In this conversation, activist and journalist Teesta Setalvad speaks with Rhiya Ahir, whose act of standing in front of a police van carrying detained protesters during the July 2026 student protests became one of the defining images of the movement.

Rhiya reflects on what compelled her to step forward, where courage comes from and why fear cannot become a reason for citizens to remain silent. Teesta speaks about the resolve it takes to stand up to power in difficult times.

The post ‘We Cannot Be Afraid’: Rhiya Ahir in Conversation with Teesta Setalvad appeared first on SabrangIndia.

According to his parents, Aditya was interested in joining the protest because he believed students were facing injustice. The couple decided to accompany him rather than prevent him from participating. The family travelled to Dak Bungalow Chowk by auto rickshaw and remained together during the demonstration.

Patna Police, however, have denied that the child was detained, saying he was rescued from a potentially dangerous situation at the protest site and later handed over safely to his family. The incident was reported by The Wire, which spoke to the child’s parents and the police.

Police say child was rescued

The Patna Police, in a press release issued on August 26, rejected social media claims that the child had been detained. According to the police, protesters had moved towards a restricted area and attempted to break through or remove barricades. Police said that amid the situation, they spotted a child at the protest site and intervened to protect him from the crowd and the possibility of a stampede. The police said the child was subsequently handed over to his family “safe and sound”. The family’s account differs.

Ranjit and Munni told The Wire that police first attempted to take Aditya away during the protest. According to them, media persons present at the spot intervened, following which the child was allowed to remain with them. Someone later gave Aditya a tricolour, which he began waving. When some protesters climbed onto a police bus that had reportedly been brought to detain protesters, Aditya also climbed onto the bus and continued waving the national flag. Ranjit said he subsequently took his son and attempted to leave the protest site.

According to him, police approached them and told him that his wife was waiting for him. He and Aditya followed the police and were subsequently placed in an ambulance along with Munni. The family says they were initially told they would be taken home. Instead, they were taken to the Kotwali police station, which is around 500 metres from Dak Bungalow Chowk.

Family alleges assault at police station

The parents have alleged that they were kept at the police station for several hours and assaulted by police personnel. Ranjit told The Wire that he and his wife were taken into a small room where around six police personnel were present, including four women police officers. He alleges that police personnel assaulted both him and his wife.

According to his account, officers instructed female personnel on how to beat Munni. He alleges that officers stepped on her legs and that he was beaten on the soles of his feet and hands with a baton. He also alleged that he was pushed to the ground, struck on his back and hit below the waist. Ranjit said the alleged assault lasted around 15 minutes.

“They treated us as if we were hardened criminals,” he told The Wire.

Munni separately alleged that police kicked her in the abdomen despite her having undergone a Caesarean-section delivery. Ranjit said he pleaded with the police to stop assaulting his wife.

The police have denied the allegations. Kotwali SHO Ajay Kumar told The Wire that no assault took place inside the police station. Responding to questions about injury marks on Munni’s body, he said the injuries could have been sustained during the protest itself.

Aditya kept asking about his parents

According to his father, Aditya himself was not assaulted at the police station. Ranjit said the child was offered biscuits and chocolates but refused them. Instead, he repeatedly asked to be allowed to stay with his parents. He also questioned police about why his parents had been beaten after seeing their injuries, according to Ranjit. The family says Aditya remained calm despite the situation.

His father told The Wire that the six-year-old has previously shown an interest in participating in protests. Aditya had also participated in an RJD-organised march in Patna on August 19, according to his parents.

Ranjit also claimed that Aditya’s actions during the August 25 protest had attracted police attention. According to him, police had lathi-charged protesters during the demonstration and some teacher aspirants suffered head injuries. Ranjit said Aditya asked in front of media persons who had ordered the lathi-charge. He further alleged that when a police officer was leaving the protest site, Aditya questioned him about where he was going after the alleged incident. According to Ranjit, police later asked the parents at the police station why their child had been asking about the injured protesters and the lathi-charge.

Mother taken to hospital

Munni reportedly became unwell while at the police station and complained of anxiety. Ranjit said he informed the police, who brought water for her. According to the family, she was subsequently taken to New Gardiner Road Hospital, a government hospital located around 500 metres from the police station. Munni told The Wire that two women police personnel accompanied her to the hospital.

She alleged that she was advised not to tell the doctor that she had been beaten at the police station. According to Munni, she did not tell the doctor about the alleged assault because she felt intimidated in the presence of police personnel. She was treated at the hospital and given a prescription. Munni alleges that the police took the prescription, telling her that it would later be given to her husband. She says the prescription was never returned.

The SHO denied the allegation that police had taken the prescription, saying that such a document normally remains with the patient. After her treatment, Munni was taken back to the police station. The family says they were finally released at around 8 pm and reached their home at around 9 pm.

Ranjit has further alleged that before their release, he and his wife were made to sign a written document. According to him, the document stated that strict action could be taken if Aditya participated in a protest in the future. He also claims that it stated that police could summon the parents for questioning at any time. Ranjit said he did not know the full contents of the document he had signed. The family also alleges that police instructed them not to speak about what had happened inside the police station.

Protest over TRE-4

The protest was organised by teacher aspirants who are opposed to changes announced by the Bihar Public Service Commission for the upcoming TRE-4 examination. Under the new pattern, the examination is to be conducted in two stages, while negative marking will continue in objective examinations. The protesting aspirants have demanded that the examination instead be conducted as a single examination and without negative marking.

On August 25, they began marching from Gandhi Maidan towards Chief Minister Samrat Choudhary’s residence. The protesters broke through police barricades during the march and reached Dak Bungalow Chowk, where police action followed. Aditya joined the protesters there with his parents.

Family now fears police harassment

Ranjit and Munni are a working-class couple. Ranjit has studied until Class 4 and works as a daily-wage labourer, earning around Rs 500 a day. Munni works as a domestic worker. The family lives in a single rented room. Aditya is their only child and studies in Class 1 at a private school. According to his parents, he enjoys Mathematics, Hindi and English and keeps a copy of the Constitution. The family says the events of August 25 have left them fearful of further police action. Ranjit told The Wire that he has stopped going to work for several days because he fears that police could arrest or assault him again. The family also says they did not eat or sleep properly after returning home that night. Munni said they kept wondering what they had done wrong. The family is now reportedly avoiding staying at home because of fears of police harassment.

Advocate Shivnandan Bharti, who is planning to file a writ petition concerning the incident, has described it as a case of illegal detention and questioned why the child was not simply handed over to his parents if the police intervention was solely for his safety.

Related:

Water Cannons Instead of Answers: Bihar’s recruitment crisis and the state’s crackdown on protest

Amnesty Investigation finds unlawful and deadly force against CJP-led protesters in Delhi and Siwan

Inside the SSP’s Office: Allegations of beatings, torture & police impunity against farmer leaders in Meerut, UP

Address Discrimination & Hate Crimes India told: CERD, UN

The post Six-year-old detained during Patna teacher aspirants’ protest, parents allege police assault appeared first on SabrangIndia.

According to KPSS, a communication dated August 23 and attributed to an outfit calling itself the United Liberation Council (ULC) has surfaced on social media. The communication reportedly carries the names and personal details of Kashmiri Pandit employees. The organisation says security agencies are examining its authenticity and origin, while reports have described the ULC as a suspected Lashkar-e-Taiba-linked proxy. KPSS stresses that irrespective of the eventual findings of the investigation, the circulation of a communication containing identifiable personal information is serious enough to warrant an immediate, transparent and credible security response.

The distinction is important. The press release does not present the authenticity of the threat as an established fact; rather, it calls for the authorities to investigate precisely that question. What KPSS argues is that the potential danger cannot be measured merely by whether the communication is ultimately proven genuine. The very fact that personal details of individuals are allegedly being circulated in a threatening context raises questions about how the information was obtained, who prepared and disseminated the material, and whether any local network or facilitation was involved.

SabrangIndia’s detailed reports featuring conversations with Sanjay Tickoo, president of the Kashmiri Pandit Sangharsh Samiti, on the two threatening letters can be read here, here and here.

A new medium for an old language of fear

For KPSS, the significance of the episode lies not only in the contents of the alleged threat but in the history it evokes. The organisation draws a direct parallel with the forms of intimidation experienced by Kashmiri Pandits in the 1990s. Threats that once travelled through walls, posters, mosque loudspeakers and whispered warnings can now circulate through social media, digital platforms and encrypted channels. The technology may have changed, but, KPSS argues, the psychological objective remains disturbingly familiar: creating the perception that a Kashmiri Pandit’s birthplace is conditional, his property negotiable, his presence temporary and his safety dependent upon the permission of others.

That history makes the present threat particularly significant for those who have attempted to return to or continue living in the Valley. KPSS argues that a Kashmiri Pandit does not become an outsider because extraordinary circumstances forced him or her to leave an ancestral home. Nor does the passage of decades erase ancestral belonging. The organisation frames the right to remember one’s home, return to it and live there without fear as questions of belonging and security rather than matters for which the community should have to seek permission or sympathy.

‘Brotherhood’ cannot replace protection

The press release also takes issue with recent remarks attributed to BJP General Secretary (Organisation), J&K, Ashok Koul, reportedly made at Tirth Raj Kapal Mochan Nagbal in Shopian while speaking about the return of Kashmiri Pandits and the need for social cohesion. According to KPSS, Koul was reported as saying that “targeted killings won’t stop” while emphasising the need to build brotherhood. KPSS says the statement should not be sensationalised or selectively interpreted, but argues that it nevertheless raises an unavoidable question: what does security mean for a community being encouraged to return if targeted violence is presented as something that may continue?

The organisation’s objection is not to the idea of brotherhood itself. It explicitly recognises social harmony as indispensable. Its argument is that social harmony cannot be treated as a substitute for institutional protection. “Brotherhood” without security, KPSS contends, risks becoming an appeal made to those who are already vulnerable while leaving the structural conditions of that vulnerability untouched. Protection requires functioning security mechanisms, intelligence, accountability and preventive action—not simply assurances following an incident.

The question is therefore not whether Kashmiri Pandits should have faith in their neighbours or in Kashmir’s pluralistic traditions. It is whether institutions can guarantee that such faith does not require them to accept an unacceptable level of risk.

