can be used selectively to harass minority groups, mirroring patterns seen elsewhere. “If the intent was merely to stop coercion, there would be no need for a new law. We already have adequate provisions in the Penal Code to deal with force or fraud.”

A retired Assistant Commissioner of Police, Joe Gaikwad, summed up the mood with quiet defiance while speaking to Mid-day: “If there was any conversion, it was from hate to love, from sinfulness to salvation. This is a peaceful community.”

‘Faith Does Not Require Permission’

As the gatherings drew to a close, participants joined in hymns and prayers. D’Souza’s concluding invocation, as quoted by Mid-Day, resonated across the crowd: “We pray, Lord, in your wisdom that you enlighten the minds of our leaders. Be with us in this moment of anxiety and grief. Let there be peace on earth.”

But this was no end — merely a beginning. The BCS announced a continuing campaign, with the next awareness event scheduled for November 16 at I.C. Colony, Borivali, as reported by all three outlets.

In its official press note, the BCS stated: “Our efforts will continue. The very title of the Bill is misleading — it is not a ‘Freedom of Religion’ law but a means to harass minorities. We will network with other religious communities and citizens of goodwill to defend the constitutional right to freedom of conscience.”

A broader warning

Beyond the Catholic community, the protest has become a bellwether for civil liberties in Maharashtra. Citizens for Justice and Peace, the lead on the case challenging various State anti-Conversion laws that remains pending before the Supreme Court, has warned that anti-conversion laws — though couched in the language of protection — often rely on vague and subjective terms such as “inducement,” “allurement,” and “coercion,” which invite misuse and threaten the presumption of personal autonomy. If enacted in its current form, the organisation fears that Maharashtra’s proposed law may replicate the chilling effects seen in northern states — discouraging interfaith marriages, constraining charitable activity, and empowering local authorities to surveil minority groups.

For the citizens gathered outside churches that Sunday, the message was clear: Faith is not a crime, compassion is not a threat, and constitutional freedom is not negotiable.

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The post ‘Faith Is Not a Crime’: Mumbai’s Christians rise against Maharashtra’s proposed anti-conversion bill appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Announcing this, senior High Court advocate Anand Yagnik, who heads the Gujarat chapter of the People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL), said that a committee has already been formed to examine the pros and cons of SIR. “While the SIR exercise began in Gujarat on November 4 and is scheduled to continue for a month, we will file a supporting petition in the case against SIR in the Gujarat High Court or the Supreme Court after observing how it proceeds in the state,” he said.

Yagnik’s announcement followed senior advocate Shahrukh Alam—who is arguing the SIR case in the Supreme Court—urging Gujarat’s civil society to also file a petition. She said there was an urgent need to create public awareness and build pressure against SIR, especially in the apex court, and that this could only be achieved if petitions were filed from different states.

Supporting the view of Gujarat activists that SIR is an exercise aimed at excluding marginalized sections from the electoral rolls, Alam said that the SIR, which began ahead of the Bihar elections despite a revision having already taken place in January, should be seen against the backdrop of an overall attack on democracy, freedom of speech, and the Constitution itself. However, she regretted that the political class remains “largely indifferent” to what is happening.

According to Alam, “We must remember that the space for free speech is shrinking—universities are cancelling lectures and refusing discussions. The state is seeking to decide everything: what to wear, what to eat, whom to marry. Exercises like the UCC, NRC, and actions around Waqf are all about the state deciding your identity. Today, state endorsement has become essential for everything. We are living as if in an open jail.”

Continuing, Alam said that in the same vein, it is now the state that seeks to decide whether one is a voter or not. “Civil society must take up the larger issues around SIR. Voting is based on the universal adult franchise, and it has always been the state’s job to ensure that no eligible citizen is left out. But now, the burden is being shifted—citizens are being asked to prove they are voters by submitting citizenship documents. The state is abdicating its responsibility,” she said.

Alam questioned why the ECI spent a huge amount of public money to revise the electoral rolls in Bihar in January, only to begin another “intensive revision” within six months, allegedly to “purify” the rolls. “Who is accountable for this waste of public funds? The ECI has not been questioned on this,” she emphasized.

On the legal front, Alam noted that while the ECI has the right to create electoral rolls, problems arise when it makes it mandatory for individuals to prove citizenship to qualify as voters. The ECI claims it will verify this on the basis of 11 documents, excluding Aadhaar and ration cards. “The ECI cannot act arbitrarily,” Alam asserted. “The Representation of the People Act merely requests citizens to assist in creating complete electoral lists. For 70 years, teachers went door-to-door recording names without asking for documents. Now, the onus has been reversed—each resident must prove citizenship.”

Countering the ECI’s initial claim that SIR aimed to remove “infiltrators,” Alam said, “Only three infiltrators were found.” When challenged, the ECI changed its justification, saying it was to “remove dead people” from the rolls. “But even that proved flawed—instances of deceased individuals remaining on the lists continued. The Supreme Court has yet to hear the case, even though Aadhaar has now been allowed,” she added.

