For a country that saw the Bhopal Gas Tragedy and many such incidents where lack of regulation resulted in massive loss of human life and toll on victims that exists to date, this turnaround is rather surprising. That too, for it to have triggered by a judgement of the Supreme Court, an institution that has been a guardian of environment from the T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India case, where tree-felling and non-forestry activity in forests across the country was stopped by an order of the Supreme Court to the Niyamgiri hills case where indigenous Dongria Kondh tribe successfully fought against Vedanta Aluminium’s bauxite mining project, using the Forest Rights Act (FRA) 2006 to assert their cultural and religious rights over the sacred hills.[1]

Background: Tracing the Origins of “Prior” Clearance

To appreciate the magnitude of the conflict between the May 2025 and November 2025 Vanashakti judgments, it is essential to situate the dispute within the broader evolution of environmental constitutionalism in India.

In the wake of the 1972 Stockholm Conference and the catastrophic Bhopal Gas Tragedy of 1984, India developed a legal regime grounded in the “Precautionary Principle.” Interpreted by the Supreme Court as part of Article 21 (the Right to Life), this principle requires that environmental protection measures must anticipate, prevent, and address sources of environmental degradation before any damage occurs.

The principal mechanism for implementing this principle is the Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) Notification. Introduced in 1994 and updated in 2006, the EIA framework mandates that certain industrial and infrastructure projects must secure “prior” Environmental Clearance (EC) before any construction begins. The underlying rationale is that any environmental harm, such as deforestation or wetland destruction, is often irreversible. If assessments are conducted post-construction, they serve merely as a bureaucratic formality, failing to achieve the goal of sustainable development.

However, a significant gap has emerged between this normative ideal and the realities of India’s rapid industrialization, ready crony land grab. Successive governments, prioritising the “Ease of Doing Business,” began to grant “ex post facto” (retrospective) clearances to projects that had already commenced operations unlawfully. This practice created a moral hazard—companies found it cheaper to violate the law and pay penalties later than to undergo the rigorous and time-consuming process of prior assessment. The Vanashakti litigation originated when the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEFCC) attempted to formalize this practice through a 2017 Notification and a 2021 Office Memorandum (OM), thereby turning what was intended as amnesty into a standard procedure.

The May 2025 Judgment: The Normative Firewall

On May 16, 2025, a two-judge bench consisting of Justice Abhay S. Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan delivered a judgment that aimed to uphold the “Rule of Law” over economic expediency.

Textualist Rigidity and the “Anathema” of Retrospection

The May judgment adopted a strict and literal interpretation of the EIA Notification 2006, holding that the requirement for “prior” EC is mandatory. Relying on precedents such as Common Cause v. Union of India (2017) and Alembic Pharmaceuticals v. Rohit Prajapati (2020), the bench emphasised that ex post facto clearances are “completely alien to environmental jurisprudence” and constitute an “anathema” to the EIA framework. Permitting operations without prior assessment, the Court reasoned, effectively condones violations. If EC is eventually denied after construction, the environmental harm is already irreversible; if granted, the “precautionary principle” is rendered meaningless.

The Sanctity of Executive Undertakings

The Court also scrutinised the legal history of the 2017 Notification, which had offered a six-month “amnesty” window for violators. When challenged before the Madras High Court, the Union Government had assured the court that this was a “one-time measure.” The May bench found that the subsequent 2021 OM—which perpetuated the amnesty indefinitely—breached this judicial undertaking. The Court held that the executive cannot renege on its assurance to the court, striking down the 2021 OM as arbitrary and violative of Article 14.[2]

Rejection of Monetary Regularisation

The May judgment explicitly rejected the notion that penalties under the “Polluter Pays Principle” could substitute for prior compliance. It noted that while Section 15 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 provides for penalties, it does not authorize the regularization of illegal structures. As a result, the Court held that even if penalties are paid, illegal constructions lacking prior clearance must be halted and demolished. The bench stressed that the “Polluter Pays Principle” cannot be twisted into a license to pollute.[3]

The November 2025 Review: The Pragmatic Recalibration

In a dramatic turnaround just six months later, a three-judge Review Bench led by Chief Justice B.R. Gavai (with Justice Bhuyan dissenting) set aside the May judgment.

