The Immigrant Expulsion from Assam Act, 1950 (hereinafter IEAA) emerged from the unique and tumultuous socio-political landscape of post-Partition India. Enacted to address the significant influx of migrants into Assam, primarily from what was then East Bengal (later East Pakistan, and now Bangladesh), the IEAA was a legislative response to demographic shifts perceived as impacting the region’s economy and social fabric. At the time of its enactment, the general framework of the Foreigners Act, 1946, did not extend to individuals migrating from the newly formed Dominion of Pakistan, necessitating a specific statute for Assam which was experiencing a particularly acute situation.

Recently, the IEAA has been thrust into the spotlight due to interpretations suggesting it confers, or that the Supreme Court of India has affirmed its conferral of, extensive and summary expulsion powers upon district administrative authorities, such as District Collectors or Deputy Commissioners. This interpretation, notably articulated by Assam’s Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma, posits that these authorities can expel individuals deemed to be foreigners under the IEAA without recourse to the established quasi-judicial process of the Foreigners Tribunals. Such an interpretation implies a significant departure from the procedural safeguards that have evolved in Indian administrative and constitutional law concerning the determination of nationality and the profound act of deportation.

This article contends that such an interpretation is a fundamental misreading of the IEAA itself, is not substantiated by a careful analysis of the Supreme Court’s recent judgment in In Re: Section 6A of the Citizenship Act 1955 and stands in opposition to established principles of administrative law and due process.[1] This piece builds on an earlier work discussing the processes and procedures of deportation, which can be accessed here.

Far from endorsing an unfettered executive power of expulsion at the district level, the Supreme Court’s pronouncements, when read holistically, suggest an integration of the IEAA within the existing, more elaborate procedural framework for identifying and dealing with foreigners. The erratic understanding appears to arise from a selective and decontextualized reading of both the 1950 Act and the Supreme Court’s observations, potentially fuelled by a desire for more expedited executive action in a complex and sensitive domain. The timing of this re-interpretation, particularly following the Supreme Court’s judgment, suggests an attempt to leverage judicial pronouncements to legitimise a pre-existing executive inclination towards summary powers, overlooking the nuanced directives for the harmonized application of various statutes governing foreigners in Assam.

II. The Immigrant Expulsion from Assam Act, 1950: Legislative intent and provisions

An examination of the IEAA’s text is essential to understand its original scope and intended operation. The pivotal provision concerning expulsion is Section 2, titled “Power to order expulsion of certain immigrants”. This section states as follows:

2. Power to order expulsion of certain immigrants.—If the Central Government is of opinion that any person or class of persons, having been ordinarily resident in any place outside India, has or have, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, come into Assam and that the stay of such person or class of persons in Assam is detrimental to the interests of the general public of India or of any section thereof or of any Scheduled Tribe in Assam, the Central Government may by order—

(a) direct such person or class of persons to remove himself or themselves from India or Assam within such time and by such route as may be specified in the order; and

 (b) give such further directions in regard to his or their removal from India or Assam as it may consider necessary or expedient:

Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to any person who on account of civil disturbances or the fear of such disturbances in any area now forming part of Pakistan has been displaced from or has left his place of residence in such area and who has been subsequently residing in Assam.

The basis for such an order is the Central Government’s “opinion” that the continued presence of the individual or group is “detrimental” to specified public interests. While the formation of an opinion involves subjective satisfaction, in the contemporary administrative law paradigm, such satisfaction cannot be arbitrary or devoid of objective material; it remains susceptible to judicial review on grounds of mala fides, non-application of mind, or reliance on irrelevant considerations, particularly when fundamental rights—Article 14 and 21 in this case— are implicated. More on this is discussed in Part VI of this article. For now, let us get back to IEAA.

The Act further provides for the delegation of these powers. Section 3 of the IEAA, “Delegation of power,” states:

“The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that the powers and duties conferred or imposed on it by section 2 shall, subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the notification, be exercised or discharged also by—

(a) any officer subordinate to the Central Government.

(b) the Government of Assam, Meghalaya or Nagaland or any officer subordinate to that Government.”

This provision underscores that any power exercised by a District Collector or Deputy Commissioner under the IEAA would stem from a specific, conditional delegation by the Central Government. It is not an autonomous power. The nature and scope of such delegated authority are circumscribed by the conditions laid down in the notification and the parent Act itself. The claim that District Collectors inherently possess sweeping expulsion powers under the IEAA overlooks this crucial two-step process: the primary power resting with the Central Government, followed by a conditional delegation.

Furthermore, the Proviso to Section 2 of the IEAA introduces a significant qualification:

“Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to any person who on account of civil disturbances or the fear of such disturbances in any area now forming part of Pakistan has been displaced from or has left his place of residence in such area and who has been subsequently residing in Assam.”

This proviso indicates that even in 1950, the legislature intended to differentiate among categories of migrants, offering protection to those displaced due to civil disturbances. This nuanced approach undermines any interpretation of the IEAA as an indiscriminate tool for the summary expulsion of all individuals who might have entered Assam from territories that became Pakistan. It suggests a legislative intent sensitive to humanitarian concerns, even within an Act focused on expulsion.

The original legislative intent, as contextualized by the Supreme Court, was to address a specific gap: the Foreigners Act, 1946, did not initially apply to immigrants from Pakistan (as it was then) specifically, and Assam was facing a unique migratory pressure. The IEAA was thus a targeted measure for a particular historical moment, preceding the more comprehensive and procedurally detailed framework later established by the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964.

III. Decoding the Supreme Court’s Judgment in In Re: Section 6A of the Citizenship Act 1955

The Supreme Court’s judgment in In Re: Section 6A of the Citizenship Act 1955 is central to the current debate. A careful reading of the opinions of the learned judges is necessary to ascertain what the Court actually said about the IEAA and its interplay with other laws.

Chief Justice Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud’s Opinion

CJI Justice Chandrachud(as he was then), in his opinion, provided a historical overview of the IEAA, noting its enactment was prompted by the fact that the Foreigners Act, 1946, initially did not cover immigrants from Pakistan, and that the IEAA was specifically applied to Assam to deal with large-scale immigration from East Bengal. The Foreigners Act’s limitation was due to the fact that it was enacted during the British rule and the limitation was rectified via an amendment in 1957.

This historical context is vital, as it positions the IEAA as a measure designed to fill a legislative void that was subsequently addressed by more comprehensive legal frameworks.

Justice Chandrachud’s opinion, while not having any declarations over whether the IEAA survives or not, had two crucial points.

1. Parliament did not want the powers given by IEAA to be used against those who were refugees that have migrated into India in account of civil disturbances or the fear of it (Para 53).
2. The act only applied to the state of Assam meaning—not only that these powers can only be granted to the district authorities in Assam, but the exercise of these powers can also only be against the immigrants in Assam and not rest of India (Para 53). This means that forcibly transporting alleged immigrants to Assam and using IEAA to deport them is not lawful.

Justice Surya Kant’s opinion for the majority

Justice Surya Kant’s opinion, on behalf of himself and Justices M.M. Sundresh and Manoj Misra, contains several crucial points regarding the IEAA.

1. Critically, Justice Kant stated that the IEAA and the Foreigners Act, 1946, are not in conflict and, in fact, “supplement and complement each other within the framework of Section 6A” (Para 376). This statement directly counters any notion that the IEAA operates in isolation with overriding powers, suggesting instead a synergistic relationship.
2. Referencing Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India, Justice Surya Kant affirmed that the IEAA, the Foreigners Act, 1946, the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964, and the Passport Act, 1967, all apply to the State of Assam.[2] This reinforces the understanding of a composite legal framework governing foreigners in Assam, rather than the IEAA standing as a singular, overriding statute.
3. One of the key directives issued by the Bench for which Justice Surya Kant authored the opinion is: “The provisions of the Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act, 1950 shall also be read into Section 6A and shall be effectively employed for the purpose of identification of illegal immigrants. (Para 391)“ The phrasing “read into Section 6A” and “employed for the purpose of identification” strongly suggests an integrative and procedural application. Section 6A (1)(b) of the Citizenship Act, 1955 itself defines “detected to be a foreigner” by reference to the Foreigners Act, 1946 and the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964. If the IEAA were intended to provide an alternative, tribunal-exempt route for expulsion, the judgment would likely have clarified this. Instead, its use is linked to “identification,” which is a primary function leading to or forming part of the tribunal process.
4. Justice Surya Kant further opined as follows about the scope of both IEAA and the Foreigners Act, 1946:

As discussed above, IEAA is only one of the statutes that addressed a specific problem that existed in 1950. The issue of undesirable immigration in 1950 necessitated the promulgation of the IEAA and the granting of power to the Central government to expel such immigrants. On the contrary, the provisions of Section 6A have to be viewed from the focal point of 1971, when Bangladesh was formed as a new nation and an understanding was reached to grant citizenship to certain classes of immigrants who had migrated from erstwhile East Pakistan, as has been detailed in paragraphs 230 and 231 of this judgement. Hence, Section 6A, when examined from this perspective, is seen to have a different objective—one of granting citizenship to certain classes of immigrants, particularly deemed citizenship to those immigrants who came to India before 01.01.1966 and qualified citizenship, to those who came on or after 01.01.1966 and before 25.03.1971.

Since the two statutes operate in different spheres, we find no conflict existing between them. The Parliament was fully conversant with the dynamics and realities, while enacting both the Statutes. The field of operation of the two enactments being distinct and different and there being a presumption of the Legislature having informed knowledge about their consequences, we decline to hold that Section 6A is in conflict with a differently situated statute, namely the IEAA.

Instead, we are satisfied that IEAA and Section 6A can be read harmoniously along with other statutes. As held in Sarbananda Sonawal (supra), none of these Statutes exist as a standalone code but rather supplement each other. [Paras 379, 380 & 381]

Justice J.B. Pardiwala’s Opinion

Justice Pardiwala, in his dissent over the validity of Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955, touches upon IEAA but not in any substantial terms.

Collectively, these opinions affirm the continued validity and operability of the IEAA but situate its application within the broader, evolved legal framework governing foreigners. There is no explicit statement in any of the opinions that the IEAA empowers District Collectors to expel individuals based on a prima facie “opinion” without reference to the Foreigners Tribunals, nor that such an “opinion” under IEAA can substitute a tribunal’s quasi-judicial finding. Such a significant departure from the established Tribunal system, if endorsed by the Supreme Court, would have necessitated clear and unambiguous language, which is conspicuously absent.

IV. Why the Supreme Court Judgment disallows an inference of unfettered expulsion powers under IEAA, 1950

The assertion that the Supreme Court’s judgment in In Re: Section 6A  grants, or affirms, sweeping summary expulsion powers to District Collectors under the IEAA, thereby bypassing the Foreigners Tribunals, is not borne out by a careful reading of the judicial pronouncements. Several arguments counter this interpretation:

First, the judgment, particularly Justice Surya Kant’s opinion, emphasizes integration and supplementation, not supersession. The directive to “read into Section 6A” and employ the IEAA “for the purpose of identification of illegal immigrants” (Para 391(e)) implies that the IEAA is to function as a component within the broader machinery. Section 6A (1)(b) of the Citizenship Act itself defines “detected to be a foreigner” as detection “in accordance with the provisions of the Foreigners Act, 1946 and the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 by a Tribunal constituted under the said Order”. If the IEAA were to provide a parallel mechanism that bypasses this definition for expulsion purposes, the Supreme Court would have had to explicitly state that the requirement of tribunal-based detection could be circumvented under the IEAA. No such statement is made. Instead, the IEAA’s role is linked to “identification,” which is the preliminary step that often leads to a reference to a Foreigners Tribunal for a conclusive determination of status.

Second, the power delineated in Section 2 of the IEAA is primarily vested in the Central Government. While Section 3 allows for the delegation of this power, such delegation is subject to conditions specified in the notification. Crucially, delegated power cannot be exercised in a manner that contravenes fundamental due process requirements or ignores established statutory mechanisms like the Foreigners Tribunals, especially when the Supreme Court itself links the IEAA’s contemporary use to “identification” within the Section 6A framework. The scope of delegated authority cannot be broader than the power of the delegating authority when read in conjunction with other prevailing laws and constitutional mandates ensuring procedural fairness.

