The verdict brings to a close one of the most significant constitutional controversies concerning electoral administration in recent years. While the judgment conclusively answers the question of whether the Election Commission possesses the authority to undertake a SIR, it leaves several substantive concerns unresolved. The challenge before the Court was never confined merely to the legality of electoral roll revision. Rather, it centred upon whether an exercise ostensibly intended to identify eligible electors had, in practice, transformed into a process requiring already registered voters to re-establish their entitlement to remain on the electoral roll, thereby blurring the distinction between verification of electoral eligibility and an unregulated (by law or authority) scrutiny of citizenship.

While upholding the ECI’s powers, the Division Bench simultaneously issued a series of directions intended to regulate the consequences of deletions arising from the SIR exercise. Yet it is within these directions themselves that some of the most difficult constitutional questions continue to persist.

The sudden introduction and expansion of SIR and the deletion of 5.18 crore electors

One of the most consequential yet insufficiently examined aspects of the SIR exercise is its unprecedented scale and the magnitude of voter deletions that followed its implementation across multiple States. No previous exercise of its kind under Election Law or Practice has ever had such intent or result. It is there then that this verdict –by failing to engage in the crucial gaps and issues in implementation highlighted by the multifarious Petitioners—substantively falters.

The result is this: While the Supreme Court has, after rigorous hearings and several interim orders, ultimately upheld the constitutional validity of the SIR framework and accepted the Election Commission of India’s justification (that the exercise was intended to enhance the accuracy, completeness and integrity of electoral rolls). The moot question of what necessitated the adoption of an extraordinary and intensive verification mechanism when the Representation of the People Act, 1950, the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960, and the established system of continuous revision already provides for detailed procedures for the addition, correction and deletion of names from electoral rolls remains unanswered.

2023-2024, two years prior to the launch of the Bihar SIR in June 2025 were also marked by related issues that directly impact on the autonomy and functioning of the Election Commission of India (ECI) a hitherto constitutional authority that enjoyed broad respect and acceptance. The present Regime’s overturning of a Supreme Court of India (SCI) final judgement on the need for wider choice and representation (including that of the Chief Justice of India-CJI) in selection of the CEC etc. is one such. The other is the huge accountability crisis in counting methods and transparency by the ECI around the Lok Sabha Polls of 2024, reports around which may be read here and here. Given the outcry by citizens groups and Opposition parties around “Vote Chori” and manipulation during and post 2024 LS polls (including the Haryana, Maharashtra state elections), the ECI even arbitrarily decided to amend its own Rules in ensuring availability of the CCTV footage during storage and counting to citizens and candidates.

The SIR 2-25-2026 was therefore conducted under a shroud of allegations and scrutiny. Thereafter follows the May 27 judgement of the apex court that in a sense obliterates these background developments.

The judgment recognises the Commission’s constitutional authority under Article 324 and Section 21(3) of the Act, yet neither the Court nor the Commission appears to have fully explained why existing statutory mechanisms were considered inadequate or incapable of addressing concerns relating to migration, duplication, deaths or ineligible entries. The absence of such justification becomes particularly significant when the practical outcome of the exercise has been the near arbitrary removal/deletion of more than 5.18 crore (51.8 million!!) electors across thirteen states/jurisdictions.

Impact of SIR across the States

The Bihar exercise, initiated through the Election Commission’s notification dated June 24, 2025, became the foundation upon which the SIR model was subsequently replicated in twelve other States and Union Territories. According to the available figures, the cumulative impact of these exercises resulted in the deletion of approximately 5.18 crore names from electoral rolls covering an electorate of nearly 50.99 crore voters.

The scale of these deletions was unprecedented in the history of electoral roll revision in India. Uttar Pradesh alone witnessed deletions exceeding 2.05 crore electors, while West Bengal recorded deletions of approximately 83.86 lakh names. Tamil Nadu saw nearly 74 lakh deletions, Gujarat approximately 68 lakh, Madhya Pradesh 34.25 lakh, Rajasthan 31 lakh and Chhattisgarh around 25 lakh. Even smaller jurisdictions such as Goa, Puducherry, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Lakshadweep recorded deletions running into significant proportions of their total electorate.

These figures raise an important constitutional question: When a bureaucratic exercise hurriedly undertaken in the name of electoral ‘purification’ results in the such mass exclusion of more than five crore (50 million) registered voters, should not the burden of transparency and accountability correspondingly become more exacting and higher?

Bihar as the testing ground of SIR

The Bihar experience illustrates the complexity of this concern. Before the commencement of the SIR exercise, Bihar’s electoral roll consisted of approximately 7.89 crore registered electors. Following the intensive revision process, the draft electoral roll published by the Election Commission contained only 7.24 crore electors. This meant that nearly 65 lakh individuals who had previously appeared on the electoral roll were absent from the draft roll. The Commission attributed a substantial portion of this reduction to the non-submission or non-collection of Enumeration Forms during the verification process. However, the omission of such a large number of previously enrolled electors at the draft stage immediately generated concerns regarding the practical consequences of a documentation-based verification exercise conducted within compressed timelines and under challenging administrative conditions.

The Commission subsequently issued its final press release on September 30, 2025 announcing the completion of the Bihar SIR. According to the data disclosed therein, 3.66 lakh names were permanently deleted after detailed statutory verification, while 21.53 lakh eligible electors were either restored or added through Form-6 applications and the claims-and-objections process. As a result, the final electoral roll stood at approximately 7.42 crore electors. At first glance, the Commission presented these figures as evidence of a successful correction mechanism that enabled genuine electors to re-enter the electoral database. However, a closer examination of the numbers reveals a significant discrepancy.

The pre-SIR electoral roll contained approximately 7.89 crore electors, whereas the finalised roll contained 7.42 crore electors. This represents a net reduction of approximately 47 lakh electors. Yet the numerical explanation offered by the Commission does not fully account for this decline. If 3.66 lakh names were permanently removed after verification and 21.53 lakh electors were subsequently added, the total documented movement in the database amounts to 25.19 lakh electors. Even after accounting for these figures, an unexplained variance of approximately 21.81 lakh electors remains between the pre-revision electorate and the final electoral roll. Put differently, the available data does not mathematically reconcile with the final published electoral database.

This discrepancy is not merely statistical. It goes to the heart of the transparency and accountability concerns that surrounded the SIR exercise from the beginning. Electoral rolls are the foundational instruments through which the constitutional guarantee of universal adult suffrage under Article 326 is operationalised. Consequently, when millions of names disappear from electoral rolls during a revision exercise, a clear and comprehensive explanation becomes essential. The available public figures explain certain categories of additions and deletions, but they do not adequately account for the entire difference between the pre-revision and post-revision electorate. In the absence of a detailed category-wise reconciliation identifying how and why the remaining electors ceased to form part of the final database, the figures disclosed by the Commission appear incomplete and internally inconsistent.

The issue becomes even more significant because the revised Bihar electoral roll was not merely a provisional administrative exercise. It became the basis for the conduct of the Bihar Legislative Assembly elections held in November 2025, with the results declared on November 14, 2025. Specifically put, is a state election, where as many as 47 lakh (4.7 million) voters did not cast their franchise because they were not given a chance to prove their electoral status, legitimate in the eyes of the Law, Courts and Constitution?

Consequently, the constitutional questions raised before the Supreme Court were not being examined in an abstract or prospective setting; they concerned an electoral framework that had already been implemented and utilised for a completed democratic exercise. The Court’s eventual decision therefore validated not merely the legal authority to undertake a SIR but also the inefficient and partisan exercise with practical consequences flowing from that exercise.

Yet the larger constitutional concern remains unresolved. The Election Commission consistently maintained that the purpose of the SIR was to ensure that every eligible citizen was included in the electoral roll while simultaneously removing ineligible, duplicate, shifted or deceased voters. However, the public discourse and the statistical outcomes reveal that the exercise was perceived primarily through the lens of deletion rather than inclusion. The overwhelming –and heavily partisan and unaccountable–administrative focus appeared to be directed towards verifying existing entries and identifying names for exclusion. There was comparatively less emphasis on institutional mechanisms designed to assist vulnerable citizens in retaining their electoral status or navigating documentation requirements. For many petitioners and civil society organisations, the concern was not merely the removal of ineligible names but the possibility that genuine electors could be excluded because of absence of access–procedural, technical or documentation-related difficulties.

It is this broader context that explains why the challenge to the Bihar SIR generated such intense public debate. The controversy was not only confined to the Election Commission’s authority to revise electoral rolls. Rather, it concerned the manner in which that authority was exercised, the scale of deletions that followed, the burden imposed upon existing electors to re-establish their eligibility, and the absence of complete public clarity regarding the final numerical outcomes.

Even after the Supreme Court’s judgment of May 27 upholding the legality of the SIR framework, these factual and statistical questions remain largely unanswered. The Court resolved the narrow, legal issue of constitutional powers; it did not fully address the concerns arising from the moral, constitutional and real-life consequences of an exercise that ultimately resulted in the deletion of more than 5.18 crore (51.8 million) electors across the country and left significant discrepancies in the publicly available electoral data. In a democracy founded upon universal adult franchise, those questions are not peripheral. They fundamentally point to the relationship between electoral integrity and electoral inclusion, the right to Universal Adult Franchise, integral to a living, participatory Democracy. On grounds of ‘prevention of illegible voters/voting’, the fundamental and key constitutional question of not ever disallowing any eligible voter from his Right to Vote has been consciously blurred if not obliterated.

Contradictory position on citizenship and deleted voters

One of the most significant aspects of the judgment lies in the Court’s treatment of citizenship-related scrutiny undertaken during the SIR exercise.

In paragraph 186(f) of the judgement, the Court held that the Election Commission is empowered to undertake only a limited enquiry into citizenship for the purpose of satisfying itself regarding eligibility for inclusion in the electoral roll. The Court expressly clarified that such an enquiry does not amount to a determination of citizenship in the strict legal sense and that any action taken pursuant to such an exercise is confined exclusively to electoral consequences. According to the Court, the consequence of such a determination is correspondingly limited. It affects an individual’s entitlement to remain on the electoral roll and consequently their participation in the electoral process, but it does not divest the individual of citizenship nor foreclose adjudication by the competent authority under the Citizenship Act, 1955.

However, the subsequent directions appear to create a degree of tension with this formulation.

In paragraph 186 (g), the Court directed that where the Commission is not satisfied that a person fulfils the statutory conditions for inclusion in the electoral roll, it would be incumbent upon the Commission to refer such an individual to the competent authority within the Central Government for adjudication in accordance with law. The Court further clarified that any deletion effected on this ground shall remain subject to the outcome of such adjudication.

If this is genuinely so, and the Commission possesses neither the authority nor the required expertise/wherewithal to determine citizenship, can or should elections be conducted before final and thorough adjudication of all those excluded, given the hastily conducted SIR that excludes staggering numbers of Voters/Electors?

Without linking the final adjudication process under a badly conducted SIR to actual future conduct of elections, the Court has given lent its approval to a basically incomplete and flawed process. Besides, the practical consequence of this direction is significant. Although the Court repeatedly emphasises that the Commission itself does not determine citizenship, the Commission’s dissatisfaction regarding a person’s eligibility may nevertheless become the trigger for a formal citizenship adjudication before another authority. Consequently, while the Election Commission may not be exercising citizenship jurisdiction in the strict legal sense, its findings can initiate a process that ultimately culminates in a determination of citizenship status.

The issue becomes even more pronounced in paragraph 186(h), where the Court specifically directed that all cases involving persons whose names had been deleted from the 2003 electoral roll on the basis of the Commission’s opinion that they were not citizens must be referred within four weeks to the competent authority under the Citizenship Act, 1955. The competent authority was directed to decide such matters after providing notice and an opportunity of hearing and, preferably, before the next Parliamentary, Assembly or Local Body election, whichever occurs earlier.