 The “Per Incuriam” Doctrine and the Battle of Precedents

The Review Bench invoked the doctrine of per incuriam—rendered in ignorance of binding law—to overturn the May judgment. The majority held that the May Bench had failed to consider coordinate bench decisions in Electrosteel Steels Ltd. (2021)[4], Pahwa Plastics (2022)[5], and D. Swamy (2023)[6].

The May Bench had relied on Common Cause and Alembic to assert that ex-post facto EC is illegal. The Review Bench argued that while Alembic described such clearances as “anathema,” it ultimately allowed industries to continue operating after paying fines.

The Review Bench interpreted the relief granted in Alembic (allowing the industry to operate) as the binding principle of law, whereas the May Bench considered the relief as an exceptional measure under Article 142, treating the prohibition on retrospective EC as binding law.

Ultimately, by prioritising Electrosteel—which stated that the Environment Protection Act “does not prohibit” ex post facto clearance—over the strict reading of Common Cause, the Review Bench found the May judgment erroneous for ignoring the more recent “balanced approach” adopted by the Court.[7]

2. The Doctrine of “National Assets” and Sunk Costs

Economic consequences were a decisive factor in the Review Judgment. The Court accepted the Union’s argument that the May judgment would require the demolition of “national assets” valued at over ₹20,000 crore.[8]

The Court cited specific examples such as the AIIMS hospital in Odisha (962 beds) and the greenfield airport in Vijayanagar as projects facing potential demolition.[9]

The Review Bench further argued that demolishing these large-scale projects would cause more environmental damage (from dust and debris) than allowing them to remain operational. The Court rhetorically questioned whether demolishing effluent treatment plants would truly benefit environmental protection.[10] This reasoning, in effect, used environmental concerns to justify non-enforcement of environmental law.

Statutory Flexibility

Contrary to the May judgment, the Review Bench held that Section 15 of the Environment Protection Act does not mandate demolition. The Act, according to the Review Bench, allows for flexibility, and the executive can “amend or modify” notifications as needed.[11] Thus, the 2021 OM was not seen as violating the “one-time” judicial undertaking but as a valid exercise of executive power, especially as it was issued following directions from the National Green Tribunal (NGT).

Analytical Critique: The Erosion of Certainty

The rapid shift between the Vanshakti verdicts reveals a deep schism within India’s environmental constitutionalism. While the Review Judgment saved billions in investment, it set a precarious precedent that undermines the rule of law in three key areas.

The Inversion of Stare Decisis (Precedent)

The main issue with the Review Judgment is its handling of precedent. Justice Bhuyan’s dissent pointed out that Electrosteel and Pahwa—relied on by the Review Bench—were two-judge bench decisions, as was Common Cause, which formed the foundation of the May judgment and offered a comprehensive interpretation of the EIA Notification.

The Review Bench declared the May judgment per incuriam for not following Electrosteel, but the dissent argued that Electrosteel itself was per incuriam for disregarding the binding principle established in Common Cause.[12]

The Review Bench’s position—that the relief granted in Alembic (allowing industries to continue) constitutes binding laws jurisprudentially problematic. The Supreme Court often uses its extraordinary powers under Article 142 to grant case-specific relief while maintaining a contrary legal principle. By elevating discretionary relief to binding precedent, the Review Judgment effectively legalises violations, signaling to lower courts that statutory prohibitions on retrospective clearance can be ignored when economic stakes are high.

The Institutionalisation of Fait Accompli

The Review Judgment entrenches the doctrine of Fait Accompli in Indian law, suggesting that violations on a sufficiently large scale become practically irreversible.

