In spite of being one of India’s wealthiest state, Karnataka continues to perform poorly on key public health indicators compared to some of the other southern states (see Table 1 below) primarily because of structural and policy failures. However, it is no accident that the state continuous to be promoted as a ‘model’ for healthcare reforms, largely due to its aggressive adoption of privatisation, public–private partnerships (PPPs), contracting out critical health care services and insurance-based healthcare. The state has been quick to uptake the mandates of the

Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPS) -economic reform packages pushed onto India by International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank.

Table 1: Comparison of mortality indicators for Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu 

Table 2: Health coverage indicators for Karnataka (NFHS-5) 

What should a Public Health law look like?

When there is a failure of voluntary compliance to public health policies, laws may be required. However, laws in themselves may be inadequate unless there is a political and moral mandate by governments to protect populations from threats to health and even to healthcare systems themselves. Public health laws should:

• Set clear rules of behaviour for individuals, public bodies, and private actors
• Define powers, limitations, and duties
• Protect fundamental rights
• Apply universally and predictably under the rule of law
• Must be transparent, publicly debated, and widely
• Embed principles of autonomy, privacy, transparency, accountability, and least
• Include Collective Rights to Social Determinants of Health such as safe drinking water, sanitation, nutrition and housing at the very least.
• Explicitly provide right to universal, free health care services that includes free diagnostics, free treatment and free drugs for ALL citizens for ALL health conditions without any conditions or exceptions.
• Prevent any role of private/ corporate entities in planning, regulating, monitoring or provisioning of public health care services
• Explicitly list violations of citizens’ health, health care and patient rights with clear redressal and enforcement mechanisms with proportionate penalties.

• Regulate unnecessary tests, procedures, referrals, bribes, negligence, and staff
• Clarify responsibility for service delivery
• Prevent sabotage by regulated
• Apply Siracusa principles to limit state power during emergencies
• Cap the costs of drugs and treatment in private/ corporate entities and enforce evidence based, standardised government protocols for treatment of diseases of public health importance.

How Karnataka government perceives health rights

A government draft Karnataka Right to Health and Emergency Medical Services Bill 2025 has been circulating, without any due process of public consultation and mostly borrowed from the Rajasthan Right to Health Act (2022). Some activists in Karnataka have been clamoring for a replication of the Rajasthan Right to Health Act without investing too much thought into whether this is what Karnataka requires.

This critique by Karnataka Janaarogya Chaluvali (KJC) illustrates that the draft Bill for Karnataka neither protects the public health system not citizens’ health care rights. Instead, it seems to legitimise large scale privatisation with a predominant focus on empanelling hospitals for emergency medical care and outsourcing ambulance services to any entity that ‘volunteers’ to do so.

The Preamble of the draft Bill invokes Articles 47 and 21 of the Constitution claiming to commit to providing “protection and fulfilment of rights and equity in health and well-being”, “free accessible health care for all residents of the State with the progressive reduction in out of pocket expenditure in seeking, accessing or receiving health care’ and “to provide for the people of Karnataka rights to health including emergency Health services with participation of stake holders and people for realization of people’s right to health services”.

In the case of Pt. Parmanand Katara vs Union of India & Ors on August 28, 1989, the Supreme Court has quoted the Constitutional mandate of the state to preserve life and obliging every doctor (government and medical institutions) to protect life. The Indian Medical Council Act (1860) and Indian Medical Council/Code of medical ethics also state the importance of immediate medical aid in all cases. No law or State action can intervene to avoid or delay these paramount obligations of the medical profession and all standards of care and quality must be upheld while doing so. Doctorscannot put the life of a patient at stake while waiting for fees to be paid. The Karnataka Private Medical Establishments (KPME) Act further reaffirms this mandate. Indeed, there can be no Right

to health without the intrinsic right to emergency healthcare1, so it is unclear why this has to be specified separately as the Karnataka Right to Health and Emergency Medical Services Bill 2025.

Vague definitions and commitments defeat the purpose of a law

The Karnataka draft bill and the Rajasthan Right to Health Act have failed to use standardised globally accepted definitions related to public health and therefore leave wide room for (mis)interpretation, going against the very principle of a good law. Defining public health as “the health of the population, as a whole especially as monitored, regulated, and promoted by the Government” is not only inadequate but also mischievous because it leaves out the crucial term “provisioned” absolving the state from being primary provider.

“health care”, taken verbatim from the watered down Rajasthan Health Act is defined as “testing, treatment, care, procedures and any other service or intervention towards a preventative, promotive, therapeutic, diagnostic, nursing, rehabilitative, palliative, convalescent, research and/or other health related purpose or combinations thereof, including reproductive health care and emergency medical treatment, in any system of medicines, and also included any of these as a result of participation in a medical research program”. Including health research into the definition of healthcare has many implications. Similarly the term “government funded healthcare services” legalises handing over funds to NGOs and private entities further absolving the government from its own Constitutional responsibilities.

The draft further reduces public health to a scheme (Karnataka Scheme of Public Health) with the planned State Health Authority (SHA) being expected to ensure availability, not of comprehensive health care or health, but only “medical services” free of cost, not to all, but only to “eligible patients”. Public health rights must include social determinants of health such as water, sanitation, nutrition, housing etc and include not just related to curative care services.

The SHA is expected to oversee medical, clinical, and social audits; hear all appeals against decision of District /city Health Authority; empanel private medical establishments and outsource ambulance services. It is not clear why a regulatory body should be carrying out executive functions like empanelment of private, placing the Suvarna Arogya Suraksha Trust (SAST) Executive Director as member-secretary of the SHA. SAST is an autonomous body with representatives of empanelled private hospitals on its Board and conflict of interest. Typically, the Director of Health and Family Welfare should be the member secretary of state level regulatory bodies.

Further, the corresponding District /city Health Authority includes the IMA as member. It is not clear what a member of the IMA is doing in a district level regulatory body which also hears people’s grievances. IMA members also have their own hospitals in the district. How can a legislation allow such a conflict of interest?

Grievance redressal

An aggrieved person should first approach the concerned person within the health care institution. If their complaint does not get resolved or if the person is not satisfied with the action taken by the health care institution, then she may approach the District Health Authority. Finally, an appeal can be made to the SHA and the latter should look into the matter and resolve it. There don’t seem to be any serious consequences of violating the provisions of the Bill apart from “a fine up-to rupees ten thousand for the first contravention, and up-to rupees twenty-five thousand for the subsequent contraventions”. Thus, human life is reduced to a few thousand rupees on the pretext of grievance redressal!

Finance

As per Chapter 6 and 8 of the draft Bill, the SHA will receive INR 100 crores as token fund from the state government to be used as corpus fund. The SHA as well as the District/ City authority can to raise its own funds not only through government bodies but also receive “donations” from any “individuals or body”. Isn’t it obvious that if individuals or groups donate funds then they will have a stake in the functioning of this regulatory body? These bodies can also borrow money from the open market for carrying out its activities. So the government will set up a regulatory body which the government itself will be unable to fund? How is the government expected to have any kind of control over this regulatory body? Further, the accounts of these agencies will be accounted by auditors appointed by themselves. While audited accounts have to be placed before the state legislature, it does not mention if it will be audited by the CAG. These provisions make the government’s intent highly suspect and does not infuse any confidence that the government has citizens’ interest in mind.

No real commitment to Right to Health or Emergency services

In this draft Bill, the government primarily commits to a Right to Information, a right to free OPD services and IPD consultations at public health institutions “accordantly to their level of health care as may be prescribed by rules made under this Act” and “emergency treatment and care for accidental emergency, emergency due to snake bite/animal bite and any other emergency decided by State Health Authority under prescribed emergency circumstances, without prepayment of requisite fee or charges including prompt and necessary emergency medical treatment and critical care, emergency obstetric treatment and care, by any public health institution, health care establishment and empanelled health care centres, qualified to provide such care or treatment accordantly to their level of health care, promptly as prescribed or as per guidelines and in a case of medico-legal nature of case, no health care provider or health care establishment shall delay treatment merely on the grounds of receiving police clearance or a police report”

Further it states that “Provided that after proper emergency care, stabilisation and transfer of patient, if patient does not pay requisite charges, healthcare provider shall be entitled to receive requisite fee and charges or proper reimbursement from State Government in prescribed manner as the case may be”. The statement ‘if the patient does not pay’ implies that payment by the patient is the first option and only if that does not happen, there will be reimbursement by the State.

The clause in the Act that emergency medical services means “any reasonable measure to render first-aid, advise or assistance to an injured person of an accident or incident of crime or any other emergency” is alarming. A private entity no matter how well equipped is now (by definition) allowed to wash its hands off by simply providing first aid, advice or assistance. This is no more than what anyone on the street can do if trained in basic first aid. It absolves private medical professionals and institutions from any kind of moral or ethical obligation to a patient in an emergency.

The bill says that to “stabilise” means the “rendering of any immediate emergency care of the injured person as may be necessary to assure within reasonable medical probability, that no material deterioration of

the condition of such injured person is likely to result from or occurred during the transfer of such injured person from one hospital to another, where such appropriate facilities are available to render the requisite treatment” goes against the Supreme court directive in the case of Pt. Parmanand Katara vs Union Of India & Ors on 28 August, 1989 where preserving life by the health professional and the State is over reaching. Terms like ‘as maybe necessary to assure within reasonable medical probability’ will not hold up in a court of law and will allow negligence to be absolved. Further emergencies happen to anyone in the state – visitor or resident. The language of “eligible individual and eligible households” being brought into emergency services is concerning. Are people now expected to carry identification documents or money for healthcare emergencies everywhere they go?

Other Provisions in the Bill

Karnataka Bill has two chapters dedicated to Empanelled Hospitals (Chapter 9) and Requirements of Ambulances (Chapter 10). Chapter 9 is about empanelling private hospitals for “providing or directing the life support system or limited life support system and pre-hospital care system to provide Health care facility and treatment under Government Funded Scheme”. It is not clear what the terms “directing life support”, “life- support system”, “limited life support system” and “pre-hospital care” even mean. With funds from the government, empanelled hospitals will set up emergency departments in their respective facilities without clearly stating what their commitments and accountability mechanisms will be using government funds. District/ City Authority are expected to ensure availability of ambulances, ensure easy access to medical emergency services as also handing over ambulance services to “persons voluntarily registered”.

Conclusion

With the spate of new privatisation friendly healthcare policies, the state has moved further and further away from its core commitments. If the government of Karnataka is seriously invested in the health care, it needs to commit to sustained direct investment into government health care facilities at all levels (primary, secondary, tertiary and super-specialty); strengthened district and government medical colleges as the final referral point; a permanent and well-supported health workforce; strict regulation of private providers; transparent data reporting; and, accessible and enforceable grievance redressal mechanisms. Instead the government breezes over all of these in its draft Bill and instead undermine citizens’ health rights, public accountability, and the core principles of public health.

In the Karnataka State Integrated Health Policy in 2004 and later again in 2017, the state had committed to quality healthcare with a focus on equity, accountability, community participation to improve health and well-being of ALL the people of Karnataka and reducing health disparities.

The vision foregrounded the social determinants of health and Constitutional mandates thus foregrounding health within which healthcare is situated.

Any law that legalises privatisation (public private partnerships, health insurance, contracting) will only further drain public resources will leaving patients at the mercy of market vagaries.

Unless there is a core commitment by the government to revisit these mandates, a law can only be toothless and an ineffective band aid for optics. It is time that the citizens of the state play a more informed role in demanding for our health rights.

The Draft Bill may be read here.

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ASHA workers, Anganwadi workers and sanitation workers overlooked in India’s healthcare protection reforms

The post Healthcare in Karnataka: Is a Health Bill the Need of the Hour? appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Addressed to the Chief Election Commissioner and copied to the Chief Electoral Officer, Assam, the memorandum documents a disturbing pattern of unauthorised deletions, fabricated objections, false declarations of death, and misuse of statutory forms, allegedly targeting legitimate voters across multiple districts of the State. Along with CJP, Assam Majuri Sramik Union, Banchana Birdodhi Mancha and Forum for Social Harmony are also the signatories to this memorandum.

Dead voters filing objections, living voters declared dead

Among the most alarming allegations are instances where “dead persons” are shown as having filed objections against living voters, as well as complaints branding living electors as deceased. The memorandum flags this as a grave subversion of electoral procedures, calling for immediate scrutiny of how such objections were accepted during the SR process.

In several cases, voters who never changed residence were issued objections falsely claiming that they had shifted addresses. A separate annexure, the groups state, lists such affected voters.