Third, the Supreme Court’s affirmation of the IEAA’s validity and continued operability signifies that the Act remains on the statute books and can be invoked. However, this affirmation does not translate into a license to use the Act in a manner that disregards the specialised, quasi-judicial mechanism of Foreigners Tribunals. These tribunals are specifically established for the determination of a person’s status as a foreigner – a critical determination that must precede the severe consequence of expulsion. The interpretation that “valid and operative” means “valid for summary, independent action” is a misconstruction; the Act is valid as part of the legal toolkit, not as a master key that overrides other procedural safeguards.

Fourth, the profound implications for due process and individual liberty that would arise from granting summary expulsion powers to District Collectors, bypassing tribunals, are such that if the Supreme Court intended to endorse such a system, it would have done so explicitly and with clear reasoning. The Court’s silence on this specific point, coupled with its emphasis on the integrated and complementary application of the relevant statutes, is telling. The judgment upholds the IEAA’s existence but implicitly requires its application to be harmonized with the current, more evolved procedural framework for determining foreigner status. The focus on “identification” by Justice Surya Kant (J. Surya Kant, Para 391(e)) is pivotal. Identification is typically the precursor to adjudication by a Tribunal. If the IEAA allowed a District Collector to identify and expel based solely on a “prima facie” view, as suggested by Assam CM, the elaborate and long-standing Foreigners Tribunal system in Assam would be rendered largely redundant for a significant category of cases – an outcome the Supreme Court does not appear to endorse.

V. Harmonising the IEAA 1950 with the Foreigners Act, 1946, and the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964

The Foreigners Act, 1946, particularly Section 3, empowers the Central Government to make orders, inter alia, for prohibiting, regulating, or restricting the entry of foreigners into India or their presence therein. It is under this provision that the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964, was promulgated, establishing Foreigners Tribunals specifically for the quasi-judicial determination of whether a person is a foreigner. This mechanism is central to the definition of “detected to be a foreigner” in Section 6A (1)(b) of the Citizenship Act and is frequently referenced in the Supreme Court’s judgment as the established process.

A harmonious construction, consistent with the Supreme Court’s directive to “read into Section 6A” and use the IEAA “for identification” [J. Surya Kant, Para 391(e)], would mean that information gathered or preliminary assessments made by the district administration (as a delegate of the Central Government under IEAA Section 3) could form the basis of a reference to a Foreigners Tribunal. The “opinion” of the Central Government (or its delegate) under IEAA Section 2 that a person’s stay is “detrimental,” could serve as a ground for initiating a formal inquiry or making such a reference. However, the crucial determination of foreigner status itself, which is a prerequisite for expulsion under either Act, would remain within the purview of the Foreigners Tribunals, as per the dominant legislative scheme and procedural due process.

This interpretation aligns with Justice Surya Kant’s observation that the IEAA and the Foreigners Act “supplement and complement each other”, rather than the IEAA providing an overriding, summary power that displaces the tribunal system. The Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964, provides a specific and more recent procedural mechanism for the determination of foreigner status.

The IEAA, on the other hand, is broader in identifying the class of persons who can be expelled and the ultimate executive authority responsible (the Central Government or its delegate). Harmonisation suggests that the IEAA identifies who might be subject to expulsion and by whom the ultimate executive order of expulsion might be issued, while the Foreigners Act and the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order provide the process for establishing the critical precedent fact – whether the individual is indeed a foreigner. The term “identification” used by Justice Surya Kant is distinct from “adjudication” or “declaration” of foreigner status. District administration can play a role in preliminary identification (i.e., forming a prima facie suspicion), but the quasi-judicial adjudication of that status, given its severe consequences, aligns with the specialized role of Foreigners Tribunals.

VI. Jurisprudential foundations: Due Process and limitations on executive power in expulsion

The exercise of any statutory power, particularly one as impactful as expulsion, must be viewed through the prism of India’s evolved constitutional jurisprudence. Administrative law principles, especially those concerning natural justice (audi alteram partem, rule against bias) and the requirement for reasoned decisions, have been significantly strengthened by the Supreme Court over decades. An archaic statute like the IEAA, 1950, cannot be interpreted in a vacuum, isolated from these constitutional developments. The principle of “updating construction” requires that older statutes be read, as far as possible, in conformity with later constitutional norms and human rights jurisprudence. The IEAA, therefore, must operate within the current legal environment where procedural fairness is paramount.

For example, in Hukam Chand Lal vs. Union of India, the government disconnected the person’s telephones, citing a “public emergency” due to their alleged use for illegal forward trading (satta). The Supreme Court found the disconnection unlawful.[3] It held that the authority, the Divisional Engineer, failed to apply his own mind and record his own satisfaction that an emergency existed. Instead, he acted solely on the government’s declaration. The Court ruled that such drastic powers require the designated authority to rationally form their own opinion, not just follow orders.

In S.N. Mukherjee vs. Union of India, the Supreme Court addressed whether administrative authorities must provide reasons for their decisions.[4] In this case, the Court laid down a landmark principle: the requirement to record reasons is a part of natural justice. It held that providing reasons ensures fairness, prevents arbitrariness, guarantees application of mind by the authority, and enables effective judicial review.

The determination of whether a person is a foreigner, a decision that can lead to expulsion, has profound consequences for individual liberty, family life, and personal security. Such a determination inherently demands a fair, transparent, and quasi-judicial process. To contend that the IEAA allows for summary expulsion based solely on an executive “opinion,” without a quasi-judicial hearing by a specialized body like a Foreigners Tribunal, would be to argue for a procedure that is likely to be deemed arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. Article 21 guarantees that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law, and such procedure must be fair, just, and reasonable.

The very establishment and continued strengthening of the Foreigners Tribunal system over several decades signifies a legislative and judicial recognition that determining foreigner status is a complex matter requiring a specialized, quasi-judicial approach. While there are issues with the current system of foreigner tribunals, the way is not to go backward in terms of procedural fairness but to move forward to make processes fairer. This evolution points away from purely executive determinations of such critical facts, especially when a statutory framework for quasi-judicial assessment is in place.

VII. Conclusion: Upholding the rule of law and procedural propriety

The analysis of the Immigrant Expulsion from Assam Act, 1950, the relevant provisions of the Foreigners Act, 1946, the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964, and the Supreme Court’s judgment in In Re: Section 6A of the Citizenship Act 1955  leads to the firm conclusion that the IEAA does not confer unfettered, summary expulsion powers upon district administrative authorities that would allow them to bypass the established quasi-judicial framework of the Foreigners Tribunals.

The Supreme Court’s judgment, far from endorsing such an interpretation, supports an integrated and harmonized application of these statutes. Justice Surya Kant’s directive to “read into Section 6A” and employ the IEAA “for the purpose of identification of illegal immigrants” [ J. Surya Kant, Para 391(e)] indicates that the IEAA is to be used as a tool within the broader framework, likely to initiate inquiries or make references to the Foreigners Tribunals, which remain the designated bodies for the quasi-judicial determination of a person’s status as a foreigner. This interpretation is consistent with the principle that specific procedural statutes (like the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order) govern the determination process, while the IEAA may provide grounds or identify the authority for expulsion once such determination is made.

The constitutional imperatives of due process, enshrined in Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, mandate that any action as severe as determining nationality and ordering expulsion must be preceded by a fair and just procedure. In the context of Assam, this procedure is embodied in the Foreigners Tribunal system. Any interpretation that suggests the IEAA allows District Collectors to unilaterally form an “opinion” and expel individuals without recourse to these tribunals is not only a misreading of the Supreme Court’s recent judgment but also runs contrary to the evolution of administrative and constitutional law in India. Such an approach would be detrimental to the rule of law and could lead to arbitrary outcomes, eroding public trust in the legal system’s ability to handle complex immigration issues with fairness and consistency.

The constitutionally appropriate approach is for the district administration—acting under powers delegated by the Central Government, including those under the IEAA—to identify suspected illegal immigrants and refer their cases to the Foreigners Tribunals for a quasi-judicial determination of status. Deportation may then proceed in accordance with established legal procedures, which you can read about here. This ensures a balance between the state’s legitimate interest in managing immigration and its constitutional obligation to uphold the rule of law and procedural fairness.

(The author is part of the legal research team of the organisation)

[1] 2024 INSC 789

[2] (2005) 5 SCC 665

[3] AIR 1976 SUPREME COURT 789

[4] 1990 (4) SCC 564

Related:

Gauhati HC questions legal basis of re-detention of bail-compliant detainee, orders verification of police attendance record

Seeking sanctuary, facing scrutiny: Why India must revisit its approach to the displaced

Gauhati HC: Union government admits Samsul Ali was handed over to BSF, Court grants family visitation rights if not yet deported

Holding centres, missing memos, and silent transfers: Gauhati HC hears 5 petitions filed by families of Bengali-speaking Muslim detainees in Assam

India: A deep dive into the legal obligations before “deportation”

CJP submits supplementary memo to NHRC with survivor and family testimonies on Assam’s expulsions of Bengali-speaking Muslims

The post The contested interpretation of the Immigrant Expulsion from Assam Act, 1950 appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Demolition drives

1. Ashok Vihar demolitions, Delhi: Bulldozers arrive at dawn

In a sweeping demolition drive, a special task force accompanied by a heavy police and paramilitary presence razed over 300 jhuggis (slum dwellings) in the Ashok Vihar area of North Delhi on a Monday morning. The operation, led by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) on June 16, targeted more than 200 structures in the densely populated Jailorwala Bagh slum cluster.

The demolition began early in the day, with authorities barricading access roads and deploying multiple bulldozers and personnel from various departments. According to the DDA, the operation exclusively targeted jhuggis whose occupants had already been allocated flats under the in-situ Jailorwala Bagh rehabilitation project or were deemed ineligible under the housing policy. Officials claimed that slums protected by court orders were left untouched.

The official line: The DDA defended the demolition as a lawful and necessary step, claiming that 1,078 families had already been resettled in newly constructed 1BHK flats on the same site. These apartments, developed at a cost of ₹421 crore and valued at ₹25 lakh each, were made available to the rehabilitated families for a highly subsidised rate of ₹1.4 lakh. Another 567 households were declared ineligible based on policy guidelines.

Eligibility, according to the Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board (DUSIB), depended on two criteria: inclusion in the 2012–2015 voter rolls and possession of at least one of twelve identity documents — such as a ration card, electricity bill, passport, or bank passbook. Disqualified families included those residing on upper floors without separate documentation, minors, and individuals who used their jhuggis for commercial purposes before January 1, 2015.

Authorities also pointed out that nine families successfully contested their rejection and were subsequently allotted homes via a lottery system. As per Times of India, DDA spokesperson asserted, “Due process was followed. We respected all High Court stay orders. The demolitions were confined to those already rehabilitated or found ineligible.”

Hundreds still without shelter: Despite these assurances, ground reports and testimonies from affected residents painted a more distressing picture. Multiple media reports, including The Indian Express, alleged they had been left out of the allotment process despite decades of residence and valid documentation. Rama Devi, a relative of one of the evicted residents, said, “Only about 1,000 families got flats. More than 500 families are still shelterless. We’ve been here for decades, working as street vendors and domestic workers. Now we are evicted without compensation or alternative housing.” Others voiced concerns about the conditions in the newly allotted apartments.

Simultaneous demolitions in Wazirpur: While Ashok Vihar was in the headlines, another anti-encroachment drive was underway in Wazirpur, where the Indian Railways removed hundreds of dwellings built along the tracks. Officials cited safety concerns, such as children playing dangerously close to railway lines and reduced visibility for train drivers. The operation marked the second major clearance in the area within a month.

Security was tight, with police and two companies of paramilitary personnel deployed to prevent any unrest. Officials reported that around 308 illegal dwellings were cleared during the operation.

A pattern emerges: The demolition at Ashok Vihar is only one instance in a broader series of evictions taking place across Delhi. In recent weeks, similar drives were carried out in Bhoomiheen Camp, Madrasi Camp, and most recently in Patel Nagar — where nearly 450 jhuggis were razed on June 11. These actions point to what housing rights activists call an escalating city-wide campaign to remove informal settlements under the guise of “urban renewal.”

The demolitions have sparked sharp political reactions. Former Delhi Chief Minister and Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) leader Arvind Kejriwal took to social media to accuse the BJP-led DDA of reneging on its promise of “Jahan Jhuggi, Wahan Makaan” (where there’s a slum, there’ll be a home). “What does the BJP want — to erase every slum in Delhi? Why did the Prime Minister lie during elections?” former CM Kejriwal posted on X.