By explicitly referencing the ₹20,000 crore investment as a justification for recall, the Court signaled that the “Right to Environment” is subordinate to the “Right to Investment.” This creates a dangerous incentive for developers to proceed with construction and heavy investments before obtaining clearance, believing that courts will hesitate to order the destruction of “national assets.”

Moreover, the reasoning that demolition itself would cause pollution effectively shields all large-scale illegal infrastructure from enforcement. The further along illegal construction is, the more “environmentally damaging” it becomes to remove, thus guaranteeing its persistence. This undermines the “Precautionary Principle,” which is based on prevention rather than after-the-fact remediation.

Simply put, if the municipality of a city refrains from demolishing the encroachment buildings on banks of lakes, the city will be prone to flood and is exposed to more vulnerabilities than before. Vanshakti II judgement fully fails to engage with this very obvious and basic logic.

Conclusion: From Gatekeeper to Toll Collector

The shift from the May judgment to the November Review marks a transformation in the Supreme Court’s role in environmental governance. The May judgment sought to act as a Gatekeeper, upholding the “Prior Clearance” requirement to prevent environmental degradation before it occurs. In contrast, the Review Judgment recasts the Court as a Toll Collector, allowing violations to continue in exchange for fines and remedial actions.

While the Review Judgment provides a practical solution to the immediate issue of “stranded assets” such as the Odisha AIIMS and the Vijayanagar Airport, it causes enduring harm to the credibility of India’s environmental regulatory regime. It endorses the executive’s strategy of “dilution by notification,” where statutory mandates are weakened to accommodate industrial needs. Most significantly, it undermines the finality of Supreme Court judgments, implying that even environmentally protective verdicts can be recalled if the economic arguments are persuasive enough.

For developers, the message is unambiguous: compliance is optional, so long as one can afford the cost of post-facto forgiveness.

Amen.

(The author is part of the legal research team of the organization)

[1] Orissa Mining Corporation Ltd vs Ministry Of Environment & Forest &Ors, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 180 of 2011

[2] Para 30, Vanshakti v. Union of India 2025 INSC 718 (Vanshakti I)

[3] Para 27, Vanshakti I

[4] Electrosteel Steels Limited v. Union of India and Others  (2023) 6 SCC 615

[5] Pahwa Plastics Private Limited and Another v. Dastak NGO and Others (2023) 12 SCC 774

[6] D. Swamy v. Karnataka State Pollution Control Board and Others (2023) 20 SCC 469

[7] Para 55.1, CREDAI vs. Vankshakti 2025 INSC 1326 (Vanshakti II)

[8] Para 108, Vanshakti II (CJI Gavai)

[9] Paras 109, 110, Vanshakti II (CJI Gavai)

[10] Para 7 (VIII), Vanshakti II (Justice K. Vinod Chandran)

[11] Para 75, Vanshakti II (CJI Gavai)

[12] Para 20, Vanshakti II (Justice Bhuyan)

Related:

Cries for Environmental Justice: India at a low 176/180 countries in the 2024 Environmental Performance Index

June 5: World environment day & the increasing importance of seed conservation by farmers and rural communities

Strengthening indigenous communities means protection of the environment 

The post The Judicial Ouroboros: The Vanashakti Reversal & Crisis of Environmental Finality in India appeared first on SabrangIndia.

According to police officials, the bodies of the couple were buried behind a temple on the outskirts of the village and were recovered following the confession of the accused. As reported by The Quint, the main accused have been identified as Rinku Saini and Satish Saini, Kajal’s brothers, while a third brother has also been named in the FIR. Two of the accused have been arrested so far.

Arman, aged 27, had reportedly been working in Saudi Arabia and had returned to India a few months ago, during which time he was residing in Moradabad. It was during this period that he met Kajal Saini, 22, and the two entered into a romantic relationship. However, Kajal’s brothers were strongly opposed to the interfaith relationship and had allegedly pressured her to end it, as reported by NDTV.

Approximately three days before the recovery of the bodies, both Arman and Kajal went missing. Arman’s father, Haneef, subsequently lodged a missing persons complaint at Pakwara Police Station. During the investigation, police discovered that Kajal was also untraceable, raising further suspicion.

