The proceedings reveal a complex intersection of competing constitutional and governance concerns. On one hand lies the Court’s continuing concern regarding the rights of pedestrians, the accessibility of public spaces, and the obligation of public authorities to enforce existing laws regulating street vending. On the other hand lies the reality that the regulatory framework created by Parliament in 2014 to govern street vending has remained only partially implemented in Mumbai for more than a decade. The result is that many of the individuals who are now the subject of identification and enforcement exercises exist within a legal and administrative landscape shaped not merely by unlawful occupation of public spaces, but also by prolonged governmental failure to complete the statutory processes contemplated under the Street Vendors Act.

The Bombay High Court’s intervention must therefore be understood against a much broader historical backdrop. The present controversy is not simply about the existence of unauthorised hawkers. It is also about the consequences of a decade-long failure to fully implement a law that was specifically enacted to regulate street vending while protecting the livelihoods of some of India’s most economically vulnerable workers.

The regulatory framework and the incomplete implementation of the Street Vendors Act

The Street Vendors (Protection of Livelihood and Regulation of Street Vending) Act, 2014 represented a significant departure from earlier approaches to street vending. Prior to the enactment of the legislation, vendors across Indian cities often existed in a precarious legal position. Despite performing an essential economic function and serving millions of urban consumers, they were frequently treated as encroachers and subjected to eviction drives, confiscation of goods, harassment, and arbitrary displacement.

The Act sought to establish a more balanced framework. Rather than treating street vendors as a problem to be removed, Parliament recognised vending as a legitimate occupation and sought to regulate it through a system of surveys, registration, certification, designated vending zones, and representative Town Vending Committees. The legislation was premised on the understanding that public spaces could be managed in a manner that balanced urban planning concerns with the constitutional protection of livelihood.

The Town Vending Committee was intended to serve as the cornerstone of this framework. These committees were tasked with conducting surveys, identifying eligible vendors, issuing certificates of vending, recommending vending zones, and ensuring periodic review of the regulatory framework. Importantly, the Act contemplated that surveys would be conducted at regular intervals and that the regulatory system would remain responsive to changing urban realities.

In Mumbai, however, the implementation of the Act remained deeply uneven. Although surveys were initiated, subsequent stages of the process progressed slowly. Certification exercises remained incomplete, disputes arose regarding eligibility, and the functioning of Town Vending Committees became a recurring source of controversy. As a result, the comprehensive regulatory framework envisaged by Parliament never fully materialised. The consequences of these delays have become central to the present litigation.

The centrality of the 2014 survey and the status of 99,435 vendors

One of the most significant figures repeatedly referred to in the Bombay High Court proceedings is 99,435. This number derives from the survey conducted by the BMC following the enactment of the Street Vendors Act and has become the foundation of the Court’s recent directions, discussed below in detail, regarding identification and verification.

The significance of this figure cannot be understood without appreciating the broader statutory context. The survey was intended to form only one component of a larger regulatory process. It was expected that the information gathered during the survey would subsequently be used to determine eligibility, issue certificates, designate vending zones, and create a functioning regulatory system overseen by Town Vending Committees.

However, while approximately 99,435 applicants were surveyed, the larger statutory process remained incomplete. Many vendors who participated in the survey never received final vending certificates. Others continued to operate in a legal grey zone, possessing survey records or acknowledgements but lacking the formal documentation contemplated under the Act.

Vendor organisations have repeatedly argued that this prolonged administrative uncertainty created a category of workers whose relationship with the law remained unresolved. They were neither fully regularised nor formally excluded. Instead, they existed within a system that acknowledged their presence but failed to conclusively determine their legal status.

This unresolved situation became particularly visible during the COVID-19 pandemic. Street vendor organisations repeatedly highlighted how incomplete implementation of the Act affected access to welfare schemes, financial assistance, and emergency relief measures. Many vendors were unable to access benefits because they lacked documentation that they had been waiting years to receive. Representatives of vendor unions pointed out that while tens of thousands had participated in official survey processes, only a small proportion had ultimately received formal recognition through certificates of vending.

Detailed report may be read here and here.

The present litigation therefore unfolds against the backdrop of a regulatory process that remains unfinished more than a decade after the enactment of the legislation.

The proceedings before Bombay High Court

The proceedings before the Bombay High Court arise from a long-running public interest litigation concerning the regulation of street vending, hawking and encroachments on roads, pavements and public spaces across Mumbai. The petition is rooted in persistent complaints that despite repeated judicial directions, large-scale unauthorised hawking continues to obstruct pedestrian movement, affect traffic circulation, impede access to railway stations, hospitals and public infrastructure, and undermine urban planning efforts. Over the years, the litigation has expanded into a broader examination of the implementation of the Street Vendors (Protection of Livelihood and Regulation of Street Vending) Act, 2014, the functioning of Town Vending Committees (TVCs), the creation of vending and non-vending zones, the conduct of surveys of eligible vendors, and the responsibilities of multiple authorities including the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation (BMC), Mumbai Police, Railways and the State Government. The Court has repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction with what it views as administrative inaction and the failure of authorities to establish an effective regulatory framework despite the existence of a statutory scheme.

The current phase of the litigation reflects the Court’s growing dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of municipal and police authorities in regulating street vending across Mumbai. During successive hearings, the Court examined affidavits and compliance reports submitted by the BMC and other authorities detailing enforcement actions undertaken against unauthorised hawkers. However, photographs and materials placed before the Court frequently suggested that locations identified for special monitoring continued to witness significant vending activity despite repeated eviction drives.

The Court consequently began questioning whether existing enforcement efforts were producing any meaningful or lasting results. Particular concern was expressed regarding the apparent reappearance of vendors shortly after eviction operations had concluded. According to the Court, the issue was not merely the removal of vendors but the inability of public authorities to prevent the repeated reoccupation of the same spaces.

This concern became a recurring theme across several hearings. The Court repeatedly questioned why vendors who had been removed from specific locations appeared able to return almost immediately despite the presence of municipal authorities and police personnel. The judges also expressed concern regarding the apparent disconnect between the assurances provided in court and conditions observed on the ground.

The Court increasingly viewed the issue as one involving institutional accountability. Municipal authorities pointed to challenges associated with enforcement and reoccupation. Police authorities referred to limitations arising from municipal responsibilities. The Court, however, repeatedly emphasised that the continued shifting of responsibility between agencies could not justify the persistence of conditions that had been the subject of litigation for years.

The proceedings thus gradually evolved from a discussion regarding individual instances of encroachment into a broader examination of governance failures and administrative accountability.

• October 2025: The Court signals that assurances are no longer enough

The proceedings in this petition intensified significantly during the hearing held on October 22, 2025. By this stage, the BMC had already informed the Court that it had identified twenty locations across Mumbai for focused action and monitoring. Municipal authorities asserted that steps were being taken to remove unauthorised hawkers and prevent their return.

However, photographs placed before the Court painted a different picture. Images of the area immediately outside the Bombay High Court showed that hawkers continued to occupy spaces despite repeated assurances regarding enforcement.

The Court expressed clear dissatisfaction with the situation. Justice Gadkari observed that despite repeated directions and solemn assurances from authorities, unauthorised hawkers continued to maintain a significant presence across the city. The Bench indicated that it would no longer be satisfied with general statements regarding enforcement and would instead insist upon measurable compliance.

Specific stretches, including the area from Flora Fountain to Horniman Circle, were placed under direct scrutiny. Municipal officials and police authorities were directed to ensure that these locations remained free from unauthorised hawking. The Court’s approach reflected a growing belief that the problem was not the absence of legal powers but the failure to exercise them effectively.

• November 2025: The Court expands the inquiry across Mumbai

The hearing in November 2025 marked an important shift in the Court’s approach. The issue was no longer treated as confined to a handful of locations. Instead, the Court began examining the broader condition of public spaces across Mumbai.

The Bench remarked that there appeared to be virtually no commercial district, market area or railway precinct in the city that remained unaffected by hawking. The judges questioned submissions suggesting that police personnel could not verify whether vendors possessed licences or authorisations. The Court pointed out that there was nothing preventing officers from demanding documentation and taking action against unauthorised vendors.

A recurring concern during the hearing was the phenomenon of reoccupation. According to the Court, the central problem was not merely that vendors were being removed; it was that they were returning almost immediately after enforcement operations concluded.

The Court identified twenty major locations across the city—including railway station precincts, Colaba Causeway, Linking Road, Hill Road, Mohammad Ali Road, Kurla, Ghatkopar and the route between Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj Terminus and the High Court—for continuous monitoring and enforcement, as per LiveLaw.

The hearing reflected the Court’s emerging view that the problem was systemic and required sustained institutional intervention rather than sporadic eviction drives.

• December 2025: Questions regarding political and administrative will

The Court’s frustration became more pronounced during the December 2025 hearing. The immediate trigger was the continued presence of hawkers in the vicinity of the High Court despite previous directions and the existence of a nearby police chowki. The judges openly questioned whether the State intended to comply with judicial directions at all.

Justice Gadkari remarked that the State needed to clarify whether it intended to enforce the law or permit citizens to act as they pleased. The Court also rejected suggestions that the issue should be viewed solely through the lens of vendors’ rights. While acknowledging that street vendors possess constitutional protections, the Bench emphasised that pedestrians and ordinary residents also possess rights that require protection, as per LiveLaw.

A particularly significant observation concerned the temporary clearance of the area during the swearing-in ceremony of the Chief Minister. The Court noted that authorities had demonstrated their capacity to clear the area when required but had failed to maintain those conditions thereafter. This observation reinforced the Court’s growing conviction that the persistence of the problem was not merely a question of capacity but one of sustained commitment.

• March and April 2026: The Court turns to the state’s failure to implement the act

The hearings during early 2026 marked another significant development. The Court increasingly shifted its focus from immediate enforcement failures to the larger question of why the Street Vendors Act had not been fully implemented despite having been enacted more than a decade earlier.

The most pointed criticism emerged during the hearing on April 28, 2026. When the Maharashtra Government produced a Government Resolution outlining future steps for implementation of the Act, the Court reacted sharply.

Justice Gadkari repeatedly questioned what authorities had been doing since 2014. The Bench described the Government Resolution as little more than an “eyewash” and “lip service,” observing that the State appeared to be creating implementation frameworks that should have existed years earlier, as reported by LiveLaw.

The Court was equally dismissive of statistics indicating that action had been taken against approximately 9,000 illegal hawkers. Pointing out that estimates suggested the presence of several lakh vendors across Mumbai, the Bench observed that the figures presented by the State addressed only a small fraction of the larger issue.

The hearing also highlighted concerns regarding intimidation faced by citizens who reported illegal hawking. References were made to threats, violence and retaliation against complainants. Justice Khata observed that many residents had effectively lost faith in the willingness of authorities to act.

The Court repeatedly emphasised that sufficient legal powers already existed and that the problem lay in implementation rather than legislative inadequacy.

The order may be read here.

• May 2026: The shift from enforcement to identification

The hearings conducted during May 2026 marked a significant transformation in the nature of the proceedings. Until this point, the Court’s primary concern had been enforcement. Increasingly, however, the focus shifted toward identification and verification.

The Court began examining how authorities could distinguish between vendors who formed part of the surveyed population and those operating outside the recognised framework. This discussion coincided with concerns raised regarding alleged undocumented foreign nationals, particularly Bangladeshi nationals, engaged in vending activities.

The BMC informed the Court that alleged foreign nationals residing illegally in India could not be permitted to engage in hawking and that verification exercises were necessary to identify such persons.

The Court’s response was to direct the creation of a comprehensive identification system based upon the 2014 survey database. QR-code-based identity cards were ordered for all 99,435 surveyed vendors.

The Court clarified that the issuance of identity cards would not create legal rights or confer recognition beyond existing entitlements. Rather, the purpose was to facilitate identification and distinguish surveyed vendors from persons operating outside the recognised framework.

When the BMC sought additional time for implementation, the Court expressed impatience. Justice Gadkari observed that the issue had persisted for years and that authorities could not continue to seek extensions while illegal activities allegedly continued. The Bench even suggested that the State Government allocate funds necessary to expedite the process.

The Court also directed the creation of citizen-reporting mechanisms, including dedicated WhatsApp systems, online portals and email addresses through which complaints regarding illegal hawking could be submitted.

The order may be read here.

• June 2026: Questions regarding the survey database

The hearing conducted on June 10, 2026 introduced a new dimension to the proceedings by raising questions regarding the reliability of the very database upon which the ongoing identification exercise is based.

Information placed before the Court suggested that certain individuals included within the 2014 survey records may not have been genuine hawkers and may instead have been shop owners who obtained inclusion through incorrect documentation. The Court treated these allegations seriously and directed that they be examined through an inquiry supervised by senior police officials.

This development is significant because it demonstrates that the process of verification is not limited to identifying persons outside the survey database. It also extends to examining the integrity of the database itself.

The allegations suggest that questions remain regarding the accuracy of records generated during the original survey exercise. If those records are now being used as the basis for determining legitimacy, then the reliability of the underlying data inevitably assumes considerable importance.

The June hearing therefore highlighted a broader challenge confronting the ongoing exercise. The task is not merely to distinguish surveyed vendors from unsurveyed vendors. It is also to ensure that the records being relied upon are themselves accurate and capable of supporting regulatory decisions with significant consequences for livelihoods.

The order may be read here.

The shift in the Court’s perspective

• How It Began: Public spaces, pedestrian rights, and constitutional concerns

A central feature of the Court’s reasoning, prior to May, has been its concern regarding the rights of pedestrians and the accessibility of public spaces. Throughout the proceedings, the Court has repeatedly emphasised that roads, footpaths and public areas exist primarily for public use and that authorities possess an obligation to ensure that citizens are able to access them safely and freely. Particular attention has been paid to the condition of footpaths and public thoroughfares in major commercial districts and around railway stations.