Addressing the meeting, Sarfarazuddin of PUCL Bihar, who played a key role in opposing the ECI, called the exercise “dangerous” and “without legal basis.” He said it began in Bihar on June 24, requiring individuals to verify that they were on the 2003 electoral list to remain eligible voters. “No rationale was given. The timing was deliberate—monsoon floods begin after June-end. Would people save their lives or their documents in such a situation?” he asked.

He explained that block-level officers (BLOs) distributed enumeration forms requiring verification from 2003. In the absence of that, 11 alternative documents were allowed—but Aadhaar and ration cards were excluded, while passports, school-leaving certificates, birth certificates, and residence proofs were accepted.

“This was designed to exclude marginalized communities,” he said. “The Manjhi community, for instance, has only about 10 percent literacy. How can they be expected to comply? Many people had to bribe officials to get documents, leading to rampant corruption.”

In an instance of how marginalized sections are being excluded, Sarfarazuddin said that an 86-year-old poor woman’s name was missing from the draft voter list, following which her widow pension was also stopped. “Women are likely to suffer the most because of SIR,” he warned. “The ECI requires parents’ proof as one of the 11 documents. How do poor married women cope with this?”

He recounted an incident in a Muslim locality where residents protested after their duly completed forms were rejected. “A schoolteacher acting as BLO called her superior and said, ‘You told us not to accept Muslims’ forms. People are protesting—what do I do?’ Embarrassed, the officer told her to accept all the forms,” he said.

Similar protests were reported elsewhere. Initially, 64 lakh voters were found excluded in the revised draft. Following protests and legal interventions in the Supreme Court, many were restored, but the case remains pending. “This will be a long, drawn-out battle,” said Sarfarazuddin. “The ECI knows it has erred, but it has made it a prestige issue.”

Mujahid Nafees, who heads the Minority Coordination Committee and is PUCL Gujarat’s general secretary, pointed out that thousands of houses of fisherfolk on Bet Dwarka were demolished, though residents had Aadhaar cards with those addresses. “No one knows what will happen to their voting rights now,” he said.

Another Gujarat activist, Pankti Jog of the Association for Democratic Reforms, questioned how the ECI plans to “purify” electoral rolls amid Gujarat’s large-scale internal migration. Economist Hemant Shah asked whether the ECI’s aim was to prepare a voters’ list or to assess citizenship.

Courtesy: Counter View

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According to a report by PTI, the devotees were stopped after crossing into Pakistan through the Attari–Wagah border. Officials allegedly told them, “You are Hindu, you cannot go with a Sikh jatha.” Amar Chand, one of those turned back along with six family members, said that despite having valid travel documents and clearance from Indian immigration, they were refused entry once inside Pakistan.

As per the Hindustan Times report, the jatha of around 1,900 Sikh pilgrims had crossed into Pakistan on Tuesday to participate in the Parkash Purb festivities. Chand’s family, along with seven others from Lucknow, had joined the group intending to offer prayers at prominent gurdwaras, including Nankana Sahib. However, all 14 were sent back by Pakistani officials soon after entering.

As per the HT report, a Punjab intelligence officer posted at the border confirmed the incident, saying: “Those denied entry are Hindus by faith, originally from Pakistan but settled in India for many years. They held valid Indian passports and had obtained immigration clearance from our side. Once they entered Pakistan, officials there examined their documents and returned them to the BSF.”

Interestingly, other Hindu devotees in the same jatha faced no such problems. Palwinder Singh, head of the pilgrimage department of the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (SGPC), which organises the largest pilgrim groups, clarified:

“Nearly 40 Hindus are part of our group this year, and almost all entered Pakistan without any issue. Many Hindu followers of Guru Nanak travel every year for these pilgrimages — they have never been barred on the basis of religion.”

The SGPC jatha will remain in Pakistan until November 13, visiting key Sikh shrines including Gurdwara Panja Sahib (Hasan Abdal), Gurdwara Darbar Sahib (Kartarpur, Narowal), Gurdwara Sacha Sauda (Farooqabad), Gurdwara Dehra Sahib (Lahore), and Gurdwara Rori Sahib (Gujranwala).

Amar Chand recounted that his family had even paid ₹95,000 (Pakistani rupees) for bus tickets after clearing all formalities. “Five officials came and told us to get down from the bus, saying Hindus can’t go with Sikh pilgrims. We were then sent back, and our money was not refunded,” he said. Chand, originally from Pakistan, moved to India in 1999 and obtained Indian citizenship in 2010.

Meanwhile, more than 200 other applicants were stopped at the Indian side of the border as they lacked final approval from the Union Home Ministry.

Earlier, the Indian government had initially decided against sending any jatha to Pakistan this year citing security concerns after Operation Sindoor. However, it later allowed a limited group to proceed under strict conditions.

Under the 1950 Nehru–Liaquat Pact, Sikh pilgrims are permitted to visit Pakistan’s revered shrines on four key occasions each year — Baisakhi, Guru Arjan Dev’s martyrdom day, Maharaja Ranjit Singh’s death anniversary, and Guru Nanak Dev’s birth anniversary.

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The post Pakistan denies entry to 14 Hindu devotees in Sikh ‘jatha’ visiting for Guru Nanak Jayanti appeared first on SabrangIndia.