आख़िर बीजेपी चाहती क्या है? क्या दिल्ली की सभी झुग्गियाँ तोड़ना चाहती है? तो फिर मोदी जी ने क्या चुनाव के वक्त झूठ बोला था – जहाँ झुग्गी, वहाँ मकान? https://t.co/kE6CLFVwiJ

— Arvind Kejriwal (@ArvindKejriwal) June 16, 2025

AAP’s Delhi unit chief Saurabh Bharadwaj echoed the criticism, alleging betrayal and mass displacement.

भाजपा की सरकार जबसे आई है दिल्ली में गरीबों के घर और रोज़गार दोनों उजाड़े जा रहे है ।

मुख्यमंत्री रेखा गुप्ता पंजाब भ्रमण में लगी हुई हैं और यहाँ दिल्ली में रोज़ बुलडोज़र चलाया जा रहा हैं।

रेखा गुप्ता जी बतायें कि इन ग़रीब लोगों को उजाड़ने से पहले घर कहाँ दिए गए हैं ?

केंद्र… pic.twitter.com/ySJzhSXtXl

— Saurabh Bharadwaj (@Saurabh_MLAgk) June 16, 2025

Former AAP MLA Akhilesh Pati Tripathi was detained by police while protesting against the Wazirpur demolition, further fuelling the political controversy.

भाजपा सरकार के बुलडोज़र का विरोध करने पर पूर्व विधायक अखिलेश पति त्रिपाठी पुलिस की हिरासत में लिए गए

भाजपा सरकार लगातार गरीबों के घरों पर बुलडोज़र चला रही है । pic.twitter.com/y9m3HpWZF1

— Saurabh Bharadwaj (@Saurabh_MLAgk) June 16, 2025

Congress calls for ordinance, cites precedent: As per the Hindustan Times, the Delhi Congress had called on the city’s BJP administration to bring in an ordinance to immediately halt all demolition of slum clusters. Drawing a parallel with a similar move by the Sheila Dikshit-led Congress government in 2011, party leaders said such a step is necessary to prevent a humanitarian disaster.

“Just as the 2011 ordinance saved lakhs of homes, the current BJP government should pass one urgently to protect the poor from becoming homeless,” said Delhi Congress president Devender Yadav, after visiting displaced families in Govindpuri — where nearly 350 homes were bulldozed.

Yadav further alleged that widespread corruption and administrative apathy had excluded long-time residents from the eligibility survey. “People who’ve lived here for 30–40 years were left out deliberately. This, despite court orders in their favour,” he said, as per the HT report. “The BJP doesn’t want to end poverty — it wants to eliminate the poor from the city.”

2. Jamnagar, Gujarat: 7.74 lakh sq. ft. of government land cleared; structure under probe

In Jamnagar, Gujarat, authorities carried out an extensive demolition drive in the Bacchunagar area on June 15, clearing nearly 7.74 lakh square feet of what they described as illegally occupied government land. The cleared land, estimated to be worth approximately ₹193 crore, was reclaimed by a joint operation involving the Jamnagar district administration and police, amid tight security and logistical coordination.

During the course of the operation, as per the report of India Today, officials came across a large structure concealed from public view. Spread over 11,000 square feet, the structure bore the features of a religious site (dargah), and was built with marble flooring, several rooms, and a specially equipped bathing facility. The high-value construction, reportedly erected without authorisation, immediately drew the attention of the district authorities.

The Superintendent of Police, Premsukh Delu, stated that while there were signboards prohibiting donations and access to outsiders, the source of funding for the construction remains unclear. “The nature of the building and its lack of transparency regarding access or finance has raised suspicion. We are currently investigating whether the structure was being used for activities beyond religious purposes,” Delu said, as per Times of India.

A formal inquiry has been initiated to determine ownership, the legality of the construction, and potential links to unlawful activities, if any. Authorities have stated that the building was not listed in official land use records and had no apparent legal sanction for occupation of public land.

This operation is part of a wider effort by the Gujarat administration to remove what it categorises as unauthorised encroachments on state-owned land. The Jamnagar district collectorate has said that further reviews of government land titles in the region are underway, and additional demolitions may follow if more violations are identified.

3. Govindpuri, Delhi: 300+ jhuggis demolished amid heatwave

In the early hours of June 11, 2025, bulldozers rolled into Bhoomiheen Camp, a longstanding informal settlement in Govindpuri, South-East Delhi, as part of a demolition operation conducted by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA). The drive began around 5:00 a.m., catching many residents off guard. By noon, under a red alert heatwave with temperatures exceeding 45°C, hundreds of families were left out in the open, their homes razed to the ground.

DDA cites court orders, says most structures were ‘uninhabited’: As per the report of The Hindu, the DDA claimed that the demolition was carried out strictly on government land encroached by 344 jhuggi structures. In its statement, the authority said that notices were issued on June 9, giving a three-day window for residents to vacate. The DDA further stated that no court stay order was in effect, and that many of the demolished structures were “uninhabited.”

However, visuals from the ground and testimonies from residents contradicted these assertions, with dozens of families scrambling to retrieve belongings as their homes were torn down. Many affected families are migrant workers and daily-wage earners who have been living in the camp for years, some for decades.

AAP questions BJP-led government’s credibility: The demolition triggered immediate political backlash. Atishi, senior AAP leader and Leader of Opposition in the Delhi Assembly, directly called out Chief Minister Rekha Gupta, questioning her credibility. In a pointed post on X (formerly Twitter), she wrote:

“BJP’s bulldozer started running in the Bhoomiheen camp from 5 a.m. this morning. Rekha Gupta — you said three days ago that not even a single slum would be demolished. Then why are bulldozers running here?”

ग़रीब विरोधी पार्टी है बीजेपी

मुख्यमंत्री रेखा गुप्ता जी ने कहा था, दिल्ली में एक भी झुग्गी को छुआ तक नहीं जाएगा लेकिन आज यहां भूमिहीन कैंप पर सुबह 5 बजे से बुलडोजर चल रहा है।

बीजेपी की DDA और दिल्ली सरकार ने कोर्ट में अपने बड़े-बड़े वकील इन गरीबों के ख़िलाफ़ खड़े किए और कहा… pic.twitter.com/ob2PNKrGcj

— AAP (@AamAadmiParty) June 11, 2025

ये है भाजपा का असली चेहरा।

गरीबों से वोट लेकर फिर उन्हें ही बेघर कर देना। सुबह 5 बजे बुलडोज़र लेकर भूमिहीन कैंप पहुँची बीजेपी सरकार ने हज़ारों गरीबों के आशियाने उजाड़ दिए। बीजेपी को न गरीबों की परवाह है, न इंसानियत की।

बीजेपी का ‘जहां झुग्गी-वहां मकान’ का वादा अब ‘जहां… pic.twitter.com/GseSRgiz2H

— Atishi (@AtishiAAP) June 11, 2025

Former CM Atishi had visited the Bhoomiheen Camp the previous day and was reportedly detained by police while meeting residents, though police later denied the detention.

In response, Chief Minister Rekha Gupta reiterated that the state government could not defy court-directed demolitions, and maintained that alternative accommodation had been provided. However, no data was shared about how many residents had actually been rehabilitated before the eviction.

The timing of the demolition — amid a red alert heatwave issued by the India Meteorological Department — had drawn condemnation. The IMD’s red alert for Delhi explicitly warned of potential “heat illness and heatstroke in all age groups”, particularly for people without access to adequate shelter.

4. Jangpura, Delhi: 50-Year-Old Madrasi camp demolished, over 150 families left without homes

On June 1, 2025, authorities demolished the decades-old Madrasi Camp settlement in Jangpura, South Delhi, displacing hundreds of Tamil-origin residents who had lived there for over five decades. The demolition was carried out in compliance with a Delhi High Court order citing flood risk concerns ahead of the monsoon, as the settlement was situated along the Barapullah drain.

The cluster had become a well-established working-class neighbourhood, housing 370 families, many of whom worked in the informal economy and public services. But as bulldozers flattened the area, questions have emerged over the legality, adequacy, and humanity of the rehabilitation process — and whether the state’s actions respected the displaced community’s rights.

Government claims vs ground reality: In the immediate aftermath of the demolition, Delhi Chief Minister Rekha Gupta defended the operation, stating to the media that, “No one can defy court orders. Residents of that camp have been allotted houses and shifted.”

However, examination of the figures contradicts the government’s blanket assurance of rehabilitation. As per the report of The Wire, while the state claimed that all affected households were relocated to EWS (Economically Weaker Section) flats in Narela, only 189 of the 370 families were initially allotted flats. A further 26 families were later given accommodations. That leaves at least 155 families — over 40% of the entire community — without any alternative shelter.

These residents have been rendered homeless despite having lived in the settlement for decades, raising serious questions about the eligibility criteria, the documentation required, and whether the state fulfilled its legal obligation to ensure prior resettlement before demolition, as per judicial precedents and guidelines laid down in various Supreme Court judgments.

Historical and social context ignored: Madrasi Camp had been one of Delhi’s oldest informal settlements, inhabited primarily by Tamil-speaking Dalit and working-class communities, many of whom had migrated during the 1970s and 1980s for employment in the city. Despite their long-standing presence, residents alleged that they were not given sufficient prior notice, and that the verification process for rehabilitation was flawed and opaque, leaving hundreds ineligible due to technicalities.

The lack of transparency, participation, and timely redressal in these drives has raised serious concerns about the urban poor’s right to housing, especially in a city where informal settlements often fill the vacuum left by inadequate public housing policies.

5. Greater Noida, Uttar Pradesh: GNIDA plans demolition of over 20 alleged informal colonies

The Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority (GNIDA) has announced a major demolition campaign targeting more than 20 alleged informal settlements and unauthorised constructions across its jurisdiction. The clearance drive, expected to begin in late June or early July 2025, will be carried out jointly with the district administration and police, and will involve heavy machinery and on-ground security deployment.

While officials describe the campaign as a necessary step to “bring discipline and fairness in land use”, local activists and housing rights groups have raised concerns over the absence of rehabilitation guarantees or transparency in verifying whether affected residents were knowingly complicit in the alleged violations.

According to GNIDA’s Additional CEO, Sumit Yadav, the authority has prepared a ward-wise list of all areas marked for action. “Despite regular advisories and warnings, illegal colonies have continued to proliferate,” Yadav said as per a HT report, adding that earthmovers will be used to clear structures built without formal approval.

Many of the settlements now facing demolition were established after agricultural land was illegally sold and converted into residential plots by private colonisers — often without informing buyers that the land was not approved for habitation under the city’s master plan. Residents, many of whom have invested their life savings, now face eviction without clarity on alternative arrangements or accountability for the fraudulent transactions.

GNIDA claims that it acquires land from farmers under planned urban development schemes, in accordance with a notified master plan that demarcates zones for roads, utilities, and various types of land use. “Plots are meant to be allocated for approved residential, industrial, institutional, and commercial purposes. But certain colonisers have been subverting this by carving out unauthorised colonies and misleading buyers,” a senior official said, according to the HT report.

The authority said the decision to launch this campaign was taken after a recent inter-departmental strategy meeting, and that strict action would be taken not only against settlers but also against land mafias and intermediaries involved in the unauthorised conversion and sale of land.

In response to anticipated backlash, the authority has urged citizens to verify land status before purchasing plots, pointing them to the GNIDA website and land records department for ownership and land use verification. However, critics argue that such post-facto advisories offer little solace to low-income buyers now facing homelessness.

The upcoming clearance operation forms part of a wider pattern of urban land enforcement seen across Indian cities, where rapid development pressures and speculative real estate markets have frequently clashed with housing rights and the reality of widespread informal urbanisation.

Cases concerning demolitions before Courts:

1. Supreme Court upholds Bombay HC’s demolition order in case involving land mafia and illegal construction

In a significant development, the Supreme Court on June 17, 2025, upheld the Bombay High Court’s interim order directing the demolition of 17 illegally constructed buildings in Thane, Maharashtra—structures alleged to have been built by builders with links to the underworld, and without any sanction or ownership over the land.

A bench comprising Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Manmohan dismissed a special leave petition filed by a flat purchaser who contended that she and other innocent buyers—over 400 families—were being rendered homeless despite no wrongdoing on their part. The petitioner also highlighted that she was a senior citizen who had made representations to multiple state authorities, including the Chief Minister, but had received no redressal.