The Court has expressed concern that large sections of Mumbai’s public spaces have effectively become inaccessible to pedestrians because of encroachments and unauthorised vending activities. According to the Court, this situation raises questions not merely of urban management but also of constitutional governance.

In several hearings, the Bench linked the issue to broader concerns regarding the right to move freely and the obligation of public authorities to protect public infrastructure intended for common use. The judges repeatedly observed that the State cannot abdicate its responsibility to regulate public spaces and that continued inaction ultimately affects the rights of ordinary citizens. These concerns formed the foundation of the Court’s insistence upon stricter enforcement measures and closer monitoring of compliance.

• What It Became: The shift towards identification and verification

It is crucial to highlight that the recent 2026 proceedings have been about the Court’s increasing emphasis on identification and verification as mechanisms for regulating street vending. Earlier hearings focused primarily upon questions of encroachment and enforcement. More recent proceedings, however, have increasingly concentrated on distinguishing authorised vendors from unauthorised ones. This shift has been accompanied by directions requiring authorities to verify the identities of vendors and establish mechanisms capable of determining who falls within the recognised survey population.

The Court ultimately directed the BMC to undertake an exercise involving the issuance of QR-code-based identification cards to the 99,435 vendors included in the 2014 survey database. According to the Court, such a system would enable authorities to identify surveyed vendors and distinguish them from persons operating outside the recognised framework.

The BMC subsequently informed the Court that it had commenced the process of contacting and verifying the surveyed vendors. During the June 2026 hearing, municipal authorities indicated that the exercise remained ongoing and that additional time would be required to complete contact and verification procedures involving the entire surveyed population.

The Court has also directed the establishment of mechanisms through which members of the public can report instances of alleged illegal hawking. These measures include dedicated online portals, email addresses and WhatsApp-based complaint systems intended to facilitate direct reporting by citizens.

From a legal perspective, the State undoubtedly possesses the authority to investigate and act against persons residing unlawfully within India. However, the incorporation of migration-related concerns into litigation concerning street vending introduces a number of additional constitutional and policy considerations.

Street vending has historically been associated with economically vulnerable populations, including internal migrants, religious minorities, and workers employed within the informal economy. In recent years, several parts of the country have witnessed attempts to frame questions of livelihood, documentation and market participation through broader narratives concerning migration, citizenship and national security.

Consequently, the increasing emphasis upon identity verification raises important questions regarding the safeguards that will govern implementation. Verification exercises may be lawful and necessary for regulatory purposes, but they must remain grounded in evidence and due process. The distinction between lawful verification and profiling becomes particularly significant when questions of citizenship and migration become intertwined with questions of livelihood.

The implementation of the Court’s directions will therefore require careful attention to procedural fairness and constitutional protections.

The unaddressed issues 

• The Missing Conversation: Livelihood, informality and the original purpose of the Street Vendors Act

One striking feature of the Bombay High Court proceedings is the relative absence of sustained engagement with the livelihoods question that lies at the heart of the Street Vendors (Protection of Livelihood and Regulation of Street Vending) Act, 2014. Much of the litigation has centred on encroachments, pedestrian mobility, enforcement failures, unauthorised hawking and, more recently, identity verification. Yet the legislation itself was enacted because Parliament recognised that street vending is not merely an issue of urban management but one of livelihood, survival and economic justice. The Act emerged from decades of judicial intervention and policy reform aimed at ending the treatment of vendors as illegal occupants and recognising them instead as legitimate economic actors whose right to work required legal protection alongside reasonable regulation of public spaces.

The present dispute exposes the consequences of the State’s prolonged failure to implement that legislative vision. The fact that nearly 99,435 vendors were surveyed but large numbers remained trapped in administrative limbo for years illustrates a deeper institutional failure. These are not individuals operating entirely outside the system; they participated in official surveys, were recorded by public authorities and entered statutory processes that were never fully completed. The result has been persistent insecurity, leaving vendors vulnerable to eviction drives, confiscation of goods, extortion, loss of income and arbitrary exclusion from public spaces. These vulnerabilities became especially visible during the Covid-19 pandemic, when thousands of vendors across India struggled to access welfare measures precisely because the regulatory framework intended to formalise and protect their status remained incompletely implemented. Against this backdrop, the central question before Mumbai is not simply how to remove unauthorised hawkers, but whether the city can finally establish a regulatory regime that protects livelihoods while regulating public space in the manner Parliament originally intended, rather than perpetuating the cycle of enforcement, litigation and uncertainty that has characterised the past decade.

• Citizenship, identity and the risk of communalisation

The Bombay High Court’s emphasis on identification, verification and the removal of unauthorised vendors cannot be viewed in isolation from broader national developments in which questions of trade, livelihood and public space have increasingly become entangled with questions of religion, citizenship and belonging. Over recent years, Muslim vendors across several states have faced organised economic boycott campaigns, exclusion from markets, demands for identity disclosure and allegations linking their commercial activities to public health threats, demographic anxieties or national security concerns. During and after the Covid-19 pandemic, public campaigns urged consumers not to purchase goods from Muslim traders; villages in parts of Madhya Pradesh displayed banners barring Muslim vendors; political leaders publicly called for avoiding purchases from Muslim traders; and Muslim vendors were repeatedly subjected to suspicion and exclusion based solely on identity.

Equally significant has been the rise of informal and extra-legal identity policing. In several instances, private actors and vigilante groups have demanded identity documents, compelled traders to reveal their religious identities, pressured businesses to display religious markers, and effectively assumed functions reserved for lawful authorities. The experiences of Kashmiri traders across Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh and elsewhere demonstrate how quickly livelihood questions can become questions of citizenship and belonging, with vendors facing assaults, forced document checks, expulsion from localities, economic boycotts and accusations of disloyalty or terrorism. It is within this broader context that concerns arise regarding large-scale verification exercises involving Mumbai’s vendors. The Constitution undoubtedly permits lawful verification and enforcement against unauthorised activities. What it does not permit is collective suspicion, religious profiling or the transfer of verification powers to private actors. As Mumbai moves towards identifying and regulating nearly one lakh surveyed vendors, the constitutional challenge is not merely administrative. It is ensuring that verification remains a neutral legal exercise rather than becoming a mechanism through which broader anxieties about identity, migration and belonging determine who is considered entitled to participate in the city’s economic life.

The risks are not merely hypothetical. In November and December of 2025, Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP) filed a complaint before the Maharashtra Director General of Police and the National Commission for Minorities after a former BJYM functionary allegedly conducted Aadhaar checks of Muslim fruit vendors at Mumbai’s Malabar Hill market while reportedly asking Hindu vendors to display saffron flags on their carts. According to the complaint, Muslim vendors were selectively required to produce identity documents, described as potential “security threats” and subjected to public scrutiny despite the absence of any legal authority to conduct such verification. CJP argued that the incident reflected a growing pattern of extra-legal identity policing in which private individuals assume state functions and transform ordinary commercial spaces into sites of religious verification and exclusion. The episode serves as a reminder that, in the absence of robust safeguards, questions of documentation and legality can rapidly acquire communal dimensions, making the manner in which Mumbai conducts its verification process as important as the exercise itself. 

Detailed report may be read here.

A case about more than hawkers

What has emerged before the Bombay High Court over the course of these proceedings is not merely a dispute concerning street vendors occupying pavements and public roads. The litigation has evolved into a broader examination of how Indian cities govern public space, how welfare-oriented legislation is implemented, and how the State manages competing claims relating to livelihoods, legality, urban order and citizenship.

The Court has undoubtedly exposed serious administrative failures. Through repeated hearings, it has highlighted the inability of municipal authorities and police agencies to develop a consistent and durable regulatory response to street vending. It has questioned a pattern of cyclical enforcement in which vendors are removed, compliance reports are filed, and the same locations are subsequently reoccupied. It has also forced public authorities to confront uncomfortable questions regarding the implementation of a statute that was enacted more than a decade ago but remains only partially realised.

Yet the proceedings simultaneously reveal a deeper contradiction at the heart of the present controversy. For years, the State failed to complete the very processes through which the legality of street vending was supposed to be determined. Surveys were conducted, databases were created and statutory mechanisms were established, but the larger framework contemplated by the Street Vendors Act remained unfinished. The current effort to distinguish between authorised and unauthorised vendors is therefore taking place within a system whose foundational processes were themselves left incomplete.

This contradiction lies at the centre of the present litigation. The problem confronting Mumbai is not solely the existence of unauthorised hawking. It is also the consequence of a regulatory regime that was never fully implemented despite clear statutory mandates. Many of the enforcement challenges now highlighted by the Court are inseparable from that history.

The significance of the case consequently extends well beyond questions of encroachment. It raises fundamental questions about the capacity of public institutions to implement social legislation, the limits of enforcement-based governance, and the role of identification and documentation in determining access to livelihoods in contemporary India. It also raises important questions about how cities balance the rights of pedestrians and residents with the economic realities of millions of informal workers who depend upon public spaces for survival.

As the litigation continues, its legacy is likely to be measured not merely by the number of hawkers removed from particular roads or footpaths. Its enduring significance may lie in whether it succeeds in prompting the creation of a regulatory framework that is lawful, transparent and effective while remaining faithful to the constitutional commitment to dignity, livelihood and equal treatment. In that sense, the proceedings have become a debate not simply about hawkers, but about the future of urban citizenship itself and the place of informal workers within India’s rapidly transforming cities.

Conclusion: A test of constitutional governance in the city

The Bombay High Court’s hawkers litigation has ultimately exposed a reality that extends far beyond pavements, encroachments and municipal enforcement. At its heart lies a fundamental governance failure: more than a decade after Parliament enacted the Street Vendors (Protection of Livelihood and Regulation of Street Vending) Act, 2014, Mumbai is still attempting to determine who is entitled to vend, where they may vend, and under what conditions. The Court’s frustration is therefore not directed merely at the presence of hawkers on public roads, but at the inability of public institutions to implement a statutory framework that was specifically designed to regulate them.

The proceedings reveal two competing truths that must be reconciled. The first is that public spaces cannot be surrendered to unregulated occupation. Footpaths, roads, railway approaches and civic infrastructure exist for public use, and the State has a constitutional obligation to ensure that they remain accessible, safe and functional. The second is that street vendors are not simply encroachers. They are workers operating within one of India’s largest informal economies, many of whom entered official surveys, participated in statutory processes and spent years awaiting the recognition and protections promised by law. Any attempt to address the former while ignoring the latter risks reducing a complex governance challenge to a narrow law-and-order problem.

What makes the present litigation particularly significant is the contradiction it has brought into sharp focus. The State is now seeking to distinguish between authorised and unauthorised vendors through records generated by a regulatory process that was itself left incomplete. Many of the enforcement difficulties highlighted by the Court today are inseparable from years of administrative delay, institutional inertia and partial implementation of the very legislation intended to resolve them. The crisis confronting Mumbai is therefore not merely one of illegal hawking; it is also the consequence of a regulatory framework that remained unfinished despite clear statutory mandates.

The Court’s recent turn towards identification and verification adds another layer of complexity. Verification may be a legitimate and necessary tool of regulation. However, its constitutional legitimacy will ultimately depend on the safeguards that accompany it. In a climate where questions of documentation, migration, citizenship and belonging increasingly shape public discourse, the distinction between lawful verification and social profiling becomes critically important. The challenge before authorities is not simply to identify vendors, but to ensure that processes designed to enforce legality do not become instruments of exclusion, discrimination or collective suspicion.

The enduring significance of this litigation will therefore not be measured by the number of hawkers removed from a particular road or market. It will be measured by whether Mumbai finally succeeds in building the regulatory system envisioned by Parliament in 2014: one that protects public spaces without criminalising poverty, regulates economic activity without destroying livelihoods, and enforces legality through transparent procedures rather than administrative improvisation. The question before the city is not simply who may sell goods on its pavements. It is whether urban governance in India can remain faithful to constitutional commitments of dignity, equality and livelihood while responding to the genuine demands of order, planning and public accountability. In that sense, this case is not merely about hawkers. It is about whether constitutional governance can succeed where a decade of institutional failure has not.

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The post Who owns Mumbai’s streets? The Bombay High Court, street vendors and a decade of regulatory failure appeared first on SabrangIndia.

NTA STATEMENT REGARDING THE ACTION ON TELEGRAM PLATFORM IN INDIA

1. The National Testing Agency (NTA) welcomes the directions issued today in respect of the Telegram platform in India. The directions, issued on recommendations of NTA are calibrated and bounded in time:

(a) a…

— National Testing Agency (@NTA_Exams) June 16, 2026

The government has justified these measures as a response to organised examination fraud, alleged paper-leak scams and misinformation campaigns. According to statements carried by Mint, WION and other media outlets, authorities identified several Telegram channels allegedly offering access to examination papers in exchange for money. The NTA further claimed that Telegram’s message-editing feature had been exploited to create fabricated evidence of paper leaks by allowing administrators to insert examination papers into older messages while retaining original timestamps.

The importance of maintaining the integrity of national examinations cannot be disputed. The future of lakhs of students depends upon a fair and credible examination process, and organised cheating networks undoubtedly deserve stringent action. However, the constitutional question raised by the Telegram ban is not whether examination fraud should be prevented. The question is whether the State can suspend access to an entire communication platform used by millions because some actors are allegedly misusing it. Once that question is asked, the government’s decision begins to appear far less straightforward than official statements suggest.

The real problem is not Telegram

The government’s explanation begins from a fundamentally flawed premise. The recurring problem in India’s examination system is not Telegram, WhatsApp or any other communication platform. Paper leaks do not originate on social media. They originate within the examination apparatus itself. Every leak necessarily begins somewhere in the chain of printing, storage, transportation, administration or distribution of examination materials. By the time a question paper appears on a messaging platform, the breach has already occurred.