Upon questioning Kajal’s brothers, police say they confessed to murdering the couple. Based on their disclosure, the accused led investigators to the burial site. The bodies were exhumed in the presence of a magistrate and sent for post-mortem examination, following due legal procedure.

Shockingly, the accused told investigators that they had tied the hands and legs of both victims before hacking them to death, an account that has intensified concerns around premeditated violence driven by notions of family “honour,” as reported by NDTV.

Confirming the developments, Satpal Antil, Senior Superintendent of Police, Moradabad, stated:

“During the investigation, it was found that the woman’s brothers murdered both individuals. After they confessed, the bodies were recovered at their instance. The spade used in the crime has also been seized.”

थाना पाकबड़ा क्षेत्रान्तर्गत ग्राम उमरी में एक युवक व युवती की हत्या के प्रकरण में थाना पाकबड़ा पर सुसंगत धाराओं में अभियोग पंजीकृत किया गया है। पुलिस द्वारा त्वरित कार्यवाही करते हुए 02 आरोपी भाईयो को हिरासत में लिया जा चुका है प्रकरण में अन्य आवश्यक विधिक कार्यवाही प्रचलित है। pic.twitter.com/3KVkT2Vp4b

— MORADABAD POLICE (@moradabadpolice) January 21, 2026

Police have registered a case at Pakwara Police Station under Crime Number 18/26, invoking Sections 103(1) and 238 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), based on a complaint filed by Arman’s family. The incident has sparked outrage and renewed concerns over honour-based violence, particularly targeting interfaith relationships, in Uttar Pradesh and beyond. Further investigation is underway, and police have stated that action will be taken against all those found involved in the crime.

Related:

Street Pressure, State Power, and the Criminalisation of Choice: How Hindutva groups are pushing Maharashtra’s anti-conversion law

Allahabad HC: Quashes FIR under draconian UP ‘Anti-Conversion Act’, warns state authorities against lodging ‘Mimeographic Style’ FIRs

Allahabad HC slams overzealous police action, says distributing Bibles or preaching Christianity is not an offence under UP conversion law

A New Silence: The Supreme Court’s turn toward non-interference in hate-speech cases

The post Interfaith couple tied, hacked to death in Moradabad; woman’s brothers arrested in alleged honour killing appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In UP’s Sambhal, lawyers protest against the transfer of chief judicial magistrate Vibhanshu Sudheer. His transfer is purportedly linked two seperate orders of registration of FIRs against policemen including ASP Anuj Chaudhary. pic.twitter.com/XNVrUYCTGB

— Piyush Rai (@Benarasiyaa) January 21, 2026

The Allahabad High Court on Tuesday, January 20, transferred 14 judicial officers, including the Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM) of Sambhal Vibhanshu Sudheer.Aditya Singh, the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Sambhal at Chandausi, has replaced Sudheer.

Sudheer, who has now been made Civil Judge, Senior Division, Sultanpur, had on January 19 ordered Sambhal police to lodge an FIR against then Circle Officer (CO) Anuj Chaudhary and SHO in connection with the shooting of a youth during the November 2024 Sambhal violence. The Sambhal police had stated that they would move the Allahabad High Court against the CJM court’s order.

Sudheer an upright judicial officer transferred several times

A social media user posted how Vidhanshu Sudheer, the chief judicial magistrate in UP’s Sambhal who had ordered an FIR against ASP Anuj Chaudhary and other police officers was transferred for the third time in less than a year!

Vibhanshu Sudheer, the chief judicial magistrate in UP’s Sambhal who ordered registration of FIR against ASP Anuj Chaudhary and other policemen, was transferred for the third time in less than a year. pic.twitter.com/ltASN2jADU

— Piyush Rai (@Benarasiyaa) January 21, 2026

Attack on judicial independence

Severely criticising this serious slur on judicial independence, social media users likened this action by the higher judiciary to the transfer of Justice Muralidhar (Delhi HC, now retired) in 2020 after his midnight hearing and castigation of hate speech by BJP leaders who had uttered inciteful words like “Goli Maro Saalo ko.”