However, the Court declined to intervene, observing that the buildings were constructed on third-party land without any approvals, and backed the Bombay High Court’s strong stance against what it described as a “land mafia” operation that had flourished due to state inaction and complicity.

As per LiveLaw, Justice Manmohan had remarked: “Kudos to the High Court for taking a right decision… there is no rule of law when such massive illegal constructions come up with underworld backing. Unless action is taken against these unscrupulous builders, this will continue — people will keep fighting gorilla battles using the shoulders of innocent buyers. That must stop.”

Justice Bhuyan questioned how individuals were able to purchase flats in such projects without proper documentation, suggesting buyers must seek redress against the builders in appropriate forums.

Notably, the Bombay High Court, in its June 12 order, had acknowledged the plight of the petitioner but noted that: “Such construction could not have come up except with the blessings of the government and municipal officers… It is shocking that such brazen illegalities were allowed to persist, ultimately defrauding innocent flat purchasers.”

The High Court had empowered the Thane Municipal Corporation (TMC) to proceed with the demolition without waiting for further orders, given the scale of illegality and the urgency of reclaiming the encroached land. The original writ petition in the High Court was filed by a woman who claimed ownership over the encroached land, and alleged that unauthorised five-storey structures had been erected by the land mafia in violation of planning laws. Although the petitioner before the Supreme Court was allowed to withdraw the plea with liberty to approach the High Court, the interim demolition order continues to stand, signalling a tough judicial posture against illegal construction and official collusion.

2. Supreme Court stays Dargah demolition for 7 days, allows trust to seek recall of Bombay HC order

In a significant intervention on June 17, the Supreme Court stayed the demolition of a disputed dargah structure in Thane for a period of seven days, offering a limited but crucial window of relief to the Pardeshi Baba Trust, which has been locked in a long-standing legal battle over the structure’s legality. A vacation bench of Justices Sandeep Mehta and Prasanna B Varale passed the interim order while hearing a special leave petition challenging the Bombay High Court’s recent demolition directive.

The case centres on a shrine in Thane, which, according to official records and court proceedings, originally occupied just 160 square feet. Over the years, the structure is alleged to have expanded without necessary municipal approvals, eventually occupying a built-up area of over 17,610 square feet. The land itself is private, and the expansion has been challenged by the original landowner, setting off a prolonged legal conflict that has played out across multiple forums over the last two decades.

In its recent order, the Bombay High Court had strongly rebuked both the Trust and the Thane Municipal Corporation (TMC). Asper LiveLaw, the High Court labelled the Trust’s actions as “unscrupulous” and accused the civic body of filing “evasive affidavits.” The court directed the demolition of all unauthorised portions of the structure, expressing frustration at what it viewed as blatant land encroachment under the pretext of religious activity. The TMC had earlier filed reports confirming that the expansion had taken place without planning permission and that certain parts of the structure had been rebuilt even after prior demolition action was initiated.

Pardeshi Baba Trust contests order, cites omitted Civil Suit dismissal: Appearing for the Pardeshi Baba Trust, Senior Advocate Huzefa Ahmadi submitted that the Bombay High Court had failed to consider a crucial fact—the dismissal of a related civil suit in April 2025. According to Ahmadi, the Trust had informed the High Court about the suit in its pleadings, but the High Court neither referred to it nor addressed its implications in the demolition order. He argued that the High Court’s failure to engage with this material development severely undermined the fairness of the demolition directive.

According to the report of LiveLaw, Ahmadi also challenged the extent of the alleged encroachment. He contended that the High Court had mistakenly assumed the entire 17,610 sq. ft. to be illegal construction, while in fact, the dispute pertained to only 3,600 sq. ft. He further accused the landowner of exaggerating the extent of the unauthorised area and argued that the demolition order went well beyond the scope of the writ petition.

On the other side, Senior Advocate Madhavi Divan, appearing for the private landowner, strongly defended the High Court’s conclusions. She said the Trust had engaged in a deliberate and systematic land grab under the guise of religion and that the High Court’s remarks were justified. She pointed to municipal inspection reports and photographic evidence showing that the illegal portions had not only been constructed without approval, but some had also been rebuilt in contempt of earlier orders. Divan also accused the Trust of playing procedural games to delay enforcement and shield the encroachment.

Supreme Court criticises omission, offers limited relief: After hearing both sides, the Supreme Court bench expressed concern about procedural irregularities, particularly the Trust’s claim that the High Court had failed to consider the dismissal of the civil suit. Justice Sandeep Mehta called this omission “embarrassing” and noted that had the High Court been made fully aware of the civil proceedings’ outcome, its decision might have been different.

“We propose to give them permission to file a recall in view of the fact that the High Court seems to have omitted to consider the fact of the disposal of the suit,” the bench observed orally during the hearing, as reported by LiveLaw.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court allowed the Trust to approach the Bombay High Court with a recall application and ordered that the demolition be paused for a period of seven days to allow this process to unfold. The Court clarified that it was not deciding on the legality of the construction but only intervening on procedural grounds. It also left open the possibility for the Trust to return to the Supreme Court if the High Court declines to entertain the recall application. The Court made it clear that no further demolition would take place during this interim window. The legal status of the structure, the extent of unauthorised construction, and the validity of past permissions, if any, remain to be conclusively decided.

3. Bombay High Court slaps ₹1 lakh cost on journalist for PIL against SRA Project

On June 17, 2025, the Bombay High Court imposed ₹1 lakh in costs on petitioner Ankush Jaiswal, a self-proclaimed electronic media journalist, for filing a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) seeking the demolition of a Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA) project in Kandivali (East), Mumbai, which the court deemed to be a gross abuse of the legal process.

A division bench of Chief Justice Alok Aradhe and Justice Sandeep V. Marne found that the PIL lacked any genuine public interest and was barred by the doctrine of res judicata, since a similar plea filed by the same petitioner had already been dismissed by another bench in September 2022.

The impugned building—comprising six wings—is part of the Bandongri Ekta Cooperative Housing Society Ltd., developed under the SRA scheme. Jaiswal alleged multiple regulatory violations, including failure to maintain statutory distance from the National Highway and non-obtaining of requisite No-Objection Certificates (NOCs) prior to construction.

However, as per LiveLaw, the bench took serious note of the fact that:

• The petitioner approached the court 22 years after the project’s completion,
• He himself resides in the same SRA building that he claimed was “dangerous to life”,
• And that the rehabilitated slum dwellers would be rendered homeless if the court were to entertain such a plea.

The Court remarked that the PIL amounted to a “serious violation of the constitutional guarantee of shelter” for those already rehabilitated and questioned whether Jaiswal sought to push residents back onto the streets under the guise of public interest.

According to LiveLaw, dismissing the petition, the bench observed:

“The petition is an abuse of process. The plea is devoid of public interest and suffers from the bar of res judicata. It is not the function of the court to unsettle rehabilitation that has been completed decades ago, especially at the instance of one who continues to reside in the very building he attacks.”

The Court directed that the cost be recovered from the ₹1 lakh deposit previously made by the petitioner to demonstrate his bona fides, and the sum be transferred to the Maharashtra State Legal Services Authority (MSLSA).

4. Telangana High Court stays demolition of shopping complex adjacent to Peddapalli Government Hospital

On June 17, 2025, the Telangana High Court passed an interim order suspending the proposed demolition of a shopping complex adjacent to the Peddapalli Government Hospital, offering relief to the petitioner, Kishan Prakash Jhawer, who had filed a writ petition challenging the notice of eviction issued to him by state authorities.

Justice K. Sarath granted the stay after hearing arguments that the demolition was arbitrary, politically motivated, and unsupported by legal justification.

Background of the case

• The petitioner entered into a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) agreement with the Medical Department in 2007, granting him rights to operate the shopping complex for 25 years.
• On May 22, 2025, authorities issued a notice asking the petitioner to vacate the premises.
• The petitioner’s counsel, Deepak Misra, argued that this notice was based on oral instructions from the local MLA, with no legal basis.
• He also highlighted that separate proceedings were initiated in July 2024 for demolition and reconstruction of the dilapidated hospital building, not the shopping complex.

Petitioner’s arguments

• The notice lacked legal authority and cited no formal decision or government order mandating the shopping complex’s demolition.
• The shopping complex was an independent structure, not part of the old hospital building slated for reconstruction.
• The impugned action was arbitrary, motivated by political influence, and violative of contractual rights under the BOT lease.

Court’s order: Justice K. Sarath observed that a prima facie case was made out by the petitioner and stayed the proposed demolition until further hearing.

The Court emphasised that demolition of a separate, lawfully leased structure under the pretext of hospital redevelopment requires proper legal procedure, and politically driven oral instructions cannot override statutory contracts.

5. Delhi High Court grants interim relief against demolition in Batla House

On June 16, 2025, the Delhi High Court granted interim protection against demolition to six properties in the Batla House locality of Okhla, South East Delhi, in response to petitions filed by residents challenging the legality of notices issued by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA).

Justice Tejas Karia directed that status quo be maintained until the next date of hearing and issued notice to the DDA, requiring a response within four weeks. The matter is scheduled for hearing on July 10, 2025, before the roster bench.

Background of the Dispute: The petitioners — Heena Parveen, Jinat Kausar, Rukhsana Begam, Nihal Fatima, Sufiyan Ahmed, Sajid Fakhar, among others — approached the Court after receiving generic demolition notices from DDA in May 2025, targeting properties allegedly situated within Khasra Number 279.

Their core arguments included:

• Lack of demarcation: Petitioners argued that not all properties within Khasra No. 279 are illegal, and some lie outside its boundary. The DDA had failed to provide precise demarcation or individualised assessment in the notices.
• PM-UDAY scheme coverage: Several petitioners claimed their properties were covered under the PM-UDAY scheme, which provides a framework for legalising unauthorized colonies in Delhi.
• Historic occupancy: Some petitioners, such as Nihal Fatima, claimed residence in the area since 1980–82, asserting that the structures were purchased from builders and were supported by documents — albeit some in Urdu and Farsi, which were later translated.

DDA’s stand and Supreme Court reference: The DDA’s standing counsel opposed the plea, arguing that the demarcation report had already been submitted before the Supreme Court, and a demolition order dated June 4, 2025, was passed based on that.

However, the High Court referred to the Supreme Court’s earlier order of May 7, which clarified that occupants were free to seek appropriate legal remedies, thereby legitimising the High Court’s jurisdiction in entertaining the present petitions.

The Court also referenced a June 4 order in Ishrat Jahan’s case, where it had directed the DDA to file a detailed affidavit on demarcation and proposed action, due within three weeks.

Related:

Bulldozer Justice: How Unlawful Demolitions are Targeting India’s Marginalised Communities

India: A deep dive into the legal obligations before “deportation”

Public officials must face accountability for unlawful demolition actions, rule of law to be upheld: Supreme Court

Bulldozer Justice: SC orders Rs 25 Lakhs interim Compensation for illegal demolition by UP Govt in 2019

The post Razed to the ground, taken to Court: The legal and social fallout of India’s demolition drives appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: Chief Justice B.R. Gavai and Justice Augustine George Masih

Date of Order: May 22, 2025

A system on trial

In a powerful assertion of personal liberty over procedural inertia, the Supreme Court of India intervened to grant bail to Lakshya Tawar, a man whose plea for release had been adjourned an astonishing 27 times by the Allahabad High Court. Having already spent over four years in detention, Tawar’s case became a flashpoint for judicial delay. The apex court’s decision was not a commentary on the merits of the criminal allegations against Tawar but a sharp rebuke of a system that allowed a bail hearing—a matter of fundamental rights—to languish indefinitely. “In matters of personal liberty,” the bench led by Chief Justice Gavaideclared in its order, “the High Courts are not expected to keep the matter pending for such a long time and do nothing, except for adjourning from time to time.”^[1] The ruling serves as a critical case study on the judiciary’s role as the ultimate guardian of Article 21 and the dire consequences when procedural delays effectively negate the right to a timely hearing.

The factual background: A labyrinth of deferrals

Lakshya Tawar was arrested, facing serious charges of cheating, forgery, criminal conspiracy under the Indian Penal Code, and corruption under the Prevention of Corruption Act. His bail application was filed in the Allahabad High Court.