A single woman, 64 objections — all denied

The memorandum details a striking case from Goalpara town, where a woman named Naba Bala Ray from Jyotinagar, Krishnai, was shown to have filed 64 objections against voters. When the affected voters approached her, she categorically denied filing any objections. While she later withdrew some complaints in Assamese, the memorandum notes a glaring inconsistency: her signatures also appeared on Form 7 complaints in English, which she claimed she could not write or understand.

CJP annexed these complaints as evidence of forgery and fabrication within the objection process.

Man objects to himself — and 133 others

In another extraordinary instance from Shribhumi district (formerly Karimganj), a man named Salim Ahmed was shown as having filed objections against himself and 133 other voters, alleging they were not genuine electors. According to the memorandum, Ahmed told the Booth Level Officer that he never filed any such objection, pointing to what the groups describe as a “fully fabricated” complaint attributed to him without consent or knowledge.

BJP leaders accused of unauthorised access to election data

Beyond individual cases, the memorandum raises grave institutional concerns. It alleges that office-bearers of the Bharatiya Janata Party, including district-level leaders and ST Morcha functionaries, unauthorisedly entered the office of the Co-District Commissioner, Boko-Chhaygaon, and accessed official documents and the Election Commission’s electronic database.

Such actions, if proven, would amount to a serious breach of electoral neutrality and administrative safeguards, the groups warn.

Migrant workers disproportionately affected

The memorandum also flags how migrant labourers from Assam were particularly vulnerable during the SR process. Voters who had temporarily left the State for work during verification reportedly returned to find fresh objections raised against their names, effectively penalising economic migration and seasonal labour mobility.

Allegations of partisan signalling from political executive

Calling for institutional impartiality, CJP and other groups cite alleged interference in the Boko-Chhaygaon constituency and refer to statements attributed to Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma, which they characterise as “blatantly partisan” and inconsistent with the constitutional requirement of a neutral electoral process.

Demands to the Election Commission

The memorandum places eight specific demands before the ECI, including:

• Withdrawal of objections where the original complainant is absent during hearings
• Investigation and penal action for false Form 7 complaints
• Action under Section 31 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 against false declarants
• Compensation for victims subjected to mental, physical, or financial harassment
• Extension of timelines for claims and publication of the final electoral roll

At its core, the memorandum urges the Election Commission to restore procedural integrity and ensure that Assam’s electoral rolls are prepared “free and fair, in the interests of democracy”.

Why was this memorandum submitted?

Coming amid heightened national scrutiny of electoral processes, the allegations — if substantiated — point not merely to clerical lapses but to a structural vulnerability in voter list revision mechanisms, particularly in politically sensitive regions. The memorandum underscores that electoral rolls are not administrative lists but constitutional instruments, foundational to the exercise of universal adult franchise.

The Election Commission has not yet responded to the memorandum.

The complete memorandum may be read below.

Detailed report may be read here.

Related:

Supreme Court defers hearing in batch of petitions, led by CJP, challenging state Anti-Conversion laws; interim relief applications pending since April 2025

CJP flags Zee News broadcast ‘Kalicharan Maharaj vs 4 Maulanas’ for communal framing before NBDSA

A voter list exercise under scrutiny: Assam’s Special Revision of electoral rolls, allegations of targeted harassment and misuse of Form-7

The case of “pushback” of Doyjan Bibi and the quiet normalisation of undocumented deportations

The post Assam’s Electoral Rolls in Crisis: CJP flags structural manipulation in Summary Revision appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Wangchuk was detained on September 26, 2025, under the National Security Act, 1980 (NSA), following weeks of protests in Ladakh demanding statehood and Sixth Schedule protection—a movement that later spiralled into violence, leading to the deaths of four civilians.

A Bench of Justice Aravind Kumar and Justice P. B. Varale is hearing the Article 32 habeas corpus petition filed by Wangchuk’s wife, Dr Gitanjali Angmo, which challenges the legality of his continued detention. Proceedings have been closely tracked by LiveLaw and other media.

Union’s core defence

1. Court’s review is procedural, not substantive

Opening arguments for the Union, Solicitor General Tushar Mehta emphasised that judicial scrutiny in preventive detention matters is narrowly circumscribed. The Court, he argued, is not entitled to examine whether the detention was “justified”, but only whether statutory and constitutional procedures were followed so as to ensure fairness to the detenue.

Mehta relied on established precedent to submit that once the detaining authority records subjective satisfaction, courts must exercise restraint.

He further underscored the “inbuilt safeguards” within the NSA:

• The District Magistrate’s detention order must be confirmed by the State Government; and
• The detenue has a right to make a representation before an Advisory Board headed by a former High Court judge.

Crucially, Mehta pointed out that Wangchuk has not independently challenged either the confirmation order or the Advisory Board’s opinion, a submission clearly aimed at narrowing the scope of judicial interference.

2. Dispute Over Supply of Materials: Union calls allegations an “afterthought”

Responding to the petitioner’s contention that four video clips relied upon in the detention order were not supplied to Wangchuk, Mehta rejected the claim as factually incorrect and a belated fabrication.

According to the Union, the service of the detention order itself took nearly four hours, during which a senior police officer personally went through each page of the grounds and the video material, a process that was videographed.

“The DIG Ladakh sits with him, shows him every page, every clip, and asks if he is satisfied. He answers in the affirmative,” Mehta told the Court, offering to place the recording on record if required.

3. “Borrowed satisfaction” argument rejected

When the Bench raised the argument that the detention order was based on borrowed or mechanically reproduced material, Mehta countered that this misunderstands the nature of preventive detention.

He argued that a District Magistrate is not expected to personally witness each incident but is entitled—indeed required—to rely on inputs placed before him by law enforcement agencies to arrive at subjective satisfaction.

“What the authority must assess is the speech as a whole,” Mehta said, warning against isolating references to non-violence or Gandhian philosophy while ignoring the allegedly inflammatory core.

4. Union alleges “hope for riot-like situation” in Ladakh

The centrepiece of the Union’s case lies in its reading of Wangchuk’s speeches. According to Mehta, Wangchuk deliberately invoked foreign protest movements to emotionally mobilise young people in Ladakh—a region that shares borders with volatile and geopolitically sensitive areas.

He referred to Wangchuk’s alleged references to:

• Nepal’s youth-led protests,
• Political upheavals in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, and
• The Arab Spring, where multiple governments were overthrown following mass unrest.

“What is the relevance of Nepal and Ladakh?” Mehta asked. “You are not addressing Gen-Z in isolation—you are hoping for a Nepal-like situation.”

The Solicitor General dismissed Wangchuk’s invocation of Mahatma Gandhi as a rhetorical façade. “Gandhi was resisting an imperial power. He was not instigating violence against his own democratic government,” Mehta argued.

5. Alleged security concerns and references to self-immolation

The Union further alleged that Wangchuk attempted to create distance between civilians and Indian security forces by lamenting the deployment of armed personnel in Ladakh.

“Security forces become ‘they’, and the people become ‘we’—this is dangerous in a border region,” Mehta submitted.

The most serious allegation concerned Wangchuk’s references to self-immolation, drawn from the Arab Spring narrative.

“This is an invitation to bloodshed,” Mehta claimed, arguing that such examples could incite impressionable youth to extreme and irreversible acts.

Petitioner’s response

1. Non-consideration of crucial exculpatory material

On behalf of the petitioner, Senior Advocate Kapil Sibal mounted a systematic dismantling of the detention order in earlier hearings.

Sibal argued that the September 24 speech, in which Wangchuk broke his hunger strike and publicly appealed for peace after violence erupted, was the most proximate and relevant material—yet was never placed before the detaining authority.

Its suppression, he argued, vitiates the very foundation of subjective satisfaction, particularly when the speech was publicly available and known to authorities.

2. Failure to supply relied-upon materials violates Article 22(5)

Sibal further submitted that four key videos, explicitly relied upon in the detention order, were never supplied to Wangchuk along with the grounds of detention, in violation of Article 22(5) of the Constitution and Section 8 of the NSA.

Without access to the complete material, Wangchuk was denied the right to make an effective representation—not merely before the Advisory Board, but also before the government itself.

3. Section 5A cannot rescue a composite detention order

Rejecting the Union’s reliance on Section 5A of the NSA, Sibal argued that the provision applies only where distinct and independent grounds of detention exist.

Here, he said, the detention rests on a single composite ground, stitched together through selective videos, stale FIRs, and allegedly distorted interpretations.

Relying on Attorney General of India v. Amratlal Prajivandas (1994), Sibal submitted that a chain of events cannot be artificially severed to salvage an otherwise unlawful detention.

4. Stale FIRs, copy-paste orders, and non-application of mind

Sibal also pointed out that:

• Several FIRs relied upon date back to 2024,
• Many are against unknown persons, and
• Even the FIR registered after the Ladakh violence does not name Wangchuk.

He further demonstrated that the District Magistrate reproduced the Superintendent of Police’s recommendation verbatim, betraying a mechanical exercise of power rather than independent application of mind.

5. Allegations of anti-army rhetoric and plebiscite “completely false”

Addressing allegations that Wangchuk discouraged civilians from assisting the Indian Army during wartime, Sibal said the claim was entirely false, arising from mistranslation or deliberate distortion.

He quoted Wangchuk as urging Ladakhis not to mix political grievances with national defence, and to stand by the country during any external conflict.

Similar distortions, Sibal argued, were made regarding:

• Alleged support for plebiscite, and
• Claims of disrespect toward a Hindu goddess—both of which he described as manufactured narratives, widely debunked by fact-checkers.

Health, custody, and court-ordered medical care

Amidst these proceedings, concerns over Wangchuk’s health have also engaged the Court’s attention.

On January 29, the Supreme Court directed that Wangchuk be examined by a specialist gastroenterologist at a government hospital, after he complained of persistent stomach pain during his detention.

He was subsequently taken to AIIMS Jodhpur on January 31, where he underwent medical tests. While jail authorities claimed he had been examined 21 times, the Court accepted that specialist care was warranted and sought a report by February 2.

Voices Outside Court: Gitanjali Angmo speaks

Speaking to The News Minute at the Mathrubhumi International Festival of Letters in Thiruvananthapuram, Dr Gitanjali Angmo framed her husband’s detention as an attempt to silence a sustained and principled critique of how Ladakh is being governed after the abrogation of Article 370. She suggested that Sonam Wangchuk’s insistence on environmental safeguards and public participation in decision-making had increasingly placed him at odds with a governance model driven by centralised authority rather than local consent.

Dr Angmo emphasised that Ladakh’s demands for statehood and Sixth Schedule protection were neither sudden nor radical, but rooted in the region’s fragile ecology, high-altitude geography, and distinct cultural identity. With temperatures plunging to sub-zero levels and ecosystems highly vulnerable to disruption, she argued that policies designed for the rest of India cannot be mechanically applied to Ladakh without severe consequences for both people and environment.

She cautioned against what she described as a “one-size-fits-all” approach to governance, warning that excessive centralisation risks erasing India’s constitutional commitment to diversity and federal balance. India, she noted, has historically functioned as a plural federation, united not by uniformity but by accommodation of difference—a principle she fears is being steadily undermined.

Rejecting any suggestion that Wangchuk’s activism was anti-national, Dr Angmo characterised his work as firmly anchored in constitutional values and long-term national interest. She alleged that his speeches were selectively excerpted and stripped of context, while his repeated appeals for peace and unity were ignored, creating a distorted narrative that portrayed dissent as a security threat.

In Dr Angmo’s account, the case transcends the legality of one preventive detention and raises a deeper question about the health of Indian democracy. When region-specific political demands and environmental concerns are met with the extraordinary power of preventive detention, she suggested, it signals a troubling intolerance for dissent—particularly from India’s geographic and political margins.

A growing constitutional unease

As the hearings unfold, the case has come to symbolise a broader constitutional tension: the use of preventive detention laws against political dissent, particularly in regions demanding greater autonomy and constitutional safeguards.

At its core lies a troubling question—can references to global protest movements, stripped of context and divorced from subsequent calls for peace, justify the extraordinary power of preventive detention?

Wangchuk, notably, was detained two days after publicly calling for calm, breaking his fast, and dissociating himself from violence. The leap from that moment to the conclusion that he posed an imminent threat to national security remains at the heart of the Court’s scrutiny.

In a constitutional democracy, where preventive detention is meant to be the exception rather than the rule, the outcome of this case may well define the line between legitimate security concerns and the impermissible criminalisation of dissent.

Further hearings are awaited.

Orders of the said case may be read below.