The burden of return

KPSS also highlights what it sees as a contradiction in the political and social discourse surrounding the return of Kashmiri Pandits. The community’s return has frequently been described as essential to restoring Kashmir’s pluralistic character. Yet, the organisation argues, returning Pandits are repeatedly asked to adjust to the prevailing situation; concerns over security are met with assurances that conditions are improving; questions over ancestral property are directed towards the future; and when threats emerge again, those same individuals are expected to display patience and faith.

This leads to the central question posed by the press release: How many times must the victim prove his commitment to Kashmir before Kashmir proves its commitment to him?

For KPSS, the answer cannot be another appeal to resilience. Returning home should not require extraordinary courage. It should be an ordinary exercise of citizenship.

Avoiding collective blame—but not collective denial

The press release is also careful to distinguish between militant violence and the wider Kashmiri population. KPSS states that the majority community should not be collectively held responsible for crimes committed by militants, and that the actions of a few should not be indiscriminately attributed to an entire society. At the same time, however, it argues that society must be willing to examine the environment in which intimidation can emerge, personal information can circulate and threats can again be directed at a vulnerable minority.

This distinction is central to the organisation’s argument. Rejecting collective blame, it suggests, cannot mean refusing to examine the social and institutional conditions that allow threats to emerge or circulate.

The real test of security, KPSS argues, is not the response after violence has occurred but whether warning signs are recognised before they become violence. A society’s commitment to its minority communities cannot be measured only by the solidarity expressed after a killing; it must also be measured by whether people can live, work, worship, own property and return to their homes without having to first become victims for their humanity to be acknowledged.

What investigators must establish

The organisation’s most concrete demand is for scrutiny of the threat itself. Rather than reducing the episode to the question of whether a poster or digital communication is authentic, KPSS asks authorities to establish who prepared it, who circulated it, how the personal details were obtained, whether it represents a genuine operational threat, and whether there was any local facilitation or network involved in its preparation or dissemination.

These questions have a significance beyond this particular incident. If personal information belonging to vulnerable employees has been obtained and circulated in a threatening communication, determining the source and pathway of that information is essential to assessing the seriousness of the threat and preventing further targeting. KPSS consequently characterises these not as political questions but as security questions requiring credible answers.

Return must mean more than physical presence

The final portion of the press release turns from the immediate threat to the larger question of what a meaningful return of Kashmiri Pandits would actually entail. KPSS argues that genuine brotherhood must manifest itself through protection, institutional accountability, social vigilance and an unequivocal rejection of intimidation. It says Kashmiri Pandits do not need ceremonial expressions of solidarity but confidence that their lives will be protected before violence occurs. They also need safeguards for ancestral property and institutions capable of identifying threats before they become fatal.

The organisation’s broader concern is that Kashmir cannot convincingly claim to have moved beyond the past if threats against Kashmiri Pandits continue to reproduce the same underlying fear, even through different mediums and under different circumstances. The question, as KPSS frames it, is stark: will Kashmiri Pandits be able to return and live as equal citizens, or will every return continue to carry the warning that their presence is temporary and their safety uncertain?

Its demands are consequently straightforward: threats must be investigated, security must be guaranteed, personal information must be protected, ancestral property rights must be safeguarded, and the right to return must be treated as a matter of security and justice rather than courage and chance.

The complete press release may be read below:

Related:

‘Wherever You Go, We are watching’: Second threat letter to Kashmiri Pandits

How Can Rehabilitation Work If We Are Not Safe?’ Sanjay Tickoo on the fresh threat to Kashmiri Pandit employees

This is what we feared: Sanjay Tickoo on the rising attacks in Kashmir since March

Pleas of non-migrant Kashmiri Pandits have fallen on deaf ears: Sanjay Tickoo

Time has come to go on fast unto death: Sanjay Tickoo

Kashmiri Pandit leader Sanjay Tickoo talks about Governor’s Rule in J&K

A Kashmiri Pandit fact-checks The Kashmir Files

10 reasons why Kashmiri Pandits feel betrayed in the Valley

The post KPSS: Kashmiri Pandits need security, not ceremonial brotherhood appeared first on SabrangIndia.

But to reduce the events to a story of “students versus police” would obscure the larger crisis. The agitation is rooted in a much deeper and longstanding grievance over recruitment delays, examination irregularities, alleged paper leaks, the changing format of competitive examinations and a lack of confidence in the State’s recruitment machinery.

The violence on August 25 is therefore not an isolated law-and-order episode. It is the latest flashpoint in a protest movement that has been building for weeks — and one that has also produced disturbing allegations of excessive and abusive use of State power.

A protest over jobs, examinations and a system students no longer trust

Students have been holding a sit-in at Patna’s Gardanibagh since August 18. More than a dozen student and youth organisations have joined the agitation, with demands extending across the Bihar Public Service Commission (BPSC), Bihar Staff Selection Commission (BSSC), teacher recruitment and other government examinations.

At the centre of the immediate dispute is the fourth Teacher Recruitment Examination, or TRE-4. Students want the examination to be conducted in a single stage rather than the proposed preliminary-and-main format. They are also demanding the removal of negative marking, greater transparency in recruitment examinations and 100% domicile-based recruitment in government jobs and teacher appointments.

The scale of the recruitment opportunity is significant. The BPSC announced that TRE-4 would cover 32,388 teaching posts. According to The Indian Express, the proposed examination is expected to be held in December 2026 or January 2027, with applications scheduled from September 1 to September 30.  Students have also demanded cancellation of the 70th BPSC examination over alleged irregularities and a paper leak. The BPSC has rejected these allegations, saying that material circulated online was fake. It has also denied allegations of discrimination against Hindi-medium candidates..

Protester Vikas Bhatt, speaking to the media, pointed to the long delays in recruitment for posts such as librarians and the absence of regular examination calendars for several recruitment bodies. The New Indian Express reported his allegation that some recruitment processes announced through the BSSC had remained pending for years. The question confronting the Bihar government is consequently not merely whether students are willing to accept its assurances. It is whether the State has given them sufficient reason to trust those assurances.

The August 25 confrontation

On August 25, more than 1,500 students backed by 17 student organisations marched from the JP Roundabout near Gandhi Maidan under a call to “gherao” the Chief Minister’s residence, according to The Indian Express.  Police had erected barricades at Dak Bungalow Chowk to prevent the protesters from proceeding further. Students pushed through the barricades, leading to a confrontation with the police. The State responded with water cannons and a lathi-charge. Several students were detained. Two police personnel were also injured in the confrontation, according to The Telegraph, which reported that around 25 students were detained and later released without formal charges.

Other reports said students threw stones and that a police officer and a woman constable were injured. The violence cannot be ignored or excused: protesters who attack police personnel or damage public property must be held accountable through lawful procedures. But that does not settle the question of the State’s response.

A democratic government does not acquire unlimited authority merely because a protest becomes disorderly. The use of force must remain lawful, necessary and proportionate. The existence of barricades and a restricted area cannot by itself transform every protesting student into a threat requiring a coercive response.

The images from Patna — students facing lines of police personnel and water cannons — are particularly stark because the protesters were not demanding an overthrow of the constitutional order. They were demanding jobs, recruitment dates, examination reforms and accountability.

When the language of the State becomes dismissive

The confrontation was preceded by another controversy that exposed the widening distance between the administration and the protesters. BPSC Examination Controller Rajesh Kumar Singh, while responding to questions about the agitation, quoted the Hindi proverb: “Haathi chale bazaar, kutta bhaunke hazaar.” Protesters interpreted the remark as comparing them to barking dogs.

Singh subsequently expressed regret and said the statement had been taken out of context. But the Bihar government went further and suspended him following the controversy, according to The New Indian Express.  The suspension is significant. An official responsible for an examination system under intense public scrutiny cannot afford to speak about protesting candidates in language that can reasonably be understood as contemptuous or humiliating. Even if the proverb was not intended literally, the choice of language was extraordinarily insensitive given the circumstances. There is an important democratic principle here: the State must not dehumanise the citizen before it attempts to manage the protest. The students are not an inconvenience to be ignored until the barricades have to be erected. They are citizens raising grievances against institutions that exercise enormous power over their futures.

A much darker story lies behind the August protests

The allegations surrounding police conduct in Bihar go beyond what happened on August 25. A public hearing convened by the Bihar unit of the People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) on August 22 documented testimonies concerning police action during protests between July 21 and July 27.

According to the account published by Counterview, the hearing recorded 19 direct testimonies and allegations spanning physical assault, illegal detention, custodial torture, raids on homes, sexual violence against women protesters and other forms of intimidation. The allegations were made by protesters and activists and should be independently investigated rather than treated as established judicial findings.  The allegations are deeply disturbing. PUCL’s public hearing reportedly documented claims of targeted lathi-charges, police firing, the use of firearms, custodial abuse and violations during arrests and detention. Some testimonies also alleged that women were subjected to misogynistic abuse and physical assault.

There were also allegations concerning raids on homes. According to the report of the hearing, families claimed that police entered residences at night, assaulted residents, damaged property and subjected women to degrading treatment.

These are not allegations that a democratic government can simply dismiss as the inevitable excesses of policing. If even a fraction of these claims is true, the matter goes far beyond “crowd control”. It becomes a question of systemic abuse of police power. The PUCL hearing also raised allegations of discriminatory treatment of Muslims, Scheduled Caste persons, women and activists associated with CPI(ML), as well as allegations involving minors being detained without being produced before the appropriate authorities within legally prescribed timelines. These claims require independent verification and, if substantiated, prosecution and institutional accountability.

Even lawyers allegedly became targets

Perhaps the most alarming allegations concern those attempting to provide legal assistance to protesters. According to the PUCL public hearing account, two PUCL lawyer-members who were providing pro bono assistance to detained protesters were themselves allegedly confined and booked on charges that included liquor consumption and obstructing police duties. They were reportedly handcuffed and paraded in public.

If independently established, such conduct would strike at the heart of the right to legal representation and the functioning of the criminal justice system. Lawyers representing arrested protesters cannot be treated as extensions of the protest movement merely because they are providing legal assistance. A State that intimidates legal aid provider’s risk transforming access to justice itself into a casualty of protest policing.