Detailed report on paper leaks may be read here.

This distinction is critical because it reveals the extent to which the government’s response is directed at symptoms rather than causes. Telegram may be one of the channels through which leaked material is circulated, but it is not the source of the leak. The source lies within the institutions responsible for safeguarding examination integrity. A serious response to examination fraud would therefore focus on identifying vulnerabilities within the examination system itself: who had access to the papers, how the chain of custody was compromised, where security protocols failed and what reforms are required to prevent future breaches.

Instead, the government’s intervention directs public attention towards the platform through which information allegedly travels. This approach risks obscuring the more uncomfortable reality that examination fraud is ultimately a governance failure. Blocking Telegram may create the appearance of decisive action, but it does little to address the institutional weaknesses that make such fraud possible in the first place.

The NTA’s own explanation undermines the ban

Perhaps the most striking aspect of the government’s justification is that it appears to undermine the necessity of the measure it seeks to defend. The NTA’s own statement acknowledges that the Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre (I4C), state police forces and specialised cybercrime units had already identified and removed numerous Telegram channels, groups and bots allegedly involved in examination fraud. Law enforcement agencies had reportedly conducted investigations, tracked financial transactions and made arrests.

These admissions raise a difficult question for the government. If authorities were already capable of identifying specific channels and specific offenders, why was it necessary to block the entire platform? If targeted interventions were available and functioning, what justified the escalation to a nationwide platform-wide restriction affecting millions of lawful users?

The significance of these questions becomes even clearer when viewed through constitutional principles. Democracies do not permit governments to adopt the broadest possible restriction merely because it is administratively convenient. The burden lies on the State to demonstrate why less restrictive alternatives were inadequate. Yet the government’s own account suggests that channel-level takedowns, criminal investigations and targeted enforcement actions were already underway. The NTA therefore appears to have supplied the strongest argument against its own decision.

A constitutional problem of proportionality

The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that restrictions on fundamental rights must satisfy the doctrine of proportionality. In Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017), the Court made clear that even where the State pursues a legitimate objective, it must demonstrate that the measure adopted is necessary, that less restrictive alternatives are unavailable and that the benefits of the restriction outweigh the harm caused.

Preventing examination fraud is undoubtedly a legitimate objective. The difficulty lies in establishing that a nationwide platform ban was necessary to achieve it. The government’s own statements reveal the existence of multiple alternatives. Channels could be removed. Fraud networks could be investigated. Individuals could be arrested. Financial transactions could be traced. Criminal prosecutions could be initiated.

Once these alternatives are acknowledged, the constitutional burden shifts to the State to explain why they were insufficient. The public explanation offered thus far does not convincingly do so. Instead, it suggests that a platform-wide restriction was adopted despite the existence of narrower measures. That is precisely the scenario the doctrine of proportionality seeks to prevent.

What Anuradha Bhasin case actually says about internet restrictions

The Telegram ban also cannot be separated from the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020). While that case arose in the context of internet restrictions in Jammu and Kashmir, the principles articulated by the Court have broader relevance for all forms of digital restrictions.

The Court recognised that access to the internet is closely intertwined with the exercise of freedom of speech, access to information, education, trade and professional activity. It held that restrictions affecting digital communications must satisfy standards of necessity and proportionality and cannot be imposed through opaque executive processes. Most importantly, the Court emphasised transparency. Orders restricting communications must be published. Citizens must know why their rights are being restricted. Affected parties must have an opportunity to challenge such restrictions before courts.

In the present instance, however, the public has largely been presented with press releases and official explanations rather than the actual legal order. The reasoning adopted by the authorities remains unavailable. Whether Telegram was given an opportunity to be heard remains unclear. Whether less restrictive alternatives were seriously considered is unknown. These omissions are not procedural technicalities; they go to the heart of the constitutional safeguards identified by the Supreme Court.

The Shreya Singhal problem

The legal basis of the government’s action raises another serious concern. The reported reliance on Section 69A of the Information Technology Act immediately invites scrutiny because the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of that provision in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) only because it was presented as a narrow and carefully structured mechanism.

The Court accepted Section 69A because it involved targeted blocking of specific information under limited circumstances and subject to procedural safeguards. Its constitutional validity depended upon its narrow scope.

The Telegram ban raises the question of whether that narrow provision is now being transformed into a sweeping power capable of disabling entire communication platforms. As the Internet Freedom Foundation (IFF) has argued, there is a significant difference between blocking particular content and shutting down an intermediary used by millions. If Section 69A is interpreted broadly enough to justify platform-wide restrictions, the reasoning that underpinned its constitutional validity begins to weaken considerably.

The message editing direction may be even more troubling

The direction requiring Telegram to disable its message-editing feature raises concerns that extend even beyond the platform ban itself. While the government has publicly explained why it believes the feature was being misused, it has not clearly identified the legal authority under which it can compel a platform to redesign a feature for an entire country’s user base.

This distinction matters because blocking information and redesigning technological architecture are fundamentally different exercises of power. One concerns content regulation; the other concerns direct intervention in the design of digital infrastructure.

The implications are far-reaching. If governments can order the removal of editing functions today, similar arguments could potentially be invoked tomorrow against encryption, anonymous communication or other platform features. The issue is therefore not confined to Telegram. It concerns the broader relationship between state power and digital architecture.

Another example of India’s growing shutdown culture

The Telegram ban is not an isolated incident. It forms part of a broader pattern in which communication restrictions increasingly become the preferred response to administrative challenges. Over the last decade, multiple states have suspended internet services during recruitment examinations, teacher eligibility tests and competitive entrance examinations. These shutdowns are almost always justified as temporary and necessary measures to prevent cheating.

Yet despite repeated restrictions, examination leaks continue to occur. Fraud networks continue to operate. Recruitment scandals continue to emerge.

What persists is not the effectiveness of these measures but their repetition. Instead of reforming institutions, authorities increasingly appear to restrict communications. The result is a governance model in which the burden of institutional failure is shifted onto citizens rather than addressed at its source.

The real danger is the normalisation of censorship

The most significant concern raised by the Telegram ban is not its duration but the principle it reflects. Every time the State confronts a difficult administrative problem, there appears to be a growing willingness to restrict communications as part of the solution. Each restriction is presented as temporary. Each is described as exceptional. Yet collectively they establish a troubling precedent.

Over time, extraordinary measures become ordinary ones. Communication restrictions become routine administrative tools. Fundamental rights become subject to considerations of convenience and expediency.

The future of lakhs of students deserves protection. But constitutional freedoms deserve protection as well. A secure examination system will ultimately be built through accountability, transparency, stronger institutions and effective criminal investigation—not through platform bans and communication restrictions. The Telegram ban therefore raises a question that extends well beyond NEET. It forces us to confront whether India is becoming increasingly comfortable with restricting communications whenever governance becomes difficult. If that trend continues, the consequences will be felt far beyond a single examination cycle.

Related:

When Morality Meets Surveillance: The court’s push toward state-regulated digital content

Repeal recent amendments to the RTI act, 2005: Justice A.P Shah in an Open Letter

Safe harbour or shadow censorship? The battle over India’s digital speech

State-sponsored attacks of surveillance reveal an erosion on Indians’ right to privacy, especially journalists, political opposition

The post Telegram before NEET: When governance fails, censorship takes its place appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The Census as a Fundamental Rights Instrument

Further, PUCL points out that “the Census is not merely a bureaucratic exercise in counting heads and tabulating assets. The Indian State fulfils its constitutional obligations to its citizens through the foundational instrument. The data collected determines the allocation of welfare entitlements, targeted poverty programmes, infrastructure investments, and, crucially, delimitation of parliamentary constituencies. The Census is therefore inseparable from the right to equality (Article 14), the right to life and dignity (Article 21), and the right of citizens to be counted truthfully as bearers of rights. To falsify Census data is not an administrative irregularity: it is a violation of fundamental rights,” the statement states.

The Ground Reality

The testimony of enumerators, government school teachers, anganwadi workers, and other frontline functionaries paints a picture of deprivation that is profoundly at odds with the government’s self-congratulatory claims.

Enumerators across Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh have reported:
– Households without toilets, where residents defecate in the open, contradicting the government’s declaration that India is Open Defecation Free (ODF).
– Households without piped or treated tap water, contradicting the Jal Jeevan Mission’s claim of near-universal household water connectivity.
– Households dependent on firewood, dung cakes, and kerosene for cooking, contradicting data on LPG connections under the Ujjwala scheme.
– Households with tin roofs being instructed to be reclassified as having concrete roofs, a naked falsification of housing conditions.
– Households without electricity or internet, contradicting claims of digital inclusion.
– Residents so impoverished and excluded from state welfare that they pleaded with enumerators to help them access basic entitlements, housing, LPG, water, pensions, that they had never received despite being counted as beneficiaries in government data.

These are not discrepancies in methodology. They are the face of structural deprivation of a welfare architecture that has been constructed on paper while millions remain without its basic provisions in reality.

The Direction to Falsify: A Grave Institutional Offence

PUCL Rajasthan draws particular attention to the letter issued on June 2, 2026 by the Director of Census Operations, Rajasthan, to all district-level functionaries, directing them to ‘verify’ and correct ‘discrepancies’. Read alongside the testimony of enumerators who have been explicitly told ‘not to select options that may show the government in a poor light’, this letter constitutes institutional cover for data manipulation.

The instruction to enumerators to check whether households practising open defecation have access to a neighbour’s toilet or a public urinal, so as to revise the classification away from ‘open defecation’, is particularly egregious. It is not enumeration; it is the manufacture of consent to a falsehood.

This is not the first time that official welfare data has been found to diverge sharply from ground realities. The SIR exercise, deletions from voter rolls, manipulated BPL lists, these form part of a consistent and dangerous pattern of state-manufactured invisibility of the poor. The Census, which carries unique constitutional weight and long-term demographic and electoral consequences, cannot be permitted to become another instrument in this edifice of official falsification.

The Vulnerability of Enumerators

PUCL states, “It is equally alarmed at the position in which frontline enumerators, government school teachers, anganwadi workers, and other contractual and regular state employees, have been placed. These individuals are being required to choose between their professional integrity and their institutional subordination. Many have raised their voices on social media at considerable personal risk. They deserve full protection, not coercion.”

The manner in which the Census exercise is being conducted entirely on digital platforms using enumerators’ personal phones, in conditions of inadequate mobile connectivity in rural and tribal areas, with grossly insufficient reimbursement (a mobile recharge of Rs. 66 has been reported from Uttarakhand) enhances this vulnerability, states PUCL.  These conditions, compounded by the simultaneous performance of regular duties, render the exercise not merely flawed but structurally compromised.

Warning

PUCL “reminds the Central and State Governments that a Census whose data is manufactured to validate governmental claims rather than to enumerate lived realities is not merely a statistical fraud, it is a political and constitutional one. The decennial Census shapes delimitation, welfare targeting, fiscal devolution, and the entire architecture of representative democracy. Falsified Census data will not only deprive the poor of entitlements they urgently need; it will corrupt the very basis of democratic representation for decades.

“The invisible poor, those without roofs, toilets, electricity, or clean water, have a fundamental right to be seen, counted, and heard by the Indian State. Their erasure from official data is not a technicality. It is a rights violation.

Hence, the organization demands:

– An immediate halt to all instructions, formal or informal, to enumerators to revise or ‘correct’ data that truthfully reflects ground conditions. The CMMS portal must not be used as an instrument of real-time surveillance to pressurise enumerators into data revision.
– A full, independent, and transparent inquiry into the letter issued by the Director of Census Operations, Rajasthan, on 2 June 2026, and all allied communications issued by Charge Officers, Sub-Divisional Census Officers, and District Coordinators in this connection.
– Guaranteed protection for all enumerators who have raised concerns about pressure to falsify data, whether on social media or through other means, against any form of institutional retaliation, transfer, or disciplinary action.
– The constitution of an independent oversight mechanism, including civil society, retired senior bureaucrats, and statisticians with no government affiliation, to audit and verify Census data at the block level before final records are compiled.
– A public statement from the Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India reaffirming the constitutional obligation of the Census to capture truthful ground realities, and explicitly disavowing any instruction to enumerators to align data with government welfare scheme claims.
– Adequate material support to enumerators, including data reimbursement, dedicated time, and relief from concurrent official duties during the HLO exercise.

The detailed statement has been issued by Kavita Srivastava, national president, V. Suresh, National General Secretary and Anant Bhatnagar, PUCL state Rajasthan President among others.

Related:

Ensure transparency and inclusion in the 2027 Census: CCG

Long-delayed Census to be Conducted in Two Phases From October 2026

To count or not to count, delays and India’s decadal Census

The post Falsifying the Truth: PUCL condemns the systematic manipulation of census data & suppression of ground realities in census exercise appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Dear friends,

Some newspapers reported that after a meeting with officials yesterday, Deputy Chief Minister D.K. Shivakumar instructed authorities to immediately provide residence certificates to those who require them for SIR. As per a report in The New Indian Express.

However, according to the list of 11 documents released by the Election Commission for SIR, a simple “Residential Certificate” is not sufficient. The Commission specifically requires:
Permanent Residence Certificate (PRC) issued by the competent State authority
To obtain a Residential Certificate, documents such as Aadhaar, ration card, electricity/water bills, rental agreements, etc., are usually sufficient.
However, for a Permanent Residence Certificate, additional proof is required showing permanent residence in the state for more than six years. This may include long-term ration cards, property records, or evidence of having studied in the state or resided in the state for more than six years.
Only after verification of such documents can the competent authority—the Tahsildar or Deputy Tahsildar—issue the certificate.

The question is: if the government hurriedly issues certificates without fully following these requirements, will the Election Commission accept them?