Related:

How the Centre used a ‘Draconian’ law to silence Sonam Wangchuk and Ladakh’s aspirations

A victory for Ladakh’s voices: Sonam Wangchuk and Ladakhi activists break 16-day fast as union government agrees to renew talks on demands

Centre cancels FCRA licence of Sonam Wangchuk’s NGO, cites violations including study on ‘sovereignty’

Gen‑Z’s furious stand for Ladakh statehood, centre blames Sonam Wangchuk for violence incitement

The post When Protest becomes a “Threat”: Inside the Supreme Court hearing on Sonam Wangchuk’s NSA detention appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Is this euphoria justified when we look at the interests of Indian farmers and workers? Seen together with a much criticised 2026 Union Budget by Farmers Unions and organisations. India is likely to witness more rounds of nationwide protests.

One,details of the agreement are not yet available. It is only when the full scope and details of the trade deal are available, one can make a proper assessment.

However, the announcement made by the US President Donald Trump on his
social media accounts indicate that Indian goods imports will face a 18 per cent tariff, while India reduces tariffs and non-tariff barriers on US goods to zero.

What does this one-sided deal mean? Eliminating tariffs will or may result in the flooding the country with US goods which will adversely affect industries and workers’ livelihoods. Removal of non-tariff barriers would mean eliminating subsidies and other measures, which protect and support Indian farmers.

Moreover. Trump has claimed that India has agreed to stop buying Russian oil and committed to buy $500 billion worth of US energy, technology and farm products. This, if true, shows up the highly unequal nature of the trade deal with India in a subordinate position, circumscribing its sovereignty.

Farmers unions, analysts and experts are now demanding that the government place the full trade agreement in the Parliament and in the public domain, so that there is a thorough discussion. Any harmful provisions must be rescinded to protect the interests of Indian industry, agriculture and working people.

Sharp Criticism of 2026 Union Budget, Agriculture Finds No Presence in the Union Budget by the All India Kisan Sanghatana (AIKS). Questioning the absence of any proposals for loan waivers and sharply criticising the reduction in fertilizer subsidy by Rs.15679 crores, the AIKS has called upon farmers to burn copies of the anti-farmer, anti-federal budget on February 3 across the country*

In a press note issued, AIKS states that, the Union Budget 2026-27 fails yet again to present any commitment towards the strategic regeneration of agriculture- the most crucial livelihood sector for the Indian people. Agriculture was largely ignored by the Finance Minister in her budget speech, small and marginal farmers were mentioned just once, while there was a conspicuous absence of any mention of rural labour. The budgetary figures echo this neglect.

According to the Economic Survey presented this week by the Union government, the average growth rate of agriculture in 2025 saw a fall. The growth rate registered in the previous quarter was 3.5 per cent, against the decadal average growth rate of 4.45 per cent.

Crop production witnessed the most drastic fall. Given this context of stagnation in the agriculture sector, it was expected that the Union Budget 2026-27 will deliver some relief and momentum. However, the Budget disappoints once again.

The total budget allocated to the Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare at about 1.40 Lakh Cr., is just a 5.3 per cent increase in nominal terms from the Revised Estimate 2025-26. Accounting for inflation, this implies that the real allocation to agriculture has not seen any substantial growth.

The Economic Survey also recognised that the yield rates of various crops including cereals, maize, soybean, and pulses continue to trail behind the global averages, making Indian production uneconomic.

However, according to the AIKS. The Budget fails in terms of providing any additional support to boost agriculture research and development.

Despite the Finance Minister mentioning enhancing agriculture productivity as a kartavya, the budgetary allocation to the Department of Agricultural Research and Education has been reduced from 10281 crores Revised Estimate (RE) 2025-26 to 9967 crores (BE 2026-27).

The rhetoric on investing in cash crops continued even in this year’s budget. The speech underlined a focus on coconut, cocoa, cashew, nuts, and sandalwood. However, in reality, missions such as Cotton Technology Mission, Mission on Pulses, Hybrid Seeds, and Makhana Board, introduced in the past, find no mention in the budgetary figures.

Talking of relief to farmers, the budget presents no remarkable proposal. The subsidy on fertilizers has seen a reduction from 186460 crores (RE 2025-26) to 170781 crores (BE 2025-26). Food subsidy has also seen a reduction from the revised estimates of previous year.

There was no mention of the MGNREGS scheme or even the newly passed VB-GRamG scheme in the budget speech, which indicates the total dismissal of the significance of rural employment.

VB-GRamG scheme has been allocated 95692 crores; however, this allocation is subject to the clause of 40 per cent mandatory state funding. 60 percent of the allocated budget under VBGRamG is 57,415 crores, which is drastically less than the 88000 crores allocated to MGNREGS under RE 2025-26. This means for the new scheme to function at the previous level, State governments have to bear the burden of 38,277 crores!

As per the economic review 2025-26, the number of states with surplus has been reduced from 19 in 2018-19 to 11 in 2023-24. The states are demanding 50% share of the divisible pool but the 16th Finance Commission has proposed 41% only. The state governments without financial autonomy will not be able to find adequate funds to support the employment guarantee scheme and even the average 47 days of employment under MGNREGS will not be available for the rural people this year under VB GRAMG Act. It is a gross assault on the rural workers and peasants as well as violation of the federal rights. This is not acceptable to the peasantry.

AIKS: The only major announcement concerning rural employment was the Mahatma Gandhi Gram Swaraj Yojana, promoting village industries; however, no significant financial allocations were made.

Among the Agriculture and Allied sectors, the only significant budgetary allocation has been made under Animal Husbandry and Dairying, from 5303 crores (RE 2025-26) to 6135 crores (BE 2026-27). However, here again the thrust has been on expansion of credit-infused veterinary hospitals, breeding in the private sector and garnering foreign investments.

The AIKS has called upon the farmers, rural workers and the people at large to strongly protest against the anti-farmer, anti-worker, anti-federal budget by burning copies in villages and tehsils on February 3, 2026 or any subsequent day. AIKS also appeals to all to ensure the General Strike on February 12 will be a great success and will reflect the anger against the anti-people Union Budget 2026-27.

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The post Indian Agriculture: Between the 2026 Union budget & US-India trade deal, a huge setback for Indian farmers appeared first on SabrangIndia.

We have been observing the systemic normalisation of public shaming—a practice where police, not the judiciary, effectively deliver a public verdict. This is not due process; it is a coercive performance of degradation, rendering the principle of ‘innocent until proven guilty’ a fiction in practice. The evidence compiled herein is clear, suspects, who should still be shielded by the presumption of innocence, are paraded before cameras and crowds. They are forced into women’s clothes in a calculated act of gendered humiliation. Their heads are forcibly shaved. They are marched down roads with visible and severe injuries; limping on fractured legs or, in some cases, even made to crawl on the road!

This conduct is not the sporadic egregious misconduct of a few officers. It is a defiant, systemic practice that stands in direct contravention of established law. It squarely violates the unambiguous prohibitions set by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration (1980) SCC (3) 526.  It is a profound violation of Article 21 of the Constitution, which guarantees every person—accused or not—the right to life and human dignity.

Significantly, this recurring illegality continues in open defiance of advisories from the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Rajasthan DGP’s own circulars forbidding these very acts. The state’s top police leadership, by failing to enforce its own directives, has transitioned from silent spectator to complicit enabler. This resource is a legal examination of this practice. It details how the instruments of law are being perverted to enact a form of public justice, replacing the sanctity of the courtroom with the irreversible, prejudicial judgment of the crowd.

A map of humiliation: the state-wide trend of extra-legal parades

The colonial practice to parade accused before public and media as some hunted animal trophy is worst form of abuse of human rights of an individual. The British adopted this practice to ensure that the people of India remain fearful and subservient to handful of foreign rulers (who’s police forces were trained to turn against their own). In large part, they were successful in ensuring brute control, but that such tendencies should spiral in free ‘democratic India?

Shockingly, these extra-legal “arrest rituals” are not isolated incidents but part of a systemic practice across Rajasthan this past year that our team has documented. We present a detailed legal analysis.

1. Gendered humiliation as punishment

Few practices reveal the collapse of constitutional restraint more starkly than the police’s resort to gendered humiliation as a tool of punishment. Across Rajasthan, police officers have repeatedly turned to misogynistic tropes—forcing accused men into women’s clothing, half-shaving their heads, and parading them before jeering crowds—as instruments of moral retribution rather than lawful procedure. These acts, staged in full public view were documented through 2025. Often, they were visually documented for social media dissemination. These unlawful acts are not by any means, spontaneous lapses of discipline. They represent a conscious performance of power—where masculinity, shame, and violence are choreographed into public spectacle.

Even when the police claim that the accused were found disguised in women’s clothes at the time of arrest, such an explanation cannot justify their public parading in the same attire. The act of displaying them before crowds in those clothes—long after custody has been secured—serves no investigative purpose. It is an act of deliberate humiliation, stripped of any legal rationale, and therefore per se illegal. It transforms supposed evidence of arrest into a spectacle of degradation, meant to mock rather than prosecute.

The incidents that follow demonstrate how the police have systematically weaponised gender stereotypes to degrade the accused. In Sikar, Udaipur, Nagaur, Jhunjhunu, and Dausa, law enforcement transformed arrests into orchestrated parades of humiliation, targeting not only the individual’s liberty but their dignity itself. Each case exposes how gendered humiliation has evolved into an informal yet recurring mode of punishment—public, performative, and patently unlawful.

• Sikar: After arresting two men for allegedly killing a bull by running it over with an SUV on October 1, 2025, Nechwa police subjected them to such degradation. Claiming the men were found hiding in women’s clothes, officers half-shaved their heads and then paraded them through the public market, forcing them to wear women’s nightgowns. This spectacle was designed to incite public anger, with crowds reportedly shouting for the men to be hanged. (Report in Dainik Bhaskar).

Image Credit: Dainik Bhaskar 

Departmental endorsement of Sikar Police’s illegal parade

This defiance of law is not merely a station-level anomaly, it is amplified by a glaring departmental contradiction, perfectly captured by the Sikar parade incident.

This illegal parade, designed to incite public anger, was then officially endorsed by the force’s public relations arm. Despite internal directives from the DGP (such as the detailed SOP dated September 21, 2023) explicitly forbidding such acts of humiliation, the official @PoliceRajasthan social media handle broadcast a video of this very parade. It was framed as a righteous act, captioned, “Rajasthan Police: A befitting reply to human cruelty”, thereby publicly celebrating a blatant violation of law as a policy success.

• Udaipur: Five men arrested by Hathipole police for rioting and assault with a sword were paraded on November 1 in a manner clearly intended to humiliate. Justifying the act with the claim that the accused were planning to flee in female attire, police forced all five to dress in women’s clothes. To amplify the shame, they were made to wear placards around their necks with slogans like “I am a burden on society” and “I am a criminal” as they were marched through the city. (Report in The Mooknayak).

Image Credit: The Mooknayak

• Nagaur: On August 1, in Merta town, three men accused of a lottery scam—a crime they allegedly committed while disguised in female attire—were subjected to a multi-layered shaming ritual. Police shaved their heads and then marched them from the bus stand to the court while forcing them to wear the women’s salwar suits. (Report in Dainik Bhaskar).

Image Credit: Dainik Bhaskar

Throughout the parade, officers forced the men to keep their hands folded and repeatedly chant, “We made a mistake.”

• Jhunjhunu & Dausa: This tactic of weaponising an accused’s disguise was repeated across districts. In Surajgarh (Jhunjhunu), on July 20, the SHO paraded a man accused of attacking a sarpanch in the salwar suit he was allegedly wearing while in hiding. (Reports in Dainik Bhaskar and Patrika).

Image Credit: Rajasthan Patrika

Similarly, in Dausa, police arrested two men for attacking officers. After finding them hiding in women’s clothes, police paraded them through the village in that same attire, forcing them to walk with folded hands and issue a public warning that “No one should do this, or they will face the same consequences.” (Report in Dainik Bhaskar).

Image Credit: Dainik Bhaskar

2. Parading the injured accused/suspects: spectacles of cruelty

In several cases, police have paraded accused. Several of these accused were visibly and severely injured, turning a “spot verification” or “Medical Examination” procedure into a public display of suffering.

• Kota: On May 22, in a shocking parade from Kanwas, police paraded two murder accused who were severely injured, allegedly from fleeing arrest. Both men had their legs in plaster casts. Media reports explicitly described one accused, Atiq, whose both legs were broken, crawling or ‘dragging himself’ on the road. The second accused, Deepak, limped painfully alongside on a crutch. The Kota Rural SP justified this as “spot verification.” He said that “action was taken to have the accused verify the scene and to prepare a site map of the incident. Since both had sustained injuries, they were taken to the spot on foot” as ETV Bharat Rajasthan reported. (Report in Dainik Bhaskar).