PUCL has consequently demanded an independent investigation into police action between July 21 and July 27, including allegations of illegal detention, custodial torture, use of firearms and the alleged targeting of its lawyer-members. It has also sought withdrawal of 64 FIRs filed against protesting students and compensation for those injured in firing in Siwan. These demands should not be dismissed as political rhetoric. They warrant an impartial investigation capable of establishing what actually happened.

Detailed report may be read here.

The State cannot answer institutional failure with police power

The central contradiction in Bihar is difficult to miss. The students are protesting because they believe recruitment processes are unreliable. The government’s response has been to insist that their concerns have been addressed while simultaneously deploying a large police presence to prevent them from marching.

On August 25, the government announced the launch of Vidyarthi Sahyog Shivir, student support camps to be held on the fourth Tuesday of every month, along with an online grievance portal and helpline 1100. The stated purpose is to allow students to place their grievances directly before government officials.  Dialogue is welcome. But a grievance mechanism cannot become a substitute for substantive accountability.

Related:

Maharashtra: After backlash, govt. moves to withdraw FIRs against student protesters but questions remain

Youth Uprising: A protest, a brute crackdown, a continuing countrywide response

Mumbai stands with students, but the state pushes back

The exam crisis that became a battle for accountability

Brute Police Action: Mumbai’s crackdown on protestors in solidarity with CJP & Student Groups, AISF, SFI & AISA

The post Water Cannons Instead of Answers: Bihar’s recruitment crisis and the state’s crackdown on protest appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The investigation, released on August 26, draws on witness testimony as well as video and photographic material examined and verified by Amnesty International’s Evidence Lab. According to the organisation, its findings show the use of pellet-firing shotguns, tear gas launchers and grenades, batons, electric shock devices and firearms against protesters between July 20 and July 24 in Delhi and Siwan, Bihar. Amnesty says the manner in which these weapons were deployed breached international human rights standards as well as domestic policing guidelines.

The findings directly challenge the Delhi Police’s public account of the crackdown. Delhi Police had denied allegations of disproportionate force and described its handling of the protest as “professional”, including before the Supreme Court. Amnesty, however, says the evidence it verified contradicts that version of events.

For Amnesty International India Chair Aakar Patel, the episode represents something more serious than a conventional crowd-control operation. He described the authorities’ response as beginning with restrictions on communication, movement and assembly before escalating into what he called unnecessary or excessive force against peaceful protesters, including children. The organisation has characterised the response as “state-sanctioned violence masked as crowd control” and has pointed to the absence of accountability a month later as evidence of continuing impunity.

Evidence of pellet firing

One of the most serious findings concerns the use of shotguns capable of firing pellet ammunition. Amnesty’s Evidence Lab verified 17 videos filmed in central Delhi on July 20, covering areas around Jantar Mantar, Sansad Marg and Connaught Place, as well as two videos from Siwan in Bihar recorded on July 24. The Delhi footage was found to show personnel belonging to the Delhi Police, Rapid Action Force (RAF) and Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF).

Two videos verified by Amnesty show an RAF officer firing a shotgun into a crowd at the Connaught Place–Sansad Marg intersection. Two other verified videos show protesters near the same location with injuries consistent with birdshot wounds. Amnesty also verified CCTV footage showing two RAF officers carrying shotguns elsewhere in the area.

The significance of the finding lies in the nature of the ammunition. Birdshot consists of multiple small metal pellets and is inherently inaccurate, Amnesty says, creating a serious risk not only to the intended target but also to bystanders. The organisation states that birdshot has been associated with deaths and blindness in other contexts and argues that it has no legitimate place in law enforcement.

A protester interviewed by Amnesty described being struck from behind while attempting to flee. According to the testimony, the individual sustained approximately 25 to 30 pellet wounds and required hospital treatment. The protester said doctors confirmed that the injuries were caused by pellets and that the incident had left extensive scarring.

The alleged absence of a warning is also significant. India’s Bureau for Police Research and Development guidelines recommend that security forces warn protesters before deploying less-lethal or lethal force. International standards similarly require law-enforcement agencies to exhaust non-violent means wherever possible and issue a clear warning before resorting to force when circumstances permit. Amnesty says the protester it interviewed reported receiving no warning before the pellet firing.

The allegations had previously been rejected by Delhi Police, which described reports of pellet injuries as “Fake News” and called them “completely false and misleading”. The police also warned that legal action could be taken against those allegedly spreading rumours.

However, the Amnesty investigation comes alongside other reporting cited in the organisation’s findings. The Hindu reported that an RAF unit fired two ballistic cartridges loaded with plastic pellets on the evening of July 20 on the orders of a Deputy Commissioner of Police. An internal CRPF inquiry reportedly found that RAF personnel had fired at least seven rounds containing metal pellets. An RTI response cited by The Hindu indicated that at least ten people were injured by pellets during the protests.

Tear gas used against protesters

Amnesty’s investigation also raises concerns about how tear gas was deployed. One verified video shows a tear gas grenade landing close to a group of protesters and exploding with a heavy blast. Amnesty says another verified sequence showed the grenade exploding immediately after landing near protesters, with one person attempting to escape before being thrown to the ground.

Eyewitnesses told Amnesty that tear gas grenades were fired directly towards protesters rather than being launched at an angle above their heads. The organisation says this is inconsistent with UN guidance on less-lethal weapons. More fundamentally, Amnesty argues that the use of tear gas should be restricted to situations involving widespread and serious violence. While acknowledging that there were isolated incidents of protesters throwing stones, it says the available evidence does not indicate violence on a scale that would meet that threshold.

This distinction is crucial. Crowd-control powers are not unlimited simply because a protest becomes difficult to manage. The question is whether the force used is necessary and proportionate to the threat actually posed. Amnesty’s findings suggest that, in several instances, the authorities crossed that line.

Lathis, including against peaceful protesters

The investigation further documents what Amnesty describes as frequent misuse of long, flexible batons, or lathis. The organisation verified eight videos showing Delhi Police and RAF personnel striking protesters, including a young boy who, according to Amnesty, offered no provocation or resistance. In some instances, officers allegedly struck people indiscriminately across different parts of their bodies. One verified video shows a man who had been knocked to the ground being repeatedly struck while he was unable to move or pose an apparent threat.

Amnesty notes that the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture has described such long flexible batons as inherently cruel, inhuman or degrading because they can deliver greater kinetic force than conventional batons, increasing the risk of serious injury. The investigation also identifies another accountability concern: the presence of plain-clothes men participating in beatings.

In at least two verified videos, men in plain clothes—including some wearing black helmets marked “Delhi Police”—are seen beating protesters with lathis. Uniformed officers appear to escort them towards the crowd but do not intervene, according to Amnesty. The organisation also points to the apparent absence of visible identification such as name tags or badge numbers, which it says violates the principle that law-enforcement officials must be identifiable during encounters involving the use of force.

Electric shock weapons under scrutiny

Amnesty also verified a video showing an RAF officer using an electric shock baton against a peaceful protester. The organisation argues that direct-contact electric shock devices cause severe pain without necessarily incapacitating a person and that there are less harmful alternatives available to law enforcement. Amnesty, together with the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, has called for their complete prohibition because of the risks of severe suffering, psychological harm, lasting disability and, in cases of prolonged use, death.

The finding therefore adds another layer to the concerns raised by the report: the issue is not simply the quantity of force used, but the choice of weapons and methods deployed against people participating in an assembly.

An assault rifle in Siwan

Perhaps the most alarming footage examined by Amnesty comes not from Delhi but from Siwan, Bihar. Two videos filmed on July 24 and verified by Amnesty show a state police officer firing an AK-type assault rifle towards protesters. Amnesty notes that such firearms are designed to kill and, under international standards governing assemblies, may only be used where there is an imminent threat of death or serious injury to a specific individual and only as an absolute last resort. The organisation says it found no evidence that such a threat existed in the incident examined.

The report says authorities have made no public commitment to investigate or prosecute officers involved in the alleged use of firearms, birdshot, tear gas, lathis and electric shock weapons. Amnesty is calling for a prompt, impartial and effective investigation, with the findings made public. It has specifically demanded an immediate end to the deployment of birdshot ammunition and direct-contact electric shock devices.

The crackdown began before the first baton was raised

The Amnesty investigation also places the use of force within the wider restrictions imposed on the “Chalo Sansad” march. Authorities denied permission for the march, imposed an internet shutdown around the proposed protest areas, prohibited gatherings of more than five people, closed several Delhi Metro stations and erected barricades across central Delhi.

Amnesty argues that these measures themselves raise serious freedom-of-assembly concerns. Under international human rights law, peaceful assemblies are not supposed to depend on prior permission. Where notification requirements exist, their purpose should be to allow authorities to facilitate an assembly rather than provide a mechanism for restricting it. The organisation further argues that the prohibitory orders effectively amounted to a blanket ban on the march and failed the requirements of legality, necessity and proportionality. It reaches a similar conclusion regarding the blanket internet shutdown imposed around the protest.

This is an important aspect of Amnesty’s findings. The report does not examine the July 20 violence simply as an isolated confrontation between protesters and police. It places the physical use of force within a broader sequence of restrictions—communication blackouts, movement restrictions, barricading, transport disruption and prohibitory orders—that had already narrowed the space for protest.

More than 400 injured

The scale of the confrontation was substantial. According to Delhi Police, more than 400 people, including police personnel and protesters, were injured. Amnesty also notes that at least three people were injured in Siwan, including a bystander who was shot and sustained a bullet wound to the neck. The report’s findings therefore raise questions extending beyond individual incidents captured on camera. If hundreds were injured during the police response, and if independently verified footage shows the deployment of weapons in circumstances Amnesty considers unlawful, the central question becomes one of institutional accountability: who authorised the force, who carried it out, who monitored it, and who is responsible for investigating it? A month after the events, Amnesty says there has been no public commitment from the authorities to investigate or prosecute officers involved.

Amnesty places the July events against the longer history of pellet-gun use by Indian authorities. The organisation has previously documented extensive injuries, including blindness and deaths, linked to the use of birdshot-loaded shotguns for crowd control in Jammu and Kashmir. A committee established by the Ministry of Home Affairs in 2016 to consider alternatives recommended restricting the use of such weapons to the “rarest of rare cases”, although it did not recommend a complete prohibition.