Muralidhar transferred after Delhi riots order. Justice Sreedharan transferred after order in BJP leader Vijay Shah’s hate speech case. Vibhanshu Sudheer transferred after directing FIR against police officers in Sambhal violence. What does this tell us about judicial…

— Ashish Goel (@ashish_nujs) January 21, 2026

This user even reminder the conscientious public how –in a publicised change of heart –even the Supreme Court Collegium notified the transfer of Justice Atul Sreedharan to the Allahabad HC and not to Chhattisgarh where he would have been senior most Judge! The Collegium made it public that the action was under the Union Government’s ‘advise’. This became public in October 2025. Earlier last year, Justice Sreedharan had ordered an FIR against BJP minister Vijay Shah for his “scurrilous language” against an Indian Army Officer, Colonel Sofia Quraishi, who was one of the representatives of the Indian army who had briefed the media during Operation Sindoor last May.

Trajectory of Transfer: On August 25, 2025, the Supreme Court Collegium, comprising Chief Justice of India (CJI) B.R. Gavai and Justices Surya Kant, Vikram Nath, J.K. Maheshwari, and B.V. Nagarathna, had first recommended the transfer of 14 judges, including Justice Sreedharan, from the Madhya Pradesh High Court to the Chhattisgarh High Court. However, two months later, on October 14, the Supreme Court Collegium withdrew its recommendation to transfer Justice Sreedharan to Chhattisgarh at the request of the Union Government. Instead, the SC decided to transfer him to the Allahabad High Court instead. Followed by this was a much-publicised statement published on the Supreme Court’s website, which stated that the decision to modify the recommendation was made following a “reconsideration sought by the Government.” No reasons were provided for the government-sought reconsideration of the Collegium’s recommendation publicly. This was the first time, the Collegium has publicly acknowledged that it revisited—and changed—its decision at the Government’s request

Fourteen transfers by Allahabad HC

In the transfer order released by Registrar General of Allahabad High Court, January 2026, Harendra Nath, Additional District & Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Kannauj, has been made Additional District & Sessions Judge/Special Judge, Kannauj in the exclusive POCSO case Court, replacing Alaka Yadav, who will be joining as Additional District & Sessions Judge/Special Judge, Gonda.

Special Judge/Additional District & Sessions Judge, Gonda, Vikas has been made Additional District & Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Gonda, for trying cases of crime against women.

Urooj Fatima, Additional Civil Judge, Senior Division, Sitapur will be joining as Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sitapur, replacing Anshu Shukla.

Meanwhile, Anshu Shukla has been made Civil Judge, Senior Division, Sitapur, replacing Gaurav Prakash, who will be taking charge of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sitapur. Prakash has replaced Rajendra Kumar Singh, who will be the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kannauj.

He has replaced Shraddha Bhartiya, who has been made Civil Judge, Senior Division, Kannauj, replacing Jyotsna Yadav, who will now be Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kannauj.

She has replaced Sneha, who has been made Secretary (Full Time), District Legal Services Authority in Kannauj. Outgoing Sambhal CJM Vibhanshu Sudheer has replaced Alunkrita Shakti Tripathi, who will be Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate in Sultanpur, replacing Shubham Verma. Verma will be joining as Additional Civil Judge, Senior Division/Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sultanpur.

Related:

“Sambhal: Anatomy of an Engineered Crisis”- How a peaceful Muslim-majority town was turned into a site of manufactured communal conflict

Sambhal Custodial Death: A systemic failure exposed

Supreme Court blocks execution of Nagar Palika’s order regarding well near Sambhal Mosque, prioritises peace and harmony

The post CJM who ordered FIR against police for 2024 Sambhal violence case transferred by Allahabad HC, new trend? appeared first on SabrangIndia.