The West Bengal Experience

When SIR was conducted in West Bengal, residents submitted domicile certificates issued by the state government to prove their status. Attention: These were not ordinary residence certificates but permanent residence (domicile) certificates.

However, the Election Commission initially rejected them, arguing that they did not satisfy its prescribed Permanent Residence Certificate requirements. It also ordered that even those who had already submitted domicile certificates could be issued fresh notices. This was reported here.

As a result, then Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee publicly protested and later approached the Supreme Court. Only after these developments did the Election Commission, on February 9, agree to accept West Bengal domicile certificates as SIR eligibility documents, subject to several conditions. The conditions included:

1) EROs and AEROs could accept only those residence certificates issued in accordance with the West Bengal Government Order dated November 2, 1999.

2) The certificates had to be issued only by competent authorities such as District Magistrates, Additional District Magistrates, Sub-Divisional Officers, or the District Collector of Kolkata.

3) The certificates had to be issued strictly according to government guidelines.

4) All officials were required to be informed of and comply with these guidelines.

This has been detailed here.

This demonstrates the Election Commission’s “strict” (or exclusivist) approach—even toward permanent residence certificates issued by a state government. The Supreme Court has also upheld this authority.

States like Karnataka May Face Greater Difficulties

The ordinary residence certificate referred to by the Chief Minister of Karnataka, DK Shivakumar does not meet the “Permanent Residence Certificate” requirement under SIR. Given the West Bengal experience, only a Karnataka Domicile Certificate is likely to satisfy the Commission’s Permanent Residence Certificate requirement.

However, the same conditions imposed in West Bengal may effectively apply in Karnataka as well.
Generally, to establish Karnataka domicile status, one may need to show:

– Residence in Karnataka for seven years,
– More than six years of education in Karnataka,
– Parents residing in Karnataka, or
– Ownership of property in Karnataka.

These documents must then be verified and approved by the competent authority, usually a Tahsildar or higher-ranking official.

Therefore, since the Election Commission appears determined to use SIR to remove/exclude as many people as possible from electoral rolls on technical grounds, even minor procedural lapses in obtaining domicile certificates could be treated as discrepancies and lead to rejection.

Karnataka’s Chief Electoral Officer, Ambu Kumar, has already stated that a “discrepancy” AI will be applied after submission of Enumeration Forms in Karnataka as well.

Consequently, D.K. Shivakumar’s general instruction to issue residence certificates to everyone who needs them is unlikely, by itself, to protect Dalit and other marginalized communities in Karnataka from the risks posed by SIR. For this reason, the instruction to issue residence certificates should not be viewed as a victory, nor is a cause for complacency.

Therefore, let us remember:
– A Residential Certificate does not satisfy the Permanent Residence Certificate requirement.
– Obtaining a Domicile Certificate that may satisfy the Permanent Residence Certificate requirement is not easy for many eligible members of marginalized communities.

– Documents obtained without following the proper procedure and authority may not be accepted by the Election Commission.

Let us remain alert and not get carried away

Let SIR be completely withdrawn — let democracy survive

Disclaimer: The views expressed here are the author’s personal views, and do not necessarily represent the views of Sabrangindia.

Related:

Jharkhand’s Biggest Democratic Test Yet: The SIR Challenge

SC greenlights SIR, upholds ECI’s power to revise electoral rolls

Documents Cannot Decide Democracy: How CJP is training communities to navigate the SIR process

The post Anti-SIR Activists Beware: A mere Residential Certificate does not satisfy SIR requirements appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In a judgment that may become an important reference point in India’s continuing debate over liberty and national security, a Division Bench of Justice Navin Chawla and Justice Ravinder Dudeja ruled that the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty under Article 21 cannot be indefinitely subordinated to statutory restrictions on bail.

“The appellant’s rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India need to be balanced and may even trump the restriction imposed under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA,” the Court observed, as per LiveLaw, while setting aside a December 2024 order of the Special NIA Court that had refused bail.

The ruling, however, does not immediately secure Parvez’s freedom. He continues to remain in custody because he is also an accused in a separate NIA case registered in 2020 relating to alleged terror-funding networks in Jammu and Kashmir, where his bail plea remains pending.

The case against Khurram Parvez

Parvez, one of Kashmir’s most internationally recognised human rights defenders, was arrested by the National Investigation Agency (NIA) on November 22, 2021, during an investigation into what the agency described as a Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) over ground worker network allegedly operated by a Pakistan-based handler known as Hyder alias Ali alias Yusuf.

Significantly, Parvez was not named in the original FIR registered by the NIA on November 6, 2021. His name emerged during the course of the investigation.

The NIA’s case is that Parvez, while functioning as Programme Coordinator of the Jammu Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society (JKCCS) and Chairperson of the Asian Federation Against Involuntary Disappearances (AFAD), was allegedly involved in terrorist conspiracy “in the guise of human rights activism.”

According to the prosecution, Parvez recruited Muneer Ahmad Kataria as an overground worker for Lashkar-e-Taiba and facilitated his introduction to Pakistani handler Hyder. Kataria allegedly recruited another accused, Arshid Ahmad Tonch, creating a chain of operatives linked to the militant organisation.

The agency further alleged that Parvez was involved in gathering sensitive information regarding Indian security installations, army camps, troop movements, road conditions near the Line of Control, and details of military and paramilitary structures. Investigators claimed that information about officers involved in counter-insurgency operations was compiled into dossiers described as “High-Ranking Perpetrators.”

The NIA also relied upon emails allegedly showing contact between Parvez and Pakistani journalists who sought footage of Indian military deployment in Kashmir.

The prosecution further pointed to Parvez’s visits to Pakistan in 2007 and 2015, where he allegedly met Syed Salahuddin, chief of the Hizbul Mujahideen and a designated terrorist. Visiting cards of Hizbul functionaries recovered from JKCCS offices were also cited as incriminating material.

Additionally, the agency alleged that Parvez played an active role during the 2016 protests that followed the killing of militant commander Burhan Wani, accusing him of making speeches including slogans such as “Burhan tere janissar, beyshumaar beyshumaar“, “Go Back India“, and “India go away from Kashmir“. According to the prosecution, these activities promoted separatist sentiment and encouraged unrest.

A separate strand of the prosecution case concerns allegations that Parvez attempted to secure the release of electronic devices seized by investigators through illegal payments routed via Muneer Ahmad Kataria to former NIA Superintendent of Police Arvind Digvijay Negi, who was later arrested in a separate corruption scandal.

The approver at the centre of the case

A critical feature of the High Court’s analysis was the centrality of Muneer Ahmad Kataria, who has since turned approver. In a supplementary chargesheet filed in July 2025, Kataria claimed that he had worked as an NIA informer since 2019 and had known Parvez since 2015. He alleged that Parvez introduced him to Hyder, described him as the “Chief Operating Commander” of the Lashkar-e-Taiba’s Jammu and Kashmir module, and facilitated financial and operational links.

Kataria also alleged that Parvez paid him Rs 1.5 lakh to be passed on as a bribe to NIA officer Arvind Digvijay Negi. The High Court acknowledged that these allegations were serious. However, it emphasised that they rested substantially on the testimony of a co-accused who had become an approver and who himself claimed to have been working as an NIA informer.

“While the above statement raises serious allegations against the appellant, these allegations are based on the statement of a co-accused who has since turned approver and who himself claims to be an NIA informer. His evidence is yet to be tested in trial,” the Bench observed in Para 66 of the judgment. That observation became one of the most significant aspects of the judgment.

The Defence: Human rights work, not terrorism

Parvez’s legal team, led by Senior Advocate Tanveer Ahmed Mir, argued that the prosecution had systematically criminalised legitimate human rights documentation. The defence pointed out that many of the documents cited by investigators—including the “Structure of Violence” report and the “Alleged Perpetrators” report—were publicly available publications that had been released years earlier and remained accessible on the JKCCS website.

The “Structure of Violence” report, published in 2015, documented military and paramilitary structures in Kashmir as part of human rights research. The “Alleged Perpetrators” report, published in 2012, compiled information about officers allegedly implicated in human rights violations, much of it obtained through Right to Information requests.

The Court noted an important fact: the prosecution did not dispute that these documents had been publicly available for years. It further recorded that the “Alleged Perpetrators” report had even been shared with the Indian Army, which publicly responded to it in 2012.

The defence also argued that Parvez’s visits to Pakistan in 2007 and 2015 were undertaken openly, with valid visas, and were part of public advocacy efforts that had long been documented in the public domain.

On the allegations relating to slogans and participation in protests, the defence argued that expressions of political dissent or advocacy of self-determination cannot automatically attract anti-terror provisions unless they cross the threshold into incitement of violence or active involvement in terrorist activity.

The constitutional question

At the heart of the case lay a broader constitutional question that has increasingly confronted Indian courts: can a person accused under UAPA be kept in prison indefinitely while waiting for trial?

Section 43D (5) of the UAPA creates one of India’s toughest bail standards. Courts are ordinarily prohibited from granting bail if the accusations appear prima facie true on the basis of the chargesheet and case diary.

The High Court devoted substantial attention to recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on this issue. The Bench revisited and relied upon the landmark decision in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, where the Supreme Court held that constitutional courts retain the power to grant bail when prolonged incarceration threatens fundamental rights.

Quoting extensively from Najeeb, the High Court reiterated that statutory restrictions “will melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence.” (Para 52)

The Court also examined the Supreme Court’s more recent judgment in Gulfisha Fatimav, which cautioned that delay alone cannot automatically justify bail in every UAPA case and that courts must conduct a contextual assessment that takes into account the nature of allegations, stage of proceedings, causes of delay and risks associated with release.

Yet the Bench also referred to the Supreme Court’s subsequent observations in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi, where a three-judge bench strongly reaffirmed the constitutional foundations of bail.

The Supreme Court had observed in Andrabi: “‘Bail is the rule and jail is the exception’ is not merely an empty statutory slogan. It is a constitutional principle flowing from Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution and the presumption of innocence.”

Detailed analysis of Andrabi judgment may be read here.

The High Court further noted that although the broader question regarding the relationship between Article 21 and Section 43D (5) has now been referred to a larger Bench of the Supreme Court, existing precedent continues to bind constitutional courts.

Four-and-a-half years without trial

The factor that ultimately proved decisive was the extraordinary delay in the proceedings. The Court recorded that Parvez had been incarcerated since November 22, 2021. Despite spending almost four-and-a-half years in prison, the case had not even crossed the stage of arguments on framing charges.

The prosecution proposed to examine 197 witnesses if charges were eventually framed. The Court observed that there was “no likelihood” of the trial concluding in the foreseeable future. The judges therefore considered the allegations, the stage of proceedings, the constitutional guarantee of liberty, and the reality of the judicial process together.

” We have taken note of the above allegations and the defence of the appellant, only to highlight that they must be tested against the long period of incarceration of the appellant and the fact that there is no likelihood of the trial ending soon as also against the yardstick of bail being the rule, while denial thereof being an exception. The appellant‟s rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India need to be balanced and may even trump the restriction imposed under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA.” (Para 71)

The Court added that continued incarceration under these circumstances raised serious Article 21 concerns.

Disability as an additional ground

The Bench also gave weight to Parvez’s physical disability. Parvez lost his leg in a landmine explosion in Kupwara in 2004 while participating in election-monitoring work and has used a prosthetic limb ever since. Although the NIA argued that his disability had not prevented him from engaging in extensive travel and activism, the Court concluded that his condition nevertheless entitled him to special consideration.

“We are also to keep in mind that the appellant is infirm. Though the learned SPP has emphasised that his infirmity has not deterred the appellant from still indulging in activities, which he describes as being anti-national, the fact remains that the appellant is infirm and deserves that special consideration,” the Bench held in Para 73.

Bail granted, but under strict conditions

Having balanced the seriousness of the allegations against constitutional concerns arising from prolonged incarceration, the Court granted bail. The conditions imposed are extensive.

Parvez must furnish a personal bond of Rs 2 lakh with two sureties, surrender his passport, remain within the National Capital Territory of Delhi unless granted permission to travel, appear before the trial court whenever required, and report periodically to investigators.

He is prohibited from contacting witnesses, tampering with evidence, making public statements about the merits of the case, or engaging in activities that could prejudice the trial. Among the more notable conditions is a prohibition on uploading, sharing, disseminating or circulating any “anti-national material” through social media or other platforms. The Court also clarified that any violation of the conditions could result in cancellation of bail.

A significant UAPA bail ruling

The judgment arrives at a moment when courts across India are grappling with a growing tension between national-security legislation and constitutional guarantees of liberty. Rather than deciding whether the allegations against Parvez are true or false, the Delhi High Court repeatedly emphasised that such questions must ultimately be resolved at trial.

Its focus was narrower but constitutionally significant: whether an individual can remain imprisoned for years while a trial remains nowhere near completion.

The Court’s answer was clear.

Even in prosecutions involving terrorism allegations, constitutional courts cannot ignore prolonged incarceration. While the allegations against Parvez remain serious and continue to be contested, the Bench concluded that constitutional guarantees of liberty, speedy trial, and due process cannot become casualties of an endlessly delayed prosecution. As the Court put it, Article 21 may, in appropriate cases, “even trump” the restrictions imposed by the UAPA.

The complete judgement may be read below:

Previous reports on the cases against Khurram Parvez may be read here.

Related:

50 HR groups appeal for unconditional release of Khurram Parvez, Irfan Meraj

MEA lashes out against OHCHR comment on Khurram Parvez’s arrest

Kashmir based human rights activist Khurram Parvez arrested

Khurram Parvez is still in jail despite court’s release order due to ‘minor clerical error’

The post Article 21 May Trump UAPA Bail Bar: Delhi High Court grants bail to Kashmiri rights defender Khurram Parvez after 4½ years in jail appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The government presents the exercise as a necessary response to illegal immigration, demographic change and national security concerns. Yet mounting evidence from court proceedings, media investigations, government directives and testimonies from affected families raises a more troubling picture: one in which due process protections appear increasingly fragile, citizenship verification procedures are often opaque, and Bengali-speaking Muslims bear the overwhelming burden of suspicion.