In 2018, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights called on India to end the use of pellet-firing shotguns for crowd control in Jammu and Kashmir. A petition seeking to decommission the use of pellet-firing shotguns by law-enforcement agencies for policing assemblies was also filed before the Supreme Court in July 2026. The Delhi allegations therefore revive a longstanding question about whether weapons that have caused severe and sometimes permanent injuries in crowd-control situations should be used at all.

From “crowd control” to accountability

The central thrust of Amnesty International’s investigation is ultimately about the limits of state power. The State unquestionably has a responsibility to protect people, maintain public order and respond to violence. But policing a protest does not give authorities an unrestricted licence to use force. International standards require force to be lawful, necessary and proportionate, with lethal force reserved for exceptional circumstances involving an imminent threat to life or serious injury.

Amnesty’s evidence raises questions on each of those fronts. Its investigation alleges pellet firing into crowds, tear gas deployed directly at protesters, repeated baton strikes against people who were not resisting, the use of an electric shock device against a peaceful protester and the firing of an assault rifle in Siwan. It also documents restrictions on communication and assembly before and during the protest.

The significance of the report lies not merely in its catalogue of weapons. It is the combination of restriction, force and apparent absence of accountability that makes the findings particularly troubling. The Delhi Police has maintained that its handling of the protest was professional. Amnesty’s investigation reaches a sharply different conclusion, backed by 19 videos it says its Evidence Lab verified across Delhi and Siwan, alongside witness testimony and photographic evidence.

The complete report may be viewed here.

Related:

From the violence of 2024 to the Bakri Eid tensions of 2026, a fact-finding report examines Mira Road’s deepening communal fault lines

Bihar: Not just Delhi, Patna, Siwan too saw brute police violence against demonstrating students: PUCL

Inside the SSP’s Office: Allegations of beatings, torture & police impunity against farmer leaders in Meerut, UP

‘Wherever You Go, We are watching’: Second threat letter to Kashmiri Pandits

The post Amnesty Investigation finds unlawful and deadly force against CJP-led protesters in Delhi and Siwan appeared first on SabrangIndia.

To date, the issue of police brutality that has received national attention is the barbarity displayed in the capital of Delhi on July 20. Reports on this aspect of overt police misconduct may be read here, here and here. However, the conduct of the state police in another BJP-ruled state like Bihar has received scant attention.

Following newspaper reports of this brutality in Patna and Siwan, the PUCL’s Bihar Unit constituted a fact-finding team to investigate the cases of police firing and bullet injuries sustained by students, custodial torture of students resulting in severe hearing loss sustained by a student, and intimidation acts of the police. The team visited Siwan on the August 15 and 16 and met all the injured victims of either police firing or custodial torture. It also came across cases of intimidation by police, house raids, and damage to property and beating, profiling of victims on the lines of caste and religion, and attempts to destroy evidence. This report is also being prepared. Similarly, PUCL acted on a complaint regarding police brutality unleashed on the students of a welfare hostel in Sitamarhi, where a day before the July 22 protests, the police entered the hostel and brutally beat students. This incident is currently under investigation.

Thereafter, on August 22, at the IMA Hall, Gandhi Maidan. Patna, a public hearing was conducted to record testimonies and first person accounts of the statewide police brutality between July 21-25 in several locations of the state. The report was released today. This was a part of the human rights platform’s decision post July 25 to comprehensively document cases of police brutality, violating the human rights of Indian citizens guaranteed by the law, PUCL decided to hold a public hearing so that the voices of the victims could be captured and incorporated in its report.

As mentioned above, the public hearing was organised on 22 August 2026 at the Indian Medical Association (IMA) Hall, South-East Gandhi Maidan, Patna. Over one hundred people participated, comprising mostly students, PUCL members, and civil society activists. Most students belonged to organisations such as AISA, AISF, Disha Chhatra Sangathan, and NSUI. One student activist, and a victim of police violence as well, belonged to Chhatra RJD. A panel, comprising Basant Chaudhary (senior advocate, Patna High Court), Sudha Varghese (Padma Shri awardee, social worker), Arshad Ajman (social activist), and Pranav Chaudhary (former Assistant Editor of the Times of India, Patna edition), presided over the proceedings. A total of 19 victims of police brutality presented their testimonies. Of these 19 victims of police violence, a recorded video testimony of Bullet Kumar Gond, an ST youth from Siwan district, was presented as his bullet injuries and subsequent intramedullary nailing did not permit travel.

Based on the testimonies during the public hearing, also supported by the fact-findings in Siwan and Patna, the following types of cases of police brutality, seriously infringing upon human rights of the protesters, were recorded:

1. Brutal lathi charge deliberately targeting students to injure them. In some cases, beating of students happened outside the sites of protests or at the timings of the bandh call.
2. Hitting girl protesters on their private parts.
3. Firing directly on students, without any warning or immediate provocations, resulting in several cases of bullet injuries. In some instances, those injured by bullets were further beaten up.
4. Using a firearm as lethal as the AK-47 on students, though this firearm is not supposed to be used on protesting citizens.
5. Custodial torture of students by the police, resulting in injuries, loss of hearing, etc.
6. Illegal detention of students without presenting them before a magistrate within 24 hours.
7. Detained students’ families not informed of their whereabouts, thus denying the students the support of their families and lawyers.
8. Students sent to judicial custody without informing them of the charges against them or providing them with a copy of the FIR.
9. Students sent to judicial custody without access to a lawyer to defend them before the magistrate.
10. Destruction of evidence by police, such as seizing students’ and passerby citizens’ mobile phones to destroy video recordings related to the use of force by them.
11. Raiding students’ and activists’ homes in the dead of night without any search warrant. Beating of residents, damaging household items, abusing women, including older women, and infringing the right to privacy by checking mobile and personal belongings.
12. Making misogynist remarks against girls during home raids and in custody. For example, family members being warned that the girl will not find a groom if she participates in protests along with boys.
13. Obstructing an officer of the court (advocate on record of the Patna High Court) in discharging his duty to represent his client, filing FIRs against two lawyers in unsubstantiated charges of liquor consumption and another charge of obstructing the police officer in discharging their duty, parading them handcuffed in public, and leaking their arrest memo photos to the media.
14. Custodialisation and beating of citizens who were passersby at that moment. One such passerby was hit by a bullet fired by police in Siwan.
15. Even minors kept in police custody, not presented before the Child Welfare Committee and the JJ Board.
16. Calling students terrorists. Threatening protesters during their custody of imposing UAPA and making them suffer like Umar Khalid.
17. Profiling of arrested protesters on religious and caste lines, and differential treatment with them based on these lines. In particular, Muslims, SCs, women, and CPI (ML) activists were harshly treated.

The panellists were unanimous in their opinion that the testimonies made the entire state culpable and, rather than calling it merely police brutality, it should be called state brutality or state repression. It is only when the government decides to crush a movement that the police unleash their brutality ruthlessly.

Hence, the PUCL seeks accountability of the state for human rights violations.

Demands of the PUCL, Bihar

Towards the end of the public hearing, PUCL Bihar Unit presented a charter of demands and also announced its future action plan. The key demands are as follows:

• An independent and impartial investigation into the police actions starting from 21 July to July 27, 2026, including but not limited to the use of firearms in Siwan and Jehanabad, brutal lathi charge against protesters throughtout the state, illegal detention, custodial torture, violations of legal provisions while remanding the detained protestors to judicial custody, harassment of activists even after the protests were over, and mistreatment of two lawyer members of PUCL and imposition of false cases against them. The inquiry should also include brutal police action inside the welfare hostel in Sitamarhi on the evening of July 21.
• Fixing accountability for police brutality and stern punitive action against police officials at various levels who violated the rights of protesters and other victims.
• Fast-tracking the process to withdraw all 64 FIRs against protesting students. Identification and withdrawal of cases filed even after 6 pm on 26 July if they are related to the protests and Bihar bandh, and also related to the protests filed by private individuals against the protesters.
• Adequate compensation for all persons injured in the Siwan firing, commensurate with the nature and seriousness of their injuries.
• Protection of the constitutional right to peaceful protest, so that students, activists and ordinary citizens are not subjected to violence merely for raising their voices.
• Review of the police manual and police training and suitable changes therein so that police are sensitive about civil rights and regulating the protesting crowd, and do not resort to brutal methods.

Background: It was on July 25, several PUCL members raised their worries after watching and reading the news about Bihar police’s brutal action against protesting students in Patna and other parts of the state. Hundreds of student protesters and others were detained in several police stations, and some were even sent to judicial custody. There was also news of injuries sustained by several protesters due to lathi charge, police firing, and tear gas shelling. Police picked some students and youth activists from their homes. Some non-participating youth who just happened to pass by the site of protests were picked up by the police and detained or sent to jail. We also received news of the beating of some students in police custody.

It is in these circumstances that the PUCL Bihar Unit decided to play an active role in providing immediate legal support to detained or jailed protesters and other youth and, for this purpose, collaborated with the Jan Nyay Abhiyan in Patna and other districts. A group of lawyers worked day and night to identify detained or jailed protesters, file their bail petitions, meet those in police custody to assess their physical condition and needs, and accompany them when police presented them before a judicial magistrate. While performing this important role of a human rights defender and also as officers of the court, two of the PUCL lawyer members were kept in illegal confinement and implicated in false cases. Currently, they are on bail.

Action Plan

All testimonies and remarks by the panellists, as well as fact-finding reports, will form an important part of a detailed report on state repression unleashed on protesting students. PUCL sees this report as a useful tool for seeking justice for the victims. The report will be submitted to relevant government offices, commissions, legislative committees, courts, police and judicial training institutions, academic institutions, and other civil rights organisations. The full report will be printed and disseminated, and its summary will be sent for publication to newspapers, news portals, magazines and journals.

On the legal front, PUCL plans to hold a meeting with prominent lawyers to explore the possibility of filing a writ in the High Court and/or other actions, as per their advice. Together with Jan Nyay Abhiyan, PUCL will also monitor the withdrawal of 64 FIRs related to student protests, as per the government’s announcement. Moreover, there are still cases filed by private individuals or the police but not listed in the 64 FIRs.