“An FIR against a 14-year-old child is not law enforcement. It is fear,” tweeted Ravi, a LinkedIn influencer, highlighting the Yogi Adityanath-led Uttar Pradesh government’s role. Supporters, including parody accounts mimicking political figures, shared clips of Gautam critiquing media bias and religious hypocrisy, drawing parallels to historical figures like Bhagat Singh. One widely shared post contrasted Gautam with a 14-year-old promoted as a “spiritual guru,” lamenting: “One asks questions and gets an FIR; the other gets a throne. That’s the caste difference.” Allegations of targeted anti-Dalit caste bias have also been made.

Another post said, “An FIR against a 14-year-old child is not law enforcement. It is fear. The Yogi government filing an FIR against Ashwamit Gautam , a 14-year-old content creator from Lucknow, is deeply disturbing and shameful. This is not about justice this is about a government that cannot tolerate questions.

Ashwamit is not a criminal.
He does not spread violence.
He does not promote hatred.

His only “crime” is that he asks questions about unemployment, inflation, and government policies questions that millions of Indians are already asking.

A 14-year-old boy who speaks with logic, clarity, and courage, making long analytical videos without scripts, reaching lakhs of youth this should have been celebrated in a democracy. Instead, he is being intimidated with an FIR.

Why?

Because he is young, Dalit, and fearless.

Power is not scared of criminals; it is scared of awareness. It is scared of a generation that refuses to stay silent. Vague FIR language, no clear sections disclosed, no transparency this is nothing but using law as a weapon to spread fear.

The message is loud and clear: “If you question the government, you will be punished even if you are a child.”

This is not just an attack on freedom of expression. It exposes caste and class bias. Would the same action be taken if this child was spreading hate or praising those in power? We all know the answer.

Criticism is not anti-national. Questioning the government is a constitutional right. If a 14-year-old is asking tough questions, the government should reflect not repress.
FIR instead of encouragement.

Fear instead of dialogue.

This is not strength this is insecurity.

History teaches us one thing: governments that silence voices never last. Children who speak the truth may be targeted, but they are never erased.

Stand with Ashwamit Gautam
Silencing a child exposes the weakness of power, not the crime of the child.”

Hero Ashwamit gautham

At just 14, Ashwamit stands tall.
A Dalit boy with courage beyond his years, questioning power and speaking truth to authority. pic.twitter.com/TybtmlhICz

— VoiceOfMadiga-ಮಾದಿಗ ಧ್ವನಿ® (@JaiBhimMadiga) January 19, 2026

Ashwamit Gautam, 14-year-old content creator who was pointing out the need for basic things like education, good roads, clean water, electricity & clean air is NOW facing FIR.

While that superstitious human samosa is getting awards from Union Minister/Ethanol Billionaire. pic.twitter.com/rfsFf7qa3D

— Dr Ranjan (@AAPforNewIndia) January 18, 2026

एक 14 साल के लड़के की आवाज़ से डर गई सरकार FIR तक पहुंच गई,
⁰आश्वामित गौतम लखनऊ का वो क्रांतिकारी बच्चा जो अंबेडकर भगत सिंह और चे ग्वेरा को पढ़ता है l।

इतनी कम उम्र में सरकार और सिस्टम से सवाल पूछता है।
⁰इंस्टाग्राम पर 666K फॉलोवर्स हैं बेहतरीन कंटेंट पोस्ट करते हैं आश्वामित… pic.twitter.com/LlCce5AJvu

— Ankit Yadav (@Ankitydv92) January 14, 2026

FIR

The FIR was reportedly lodged by the Lucknow police citing concerns over Gautam’s online activities. Police authorities have not disclosed the specific legal sections invoked or identified the complainant. Sources familiar with the matter say the case relates to content perceived as critical of the state administration says Deshambhini.

The young 14 year old, Gautam has built a substantial following on social media through long-form analytical videos discussing rising inflation and the cost of living, unemployment among young people, widening social inequality, and issues affecting the Dalit community. His unscripted videos have gained traction among youth audiences across Uttar Pradesh.