The Court further directed that if the competent authority ultimately concludes that the deleted individuals are citizens, their names shall be restored to the electoral roll. When and if that happens, what of the Denied Right to Vote in all previous elections until the process is completed/conducted?

Significantly, however, the judgment remains silent on the converse situation.

The directions clearly prescribe the consequences where the competent authority determines that the individual is a citizen. Restoration to the electoral roll follows as a matter of course. However, the judgment does not elaborate upon the legal consequences that would follow if the competent authority were to hold that the individual is not a citizen. The judgment neither identifies the statutory mechanism governing such a situation nor discusses the broader legal implications arising from such a finding.

The judgment therefore resolves the question of institutional competence but leaves unresolved the apprehension reflected in the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) notification dated June 24, 2025. The notification provides that where the Election Registration Officer (ERO) or Assistant Election Registration Officer (AERO) entertains doubts regarding the eligibility of a proposed elector—whether due to non-submission of requisite documents or otherwise—a suo motu inquiry may be initiated, followed by the issuance of notice requiring the individual to show cause as to why his or her name should not be deleted from the electoral roll. Upon completion of field verification and examination of documentary material, the ERO/AERO is empowered to decide upon inclusion in the final electoral roll and is required to pass a reasoned speaking order in each case. Significantly, the notification further directs EROs to refer cases involving suspected foreign nationals to the competent authority under the Citizenship Act, 1955, while authorising AEROs to independently exercise the powers of the ERO under Section 13C(2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1950. Consequently, although the Court has affirmed that the Election Commission’s enquiry does not amount to a determination of citizenship, concerns persist regarding the practical operation of a framework in which electoral scrutiny may, in certain cases, culminate in processes closely connected with questions of citizenship status.

Lal Babu Hussein and the presumption of validity of existing electoral registration

A central plank of the challenge to the SIR exercise was the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Lal Babu Hussein and Others v. Electoral Registration Officer, (1995) 3 SCC 100. In Lal Babu Hussein, the Court was dealing with disputes relating to electoral registration in which questions of citizenship directly arose. Recognising the serious consequences associated with exclusion from electoral rolls, the Court laid considerable emphasis on procedural fairness, adherence to natural justice and independent application of mind by electoral authorities.

The Court directed that the officer conducting the enquiry must entertain all forms of evidence, documentary or otherwise, that the affected person seeks to produce. The affected individual must be afforded a meaningful opportunity to rebut any material relied upon against them. The enquiry was characterised as quasi-judicial in nature, requiring fairness, objectivity and reasoned decision-making. The Court further directed that election authorities must consider the provisions of the Constitution, the Citizenship Act and all related legal provisions before arriving at a conclusion. It also quashed restrictions imposed by the Election Commission on the consideration of certain documents and emphasised that evidentiary value must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Most importantly, the Court underscored that authorities must conduct themselves in a manner consistent with natural justice and free from preconceived notions.

The significance of Lal Babu Hussein lies not merely in its procedural safeguards but in its recognition that inclusion in an electoral roll carries a presumption of validity. The petitioners challenging the Bihar SIR relied heavily upon this principle. Their contention was that once a citizen has already been included in the electoral roll through a legally recognised process, the burden should not casually shift onto that individual to once again establish eligibility through a fresh and intensive verification exercise.

The Supreme Court, however, distinguished Lal Babu Hussein from the Bihar SIR.

According to the Court, Lal Babu Hussein was decided in the context of individual adjudicatory proceedings concerning specific disputes, whereas the Bihar SIR constituted a systemic and inquisitorial exercise undertaken across the electorate in furtherance of the Commission’s constitutional mandate. Consequently, the Court held that while inclusion in the electoral roll undoubtedly gives rise to a presumption of validity, such presumption remains rebuttable and cannot operate as a blanket embargo upon the Commission’s authority to undertake a Special Intensive Revision.

This distinction forms a critical component of the judgment. However, it simultaneously raises a broader constitutional question. If inclusion in an electoral roll generates a presumption of validity, what practical protection does that presumption provide when millions of electors are subjected to fresh verification through a statewide exercise? While the Court recognises the existence of the presumption, the judgment substantially limits its practical effect by permitting large-scale re-examination of already enrolled electors.

Citizenship by presumption, not by documents: the unresolved core of the SIR debate

One of the most significant yet insufficiently examined aspects of the Bihar SIR litigation concerns the nature of citizenship verification itself. Throughout the proceedings, the Election Commission justified the exercise on the ground that electoral rolls must contain only eligible citizens, while the Supreme Court ultimately held that the Commission is empowered to undertake a limited enquiry into citizenship for electoral purposes.

However, the larger difficulty lies in the fact that Indian citizenship law does not prescribe a single, universally accepted document that conclusively establishes citizenship in every circumstance. Unlike identity verification, which may be undertaken through documents such as Aadhaar, citizenship is ordinarily established through a combination of statutory presumptions, factual circumstances, birth records, lineage, residence histories and legal provisions contained in the Citizenship Act, 1955. Consequently, the entire SIR exercise appears to have proceeded on a presumption of citizenship rather than on the basis of any definitive citizenship document recognised uniformly under law.

This becomes evident from the categories of documents accepted during the SIR process. Aadhaar, for instance, is fundamentally a document of identity and residence; it is not a proof of citizenship. Similarly, documents such as ration cards, bank passbooks, school certificates, board examination certificates, property records or welfare-related documents may establish the existence, residence or identity of an individual during a particular period, but none of them independently constitute proof of Indian citizenship. Even birth certificates, which are often treated as foundational documents, do not by themselves establish citizenship in every case, particularly because citizenship by birth in India is governed by different statutory conditions depending upon the date of birth and the status of parents under the Citizenship Act. In that sense, the controversy surrounding SIR was never merely about the production of documents but it was about the legal assumption that citizenship could be inferred through a documentation framework despite the absence of any statutory provision prescribing a definitive citizenship document.

A departure from established electoral practice

The controversy is further accentuated by the fact that the SIR exercise marked a substantial departure from the traditional process of electoral roll maintenance. Historically, electoral registration in India has operated on the basis that inclusion in an existing electoral roll carries a presumption of validity unless specific grounds for deletion are established through the procedure prescribed under the Representation of the People Act, 1950 and the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960. The Supreme Court itself acknowledged this principle by recognising that inclusion in the electoral roll creates a presumption of validity, though one that is rebuttable. Yet the SIR framework effectively required millions of already enrolled electors to re-establish their eligibility through fresh documentation and verification procedures.

The contrast with earlier exercises becomes particularly relevant in light of the experience of Assam. The National Register of Citizens (NRC) process in Assam was conducted under a unique statutory and historical framework, involving specific legacy documents, electoral roll references dating back to 1951 and a legal architecture shaped by the Assam Accord. The documents accepted in the NRC process were tailored to that specific context. By contrast, the Bihar SIR exercise adopted a different framework altogether, while simultaneously rejecting reliance upon certain forms of prior electoral inclusion that had historically been treated as relevant indicators of eligibility.

Foreigners’ tribunals and the limits of analogy

Pertinently, comparisons were frequently drawn with the Foreigners Tribunals functioning in Assam. However, such analogies are not straightforward. The Foreigners Tribunal system emerged from a distinct historical and statutory context linked to immigration concerns in Assam and derives authority from specialised legal provisions applicable in that region. There is presently no equivalent nationwide mechanism automatically applicable to citizenship disputes arising from electoral revision exercises in other States.

Consequently, while the Court’s directions contemplate referral to a competent authority, they do not identify whether any existing institutional structure is capable of handling such disputes on a large scale. Nor do they explain how citizenship determinations are expected to be completed within the timeframe contemplated by paragraph 186(h), particularly when citizenship questions often involve complex inquiries into birth, descent, migration, residence and statutory status extending across decades.

The missing context behind the Bihar SIR

Any assessment of the Supreme Court’s verdict must necessarily be situated within the broader actual, on-ground, reality/factual context in which the Bihar SIR was conceived and implemented. According to the Commission, the exercise was intended to ensure that every eligible citizen was enrolled, no ineligible voter remained on the rolls and entries relating to deceased, shifted or duplicate electors were removed.

The notification stated that the Commission would scrupulously adhere to the constitutional and statutory framework governing electoral eligibility, particularly Article 326 of the Constitution and Section 16 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950. Article 326 guarantees elections based upon adult suffrage, while Section 16 identifies circumstances under which an individual may be disqualified from registration as an elector, including non-citizenship, unsoundness of mind and disqualification arising from electoral offences.

The Commission invoked Article 324 of the Constitution and Section 21 of the Representation of the People Act as the source of its authority. It further stated that the exercise represented the first intensive revision of Bihar’s electoral rolls since 2003 and was necessary to preserve the integrity of electoral rolls in light of rapid urbanisation, migration, demographic changes, underreporting of deaths and concerns regarding the presence of foreign nationals.

To implement the exercise, Booth Level Officers were directed to conduct extensive house-to-house verification. Existing electors were required to complete Enumeration Forms and provide supporting documents. Electoral Registration Officers and Assistant Electoral Registration Officers were entrusted with processing claims and objections before final publication of the revised rolls.

Although the stated objective was to ensure inclusion of all eligible voters, the implementation of the exercise generated widespread concerns from civil society organisations, political parties and election law scholars. Critics questioned the compressed timeline, the documentary requirements and the practical feasibility of requiring millions of electors to complete the process within a matter of weeks. These concerns ultimately formed the foundation of the constitutional challenge that reached the Supreme Court.

The significance of this background cannot be understated. The legal controversy surrounding the Bihar SIR did not arise merely because a revision of electoral rolls was undertaken. It arose because the revision was conducted through an extraordinary and unprecedented methodology that fundamentally altered the manner in which existing electors were required to establish their continued presence on the electoral roll.

The full judgement dated May 27, 2026 can be read here

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The post Judgement delivered, paradox prevails: every voter a citizen, but what is the fate of 51.8 million excluded? appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The agitation, organised under the banner of the Kanda Utpadak Shetkari Kranti Mahamorcha, drew large participation from onion growers across Nashik — one of India’s largest onion-producing regions — and was supported by leaders of the opposition Maha Vikas Aghadi (MVA), including Rohit Pawar, Harshvardhan Sapkal and Ambadas Danve.

Demonstrations by different lots of farmers in a few thousands at the APMC’s procurement offices across districts culminated in a 10,000-strong blockade on the highway with several thousand being detained/arrested by the police. Apart from the protesting farmers, Opposition leaders who stood with protesting farmers in support were also detained. Harshvardhan Sakpal, President of the Maharashtra Pradesh Congress Committee (MPCC), Rohit Pawar, Member of Vidhan Sabha (MLA) from Karjat from the NCP-Sharad Pawar (NCP-SP) and Ambadas Danve, former Leader of the Opposition in the State Assembly from Shiv Sena-Udhav Thackeray.

According to a report published by Rural Voice, nearly 1,500 farmers gathered in Chandwad town and temporarily blocked traffic on the highway while demanding remunerative prices for onions amid a steep crash in market rates. Farmers argued that the current prices being offered in markets are far below their production costs and have pushed cultivators into severe distress. The report noted that onion wholesale inflation has remained negative since March 2025, while retail inflation has stayed negative since May 2025, reflecting a prolonged decline in prices that has sharply reduced farmer earnings.

Across several other media reports, farmers repeatedly highlighted the widening gap between cultivation costs and market returns. The New Indian Express reported that onion growers were demanding procurement at ₹32 per kilogram while prevailing market prices in parts of Maharashtra had reportedly crashed to as low as ₹4–6 per kilogram. Farmers and opposition leaders argued that the current rates are insufficient even to recover the cost of seeds, fertilisers, labour, storage and transport.