An invitation was received during the public hearing to conduct a similar public hearing in Jehanabad on the use of firearms and other brutal methods employed by the police against protesters. The PUCL has stated that it will pursue the invitation and also explore the possibility of organising public hearings in Siwan and Sitamarhi.

Related:

Maharashtra: After backlash, govt. moves to withdraw FIRs against student protesters but questions remain

Youth Uprising: A protest, a brute crackdown, a continuing countrywide response

Mumbai stands with students, but the state pushes back

The exam crisis that became a battle for accountability

Brute Police Action: Mumbai’s crackdown on protestors in solidarity with CJP & Student Groups, AISF, SFI & AISA

The post Bihar: Not just Delhi, Patna, Siwan too saw brute police violence against demonstrating students: PUCL appeared first on SabrangIndia.

According to her husband, Jumman Fakir, the family soon received a call from the Mumbai Police’s Chembur Crime Branch. Sahida had been detained on suspicion of being an “illegal immigrant”. Within days, the family was told that she had been sent to Bangladesh. Her husband says he had repeatedly approached the authorities with documents establishing her identity and roots in West Bengal, but they were allegedly disregarded. Sahida eventually called her family from Satkhira, Bangladesh.

The story, first reported in detail by Scroll on August 11, is disturbing not merely because of what allegedly happened to one woman, but because of the larger question it raises: what happens when the State begins treating Bengali identity as evidence of foreignness?

The Indian Express separately reported that Sahida was detained on July 18 and that sources said she was taken to Assam before being pushed across the border along with others. The report also provided that her family was preparing to approach the Calcutta High Court and that a migrant workers’ forum had written to the Ministry of External Affairs seeking intervention.

The facts, as reported, demand something more than administrative clarification. They demand scrutiny of the entire architecture through which a person can apparently move from being a resident of India to being labelled an “infiltrator”, detained and ultimately expelled from the country without a meaningful opportunity to contest that determination.

A woman disappears, and the State’s explanation is suspicion

Sahida’s case is particularly troubling because her family says it did not merely possess one disputed identity document. They produced a birth certificate recording her birth in Swarupdaha village in West Bengal in 1988. They produced a school certificate, a voter identity card issued in 2008, documents relating to land in Gobindapur, and records concerning her family. Her parents’ names, according to Scroll, also appeared in the 2002 electoral rolls.

None of these documents, individually, should be treated as an automatic and conclusive certificate of citizenship. That distinction matters. A voter ID, Aadhaar or land document cannot, by itself, settle every question concerning citizenship. But that is precisely why the State’s obligation becomes more important, not less.  If citizenship is disputed, the answer cannot simply be deportation. The dispute must first be investigated.

Sahida’s husband told Scroll that police asked for the birth certificates of her parents even after he had produced her own birth certificate and other documents. He said the family could not provide such certificates because they were from a generation in which birth registration was not common. That raises an obvious question: how much documentation must a poor citizen produce before the State believes that she belongs to the country in which she was born and has lived?

For months, instances of forced deportations and illegal pushbacks have surfaced from Assam, West Bengal, Gujarat, Rajasthan, Maharashtra and Delhi of individuals “suspected” of being Bangladeshi nationals. In many of these cases, the family of those deported have approached the courts alleging that the removals were carried out without any disclosed nationality verification, without travel documents, and without Bangladesh formally acknowledging or accepting the individuals concerned.

Detailed reports may be read here, here, here, here and here.

The most dangerous word in this story is “suspected”

There is a profound legal difference between suspecting that someone may be a foreign national and establishing that they are one. The first is an investigative starting point. The second is a legal conclusion. Sahida’s case, as reported, appears to collapse the two. Scroll reported that the family was not given documents relating to her arrest or detention and that the Mumbai and Navi Mumbai police did not respond to questions seeking clarification about the grounds for her detention.

When the State takes away a person’s liberty, the burden of public accountability does not disappear merely because the allegation involves “illegal immigration”. If anything, the stakes are higher because the consequence may ultimately be removal from the country itself. The Constitution does not create a zone of executive immunity around immigration enforcement.

Article 21 protects life and personal liberty. Article 14 demands non-arbitrariness and equality before the law. Article 22 contains safeguards concerning arrest and detention. These constitutional protections cannot become conditional upon whether the person is socially respectable, economically secure or perceived to “look Indian”. And the constitutional question becomes particularly serious when a person is allegedly identified not through a properly adjudicated finding but through a combination of suspicion and social profiling.

The border cannot become a substitute for a hearing

Sahida’s husband told Scroll that she was detained because she was Bengali. In Maharashtra, the crackdown has become increasingly expansive. Hindustan Times reported in March that the state government told the Legislative Council that more than 2,000 alleged illegal Bangladeshi nationals had been deported in 2025, compared with 202 in 2024, and that the state planned intensive “combing operations” in slums, construction sites and other areas. There is nothing inherently unlawful about a State identifying and removing foreign nationals who are illegally present. Immigration control is a legitimate governmental function. The danger begins when the hunt for foreigners becomes a hunt for people who appear foreign.

The physical act of pushing someone across an international border has consequences that are fundamentally different from ordinary detention. Once a person is in Bangladesh, an Indian court’s ability to protect her becomes substantially more complicated. Access to lawyers, family members and documents becomes difficult. The very act of deportation can therefore create a second legal problem out of the first. This is exactly what makes Sahida’s account so alarming. According to the Indian Express, she said she was taken to the Assam border and pushed into Bangladesh at around 1 a.m. She reportedly walked for hours through muddy fields before local residents helped her and a family in Satkhira provided her shelter.

A precedent already exists for bringing people back

The danger of mistaken deportation is no longer theoretical. In 2025, several Bengali-speaking residents working outside West Bengal were detained and sent across the Bangladesh border amid claims that they were Bangladeshi nationals. One of the most consequential cases involved Sunali Khatun, her husband and their son. The Calcutta High Court’s September 2025 judgment in Bhodu Sekh v. Union of India is particularly relevant. The court examined the deportation of Sunali Khatun, Danish and their son Sabir. The authorities had argued that the family had failed to establish Indian citizenship. But the court also considered the procedure prescribed by the Union’s May 2, 2025 memorandum for persons suspected of being Bangladeshi or Myanmar nationals who claimed Indian citizenship in another State.

The memorandum contemplated verification by the State or district from which the person claimed to originate. Where a person claimed Indian citizenship and residence in another State, the concerned authorities were required to seek verification from that State and district administration. The judgment records that such verification was to be undertaken within a specified period, during which the person could be kept in a holding centre.

The Calcutta High Court ultimately held that the procedure had not been followed and described the authorities’ action as being undertaken in “hot haste”. It set aside the detention and deportation orders concerning Sunali, Danish and Sabir and directed the authorities to take steps to bring them back to India. In May 2026, the Union told the Supreme Court that it would bring back people deported to Bangladesh and verify their citizenship claims. All those six deported in this case are now back in India.

Detailed reports may be read here and here.

Notably, a separate affidavit was filed by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) on July 31, 2026 in Rajubala Das v. Union of India pursuant to the Supreme Court’s order dated March 21, 2025. The affidavit sought to explain the legal and administrative framework governing deportation where the nationality of a declared foreigner remains unknown or unverified. In doing so, the Union makes one of its clearest judicial admissions to date: deportation cannot even be initiated unless the individual’s nationality has first been verified by the receiving State, appropriate travel documents have been obtained, and the receiving country has agreed to accept the individual.

The affidavit fundamentally distinguishes between being declared a foreigner and being legally deportable. While a declaration by a Foreigners Tribunal may settle a person’s legal status within India, it does not, the Union now accepts, authorise the State to physically remove that individual from Indian territory. Deportation remains contingent upon a separate process involving diplomatic engagement, nationality verification, issuance of travel documents and, most importantly, the consent of another sovereign State. In other words, the executive cannot unilaterally deport a person merely because Indian authorities believe them to be a foreign national.

Detailed report may be read here.

The SIR connection makes the situation even more sensitive

Sahida’s case also comes amid intense scrutiny of electoral citizenship verification in West Bengal. According to Scroll, Sahida’s parents appeared on the 2002 electoral roll, while Sahida herself was marked “under adjudication” in the recent Special Intensive Revision process, with an appeal pending before the relevant tribunal. The fact that an electoral-roll dispute exists cannot itself establish whether Sahida is or is not an Indian citizen. But it does reinforce why administrative processes must remain separate and carefully bounded. Being excluded from an electoral roll is not the same thing as being declared a foreign national.

Indeed, in August 2025, the Supreme Court sought clarity from the Centre on the standard operating procedure governing deportation drives and specifically raised concerns about allegations that Bengali-speaking minorities were being singled out. The Court observed that while persons attempting to illegally cross into India could be dealt with at the border, once a person was already inside the country, the law prescribed a procedure.

Over the past few months, multiple petitions before the Supreme Court and High Courts have alleged that persons suspected of being Bangladeshi nationals were taken across the international border without any publicly disclosed deportation process. In several cases, families have alleged that individuals were picked up without prior notice, denied access to lawyers or relatives, and removed without any disclosed deportation order or travel documents.

Detailed report may be read here, here, here and here.

Related:

‘Deportation Cannot Begin without Nationality Verification’: Union’s Rajubala affidavit clarifies legal limits on executive power

Aadhaar, Voter ID and PAN Cannot Prove Citizenship: Calcutta High Court’s Foreigners Order and the burden of belonging

They Belong Here: An elderly couple’s victory for citizenship

Another CJP Victory: Barpeta Tribunal declares Alam Khan ‘not a foreigner’

When a narrow reading of documents decide citizenship: GHC in Aminul Hoque

‘Fairness & reason ‘: SC rules that due process is a must for citizenship determination

Gauhati High Court upholds foreigner declaration, rejects mental illness plea

The post When Suspicion Becomes Deportation: The case of Sahida Fakir and the dangerous criminalisation of Bengali identity appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Recent figures reported through an RTI investigation by The Indian Express suggest that India is witnessing an unprecedented expansion of government-backed content restrictions. Between March and July 2026, government agencies issued nearly 1.95 lakh blocking directions to Instagram, Facebook and YouTube. According to the report, this amounted to roughly 1,275 directions every day, or approximately one direction every 68 seconds. Instagram alone received nearly one lakh directions, Facebook around 80,000 and YouTube approximately 15,000.