What followed was not a swift adjudication but a cycle of repeated deferrals. Over the course of his plea, the matter was adjourned 27 times. During the proceedings, the High Court took note of Tawar’s “long criminal history of thirty-three cases” and, in its order of March 20, 2025, adjourned the case for another two weeks. It directed the trial court to first record the evidence of the complainant before it would reconsider the bail plea. While this might appear as a measure of due diligence, for a man already incarcerated for four years, it represented yet another hurdle in a seemingly endless procedural maze. It was this pattern of delay that propelled the case to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court’s intervention: A decisive rebuke

On May 22, 2025, the Supreme Court expressed its unequivocal disapproval. “How can the high court adjourn a bail hearing 27 times in a matter related to personal liberty?” Chief Justice Gavai pointedly asked. The Court noted that it would “normally not have entertained the matter” challenging adjournments, but the “peculiar facts and circumstances” of this case, namely the extraordinary number of deferrals, demanded an exception.

The Supreme Court’s decision to grant bail was based on a confluence of factors:

1. The Egregious Delay: The 27 adjournments were the primary catalyst, which the Court viewed as a de facto denial of justice.
2. Prolonged Incarceration: Tawar had already been imprisoned for over four years.
3. Fulfilment of High Court’s Condition: The complainant’s evidence—the very reason for the High Court’s last adjournment—had since been recorded.

Finding the High Court’s inaction indefensible, the Supreme Court directly granted bail to Tawar, rendering the application pending before the Allahabad High Court “infructuous.” By doing so, it sent a powerful signal that procedural failings impinging on fundamental rights would not be tolerated.

Upholding the spirit of Article 21

This case is a potent illustration of Article 21 of the Constitution, which guarantees that no person shall be deprived of their life or personal liberty “except according to procedure established by law.” The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, notably in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, has established that this procedure must be “just, fair, and reasonable.” The right to a speedy trial, articulated in Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, is a cornerstone of this principle.

The Tawar judgment extends this logic forcefully to pre-trial proceedings. Indefinite detention caused by the repeated adjournment of a bail hearing is a clear violation of fair procedure. By intervening, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that judicial discretion in managing dockets is not absolute and cannot be exercised in a manner that erodes fundamental rights. The maxim “justice delayed is justice denied” is rarely more applicable than when an individual’s liberty is suspended in a state of indefinite judicial limbo. However, whether the Supreme Court and judiciary as a whole will apply this standard in dealing with the delayed bail for political prisoners, especially in the context of cases like Umar Khalid’s is a question that is yet to be answered.

(The author is part of the legal research team of the organisation)

^[1] Para 5, Lakshya Tawar v. CBI[SLP(Crl.) No. 5480/2025

Related:

“Illegal detention cannot be allowed even for a minute”: Gauhati HC orders release of Goalpara man picked up despite complying with bail conditions

SC’s denial of bail to journalist Rupesh Singh once again showcases how the Court looks at bail under UAPA, with varying consistency

The post SC intervenes for personal liberty after HC adjourns a bail application 27 times! appeared first on SabrangIndia.

On June 16, the Gauhati High Court declined to grant interim protection in the petition filed by Torap Ali, but directed the Standing Counsel for the Foreigners Tribunal to obtain a verification report from the concerned police station regarding whether the two detained persons — Abu Bakkar and Akbar Ali — were complying with the weekly reporting conditions of their COVID-era bail prior to being picked up again by Assam Border Police on May 24, 2025.

This crucial direction, focusing on attendance verification, may determine the legality of their continued detention — especially if it is shown that the men were fulfilling the conditions set out in their 2020–21 bail orders issued under the Supreme Court’s directions. The said order was delivered by the Division Bench of Justices Kalyan Rai Surana and Malasri Nandi during the third hearing of the said matter.

As the matter was taken up, the Standing Counsel for the Foreigners Tribunal requested two additional days to file the State’s affidavit, explaining that instructions were awaited. The Court granted this request and listed the matter for June 20, 2025.

The petitioner’s counsel requested that the Court clarify that no deportation or further adverse action should take place until the affidavit is filed and the matter heard. However, the Court declined to grant protection, after learning that the FT declaration had earlier been challenged and dismissed, and that no fresh challenge had been filed prior to the detention. The Court observed that it could only grant such protection in cases whether the foreigner status was being challenged.

Despite refusing interim protection, the Court gave a key procedural direction: it instructed the FT counsel to obtain particulars from the concerned police station regarding whether the detainees, who were earlier released on bail, had been complying with their reporting obligations.

This police verification is now central to the next phase of the case — as bail compliance under judicially issued orders may raise serious questions about whether the re-arrest and continued detention were in violation of due process.

The June 16 order may be read below.

Why attendance matters?

Both Abu Bakkar and Akbar Ali, residents of Bhukuradia village, Kamrup district, had been declared foreigners by FT No. 4, Kamrup in 2017. They were subsequently detained and later granted bail during the COVID-19 pandemic, after having completed over two years in custody — under guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in Suo Motu WP(C) 1/2020 and adopted by the Gauhati High Court.

Their bail conditions required them to report weekly to the local police station — a compliance regime that many of the now detainees have followed for years without breach.

In the petition filed by their nephew Torap Ali, it was asserted that both men had been faithfully reporting to the police station every week, and that there had been no cancellation of bail or fresh order of detention prior to May 24 — the date they were suddenly picked up from their residence at night by Border Police without any arrest memo or warrant.

If the police attendance register shows that they were reporting as required up to May 2025, the State may face questions on whether the re-arrest was in complete violation of lawful bail protections, and whether procedural safeguards under Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution were ignored.

It is essential to note that the High Court’s direction in Torap Ali case to verify police station attendance mirrors the decisive factor that led to relief in the Mozida Begum v. Union of India and ors case that was issued by the Gauhati High Court in the same day. In that matter, the detainee — Hachinur @ Hasinur — was released from custody after the Gauhati High Court found that he had been complying with the weekly police reporting conditions of his COVID-era bail. The Court held that re-arresting a bail-compliant individual without cancelling the earlier order was “expressly illegal.” That case hinged on the submission of a signed attendance sheet from the local police station, which the bench treated as conclusive proof of compliance. In Torap Ali, the Court has now taken the first step in that same direction — ordering the FT counsel to obtain a similar verification report from the concerned police station. Whether the detainees were regularly reporting may prove equally pivotal in determining the legality of their continued detention. (Details of the Moziba Begum case may be read here.)

Summary of prior proceedings

1. May 28, 2025

The matter was first mentioned; FT counsel stated they had not received the pleadings. The Court adjourned the matter to the next day.

The order may be read here.

2. May 29, 2025

Petitioner informed the Court that Abu Bakkar and Akbar Ali had been re-arrested on May 24, despite being on bail and complying with conditions. The Court sought information from the State regarding their custody status.

The order may be read here.

3. June 4, 2025

The FT counsel submitted that both men were now lodged at Kokrajhar Holding Centre. The Court:

• Granted family visitation rights;
• Allowed the petitioner to obtain the detainees’ signatures on vakalatnamas;
• Directed the State to file an affidavit explaining the basis of arrest and detention by June 16.

The order may be read here.

4. June 16, 2025

At the hearing on June 16, no affidavit had been filed by the State, despite the Court’s June 4 direction. The FT counsel sought an extension of two days. Crucially, the Court directed that details regarding police station attendance must be obtained and submitted, especially since the bail orders were conditional upon weekly reporting. The police station records may now become central to the Court’s evaluation of whether:

• The re-arrest was lawful;
• Bail conditions were violated;
• Or whether, as seen in other recent cases, procedural norms were bypassed without basis.

The matter will next be heard on June 20, 2025.

Related:

Gauhati HC questions legal basis of re-detention of bail-compliant detainee, orders verification of police attendance record

Seeking sanctuary, facing scrutiny: Why India must revisit its approach to the displaced

Gauhati HC: Union government admits Samsul Ali was handed over to BSF, Court grants family visitation rights if not yet deported

Holding centres, missing memos, and silent transfers: Gauhati HC hears 5 petitions filed by families of Bengali-speaking Muslim detainees in Assam

India: A deep dive into the legal obligations before “deportation”

CJP submits supplementary memo to NHRC with survivor and family testimonies on Assam’s expulsions of Bengali-speaking Muslims

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Nearly three weeks after her sudden and unannounced detention, on June 16, the Gauhati High Court granted visitation rights and legal access to Doyjan Bibi, the woman at the centre of the writ petition filed by her husband, Abdul Rejjak, under Article 226 of the Indian Constitution.

The petition alleged that Doyjan Bibi had been picked up from her home in Gauripur, Dhubri district, on the night of May 24, 2025, without any warrant, arrest memo, or subsequent disclosure of her whereabouts. Since her detention, the family had received no formal communication regarding where she was being held — prompting the filing of a petition to trace her location and challenge the legality of her custody.

During the hearing, the counsel for the Foreigner’s Tribunal (FT) submitted that he had received verbal instructions over phone indicating that Doyjan Bibi is currently lodged at the Kokrajhar Holding Centre.

The bench comprising Justice Kalyan Rai Surana and Justice Malasri Nandi recorded the statement and passed an order:

• Allowing the petitioner, Abdul Rejjak, along with one family member, to visit Doyjan Bibi at the holding centre;
• Permitting the signature of the detained person on the vakalatnama, to facilitate proper legal representation in the ongoing petition;
• Listing the matter again on June 25, 2025, for further hearing.

Prior hearing (June 9): Revival of FT order cited, no location disclosed

At the earlier hearing on June 9, the FT counsel had informed the Court that Doyjan Bibi had been declared a foreigner by FT No. 4, Dhubri in 2017, in an ex-parte proceeding. That order had been set aside by a coordinate bench of the Gauhati High Court in 2021, on the condition that the detainee reappear before the FT. It was submitted that since she failed to appear, the original FT opinion had been revived, and her COVID-era bail cancelled.

However, during that hearing, the State had been unable to provide any official information about where Doyjan Bibi was being held, or under what authority she had been taken into custody. The Court had deferred substantive consideration of relief but sought information regarding her custody status.

Details of the hearing may be read here.

June 16 order: Limited relief, awaiting full disclosure

On June 16, the State could not provide any written record of detention or produce Doyjan Bibi in court. The only submission made was verbal — a telephonic update from the FT counsel — that she is presently in Kokrajhar Holding Centre.

The Court, while refraining from adjudicating on the legality of the detention at this stage, treated the FT counsel’s statement as sufficient basis to allow limited visitation and legal access.

The matter is now listed for further hearing on June 25.

Doyjan Bibi’s detention falls within a pattern of cases involving individuals:

• Declared foreigners by ex parte FT orders;
• Later released on bail following more than two years in detention, under Supreme Court directions during COVID-19;
• And subsequently re-arrested — allegedly without fresh legal orders, warrant, or procedural safeguards — in May 2025, often at night and without notice to family.

Gauhati HC order can be read below.

Related:

“Illegal detention not even for a minute”: Gauhati HC orders immediate release of bail-compliant detainee in Assam

Gauhati HC questions legal basis of re-detention of bail-compliant detainee, orders verification of police attendance record

Seeking sanctuary, facing scrutiny: Why India must revisit its approach to the displaced

Gauhati HC: Union government admits Samsul Ali was handed over to BSF, Court grants family visitation rights if not yet deported

Holding centres, missing memos, and silent transfers: Gauhati HC hears 5 petitions filed by families of Bengali-speaking Muslim detainees in Assam

India: A deep dive into the legal obligations before “deportation”

CJP submits supplementary memo to NHRC with survivor and family testimonies on Assam’s expulsions of Bengali-speaking Muslims

The post Gauhati HC allows family visit after state confirms Doyjan Bibi’s detention in Kokrajhar centre appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The High Court bench comprising Justice Kalyan Rai Surana and Justice Malasri Nandi made clear that “illegal detention cannot be allowed even for a minute,” and refused the State’s request for an adjournment, stating that failure to obtain timely instructions could not be a ground to delay liberty.

This order came after three rounds of hearings in the habeas corpus petition filed by Mozida Begum, the detainee’s mother, who had approached the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, challenging her son’s sudden re-arrest and incommunicado detention. In the previous hearings on June 6 and June 11, the Court had established that:

• The detainee was being held at the Kokrajhar Holding Centre;
• The Court had stayed any deportation;
• His attendance at Goalpara Police Station on May 5, 12, and 19 had been recorded and submitted as Annexure 4;
• The Goalpara PS was directed to verify the attendance sheet, and the State was directed to respond.