Detailed report may be read here.

At the heart of the controversy, lies a fundamental constitutional question: can the Indian state pursue such detention and immigration enforcement while bypassing the procedural safeguards that protect individuals from arbitrary detention, wrongful deportation and statelessness? Two, without this due process of either established legal norms or procedures not enquiries/investigations into who these illegal immigrants are, is such action not arbitrary and without foundation?

The missing data and the transparency deficit

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the current deportation drive is not merely the scale of the exercise but the extraordinary lack of transparency surrounding it. Across Assam, West Bengal, Gujarat and other states, governments have announced deportations, detention drives and large-scale verification exercises. Yet even today, there is no publicly available dataset identifying who has been classified as an undocumented migrant, from which districts they were picked up, what evidence was relied upon, whether nationality was independently verified, how many individuals challenged those determinations, how many continue to remain in detention centres, and how many have ultimately been deported.

This absence of information is particularly striking because the consequences of these decisions are so severe. Deportation is among the most coercive powers exercised by the state. It can separate families, extinguish livelihoods, result in prolonged detention and, in some cases, leave individuals stranded in a country they insist is not their own. Yet the public is being asked to accept the legitimacy of the process without access to even the most basic information about how it is being carried out.

The opacity is all the more difficult to justify because the Union governments own deportation policy appears to contemplate extensive record keeping and reporting requirements. The policy submitted by the Ministry of Home Affairs before the Supreme Court requires state governments to maintain records of individuals handed over for deportation, submit mandatory reports to the Union government, and provides that the Bureau of Immigration shall publish information relating to deported Bangladeshi nationals and Rohingyas on a public portal for verification purposes.

Yet little of this information is publicly accessible. Speaking to Al Jazeera, civil rights activist and CJP Secretary Teesta Setalvad argued that the present campaign appears to be driven more by political rhetoric than publicly available evidence. “Even today the authorities have not made available exactly who, which families, from which locations have been identified as illegal immigrants, on what basis and assessment and then sent back,” she said. “There is also an element of targeting specific sections, particular communities.”

Her criticism points to a fundamental problem: In the absence of publicly available data, independent scrutiny becomes nearly impossible. It is impossible to assess whether those being detained and deported are in fact undocumented migrants, whether particular communities are being disproportionately targeted, whether established procedures are being followed, or whether wrongful deportations are taking place.

The demand for transparency is therefore not a procedural technicality. It lies at the heart of democratic accountability. If governments are confident that deportations are being carried out lawfully, after proper verification and in accordance with due process, then there is a compelling public interest in releasing comprehensive data regarding those detained, those housed in holding centres, those whose nationality has been verified, and those who have ultimately been deported.

Until such information is made available, one of the most far-reaching citizenship and deportation exercises in recent Indian history will continue to operate largely beyond meaningful public scrutiny.

From political slogan to state policy

For decades, the BJP has built its political narrative in eastern India around the issue of “illegal infiltration” from Bangladesh. The party has repeatedly argued that large-scale migration has altered the demographic composition of border states, strained public resources and created security vulnerabilities.

The issue has occupied a central place in BJP campaigns in Assam, West Bengal and Tripura. Senior BJP leaders, including Union Home Minister Amit Shah, have frequently described undocumented migrants from Bangladesh as a threat to national security and demographic stability. During previous election campaigns, Shah famously referred to illegal migrants as “termites“, a phrase that drew widespread criticism from civil society groups and human rights organisations. Report in The Hindu.

Following the BJP’s victory in West Bengal, these political commitments quickly evolved into administrative action. Chief Minister Suvendu Adhikari announced the implementation of a “detect, delete and deport” framework under which individuals identified as illegal migrants would be detained by state authorities and transferred directly to the Border Security Force (BSF) for deportation, as per Hindustan Times. The announcement was accompanied by instructions to establish holding centres across districts and create a streamlined mechanism for identifying and removing alleged infiltrators. What was once campaign rhetoric had become state policy.

The creation of a national deportation architecture

The developments in West Bengal are not occurring in isolation. According to documents reported by The Hindu, the Union Ministry of Home Affairs has formulated a comprehensive deportation policy requiring states to establish district-level special task forces for the identification, detention and deportation of alleged illegal migrants from Bangladesh and Myanmar. However, before the Supreme Court of India, in the ongoing Rajubala Das v. Union of India case, the deportation policy submitted before the Courts hays down more tested procedures. The same has been explained below.

The policy directs states to:

• Create dedicated holding centres or camps for undocumented migrants awaiting deportation.
• Establish a time-bound mechanism for identification and nationality verification.
• Upload biometric information and demographic data onto the Foreigners Identification Portal.
• Cancel government-issued identity documents obtained by individuals determined to be illegal migrants.
• Maintain monthly reports regarding foreigners who are untraceable, detained or awaiting deportation.
• Coordinate with central agencies to facilitate removals.

The guidelines envision a nationwide infrastructure capable of processing large numbers of suspected migrants. Holding centres are to be enclosed by ten-foot boundary walls and barbed-wire fencing. Detainees are to remain confined pending verification of nationality and completion of deportation procedures.

Although the policy states that these facilities should provide humane living conditions, medical care, educational facilities for children, communication access and recreational space, rights groups argue that the rapid expansion of detention infrastructure signals a shift towards normalising large-scale administrative detention.

A policy contradiction at the heart of the deportation drive

One of the most striking aspects of the current deportation campaign is the apparent tension between the procedures explained above and the deportation framework that the Union Ministry of Home Affairs itself placed on record before the Supreme Court.

In the Rajubala Das v. Union of India proceedings before the Supreme Court, the MHA submitted an affidavit setting out a detailed deportation policy governing the treatment of alleged undocumented Bangladeshi nationals and Rohingyas. That policy envisages a structured process involving coordination between state governments, the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of External Affairs, foreign missions and designated border-guarding forces. Crucially, it recognises that nationality cannot be assumed unilaterally and that nationality verification is a necessary component of the deportation process.

The policy specifically provides that where an alleged undocumented Bangladeshi national or Rohingya is arrested, their details are to be furnished to the Ministry of External Affairs so that the matter can be taken up with the Bangladesh High Commission or the Myanmar Embassy for nationality verification. The stated purpose is to enable the foreign government concerned to process and verify the individual’s nationality before deportation is carried out.

The same policy also requires state governments to maintain records of all individuals handed over for deportation and submit mandatory monthly reports to the Ministry of Home Affairs. It further provides that the Bureau of Immigration shall publish a list of deported Bangladeshi nationals and Rohingyas on a public portal for verification purposes.

This raises a serious question: If the deportation policy submitted before the Supreme Court contemplates nationality verification through diplomatic channels, maintenance of detailed records, mandatory reporting and publication of deportation data, how do these safeguards square with reports of alleged pushbacks, summary removals and immediate send-backs at the border?

The question becomes even more pressing in light of report that Bangladeshi and Myanmar nationals intercepted at land or maritime borders may be “immediately sent back” after their biometrics are recorded. The apparent gap between the procedures described before the Supreme Court and practices now being reported on the ground deserves far greater public scrutiny.

Detailed report on the Rajubala case may be read here.

Holding centres become operational

The practical implementation of this framework is already underway. Malda became the first district in West Bengal to operationalise a holding centre under the new policy. The facility initially housed nine individuals identified as suspected Bangladeshi nationals, including women and children.

Officials, as per The Indian Express, described the centre as a temporary facility where detainees would remain while their nationality and immigration status were verified.

However, rights advocates point out that detention itself can become punitive when individuals are confined before citizenship disputes are conclusively resolved. This concern is especially significant in border regions where documentation is often incomplete, where migration has historically occurred across fluid borders, and where linguistic and cultural similarities between Indians and Bangladeshis complicate nationality determinations.

West Bengal

West Bengal is the epicentre of the current drive. According to Chief Minister Suvendu Adhikari, the state has already deported 4,800 alleged undocumented Bangladeshi migrants through newly established holding centres in border districts. Another 836 people were reportedly being held awaiting deportation as of early June 2026, as per The Times of India.

The government has also established an expanding network of detention facilities. Initial reports indicated that 11 holding centres had been created across the state and were housing at least 335 detainees, while later reports from Malda alone suggested more than 150 detainees had already been transferred there from North 24 Parganas district.

Government officials have presented these numbers as evidence of successful enforcement. However, the figures raise significant questions. If nearly 5,000 people have been removed within weeks of the BJP assuming office, it remains unclear how many cases involved completed nationality verification by Bangladesh, how many individuals received access to legal representation, and how many removals were subject to judicial scrutiny.

Gujarat

The largest publicly reported operation outside eastern India occurred in Gujarat. Under “Operation Delta Hunt”, authorities investigated approximately 6,200 individuals and identified 362 people as alleged illegal Bangladeshi immigrants, as per The Hindu. Of these, 166 were identified in Ahmedabad alone, including women and children. Authorities also stated that investigations into hundreds of additional cases were continuing.

The Gujarat government has further indicated that it intends to prosecute employers and landlords accused of sheltering undocumented migrants.

Assam

Unlike West Bengal and Gujarat, the Assam story is not primarily reflected through new numerical announcements but through litigation. Throughout 2025 and 2026, several habeas corpus petitions before the Gauhati High Court and the Supreme Court challenged alleged “pushback” operations involving Bengali-speaking Muslims who claimed Indian citizenship. The significance of Assam lies not merely in the number of people detained but in the emergence of documented allegations that Indian citizens were wrongly identified as foreigners and transported towards the Bangladesh border.

Citizens for Justice and Peace provides legal aid in some cases, details may be read here, here and here.

The Assam cases effectively became the warning sign for what now may happen on a larger scale in West Bengal.

The May 2025 Assam crisis report may be read here.

National figures

At the national level, according to The Hindu, the Ministry of External Affairs has confirmed that India has asked Bangladesh to verify the nationality of more than 2,860 individuals whom Indian authorities believe to be Bangladeshi nationals residing illegally in India.

Simultaneously, the Union Ministry of Home Affairs has directed states to establish district-level mechanisms for the identification, detention and deportation of alleged undocumented migrants from Bangladesh and Myanmar, suggesting that the campaign is being institutionalised nationwide rather than remaining confined to border states.

The human cost of wrongful deportation

Few cases illustrate the dangers of inadequate verification more clearly than that of Sunali Khatun. Reported extensively by BBC News, Khatun, a Bengali-speaking Muslim woman from West Bengal, was detained in Delhi alongside her husband and young son on suspicion of being an undocumented migrant. Authorities alleged that she lacked proof of lawful residence and initiated deportation proceedings. According to her account, officials failed to properly verify her claim that she was an Indian citizen from West Bengal. She, her husband and child were subsequently transported to Bangladesh. Once there, Bangladeshi authorities treated them as illegal entrants and imprisoned them. The family spent months in detention.

Detailed report on this case may be read here.

Only after intervention by the Supreme Court was Sunali permitted to return to India on humanitarian grounds while her citizenship claims continue to be examined. Her husband remains stranded in Bangladesh.  The case exposed the potentially catastrophic consequences of administrative errors in citizenship determination. A mistaken deportation is not simply an immigration decision. It can separate families, result in imprisonment in another country and effectively strip individuals of their nationality.

Due process concerns

The central criticism of the current deportation campaign is not that states lack authority to remove foreign nationals. Every sovereign state possesses the power to regulate immigration and deport individuals who are unlawfully present. The issue instead concerns the process by which such determinations are being made.

Under established principles of administrative fairness and constitutional governance, individuals facing deportation should ordinarily have:

• Notice of the allegations against them.
• Access to documentary evidence.
• An opportunity to challenge adverse findings.
• Legal representation.
• Independent verification of nationality.
• Judicial oversight where fundamental rights are implicated.

The recent practices, however, often fall short of these standards. Reports from Assam and West Bengal suggest that detention frequently precedes verification rather than following it. In several cases, families have alleged that individuals were forced to prove citizenship after already being taken into custody. Such an approach effectively reverses the burden of proof and creates significant risks of wrongful exclusion.

Detailed report on deportation process may be read here.

Religious selectivity and the Citizenship Amendment Act

The controversy is further complicated by the interaction between deportation policy and the Citizenship (Amendment) Act. The CAA provides a pathway to citizenship for Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis and Christians from Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan who entered India before the prescribed cut-off date. Muslims are excluded.

Chief Minister Suvendu Adhikari has repeatedly emphasised that communities covered by the CAA will not face action under the deportation framework. Those outside its protection, however, remain vulnerable to detention and deportation. Two individuals entering India under similar circumstances may face radically different legal consequences depending upon their religious identity.

This concern is particularly acute because the overwhelming majority of those targeted by current deportation drives are Bengali-speaking Muslims.

Bangladesh pushes back

The crackdown has also generated significant diplomatic friction. Bangladesh has repeatedly objected to what it describes as attempts by Indian authorities to push individuals across the border without completing formal nationality verification procedures.

As per The Indian Express, Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) officials have publicly stated that they blocked numerous attempts by Indian authorities to send individuals into Bangladesh without prior verification.

Bangladesh’s Foreign Affairs Adviser, Shama Obaid, has stated that Dhaka has repeatedly communicated its concerns to New Delhi and insisted that existing bilateral mechanisms must be followed. The position of Bangladesh is straightforward: no person should be accepted unless their nationality has first been verified. India officially maintains that deportations occur only through established procedures.

Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal has stated that India has submitted details of more than 2,860 suspected Bangladeshi nationals to Dhaka for verification. Yet the persistence of Bangladeshi objections suggests continuing disagreements regarding implementation.