The scale becomes even more striking when compared with the previous period for which comparable figures are available. RTI data accessed by The Indian Express showed that between October 2024 and October 2025, 2,312 blocking orders were sent to 19 online platforms through the government’s Sahyog portal. That amounted to roughly six orders a day. In the following five months, directions to just three major platforms rose to almost 1.95 lakh. Such a dramatic increase cannot be treated merely as an administrative statistic. It raises a much larger question about the changing relationship between the State, technology companies and citizens in India’s digital public sphere. And the timing makes that question even more difficult to ignore.

When protest moves online, censorship follows

A significant proportion of the latest blocking directions reportedly coincided with the student protests over examination irregularities and leaks in Delhi. The Indian Express, citing a senior government official, reported that a considerable share of the directions were issued as the NEET protests gathered momentum, particularly on Instagram. This is important because Instagram was not simply being used as a space in which the protests were discussed after they happened. It became one of the principal spaces through which the movement itself was organised.

The material compiled in the research shows how the Cockroach Janta Party’s social-media presence became central to the mobilisation, with protest announcements, videos, memes, explainers and other political content circulating rapidly among young users. The account reportedly grew to millions of followers and played an important role in mobilising people for demonstrations, including the July 20 “Sansad Chalo” march. That transformation of social media into a political organising space has a profound constitutional consequence.

A protest today does not begin only when people gather on a street. It begins when people communicate. They decide where to meet, circulate information about police action, share videos from the ground, publicise their demands and tell others what is happening. The digital space has therefore become part of the infrastructure of democratic protest itself. Consequently, restricting that space can affect far more than an individual’s ability to upload a post. It can affect the ability of a movement to organise, document itself and communicate with the wider public. This is why the reported restrictions during the protests deserve particularly close scrutiny.

Article 14, for instance, reported that journalist Sadhika Tiwari’s video showing a student allegedly being beaten by police was blocked on X following a government order. The video, according to the report, showed a crying student and did not contain hate speech, misinformation or graphic imagery. Around the same period, Meta temporarily blocked the Instagram account associated with CJP, which reportedly had more than 23 million followers, although the account was subsequently restored after criticism. The significance of such incidents lies not merely in whether one particular video was lawfully restricted. It lies in the fact that videos documenting State action during a protest are themselves part of the democratic record.

If citizens cannot see what happened on the streets, they cannot independently evaluate competing claims about what happened there. If videos documenting police conduct disappear before they can circulate widely, public debate becomes dependent increasingly upon official accounts of events. That is precisely where the problem of censorship becomes a problem of democracy.

The three-hour problem

The most troubling development, however, may not be the number of takedown directions alone. It is the shrinking amount of time available to platforms to respond to them. As Article 14 reported, the period within which intermediaries are expected to comply with certain government requests has been progressively reduced, eventually reaching three hours in 2026. The investigation linked this shrinking compliance period with the sharp increase in government takedown directions. Three hours may sound like an administrative efficiency measure. It is not difficult to see why it becomes something much more consequential when the subject is constitutionally protected speech.

Imagine a government order directing a platform to remove a journalist’s report. Before complying, the platform would ideally need to determine whether the issuing authority has jurisdiction, whether the order identifies the material adequately, whether the statutory requirements have been met, whether the content actually falls within the legal grounds for restriction and whether the restriction is proportionate. The affected journalist may also need an opportunity to respond. A court may eventually have to examine the order. Yet the platform is given only a few hours to act.

Under those circumstances, the rational institutional response is unlikely to be a careful legal assessment. It is likely to be compliance first and review later. That creates an important constitutional problem. A system that imposes severe consequences for delayed compliance but relatively weak consequences for wrongful removal creates an obvious incentive for platforms to err on the side of deletion. The consequence is what free-speech activists have long warned about: over-removal.

Lawful speech does not have to be formally prohibited for censorship to occur. It is enough for platforms to become sufficiently afraid of retaining controversial material that they begin removing content whenever there is doubt.

Sahyog and the transformation of censorship into infrastructure

The government’s Sahyog portal illustrates another aspect of this changing architecture. Introduced in October 2024, Sahyog was designed to streamline communication between government authorities and online intermediaries. In itself, there is nothing inherently problematic about creating an administrative mechanism through which lawful government directions can be communicated to technology companies. But administrative efficiency cannot substitute for constitutional safeguards.

Article 14 reported that X challenged Sahyog before the Karnataka High Court, arguing that the system effectively facilitated censorship by allowing government requests to reach platforms through a centralised mechanism. The Karnataka High Court rejected the challenge in July 2025 and characterised Sahyog as a facilitation mechanism rather than an independent censorship authority. That judicial characterisation is important, but it does not end the constitutional debate.

A communication system may technically be nothing more than a channel. The real constitutional question concerns what happens after the communication reaches the platform. If a government direction arrives through an official portal, carries the appearance of State authority and has to be acted upon within three hours, the practical ability of a platform to question that direction becomes extremely limited. The portal may facilitate communication.

But when that communication is backed by an extremely short compliance window and automated enforcement, the overall system can begin functioning as something considerably more powerful: an infrastructure through which State decisions about speech are translated rapidly into restrictions on citizens’ access to information.

When the algorithm becomes the censor

This is perhaps the most disturbing development. According to The Indian Express, Meta integrated its systems with Sahyog to comply with the three-hour requirement, allowing content identified through government directions to be restricted or removed automatically rather than waiting for a separate human review before compliance. Automation is attractive because it makes compliance efficient. But constitutional rights are precisely the kind of interests that should make us suspicious of efficiency without accountability.

A human decision-maker can, at least theoretically, ask whether a government direction is valid. An automated system cannot meaningfully interrogate the constitutional legitimacy of the State’s demand. It receives an instruction and executes it. The danger is therefore not simply that the government can order content to be removed. The danger is that a government instruction can increasingly be converted into an automated technical command. The chain becomes remarkably simple: the State issues the direction, the platform’s system receives it, the content is restricted and the user discovers that the speech has disappeared.

A citizen cannot challenge a decision that they cannot see

The question of notice is therefore central. Alt News has documented instances in which users received generic notifications stating that content had been restricted pursuant to a legal request or through an automated process, without being provided meaningful information about the specific legal basis or authority involved.

This creates a basic procedural problem. If a person does not know who ordered the restriction, they cannot determine whether the authority had jurisdiction. If they do not know which law was invoked, they cannot assess whether the restriction is legally sustainable. If they do not know why their particular content was unlawful, they cannot meaningfully challenge the decision. And if they cannot access the order itself, they may not even know what exactly they are supposed to challenge. This is where transparency stops being a policy preference and becomes a constitutional necessity. The State cannot reasonably expect citizens to defend their right to speak against an order whose existence, reasoning and legal basis remain hidden from them.

The disappearance of journalism is more serious than the disappearance of content

The consequences become particularly serious when the material being restricted is journalism. Article 14 reported that in March 2026 alone, Facebook pages belonging to at least six news and digital publications were blocked. The report also identified restrictions involving Greater Kashmir, Rising Kashmir, Kashmir Life, Molitics India, National Dastak and 4PM News Network, among others. The Wire, Maktoob Media and Peek TV have similarly reported restrictions affecting their content.

The problem here is fundamentally different from the removal of ordinary user-generated material. A journalist reporting on a protest is not simply generating “content”. They are creating a record of a public event. A report about Kashmir may become part of the historical record of the region, a video documenting police action may later become evidence in litigation, or a report concerning government policy may inform electoral choices. When such material disappears without clear explanation, the damage therefore extends beyond the individual publisher.

The public loses access to information that may be essential to holding power accountable. That is why the freedom of the press cannot be protected merely by allowing newspapers to continue printing. In 2026, press freedom also requires journalists to be able to reach audiences through the digital platforms on which those audiences increasingly depend.

The State’s concern about decentralised communication is not irrelevant — but it is not enough

The controversy surrounding Bitchat, Briar and Bridgefy demonstrates that the problem extends beyond mainstream social-media platforms. During the Jantar Mantar protests, demonstrators reportedly turned to Bluetooth-based mesh communication applications that could facilitate communication between nearby devices without relying entirely on conventional mobile internet infrastructure.

The government’s concern was that such systems could make lawful interception, identification and investigation more difficult. According to reports, the Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre issued directions seeking the removal of Bitchat, Briar and Bridgefy from major app stores and also sought action against Bitchat’s GitHub repository. Medianama reported that the notices provided intermediaries with three hours to comply, although officials later orally instructed companies not to enforce the directions.

ThePrint reported that the I4C notice to GitHub invoked Section 79(3)(b) of the Information Technology Act read with Rule 3(1)(d) of the IT Rules and sought removal of Bitchat’s repositories within three hours. There is a legitimate public-interest argument here. Communication technologies can be abused for criminal activity, and the State cannot be expected to remain completely powerless when technology is used to facilitate serious offences. But that cannot be the end of the analysis.

The fact that a technology can be misused does not establish that the technology itself should be suppressed. A telephone can be used to organise a crime. A messaging application can be used to coordinate violence. Social media can spread misinformation. None of these facts, by themselves, justify eliminating the technology. The State must still establish why the restriction is necessary, why less restrictive alternatives would not work and why the particular application or communication mechanism presents a sufficiently serious and demonstrable threat. Otherwise, “public order” becomes a justification capable of swallowing the right to communicate altogether.

The constitutional framework is not optional

India does not indulge this issue without constitutional guidance. Article 19(1)(a) guarantees freedom of speech and expression, while Article 19(2) permits reasonable restrictions on specified grounds. The Supreme Court’s decision in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India remains a foundational judgment in understanding the limits of online speech regulation.

The Court’s decision is important precisely because it recognises that vague or overbroad restrictions can have a chilling effect on legitimate expression. The existence of a statutory power, therefore, cannot by itself answer the constitutional question. The State must still demonstrate that the restriction falls within the law and survives constitutional scrutiny. That is particularly important where the restriction affects political expression.

Political speech lies at the heart of democratic participation. Criticism of government policy, reporting on protests, documenting police action and exposing administrative failures cannot be placed in the same category as genuinely unlawful material merely because they are inconvenient or controversial. The State must be able to distinguish speech that is unlawful from speech that is merely uncomfortable. That distinction is the foundation of a functioning democracy.