Image Credit: ETV Bharat Kota

• Jaipur: On January 23, Vidhyadharnagar police paraded five men accused in a high-profile robbery and murder case. Two of the men had sustained fractured legs from falling in a ditch and were in plaster casts. (Report in Dainik Bhaskar).

Image Credit: Dainik Bhaskar

Police forced these injured men to walk, limping and supported by officers, from the police vehicle to the crime scene and even to the victim’s house.

• Tonk: On September 30, The Times of India reported that the Tonk Police arrested three men for allegedly molesting a 13-year-old girl and threatening her with an acid attack. During the public “spot verification,” one of the accused, unable to walk, was filmed dragging himself on the road, while the other two limped beside him as locals cheered. During the parade, a large crowd gathered and chanted slogans of “Tonk Police Zindabad.” (Report in Dainik Bhaskar).

Image Credit: Dainik Bhaskar

• Kotputli: On July 1, four men accused of murdering a liquor contractor were arrested after a police “encounter” in which all four were shot in the legs. Immediately following their medical treatment, police paraded the injured accused, limping from their fresh gunshot wounds, in a “procession” through the town.

• Karoli: On February 25, two men accused of firing over a payment dispute at a salon were arrested after being injured, allegedly by falling on stones while fleeing. Police then paraded the two men, who were visibly limping, and forced them to walk through the city with folded hands, apologising to the public. (Report in Dainik Bhaskar).

Image Credit: Dainik Bhaskar

3. Rituals of degradation: shaving, placards, and drums

Beyond gendered humiliation, police employ other theatrical methods of degradation designed to shatter an accused’s self-respect.

• Baran: On June 3, demonstrating that even an alleged intent to commit a crime warrants public degradation, police arrested 12 men for planning a robbery at a petrol pump. Before any trial, police shaved the heads of the accused and paraded them through the city market, forcing them to join their hands and publicly apologise. (Report in NDTV Rajasthan).

Image Credit: NDTV Rajasthan

• Pali: On October 28, the Pali Police orchestrated a highly theatrical shaming procession for three murder accused. Officers hired dhols (drums) to beat as they marched the men from Ambedkar Circle to the court. The accused, who were visibly limping, were forced to wear clothes with the label ‘Hardcore History-sheeter’ printed on them and beg for forgiveness.

During the parade, a woman tried to reach the accused to slap them, but the police stopped her

• Hanumangarh: On October 30, the Gogamedi police arrested six men, alleged to be members of a criminal gang. As a form of summary punishment, police forcibly cut their hair and then paraded them through village. (Report in Dainik Bhaskar).

Image Credit: Dainik Bhaskar

The men were seen limping and attempting to hide their faces in shame during the procession.

Footage Credit: Dainik Bhaskar

• Udaipur: On October 5, combining multiple forms of humiliation, Bhupalpura police paraded two men accused of a stabbing. The men were forced to walk while visibly limping from injuries sustained during their arrest, and police had half-shaved their heads to maximise their public disgrace.

The accused men were marched in this state for approximately two kilometers to “recreate the scene.”

4. General parades: “sport verification” as public spectacle

Even in cases without overt torture, the routine practice of parading suspects for “spot verification” is used as a pretext for public shaming.

• Jodhpur: On August 20, after arresting suspects in a firing case, Jodhpur police paraded the accused on foot from the police station to the nearby crime scene in the middle of the market, justifying it as the “last day of remand” and a “spot inspection.” (Report in Amar Ujala.

Image Credit: Amar Ujala

• Bikaner: On July 28, Lunkaransar police paraded six men, accused of attacking a shopkeeper, through the same market where the incident occurred, forcing them to walk to the hospital. The parade drew a large crowd, which turned the procession into a “julus” (spectacle). (Report in Dainik Bhaskar).

Image Credit: Dainik Bhaskar

• Jaipur: In a separate Vidhyadharnagar case, on June 3, two men arrested for allegedly trying to free a suspect from police custody and tearing a constable’s uniform were paraded at the scene of the incident, where they were forced to fold their hands and apologise. (Report in Patrika).

Image Credit: Patrika

• Churu: On September 21, Taranagar Police paraded a young man accused of allegedly stabbing a female student. He was marched from the police station through the main market and bus stand to “send a message.” According to Dainik Bhaskar, the SHO was quoted as saying, “This is the fate of those who commit crimes.”

Link: https://dai.ly/x9qx8kw

The statutory framework: due process vs. public spectacle

The statutory framework governing arrest, detention, and investigation in India is exhaustive and focuses entirely on procedural correctness, investigative necessity, and the rights of the accused. This framework is designed to protect the individual from the arbitrary exercise of state power.

Conspicuously absent from the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), and its predecessor, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is any provision, power, or procedure that legitimises the public parading, shaming, or forced humiliation of an accused or suspect. The police actions documented in Rajasthan are not a mere over-extension of authority but they are in direct contravention of black-letter law.

The limited and defined powers of arrest

The police’s power to arrest is not absolute. It is narrowly defined, primarily under Section 35 of the BNSS, 2023 (which corresponds to Section 41 of the CrPC, 1973). This section outlines the specific circumstances under which a police officer may arrest without a warrant. The entire purpose of this power is to prevent the commission of further offenses, ensure a proper investigation, or secure the accused’s presence at trial. It does not grant any power to inflict summary punishment or public humiliation.

The manner of arrest is detailed in Section 43 of the BNSS, 2023:

(1) In making an arrest the police officer or other person making the same shall actually touch or confine the body of the person to be arrested, unless there be a submission to the custody by word or action:

Provided that where a woman is to be arrested, unless the circumstances indicate to the contrary, her submission to custody on an oral intimation of arrest shall be presumed and, unless the circumstances otherwise require or unless the police officer is a female, the police officer shall not touch the person of the woman for making her arrest.

(2) If such person forcibly resists the endeavour to arrest him, or attempts to evade the arrest, such police officer or other person may use all means necessary to effect the arrest.

(3) The police officer may, keeping in view the nature and gravity of the offence, use handcuff while making the arrest of a person or while producing such person before the court who is— (i) a habitual or repeat offender; or (ii) a person who escaped from custody; or (iii) a person who has committed offence of organised crime, terrorist act, drug related crime, illegal possession of arms and ammunition, murder, rape, acid attack, counterfeiting of coins and currency-notes, human trafficking, sexual offence against children, or offence against the State.

While Sub-section (3) introduces specific grounds for handcuffing, its legal basis remains tied to preventing escape and ensuring safety—not for public display. The parading of an accused in handcuffs, often when they are already subdued or injured, serves no legitimate custodial purpose.

The absolute prohibition on unnecessary restraint

The most blatant statutory violation in these public parades is the breach of Section 46 of the BNSS, 2023 (mirroring Section 49 of the CrPC). This provision is not ambiguous and leaves no room for discretion. It mandates:

“The person arrested shall not be subjected to more restraint than is necessary to prevent his escape.”

Forcing an accused to wear women’s clothing, shaving their head, hanging a placard around their neck, or forcing them to limp through a market while injured is, by any definition, “more restraint than is necessary to prevent his escape.” These acts are illegal, punitive, and fall entirely outside the police’s lawful authority.

Provisions pertaining to the use of handcuffing

The legal framework governing handcuffs in India was historically undefined, with no explicit provision in the previous CrPC, 1973. Their use was permissively shaped only by Supreme Court directives, notably in Prem Shanker Shukla v. Delhi Administration (1980) SCC (3) 526 and Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) guidelines (2010), which strictly limited it to a measure of last resort for securing restraint—not as a routine tool.

The new Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), in Section 43(3), for the first time codifies this power, but only for exceptionally narrow and grave circumstances, such as for a habitual or repeat offender, a person who escaped custody, or one who has committed specified serious offences like organised crime, terrorism, murder, or rape.

While police may justifiably argue that handcuffs are necessary to secure an accused during spot verifications, medical examinations, or production before the court, the incidents documented across Rajasthan tell a different story. The visual evidence shows handcuffs being weaponised not for legitimate restraint, but as a prop for public shaming—an integral part of the illegal parade. This unnecessary, performative demonstration of power is a per se unconstitutional and illegal act, designed to inflict humiliation rather than uphold the law.

Zoological strategies repugnant to Article 21: SC’s definitive mandate in Prem Shankar Shukla

The foundational and most authoritatively-violated law on this matter remains the Supreme Court’s 1980 judgment in Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration (1980) SCC (3) 526. This ruling did not just restrict handcuffing; it condemned the entire mindset behind public degradation as an affront to the Constitution. The Court declared that handcuffing is “prima facie inhuman” and “arbitrary,” calling it a “zoological strategy” that is “repugnant to Article 21.”

Addressing the exact ritual of parading, the Court observed:

“But to bind a man hand-and-foot, fetter his limbs with hoops of steel, shuffle him along in the streets and stand him for hours in the courts is to torture him, defile his dignity, vulgarise society and foul the soul of our constitutional culture.” (Para 22)

The Court established that the “convenience of the custodian” (Para 24) is irrelevant. Handcuffing is not a routine procedure but an “extreme measure” (Para 25) that can only be justified as the “last refuge, not the routine regimen” (Para 25). The bench explicitly rejected the idea that the “nature of the accusation” (Para 31) is a valid criterion. Instead, the only determinant is a “clear and present danger of escape” (Para 31), which must be based on “clear material, not glib assumption” (Para 31).

Crucially, the judgment set a non-negotiable procedural safeguard: police cannot act unilaterally. Even in those rare, extreme cases, the officer must:

“…record contemporaneously the reasons for doing so… The escorting officer, whenever he handcuffs a prisoner produced in court, must show the reasons so recorded to the Presiding Judge and get his approval. Otherwise… the procedure will be unfair and bad in law.” (Para 30)

The Court concluded by condemning the practice as a “barbarous bigotry” and “an imperial heritage, well preserved” (Para 33), making it clear that such “animalising” (Para 23) displays are summary punishments “vicariously imposed at police level” (Para 31) and have no place under the Constitution.

The judgement of Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration (1980) can be read here

Police duty is arrest, not punishment: the Omprakash judgment

In Omprakash and Ors. v. State of Jharkhand (2012) 12 SCC 72, the Supreme Court stressed the fundamental limits of police duty. The Court observed that the police designated role is not to deliver summary punishment, stating “It is not the duty of the police officers to kill the accused merely because he is a dreaded criminal. Undoubtedly, the police have to arrest the accused and put them up for trial.” (Para 42).

This observation highlights the principle that the police’s sole, lawful function is to bring an accused before the judiciary, not to usurp the judicial role by inflicting punishment—be it through extra-judicial killings or, by extension, through acts of public degradation.

The judgement of Omprakash and Ors. v. State of Jharkhand (2012) 12 SCC 72 can be read here

A Parallel Trial: Supreme Court on the illegality of media parades of accused

The Hindu reported that on August 28, 2014, the Supreme Court directly condemned the practice of police parading suspects before the media, viewing it as a serious threat to the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial. During the 2014 hearings for the Public Union for Civil Liberties & another v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors. (CDJ 2014 SC 831), a three-judge bench led by then-Chief Justice R.M. Lodha expressed strong disapproval of this practice. The Chief Justice was unequivocal, stating:

“Media briefings by investigating officer during on-going investigations should not happen. It is a very serious matter. This issue touches upon Article 21 [right to life and liberty including fair trial].”

The bench, which also included Justice Kurian Joseph, noted that this conduct prejudices the accused before they are even charged. Justice Joseph observed that by releasing unproven statements, “a parallel trial is run in the media,” which affects the fundamental rights of the accused and creates an indelible stigma.

Home Ministry’s advisory on media policy and ban on public parading of accused persons

The systemic defiance of legal norms is further evidenced by the police’s flagrant disregard for binding directives from the Union Government itself. As far back as April 1, 2010, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) issued a comprehensive “Advisory on Media Policy of Police” (F. NO.15011/48/2009-SC/ST-W) to all states. This advisory explicitly mandates precautions to protect the dignity of those in custody. Guideline VI(a) of the memorandum is unequivocal that “arrested persons should not be paraded before the media.”

Para (VI) reads as follow;

“Due care should be taken to ensure that there is no violation of the legal, privacy and human rights of the accused/victims.

1.  Arrested persons should not be paraded before the media.
2.  Faces of arrested persons whose Test Identification Parade is required to be conducted should not be exposed to the media.”