The immediate trigger for the protest was the Centre’s announcement of onion procurement through NAFED and NCCF at revised rates of approximately ₹1,580 per quintal. Farmer groups rejected the procurement price as grossly inadequate. Speaking during the protest, several cultivators stated that onion production itself costs roughly ₹1,800–2,000 per quintal, making the government’s procurement rate economically unviable. The Hindu quoted one farmer saying that cultivators were “not even able to recover the cost of production after selling onions.”

Farmer organisations demanded that procurement prices be increased substantially, with various groups seeking rates between ₹2,400 and ₹3,000 per quintal. Protesters also called for compensation for farmers who had already sold onions at distress prices over recent months. Reports in National Herald, Mid-Day and The Times of India noted that growers additionally demanded expanded procurement operations across onion-producing talukas, direct intervention in markets, and stronger implementation of price deficiency payment schemes.

The protest also reflected growing anger over repeated export restrictions imposed on onions over the past several years. Farmers alleged that unstable export policies and sudden government interventions had weakened India’s onion trade and severely damaged farmer incomes. According to The Hindu, opposition leaders argued that international markets, including Bangladesh, had increasingly reduced onion imports from India due to inconsistent export policies.

The demonstrations quickly escalated into a large-scale highway blockade. Multiple media outlets, including The Times of India and The Economic Times, reported that protesters marched from the Chandwad APMC to the Mumbai–Agra highway, blocking traffic for nearly 90 minutes to two hours. Long queues of vehicles formed on both sides of the road as farmers raised slogans, dumped onions onto the highway and wore garlands made of onions as a symbol of their distress.

Some protesters also distributed Melody toffees during the agitation in a symbolic political gesture directed at the Prime Minister after recent public attention around the confectionery brand. The Economic Times reported that protesters sarcastically remarked that if onions were promoted in the same way, perhaps their prices too would rise.

Police later intervened and detained several protesters and opposition leaders, including Harshvardhan Sapkal (INC) Rohit Pawar (NCP-SP), and Ambadas Danve (SS-UBT). According to The Times of India, more than 300 police personnel, including riot control units, were deployed to manage the situation. The report stated that over 50 protesters were detained under provisions of the Bombay Police Act before being released later.

While authorities alleged that some protesters attempted to deflate the tyres of stranded vehicles, opposition leaders claimed they had instructed demonstrators not to target ambulances, public transport or ordinary civilians. Nevertheless, the confrontation underscored the intensity of frustration among onion growers, many of whom say they have been trapped in recurring cycles of debt, price crashes and policy uncertainty.

Importantly, the Nashik protests are not an isolated flashpoint. They reflect a broader agrarian crisis that has repeatedly surfaced in Maharashtra’s onion economy over the past decade. Farmers participating in the agitation argued that while the costs of cultivation have steadily increased due to fertilisers, pesticides, labour, transport and storage expenses, government interventions have largely focused on controlling consumer prices rather than ensuring farmer incomes.

Several farmer leaders warned that continuing distress sales and unstable pricing policies could intensify indebtedness and deepen the agrarian crisis across onion-producing regions of Maharashtra. As protests spread beyond Nashik into areas including Sambhaji Nagar and Solapur, the demonstrations have once again drawn national attention to the fragile economics of onion cultivation — a sector where even minor policy shifts can determine whether farmers survive a season or sink further into debt.

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The post “₹4 a Kilo for a Crop That Costs ₹20 to Grow”: Nashik’s onion farmers erupt in protest over deepening price crisis appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Appearing before a Bench comprising Chief Justice of India Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi and Justice Vipul Pancholi, Solicitor General Tushar Mehta stated that the Union had decided, “keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case,” to facilitate the return of the deported individuals and examine their claims to Indian citizenship in accordance with law.

“My instructions are, the Government will bring them back, and thereafter will examine their status, and depending on the outcome, will take steps accordingly,” the Solicitor General submitted before the Court, reported LiveLaw.

Senior Advocate Sanjay Hegde, appearing for the affected individuals, urged the Court to formally record the Union’s assurance. The Solicitor General agreed, while clarifying that the statement was being made in the exceptional circumstances of the present case and should not be treated as a precedent for future matters involving deportation or citizenship disputes.

As per LiveLaw, recording the submission, the Supreme Court passed an order stating: “The Solicitor General of India submits that keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, and by not treating it as a precedent to be followed in other instances, the Government of India has decided to bring the respondents back to India and to verify the claim of Indian citizenship. Their continuation in India will depend on the outcome of such enquiry.”

The Solicitor General informed the Bench that the process of bringing the individuals back from Bangladesh could take approximately eight to ten days.

The proceedings arise out of a series of habeas corpus petitions concerning Bengali-speaking families who were deported to Bangladesh in June 2025 during identity-verification operations allegedly conducted under a Ministry of Home Affairs directive. In September 2025, the Calcutta High Court had directed the repatriation of several deported persons, including Sunali Khatun, her husband Danish Sekh and their minor son Sabir Sekh, as well as Sweety Bibi and her two sons, Kurban and Imam. The High Court had sharply criticised the “hot haste” with which the deportations were carried out, observing that the affected individuals were removed without adequate inquiry, without a meaningful opportunity of hearing, and in apparent violation of procedural safeguards contained in the Union Government’s own guidelines.

The present development marks a substantial shift in the Union’s position. Earlier, in December 2025, the Centre had agreed to facilitate the return of Sunali Khatun—who was then in an advanced stage of pregnancy—and her young son on what it described as “purely humanitarian grounds.” At the time, the Supreme Court had underscored the need to balance legal enforcement with humanitarian considerations, remarking that some situations required “law to bend to humanity.”

That earlier intervention had followed disturbing findings by the Calcutta High Court regarding the manner in which the deportations were executed. According to the pleadings before the High Court, the affected families, originally from West Bengal but residing in Delhi for livelihood, were detained during an identity-verification exercise and deported to Bangladesh within five days. The High Court had noted that documentary material, including electoral records relating to the deportees’ family members, prima facie indicated Indian lineage and warranted a fuller inquiry before any coercive action could be taken.

While the Union Government has consistently maintained that the deportations were lawful and that the citizenship claims remain disputed, Friday’s undertaking before the Supreme Court indicates that the affected individuals will now be given an opportunity to establish their nationality status within India before any further steps are contemplated.

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The post Bhodu Sekh Case: Union agrees before Supreme Court to repatriate deported Bengali-speaking individuals pending citizenship inquiry appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Yet from the start of the protests in April 2026, the state attempted to reduce the protests into something smaller, narrower, and more criminal than they actually were. What was unfolding in Noida was not merely a law-and-order disturbance. It was not an irrational outbreak of mob violence. Nor was it simply a reaction to one wage notification.

It was the culmination of years of accumulated distress inside India’s industrial economy. The protests represented the eruption of long-suppressed anger over stagnant wages, forced overtime, unsafe working conditions, contractual exploitation, rising inflation, arbitrary deductions, labour insecurity, and the collapse of institutional mechanisms through which workers could negotiate with employers.

For perhaps the first time in years, the invisible workforce powering India’s manufacturing economy forced itself into national visibility. In addition, the state responded not with dialogue or labour mediation — but with policing, criminalisation, conspiracy narratives, mass FIRs, detentions, and coercive force.

That response revealed something fundamental about the contemporary Indian political economy: labour unrest is increasingly treated not as a democratic or industrial issue but as a security threat.

The industrial glory of Noida was built on invisible and disposable labour

For more than two decades, Noida and Greater Noida have been projected by governments, investors, and industry bodies as symbols of India’s industrial transformation — sprawling manufacturing corridors representing export growth, technological expansion, and integration into global supply chains. Electronics assembly plants, garment export units, pharmaceutical industries, footwear factories, automobile ancillary hubs, and mobile-phone manufacturing facilities turned the region into one of North India’s most important industrial belts.

Political speeches, investment summits, and corporate campaigns repeatedly celebrated Noida as evidence of India’s emergence as a global manufacturing destination under initiatives such as “Make in India.” But beneath this image of industrial modernity existed a vast labour regime built upon invisibility, insecurity, and disposability.

The industrial economy of Noida depended overwhelmingly on migrant labourers arriving from Bihar, eastern Uttar Pradesh, Jharkhand, Bengal, Odisha, Assam, and other economically distressed regions. These workers migrated not because industrial employment guaranteed stability, but because rural economies increasingly offered little possibility of survival amid agrarian distress, shrinking agricultural incomes, indebtedness, and chronic unemployment.

Once inside Noida’s industrial ecosystem, many workers entered conditions defined by insecurity, overcrowding, exhausting work schedules, and near-total absence of bargaining power. As The Times of India reported during the protests, large numbers of workers employed across electronics factories, garment units, footwear industries, and ancillary manufacturing facilities earned roughly between ₹11,000 and ₹13,000 per month despite routinely working extended shifts. Workers and labour organisers told the newspaper that shifts regularly stretched beyond eight hours, often reaching 10–12 hours during periods of intense production demand.

Several workers alleged that overtime had effectively become compulsory. According to accounts cited in The Indian Express, workers frequently began shifts early in the morning and returned late at night after exhausting factory schedules, leaving little time for sleep, recovery, or family life. In many factories, labourers alleged that refusal to comply with overtime expectations risked threats, penalties, or removal from work rosters.

The wage structure itself revealed the depth of economic exploitation. Even before deductions, monthly wages barely sustained survival within NCR’s rapidly rising cost of living. After accounting for rent, transport, food, electricity, and remittances sent back to families in villages, many workers reportedly retained almost nothing by the end of the month.

Contract labour became the central mechanism of industrial control

One of the clearest realities exposed by the Noida protests was that the industrial economy of NCR no longer functions primarily through stable, direct employment. Instead, it increasingly operates through a vast contract labour regime that allows industries to maximise production while minimising accountability.

The modern factory system in Noida is built not merely on low wages, but on deliberately structured insecurity.

Across electronics factories, garment export units, footwear industries, pharmaceutical facilities, automobile ancillary plants, and mobile-phone assembly units, workers repeatedly stated during the protests that they were employed not directly by companies but through contractors, labour suppliers, manpower agencies, and intermediaries who controlled recruitment, attendance, wages, discipline, and dismissals. Reports by Hindustan Times described these intermediaries as effectively functioning as “shop-floor fixers” operating between management and labour.

This structure was not incidental to industrial production. It became central to the organisation of industrial power. The contractor system served several purposes simultaneously:

• insulating companies from direct legal liability,
• fragmenting workers into unstable categories,
• weakening collective bargaining,
• discouraging unionisation,
• and ensuring labour remained permanently replaceable.

Workers repeatedly described how insecurity itself became a mechanism of industrial discipline, as reported by The Wire.

Many alleged they had no written contracts and could be removed from work without explanation. Others stated that labourers were routinely terminated before they became eligible for statutory protections, bonuses, provident fund benefits, or wage increments. Accounts documented in reports by The Indian Express and labour organisers covering the protests suggested that the fear of sudden dismissal had become normalised inside factories.

The figures cited during the protests were staggering:

• 58.2% of workers reportedly had no written employment contract,
• 51.7% lacked social security protections,
• over 47% were not entitled to paid leave.

These numbers revealed something fundamental about Noida’s industrial economy: Insecurity was not exceptional. It had become structural.

Even inside formally organised manufacturing systems linked to major domestic and international supply chains, workers increasingly existed in conditions resembling informal labour.

Reports emerging during the protests, including coverage by Scroll and labour-rights commentators, repeatedly highlighted how contractualisation fragmented workers inside the same factory. Workers performing identical labour often belonged to different employment categories depending on the contractor through whom they were hired. This meant different wage structures, different entitlements, and different levels of vulnerability despite identical work on the same production lines. The contractor system therefore did more than reduce labour costs. It actively prevented worker solidarity.