Another concern emerging from the reporting is the increasingly routine character of mechanisms originally justified by urgency. Emergency powers exist for a reason. There are situations in which authorities may need to act quickly to prevent serious and immediate harm. But emergency mechanisms become constitutionally dangerous when the exception starts functioning as the ordinary route for restricting speech.

Article 14 reported concerns among technology-policy experts that emergency blocking mechanisms could increasingly become part of routine online governance, particularly because affected parties may not receive the underlying orders and therefore have limited opportunities to challenge them. The constitutional problem can be stated simply. An emergency procedure should make the State faster when speed is genuinely necessary. It should not make the State less accountable because it has chosen to act quickly. If anything, extraordinary powers should trigger stronger review precisely because they reduce the opportunity for the affected person to respond beforehand.

Platforms are not innocent bystanders

The responsibility, however, does not rest with the government alone. Technology companies have enormous power over what citizens can see, publish and circulate. They therefore have their own obligations of transparency. The Indian Express reporting indicates that Meta generally provides users in several jurisdictions with information when governments request restrictions on their content, but that such disclosures are not provided in India and some other markets because of legal and regulatory considerations. That should concern anyone who believes that users have a right to understand why their speech has been restricted.

A platform should not be able to tell a journalist merely that their report is unavailable because of a “legal requirement”. The journalist should know whether the government ordered the restriction, which authority issued the order and which law was invoked. Transparency does not necessarily prevent compliance. A platform can comply with a lawful government direction while still informing the affected user that the government sought the restriction. Indeed, transparency may be one of the few mechanisms capable of ensuring that government censorship does not become invisible.

The reported proposal by X to make government requests more visible to users therefore deserves attention. According to recent reports, Elon Musk announced that X would begin making government requests to restrict or remove content more transparent, including information about the requesting authority and, where available, the legal basis for the request.

The Indian government has understandably maintained that platforms operating in India remain subject to Indian law. But that is not inconsistent with transparency. The two principles can coexist. If the State has lawfully ordered a restriction, there should be no reason for the process to remain invisible. Government censorship should not become anonymous censorship.

India must decide what kind of digital democracy it wants

There is a legitimate State interest in regulating harmful online material. There is a legitimate public interest in combating misinformation, incitement, deepfakes, threats and criminal coordination. Technology companies cannot claim absolute immunity from the laws of the countries in which they operate. But none of these propositions answers the central constitutional question.

How much power should the State possess to determine what citizens are allowed to see, publish and circulate — and what safeguards must accompany that power?

Nearly 1.95 lakh blocking directions in five months, as reported by The Indian Express, should force that question into the centre of India’s democratic debate. The answer cannot simply be that the government has followed a procedure. A procedure that is too fast to meaningfully challenge, too opaque to independently scrutinise and too automated to permit genuine review can satisfy the appearance of legality while undermining the substance of constitutional protection.

Indian law therefore needs stronger safeguards around government-directed content restrictions. Orders should clearly identify the legal provision relied upon, the authority issuing them and the reasons for restricting the particular material. Affected users should ordinarily receive notice and have access to a meaningful appeal mechanism. Emergency orders should be subject to prompt independent review and should automatically lapse unless their continuation is justified. Platforms should publish greater information about government requests, including anonymised data that allows the public to assess how frequently such powers are being used and how often they are challenged or withdrawn. Most importantly, the burden cannot silently shift from the State having to justify censorship to the citizen having to prove why their speech should remain online.

The extraordinary rise in takedown directions, the targeting of protest-related content, the restrictions imposed on journalists and news organisations, the attempt to interfere with decentralised communication tools and the increasing use of automated compliance together point towards a digital environment in which the speed of censorship may be outpacing the speed of accountability.

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The post The State Wants the Delete Button: India’s new architecture of digital censorship appeared first on SabrangIndia.

According to the data compiled by the Safai Karamchari Andolan, a civil society organisation working against Manual Scavenging – 101 sanitation workers have died cleaning sewers and septic tanks across India during the first 188 days of 2026, amounting to one death every 45 hours. The capital of India, Delhi NCR is alone accounted for 12 deaths. However, what constitutes a greater violation of human rights is the under-reporting of these deaths by the central government in order to evade liability. In an April 2026 through a release of the Press Information Bureau (PIB), the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment stated that, according to the National Commission for Safai Karamcharis, 317 sanitation workers had died due to hazardous cleaning of sewers and septic tanks between 2021 and 2025, the same release says that 89,248 sewer/septic tank workers had been profiled and validated under NAMASTE scheme. The State’s own numbers reveal a troubling contradiction: thousands of workers are recognised as performing hazardous sanitation work, yet the deaths arising from it remain strikingly few on paper. How, then, are these deaths being counted?

The state justifies this under-reporting by drawing a distinction between “cleaning human excreta” vs “accidents during the hazardous cleaning of sewers and septic tanks”, but for the worker who enters a sewer and never comes out, there is no such distinction. The major question that we as a society should ask is that when a person dies while manually cleaning a sewer, does the legal classification matter more than the death?

If carefully scrutinised, we can find that the section 2(d) of the Prohibition of Employment as Manual Scavengers Act, 2013 separately defines “hazardous cleaning”, whereas section 7 expressly prohibits employing or engaging a person for hazardous cleaning of a sewer or septic tank, and under Sec 33, the act doesn’t merely prohibit hazardous cleaning, it also says that local authorities and other agencies have a duty to use modern technology for cleaning sewers and septic tanks. The emphasis, therefore, should not merely be on providing protective gear to those entering these hazardous spaces, but on completely eliminating the need for human beings to enter them in the first place. Yet, despite the legislative mandate and technological alternatives, State instrumentalities continue to remain criminally silent.

In the case of Safai Karamchari Andolan & Ors. v. Union of India (2014), the Court recognised sewer deaths and directed compensation of Rs. 10 lakhs to the families of deceased workers, which was enhanced to Rs. 30 lakhs in Balram Singh v. Union of India (2023)

The documentary Kakkoos filmed in Tamil Nadu, a state which is said to have the highest number of Manual Scavengers, brings out another disturbing reality: the existence of legislation prohibiting dry latrines has not eliminated the conditions that continue to force people to manually handle human excreta. However, the practice extends far beyond the cleaning of latrines.

Garbage collectors, for instance, are often required to handle human excreta when waste from households of medical patients is disposed of in polythene bags and subsequently has to be removed by hand. In schools without adequate water or sanitation facilities, children may defecate and leave, leaving cleaners to remove the excreta with their bare hands. Yet, such workers are often not recognised as manual scavengers. Kakkoos therefore exposes the gap between the legal understanding of manual scavenging and the lived reality of those who, in one way or another, are compelled to handle human excreta.

However, the danger does not end with the indignity of the work. Manual scavengers are routinely exposed to hazardous gases such as hydrogen sulphide, carbon monoxide, ammonia and methane, with prolonged exposure causing respiratory and visual impairment, seizures and, in severe cases, death. Constant contact with human and animal excreta further exposes them to infections such as leptospirosis. Yet, for a community already pushed to the margins by caste and poverty, access to healthcare remains limited. The physical and mental toll of such work, coupled with poor living conditions and, in some cases, dependence on alcohol as a means of coping, only deepens a cycle of vulnerability that the State has a responsibility to break.

Manual scavenging, thus, is not only a blatant violation of the human rights bestowed upon an individual by virtue of birth, but also raises serious questions about social practices continued in society in the name of “tradition”. The practice is deeply rooted in the caste hierarchy, where a birth-given identity has historically determined the occupation and social position of an individual.

Yet, despite Article 17 of the Constitution abolishing untouchability in 1949, manual scavengers continue to remain among the most disadvantaged communities within the Dalit population, historically placed at the lowest rungs of the caste hierarchy as “Atishudras”. The fact that a birth-assigned tag can continue to determine who performs such inhumane work, decades after constitutional abolition, is perhaps the starkest illustration of the distance between what the law promises and what society continues to practice.

(The author is a law student at BMS College of Law, Bangalore)

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The post The Deaths behind India’s Cleanliness appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In a conversation with Sabrang India, Sanjay Tickoo, president of the Kashmiri Pandit Sangharsh Samiti (KPSS), said the latest incident must be understood against the backdrop of targeted killings, repeated security concerns and what he described as a persistent failure to address vulnerabilities faced by Kashmiri Pandit employees.

The immediate trigger is a purported threat letter circulated online in the name of the United Liberation Council (ULC), which warned Kashmiri Pandits working in the Valley to “change their ways” and published the names and phone numbers of employees. Police are reportedly verifying the authenticity of the letter, while security officials have suggested that the group could be a front or shadow organisation of Lashkar-e-Taiba.

According to The Indian Express, six employees, all from the Revenue Department, were named in the letter. The newspaper reported that departments, particularly the Revenue Department and School Education Department, had informally asked Kashmiri Pandit employees to remain at home or take leave, although the Director of School Education denied that any formal instructions had been issued. The New Indian Express likewise reported that Pandit employees had been asked to work from home for some time.

The detailed report may be read here.

Tickoo, however, argues that the immediate controversy over the letter obscures a much deeper problem.

A threat that cannot be seen in isolation

According to Tickoo, targeted killings of Kashmiri Pandits began to re-emerge as a serious concern from 2021 onwards. On October 5, 2021, prominent Kashmiri Hindu pharmacist Makhan Lal Bindroo was shot dead inside his pharmacy in Srinagar. Two days later, on October 7, Supinder Kour, a government school principal, and Deepak Chand, a teacher at the same school, were shot dead inside the school premises in Srinagar’s Eidgah area. These killings were part of a broader spate of targeted attacks against civilians, including Kashmiri Pandits and non-local workers. Government data recorded four Kashmiri Pandits among those killed by terrorists in 2021, further deepening the sense of vulnerability among the community and raising renewed questions over the security of those living and working in the Valley. The killings generated widespread fear within the community and renewed concerns over whether Kashmiri Pandits working in the Valley could be adequately protected.

The security environment subsequently intensified, with security forces conducting anti-militancy operations and authorities questioning individuals suspected of having links with militant networks, including alleged overground workers.