The demography committee

The deportation drive is now being supplemented by a broader effort to study demographic change. The Union Government recently established a high-level committee chaired by retired Supreme Court judge Justice Prakash Prabhakar Naolekar to examine demographic shifts allegedly caused by illegal migration and other factors. The committee’s mandate extends beyond research.

It has been tasked with recommending systems for identifying, detaining and deporting undocumented migrants and proposing mechanisms for strengthening border management and population monitoring. Its creation fulfils a commitment made by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and reflects the growing centrality of demographic concerns within government policy.

However, the language surrounding the committee has generated concern. Government statements describe demographic change arising from migration as an “unnatural” phenomenon and a “monumental challenge”. Such framing risks treating entire communities as demographic threats rather than as individuals possessing rights and legal protections.

Detailed report may be read here.

A constitutional test

India unquestionably has the authority to regulate immigration and remove foreign nationals who have entered or remained unlawfully. But citizenship determination is among the most consequential exercises of state power.

A mistaken arrest can be corrected. A mistaken deportation can leave a person stateless, imprisoned in a foreign country or permanently separated from family members. The experiences documented in Assam, the wrongful deportation allegations, Bangladesh’s repeated protests over alleged pushbacks, the establishment of detention infrastructure across West Bengal and the government’s push towards a nationwide deportation architecture collectively point to a deeper concern. The issue is no longer merely immigration enforcement.

It is whether the Indian state can pursue that objective while respecting the constitutional guarantees of fairness, equality and due process. As detention centres multiply, deportations accelerate and citizenship verification becomes increasingly securitised, the challenge confronting India is not simply identifying who belongs. It is ensuring that, in the process of deciding who does not, the state does not abandon the rule of law itself.

Related:

India’s Silent Push-Out: Courts, states, and the deportation of Bengali-Speaking Muslims

Gauhati HC orders clarity after state cites deportation of ‘Wrong Doyjan’ in alleged ‘pushback’ case, demands specific reply on her whereabouts

SC stays deportation of woman declared foreigner, issues notice on challenge to Gauhati HC Order

Contradictory Calls: SC halts one Tamil refugee’s deportation, denies another citing ‘not a Dharamshala’

Gauhati HC directs State to confirm custody or deportation of two men detained in midnight police action in Assam

Assam govt to SC: 33/63 of those marked for ‘deportation’ are contesting ‘foreigner’ status in courts

The post Who decides who belongs? Detention, deportation and the crisis of due process appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The judgment, delivered by Justice Neena Bansal Krishna on May 29, 2026, represents a comprehensive rejection of the allegations that formed the basis of nearly six years of investigation into the news portal’s foreign investment transactions. The Court not only found that the allegations failed to disclose the commission of any cognisable offence but went considerably further, characterising the proceedings as mala fide, arbitrary and an abuse of investigative powers directed against independent journalism.

The Court observed:

“Not only are the present proceedings only mala fide, but also an arbitrary attack and abuse of powers on the free and impartial journalism of the Petitioners.” (Para 121)

The finding is remarkable both for its breadth and for the language employed by the Court. While courts frequently examine the legality of investigations, it is comparatively rare for a constitutional court to explicitly connect the exercise of investigative powers with concerns regarding press freedom and the functioning of independent media.

The Background: Foreign investment, criminal allegations and ED action

The case arose out of an investment received by PPK Newsclick Studio Pvt. Ltd., the company operating NewsClick, from US-based Worldwide Media Holdings LLC.

According to the allegations, NewsClick received approximately USD 1.5 million, amounting to around ₹9.59 crore, in April 2018 through a share subscription arrangement. The EOW alleged that the shares had been deliberately overvalued in order to circumvent restrictions governing foreign direct investment in news media entities. It was further alleged that the funds received through the investment were siphoned away through salaries, consultancy fees, rent and other operational expenditures.

Based on these allegations, an FIR was registered in August 2020 under Sections 406, 420 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. Shortly thereafter, the Enforcement Directorate registered an Enforcement Case Information Report (ECIR) under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), treating the offences alleged in the FIR as scheduled offences capable of triggering a money laundering investigation.

The ED subsequently conducted extensive searches and seizures, raided NewsClick’s offices and the residences of journalists associated with the platform, and repeatedly summoned Purkayastha and other employees for questioning.

However, after examining the factual and legal basis of the allegations, the High Court concluded that the prosecution’s case suffered from fundamental defects at every stage.

No FDI restriction existed in 2018

The central allegation underlying the prosecution’s case was that NewsClick had received foreign investment in violation of restrictions applicable to news media organisations.

The Court found that this allegation was fundamentally misconceived. The judgment records that before receiving the investment, NewsClick had sought clarification from the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting regarding the applicability of foreign investment restrictions to online news platforms. In response, the Ministry clarified on January 5, 2018 that online publication through websites and web portals did not fall within the ambit of print media.

Relying on this clarification, the Court observed that there was no cap on foreign investment in digital news platforms at the time the investment was received.

The Court held:

” From the response received from the Ministry in respect of FDI Policy, it was clearly evident that there was no cap on the online publication of news and thus, the Agreement between the Petitioner and M/s Worldwide Media Holdings LLC and, therefore, the Investment Agreement dated 20.03.2018 cannot be said to be in violation of any law or disclosing any criminal offence. The receiving of 1.5Million USD that were remitted on 11.04.2018 in exchange of 7.69% shares of the Petitioner Company.” (Para 70)

Consequently, the Investment Agreement dated March 20, 2018 and the remittance received on April 11, 2018 could not be said to violate any law or disclose any criminal offence. This finding strikes at the heart of the prosecution’s case. The allegation that NewsClick structured the investment to evade foreign investment restrictions necessarily depended on the existence of such restrictions. Once the Court concluded that no cap existed at the relevant time, the principal basis of the investigation effectively collapsed.

The Court rejects the share overvaluation theory

The investigating agencies also alleged that NewsClick had deliberately overvalued its shares in order to facilitate the foreign investment transaction. The Court found no substance in this allegation.

The judgment records that the company had obtained a valuation certificate from BGJC Associates LLP, which assessed the fair value of the shares at ₹9,188 per share in accordance with FEMA requirements. The Court noted that there was no allegation of manipulation or illegality in the valuation exercise itself.

The final investment was made at a higher value after negotiations between the investor and the company. The Court observed that the share price was mutually agreed upon after considering the prospects and growth potential of the company. Significantly, the Court refused to criminalise what was essentially a commercial decision.

Justice Krishna observed:

“It is an economic decision which does not spell out any criminal offence.” (Para 73)

The Court further accepted the company’s explanation that the valuation had been undertaken through the Discounted Cash Flow method, an internationally recognised valuation methodology accepted under Indian regulatory frameworks.

The judgment therefore draws a clear distinction between commercial valuation disputes and criminal wrongdoing, holding that the former cannot automatically be transformed into the latter in the absence of evidence of fraud or deception.

The allegation of siphoning funds was found untenable

Another major plank of the prosecution’s case was the allegation that foreign investment received by NewsClick had been siphoned away through salaries, consultancy fees, rent and other operational expenditures. The Court rejected this allegation outright.

Justice Krishna observed that these expenditures were entirely consistent with the functioning of a digital media organisation and represented ordinary business expenses incurred in the course of running the company. The Court held that even if one were to assume that excessive expenditure had been incurred, that fact alone would not disclose the commission of a criminal offence.

The judgment states:

“Even if it is accepted that there were over payments and excessive expenditure incurred by the Petitioner, then too it does not disclose any criminal offence. The allegation of siphoning is, therefore, not tenable.” (Para 76)

This finding effectively dismantled the prosecution’s attempt to portray routine operational expenditure as evidence of criminal activity.

The RBI’s findings undermined the investigation

One of the more significant aspects of the judgment concerns the Court’s treatment of material received from the Reserve Bank of India. The Court noted that an earlier status report prepared during the investigation recorded that the RBI had informed investigators that the foreign remittance had been received through the automatic route and that there had been no delay in the issuance of shares or compliance with reporting requirements under FEMA.

According to the judgment, the RBI had stated that:

” Significantly, one Status Report dated 26.07.2021, copy of which was forwarded to the Petitioner as an advance copy, though not placed on record, clearly stated that during the course of investigation a Reply from RBI had been received wherein it was mentioned that as per the Form FCGPR, the foreign inward remittance was under automatic route and there was no delay in issue of shares as well as reporting, as per the extant FEMA regulations in case of the Petitioner.” (Para 77)

The Court noted that this material was subsequently withdrawn from later status reports. Nevertheless, it held that the correspondence was sufficient to indicate that no FEMA violations had been established against the company. The observation significantly weakened the prosecution’s attempt to portray the investment as unlawful.

The allegation that the investor was non-existent failed

The State had also alleged that Worldwide Media Holdings LLC did not legally exist and that the transaction was therefore fraudulent. The Court found that the allegation was unsupported by the material on record.

The company explained that although an earlier entity bearing the same name had been dissolved under Delaware law, a new company with the same name had subsequently been incorporated. The Court noted that nothing had emerged during the investigation to establish that the entity which invested in NewsClick was non-existent. Indeed, the status reports filed by the investigating agencies were largely silent on this aspect. The allegation therefore failed to withstand judicial scrutiny.

No offence of cheating was made out

Having examined the factual allegations, the Court proceeded to analyse whether the offences alleged in the FIR were legally sustainable. With respect to Section 420 IPC, the Court observed that the offence of cheating requires the existence of a person who has been deceived and dishonestly induced to part with property.

In the present case, the investor itself had never alleged that it had been cheated. Worldwide Media Holdings LLC had not lodged any complaint against NewsClick and no material emerged during the investigation suggesting that any person had been deceived.

The Court observed:

” For the offence of cheating, it is necessary that there must be an aggrieved person who has been cheated out of his valuable property. In this case, M/s Worldwide Media Holdings LLC is the entity which had forwarded 1.5 Million USD to the Petitioner. However, there is no Complaint whatsoever, by the Company about having been cheated by the Petitioner. Pertinently, the Complaint had been made by one Shoban Singh, who was merely an informant and was not the aggrieved person. There is nothing which has emerged even during the investigations as reflected in the Status Report, that there was any person who was aggrieved or who was cheated by the Petitioner. The offence of cheating even if all the allegations made are admitted, is not established.” (Para 83)

Accordingly, the essential ingredients of cheating were absent.

No criminal breach of trust either

The Court reached a similar conclusion regarding the allegation under Section 406 IPC. Justice Krishna observed that criminal breach of trust requires entrustment of property and its subsequent misappropriation. Neither requirement was satisfied in the present case.

The transaction between NewsClick and Worldwide Media Holdings LLC was an investment in exchange for shares. The Court held that such a transaction could not, “by no stretch of interpretation,” be characterised as entrustment or misappropriation. Consequently, the offence under Section 406 IPC was also found to be absent.

The Court concluded:

” Even if all the allegations are accepted, no offence under 406 or 420 IPC is disclosed in the FIR and in the subsequent investigations that have been undertaken.” (Para 85)

The Court rejects the ED’s conspiracy argument

Recognising the weakness of the allegations under Sections 406 and 420 IPC, the Enforcement Directorate sought to rely on Section 120B IPC, arguing that the investment transaction itself constituted a criminal conspiracy involving Purkayastha and the foreign investors.

The Court was unconvinced. It noted that criminal conspiracy requires an agreement to commit an illegal act or a legal act through illegal means. The material placed before the Court disclosed neither. The allegations of conspiracy were unsupported by evidence and amounted to little more than assertions.

Justice Krishna therefore held:

“ From the reply of ED, it is evident that the allegation that there is a clear-cut existence of a scheduled offence, is totally misconceived and baseless.” (Para 117)

This finding proved fatal to the ED’s case because the existence of a scheduled offence is a jurisdictional prerequisite for invoking the PMLA.

A “fishing and roving exercise” without any offence

Perhaps the most severe criticism in the judgment should be directed at the manner in which the investigation was conducted. The Court noted that years had passed since the registration of the ECIR. Numerous summons had been issued. Purkayastha and various employees had repeatedly joined the investigation. Searches had been conducted and extensive inquiries had been undertaken. Yet no material establishing the commission of a criminal offence had emerged.

The Court concluded:

“ Two years have passed since the registration of impugned ECIR in 2022. The Petitioner No. 2 and various employees of Petitioner number one have joined investigations on numerous occasions in 2021, after which they have not been summoned even once between September 2021 to June 2022. The manner in which the investigations have been conducted clearly show that the same is a fishing and roving exercise in the financial affairs of the Petitioners without the existence of any offence.” (Para 119)

The observation goes beyond a criticism of investigative shortcomings. It reflects the Court’s conclusion that the investigation itself lacked a legally sustainable foundation.

Quashing the FIR and the ECIR

Having found that the FIR disclosed no offence under Sections 406, 420 or 120B IPC, the Court held that its continuation amounted to a “gross abuse of the process of law.” The FIR was accordingly quashed.

Once the FIR fell, the ECIR could not survive. The Court reiterated the settled principle that where the predicate offence is quashed, the corresponding money laundering proceedings must also fall. The ECIR registered by the Enforcement Directorate was therefore quashed in its entirety.

Why the judgment matters

The significance of the judgment extends well beyond the immediate relief granted to NewsClick and Prabir Purkayastha. The Court did not merely find gaps in the evidence. It found that the allegations themselves failed to disclose criminal offences. It rejected the factual premises underlying the investigation, dismantled the legal basis for the offences invoked, and questioned the very foundation of the ED’s exercise of jurisdiction under the PMLA.

Most significantly, the Court linked the proceedings to broader concerns regarding press freedom, concluding that the case represented not only a legally unsustainable prosecution but also a misuse of investigative powers against independent journalism.