Workers alleged that attendance systems were manipulated, overtime compensation arbitrarily reduced, and deductions imposed without transparency. Multiple reports documented complaints regarding deductions for aprons, uniforms, slippers, safety equipment, and even questionable “ITI diploma” schemes that workers believed either did not exist or offered no meaningful educational benefit.

Several workers reportedly told journalists and labour organisers that raising complaints about overtime, wage deductions, or conditions could lead to immediate removal from work rosters. This fear was economically devastating for migrant workers. For labourers supporting families in villages while surviving in rented industrial settlements around Noida, losing employment could immediately trigger hunger, debt, or eviction.

As per The Caravan, women workers faced particularly severe vulnerabilities inside this structure. Reports by independent media platforms and labour groups documenting the protests described complaints regarding overcrowded and unhygienic toilets, inadequate sanitation facilities, and dismissive responses from supervisors when concerns were raised. Contractual insecurity also made reporting harassment or abuse significantly more difficult because workers feared retaliation or dismissal.

The Noida protests therefore exposed how contractualisation had fundamentally transformed industrial relations in India. The contractor system was no longer merely a labour arrangement. It had become the primary architecture through which industrial discipline, labour suppression, and economic control were maintained across India’s manufacturing economy.

Inflation turned low wages into a survival crisis

The immediate economic context behind the protests was critical. By early 2026, industrial workers across the NCR region were already under immense financial pressure. The energy crisis triggered by geopolitical tensions in West Asia and disruptions around the Strait of Hormuz sharply increased fuel prices across India. LPG costs surged, transport became more expensive, and food inflation intensified dramatically.

For workers already surviving on stagnant wages, the consequences were devastating. Indian Express and The New Indian Express repeatedly documented workers explaining how monthly wages no longer covered basic survival expenses. Rent alone reportedly consumed one-third to half of monthly income for many migrant labourers living in overcrowded industrial settlements around Noida and Greater Noida.

One worker described returning to cooking on a wood-fired chulha because LPG cylinders had become unaffordable. Others explained that after paying rent and transport expenses, almost nothing remained for food, healthcare, or family support.

The protests therefore emerged from material desperation. This was not abstract labour dissatisfaction. Workers were confronting the collapse of subsistence itself. The erosion of real wages had become impossible to ignore. Even as industrial productivity increased and companies expanded production, workers experienced declining purchasing power and worsening living conditions. The industrial economy demanded more labour from workers while giving them less capacity to survive. That contradiction produced explosive anger.

Haryana’s wage hike triggered an explosion that was already building

The immediate trigger for the Noida uprising came from neighbouring Haryana. After sustained labour unrest and wage-related mobilisation across industrial centres such as Manesar, Gurugram, and Faridabad, the Haryana government announced a substantial increase in minimum wages in April 2026. As per The Hindu, the revised wage rates reportedly increased minimum pay for unskilled workers from roughly ₹11,000–11,300 to more than ₹15,000 per month.

The announcement spread rapidly through worker WhatsApp groups, labour settlements, contractor networks, factory dormitories, and informal worker circles across Noida and Greater Noida. Its political impact was immediate. Workers across industrial belts in Uttar Pradesh began directly comparing their wages with those offered in neighbouring Haryana for nearly identical work.

The question emerging inside factories was devastatingly simple: Why were workers producing for the same industrial economy being paid thousands less simply because they worked across a state border?

This comparison carried enormous political force because Noida, Greater Noida, Gurugram, Manesar, and Faridabad do not function as isolated industrial regions. They form part of an interconnected NCR manufacturing ecosystem where labour, contractors, and production networks constantly move across state boundaries. Workers assembling electronics, garments, automobile components, footwear products, or mobile phones in Noida often performed labour nearly identical to workers employed in factories in Manesar or Gurugram. Yet wage structures differed dramatically.

Coverage by Scroll, and worker testimonies documented by independent labour-rights groups highlighted how workers increasingly viewed this disparity as evidence of deliberate labour suppression rather than economic necessity. The comparison with Haryana transformed workplace dissatisfaction into political anger. Workers and labour organisers reportedly argued that industrial competitiveness in Uttar Pradesh increasingly depended upon keeping labour cheaper, more weakly protected, and less organised than neighbouring states.

This was one of the most important dimensions of the protests. The Noida unrest rapidly became about far more than a single wage revision. It exposed a broader development model in which states compete for industrial investment by suppressing labour costs, expanding contractualisation, weakening collective bargaining structures, and maintaining a permanently insecure workforce.

The collapse of labour institutions left workers with only the streets

One of the deepest structural causes behind the unrest was the collapse of institutional labour negotiation mechanisms. Historically, industrial disputes in India were mediated through trade unions, labour commissioners, conciliation systems, industrial tribunals, and collective bargaining processes. Those systems have steadily weakened.

Reports by Article 14 and others repeatedly noted that workers today possess very few effective institutional avenues through which grievances can be meaningfully addressed. The weakening of trade unions combined with the expansion of contract labour fragmented workers and undermined collective organising.

As a result, workers increasingly felt that no institutional mechanism existed through which employers or the state would seriously engage with their grievances. This is crucial to understanding the escalation in Noida. The unrest did not emerge because workers suddenly became violent or irrational. It emerged because institutional channels for labour negotiation had been systematically hollowed out.

Workers turned to the streets because the structures historically meant to mediate industrial conflict had largely collapsed. The tragedy is that the state itself helped weaken these institutions — and then responded to the resulting unrest through coercion instead of reconstruction.

 Labour Codes deepened worker anxiety and distrust

The protests also unfolded against the backdrop of the implementation of the four Labour Codes in late 2025. The Codes covering wages, industrial relations, occupational safety, and social security were promoted as reforms intended to modernise labour regulation and improve ease of doing business. But workers and labour scholars increasingly viewed them differently.

Many feared that the reforms weakened labour protections while expanding managerial power and flexibility.

Labour economist K.R. Shyam Sundar noted in The Indian Express that the new framework created uncertainty regarding working-hour limits and increased executive discretion in labour regulation. Workers repeatedly alleged that “flexibility” effectively meant longer hours, increased overtime pressure, and weaker enforcement of labour standards.

The old Factories Act imposed clearer restrictions on daily working hours and spread-over limits. Critics argued that the new framework diluted these protections under the language of reform. Importantly, many workers reportedly expected the Labour Codes to improve wages and standardise protections after their implementation in November 2025. When these expectations were not realised, frustration deepened dramatically. Workers increasingly perceived labour reform not as protection but as deregulation in favour of industrial capital.

The critical appraisal of the new labour codes may be read here.

The state reframed a labour crisis as a security threat

Perhaps the most alarming feature of the Noida protests was how rapidly the Uttar Pradesh government transformed what was fundamentally a labour and economic crisis into a security operation. From the very beginning, the state appeared far more willing to investigate conspiracy than exploitation.

Instead of foregrounding the actual grievances driving workers onto the streets — stagnant wages, inflation, contractual exploitation, unpaid overtime, unsafe working conditions, arbitrary dismissals, and collapsing labour protections — the official response increasingly shifted toward the language of destabilisation, subversion, and law-and-order threat.

As reported across The Hindu, senior officials and police authorities repeatedly suggested that “outside forces” and organised conspirators were responsible for the unrest.

Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath publicly suggested that “urban naxalites” and disruptive actors were attempting to provoke industrial instability. Simultaneously, sections of the police and administration alleged that Pakistani social media handles had amplified misinformation surrounding the protests.

This framing was not politically neutral. It fundamentally altered the meaning of the protests themselves. Workers demanding dignified wages and humane working conditions were no longer treated primarily as citizens articulating economic grievances. They were increasingly portrayed as potential instruments of destabilisation.

The implication was deeply dangerous: Large-scale labour mobilisation itself became suspicious. The state effectively suggested that worker anger on such a scale could not emerge organically from economic suffering and structural exploitation. Instead, unrest had to be explained through hidden instigators, ideological infiltration, foreign amplification, or organised conspiracy. This reflected a broader political tendency increasingly visible across India — the securitisation of democratic dissent.

Economic protest was not treated as evidence of policy failure, labour distress, or institutional collapse. It was reframed as a threat to public order and industrial stability. This shift carried enormous consequences.

Once labour unrest was classified as a security problem rather than a social or economic issue, coercive policing became easier to justify while structural questions about wages, labour protections, and exploitation were pushed into the background.

Coverage and commentary emerging during the protests in Scroll.in repeatedly warned that this narrative erased workers’ own political agency. The implication was that workers themselves were incapable of collectively resisting exploitation unless manipulated by hidden actors.

Historically, this has been one of the most common methods used by states to delegitimise labour movements. By converting economic anger into conspiracy, governments avoid confronting the structural conditions that produced the unrest in the first place.

The tragedy of the Noida response was that it prevented any serious political engagement with the actual realities workers were describing: impossible living costs, wage stagnation, contractor exploitation, unsafe workplaces, and the collapse of labour negotiation mechanisms. The more the state emphasised conspiracy, the less it spoke about labour. And that silence revealed the deeper priorities underlying the response.

Detailed report on fact finding on Noida protest may be read here.

Police repression became the state’s primary language

As the protests intensified around April 13, the state moved decisively away from negotiation and toward coercive suppression. What began as labour unrest was increasingly met with the machinery of criminal law, mass policing, surveillance, and punitive force.

Reports emerging from Noida and Greater Noida in Hindustan Times described widespread lathi charges, raids, detentions, arrests, and sweeping FIRs filed against workers and unnamed persons allegedly involved in the protests. Workers and activists repeatedly alleged that police intervention escalated confrontations that had initially been localised and economically driven.

Instead of functioning as mediators attempting to reduce tensions, police operations increasingly appeared designed to demonstrate overwhelming state control. The scale of criminalisation was extraordinary.

According to reports emerging during the crackdown from The Indian Express, police registered cases against thousands of unnamed persons under serious penal provisions including rioting, unlawful assembly, destruction of property, and attempt to murder. Entire working-class neighbourhoods reportedly came under fear and surveillance.

Workers described police raids in labour settlements late at night. Families reportedly searched desperately for detained relatives without clear information regarding where they had been taken. Independent reports and labour-rights accounts alleged that minors and uninvolved persons were also picked up during police operations conducted across industrial localities.

Accounts emerging from detention facilities and Kasna jail raised serious constitutional concerns. Lawyers, labour organisers, and civil-rights activists cited in reports by Scroll.in alleged violations of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution, including arbitrary detentions, denial of timely legal access, failures to promptly inform families, and procedural irregularities surrounding arrests.

What was particularly striking was the collective nature of the crackdown. The policing increasingly resembled punitive action directed not only at specific accused individuals but at labour communities themselves. Fear spread rapidly through worker settlements across Noida and Greater Noida. The message being communicated by the state was unmistakable: Collective resistance would invite overwhelming coercive force.

This was especially significant because the protests themselves emerged from the collapse of institutional labour mediation mechanisms. Workers had already reached a point where they felt trade unions, labour departments, and industrial dispute systems no longer meaningfully addressed their grievances. The state’s response to this institutional collapse was not reconstruction of dialogue, rather it was criminalisation.

The criminalisation of labour solidarity was equally significant

The crackdown did not remain confined to workers physically present at protest sites. Very quickly, the focus of police action expanded toward labour organisers, student activists, writers, independent voices, and individuals publicly expressing solidarity with workers. What made this phase of the crackdown especially alarming was that the state increasingly appeared to treat labour organising itself as suspicious political activity.

The shift became particularly visible through the arrests and prosecutions that followed the April 13 protests. As reported by The Indian Express, police repeatedly alleged that the unrest had not emerged organically from worker anger but had instead been orchestrated by an “organised syndicate of outsiders.” Authorities claimed that labour organisers and activists associated with groups such as Mazdoor Bigul Dasta played a “significant role” in provoking violence, disrupting public order, and inciting workers.