But for employees under the Prime Minister’s employment package, the problem was not limited to attacks themselves. The availability and circulation of personal information of employees became a recurring security concern. Around 6,000 Kashmiri Pandits have received government employment under the Prime Minister’s Special Rehabilitation and Employment Package, introduced in 2010 as part of the government’s effort to facilitate the return and rehabilitation of Kashmiri Pandits displaced from the Valley following the outbreak of militancy and the mass displacement of the community in the 1990s.

The employment package was premised on an important condition: beneficiaries were expected to work in the Valley. But, as Tickoo points out, the same requirement that forms the basis of the rehabilitation policy also leaves employees particularly vulnerable when security deteriorates.

The lists that keep resurfacing

This is not the first time the publication of employee details has raised alarm. In December 2022, Kashmiri Pandit employees protested after a purported hit list released by The Resistance Front (TRF) named 56 Kashmiri Pandits working in the Valley under the Prime Minister’s Rehabilitation Package. The employees demanded a high-level investigation into how official information identifying them had reached a militant organisation.

At the time, the employees were already protesting outside the Relief Commissioner’s office in Jammu following the targeted killing of Rahul Bhat in Chadoora on May 1, 2022.

The concern was straightforward: if the State had collected the personal information of employees for the purposes of rehabilitation and employment, how was that information reaching organisations issuing threats against them? Tickoo told Sabrang India that the problem has never really been resolved. According to him, lists containing details of Prime Minister’s Package employees have continued to circulate publicly on social media.

He believes the same publicly available information is now being exploited again. Tickoo said that while a larger list of around 20 employees is allegedly available on social media, the latest threat letter specifically identified seven employees with their full names and phone numbers. This differs from reports in The Indian Express, which identified six employees named in the purported letter.

For Tickoo, the issue is therefore not simply the existence of a threatening poster. It is how such specific personal information continues to become available in the first place. “How are these posters being posted on social media?” is the question he says the government must answer. More importantly, he asks, who is providing private information about government employees to those circulating the threats?

‘Since 2022, meetings have resulted in nothing’

Tickoo said the issue has repeatedly been raised with the government. According to him, several meetings have taken place with the Secretary of the Home Department since 2022, but they have not resulted in any meaningful resolution of the concerns raised by Kashmiri Pandit employees.

The latest episode comes after a period in which violence and insecurity have again been building in parts of Kashmir. Tickoo referred to the recent killing of a policeman in Anantnag and the subsequent killing of two migrant workers in Kulgam. The Wire reported the killing of policeman Ashiq Hussain Qureshi in Anantnag on June 22 while he was deployed for Amarnath Yatra duty, followed by the July 31 killing of two migrant workers from Chhattisgarh at a brick kiln in Kulgam.

The sequence, Tickoo argues, has heightened apprehension that further attacks could take place, including against minorities and migrant workers. For him, the responsibility ultimately rests with the government. Tickoo described the situation as a security lapse on the part of either the Union government or the Jammu and Kashmir administration, while expressing frustration that neither level of government has accepted responsibility.

When security concerns undermine rehabilitation

The contradiction at the heart of the Prime Minister’s Package is difficult to ignore. The government encourages displaced Kashmiri Pandits to return to the Valley and provides employment as part of its rehabilitation programme. Yet when security threats emerge, the immediate response is reportedly to ask those very employees to stay indoors or remain away from work.

That contradiction has existed for years. In 2022, after a series of targeted killings, Kashmiri Pandit employees staged a prolonged protest and demanded transfers outside Kashmir. The Indian Express reported that employees protested for around 350 days and sought permanent relocation to Jammu. The government rejected the demand and instead relocated some employees to areas considered safer within the Valley.

Tickoo argues that the latest episode risks producing the same outcome: employees who have been asked to return to Kashmir are once again made to feel that their presence there is unsafe. And the consequences extend beyond the immediate threat.

According to Tickoo, when employees leave the Valley because they feel unsafe, they risk losing the benefits attached to the rehabilitation package because those benefits are linked to their continuing residence and employment in Kashmir.

In other words, the employee is caught between two vulnerabilities: remaining in Kashmir despite a credible fear for personal safety, or leaving and potentially jeopardising the very rehabilitation benefits that were meant to facilitate their return.

‘They cannot simply return to work’

The latest threat has also created a practical problem for the employees whose names and numbers were published. Tickoo said that once an individual’s identity and telephone number have been publicly circulated alongside a threat, simply telling that person to return to work does not address the fear created by the threat.

The issue is particularly serious, he argues, because several of the employees named in the latest poster work in departments where their official responsibilities may place them in contact with people who have vested interests in government enforcement.

Tickoo specifically referred to employees working in Regional Transport Offices and alleged that private agents operating around these offices had historically relied on bribery to obtain driving licences and vehicle fitness certificates. According to him, the arrival of Kashmiri Pandit employees under the Prime Minister’s Package and their adherence to official procedures had disrupted such practices. He alleged that this could be one reason why employees working in these positions had become targets.

These claims are Tickoo’s allegations and would require independent investigation. But they point towards another dimension of the controversy: whether threats against government employees are connected not only to their identity as Kashmiri Pandits, but also to the particular government functions they perform.

The problem of the ‘unofficial’ order

Another striking feature of the present episode is the absence of a formal government order. The Indian Express reported that departments had verbally instructed Kashmiri Pandit employees to remain at home, while the Director of School Education publicly denied issuing such instructions. The Wire similarly reported that employees had received work-from-home directions through departmental or internal channels, without a publicly available formal order.

Tickoo says this informality is not accidental. According to him, governments in Kashmir often avoid issuing formal orders in such situations because an official directive to keep an entire section of employees away from their workplaces would amount to an acknowledgement that the security establishment has failed to protect them.

He also argues that a formal order could invite judicial scrutiny, particularly if employees are effectively prevented from discharging their duties because of their identity. The result, he says, is a system of verbal instructions in which everyone understands what is expected, but nobody formally accepts responsibility for the decision.

The question of the source

For Tickoo, the publication of phone numbers is perhaps the most troubling aspect of the latest episode. He questioned how individuals operating underground could obtain such specific information and circulate it publicly. He also questioned whether the source of the information could be traced and why the authorities had not yet established who was behind the dissemination of the posters.

The question is particularly significant because the purported threat does not merely make a general warning against a community. It identifies individuals. That transforms the issue from a broad security concern into a question of data security, official confidentiality and institutional responsibility. If employee lists are available openly on social media, the government must establish how they reached the public domain, whether official databases were compromised, whether the information was leaked deliberately or inadvertently, and whether those responsible for the disclosure can be identified.

Without such an investigation, the cycle is likely to repeat.

A growing lack of faith

Tickoo also spoke of what he described as a wider erosion of faith in the security establishment. According to him, people in Kashmir have been warning the Union government for the last three to four years that something appeared to be building up. Those concerns, he believes, have not received adequate attention. The latest threat therefore carries significance beyond the employees reportedly named in it.

If employees believe that their personal details can be obtained, that threats can be issued against them, and that the government response will be to ask them to remain indoors rather than identify the source of the threat, confidence in the security system inevitably weakens. For the Kashmiri Pandit community, this is particularly consequential because rehabilitation itself depends on a measure of trust.

Rehabilitation cannot mean confinement

The contradiction becomes even sharper against the backdrop of public celebrations and government campaigns in the Valley. The Wire reported heightened security arrangements ahead of Independence Day, including additional checkpoints, frisking, night patrols and surveillance. At the same time, authorities and BJP workers have been organising Tiranga rallies, cultural programmes, sporting events and other public activities as part of the Har Ghar Tiranga–Vande Mataram campaign.

Tickoo questions the contrast. If a minority community is being informally asked to remain indoors because of security threats, he asks, how can the government simultaneously claim that normalcy has been restored and organise public celebrations across the Valley?

For him, the issue is not opposition to public celebrations. It is the contradiction between projecting normal public life and privately instructing a vulnerable section of the population to restrict its movement. The question is ultimately one of whose normalcy is being protected.

‘Why are the Pandits still suffering?’

Tickoo’s larger argument is that the government cannot continue treating every such episode as an isolated security incident. The latest threat may be attributed to a purported militant organisation. The police may establish that the letter is genuine or fabricated. The perpetrators may eventually be identified—or they may not. But, Tickoo argues, the underlying problem remains.

Over the past several years, Kashmiri Pandit employees have faced targeted killings, threats, protests, demands for transfers, security restrictions and repeated uncertainty over whether they can safely continue working in the Valley.

A rehabilitation policy that requires employees to live and work in Kashmir cannot succeed merely by providing employment. It must also ensure that they can move freely, access public spaces, perform their jobs and live ordinary lives without being forced into periodic confinement because of their identity.

The latest threat therefore raises questions that go beyond the purported organisation behind the poster. Who has access to the employees’ personal information? Why have repeated concerns about leaked lists not produced a satisfactory answer? Why are employees once again being asked to stay indoors instead of being given a transparent security assessment? And how long can a rehabilitation policy function if its beneficiaries repeatedly feel compelled to leave the Valley for their own safety?

For Tickoo, the larger failure is one of accountability. He argues that when security lapses occur, the State can point towards an organisation, a militant network or actors across the border. But if threats are able to reach identifiable employees and disrupt their everyday lives, the State must also account for the security failures within its own institutional framework.

The danger, he says, is that anyone could claim to represent a fabricated organisation, circulate threats and create fear and disruption, while the government simply attributes the episode to forces operating from across the border. That, however, does not answer the question of how the information reached them. Nor does it answer the question of why, after years of assurances and repeated meetings, Kashmiri Pandit employees continue to feel that their return to the Valley comes with an unresolved risk.

The latest threat letter may disappear from social media. The informal work-from-home instructions may eventually be withdrawn. Employees may be asked to return to their offices. But unless the questions around security, accountability and leaked personal information are answered, the larger problem will remain: a community encouraged to return in the name of rehabilitation, but repeatedly reminded that its safety in the Valley remains uncertain.

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The post ‘How Can Rehabilitation Work If We Are Not Safe?’ Sanjay Tickoo on the fresh threat to Kashmiri Pandit employees appeared first on SabrangIndia.