In doing so, the judgment stands as a significant reaffirmation of a basic constitutional principle: that criminal law cannot be invoked merely on suspicion, and that the extraordinary powers of investigation available to the State must remain anchored to an identifiable offence supported by law and evidence.

The complete judgment may be read here.

Detailed reports on cases against Prabir Purkayastha may be read here and here.

Related:

NSA slapped on journalist, DU scholar in Noida workers’ protest case amid allegations of crackdown on dissent

J & K: Attempt to muzzle FoE, Media? Police summons to media, journalists

“This system breaks the body when it cannot break the spirit” — Ipsa Shatakshi on her jailed husband, journalist Rupesh Kumar Singh

How the noose tightened: understanding modus operandi of killers who took the life of journalist-activist, Gauri Lankesh

Assam: Journalist Dilwar Hussain Mozumdar detained for 12 hours, arrested after covering protest against an alleged recruitment scam involving key BJP leaders

The post No Crime, No Predicate Offence, No ED Case: Delhi High Court quashes proceedings against NewsClick appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The National Eligibility Entrance Test (NEET) 2026 was conducted on May 3, 2026, however, it is set to be re-conducted in June. Let’s look at the timeline of events that led to this redo.

Before the May 3 exam, the NTA said the exam was conducted under “full security protocol”, including GPS-tracked paper transport, biometric verification, AI-assisted CCTV monitoring, and 5G jammers at centres. The test was conducted across 551 Indian cities and at 14 overseas centres, with nearly 23 lakh candidates having registered. On the night of May 3, when Suthar (a chemistry teacher from Sikar, Rajasthan) was discussing the NEET questions with his students, he came across a PDF document that went viral a day before the exam. That document had all the chemistry questions that appeared in the actual exam. It further contained ninety of the biology questions that were asked in the exam. Following this discovery, Suthar informed the Rajasthan police and the NTA.

Now, the probe starts. One of the first breakthroughs in the investigation came when Rajasthan Police’s Special Operations Group arrested the alleged mastermind from Dehradun on May 7. A day later, four more persons, all NEET aspirants from Dehradun, were arrested and brought to Sikar for further interrogation. Among the five, the police said that the counsellor is accused of selling the leaked question paper to aspirants as a “Guess Paper.” He had allegedly received it from someone in Kerala, and it was suspected he managed to obtain probable questions of the examination paper even before it was sent for printing. The NTA escalated the matter to Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) for “independent verification and necessary action.”

The Rajasthan Police inquiry linked the suspected document to an MBBS student from Churu who was at the time studying at a medical college in Kerala. It was quickly spread through NEET aspirants who shared it with each other. The probe also revealed that the material was widely shared through encrypted messaging apps and social media, with some recovered chats reportedly carrying the “forwarded many times” label, suggesting that the questions may have reached a large number of students before the exam. The guess paper was sold to students at rates between Rs 20,000 and Rs 2 lakh, with some media reports indicating charges as high as Rs 5 lakh. By the night before the exam, copies were allegedly circulating for around Rs 30,000 each.

On May 12, nine days after the conduct of the examination, the NTA officially cancelled NEET UG 2026 “in the interest of students” and to protect the credibility of the national examination system. However, the probe continued.

In order to understand how structural and rooted the corruption in the national examination system is, it is imperative to look at the findings that followed the probe. On May 13, the Federation of All India Medical Association (FAIMA) moved the Supreme Court challenging the “systemic failure” of the NTA in conducting NEET-UG 2026. The petition sought directions to replace or fundamentally restructure the NTA and to conduct a fresh NEET-UG 2026 examination under judicial supervision, including digital encryption and locking of question papers, a transition to a digital test model, and publication of centre-wise results for detection of statistical anomalies and organised malpractice.

Prahlad Vittal Rao Kulkarni, identified as the alleged kingpin and a domain expert in chemistry from Latur who had for years served on panels involved in setting the NEET question paper, was arrested on May 15, for allegedly exploiting his access to confidential material. He allegedly hosted special coaching classes at his house in the last week of April and dictated questions to a select students. On May 16, the CBI arrested Manisha Gurunath Mandhare, a biology lecturer who was part of the NTA’s paper-setting committee for the NEET exam held on May 3. The arrest was made on the basis of questioning of P V Kulkarni and other accused in the paper leak case. She was allegedly involved in the examination process and appointed by the NTA as an expert with complete access to the Botany and Zoology question papers. Mandhare is alleged to have mobilised prospective NEET examination candidates in April 2026 through Manisha Wagmare of Pune (she was arrested on May 14) and conducted special coaching classes for students at her home, dictating leaked questions and collecting lakhs of rupees as fee. Most of these questions tallied with the questions that appeared in the examination on May 3. The CBI on May 22 arrested Manisha Sanjay Havaldar. She had been appointed by the NTA as an expert to set the question paper for the physics section. Investigators found that she allegedly shared several Physics questions with co-accused Manisha Mandhare in April 2026.

There were several other arrests made by the CBI in relation to this from States such as Rajasthan, Delhi, Haryana.

On May 21, NTA Director General Abhishek Singh appeared before the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Education, Women, Children, Youth and Sports. Singh told the committee that the agency does not view the NEET exam as having been “leaked.” Even when Opposition members pressed for answers, NTA officials stuck to their position that the CBI is investigating, and they would only call it a leak if the CBI finished its probe and confirmed it. On questions from MPs about how the NEET paper was leaked, Singh said it was “not leaked through their system“. Several MPs asked him then how did the paper get leaked and what was the need to cancel the exam and hold a re-test. He had no answer and insisted that CBI was looking into the matter. Some opposition MPs demanded that the probe report be presented before the panel, but BJP members objected, saying the CBI is an independent body and should be allowed to do its work.

On May 29, the NTA informed the Supreme Court that it was all set to conduct NEET UG in digital testing mode from the next year instead of the pen and paper mode. The NTA’s affidavit stated to the Supreme Court in relation to the several petitions (including the aforesaid FAIMA petition) that the transition will be implemented from the next examination cycle in consultation with the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare thereby bringing all major NTA examinations onto the digital testing platform. Regarding the June 21 re-examination, the NTA told the Court that the re-examination scheduled on June 21, will be conducted under a further strengthened SOP framework and with multi-layer authentication.

This paper leak saga shows how deeply percolated corruption is in Indian educational system is. Students who work tirelessly for months and even years are failed by the system consistently. It erodes the faith public has in the government in conducting something as rudimentary as exams. The repercussions of such failures are tragic and extremely disheartening. The next section shall deal with the distress such failures cause to the students and the extreme steps that they are forced to take.

Aftermath, Young Lives lost

NEET is the biggest exam in terms of number of applicants in India, and is mandatory for anyone who aims to take admission in medical courses. In the hope of becoming doctors, students spend years preparing for the exam in extremely competitive and burdensome environments. Therefore, when the news of its cancellation was out, the consequences were tragic.

Pradeep, 21, had taken the exam twice before but failed to secure the needed marks. This time, the moment he walked out of the examination hall, he hugged his father and said, “Papa, this time I have become a doctor.” He had spent lakhs of rupees and countless hours preparing for the exam. As per the answer key of the exam conducted on May 3, Pradeep was securing a seat in a government medical college with ease. However, the news of cancellation put him in so much despair that he died by suicide. Pradeep Manich, 23, was a labourer’s son who had been living in a rented accommodation in Sikar away from his home. Reportedly, his family had sold their land and taken loans to fund his coaching and expenses for NEET. After his third attempt, the news of the paper leak and re-examination left him hopeless and disillusioned. He was devastated and he hanged himself days after the exam. Akanksha Chaturvedi had been preparing for the medical entrance exam in Nagpur and reportedly suffered from severe depression triggered by the cancellation, and ultimately, died by suicide. Her suicide note said, ” I no longer have the courage to take the NEET exam again. I was scoring good marks in my first attempt, but now there is no guarantee that I will perform well again.” Her father, a farmer, worked as a cook in Nagpur, and also put himself in financial debt to support her dreams of becoming a doctor. In Uttar Pradesh’s Lakhimpur Kheri, 21 years old Ritik Mishra died by suicide after reportedly distressed by the cancellation of the examination. Further, a 17 years old boy from Goa district took his life after the cancellation owing to academic stress and concerns over balancing studies with his passion for hockey.

19 years old Divyansh Sharma from Sikar tells how impactful such re-examinations are psychologically. Sharma says that when students spend one or two years preparing and the paper gets leaked, it feels devastating. He made it clear that beyond financial loss, the greatest cost is time. Talking about his own experience, he said Sikar (a hub for competitive exams preparation) as an emotionally draining environment, filled with overcrowded hostels, endless classes, and routines built entirely around mock tests and revision. The competition is so intense that students study throughout the entire day. When news breaks that an exam will be held again due to a leak, it kills motivation. He also points out that the psychological challenge is significant, as students begin to doubt whether they can replicate their previous level of performance. Devadrita Dam, an 18 years old aspirant from Gurgaon, had been genuinely hopeful after the exam because the paper seemed easier compared to previous years. In the week following the exam, she was finally reconnecting with friends after months of social isolation that the exam forces under the guise of rigour of preparation. Then her best friend sent her a message saying the paper had been cancelled. She initially assumed it was a joke, but her uncle called to confirm the news. She broke down crying at the thought of having to go through the entire process again. According to Dam, the leak has seriously shaken students’ faith in the system.

These heart-breaking stories show how disproportionately the cancellation of exams affected students who came from lower income families. And how, the system failed the students by not being able to conduct an exam of such importance with honesty and transparency.

Owing to these incidents in light of systemic failure of the education system towards its students, there were protests as legitimate expression of anguish by students. On May 12, National Students’ Union of India (NSUI) staged a massive protest at Shastri Bhawan. Protestors were seen climbing the barricades at Shastri Bhawan to show their disappointment and anger. Characteristically Delhi Police detained several protestors. This was the same day the NTA officially confirmed the exam’s cancellation showing that the students were in the streets within hours of the announcement. A couple of days later on May 16, NSUI staged a massive protest outside the NTA headquarters in Delhi under the banner of the “NTA Halla Bol” campaign. The protestors rightly pointed out the suicides that took place owing to NTA’s failure that led to the re-examination.

Further, IYC activists took out a protest march from Teen Murti Circle towards the Education Minister’s residence holding posters and banners. However, they were stopped by police barricades and some protestors had been detained as well. Members of the All India Students’ Association (AISA) staged a demonstration demanding accountability for recurring examination irregularities outside the Ministry of Education on June 1. These protestors were also later detained by Police. On May 31 in Bhopal and on June 1 in Bhubaneswar, torchlight marches were organised outside the residence of Dharmendra Pradhan demanding his resignation over the paper leak issue. Moreover, On June 6, IYC President Uday Bhanu Chib led thousands in a protest in Haryana. Protesters faced water cannons and even barricades and police lathis. Despite of such protests the mainstream media has remained silent on both the fronts, raising voice against the government that allowed such a leak to happen, and it has remained silent on these protests by not covering their plight, anguish and courage to protest against such failures. And whenever such protests are shown, the lens is partisan— a political battle between Congress and BJP. Instead of putting the plight of the students at the centre of its coverage, the narrative is completely shifted to party politics. The response by the State that included, barricading, detention, shooting water guns, reflect how the state has increasingly collapsed the distinction between disruption and dissent. A detailed report on the mainstream media’s cold shoulder and on the protests that happened nationwide can be read here.

Repeated Leaks

It is imperative to note that the NEET exam was earlier leaked just two years ago! The 2024 NEET examination had an unusually high number of top rankers. Further, many students received scores that appeared mathematically impossible. This raised the concerns of paper being leaked. The CBI in pursuance of these allegations of paper leak arrested 40 individuals. The government’s initial posture was flat denial. When Dharmendra Pradhan took charge as Education Minister in June 2024, he told reporters that “there is no corruption or paper leak in NEET-UG 2024.” This position was maintained even as police in multiple states were making arrests and producing evidence to the contrary.

Subsequently, the matter reached the Supreme Court. The Court said there would be no re-examination, ruling that the data on record was not enough to show a systematic leak. However, the Court stated that there was a paper leak, though it found it localised to the areas of Hazaribagh and Patna. It simultaneously acknowledged serious weaknesses within the NTA and insisted on structural reform to prevent such instances from repeating. Following this, a committee namely Dr. K. Radhakrishnan Committee was setup. The Court specifically directed the committee to examine the viability of comprehensive CCTV surveillance, surprise inspections, secure transportation systems, digital tracking, and stricter identity verification mechanisms. The court also directed the Ministry of Education to monitor implementation through a Steering Committee. The Radhakrishnan committee submitted its report in October 2024 to the central government, that contained several recommendations to prevent future leaks. These included a shift to digital testing to eliminate the vulnerabilities of physical paper handling, biometric verification, AI-based surveillance, encrypted digital question delivery, and multi-stage examination formats. In January 2025, the Centre told the Supreme Court that it would implement all these corrective measures as suggested by the committee.

Now, the question that crops up is, what did the government do? Unsurprisingly, the answer is nothing. Despite recommendations by the K. Radhakrishnan committee after the 2024 controversy, the examination continued under the same manner as before. The NTA has immense structural problems that facilitates such leaks and other issues commonly faced by students (some problems are left unaddressed by the committee itself). The National Testing Agency was established in 2017 without parliamentary debate, public consultation, or a statutory foundation. It operates as a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 rather than as a body created by legislation. Its memorandum of association (a basic charter that any registered organisation is expected to publish) has never appeared on its website, unlike comparable bodies such as the CBSE. The agency’s financial workings are equally opaque. While institutions like the UPSC and AIIMS publish detailed annual reports with budget allocations and expenditure data, the NTA has simply stated on its website that because the number of exams it conducts varies each year, it is “difficult to maintain Head-wise/Exam-wise Budget.” For an agency that collects fees from over two crore candidates annually and outsources significant work to private contractors, this opacity raised eyebrows to say the least.