June 16, 2025: Court orders immediate release

Today, at the third hearing of the case, the State had sought an adjournment, saying instructions had not yet been received. The counsel requested the matter be listed on Wednesday (June 18). But the bench firmly declined, stating that the liberty of a person cannot be delayed for want of bureaucratic coordination.

Appearing for the petitioner, Advocate A.R. Sikdar objected to the request for adjournment. He submitted that:

• The purpose of the hearing was to decide on the release of a person already granted bail;
• The detenu had complied with every condition laid out in the 2021 bail order;
• His arrest and continued detention violated the earlier High Court order, as well as Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution;
• The writ petition challenging the FT order remained pending, and hence no finality could be claimed in terms of nationality or removal proceedings.

He asked the Court to order Hasinur’s immediate release from custody, arguing that continued detention was both unconstitutional and unjustified.

The bench responded with unequivocal concern for the deprivation of liberty: “We are releasing him because this will be illegal detention. Not even for a moment we will wait.”

Justice Surana made clear that the Court would not delay protection of liberty merely due to bureaucratic inaction: “You should have gotten instructions if you wanted. We will not even wait till 2 o’clock. Once there is bail, if they do not give you instructions, it is their lookout.”

The Court further stated that if the State truly believed there were grounds to re-arrest the detenu, it should have moved an interlocutory application (IA) to cancel the bail or obtained a fresh judicial order. Without that, the State had no authority to hold him.

“If you wanted to arrest him after the COVID bail, you could have moved an I.A. Let the State move an application for recall if they want. We’ll hear it at 2. But right now, we are granting bail.”

Based on the above arguments, the Court stated that:

• That bail had been granted and remained valid;
• That attendance had been recorded and verified;
• That no cancellation of bail or new proceedings had been initiated;
• And that continued detention was “expressly illegal.”

Order issued by the Court: The Court dictated the following in its written order:

• Recalled that bail had been granted to Hasinur on June 7, 2021, by a division bench under the Supreme Court’s suo moto COVID-19 bail guidelines;
• Noted that the bail order required weekly reporting, which the petitioner had complied with, supported by Annexure 4, a police attendance sheet verified by Goalpara PS;
• Reaffirmed that the FT opinion declaring him a foreigner remains under judicial challenge;
• Emphasised that no cancellation of bail had occurred, and that no fresh detention order had been passed;
• Held that the continued detention of Hasinur was “expressly illegal”.

“It becomes the duty of the Court to protect the fundamental rights of the detained person. The arrest of a person already on bail amounts to overreach of the State. Illegal detention cannot be allowed even for a minute,” the Bench had said during the hearing.

Directions issued by the Court: The Court then issued the following directions:

1. The Officer-in-Charge of the Kokrajhar Holding Centre shall immediately release Hasinur from detention;
2. The Superintendent of Police (Border), Goalpara is directed to ensure compliance with the Court’s order;
3. In the event the State believes there is compelling reason to detain him, it may move for recall of the bail order or file an appropriate application under law;
4. The case is listed for June 20, 2025, for the State to report compliance with the release directions.

The Court’s order emphatically stated that even a minute of unlawful detention was impermissible, and rebuked the failure of the relevant department to provide timely instructions to the FT counsel.

Background: Bail, compliance, and sudden pickup

Hachinur had been declared a foreigner by an FT order prior to 2021. He was released on conditional bail on June 7, 2021, by a division bench of the Gauhati High Court, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s directions in Suo Moto WP(C) No. 1/2020 concerning COVID-related decongestion of detention centres. The release order, like others under the COVID regime, required weekly reporting to the local police station.

Between 2021 and 2025, Hachinur had consistently complied with this requirement. In the weeks leading up to his detention, his attendance at Goalpara Police Station was recorded on May 5, May 12, and May 19, 2025, as per an attendance sheet signed by police officers, annexed to the writ petition as Annexure 4.

Yet, on May 25, 2025, he was picked up from his residence by Border Police personnel. He was first taken to the Goalpara Police Reserve, then reportedly shifted to Matia Transit Camp, and ultimately lodged in the Kokrajhar Holding Centre — his location remaining unknown to his family until it was disclosed in court on June 6.

June 6, 2025: Habeas petition admitted; deportation stayed

On June 6, the High Court heard the matter for the first time. At that stage, the State and FT counsel failed to disclose any valid reason for the detention, but confirmed that Hachinur was being held at Kokrajhar Holding Centre, not Matia. On that basis, the Court:

• Issued notice on the writ petition;
• Directed that no deportation shall be carried out without the Court’s permission;
• Permitted two family members to visit the detainee in custody;
• Ordered that the Deputy Commissioner of Police (Border), Kamrup Metro, be informed, and that the detention centre receive the order for implementation.

This interim order gave the family its first opportunity to confirm that Hachinur was alive and accessible — reportedly following nearly two weeks of silence from authorities and a refusal by local police to accept an FIR.

(Details of June 6 hearing may be read here.)

June 11, 2025: Court flags potential illegality of detention

At the next hearing, on June 11, Advocate A.R. Sikdar, for the petitioner, submitted that he had met with Hachinur at the holding centre and reiterated that the detainee was bail-compliant. He sought restoration of liberty in light of the fact that the Foreigners Tribunal opinion against him was under challenge in WP(C) 2546/2020, and there was no revocation of bail nor any fresh order warranting arrest.

The FT counsel requested time, indicating that instructions would be received soon. However, the Court made it clear that the matter could not be indefinitely delayed, and stated:

“If he was complying with his bail conditions, detention may be illegal.”

Accordingly, the Court:

• Ordered that Annexure 4 (police attendance sheet) be verified by the Officer-in-Charge, Goalpara PS;
• Directed petitioner’s counsel to send a soft copy of the petition and annexure to the FT counsel;
• Instructed that the FT counsel email the documents to the Goalpara SP (Border) and the OC of Goalpara PS for verification;
• Fixed the next hearing for June 16, while maintaining the earlier direction against deportation.

Detailed report may be read here.

Significance: A judicial stand against state overreach in citizenship matters

The order in Mozida Begum v. Union of India is a resounding judicial affirmation of constitutional due process in a context where dozens of similarly placed individuals — Bengali-speaking Muslims previously released on COVID bail — have allegedly been picked up without warrant, notice, or legal recourse.

It demonstrates that:

• Bail is not symbolic: Once granted, it protects liberty unless formally revoked.
• Arrest without legal authority is unconstitutional, even for those declared “foreigners.”
• Pending writ petitions against FT declarations must be respected, especially where the State has not succeeded in upholding those opinions.
• And that access to police records (like attendance sheets) and visitation rights matter deeply in reasserting legal agency.

The Gauhati High Court’s refusal to adjourn, even briefly, and its framing of the arrest as “overreach” sets a vital precedent for similar cases emerging across Assam.

Related:

Gauhati HC questions legal basis of re-detention of bail-compliant detainee, orders verification of police attendance record

Seeking sanctuary, facing scrutiny: Why India must revisit its approach to the displaced

Gauhati HC: Union government admits Samsul Ali was handed over to BSF, Court grants family visitation rights if not yet deported

Holding centres, missing memos, and silent transfers: Gauhati HC hears 5 petitions filed by families of Bengali-speaking Muslim detainees in Assam

India: A deep dive into the legal obligations before “deportation”

CJP submits supplementary memo to NHRC with survivor and family testimonies on Assam’s expulsions of Bengali-speaking Muslims

The post “Illegal detention cannot be allowed even for a minute”: Gauhati HC orders release of Goalpara man picked up despite complying with bail conditions appeared first on SabrangIndia.

However, an examination of the Court’s free speech jurisprudence in recent months reveals a disquieting pattern of contradiction and inconsistency. Alongside landmark judgments that have robustly defended expressive freedoms, there has emerged a parallel and conflicting stream of pronouncements, delivered through interim orders and expansive bail conditions. These orders have imposed sweeping prior restraints on speech, frequently without substantive reasoning and based on subjective assessments of morality or public sentiment. This trend represents a significant deviation from the Court’s larger constitutional role. It departs from established doctrines that demand a high threshold for restricting speech and, in doing so, fosters a climate of legal uncertainty. This analysis contends that this jurisprudential dissonance not only undermines the predictability of law but also creates a tangible “chilling effect” on public discourse, thereby weakening the very democratic fabric the Court is duty-bound to protect.

The doctrinal anchor: Article 19(1)(a) and the high bar for restriction

The Supreme Court’s traditional role as a bulwark for free expression is rooted in a series of foundational precedents. In Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras (1950), the Court established that the freedom of speech lies at the core of all democratic organizations. It held that any restriction must be evaluated from the perspective of its directness and proximity to the specified grounds in Article 19(2), such as public order or the security of the State. This principle evolved over decades, culminating in the landmark verdict in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015).

In Shreya Singhal, the Court struck down Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, for being unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.[1] Crucially, it fortified the “incitement” standard, clarifying that speech can only be restricted when it rises to the level of “incitement to an offence.” This test requires a clear nexus between the expression and the likelihood of imminent lawless action. Mere advocacy, discussion, or even offensive and unpopular speech is constitutionally protected.[2] This judgment, along with the effective suspension of the colonial-era sedition law (Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code) in May 2022 due to its rampant misuse, represents the doctrinal high-water mark of free speech protection in India. Whether the Court should have suspended the provision or not, in the context of the discourse around judicial activism and overreach is a different debate.

These rulings firmly embody the Court’s constitutional role: to set clear, objective, and high standards for any State action that seeks to curtail expression. It is against this established doctrinal backdrop that the recent developments must be assessed.

The changing trajectory: Judicial paternalism and unreasoned restraints

The recent cases of Ranveer Allahabadia and Professor Ali Khan Mahmudabad serve as stark illustrations of a judicial approach that appears untethered from the principles laid down in Shreya Singhal.

In the matter involving podcaster Ranveer Allahabadia, the Court was approached for the consolidation of multiple First Information Reports (FIRs) filed against him for allegedly obscene content in an online show. While granting interim protection from arrest, the bench imposed a blanket, unreasoned gag order, prohibiting him from airing any shows on any platform. This order was a classic act of prior restraint, imposed without any adjudicatory finding that the content was, in fact, legally obscene. The Court’s oral remarks, condemning the language as “dirty” and “perverted” suggested a departure from objective legal analysis towards a subjective, moralistic critique. While this sweeping ban was later modified, it was conditioned on an undertaking that future content would “maintain the desired standards of decency and morality so that viewers of any age group can watch.” Such a condition is inherently vague and places the judiciary in the role of a super-censor, dictating amorphous “societal norms” for creative expression. This judicial paternalism (as Anmol Jain mentions it) stands in direct conflict with the principle that the Court’s role is to be a legal arbiter, not a moral guardian. Furthermore, the bench’s stated inclination to expand the scope of this proceeding to devise regulatory measures for online content signals a potential overstepping of the judicial function into the legislative domain.

Even more troubling is the case of Professor Ali Khan Mahmudabad, who faced multiple FIRs, including for sedition, over a Facebook post commenting on India’s recent military operation—Operation Sindhoor. The Supreme Court, while granting interim bail, imposed an exceptionally broad gag order, restraining him from expressing any opinion on the underlying conflict. It also directed the confiscation of his passport. Critically, the Court refrained from undertaking a prima facie analysis of whether the speech in question met the stringent incitement-to-violence threshold. It delegated the task of interpreting the “complexity of the phraseology” to a Special Investigation Team (SIT) of police officers. For this very broad set of restrictions to have been put, one would expect a deep reasoning as to why a person’s free speech is being restricted on this level for a simple Facebook post that has not incited any violence anywhere. However, the Court finds a way to not meet this reasonable expectation by giving a 2-page order. Not even a prima facie mentioning of the remarks or saying how they engaged with them is done by the Court. While it is a simple interim bail order, the restrictions placed on the petitioner warrant the reasoning, something that would not have been expected of the Court if not for the restrictions.

This raises a pertinent question. Does the Supreme Court not have the responsibility to be well reasoned it its order, especially in an order that curtails the freedom of speech of a person? In a democracy like India, the Court does have such responsibility.