It further instructs that “due care should be taken to ensure that there is no violation of the legal, privacy and human rights of the accused/victims.” The MHA advisory, which forms the basis for subsequent state-level circulars, also directs that any deviation “should be viewed seriously and action should be taken against such police officer/official.”

The recurring spectacles in Rajasthan are therefore a direct violation of these long-standing, explicit instructions from the very ministry overseeing internal security.

The MHA advisory dated April 1, 2010 can be read here

Section 29 of the Rajasthan Police Act, 2007

The very statute governing the state’s police, the Rajasthan Police Act, 2007, establishes a clear, affirmative obligation for officers to follow the law. Section 29 of the Act details the duties and responsibilities of every police officer. Crucially, Section 29(i) mandates that an officer shall “perform such duties and discharge such responsibilities as may be enjoined upon him by law or by an authority empowered to issue such directions under any law.” This provision makes adherence to all legal mandates—including constitutional protections, Supreme Court judgments, and internal departmental circulars—a fundamental and non-negotiable component of an officer’s statutory duty.

Circulars/advisory issued by the DGP, Rajasthan

This reported illegality is not just a violation of MHA advisories but also a direct contravention of the Rajasthan Police’s own internal guidelines. On October 18, 2013, the Director General of Police (DGP), Rajasthan, issued a specific advisory to all District Police Superintendents and G.R.P. Ajmer/Jodhpur regarding police-media relations. This directive explicitly aimed to prevent the very practices now seen across the state. Para (vi) of the advisory clearly mandates:

“It should always be kept in mind that; (a) the arrested person should not be paraded before the media. (b) The face of the accused whose identity is to be paraded should not be shown to the media.”

The DGP, Rajasthan’s instructions dated October 18, 2013 can be read here

Rajasthan Police’s SOP strictly prohibits using handcuffs for “public ridicule, harassment, or humiliation”

On September 21, 2023, the Additional Director General of Police (Crime), Rajasthan, issued a detailed Standard Operation Procedure (SOP) acknowledging that handcuffing and displaying accused was being done “routinely,” a practice that “humiliates a person,” “hurts their self-respect,” and “tarnishes the image of the police.”

Citing the Rajasthan High Court’s 2023 order (supra) and the Supreme Court’s mandate in Prem Shankar Shukla (supra), the SOP strictly prohibits using handcuffs for “public ridicule, harassment, or humiliation” or merely for the “convenience of the escort team.”

The SOP mandates that handcuffs are a last resort, to be used only in “exceptional circumstances” (e.g., the prisoner is violent, dangerous, or a high escape risk) and requires prior court approval. The reasons for their use must be meticulously recorded in the police station’s daily diary (Roznamcha Aam) before application.

The SOP also explicitly forbids the routine handcuffing of “Satyagrahis, persons holding dignified positions in public life, journalists, [and] political prisoners,” and states that even if justifiably handcuffed, they must not be paraded. It directs senior officers (IGPs and SPs) to ensure “verbatim” compliance with these instructions.

The ADGP, Rajasthan’s directive dated September 21, 2023 can be read here

“Will not conduct a public parade”: DGP’s January 2025 SOP directly bans shaming rituals

The legal prohibitions against these practices were reinforced with the issuance of a new “Standard Operating Procedure for the use of handcuffs” by the Director General of Police, Rajasthan, on January 15, 2025. This SOP was issued to align with Section 43(3) of the new Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023, which codifies the power to use handcuffs for specific, grave offenses (e.g., habitual offenders, terrorism, murder, rape, organised crime).

However, the directive unequivocally states that even for these accused, handcuffs are only permissible in “exceptional circumstances” where there is a “clear and present danger” of escape or violence, and the reasons must be “clearly recorded.” Most significantly, the 2025 SOP directly confronts and bans the very rituals this resource documents. It explicitly commands:

“The police officer, after handcuffing, will not conduct a public parade of the prisoner.”

Furthermore, it directly targets the police practice of broadcasting these events, instructing officers to: “…take special care that after handcuffing, photos or videos of the prisoner are not uploaded to social media.”

This latest directive from the state’s top police office leaves no ambiguity, explicitly forbidding the exact conduct of parading suspects and disseminating the footage.

The directions of DGP, Rajasthan dated January 15, 2025 can be read here

Rajasthan High Court’s condemnation on illegal handcuffing

On May 26, 2023, the Rajasthan High Court’s order (Jodhpur Bench) in D.B. Habeas Corpus Petition No. 156/2023, the Court, while disposing of the petition, issued several key directives. The operative part of the order mandates the respondents to conduct an expeditious inquiry into the incident and against the delinquent officers, including those already suspended. The Court directed that the Inspector General of Police (IGP) must personally monitor the progress of this inquiry.

Furthermore, the Court explicitly ordered the IGP to ensure that the directions issued by the Supreme Court [notably in Prem Shanker Shukala v. Delhi Administration (1980) SCC (3) 526, which prohibit routine handcuffing, are followed “in letter and spirit” throughout his jurisdiction.

The High Court’s take on the handcuffing was one of strong condemnation. It found the action of handcuffing the petitioner’s son—who was not formally arrested and was hospitalised with a fractured leg, rendering him unable to walk—to be “inhuman” and “absolutely illegal and unconstitutional.” The Court noted that the very presence of handcuffs at the general ward bed of an unarrested accused, who alleged he was fettered at night, “firmly established” the illegality and was a clear violation of constitutional mandates, dismissing the suspension of officers as an “eye-wash.”

The order dated May 26, 2023 of the Rajasthan High Court can be read here

The judicial condemnation of public parades extends beyond a single state

Apart from the Rajasthan High Court, this concern is also shocking courts across the country as well, as the Gujarat High Court, in R/WPPIL/153/2018, Bhautik Vijaybhai Bhatt v. Director General of Police, addressed this issue directly. The Public Interest Litigation sought a writ of mandamus to stop police from “taking out procession of accused persons by handcuffing them… and beat such accused persons in public place.” In response, the Additional Director General of Police filed an affidavit assuring the Court of “proposed draft instructions” to be issued to all officers.

The High Court’s order dated May 7, 2019, specifically recorded that these new instructions would ensure that accused persons are “not parading them in public at large” or given any “maltreatment.” The affidavit, accepted by the Court, affirmed that accused must be “protected from mob violence” and taken to the police station or Magistrate “in a dignified manner by protecting their individual status.” The Court disposed of the PIL by directing the state to issue this circular, reinforcing that legal guidelines must be “strictly complied with.”

The order of Gujrat High Court dated May 7, 2019 can be read here

No parading of accused/suspects: Hyderabad High Court (Telangana HC)

The New Indian Express reported that on June 21, 2018, a division bench of the Hyderabad High Court comprising Chief Justice Kalyan Jyoti Sengupta and Justice PV Sanjay Kumar recently expressed their “extreme displeasure” over parading of accused in front of media and television channels. The observation has evoked a positive response and won accolades from different walks of life. The judges asserted that the bench would pass orders prohibiting the practice.

Subsequently, the High Court refused a request to grant the DGP, Andhra Pradesh, two weeks to file an affidavit in the case. The bench, demonstrating its urgency on the matter, strongly remarked that “You are treating the accused-suspects as animals that is why you are allowing them before the media without any respect to their Right to Privacy which is a fundamental right. We will grant only a week’s time to you to file the affidavit as per our earlier direction” as the Deccan Chronicle reported

Rights of the accused: protection and fair trail, not degradation

The law, far from sanctioning humiliation, builds a wall of protection around the accused. Section 38 of the BNSS, 2023 (mirroring Section 50 of the CrPC), mandates that when any person is arrested and interrogated by the police, he shall be entitled to meet an advocate of his choice during interrogation, though not throughout interrogation.

Furthermore, Section 51 of the BNSS, 2023 (regarding the medical examination of the accused), shows the law’s intent:

…it shall be lawful for a registered medical practitioner, acting at the request of any police officer… to make such an examination of the person arrested as is reasonably necessary in order to ascertain the facts which may afford such evidence…

The purpose of a medical examination is evidentiary—to find trace evidence on the accused or document injuries relevant to the crime. This provision is perverted when police parade suspects with injuries (like fractured legs), turning a procedure meant for legal and medical documentation into a spectacle of cruelty.

The core jurisprudential breach

These police conduct tears at the very fabric of Indian criminal jurisprudence.

1. Violation of Article 21 (Dignity): The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the right to life under Article 21 includes the right to live with human dignity. Public shaming, forced haircuts, and gendered humiliation are a profound assault on that dignity.

Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which guarantees the “right to live with human dignity.” This is the “most precious right” afforded to “every person,” a guarantee that is not suspended upon accusation or arrest. As the Supreme Court has affirmed in PUCL v. State of Maharashtra [Criminal Appeal No. 1255 of 1999] that, “even the State has no authority to violate that right.” (Para 7)

The judgement of PUCL v. State of Maharashtra [Criminal Appeal No. 1255 of 1999] can be read here

The only exception under Article 21 is that liberty can be curtailed, but only subject to the “procedure established by law”—which means through a fair trial, investigation, and conviction by a competent court. However, the police’s summary “punishments” in the name of spot verification and medical examination are per se illegal and a gross violation of the Constitution, as police have no authority to adjudicate guilt or inflict penalties.

This practice also fundamentally subverts Article 20(2) of the Constitution, which prohibits double jeopardy. When police inflict this public degradation, they are administering a “punishment” before any trial. Should the accused later be convicted by a court, they would have been subjected to two punishments—first, the illegal, irreversible public shaming by the police, and second, the judicial sentence. This police action is a brazen usurpation of judicial power, rendering the presumption of innocence a nullity.

In Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, (1980) 3 SCC 488, the Supreme Court even condemned the inhuman and degrading treatment of prisoners, particularly the use of solitary confinement and held that fundamental rights do not end at the prison gates. It was emphasised that prison authorities must respect the dignity and rights of inmates under Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution. Thus, ‘human dignity’, which is apparently not a fundamental right was read as a part of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

The judgement of Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (1980) can be read here

In K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1 this Court affirmed right to privacy as a fundamental right under the Constitution, which was read as a right and a part of ‘life and liberty’ under Article 21. It was held that privacy encompasses autonomy, dignity, and the freedom to control their own personality.

The judgement of K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) can be read here

2. Violation of Article 20(3) (Self-Incrimination): Forcing an accused to walk with folded hands and publicly chant “I made a mistake” is a form of compelled confession, obtained through duress and humiliation. It is a flagrant violation of the right against self-incrimination.

“I Made a Mistake”: forced confessions and the death of Article 20(3)

A core constitutional safeguard, enshrined in Article 20(3) of the Constitution, dictates that “No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.” This right against self-incrimination is so foundational that the law of evidence, both in Section 25 of the former Indian Evidence Act and its successor Section 23 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, explicitly states that “No confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence.” These laws exist precisely because of the inherent risk of coercion in police custody.

The police rituals documented across Rajasthan—forcing accused men to chant “We made a mistake” or publicly apologise to crowds—are a flagrant and theatrical violation of these very safeguards. Such a “confession,” whether genuinely given in the privacy of a station or compelled by police pressure, is legally worthless and inadmissible as evidence.

Therefore, the only purpose of this public performance is extra-legal, to inflict humiliation, satisfy public anger, and enact a summary punishment. This practice is a performative and compelled act of self-incrimination. It does not matter if an accused has confessed; the police have no authority to broadcast this, let alone force its re-enactment as a public spectacle. By forcing an accused to apologise on camera, the police are not conducting an investigation; they are staging a verdict and illegally compelling a person to be a witness against himself, not before a court of law, but before a roadside mob.

3. Destruction of the Presumption of Innocence: The accusation has to be proven in a court of law. When investigating authorities “play to the gallery,” they usurp the role of the judiciary. They declare the person guilty before a trial, inflicting an irreversible public sentence that no subsequent acquittal can ever undo. This damages the credibility and integrity of the entire justice system.

The D.K. Basu mandate: a judicial blueprint against custodial abuse

The most foundational legal standards for arrest and detention were established by the Supreme Court in its landmark judgment, D.K. Basu v. State of W.B. [(1997) 1 SCC 416]. The Court, deeply concerned with custodial violence and the abuse of police power, formulated a set of 11 mandatory requirements. These guidelines are not suggestions but “preventive measures” designed to ensure transparency, accountability, and the protection of an arrestee’s fundamental rights under Article 21. They create a non-negotiable procedural blueprint that stands in stark contrast to the arbitrary rituals of public shaming. The Court directed in Para 35 of the judgement that requirements to be followed in all cases of arrest or detention till legal provisions are made in that behalf as preventive measures.