This narrative became central to the state’s justification for the crackdown. Among the most prominent cases was that of Aditya Anand, a 28-year-old BTech graduate from National Institute of Technology Jamshedpur and an employee at Genpact, whom police described as a “mastermind” behind the Noida protests. As reported by The Indian Express, Anand was arrested from Tiruchirappalli in Tamil Nadu on April 18 and later linked by Haryana Police to separate labour unrest and violence in Manesar that had occurred four days before the Noida protests.

Police alleged that Anand delivered “provocative speeches,” organised marches, and encouraged workers to block roads. He was booked under multiple serious provisions, including rioting, unlawful assembly, assault on public servants, criminal conspiracy, and attempt to murder. Yet the details emerging about Anand’s background complicated the state’s narrative considerably.

His family described him not as a violent conspirator but as someone deeply engaged with labour issues and social movements. His younger brother told The Indian Express that Anand had rejected job opportunities abroad, including in Sweden, because he wanted to remain in India and work on issues affecting ordinary people. The family stated that he had long been associated with labour concerns and youth activism linked to the Naujawan Bharat Sabha, the organisation historically associated with Bhagat Singh.

The symbolism here was politically significant. A labour activist speaking publicly about workers’ rights was increasingly being framed through the language of criminal conspiracy and organised disorder. The crackdown intensified further in May when authorities invoked the stringent National Security Act against two accused linked to the protests: Aakriti Chaudhary, a 25-year-old history graduate from Delhi University, and former journalist Satyam Verma.

The use of the NSA marked a dramatic escalation. Preventive detention laws of this nature are generally associated with threats to national security or public order of an exceptional nature. Their invocation against individuals associated with labour protests and worker solidarity immediately raised concerns among civil-rights groups and labour organisations.

According to The Indian Express, police alleged that Chaudhary and Verma were active members of Mazdoor Bigul Dasta and had played “significant roles” in violence, arson, and disorder during the protests. But the accounts emerging from families and lawyers sharply challenged this narrative.

Aakriti Chaudhary’s father reportedly stated that she had been picked up from Botanical Garden Metro station on April 11 — two days before the violence on April 13 — raising serious questions about the chronology of the allegations against her. Her family argued that she had merely participated in activities supporting workers’ rights.

Her father, who works with Ganashakti, the CPI mouthpiece, told The Indian Express: “I’m proud that my daughter was raising her voice for workers’ rights. She is the Bhagat Singh of today.”

Similarly, advocates representing other accused argued that students and social workers had merely expressed solidarity with workers through speeches, meetings, and street plays — activities traditionally associated with democratic protest movements.

The case of Satyam Verma was equally revealing. Verma, a journalist and editor associated with writings on Bhagat Singh and anti-colonial political history, was arrested from his residence in Lucknow. Friends and associates described him as a long-time journalist, translator, and intellectual engaged with labour and democratic issues rather than violent mobilisation. Other arrests followed a similar pattern.

Himanshu Thakur, a 24-year-old history postgraduate from Hansraj College and a NET-qualified scholar, was accused of instigating crowds and coordinating violence. His family described him as someone involved in student activism, translation work, and social causes, including protests relating to student deaths during the Delhi flooding crisis.

What became increasingly visible through these arrests was a larger pattern: The state was collapsing the distinction between labour organising, political solidarity, and criminal conspiracy.

This distinction mattered enormously. Instead of recognising collective labour mobilisation as a democratic response emerging from exploitation, inflation, contractual insecurity, and wage stagnation, authorities increasingly personalised the unrest through narratives centred on masterminds, infiltrators, and ideological actors.

This framing effectively erased workers’ own political agency. The implication was that workers themselves could not independently organise resistance after years of economic distress and labour exploitation. Their anger had to be explained through manipulation by “outsiders.” Historically, states confronting labour unrest have often relied upon precisely this strategy.

Worker mobilisation is reframed not as a consequence of material exploitation but as evidence of political contamination or organised subversion. The consequences of such a framework extend far beyond one protest. Once labour solidarity itself becomes suspicious, the democratic space available for workers to organise, negotiate, document abuses, and collectively assert rights begins shrinking dramatically. This was what made the Noida crackdown especially significant. The issue was no longer merely how the state handled one industrial protest.

The deeper question was whether independent labour mobilisation itself was increasingly being treated as illegitimate within India’s contemporary industrial order — particularly when it challenged industrial profitability, disrupted production, or exposed the inequalities hidden beneath the language of economic growth and “Make in India” industrial success.

Detailed report on state crackdown on dissent may be read here.

Noida was one of the most important labour protests in contemporary India

The importance of Noida cannot be overstated. The protests formed part of a broader wave of labour unrest across industrial regions including Manesar, Surat, Panipat, Barauni, Faridabad, and other manufacturing hubs.

Across sectors and geographies, workers raised remarkably similar demands:

• living wages,
• overtime compensation,
• social security,
• dignified working conditions,
• stable employment,
• humane working hours.

This convergence revealed a national labour crisis. Noida exposed the widening contradiction at the centre of India’s economic model: expanding industrial growth and rising productivity alongside deepening worker insecurity and stagnant real wages. Most importantly, the protests revealed the limits of governing labour through precarity, exhaustion, fear, and suppression.

The interim wage hikes announced after the unrest only reinforced this reality. The government responded meaningfully only after workers paralysed industrial movement and disrupted production. That fact alone is a profound indictment of the existing labour regime.

Noida was not merely an industrial disturbance. It was a warning from the workforce sustaining India’s manufacturing economy — a warning that an industrial system built on insecurity, wage suppression, informalisation, and coercion cannot indefinitely maintain social peace.

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Workers Cry for Justice!

The post Noida Protest 2026: A labour uprising the state refused to understand appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The team, formed by civil rights group Jan Hastakshep included Supreme Court senior advocate S.S. Nehra, former Hindu College professor Ish Mishra, retired IFS officer Ashok Sharma, senior journalist Anil Dubey, and senior advocate M.Z. Ali.

The team visited Noida on April 24 and spoke to workers across multiple industrial units, shopkeepers and other affected residents on the issue.

According to the statement released by the team, investigators have found no evidence to support allegations circulated by sections of the administration and media that foreign elements were behind the protests.

Instead, the team reported how, the anger among the workers had been building for years over low wages, rising inflation and comparisons with higher minimum wages in neighbouring Delhi and Haryana. The agitating workers told the team that factories relocating from Delhi and Gurugram to Noida continued paying lower wages after shifting operations, despite higher pay scales prevailing in those regions.

The fact-finding group said that this dissatisfaction intensified after workers learned that wages at units in Haryana –barely 170 kilometres away–had increased significantly following a hike in minimum wages there. This comparison, combined with stagnant wages in Noida for 10 years, reportedly triggered the initial sit-in protest at a garment-manufacturing unit in Sector 83 earlier this month. According to the Fact-finding team’s statement, protests spread across industrial clusters in Sectors 59, 60, 62, 83 and 84, eventually drawing tens of thousands of workers onto the streets. The team also alleged that police action escalated tensions and that more than 1,000 workers were detained, with some families not informed of their whereabouts for several days.

The team of investigators noted that the state government’s subsequent actions, including issuing notices to 43 contractors, cancelling licences of 10 contractors and announcing a 21 per cent wage increase, indicated acknowledgement of the irregularities in wage practices rather than evidence of any external conspiracy.

Significantly, a trade union leader who had worked in a multinational company, also told the team that two decades ago, wages were not an issue in NOIDA and Greater NOIDA because wages here were higher than in other states. However, conditions have changed over the past 20 years.

Disparate wages: While wages increased in Delhi and Haryana, they did not increase in Uttar Pradesh, and companies arbitrarily set their own minimum wages. This difference also significantly increased exploitation. He added that most of NOIDA industries operate with only contract labour, with companies hiring workers through contractors who provide no security or other benefits.

The team concluded that the unrest reflected long-standing labour grievances rooted in wage stagnation and rising living costs, and called for implementation of revised minimum wages, linking wages to inflation, and withdrawal of cases against workers involved in the protests.

Related:

NSA slapped on journalist, DU scholar in Noida workers’ protest case amid allegations of crackdown on dissent

The post No ‘Pakistan conspiracy’ in Noida labour unrest: Fact-finding report appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Long before the current anxieties around Special Intensive Revision (SIR) exercises emerged, CJP had already been deeply involved in questions surrounding identity documentation, citizenship verification and exclusionary administrative processes. Our first intensive and continuing interventions are in the north-eastern state of Assam, where a peculiar blend of exclusivist xenophobic politics shaped policy and actions that have together targeted legitimate Indians in the quagmire of having ‘to establish documented citizenship.’ Read about CJP’d continuing journey through 2025 here.

Subsequently, two years down the line, 2019-2020, during the months and years of fear generated by the CAA-NRC debates, CJP organised extensive documentation and awareness campaigns across several states, helping communities understand legal processes, preserve records, obtain missing documents and resist panic-driven misinformation. The organisation’s interventions consistently focused on ensuring that vulnerable populations—especially minorities, migrants, women, Adivasis, Denotified Tribes (DNTs), informal workers and economically marginalised groups—were not pushed outside the constitutional framework through procedural barriers.

Detailed reports may be read here, here, here and here.

It is from this history of engagement that CJP, together with Vote for Democracy (VFD), began conducting a series of detailed SIR awareness and training sessions in Maharashtra. In 2025, with the elections to the Bihar State Assembly, the State’s most recent efforts to push large sections of Indians to potential disenfranchisement by exacting an unrealistic ‘citizenship test’ began. The Special Intensive Revision (SIR) exercise that subsequently travelled to Bengal, Tamil Nadu, Gujarat and Uttar Pradesh has defied statutory law (Representation of People’s Act, 1951), Constitutional precedents (Article 14, 15 and 21) and the basic principles of due process and natural justice.

Tragically, this SIR exercise has been preceded by the most significant erosion of autonomy and integrity of a constitutional body like the Election Commission of India (ECI), casting a cloud on the very integrity of the election process under Articles 324-326 of the Indian Constitution. Vote for Democracy (VFD), a citizens’ platform guided by experts has analysed and exposed this deterioration of fair and free elections from the parliamentary elections of April-June 2024. VFD’s reports may be read here, here, here and here.

These trainings were never intended to legitimise or endorse a hurried and deeply problematic SIR exercise. In fact, the position adopted by CJP and VFD has remained unequivocal: the current SIR model, as implemented across multiple states, raises profound constitutional concerns because of the manner in which it transfers the burden of proof onto ordinary citizens while creating conditions ripe for exclusion and disenfranchisement. The purpose of the trainings, therefore, was not compliance for its own sake. It was protection.

As the CJP-VFD booklet on SIR itself clearly states, the trainings are meant “strictly to arm you with the tools to defend your rights and navigate this unconstitutional hurdle, not to legitimise it.”

The booklet may be read here and here.

At a time when fear, misinformation and confusion were spreading rapidly among communities, the trainings sought to communicate one essential message: panic helps exclusionary systems thrive. Knowledge, preparation and collective solidarity followed by determined interventions and action, are what protect democratic rights.

The Maharashtra trainings

Over the course of several months, CJP conducted three major SIR-focused training and awareness programmes in Maharashtra:

• March 21: Training session with Bombay Catholic Sabha
• April 16: Joint awareness and training session with a Community-Based Organisation (CBO), Agripada, South Mumbai
• April 30: Community training programme with Jan Haqq Sangharsh Samiti

These were not routine seminars or technical workshops. They became spaces where fear, uncertainty and lived experiences surfaced openly.

Participants included community organisers, women’s groups, migrant workers, social activists, minority organisations, students, religious leaders, local volunteers, housing rights advocates, DNT representatives, trade union workers, and ordinary residents increasingly worried about how SIR-style exercises could impact their ability to remain on electoral rolls.