The biggest problem that NTA has is its outsourcing tendencies. The NTA contracts out some of its most consequential functions such as setting up exam centres, managing physical security, capturing biometric data, to other parties. This problem needs to understood in tandem with the fact that it coordinates with a network of private actors that has no published standards of governing and nobody knows how those actors are selected, supervised, or held accountable. The result has been visible in examination halls where power cuts lasted over an hour or even when students were handed out rainwater-soaked answer sheets. Nothing about the process of setting question papers is publicly known. The qualifications required of paper setters, the processes they follow, and the safeguards against conflicts of interest is simply not disclosed. The CBSE publishes a detailed document specifying exactly these things, including the duties of “secrecy officers” responsible for maintaining confidentiality through the examination process. The NTA has no equivalent. This goes on to show how much opacity is present in the entire process of conducting the examinations– from setting of papers to the conduct of exam on the final day. In toto, it is a centralised body that works with near zero accountability. In such a setting, bluntly, lapses are inevitable.

NOT JUST NTA OR NEET

However, the problem in the examination framework of India is by no means limited to the NTA but runs much deeper.

In May 2026, the Central Board of Secondary Education declared Class 12 results.  There was a drop in passing percentage this year by 3 points. Consequently, students wanted to check their answer sheets and see what went wrong. However, it was found that, students were receiving wrong answer sheets. Evaluators were marking blurred, illegible scans. Pages had gone missing. This year marked On-screen marking’s (OSM) first use by CBSE. The promise of OSM was quite handsome. In OSM, answer sheets are scanned, digitised, and uploaded to a secure portal. Examiners log in remotely and mark on their screens, this marking is then auto-tabulated by the system. CBSE had, in fact, conceived of OSM back in 2014 but shelved the idea because of logistical difficulties. Cut to 2026, CBSE announced its plan on using OSM. During mandatory mock evaluation sessions on February 26, 2026, teachers reported portal access failures, slow system performance, and errors in teacher data on the registration portal. Knowing all this, and instead of going for a phased launch of the technology, CBSE still decided to rollout the technology all at once, for nearly 1 crore answer scripts. In a March 16 circular, CBSE warned Class 10 and 12 evaluators of legal action for sharing “misleading” information about the marking process on social media and declared that evaluation is confidential, therefore, it should not be discussed.

Once the results were out, students who accessed their answer sheets via the OSM verification portal found pages scanned so poorly that not a single line was legible yet the examiner had marked them. On various Reddit and X posts, students described evaluators placing red ticks and numerical scores on images that were, functionally, blank. These problems gained traction when Vedant Shrivastava posted his Physics answer sheet on X. When he checked his answer script he found out that someone else’s answer sheet was marked instead of his. There was a clear difference in handwriting. CBSE eventually admitted the error and issued the correct scanned copy, but only after Vedant’s post had gone viral.

I am a CBSE Class 12 student.

After receiving unexpectedly low marks in Physics, we applied for photocopies of my answer sheets through the CBSE reevaluation process.

Today we received the copies.

And I am shattered because the Physics answer sheet uploaded by CBSE is not mine

— VEDANT (@VEDANTSHRIV17) May 23, 2026

Along the same vein, Sanjana, found that every page of her Chemistry answer booklet belonged to a completely different person. CBSE later acknowledged it had “discarded around 30 answer sheets due to issues like unclear images and duplicate entries” without re-scanning them, this means some students were potentially evaluated on nothing whatsoever.

I applied for CBSE revaluation. The scanned copy of my chemistry sheet I received does not match my handwriting or written responses.
For reference, I am attaching my English answer sheet, which clearly reflects my actual handwriting. pic.twitter.com/laINaEMAP3

— Sanjana (@Sanjanaopxe) May 25, 2026

These issues could largely be pinned to the vendor who was responsible for the application the of OSM technology. The company entrusted with building and running the OnMark digital evaluation platform for CBSE is Coempt Edu Teck Private Limited, a Hyderabad based education technology firm. It was formerly known as Globarena Technologies Private Limited, and it had in the past made grave errors in technological applications. Those errors had led to several suicides as well.

If this company had such discouraging past, how did it manage to get the tender? The inconsistencies in floating of three tenders before finally settling with Coempt Edu Teck was first reported in the Hindustan Times.  Later, Sarthak Sidhant, a 17 years old Class 12 student from Jharkhand showed gave a breakdown of the requirements were consistently to grant then tender were changed several times in a way that made Coempt eligible for it. He spent days readings official CBSE bidding documents on the Central Public Procurement Portal, and tracked changes across three successive versions of the tender.  He published his findings in a blog post, these findings reveal the deep percolated corruption in the system that allowed Coempt to bag the tender.

The original Request for proposal (RFP) contained three specific clauses that would disqualify a vendor for poor past performance. These clauses were entirely removed from the revised RFP. A company with Coempt’s track record would have been eliminated at the gate under the original standards. Further, the minimum revenue threshold was set at ₹50 crore in an earlier version of the tender. It was pointed out that Coempt, would not to meet this threshold therefore, the same was revised in ways that made the company eligible. Capability Maturity Model Integration levels (these are standard benchmarks for software development capabilities) were also reportedly adjusted in the new tenders. The tender was first issued in February 2025. After the initial process failed to move forward, it was re-issued in May 2025, then again. Each iteration, Sidhant alleged, brought the eligibility criteria closer to Coempt’s actual profile. The cybersecurity standards required of the vendor were also scaled back across each of these successive drafts.

Furthermore, Nisarg Adhikari, a 19 years old ethical hacker broke into CBSE’s OSM portal and found several vulnerabilities. He found out numerous flaws that could allow anyone with basic technical knowledge to bypass OTP authentication, impersonate examiners, reset passwords, and even alter marks scored by students! This demonstrates how poorly the OSM was developed and deployed. The entire process of implementing OMS was marred with corruption that rewarded incompetence.

Across the 18 lakh who appeared for Class 12 board exams this year, there is now an uncertainty about the integrity of their results. Even students who scored well and were not directly affected by the visible failures have no guarantee that their marks accurately reflect their performance. This is the case because the system that produced those marks has been publicly demonstrated to be insecure and badly managed. The Board had twelve years to plan OSM after first conceiving it in 2014. It chose to deploy it overnight. It awarded the contract 74 days before exams began. It accepted security certificates covering other people’s systems. It threatened teachers who raised concerns with legal action

The response to these revelations

Instead of any of this being on the front page, it was a teenager that cracked the story open. Several right-wing social media accounts started heckling Vedant (student who received the wrong physics answer script) as anti-national. He was also derogatorily called as a Pakistani. Among those who amplified this heckling was Ashok Shrivastav, a journalist and primetime anchor at Doordarshan News. Shrivastav posted a screenshot of Vedant’s profile location (which showed South Asia) and commented “Did Pakistanis also appear for CBSE exams?!!”

A journalist at a taxpayer-funded national broadcaster took a grievance from a student who had received the wrong answer sheet, checked the geolocation setting of his fresh social media account, and concluded that the most plausible explanation was Pakistani subterfuge.

This shows the levels that Indian Media has stooped down to. Vedant and his family were inundated with abuse. They were called “Pakistani agents,” “anti-national,” “Soros agents,” and members of the “Deep State.” 17 years old who had spent the year studying for his boards, who had done nothing more than post proof of an institutional failure affecting his own marks, was now managing a mental health crisis on top of everything else.

This response is not exclusive to Vedant, even Nisarg and Sarthak who did a commendable job in showing the truth behind the tender allocation and the various infirmities of the present OSM system were treated with the same vitriolic response. The logic of this rhetoric works like this. Any complaint about a government system is, by definition, motivated by hostility to India. Anyone motivated by hostility to India is acting on behalf of India’s enemies. Pakistan is the most convenient enemy. Therefore, any complaint = Pakistani.

CONSTITUTONAL DIMENSIONS

The right to life under Article 21, as interpreted through Unnikrishnan and subsequent decisions, encompasses the right to education. The judiciary has consistently read Article 21 expansively to include not just bare survival but the conditions necessary for a dignified human existence. Access to a fair, uncorrupted examination is not peripheral to this right. For millions of students, particularly those from lower-income families who cannot afford private alternatives or second attempts, NEET and CBSE board exams are the singular pathway to a livelihood and a dignified future. When those pathways are sabotaged by institutional negligence and structural corruption, the right to a dignified life is contravened. The suicides that followed the 2026 NEET cancellation are the most extreme indictment of this constitutional violation. Moreover, paper leak that was facilitated by state appointed officials violated the right to equality.  It gave an undue advantage to some candidates over others who attempted the examination honestly. Two candidates sit for the same exam. One has seen the questions. One has not. They are not equal before that paper, and the State made them unequal. The Supreme Court’s commitment to protecting the integrity of competitive examinations was further reinforced in a 2015 decision (Tanvi Sarwal v. Central Board of Secondary Education) involving the CBSE, where the Court directed that a fresh all-India medical entrance examination be held after concluding that widespread use of electronic devices had compromised the process beyond repair.

The Public Examinations (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2024 represents the legislature’s acknowledgment that examination fraud is a criminal offence. It contravenes the foundational principles of constitution such as equal treatment of everyone. The Act criminalises question paper leakage, unauthorised access to confidential material, organised distribution networks, impersonation, and digital facilitation of cheating. It extends liability beyond individual bad actors to service providers, vendors, printing contractors, and institutional officers, making negligence and collusion equally punishable. The existence of this statute makes the State’s failure 2026 constitutionally indefensible. The legislature had already recognised, through this law, that paper leaks violate the foundational conditions of fair competition. That recognition maps directly onto the Article 14 guarantee of substantive equality. When the executive arm of the State allowed an institutional architecture that permitted paper setters with unrestricted access to confidential material to operate without oversight. It significantly increased the chances of such leaks, and in turn, increased the chances of constitutional violations as written above.

The way the State responded to the protests that broke out in response of these constitutional violations are quite telling. The Supreme Court has recognised in multiple decisions that the right to protest is implied in Article 19 and that the State must make genuine arrangements for dissent to be heard rather than suppressed. When Delhi Police detained students within hours of the cancellation announcement, when water cannons were deployed in Haryana, when IYC marchers were stopped before they could reach the Education Minister’s residence, the State directly prevented public accountability. The restrictions that Article 19(2) permits on these freedoms must be reasonable and proportionate. Treating students the way they were treated for protesting the loss of an examination they spent years preparing for fails any honest proportionality test.

References for this analysis may be found here.

(The programme research team also consists of interns; this resource has been worked on by Hamzah Patel)

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The post The system that keeps failing appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Khurram Parvez was arrested close to five years ago, in a case registered against him by the National Investigation Agency (NIA) under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) for alleged terror funding, conspiracy and recruiting persons for the terrorist organisation Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). Parvez was arrested in the case on November 22, 2021 from Srinagar. He was remanded to judicial custody on February 25, 2022, following series of police custody remands.

On December 19, 2024, the date he filed the appeal, Parvez had been in custody for a total period of roughly 3 years and 1 month. Today –when the judgement is finally delivered–the period of incarceration totals 4 years and 7 months. It took a year and six months for disposal of a bail appeal in the Delhi HC!

The NIA alleged that a network linked to the banned terrorist organisation Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) recruited Over Ground Workers (OGWs), gathered intelligence on security installations and facilitated terror funding. Parvez was arrested during the investigation, although he was not named in the original FIR. According to the charge sheet, the allegations against him were that he recruited OGWs for LeT, collected information regarding the movement and structure of the Army, had links with Pakistan-based terrorist organisations, and instigated protests following the killing of Burhan Wani in 2016.

Khurram’s appeal however strongly argued that the prosecution’s case against Parvez was unsupported by evidence and that he is a “factual stranger” to the larger conspiracy alleged by the NIA. It was also Parvez’s case that there was no digital evidence showing his contact with members of any proscribed terrorist organisation and that no call detail records were collected regarding the alleged meeting between him and co-accused Muneer Ahmad Kataria.

Parvez also argued that he is a human rights activist and was the Programme Coordinator and Spokesperson of the Jammu Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society (JKCCS) and also the Chairperson of the Philippines-based Asian Federation against Involuntary Disappearances (AFAD), which campaigns on the issue of enforced disappearances. In his appeal, Parvez said that he was a factual stranger to the alleged conspiracy and that the investigators had failed to establish any contact between him and LeT operatives or members of any banned organisation. He stated that an examination of digital devices seized from him revealed no communication with alleged handlers or evidence of recruitment of overground workers.

He also rejected the allegations that his past visits to Pakistan demonstrate links with proscribed organisations, stating that the trips were undertaken publicly as part of humanitarian and advocacy initiatives, including campaigns against landmines and enforced disappearances.

In his bail application, Khurram Pervez argued that there was no evidence that Parvez passed sensitive military information to any terrorist operative and that there was no allegation linking him to any alleged terror-funding money trail.  Counsel for Pervez included senior advocate Tanveer Ahmed Mir, along with Ms. Swati Khanna, Ms. Raminder Kaur, Mr. Md. Imran Ahmad, Mr. Shahzad Khan and Mr. Kartik Venu. The bail plea was filed through advocate Kartik Venu.For the NIA, advocates Mr. Rahul Tyagi, SPP, Ms. Priya Rai, Mr. Shubham Goyal, Mr. Jatin Khatri, Mr. Amit Rohila appeared.

Related:

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J’khand HC grants bail to UAPA accused as no link to Al-Qaeda established

The post UAPA: Delhi HC grants Bail to Kashmiri activist Khurram Parvez after close to 5 years in alleged terror funding case appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The post Sleeping Under an Open Sky on No-Man’s Land: Two Children, Ten Lives, and the Machinery of Exclusion appeared first on SabrangIndia.