These directives establish procedures to protect the rights of individuals during arrest and detention. Police officers must wear clear identification, and their details must be registered. An “Arrest Memo” must be prepared at the time of arrest, detailing the time and date, witnessed by a family member or local respectable person, and countersigned by the arrestee.

The arrestee must be informed of their right to have one friend or relative notified of their arrest and custody location. If this person lives out-of-district, police must notify them via the Legal Aid Organisation within 8-12 hours. The arrestee has the right to an injury inspection at arrest, recorded in a signed “Inspection Memo,” and must receive a medical examination by an approved doctor every 48 hours. They may also meet their lawyer during interrogation.

All arrest details must be recorded in a station diary, with copies of documents sent to the Magistrate. Furthermore, the district/state police control room must be informed of the arrest and custody location within 12 hours and display this information publicly.

The judgement of DK Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997) can be read here

No action from SHRC and DGP Rajasthan’s office

Despite an unambiguous legal framework, the compiled evidence reveals a systemic collapse of every accountability mechanism. The Rajasthan State Human Rights Commission (RSHRC), armed with suo moto powers to protect fundamental rights from illegal police practices, has remained a silent spectator. This inaction persists even as these “arrest rituals” have escalated since 2025, transforming from sporadic abuses into a monthly, viral spectacle of state-endorsed degradation.

This open defiance is amplified, not punished, with official police social media handles celebrating the violations. The institutional failure is absolute as the Rajasthan High Court has not taken suo motu cognizance, and the Director General of Police, despite his own clear directives (Jan 2025) forbidding these parades, has proven unable or unwilling to enforce them. The result is a state of perfect impunity, where the Constitution is openly defied, and the law, judiciary, and human rights commissions have, by their collective silence, become complicit enablers.

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The post Parade of Public Shaming: How Rajasthan police’s illegal “arrest rituals” replace due process with public defilement appeared first on SabrangIndia.

This was the thirteenth occasion on which the petitions have been listed before the Supreme Court. The proceedings arise from a group of writ petitions pending since 2020, raising substantial constitutional questions concerning the scope of freedom of conscience, personal liberty, equality, and the extent of State power to regulate religious conversion and interfaith marriages. Senior Advocate Chander Uday Singh, Advocate Srishti Agnihotri and Advocate Sanjana Thomas are representing CJP, the first and lead petitioner in the case.

Origin and expansion of the challenge

The challenge was first initiated in January 2020, when the Supreme Court issued notice on petitions questioning the constitutional validity of laws enacted by certain States to regulate religious conversion. These early petitions focused on statutes in Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Madhya Pradesh, and Himachal Pradesh.

Over time, similar laws were enacted in additional States. In 2023, the Supreme Court permitted Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP)—the lead petitioner in the batch—to amend its writ petition to bring within the scope of the proceedings comparable statutes enacted in Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Haryana, Jharkhand, and Karnataka. As a result, the present batch now concerns nine State enactments, each styled as a “Freedom of Religion” or “Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion” law.

The petitions contend that although framed as measures to prevent forced or fraudulent conversions, the impugned statutes impose criminal, procedural, and administrative burdens on the exercise of individual choice in matters of faith and marriage.

Hearing of April 16, 2025: Applications for early hearing and interim relief

A significant procedural development occurred on April 16, 2025, when the Supreme Court heard applications filed by Citizens for Justice and Peace seeking (i) an early hearing of the long-pending petitions and (ii) interim relief in light of continued enforcement of the impugned laws.

The matter was heard by a Bench comprising then Chief Justice of India Sanjiv Khanna and Justice Sanjay Kumar. The applications were filed against the backdrop of the ongoing operation of the anti-conversion statutes across several States and subsequent legislative amendments, including amendments enhancing penalties and expanding the scope of offences.

Appearing for CJP, Senior Advocate Chander Uday Singh submitted that the interim applications were necessitated by the manner in which the laws were being implemented on the ground. It was urged that certain provisions—particularly those relating to prior declarations before conversion, criminalisation of conversion associated with marriage, third-party complaints, and reversal of burden of proof—were resulting in repeated invocation of penal provisions against consenting adults. Singh requested the Court to issue notice on the interim relief application and to stay the operation of the most consequential provisions pending final adjudication.

On behalf of the Union of India, Solicitor General Tushar Mehta contested the submission that there were instances of misuse warranting interim relief. In response, the Bench directed Attorney General R. Venkataramani to examine the applications and indicate the Union’s position on the various prayers raised therein, including identifying aspects that may not be opposed.

The Court further directed that States and non-applicants file responses to the interim applications, even in the absence of a formal notice, with a view to ensuring that pleadings are completed expeditiously. The matter was directed to be listed on a non-miscellaneous day, signalling the Court’s intent to take up the applications in a substantive manner.

Details of the proceedings may be read here.

Proceedings of September 16, 2025: Directions on pleadings and de-tagging

The batch of petitions, along with the pending interlocutory applications, came up for consideration on September 16, 2025, before a Bench comprising then Chief Justice of India B.R. Gavai and Justice K. Vinod Chandran.

At this stage, the Court directed nine respondent States—Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Haryana, Jharkhand, and Karnataka—to file detailed responses to the applications seeking interim stay of their respective statutes.

The Court granted four weeks’ time to the States to file affidavits in reply and indicated that the matter would be taken up for consideration of interim relief after completion of pleadings. To facilitate the preparation of common compilations and streamline submissions, the Court appointed Advocate Srishti Agnihotri as nodal counsel for the petitioners and Advocate Ruchira Goel as nodal counsel for the respondents.

During the same hearing, the Court considered a separate Public Interest Litigation filed by Advocate Ashwini Upadhyay, which sought directions for a pan-India law to criminalise religious conversions carried out through deceit or coercion. The Bench clarified that the subject matter of that petition was distinct from the constitutional challenge to existing State enactments and accordingly de-tagged the Upadhyay petition from the present batch.

Detailed proceedings may be read here.

Nature of the impugned statutes

Across the nine States, the impugned laws generally contain provisions that regulate religious conversion through a combination of prior declarations, criminal penalties, and procedural presumptions. The petitioners have argued that these provisions, taken together, create a legal regime in which conversion is treated as inherently suspect, particularly when it occurs in the context of interfaith relationships or marriage.

A central feature of many of the statutes is the requirement that a person intending to convert must give prior notice to a District Magistrate or other designated authority. In several States, this declaration is followed by a police inquiry or verification process, and in some cases, the declaration is required to be publicly displayed. The petitions argue that such requirements subject the exercise of freedom of conscience to prior executive approval, thereby altering the constitutional relationship between the individual and the State.

Another significant feature is the manner in which conversion associated with marriage is addressed. Several statutes presume that conversion undertaken for the purpose of marriage is suspect and may amount to conversion by force, fraud, or allurement. According to the petitioners, this effectively places consensual interfaith marriages under criminal scrutiny, even in the absence of any allegation by the individuals concerned.

The statutes also commonly permit persons other than the allegedly aggrieved individual to lodge complaints, thereby enabling third-party intervention in private relationships. In addition, many of the laws reverse the burden of proof, requiring the accused to demonstrate that a conversion was voluntary, and impose stringent bail conditions that can result in prolonged incarceration.

During the course of the hearings, CJP (petitioners) drew the Court’s attention to legislative amendments and judicial developments relating to individual State statutes.

Particular reference was made to amendments introduced by the State of Uttar Pradesh in 2024 to its Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act. It was submitted that these amendments enhanced the penal consequences under the statute, including the introduction of minimum sentences extending to long terms of imprisonment and the imposition of bail conditions similar to those found in special statutes. It was also pointed out that the amendments expanded the category of persons who may lodge complaints under the Act.

The petitioners (CJP) also relied on interim orders passed by High Courts in challenges to similar laws. The Gujarat High Court has stayed the operation of certain provisions of the Gujarat Freedom of Religion Act on the ground that they impinge upon the right of consenting adults to marry. The Madhya Pradesh High Court has stayed provisions requiring prior declaration to the District Magistrate. Appeals against these interim orders are presently pending before the Supreme Court.

Related proceedings and de-tagging of a connected petition

During the September 16, 2025 hearing, the Supreme Court also addressed the status of a petition filed by Advocate Ashwini Upadhyay, which sought directions for the enactment of a central law regulating religious conversions. The Court directed that this petition be de-tagged from the present batch, observing that its subject matter was distinct from the challenge to the constitutional validity of existing State enactments.

Submissions on personal liberty and gender concerns

In addition to CJP, several interveners have placed submissions on record. The National Federation of Indian Women (NFIW) has raised concerns regarding the impact of these laws on women’s autonomy, particularly in cases involving interfaith relationships. It has been contended that the statutory framework tends to treat adult women as lacking agency in matters of choice, thereby inviting State and familial intervention.

Position as of the latest listing

As of the listing on January 28, 2026, the Supreme Court has not yet heard arguments on the interlocutory applications seeking interim relief, nor has it commenced final hearing on the constitutional validity of the impugned statutes. The matter now stands listed for February 3, 2026.

The outcome of the forthcoming proceedings will determine whether interim directions are issued pending final adjudication of questions that bear on the interpretation of Articles 14, 21, and 25 of the Constitution, and on the extent to which the State may regulate religious conversion without infringing upon personal liberty and freedom of conscience.

Below is a table, computed for the CJP’s 2020 petition and presented to the Court, which provides the most egregious sections of the law in some of these states:

Detailed reports may be read here and here.

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The post Hearing in batch of CJP-led petitions challenging state Anti-Conversion laws defers in SC; Interim relief applications pending since April 2025 appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Dr Patil was questioned on January 21, 2026 for six hours and this was the third time that he was being interrogated by the authorities after being suddenly and summarily detained on his arrival from the United Kingdom (UK) on January 10, 2026 while on a visit to his family in Erandol, Maharashtra.

He had first been summoned for interrogation on January 16. He participated in the questioning and while, on the same day, he formally requested and appealed for the withdrawal of the LOC, as he was scheduled to return to the United Kingdom on 19 January there was no clear response from the authorities. Thereafter when he arrived at the airport on the scheduled date of departure, he was informed that the LOC had not been quashed. Notably, no prior intimation regarding the continuation of the LOC was provided to him. Dr Patil was accompanied by his wife on his trip to India.

Besides Dr Patil has stated that he has incurred financial loss as he missed his flight and the opportunity cost of working at his destination workplace. The continuation of LOC is a continuation of harassment by way of using the procedure as punishment. In any case, the FIR that has sought to be quashed, the Petition states, “an instance of misuse of criminal law to achieve a political vendetta and suppress any kind of different political view or opinion.[Read more about this on our page]

Single Judge Bench Justice Ashwin Bhobe is hearing Patil’s petition which sought to quash the FIR and cancel the LOC. The next hearing is posted on February 4. Senior Adv Sudeep Pasbola is appearing for the petitioner while Adv general Milind Sathe is appearing for the state.

Details of his detention and the FIR against him including his petition in the High Court challenging both the LOC and FIR may be read here.

Legal Analysis of the case

Section 353(2) of the Bharatiya Nyay Sanhita under which the FIR has been registered provides that:

“Whoever makes, publishes or circulates any statement or report containing false information, rumour or alarming news, including through electronic means, with intent to create or promote, or which is likely to create or promote, on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community or any other ground whatsoever, feelings of enmity, hatred or ill will between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.”

For the offence under Section 353(2) to be made out, the following elements must be established:

A] Publication or circulation of false or alarming information

B] Intent or likelihood to promote enmity or hatred;

C] Such enmity must be between identifiable groups based on religion, caste, language, race, or community

Since the original social media post is presently inaccessible, it is not possible to make definitive contentions regarding its contents. The actions taken appear arbitrary and unjust.

This raises a crucial legal question: whether criticism of the existing government, in and of itself, can amount to the circulation of false information within the meaning of the applicable penal provision.

The FIR lodged against Dr. Sangram Patil alleges that his social media post had the potential to generate hatred and friction between individuals who support the BJP and those who do not. It is contended that the post was intended to promote enmity between persons holding differing political ideologies.

Such an allegation, however, raises a serious constitutional concern. Mere expression of political opinion, even if sharply critical, does not by itself amount to the promotion of enmity between legally recognisable groups as contemplated under the penal law. The expression of one’s opinion is protected as an essential facet of personal liberty and freedom of expression under Articles 19(1) (a) and 21 of the Constitution of India.