Across all three programmes, a striking reality emerged repeatedly: for many people, the fear was not abstract. It was deeply personal. The idea that decades-old documents could suddenly determine one’s legitimacy as a voter –and thereafter a citizen– triggered anxieties rooted in poverty, displacement, migration, illiteracy, gender discrimination and bureaucratic neglect accumulated over generations.

In fact, for a joint delegation meeting with the CEO of Maharashtra, Chokkalingam in early March 2026, of which CJP was a crucial part, was revelatory. The officer unambiguously stated that the 2003 Guidelines would not be followed but also admitted that ‘no fresh guidelines had yet been issued’ by the ECI, Delhi. Emphasising that the current exercise would be one in determining that ‘only Indians’ figure on the electoral roll, Chokkalingam explained the amendments made to Section 3 of the Indian Citizenship Act, 1955 that distinguished between a) those born before 1987, b) those between 1987 (July 1) and 2004 and those c) those born after that date in terms of what sorts of documentary proof were required to ‘establish’ Indian citizenship. For a) simply being born in India was proof enough, for b) in addition to his/her own birth in India, it was required to establish that at least one of the parents was Indian; and for c) it was important to establish that neither mother nor father was an ‘illegal immigrant.’

The Bihar and West Bengal Experience: Why these trainings became necessary

The Maharashtra sessions were built directly upon the extensive field experiences documented by CJP and VFD teams in states where SIR-related exercises had already generated serious problems. These include Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat and Tamil Nadu. Assam has, meanwhile only so far had a Special Revision (SR) of its rolls, not an SIR.

Ground reports from Bihar and West Bengal revealed patterns of confusion, mass anxiety, arbitrary notices, technological mismatches, documentation hurdles and administrative opacity. These findings eventually culminated in the publication of the detailed handbook Inside the Special Intensive Revision (SIR): Deadly Deadlines, Mechanical Disenfranchisement, and the Ground Reality of Claims and Objections Period & SIR Notices/Hearings.

The booklet combined investigative analysis, field documentation, legal guidance and practical training material. It explained the structure of the SIR process, the roles of electoral officers, the significance of legacy electoral rolls, the functioning of notices and hearings, appeal mechanisms, acceptable documents, and the methods through which exclusion was being operationalised on the ground.

Most importantly, it documented how the current SIR framework represented a dramatic departure from earlier electoral revision exercises.

The 2003 SIR process, for example, had been conducted over nearly six months, relied on existing electoral rolls and EPIC cards as foundational documents, and emphasised facilitative house-to-house verification. Enumerators were not expected to function as citizenship adjudicators. This time round, 2025-2026, with the ECI acting like the weaponised (read unconstitutional) arm of an exclusivist regime, hurried and arbitrary adjudications on citizenship have become the order of the day.

The present model, therefore, has increasingly transformed electoral verification into an exercise marked by compressed timelines, mechanical scrutiny, opaque software systems, and retrospective documentary burdens. CJP and VFD’s field reports documented how software-driven mismatches involving spelling variations, transliteration differences, age-gap calculations and data-entry inconsistencies generated large numbers of “unmatched” or “suspicious” entries.

The Maharashtra trainings therefore emerged not from speculation, but from documented experiences already unfolding elsewhere.

What happens when the poor are asked to prove their existence?

A significant portion of the Maharashtra trainings conducted by CJP focused on helping participants understand the broad range of documents that may potentially be relied upon during SIR-related verification processes. Methods of accessing documents that may exist and be available with local authorities, understanding and tracking legacy and linkages to those voters/citizens who are available and verifiable in the baseline document –the electoral role between 2002-2004—were also granularly shared. CJP’s experiences pan-India across states and regions, intervening on multiple fronts has created a rich knowledge base of accessing documents from levels of the bureaucracy and this is being widely shared. The trainings repeatedly stressed an important point: people often panic because they assume that the absence of one “perfect” document automatically disqualifies them. However, the indicative list itself demonstrates that identity and eligibility can be established through multiple forms of documentary evidence.

Participants were carefully guided through the list of acceptable or supporting documents referenced in the handbook and subsequent judicial interventions. These include: identity cards or pension payment orders issued to government employees or pensioners; identity cards or certificates issued by government authorities, banks, post offices, LIC or PSUs prior to July 1, 1987; birth certificates; passports; matriculation or educational certificates; permanent residence certificates; forest rights certificates; OBC, SC or ST caste certificates; NRC records where available; family registers prepared by state or local authorities; land or house allotment certificates; Aadhaar cards; and Class 10 admit cards or pass certificates.

Throughout the trainings, facilitators repeatedly emphasised that even one among these documents, when supported with supplementary records and consistent identity details, could help establish a person’s identity and continued existence within the social and administrative framework of the country. The sessions therefore focused heavily on practical strategies: how to organise documents chronologically, how to retrieve old records, how to preserve photocopies and acknowledgements, and how to identify alternative supporting papers where primary documents were unavailable.

Yet, as the discussions during the trainings revealed, the ground reality surrounding documentation is far more complicated than official lists often assume. For large sections of the population, documents are not simply lying safely preserved in family cupboards waiting to be produced before authorities. Instead, documentation histories are fragmented by poverty, migration, environmental disasters, displacement, gender discrimination and bureaucratic neglect accumulated over decades. Many participants explained that births in their communities took place at home and were never formally registered. Others spoke of losing papers during drought-induced migration, floods, demolitions, fires or repeated changes in residence. Several older participants described how schools they attended no longer exist, making retrieval of school leaving certificates or mark sheets almost impossible today.

Women repeatedly raised concerns about documentary inconsistencies arising from early (pre 18 or 21 years) marriage-related surname changes, spelling variations and shifts in residence. Some women who were married young explained that they had voted for the first time from their husband’s homes, bypassing any formal electoral linkage with their natal families. This now makes tracing documentary continuity with parental records extremely difficult though not impossible.

Similarly, members of Denotified and Nomadic Tribes (DNTs), migrant workers and daily wage earners pointed out that even obtaining caste certificates, residence proofs or duplicate records often requires multiple visits to government offices—something many cannot afford without losing crucial daily income. For homeless persons, tenants, informal workers and highly mobile populations, stable address-based documentation itself becomes a challenge.

The trainings therefore highlighted a critical contradiction at the heart of documentation-heavy verification exercises: while the State increasingly demands layered documentary proof, millions of people have historically lived at the margins of formal documentation systems themselves. In this context, the sessions sought not only to explain which documents may help, but also to collectively confront the deeper structural inequalities that determine who is able to preserve paperwork, who is visible within administrative systems, and who remains vulnerable to exclusion.

Documents Decide Everything: The fear communities brought into the trainings

One of the most powerful aspects of the Maharashtra sessions was the extent to which people spoke openly about the fragility of their documentary histories. Again and again, participants raised concerns that exposed the enormous disconnect between bureaucratic expectations and lived realities.

The missing birth certificate problem: Perhaps the most recurring concern involved birth certificates.

Large sections of older generations, particularly from rural, working-class and poor communities, were born at home and never formally registered with civil authorities. Institutional births were inaccessible, expensive or culturally uncommon for decades. Women participants repeatedly spoke about how neither they nor their siblings had any birth records because births took place with the assistance of local midwives rather than within hospitals.

The statistics themselves reveal why this remains such a massive issue. Birth registration in India became widespread only relatively recently. Even official data shows significant historical gaps in registration coverage.

For many participants, the sudden expectation that decades-old birth records must now exist produced profound anxiety.

Maharashtra’s histories of drought, migration and loss: Participants also described how environmental and economic crises had repeatedly destroyed family records.

Several communities had lived through devastating droughts across parts of Maharashtra, forcing migration, distress movement and repeated displacement. Others recalled losing documents during floods, cyclones, fires or long-term housing instability. Some participants referred to records lost during the tsunami years or during forced relocations connected to urban redevelopment and informal settlement demolitions. For poor families surviving through cycles of migration and precarious labour, preserving fragile paper records over decades was often impossible.

Yet the current SIR-style expectations assume stable homes, continuous paperwork, formal institutional access and uninterrupted documentation histories.

When the school itself no longer exists: Another major issue that surfaced repeatedly was the problem of accessing school records. Many older government schools, village schools and informal educational institutions no longer exist in their original form. Buildings were demolished, records disappeared, administrations changed, or archives were never digitised.

Several participants explained that even when they knew they had once studied in a particular school, obtaining school leaving certificates or mark sheets today had become practically impossible because the institution itself had shut down or records were destroyed years ago.

For individuals from poor families who studied intermittently or dropped out early to begin work, educational documentation is often fragmentary or inaccessible. Yet these very records are increasingly treated as crucial identity markers.

The invisible burden on Denotified tribes and marginalised communities: The trainings also foregrounded concerns specific to Denotified and Nomadic Tribes (DNTs), whose histories of exclusion from stable settlement patterns, education systems and formal state recognition continue to shape their present vulnerabilities.

Participants pointed out that many DNT communities remain structurally under-documented because generations lived outside formal administrative frameworks. Accessing caste certificates, residence records or historical proofs often requires repeated interactions with distant bureaucratic offices.

For daily wage earners, every visit to a government office means losing a day’s income. The trainings repeatedly emphasised that documentation burdens are never socially neutral. They fall most heavily on those already living precariously.

Women and documentary disruption: Women’s experiences emerged as one of the most significant dimensions of the discussions. Across communities and religions, women described how marriage routinely disrupted documentary continuity. Changes in surname after marriage frequently resulted in inconsistencies across different identity documents.

Many older women explained that they had married before turning 18 and had voted for the first time from their husband’s residence rather than from their natal home. This makes establishing documentary linkage with parental records extraordinarily difficult decades later.

Minor spelling variations across ration cards, Aadhaar cards, voter IDs, educational certificates and marriage-related records further complicate verification. The Maharashtra trainings paid particular attention to these gendered documentary realities because women are often expected to “prove” continuity across names, addresses and households shaped by patriarchal social structures.

Electoral revision cannot become citizenship surveillance

Throughout the sessions, CJP and VFD repeatedly stressed a crucial constitutional principle: electoral revision cannot be converted into a mechanism of suspicion against already-enfranchised citizens.

The handbook itself notes that the present SIR framework reverses long-standing democratic presumptions by effectively treating registered voters as suspect unless they can repeatedly prove their eligibility through documentary evidence.

This is particularly alarming because millions of people currently on electoral rolls have already voted in multiple elections over decades.

The trainings therefore focused heavily on rights awareness:

• understanding notices,
• organising documents,
• preserving acknowledgements,
• seeking written orders,
• attending hearings with support persons,
• filing appeals,
• resisting arbitrary deletions,
• and documenting procedural violations.

Participants were also trained on how to search older electoral rolls, including the 2002–2004 rolls increasingly treated as “legacy data” within SIR processes. The sessions explained the functioning of Booth Level Officers (BLOs), Electoral Registration Officers (EROs), Assistant Electoral Registration Officers (AEROs), appeal processes, and the importance of procedural safeguards.

Rights groups and CBO’s were trained on and encouraged to, by the CJP team, to organise collectively and voice concerns with the offices of the state election commission so that specific concerns and anxieties of the varieties of stake holders—genuine voters, be they migrants from other states, women, minorities, DNTs, displaced persons—could be readily addressed by an otherwise opaque SEC.

CJP’s memorandum to the Maharashtra CEO

Parallel to these trainings, CJP and VFD formally approached the Maharashtra State Election Commission and the Chief Electoral Officer of Maharashtra with a detailed memorandum raising concerns about possible disenfranchisement and procedural opacity.

The memorandum urged authorities to ensure:

• accessible and searchable electoral rolls,
• properly trained personnel,
• multilingual assistance systems,
• protection against algorithmic exclusion,
• public transparency,
• a publicised social audit of the draft revised polls and the final ones (this has been mentioned as a mandatory and healthy requirement in the ECI’s own 2023 Handbook of Guidelines on Electoral Rolls;
• and safeguards against arbitrary deletions.