These cases demonstrate a worrying departure from constitutional first principles. They prioritize executive concerns over individual liberty, impose prior restraints without robust reasoning, and apply vague, subjective standards of decency or propriety that are alien to the rigorous tests established in prior judgments.

The counter-Narrative: enduring fidelity to constitutional principles

The restrictive turn is, however, not a complete narrative. The Supreme Court has also delivered powerful judgments that reaffirm its commitment to free expression, creating a landscape of profound jurisprudential dissonance.

In Mohammed Zubair v. State of NCT of Delhi (2022), the Court was faced with a similar situation of multiple FIRs filed against a journalist for his tweets. The State explicitly requested a bail condition barring him from tweeting. The bench, which notably included one of the same justices as in the Allahabadia case, unequivocally rejected this plea. It reasoned that such a gag order would be a “disproportionate.” The Court declared that a blanket ban on expression could not be imposed as a condition of liberty.

Similarly, in Imran Pratapgarhi v. State of Gujarat (2025), the Court quashed an FIR against a Member of Parliament over a poem alleged to have promoted disharmony. Justice Abhay S. Oka, writing for the bench, asserted that speech must be judged by the standards of a “strong-minded, firm and courageous” individual, not those of a “weak and oscillating” mind prone to taking offense.

These judgments stand as a testament to the enduring strength of the constitutional framework. They apply the high-threshold tests for restricting speech, reject the notion of pre-emptive gags as a routine measure, and refuse to entertain the “heckler’s veto” by protecting speech from the easily offended. Yet, their co-existence with the orders in Allahabadia and Mahmudabad creates an environment of acute legal uncertainty.

The chilling cascade: consequences of jurisprudential inconsistency

The primary casualty of this judicial inconsistency is the rule of law itself. When the country’s apex court applies contradictory principles to similar fact patterns, it becomes impossible for citizens, journalists, artists, and academics to predict the legal boundaries of permissible speech. This unpredictability is the very engine of the “chilling effect.” Expression is not only chilled by direct censorship but also by the fear that a legitimate, constitutionally protected opinion could be ensnared in a web of litigation, culminating in a restrictive gag order issued at the interim stage by the highest court itself.

This phenomenon has a cascading impact. When the Supreme Court imposes gag orders as bail conditions, it normalises such practices, signalling to lower courts and law enforcement agencies that these are acceptable tools for managing speech-related offenses. The result is a systemic shift where bail, a mechanism intended to secure liberty, is weaponised to curtail it. The core constitutional role of the Supreme Court is not merely to adjudicate disputes but to provide clear, consistent, and principled legal guidance for the entire nation by functioning as the supreme interpreter of the Constitution. By issuing contradictory pronouncements, the Court detours from this vital function, leaving a vacuum filled by uncertainty and fear. This leads to a public sphere characterized by self-censorship, where critical inquiry and challenging discourse are stifled, not by authoritarian laws, but by an unpredictable judiciary.

Conclusion: A call for constitutional reaffirmation

The Supreme Court of India stands at a critical juncture. The recent inconsistent rulings on free speech threatens to erode its legacy as the unwavering protector of fundamental rights. While landmark decisions continue to uphold the sanctity of Article 19(1)(a), the parallel trend of imposing ad-hoc, unreasoned, and paternalistic restrictions represents a significant deviation from its constitutional charter. This inconsistency is more than a mere academic curiosity; it has profound real-world consequences for the health of India’s democracy.

To restore constitutional equilibrium, the Court must return to a position of principled consistency. This requires a steadfast refusal to impose prior restraints without satisfying the highest standards of justification. It demands that all restrictions on speech be grounded in clear, reasoned orders that adhere to the established tests of necessity and proportionality. The judiciary must consciously resist the temptation to act as a moral arbiter, grounding its decisions in objective legal standards, not subjective notions of public taste.

The freedom of speech is too vital to be left to the vagaries of shifting judicial moods. The responsibility rests squarely with the Supreme Court to reaffirm its constitutional role, ensuring that the marketplace of ideas remains open and that its gavel serves to protect, not inadvertently gag, the diverse voices that animate the world’s largest democracy.

(The author is part of the legal research team of the organisation)

[1] Para 98, (2013) 12 S.C.C. 73

[2] Ibid, Para 44

Related:

Free Speech Upheld: Bombay HC strikes down IT (Amendment) Rules, 2023 as unconstitutional

Judges differ on challenge against IT amendments of 2023, right to freedom of speech & expression hangs in balance

2023 Amendment to Broadcasting Rules are clear case of censorship nothing less: Justice GS Patel, Bombay HC

IT Rules 2023: Union Government can now flag content relating to any of its “businesses” as “misleading”

The post Mixed Messaging: Free speech jurisprudence from the Supreme Court appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Initially tabled in July 2024 after the Lok Sabha elections, the bill was sent to the committee in December amid widespread opposition. Many had warned that the proposed legislation would grant the state sweeping powers to crack down on dissent under the guise of targeting Naxalism, by criminalising a wide range of political and ideological activity as “unlawful.” The original draft allowed for the prosecution of individuals, raising alarms over arbitrary arrests and the silencing of voices critical of the state.

From ‘individuals and organisations’ to ‘leftist and hard-line organisations’

In the face of this backlash, the 26-member committee—comprising MLAs from multiple parties—has amended the bill’s stated objectives. As per the HT report, the revised text now limits enforcement to “leftist and hard-line organisations” and removes references to individual’s altogether. According to the report, the objective has been reframed to read: “…to provide for more effective prevention of certain unlawful activities of leftist and hard-line organisations.”

This shift is significant but far from sufficient. While the wording may now exclude individuals from direct prosecution, the bill retains broad and ambiguous language—terms like “leftist,” “hardline,” and especially “urban Naxal”—that are politically loaded and legally undefined. These phrases have routinely been deployed to smear activists, academics, students, and protestors. Nothing in the amended draft clearly prevents such misuse.

A government official quoted in the Hindustan Times acknowledged that the initial draft had sparked fears of sweeping state action against critics of government and constitutional authorities. The revised language, he claimed, should reassure the public that the focus is strictly on organisational actors. But the lack of any statutory definition or safeguard mechanisms makes this assurance ring hollow.

Procedural tweaks: Cosmetic or meaningful?

The committee has introduced a few procedural changes. The HT report provides that the advisory board that authorises investigations under the law will now be headed by a retired High Court judge, replacing the earlier proposal of a senior government law officer. The investigating officer’s rank has also been raised—from a sub-inspector to an Assistant Superintendent of Police (ASP). These are framed as checks on misuse, but without independent oversight or judicial review at the stage of designation, they offer little substantive protection.

There’s also a clarification that the law will not be applied retrospectively. Past associations with banned organisations will not attract prosecution under the new framework—another attempt to blunt accusations of arbitrary state action.

The final meeting of the joint select committee is scheduled for June 25, after which the revised bill is expected to be tabled in the monsoon session of the Maharashtra Assembly beginning June 30.

‘Urban naxal’ still remains

Significantly, the committee has retained the term “urban Naxal” in the bill’s objectives. The phrase has no legal basis and has become a political tool to discredit activists and intellectuals. Its continued presence in the draft signals that the state remains invested in a narrative that conflates political opposition and civil resistance with insurgency.

BJP state president and revenue minister Chandrashekhar Bawankule, who chairs the committee, defended the bill by pointing to similar laws in Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, which he claimed have been effective in curbing Naxal recruitment. He asserted that the bill would deter “mind poisoning” of youth by left-wing extremists, as per the HT report.

On the other hand, legislators from the NCP (Sharad Pawar faction) said their support would depend on further clarifications and hearings. Jitendra Awhad noted that while the bill has been diluted, ambiguity persists. “We were told the term ‘left-wing extremist and hardliner’s refers only to unlawful activity by known Naxal-linked organisations, not individuals,” he said. Another committee member, Shashikant Shinde, said they had asked for all organisations that submitted objections to be invited for formal hearings before the final draft is approved.

Civil society remains firm: This bill must be opposed

For civil society groups, the amendments don’t go far enough. The bill still leaves dangerous room for interpretation. Activist Ulka Mahajan, state convenor of Bharat Jodo Andolan, called the revised draft “a repackaged threat” and confirmed that mass protests are being planned for the opening day of the monsoon session. “The law is being written in a way that allows the government to decide who is ‘hard-line’ or ‘leftist’. That could mean unions, student bodies, political critics—anyone who challenges the ruling regime,” she said, as quoted by the HT report.

Mahajan also flagged the complete absence of any mention of right-wing organisations or their activities in the bill. “Who decides what’s unlawful? And why is there no equivalent scrutiny of extremist groups on the other end of the spectrum?” she asked.

Despite tweaks to its language and structure, the Maharashtra Special Public Security Bill, 2024 continues to carry the risk of being used as a blunt instrument against dissent. The amendments may limit some excesses, but they do not address the core design of a law that conflates opposition with extremism—and hands the state the power to act on that conflation. As things stand, the threat of overreach remains embedded in the architecture of the bill itself.

It is essential to note that on April 22, 2025, Maharashtra had witnessed a coordinated, state-wide protest under the banner of the Maharashtra Public Safety Bill Anti-Conflict Committee, demanding the complete withdrawal of the Maharashtra Special Public Security Bill, 2024. Far from being a routine demonstration, this agitation marked the culmination of six weeks of unprecedented mobilisation across the state by a broad alliance of people’s movements, civil liberties organisations, and opposition parties.

At the heart of the protests was an extraordinary coalition: left parties including the CPI, CPI(M), CPIML, Lal Nishan Party, Satyashodhak Communist Party, and Shetkari Kamgar Paksh have joined hands with grassroots movements like the Shramik Mukti Dal, Sarvahara Jan Andolan, and civil rights groups including the People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) and Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP). Major opposition parties under the Maha Vikas Aghadi—the Shiv Sena (UBT), Congress, and NCP (Sharad Pawar faction)—had publicly pledged support.

From Mumbai to rural Thane, the protest on April 22 had span nearly every major district. Demonstrators assembled at collectorates, tehsil offices, and key public spaces: Bandra Collectorate in Mumbai; Ambegaon, Junnar and Pune Collectorate in Pune; Samvidhan Chowk in Nagpur; and Shahapur, Vikramgad, Dahanu, Talasari, Jawhar, Palghar, and Thane in the district’s tribal belts. (Details may be read here.)

CJP’s formal objections: A detailed constitutional indictment

On April 1, 2025, Citizens for Justice and Peace submitted a detailed memorandum to the Joint Select Committee reviewing the bill, calling for its total withdrawal. The CJP’s objections amount to a searing constitutional critique, warning that the bill effectively replicates and expands the punitive architecture of laws like the UAPA and NSA, both of which have been repeatedly misused to target dissenters and marginalised communities.

The organisation highlighted numerous provisions, many of which have now reportedly been amended, that would erode fundamental rights and shield state actors from accountability:

• Section 2(f): Vague and overbroad definitions of “Unlawful Activity”

The bill’s definition of “unlawful activity” in Section 2(f)(i–vii) was so sweeping that it risks criminalising virtually any form of dissent—from peaceful protests and strikes to critical commentary on government policies. The absence of precise legal thresholds opens the door for arbitrary action by authorities.

• Section 5(1)(2): Politicisation of the Advisory Board

The proposed Advisory Board—a supposed safeguard—lacked judicial independence. Unlike precedent statutes requiring a sitting or retired High Court judge, the bill allowed appointments of those merely “qualified” to be judges. This subtle shift undermines impartiality and enables the inclusion of individuals with close executive ties or political loyalties, compromising the board’s neutrality.

• Section 9: Unfettered powers of eviction and seizure

Section 9 authorised District Magistrates or Police Commissioners to seize property and evict occupants from designated “notified areas,” with minimal procedural protection. The provision’s vague safeguard for women and children—granting only a “reasonable time” to vacate—is deeply inadequate. In practice, this opens the door for forced evictions of protest sites or politically disfavoured communities.

• Section 10(1): Extension to movable property

In tandem with Section 9, Section 10(1) empowered the state to seize all movable property—money, documents, personal effects—within targeted premises. The clause enables the financial and organisational crippling of individuals and groups deemed adversarial to the regime, with little scope for legal redress.

• Section 12: Restricting access to justice

Perhaps most shockingly, Section 12 restricted legal recourse to only the High Courts and Supreme Court, barring district-level courts from hearing challenges under the Act. This creates an unjust barrier for the poor and marginalised, effectively denying justice to those without the means to approach higher courts. It also contravenes India’s four-tier judicial system, violating the principle of accessible and decentralised justice.