The FIR alleges that Dr Patil made statements against current BJP leaders and attempted to create political friction through his Facebook post. It also vaguely alleges derogatory remarks against an unknown woman, though the content of such statements remains unavailable.

In the words of justice K Subba Rao himself in the judgement in the Satwant Singh case [Satwant Singh Sawhney vs Ramarathnam Assistant Passport Officer, Government Of India 1967 SCR (2)] case, “ personal liberty’ within the meaning of Article 21 includes within its ambit the right to go abroad and consequently no person can be deprived of this right except according to procedure prescribed by law.” [excerpt from Priya Parameshwaran Pillai vs Union Of India And Ors. on March 12, 2015]

The Constitution of India extends the protection of Article 21, the right to life and personal liberty, to foreign nationals as well.

As affirmed in the landmark judgment of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India,1978 SCR [2]621, the guarantee of personal liberty under Article 21 is not confined to citizens alone but applies to all persons, subject only to a fair, just, and reasonable procedure established by law. “Freedom to go abroad incorporates the important function of an ultimum refunium liberatis when other basic freedoms are refused. Freedom to go abroad has much social value and represents a basic human right of great significance. It is in fact incorporated as inalienable human right in Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The Spirit of Man is at the root of Art. 21 Absent liberty, other freedoms are frozen. Procedure which deals with the modalities of regulating, restricting or even rejecting a fundamental right falling within Article 21 has to be fair, not foolish, carefully designed to effectuate, not to subvert, the substantive right itself. Thus, understood, ‘procedure’ must rule out anything arbitrary, freakish or bizarre.’ (Para D, Page 336). What is fundamental is life and liberty. What is procedural is the manner of its exercise Fairness.

Dr. Sangram Patil’s prevention from returning to his home country amounts not only to a violation of his right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, but also to a breach of Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), to which India is a signatory. India has supported the UDHR since its drafting and played a significant role in shaping its framework. The principles embodied in the UDHR are also reflected in, and have informed the interpretation of, the Constitution of India.

LOC stands for Lookout circular, it’s a document issued by the government as directive to immigration authorities to restrict and regulate physical movement of a person. This oft-used restrictive step in present times is not governed by any statutes but certain office memorandums which are released from time to time to lay down the rules concerning the same. The latest LOC Consolidated Guidelines were released in the 2021 Office Memorandum by the Ministry of Home Affairs, Foreign Division.

According to the Guidelines the recourse of LOC’s can be taken by investigating agencies in any cognizable offence under BNS or any other Penal Laws when the accused was deliberately evading arrest or may not be appearing in the trial court despite Non Bailable Warant(NWB) and other coercive measures and there was a likelihood that the accused leaving the country to evade arrest. LOC can be withdrawn by the authority that issued it or can be rescinded by the trial court. The request for issuing an LOC must be invariably issued with the approval of Originating Agency of an officer not below the rank of –

1. Deputy Secretary to the Government of India; or
2. Joint Secretary in the State Government;or
3. District Magistrate of the Concerned District;or
4. Superitendent of Police of the District concerned;or
5. SP in CBI; or
6. Zonal Director of NCB;or
7. Deputy Commissioner;or
8. Assistant Director of Intelligence Bureau;or
9. Deputy Secretary of Research;or
10. SP of NIA;or
11. Chairman/ Managing Director / Chief Executive of PSU’s;or
12. Designated Officer of Interpol;or
13. Assistant Director of Enforcement Directorate;or

Several judgements, for instance(Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochuni and vs The State Of Madras And Others 1960 AIR 1080) have laid down that any provisions which restraint upon on the liberty of locomotion must take into account processual provisions which accord with fair norms, free from extraneous pressure and, by and large, complying with natural justice. Unilateral arbitrariness, police dossiers, faceless affiants, behind-the-back materials oblique motives and the inscrutable face of an official sphinx do not fill the ‘fairness,’ bill.

The evaluation of fairness of the restrictions applied upon locomotion of a person are extremely important. The curbing of the right to travel which comes under right to life should not be arbitrary in the words of Justice PN Bhagwati in Maneka Gandhi vs UOI 1978 SCR [2]621

                 “Hearing is obligatory-meaningful hearing, flexible and realistic, according to circumstances’ but not ritualistic and wooden. In exceptional cases and emergency situations, interim measures may be taken, to avoid the mischief of the passportee becoming an. escape before the hearing begins. “Bolt the stables after the horse has been stolen” is not a command of natural justice. But soon after the provisional seizure, a reasonable hearing must follow, to minimise procedural prejudice. And when a prompt final order is made against the applicant or passport holder the reasons must be disclosed to him almost invariably save in those dangerous cases, where irreparable injury will ensue to the State. A government which revels in secrecy in the field of people’s liberty not only acts against democratic decency but busies itself with its own burial. That is the writing on the wall if history were a teacher, memory our mentor and decline of liberty not our unwitting endeavour. Public power must rarely hide its heart in an open society and system. – maneka gandhi Like stated in miss pillai judgement ‘Espousing a cause of a particular section of people could not be considered as anti-national or creating disaffection amongst people at large.” (Para- B, Page 637).

Similarly, the Court, in Priya Parameshwaran Pillai vs Union Of India And Ors. on 12 March, 2015 states that,

“Espousing a cause of a particular section of people could not be considered as anti

national or creating disaffection amongst people at large.”

Likewise, speaking against a particular ideology or leaders of a particular party cannot be the sole cause to detain anyone let alone detaining a foreign national, it can in no way be considered to be inciting hatred amongst people of different ideologies.”

The court in the Maneka Gandhi vs UOI-, 1978 SCR [2]621 case has observed that it was only exceptional cases that required the issuance of an LOC.

“Spies, traitors, smugglers, saboteurs of the health, wealth and survival or sovereignty of the nation shall not be passported into hostile soil to work their vicious plan fruitfully. But when applying the Passports Act, Over-breadth, hyper-anxiety, regimentation complex, and political mistrust shall not sub-consciously exaggerate, into morbid or neurotic refusal or unlimited imponding or final revocation of passport, facts which, objectively assessed, may prove tremendous trifles. That is why the provisions have to be read down into constitutionality, tailored to fit the reasonableness test and humanised by natural justice. Whether the holder of the passport was heard ? A passport may be impounded without notice but before any final order is passed, the rule of audi alteram partem, would apply and the holder of the passport will have to be heard.

Maneka Gandhi vs UOI, 1978 SCR [2]621, Purtabpur v. Cane Commissioner, Bihar [1969] 2 SCR 807 and Schmidt v. Secretary of State, Home Affairs [1969] 2 Ch. 149 referred to in that case.

Recently Justice N Seshasayee of Madras High Court observed that Look Out Circulars should not end up violating a person’s fundamental right to grow and prosper.

Conclusion

The detention of Dr. Sangram Patil raises grave and interlinked legal concerns, including the questionable invocation of Section 353(2) of the Bharatiya Nyay Sanhita, the curtailment of his right to travel abroad/or back to his home country, serious procedural irregularities, violations of the principles of natural justice, and non-compliance with India’s international consular obligations toward a foreign national. Taken together, these actions point to a disturbing departure from constitutionally mandated standards of fairness, proportionality, and due process.

At its core, this case exemplifies a troubling trend of criminal law and executive mechanisms being deployed in response to political expression, rather than to address any demonstrable threat to public order or national security. The continued restraint on Dr. Patil’s liberty, despite cooperation with the authorities and the absence of transparent justification,underscores the urgent need for strict judicial scrutiny. In a constitutional democracy governed by the rule of law, the exercise of state power, particularly where personal liberty is at stake, must remain accountable, reasoned, and firmly tethered to constitutional principles.

As stated by judges in the Maneka Gandhi vs UOI-, 1978 SCR [2]621

“In Many countries the passport and visa system has been used as a potent paper curtain to inhibit illustrious writers, outstanding statesmen, humanist churchmen and renowned scientists, if they are dissenters, from leaving their national frontiers. Things have changed, global awareness has dawned. The European Convention on Human Rights and bilateral understandings have made headway to widen freedom of travel abroad as integral to liberty of the person. And the universal Declaration of Human Rights has proclaimed in Article 13,”that every one has the right to leave any country including his own, and to return to his country.” (Para D, Page 717)

Lord Denning, on the theme of liberty, observed in [Schmidt v. Secretary of State, Home Affairs [1969] 2 Ch. 149 referred to]”

“Where a public officer has power to deprive a person of his liberty or his property, the general principle is that it is not to be done without hearing.

It is a mark of interpretative respect for the higher norms our founding fathers held dear in affecting the dearest rights of life and liberty so to read Art. 21 as to result in a human order lined with human justice. And running right through Arts. 19 and 14 present this principle of reasonable procedure in different shades. A certain normative harmony among the articles is thus attained, and holds Art. 21 bears in its bosom the construction of fair procedure legislatively sanctioned. No Passport Officer shall be mini-Caesar nor Minister incarnate Caesar in a system where the rule of law reigns supreme.”

“Establishment and passport legislation must take processual provisions which accord with fair norms, free from extraneous pressure and, by and large, complying with natural justice. Unilateral arbitrariness, police dossiers, faceless affiants, behind-the-back materials, oblique motives and the inscrutable face of an official sphinx do not fill the ‘fairness’ bill-subject, of course, to just exceptions an

to just exceptions and critical contexts. This minimum once abandoned, the Police State slowly builds up which saps the finer substance of our constitutional jurisprudence. Not party but principle and policy are the key-stone of our Republic.”

(Maneka Gandhi vs UOI-, 1978 SCR [2]621) (Para B, Page 726)

Freedom to air one’s views is the lifeline of any democracy and any attempt to stifle, suffocate or gag this right would sound a death-knell to its fundamentals. It cannot be gainsaid that modern communication media advance public interest by informing the public of events and developments that take place. Free and critical expression educates citizens, a crucial component of a functional democracy. A citizen who enjoys the fundamentals of free expression also enjoys the right for the free and open propagation of his or her ideas, a right to publicise these in periodicals, magazines and journals or through the electronic media. Any such attempt to thwart or deny the same gravely offends Article 19 (1) (a).

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Natasha Darade)

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The post British Citizen of Indian Origin detained in India: A Legal Analysis of Dr Sangram Patil’s Detention appeared first on SabrangIndia.

When the Court sought the stand of the petitioner, the request was strongly opposed by Advocate Dr. Ujjwalkumar Chavhan, appearing for the petitioner, Dr. Sangram Patil, a UK-based doctor and YouTuber. Counsel submitted that the petitioner continues to be illegally restrained within India due to a Look Out Circular (LOC) that remains in force, despite no final adjudication on its legality. He further pointed out that during the previous hearing, the February 4 date had been fixed after confirming the availability and convenience of the Advocate General, Mr. Sathe, yet the State had failed to file its reply till date.

Emphasising the grave consequences of delay, Dr. Chavhan informed the Court that the petitioner is an MD in Anaesthetics and is employed in the United Kingdom, and that prolonged pendency of the matter is jeopardising his professional career and livelihood. He argued that continuing to restrain the petitioner’s travel without timely hearing effectively amounts to turning the legal process itself into punishment, a practice that runs contrary to established principles of criminal jurisprudence. In view of these submissions, he urged the Court not to entertain any further adjournment.

Accepting the objections raised by the petitioner, the Bombay High Court rejected the State’s request for adjournment, directing that the matter proceed as scheduled.

The case arises from an FIR registered against Patil at the NM Joshi Marg Police Station, Mumbai, based on a complaint filed by Nikhil Bhamre, head of the BJP’s Media Cell. The FIR, lodged on December 18, 2025, alleges that Patil shared or amplified “objectionable” content on social media that amounted to “disinformation” against the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its senior leaders. The content was allegedly hosted on a Facebook page titled “Shehar Vikas Aghadi.”

Based on the complaint, police invoked Section 353(2) of the Bharatiya Nyay Sanhita (BNS), which penalises acts intended to spread false information so as to incite enmity between groups. The offence is classified as non-bailable.

Patil, a British national of Indian origin, had travelled to Mumbai from London on January 10, where he was detained by Mumbai Police upon arrival at the international airport. Subsequently, on January 19, immigration authorities prevented him from boarding a return flight to the UK, citing the existence of a Look Out Circular. He was eventually permitted to record his statement before the police on January 21, but continues to remain in India due to the travel restrictions.

On January 22, the Bombay High Court, presided over by Justice Ashwin Bhobe, issued notice to the State of Maharashtra on Patil’s plea challenging both the FIR and the LOC. The Court directed the State to file its reply by the next date of hearing.