Importantly, the memorandum emphasised that electoral revision must reduce fear rather than produce it. It warned that when documentation burdens are imposed without adequate support structures, the people who suffer first are always those already pushed to the margins: minorities, migrants, tenants, women, informal workers, DNTs and economically vulnerable populations.

Beyond Documentation: Building collective confidence

What distinguished these Maharashtra trainings was that they did not treat documentation as merely technical paperwork. They recognised documentation as deeply tied to dignity, memory, class, caste, migration, gender and survival.

For many participants, the sessions became spaces where people realised they were not individually “failing” because documents were missing or inconsistent. Rather, their experiences reflected structural realities shared by millions across India.

The trainings therefore consistently emphasised solidarity and collective defence:

• helping elderly persons retrieve records,
• assisting women facing name mismatches,
• supporting migrant workers unable to attend hearings,
• guiding daily wage earners through documentation processes,
• and ensuring that vulnerable communities do not face bureaucratic intimidation alone.

At a time when administrative processes increasingly risk producing fear and invisibility, these sessions attempted to restore confidence in constitutional rights and democratic participation.

A democratic intervention against fear

Ultimately, the SIR trainings conducted by CJP across Maharashtra were not merely legal awareness programmes. They were democratic interventions against fear.

They sought to remind people that the right to vote is not a favour granted conditionally by shifting bureaucratic systems. It is a constitutional guarantee rooted in the promise of universal adult franchise. They also sought to expose a harsh reality: when democratic participation becomes dependent upon perfect documentation histories stretching across decades, exclusion ceases to be accidental. It becomes structural.

For precisely this reason, the trainings insisted that preparation—not panic—must guide public response. Because behind every “missing document,” “mismatched name,” or “unavailable legacy record” is not simply a paperwork problem, but a human history shaped by poverty, migration, patriarchy, displacement, disaster and institutional neglect.

And it is these histories that CJP’s Maharashtra trainings sought to bring into the centre of the conversation—so that democracy is not reduced to an exercise in mechanical verification, but remains anchored in constitutional inclusion, human dignity and collective rights.

Related:

Inside the SIR: A voter roll exercise turning into a test of survival

Demystifying the SIR Notice: A systemic hurdle, not a final verdict

CJP Assam: A journey without parallel, evolving & expanding rights jurisprudence

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Chief Minster (CM), Himanta Biswa Sarma made the announcement while addressing the media after the first Cabinet meeting in his second term holding the post. Sarma took oath as Chief Minister for the second consecutive term on May 12, 2026. Results of the elections came in on May 4.

At his press meet Himanta Said the decision was taken to present the UCC in the House on the last day of the present session of the Assam Assembly on May 26. The Assam Cabinet approved the draft UCC on the May 13 and he said that we will present the UCC in the House on the last day of the first Assembly session as soon as the members take oath.

Explaining the intended law, he said the UCC will exclude tribal booth Hills and plains people from the scope of the UCC and clarified that said the UCC will not affect any religious customs. Specifically, the proposed UCC will focus on a total of four issues,” he added, “These include the minimum age of marriage, Polygamy, the rights of women in property and live in relationships.”

He added that if someone asks whether the UCC requires worship or prayers, how to hold a Chaklong wedding, etc., there should be no such questions, which is why the UCC is not concerned with religious observances or religious traditions. “The government has no say in how worship has to be done or prayers have to be offered.

He may be heard https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1891XEALmG/

A special session of the Assam Assembly is scheduled to be held from May 21–26, 2026. Newly elected MLAs will take oath during the session. The proposed bill that was approved in the Cabinet Minister’s meeting on May 12 will be tabled on May 26, the concluding day of the session.

According to the brief by Sarma, the proposed legislation aims to address:

i) Legal age of marriage

ii) Polygamy

iii) Inheritance rights

iv) Live-in relationships

v) Compulsory registration of marriage and divorce

With this move, Assam will become the third state after Uttarakhand and Gujarat to table a UCC Bill. All three are states ruled by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

It is noteworthy—and can certainly be asserted—that this decision, taken during the very first cabinet meeting of the BJP’s third government in Assam (and Himanta’s 2.0 administration), was specifically aimed at targeting a particular community.

On a previous occasion as well, the Himanta government had raised issues such as “Love Jihad” in the Legislative Assembly, specifically targeting the Muslim community.

Meanwhile, Himanta Biswa Sarma has previously stated that banning polygamy and “deceitful religious conversions” is part of Assam’s move toward a UCC-like framework. This echoes recommendations of the Justice (Retd.) Rumi Kumari Phukan Committee, which examined the legal viability of such a measure.

Related:

Assam Government to table ‘Love Jihad’ and polygamy bills, CM Sarma says parents of male accused will also face arrest

The post Assam: Bill on Uniform Civil Code (UCC), a partisan act? appeared first on SabrangIndia.

According to the police statement, both Verma and Choudhary were allegedly associated with “Mazdoor Bigul Dasta” and had played a “significant role” in the violence, arson and disruption that accompanied the workers’ protest. Police further claimed that the two attempted to disturb public order by “provoking” workers in different areas and circulating inflammatory material. Senior police officers, quoted in report by The Times of India, cited CCTV footage, electronic evidence, intelligence inputs and social media activity as the basis for invoking the NSA, a preventive detention law that permits incarceration for up to one year without trial on grounds related to national security or maintenance of public order.

The use of the NSA against the two has, however, triggered strong criticism from lawyers, labour rights groups, civil liberties organisations and campaigners associated with the Campaign for the Release of Workers and Activists of Noida (CaRWAN), who have termed the move an attempt to indefinitely prolong incarceration after the prosecution allegedly failed to establish concrete evidence during bail proceedings. Supreme Court advocate Ali Zia Kabir Choudhary, representing several accused in the matter, told The Wire that neither the accused nor their legal teams had been formally provided documents explaining the grounds on which the NSA was invoked. He pointed out that under constitutional safeguards, including Article 22 concerning protection against arrest and detention; the arrested persons are entitled to be informed of the grounds of detention.

“The only detail we have is the police press release. No papers have been supplied. In court we argued that there is not a single piece of evidence showing that Satyam or others called for violence,” Choudhary said while speaking to The Wire, adding that in Verma’s case, police had allegedly failed to show that he was even part of any WhatsApp groups cited during arguments. He further alleged that the prosecution relied largely on unrelated photographs and chats involving persons who were not arrested.

Timing of NSA invocation raises concerns

CaRWAN, in a statement issued on May 13 and cited by The Wire, questioned the timing of the NSA charges, noting that the law was invoked only after the prosecution faced difficulty during bail hearings. The collective stated that during the hearing, defence counsel highlighted the “emptiness of the charges” and the “illegality of the arrests,” while prosecutors allegedly failed to present substantial incriminating material against either Verma or Choudhary. The group argued that the accused had already spent over a month in judicial custody and that the sudden invocation of the NSA appeared designed solely to ensure continued detention.

The police crackdown follows weeks of unrest linked to industrial workers’ protests in Noida and Greater Noida. As reported by Hindustan Times, the demonstrations began on April 10 after the Haryana government announced a substantial increase in minimum wages for workers, prompting labourers in Noida’s industrial belt to demand similar hikes, better overtime compensation and improved working conditions. While protests remained largely peaceful in the initial days, violence broke out on April 13 across several industrial sectors, during which factories were allegedly vandalised, vehicles torched and police personnel injured in incidents of stone pelting.

Following the violence, the Uttar Pradesh Police launched a sweeping crackdown. Multiple FIRs, various reports place the number between seven and fifteen, were registered across police stations including Phase II and Sector 63. According to The Indian Express, hundreds of people were detained in the aftermath, while at least 60 individuals remain incarcerated on charges ranging from rioting and criminal conspiracy to attempt to murder. Police have consistently maintained, including in statements carried by The Hindu and Hindustan Times, that the violence was not spontaneous but orchestrated by an “organised syndicate of outsiders.”

Activists, students and scholars among those arrested

The arrests have drawn particular attention because many of those booked are students, researchers, labour organisers and activists rather than industrial workers themselves.

Satyam Verma, a 60-year-old journalist based in Lucknow, was arrested on April 17. According to The Indian Express, Verma previously worked with the news agency Univarta and has been associated with Janchetna Books and Jagaruk Nagrik Manch. He has also written for the labour publication Mazdoor Bigul, after which the organisation “Mazdoor Bigul Dasta” is allegedly named. Friends and supporters quoted in The Indian Express described him as a writer, translator and editor deeply engaged with labour rights and progressive literature. He is also the son of noted historian and academic Lal Bahadur Verma.

Civil rights groups have strongly disputed police claims portraying Verma as a “main conspirator.” CaRWAN stated in comments carried by The Times of India and The Wire that Verma was not present in Noida during the protests and had reportedly not visited the city in over a decade. His associates argue that the prosecution has attempted to criminalise ideological affiliations rather than establish any direct role in violence.

Aakriti Choudhary, 25, a postgraduate in history from Delhi University’s Daulat Ram College and an aspiring PhD scholar, was detained by plainclothes officers at Noida’s Botanical Garden Metro Station on April 11 — two days before the violence erupted. The Hindu reported that police initially claimed she was detained for disturbing public order, but later alleged that subsequent investigation uncovered evidence linking her to organising the protests.

Her father, Arun Choudhary, associated with the CPI(M) mouthpiece Ganashakti, questioned in comments to The Indian Express how someone detained before April 13 could be charged with orchestrating violence that occurred later. He defended his daughter’s participation in labour solidarity campaigns and criticised attempts to equate Left political beliefs with criminality. Defence lawyers similarly noted, according to Hindustan Times, that during proceedings prosecutors allegedly presented a book recovered from her residence as evidence of “Left-wing ideology.”

Concerns over criminalisation of ideology and dissent

It has been argued that the prosecution’s case increasingly appears to rely on political profiling rather than direct evidence of criminal conduct. Rajnish Yadav, counsel for Choudhary and other accused, told The Indian Express that the activists had merely participated in solidarity efforts, including speeches and street plays supporting workers demanding fair wages. He compared their participation to broader solidarity movements seen during the farmers’ protests.

The police have also arrested several other young activists and students. Among them is Aditya Anand, a 28-year-old NIT Jamshedpur graduate employed at Genpact, arrested from Tiruchirappalli on April 18. According to The Indian Express, police allege he delivered “provocative” speeches and organised marches during the protests. His family, however, portrayed him as a socially conscious engineer deeply engaged in labour rights issues and associated with the Naujawan Bharat Sabha.

Another accused, Himanshu Thakur, a 24-year-old history postgraduate from Hansraj College and a NET-qualified PhD aspirant, was arrested from Delhi’s Shalimar Bagh on allegations of coordinating protests and instigating crowds. His family told The Indian Express that he was the sole earning member of the household who supplemented family income through freelance translation work while advocating for students’ and women’s rights.

Families of working-class accused have also described devastating economic consequences following the arrests. The Indian Express reported that Amit Kumar, a 19-year-old worker from Prayagraj earning ₹8,000 a month in Noida, and Pankaj Kumar, a mason from New Ashok Nagar, are among those whose detention has reportedly pushed already vulnerable families into debt and unemployment.

Questions over misuse of the NSA

The use of the NSA in Uttar Pradesh has long been controversial. In April 2021, an investigation by The Indian Express reported that the Allahabad High Court had raised concerns over the apparent misuse of the law after red-flagging 94 out of 120 habeas corpus petitions involving NSA detentions. Similarly, Newslaundry reported in 2022 that police proposals seeking NSA sanctions in communal violence cases had invoked conspiracy narratives such as “land jihad.”