• Sections 14 and 15: Legal impunity for state officials

Sections 14 and 15 conferred blanket immunity upon police officers and district officials, even in cases of wrongful action or clear judicial censure. The language explicitly forbids the initiation of proceedings against these actors, echoing the impunity seen under the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), which has a notorious record of facilitating human rights abuses.

CJP’s analysis asserted that the Bill is a direct assault on India’s constitutional framework. Key rights under the Constitution are clearly at stake:

• Article 19 – Freedom of speech, assembly, and association are rendered meaningless when dissent itself is criminalised.
• Article 21 – Preventive detention and mass surveillance powers embedded in the bill endanger the right to life and liberty.
• Article 14 – The vague, discretionary powers granted to the executive invite selective targeting of political opponents, making equality before law an illusion.

Detailed objections raised by CJP may be read here.

Not a revision—But a repackaging of state overreach?

Despite cosmetic amendments proposed by the Joint Select Committee—such as limiting applicability to organisations and raising the rank of investigating officers—the bill’s core structure remains authoritarian. The continued use of undefined labels like “urban Naxal” and “hardliner” fuels fears of arbitrary designation and persecution. Civil society actors have warned that even moderate reformist organisations or opposition groups could be labelled as “threats” under this law.

As Maharashtra prepares for the bill’s likely reintroduction in the Monsoon Session beginning June 30, the civil protests stand as a critical moment of democratic resistance. This isn’t just about defeating one law—it’s about upholding the constitutional promise of civil liberties and preventing the institutionalisation of state repression under the pretext of public safety.

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The post Trimmed at the edges, dangerous at the core? Maharashtra’s Public Security Bill still raises alarms, to be reintroduced during Monsoon session appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The Gauhati High Court on June 11 raised serious concerns over the continued detention of Hachinur @ Hasinur, a resident of Milan Nagar in Goalpara, who had been picked up by the Border Police on May 25, 2025 despite being released on bail in 2021 and allegedly complying with all bail conditions, including weekly attendance at the local police station. The Court observed that if the detenu had been appearing regularly as required, his custody may amount to illegal detention.

The Court was hearing a petition filed by Mozida Begum, mother of Hachinur, who approached the Court after her son disappeared from public view following his detention. Her petition included Annexure-4, a police-station-attested attendance sheet showing that her son had signed in at Goalpara Police Station on May 5, May 12, and May 19 — just days before he was picked up.

“If he was complying with bail, detention may be illegal”: High Court

During the hearing, Advocate A.R. Sikdar, representing the petitioner, informed the Court that he had been able to meet Hachinur in the Kokrajhar Holding Centre, where he is currently lodged. He urged the Court to consider granting bail on the ground that Hachinur had been fully complying with the conditions laid down when he was released on bail by the High Court in 2021.

The bench, comprising Justices Kalyan Rai Surana and Malasri Nandi, took note of the submissions and orally observed that if the detenu had in fact been reporting to the police every week as required, then his re-detention may lack legal basis.

“But if he was not violating his bail conditions, detention may be illegal,” the bench remarked. It further directed that Annexure-4 — the attendance sheet signed by police officers — be sent to the Officer-in-Charge of Goalpara Police Station for immediate verification.

State counsel seeks time; court issues notice, demands verification

The Standing Counsel for the Foreigners Tribunal, appearing for the State, submitted that notice may be issued, and indicated that an affidavit could be filed after the facts were verified. The bench agreed to proceed formally, but underscored that the matter could not be allowed to drift, especially in light of what appeared to be documented compliance by the detainee.

Accordingly, the Court ordered the issuance of notice to the respondents, observing that notice had already been issued on June 6, but reiterating that the matter required active steps. (details of June 6 hearing may be read here.)

The Court further directed that:

• The Officer-in-Charge of Goalpara Police Station is to verify the authenticity of Annexure 4 — the attendance sheet annexed with the petition;
• A soft copy of the entire petition and Annexure 4 is to be shared by the petitioner’s counsel with the FT standing counsel, who shall forward it via email to the SP (Border), Goalpara and the Officer-in-Charge, Goalpara PS;
• The State is to file an affidavit confirming or contesting the contents of the attendance sheet by Monday (June 16);

The case is listed for next hearing on June 16, allowing the Court to hear the matter in light of the verification.

Family granted visitation rights to Kokrajhar Holding Centre

As an additional relief, the Court granted liberty to two family members to visit Hachinur at the Kokrajhar Holding Centre, ensuring that the family can maintain contact and facilitate his legal representation. This order builds on the interim protection granted on June 6, in which the Court had also directed that no deportation of the detainee be carried out without its express permission.

Background and legal framework

Hachinur was declared a foreigner by a Foreigners Tribunal prior to 2021. However, he was granted bail by the Gauhati High Court, and released on conditions set out in the Supreme Court directions concerning long-term detainees during the COVID-19 pandemic. One key condition was that he appear at the local police station weekly. The family maintains he had never missed a date, and that this was confirmed through police-signed attendance records.

Despite this, on May 25, 2025, he was taken into custody by Border Police, initially moved to the Goalpara Police Reserve, and then shifted to the Matia Transit Camp, where officials allegedly told his family he was no longer present. His location was only confirmed during the June 6 hearing, when the FT counsel revealed he was at Kokrajhar Holding Centre.

The current proceedings question whether such a re-arrest — absent any breach of bail or new judicial direction — can be sustained under law, and whether it violates Articles 21 (right to life and personal liberty) and 22 (protection against arbitrary detention) of the Constitution.

The order may be read below.

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The post Gauhati High Court flags potential illegality in detention of man complying with bail; police directed to verify weekly reporting appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The Authority found that while both sides of the issue were presented in the broadcast — including denials by Madrasa authorities and a detailed interview with NCPCR Chairperson Priyank Kanoongo — the anchor failed to exercise necessary caution, particularly in a situation involving conflicting claims and sensitive subject matter. The Authority issued important observations and guidance, emphasising the need for responsible anchoring, verification of claims, and avoidance of presumptive or potentially polarizing narratives in future broadcasts.

Background of the complaint

On August 19, 2024, Times Now Navbharat aired two related segments in its flagship evening programme:

Programme 1: “Sankalp Rashtra Nirman Ka: कराची का लिटरेचर..भारत के मदरसों में क्या कर रहा ? | Hindi News”

Programme 2: “Rashtravad: भारत का मदरसा…पाकिस्तान का सिलेबस? | Priyank Kanoongo | Bihar Madarsa | Hindi News”

Both the shows are based on the statement made by Chairperson of the National Commission for Protection of Child Rights, Priyank Kanoongo, who had alleged that the government-funded madrassas in Bihar are teaching from so-called “Radical-curriculum” and using “Pakistan-Published books”.

Based on the above statement, both shows propagated allegedly harmful ideas through a distorted portrayal of madrasa education, emphasizing sensationalism over balanced reporting. The “Sankalp Rashtra Nirman Ka” show and the “Rashtravad” debate show both relied heavily on inflammatory language and selective framing, painting madrassas as centres of radicalism and anti-national sentiment. The use of provocative questions and visual imagery aimed to generate fear and suspicion among viewers.

In view of the same, CJP filed a complaint with the NBDSA on September 26, 2024, alleging that the programs:

• Used provocative, communal, and stigmatising language.
• Presented unverified and one-sided narratives.
• Violated the Code of Ethics and Broadcasting Standards and Specific Guidelines Covering Reportage, especially clauses relating to accuracy, neutrality, communal harmony, and the prohibition on fear-mongering.

Details of the complaint may be read here.

CJP’s contentions

CJP’s detailed submissions alleged that:

• The programs vilified Madrasas as a whole, implying they were inherently suspicious or linked to terrorism.
• The headlines and taglines like “Jihadi Sanskriti” are not only highly inflammatory, but also lacked any evidentiary basis.
• The selective use of visuals, interviews, and graphics sensationalised the topic and created an atmosphere of fear and distrust toward the Muslim community.
• The broadcaster failed to present the views of those running Madrasas, denying them a fair opportunity to respond, which violated the principle of balanced reportage.

CJP argued that such content endangered social harmony, contributed to religious polarization, and had a real-world impact, particularly on the already marginalized Muslim minority in Bihar and across the country.

Broadcaster’s response

Times Now Navbharat submitted that:

• The programming was based on ground-level reporting, including testimonies of teachers and students.
• The subject was of legitimate public interest, especially in light of reported links between radicalisation and certain educational institutions.
• The channel did not target any religion or community, and the intention was not to generalize all Madrasas but to expose certain problematic instances.

The broadcaster also claimed that the programs adhered to the tenets of free speech and journalistic inquiry, and that no direct allegations were made without basis.

NBDSA’s findings and reasoning

After considering the submissions of both parties and reviewing the footage, the NBDSA noted that the broadcaster had included views from both the NCPCR Chairperson and the Bihar Madrasa authorities-

• Priyank Kanoongo was given space to express his concerns regarding the textbook “Talimul Islam”.
• Abdul Salam Ansari, Deputy Director of the Bihar State Madrasa Board, as well as a teacher and students at a Madrasa in Patna, were interviewed and categorically denied that the textbook was part of their curriculum.

NBDSA held that had the broadcast been confined to these interviews and objective presentation, no objection could have been sustained, as the principles of impartiality, neutrality, and objectivity were adhered to in that part.

However, the issue arose with the conduct and framing by the anchor, who, in NBDSA’s view, failed to exercise due caution:

• Despite conflicting claims between NCPCR and the Bihar Madrasa authorities, the anchor proceeded on the presumption that Kanoongo’s version was correct, thereby shaping the program around that assumption.
• The NBDSA stressed that in the presence of such a serious allegation, especially involving potential hate teaching in religious institutions, the anchor had a duty to verify the claims further or maintain a neutral stance.

The Authority pointed out that Mr. Abdul Salam Ansari, like Mr. Kanoongo, is a responsible public authority, and the lack of further verification before drawing conclusions was inappropriate.

“However, the objection is with the questions raised by the anchors during the broadcasts. No doubt, Mr. Fri.yank Kanoongo had claimed that the contents of a certain textbook “Talimul Islam” was taught in Madrasas in Bihar. Again, no doubt, he is a responsible person being the Chairman, CPCR. At the same time, the anchor should have also kept in mind that the Deputy Director, Bihar State Madrasa Board as well as the teacher and students interviewed had denounced that the textbook was indeed being taught and had refused to comment on the same without receiving any information/ representation in this regard. In such a scenario, the anchor should have been little careful before proceeding with the presumption that all this was in fact happening. Even the Deputy Director, Bihar State Madrasa Board is also a responsible person and in view of conflicting claims, there should have been some verification by the anchor before accepting the version of one person and adopting a narrative in the programme on that premise,” the NBDSA observed in its order.

The Authority also made a broader constitutional observation, stating that if any educational institution teaches hatred or demeans other religions, such teaching would be clearly contrary to constitutional ethos and must be denounced. However, it emphasized that before such a conclusion is broadcast publicly, it must be verified with due diligence.

“It is reemphasized that in this secular country governed by the Constitution of India, such kind of teachings have to be denounced. However, it is equally important to verify that in fact there were teachings in certain Madrasas in Bihar of that nature.”

“In view of the aforesaid, NBDSA is of the opinion that the anchor should be more cautious in broadcasting such programmes which have, otherwise, tendency to create the feeling of hatred towards a particular community and broadcasting of these programmes should not be without proper verifications of the contents.”

Final decision

The NBDSA decided to close the complaint but concluded with a strong advisory observation:

• Anchors must be more cautious while hosting and framing programs that deal with religious or communal issues, especially where claims remain unverified or contested.
• Broadcasters should avoid presumptive narratives that could create feelings of hatred towards any community.

.The NBDSA’s order walks a nuanced line — while not indicting the broadcaster for the program as a whole, it takes issue with editorial judgment exercised during the broadcast, particularly by the anchor. It reaffirms the role of media in upholding constitutional values and avoiding communal polarization, especially in a context where both official and institutional versions of events were in direct conflict.

The decision sends a message that in a pluralist democracy like India, the journalistic duty to verify and maintain neutrality is not just ethical—it is constitutional.

The complete order may be read below.

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