Patil has approached the High Court through Senior Advocate Sudeep Pasbola, seeking quashing of the FIR and the Look Out Circular. He has also prayed for interim relief, urging the Court to stay the investigation and restrain the prosecution from taking any coercive steps, including filing a chargesheet, until further orders. Additionally, Patil has sought permission to travel back to the United Kingdom, where he is employed.

The matter is scheduled to be taken up next on February 4, with the High Court having made it clear that no further delay will be entertained.

Related:

Bombay HC: Notice to Maharashtra state, police on UK doctor, Sangram Patil’s petition seeking quashing of LOC & FIR

Dr Sangram Patil detained by Mumbai Crime Branch, move sharply condemned

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From Purola to Nainital: APCR report details pattern of communal violence in Uttarakhand

The post Bombay High Court rejects State’s adjournment plea in Sangram Patil case; hearing to proceed on February 4 appeared first on SabrangIndia.

रतलाम – प्रेम विवाह करने वाले परिवारों का बहिष्कार किया जाएगा,
ना दूध मिलेगा, ना किराना … गांव का कोई शख्स उस परिवार के कार्यक्रम में हिस्सा नहीं लेगा साथ देने वालों का भी सामाजिक बहिष्कार होगा. pic.twitter.com/MLhL30HMnt

— Anurag Dwary (@Anurag_Dwary) January 26, 2026

Reactions from other social media users were sharp: “The decision by a village in Ratlam to socially boycott families over love marriages is a blatant violation of individual autonomy and Constitutional rights. In a democratic society, the right to choose a life partner is a fundamental freedom. Enforcing ‘social excommunication’ by cutting off access to essential goods like milk and groceries is not just regressive; it is a form of harassment that should be met with strict legal intervention.”

Residents have claimed that the social boycott decision was taken after eight couples from the village eloped and got married in the past six months.

The said video showed a man announcing that young men and women who elope and marry for love as well as their families would be socially boycotted and not invited to any event. Even those helping such persons would face the same action, he further stated. Other action, as announced by the man in the video, will include denying employment to such couples as well as daily necessities like milk. The man in the video also announces that “priests, barbers and other service providers will not go to their houses”, and adds that “anyone who helps the couple, shelters them, acts as a witness to the marriage or supports them in any way will also be socially boycotted”.

Following up on reports in NDTV Hindi and the Tribune, quoted the Collector Misha Singh stating on Monday, Republic Day, that the people in the video had been identified and police had been asked to take action in this regard.  “Our probe has revealed the decision against love marriages was taken not by the Gram Sabha, but by the villagers themselves,” she added.

In addition, the Additional Superintendent of Police (Rural) Vivek Kumar Lal also told the media that these people are being “bound over” (making it legally binding on a person to maintain good conduct and not disturb peace). Further action would also be taken after a detailed investigation, Lal said.

The past six-eight years has seen a mounting hysteria on the issue of inter-community and inter-caste marriages, building up to such an irrational crescendo that, the most conservative and rigid societal tendencies are gaining strength, being emboldened by both this rhetoric and these laws. Nine states led by Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Arunachal Pradesh, Rajasthan, Odisha, Karnataka, Jharkand and Haryana already of these draconian, anti-freedom and anti-personal choice and autonomy laws, nullifying the impact of the existing Special Marriages Act, 1951.

A constitutional challenge to these state laws has been launched by the Citizens for Justice and Peace (cjp.org.in) and is pending before the Supreme Court of India since 2020. The next hearing of the case is on Wednesday, January 28, 2026.

Related:

Haryana: “Upper castes” booked for social boycott of 150 Dalit families

Haryana govt denies social boycott of Dalits, SC takes tough stand

Triple Talaq Row: Social Boycott as Punishment Is Juvenile; AIMPLB Must Follow Quran and Accept Inevitability of Change

The post MP: Village in Ratlam gives call to ‘socially boycott’ families over love marriages appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Unlike 12 other states and Union Territories where the Election Commission of India (ECI) is conducting Special Intensive Revision (SIR) exercises, Assam is undergoing a Special Revision, as directed by the ECI on November 17, 2025, to the State’s Chief Electoral Officer.

As part of this exercise, door-to-door verification was conducted across Assam between November 22 and December 20, 2025. Crucially, unlike SIR, this process did not involve document verification.

According to ECI Letter No. 23/2025-ERS (Vol. II), the timeline for the revision is as follows:

• December 27, 2025: Publication of the integrated draft electoral rolls
• December 27, 2025 – January 22, 2026: Period for filing claims and objections
• By February 2, 2026: Disposal of claims and objections
• February 10, 2026: Final publication of electoral rolls

While officially framed as a routine electoral exercise, the SR has become deeply controversial due to the scale and nature of objections filed under Form-7, particularly against Bengali-speaking Muslims.

Allegations of targeting Bengali-speaking Muslims

Civil society groups including Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP), Banchana Birodhi Mancha, Forum for Social Harmony, Asom Mojuri Sramik Union, and the All Assam Minority Students Union, along with several opposition parties, have alleged that the SR is being misused to harass genuine Indian citizens, primarily Bengali-speaking Muslims, through mass and often false objections filed under Form-7.

Although the Assam Election Department issued a public advisory clarifying that filing a Form-7 objection does not automatically result in deletion of a voter’s name, and that every objection must go through field verification, notice to the voter, and an opportunity of hearing, organisations working on the ground insist that the process itself has become a tool of intimidation.

Despite procedural safeguards on paper, citizens report being summoned, questioned, and threatened with exclusion, leading to widespread fear and uncertainty.

Chief Minister’s remarks deepen the controversy

The situation escalated further after Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma made remarks that were widely criticised as communal and inflammatory.

Referring to the SR process, the Chief Minister stated:

“There is no debate over SR. Which Hindu family has received a notice? Which Assamese Muslim household has seen a notice? We have to issue notices to ‘Miyas’ living here. There is nothing to hide. I am troubling them.”

He further remarked:

“We will do some disturbance, but within the ambit of law. We are with the poor and downtrodden, but not those who want to destroy our community.”

Adding to this, he said:

“They have to understand that at some level, people of Assam are resisting them. Otherwise, they will get a walkover. That’s why some will get notices during SR, some for eviction, some from border police.”

These statements were seen by opposition leaders and rights groups as a direct admission that the SR process is being used to target Bengali-speaking Muslims under the guise of legality.

(Translation of headline: “If SR comes to Assam, I will cut off the names of 4.5 lakh Mia. My job is to hurt the Mia. ‘The Chief Minister’s public announcement’

 

View this post on Instagram

 

A post shared by Assam Talks (@assamtalksofficial)

(Translation: We want to steal a little Mia vote. ‘According to the rules, Mia should not vote in Assam, they should vote in Bangladesh. ‘My job is to hurt the Mia’: CM.)

Misuse of Form-7 and questions over impartiality

At the heart of the controversy is the large-scale filing of allegedly false objections using Form-7, raising serious questions about the impartiality of the Election Commission during the revision process.

Concerns intensified following allegations of interference by BJP workers in the Boko-Chhaygaon area, purported instructions issued by BJP Assam president Dilip Saikia, and the Chief Minister’s public endorsement of “disturbance” through administrative means.

While instances of false objections have been reported from several districts, the issue has drawn particular attention in Sribhumi district (formerly Karimganj) in the Barak Valley.

Sribhumi district: Objections against 133 voters

On January 19, 2026, fifteen Booth Level Officers (BLOs) from Sribhumi district were called for a training session as part of the SR process. Among them was Sumana Choudhury, a young schoolteacher from Karimganj serving as a BLO.

During the session, district officials handed her several objection forms challenging the inclusion of 133 voters from her booth in Srimanta Kanishail village, under the Karimganj North Assembly segment.

According to Sumana Choudhury, the objection forms were partly printed and partly handwritten, and all objections had been filed by a single individual, alleging that the voters had either permanently shifted or were enrolled twice. All 133 voters, she stated, were Bengali-speaking Muslims.

She said:

“During the house-to-house enumeration, I found them at their residences and collected their signatures. They have not shifted. They are genuine voters. The Election Commission documents they signed are proof.”

She further noted that the list included people personally known to her:

“Among the names was the headmaster of my school. Some are parents of my students. How could I ask them to come to a hearing to prove they are genuine voters? Who filed the objections?”

In a startling revelation, the list of objected names included the complainant Salim Ahmed himself and his relatives, effectively meaning the complainant had objected to his own name. When contacted by Sumana Choudhury, Salim Ahmed reportedly denied filing any such objections.

Following the circulation of her statements on social media, Sumana Choudhury was served a show-cause notice by departmental authorities, drawing sharp criticism from opposition leaders and rights groups.

Legal opinion: False objections are punishable

Prominent Sribhumi-based lawyer Shishir Dey stated that filing Form-7 objections on false grounds is illegal and punishable.

He explained that under the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and associated electoral rules, deletion of a voter’s name requires specific, evidence-based reasons.

“If a voter’s name is removed based on false allegations, that voter has the full right to seek legal redress,” Dey said.

He further warned that liability does not stop with the complainant:

“Election officials, including BLOs and EROs, can also face legal action if they accept false complaints without proper verification and exclude names from the voter list.”

Legal notices by affected voters

Another instance of alleged misuse of Form-7 was reported from polling stations 24 and 26 of the Achimganj area under the Patharkandi Assembly constituency in Sribhumi district, where objections were filed against thirty genuine voters.

These voters issued legal notices through senior Karimganj lawyer Subrata Kumar Pal to the District Administrator of Sribhumi, the Sub-Divisional Administrator of Patharkandi, the Election Officer, the concerned BLOs, and eight complainants, alleging a conspiracy to remove their names from the electoral rolls.

Ration dealers, verbal verification, and CJP’s intervention

Separately, reports emerged from districts including Chirang, Bongaigaon, Kokrajhar, Darrang, and Goalpara, where ration dealers allegedly began verbally summoning voters for verification.

In response, CJP teams visited local election offices, intervening to ensure that citizens are not compelled to show documents unless served with formal written notices.

CJP teams continue to assist affected voters through hearings, documentation, and coordination with BLOs on the ground.

CJP Assam legal team member Abhijeet Choudhury stated: “We will provide legal support to voters who wish to take action against those filing false complaints.”

“A repeat of NRC-style harassment”

CJP team has warned that the SR process mirrors the harassment experienced during the NRC exercise.

The organisation noted that:

• Most Form-7 complaints are false
• Many targeted voters are migrant labourers working outside Assam
• BLOs had already verified households before inclusion

CJP asserted that objections filed by outsiders without evidence should be rejected outright.

Opposition parties react

Opposition parties urged the Election Commission to ensure that no eligible voter is disenfranchised during the revision.

• The Indian National Congress (INC) lodged a police complaint in Boko-Chhaygaon against local BJP leaders and officials.
• Left parties—CPI(M), CPI(ML), CPI, SUCI, and Forward Bloc—issued a joint statement alleging that Form-7 is being used to target minorities.
• Raijor Dal leader and Sivasagar MLA Akhil Gogoi filed an FIR, citing video footage allegedly showing four individuals unlawfully operating inside the Boko co-district election office.

Earlier, opposition parties also lodged an FIR against BJP Assam president Dilip Saikia, alleging instructions to delete anti-BJP votes.

Sushmita Dev’s intervention

On January 25, 2026, TMC MP Sushmita Dev announced at a press conference: “We will file FIRs against those harassing people by misusing Form-7 and send them to jail.”

Condemning the Chief Minister’s remarks, she said: “Such comments from someone holding a constitutional position are very unfortunate.”

She further alleged that Bengali-speaking Hindus were also being misled, stating: “Like NRC, SR and later SIR will exclude more of their names.”

Claiming that 60 per cent of names in the deletion list in the Kathigara constituency are Bengali-speaking Hindus, she also criticised the show-cause notice issued to Sumana Choudhury, stating that it demonstrated the Election Commission’s political subservience.

Joint opposition press conference

On the same day, opposition leaders—including Debabrata Saikia (INC), Manoranjan Talukder (CPI-M), Akhil Gogoi (Raijor Dal), and Lurinjyoti Gogoi (Axom Jatiya Parishad)—held a joint press conference condemning communal polarisation and the conduct of the SR.

They demanded an extension of the February 2 deadline for disposal of claims and objections and accused the BJP government and the Election Commission of undermining democratic processes.

Related:

Defending Citizenship, On the Ground | CJP Assam 2025

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CJP scores big win! Citizenship restored to Mazirun Bewa, a widowed daily wage worker from Assam

Assam’s New SOP Hands Citizenship Decisions to Bureaucrats: Executive overreach or legal necessity?

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