It must be pointed out that the NSA, unlike ordinary criminal law, allows preventive detention through executive orders without the procedural protections of a regular criminal trial. Human rights advocates have repeatedly warned that the law is frequently deployed to circumvent bail and prolong incarceration where ordinary criminal charges may not withstand judicial scrutiny. The invocation of the NSA in the Noida workers’ protest case has therefore intensified concerns regarding the shrinking space for labour organising, student activism and political dissent.

Related:

JNU Students Lathi-charged, Injured, first detained during protest over V-C remarks, UGC Equity guidelines, now Jailed

UGC Guidelines 2026: AISA Protest at Delhi University followed by sexual abuse allegations amid police presence

When Protest becomes a “Threat”: Inside the Supreme Court hearing on Sonam Wangchuk’s NSA detention

Solidarity with protests of locals against projects facilitating coal transportation (Goa to Karnataka): NAPM

‘We Were Promised Rehabilitation’: Gurugram’s oldest Dalit settlement bulldozed after decade long battle; police violently beat and detain residents for protesting

The post NSA slapped on journalist, DU scholar in Noida workers’ protest case amid allegations of crackdown on dissent appeared first on SabrangIndia.

According to Kolkata Police Commissioner Ajay Kumar Nand, the arrest followed a complaint lodged by the District Election Officer (DEO) of Kolkata North. Police stated that Chatterjee had been summoned twice during the inquiry but allegedly failed to appear before investigators, prompting the cyber cell to proceed with his arrest.

“The complaint against him was lodged by the District Election Officer of Kolkata North, following which the cyber cell initiated action. He was summoned twice in connection with the matter, but he did not appear, and that is the reason why he was arrested,” Commissioner Nand told reporters at Lalbazar police headquarters, as quoted by The Hindu.

Police officials said Chatterjee would be produced before a court on Wednesday.

Posts on EVMs and Election Commission under scanner

Investigators allege that Chatterjee circulated misleading claims regarding EVM functioning and attempted to create distrust around the electoral process through social media posts made during polling and counting phases of the election, according to The Indian Express.

Officials told The Indian Express that on April 23, during the first phase of polling, Chatterjee publicly questioned why certain EVMs reportedly malfunctioned in the morning despite undergoing checks the previous night. In another social media post on May 4, the day votes were counted, he allegedly accused the Election Commission of India of carrying out a “secret plan” during the counting process.

Police have described these statements as attempts to spread confusion and misinformation surrounding the conduct of elections and the functioning of EVMs, according to The Telegraph.

Chatterjee had also advised voters through social media posts to verify VVPAT slips carefully before leaving polling booths after casting their votes, The Indian Express reported.

Academic-turned-activist and Bengali identity politics

A Harvard-educated neuroscientist and faculty member at the Indian Statistical Institute, Chatterjee became widely known in recent years for his political activism centred on Bengali linguistic and cultural identity, as noted by The Indian Express.

Founded in 2017, Bangla Pokkho has consistently campaigned for prioritising Bengali language, culture and employment opportunities for local youth in West Bengal. The organisation has also opposed what it describes as the “imposition” of Hindi in the State, according to The Hindu.

During the 2026 Assembly elections, Chatterjee had publicly urged voters to support either the All India Trinamool Congress or Left Front candidates while opposing the Bharatiya Janata Party, which he characterised as a party of “outsiders”, The Hindu reported.

CLEAR calls arrest an “assault on democratic dissent”

In the wake of the arrest, the Campaign for Language Equality and Rights (CLEAR), a civil society platform advocating linguistic equality and mother tongue rights, issued a strongly worded statement condemning the police action and demanding the immediate and unconditional release of Garga Chatterjee. Describing Chatterjee as a “neuroscientist, cultural activist” and one of CLEAR’s founding members, the organisation argued that the arrest amounted to “a direct assault on freedom of speech, democratic dissent, and the constitutional rights of every citizen.”

Invoking Articles 19(1)(a) and 21 of the Constitution, CLEAR cited recent observations of the Supreme Court of India affirming the right of citizens to criticise state institutions and peacefully dissent against government decisions. The statement further argued that public scrutiny of EVMs and the electoral process had repeatedly been recognised as legitimate within constitutional democracy, including in cases such as Subramanian Swamy v. Election Commission of India and Association for Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India. “Questioning EVMs is not sedition. It is democracy,” the statement said.

CLEAR also expressed concern over the fact that the complaint against Chatterjee had reportedly originated from the Election Commission of India itself, arguing that this raised “serious concerns regarding conflict of interest and the use of state machinery to silence criticism.” The organisation further alleged that no specific social media posts had been publicly identified as forming the basis of the FIR, calling the arrest “arbitrary, disproportionate, and contrary to the principles of natural justice.” Alongside demanding withdrawal of the complaint and transparency regarding the FIR, CLEAR called upon civil society groups and democratic organisations across the country to stand in solidarity with Chatterjee.

Political parties liberation demands release

Reacting to the arrest, Dipankar Bhattacharya, general secretary of the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Liberation, criticised the police action and demanded Chatterjee’s immediate release.

According to The Indian Express, Bhattacharya described Chatterjee as a “well-known campaigner for Bengali identity and electoral transparency” and objected to the arrest over posts concerning alleged EVM tampering.

Trinamool Congress MP Mahua Moitra took to social media to show her support.

I may not be a fan of Garga Chatterjee but arresting him & taking down his @GargaC X handle shows just how paranoid the new BJP Bengal government is. Banglar Bipokhhe Bangla Birodhi is the true face of this Parivartan. Make no mistake.

— Mahua Moitra (@MahuaMoitra) May 12, 2026

Previous arrests and controversies

This is not the first time Chatterjee has faced criminal proceedings over controversial remarks. In 2022, he was arrested following multiple FIRs filed in Assam accusing him of hurting Assamese sentiments and promoting enmity between communities after he allegedly referred to Sukaphaa, founder of the Ahom dynasty, as a “Chinese invader”, according to The Telegraph.

The controversy led to intervention by the Gauhati High Court, which issued directions concerning the execution of a non-bailable warrant against him. He was later granted transit bail subject to appearing before a court in Guwahati, as reported by The Telegraph. Separately, Bangla Pokkho members had also come under scrutiny in 2024 after two students from Bihar appearing for a Staff Selection Commission examination in Siliguri were allegedly assaulted. The Indian Express reported that a person linked to the organisation was detained in connection with the incident.

Related:

Bengal after the Ballot: Fear, retaliation and the politics of territorial power

As lynchings “normalise” in ‘New India, a Bihar imam is ‘thrashed, pushed’ from train to die in Bareilly

From FIRs to “Corporate Jihad”: How the TCS Nashik case was transformed from an investigation into a communal narrative

Fractured Fault lines: Violence, governance gaps, and rising tensions across Odisha

Censorship and the Drumbeats of Hate: Mapping the state of free speech ahead of the 2026 polls

The post ‘Bangla Pokkho’ founder Garga Chatterjee arrested over alleged EVM misinformation ahead of Bengal polls appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The opening paras of the article says it all, “It was waiting to happen. Only the “when” was not clear. The buildings in the industrial areas of the National Capital Region (NCR), with their glitzy interiors, could not camouflage the simmering anger of workers inside any longer. When what started as a small bubble of frustration took on the force of a volcanic eruption, fuelled by the oppressive conditions imposed by hostile employers and abetted by compliant governments, nothing could put a lid on it…Thus, in mid-April, workers poured out of their factories, striking work in the industrial area of the New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (Noida) in Uttar Pradesh, fully conscious of the reprisals and the heavy hand of the state that would come into play as the official reaction to their action. But it was a moment that the workers truly owned, and there was no factory that was unaffected…. There was no coordinated action, no direct union involvement. Yet, it seemed like magic. As per some official reports, workers across 82 factories struck work protesting against the 12-hour, 7-day working week and the harsh and unsafe working conditions within the factories, all for a measly monthly wage of Rs. 11,000 to Rs. 12,000.”

On November 21, 2025, the Government began implementing the four Labour Codes (on Wages, Industrial Relations, Social Security, and Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions). Concerned citizens, trade unions and opposition parties label them ‘anti-worker.’ Most regard these codes as favouring the corporate sector. Their ‘anti-worker’ dimensions include ‘the hire and fire policy’; ‘curtailing right to strike’; ‘expansion of Fixed-Term Employment (FTE); ‘diluted safety & welfare’

The way the NOIDA workers came out in droves to protest their grim reality is a case in point! The Uttar Pradesh government announced a 21% wage hike, but many workers and unions deemed this insufficient. The police have taken legal action against those (apparently several thousands) involved in the violence. On expected lines, the godified media did not highlight the plight and the protest of the NOIDA workers. The situation of the ordinary worker (particularly casual labourers and migrant workers) in India leaves much to be desired: most of them are at the mercy of employers who are exploitative and corrupt. Workers are often denied just wages and have long hours of work. Many do not get appointment letters nor are there the mandatory ‘Service Conditions.’ Trade Unions in India have become almost non-existent. The COVID period revealed the miserable conditions of the working class.

The month of May begins with the ‘International Workers’ Day’. This Day normally focuses on honouring the global workforce, promoting labour rights, and fighting exploitation. The Catholic Church has consistently championed the cause and the rights of workers. On 15 May 1891, Pope Leo XIII gave the world his path-breaking encyclical, ‘Rerum Novarum’ (‘Of New Things’), regarded as the foundational document of modern Catholic Social Teaching. The encyclical addressed the plight of the working class during the Industrial Revolution. It advocates for worker dignity, the right to form unions, and a just wage, while defending private property and rejecting both socialism and unrestrained capitalism.

In his Encyclical ‘Laborem Exercens’ (On human work), dtd. 14 September 1981, Pope John Paul writes, “the Church considers it her task always to call attention to the dignity and rights of those who work, to condemn situations in which that dignity and those rights are violated, and to help to guide [social] changes so as to ensure authentic progress by man and society.” Later, on 1 May 1991, he promulgated another Encyclical ‘Centesimus Annus’ (‘The Hundredth Year’) to commemorate the historic anniversary of ‘Rerum Novarum’. It reiterated the fundamental vision, of ‘Rerum Novarum’ and   expounded issues of social and economic justice, including a defense of private property rights and the right to form private associations, including labour unions

In keeping with the significance of the day, the Catholic Church celebrates it as the Feast of St. Joseph the Worker. Pope Pius XII established it in 1955, to honour Joseph as the patron of workers and to celebrate the dignity of human labour.

A year ago, on May 8, 2025, Pope Leo XIV was elected to succeed Pope Francis; he assumed office on 18 May. When asked to explain his choice of name, Pope Leo said, “I chose to take the name Leo XIV. There are different reasons for this, but mainly because Pope Leo XIII in his historic Encyclical ‘Rerum Novarum’ addressed the social question in the context of the first great industrial revolution. In our own day, the Church offers to everyone the treasury of her social teaching in response to another industrial revolution and to developments in the field of artificial intelligence that pose new challenges for the defence of human dignity, justice and labour.”

The Catholic Church has been consistent in defending the rights of workers for a more dignified, just and humane life. Cardinal Joseph Cardijn (1882-1967),  founder of the Young Christian Workers , left no stone unturned to focus on the plight of workers and ensure that the teachings of ‘Rerum Novarum’ are mainstreamed in the life and mission of the Church.

Pope Leo XIII says it very strongly in his ‘Rerum Novarum’, “(We must) save unfortunate working people from the cruelty of men of greed, who use human beings as mere instruments for money-making. It is neither just nor human to grind men down with excessive labour.”

The point is:  is anyone listening? Workers must unite! We must heed their cry for justice! We are all called to be in solidarity with workers, to ensure that they have better working conditions, with just wages, normal working hours and above all, to live in dignity!

 April 30, 2026

(The author is a human rights, reconciliation and peace activist)

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