The decision of the UP administration to initiate legal action against a minor has drawn sharp criticism from civil society members, digital rights activists, and opposition leaders. Many have questioned the intent behind filing an FIR against a child for political expression, calling it intimidation rather than law enforcement.

Supporters argue that Gautam has neither incited violence nor promoted hatred, and that his content is protected under the constitutional right to freedom of expression. They maintain that questioning government policy on employment, inflation, and social justice is a legitimate democratic exercise, not a criminal offence.

Other critics of his content have described his rhetoric as provocative and potentially disruptive to social harmony, a justification rights groups say is increasingly used to silence dissenting voices.

Several activists have also alleged caste and class bias, noting that Gautam belongs to the Dalit community. They have questioned whether similar action would have been taken if the content praised those in power.

The lack of transparency surrounding the FIR has further fuelled concern. “When the state responds to criticism from a child with police action instead of dialogue, it raises serious questions about democratic tolerance,” a digital rights advocate said.

To date, the Yogi Adityanath-led Uttar Pradesh government has not issued an official statement on the case.

Related:

The Price of Dissent: In India, demanding accountability in times of grief must toe the line

In Contrast: Nehru’s Take on a Young, Dissenting Irfan Habib and the Modi Govt’s Treatment of Mahmudabad

Dissent Under Siege: Police action, suspensions, and the shrinking democratic space at TISS

The post UP: 14-Year-Old Dalit Content Creator Ashwamit Gautam faces arrest, FIR over strong dissenting social media videos appeared first on SabrangIndia.

It was a single-judge bench of Justice Ashwin D Bhobe issued notice to the respondents and posted the next hearing to February 4. Senior advocate Sudeep Pasbola, represented Dr Patil and submitted that there was urgency in the matter. His client had come to India from the UK on his own and was unaware of the FIR registered against him, he added.

Advocate General Milind Sathe, for the state government, said that Patil “seems to be connected with the other (social media) post and he seems to be not cooperating” with the agency. Sathe stated that a reply to the plea, if any, will be filed within a week, which the court accepted.

The Crime Branch of the Mumbai police detained Patil on January 10 on his arrival at the Mumbai international airport. After 15 hours of questioning, he was later prevented, 10 days later, on January 19, from leaving for the UK. On January 21, he recorded his second statement before the police.

Patil has been charged with offences under Section 353 (2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), which provides a maximum three-year punishment for publishing, circulation of statement, false information, rumour leading to feeling of enmity and hatred between communities through electronic means. The social media post that has attracted such frenetic ire from the authorities reportedly related to high BJP functionaries.

The NM Joshi Marg police station in Mumbai registered an FIR based on a complaint by BJP media cell functionary Nikhil Bhamre, who claimed that he came across objectionable content posted on a Facebook page named ‘Shehar Vikas Aghadi’ on December 14 last year, with disinformation on the BJP and its leaders. Dr Patil has maintained that he simply forwarded a post of other leaders like Subramaniam Swamy with a mere content, asking why there has been no action against them.

Petition

The Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, read with Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, seeking quashing of FIR No. 0672/2025 dated 18/12/2025 registered with N.M. Joshi Marg Police Station, Mumbai, under Section 353(2) BNSS. The petition argues that the impugned FIR is based on alleged posts on Facebook, which constitute statements of fact and expressions of free speech. The FIR does not disclose the essential ingredients of any cognisable offence, lacks mens rea, alleges no violence or public disorder, and is manifestly malicious, filed by a political functionary to suppress dissent. Besides, the petition states that the continuation of the investigation amounts to abuse of the process of law and squarely falls within the parameters laid down in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal.

In the petition Dr Patil seeks the quashing of both the LOC and the FIR No 0672/2025 registered against him at the NM Joshi Police Station on December 18, 2025.

The Petition also states that the FIR does not allege any incitement to violence, threat to public order, or disturbance of public tranquillity. The complaint or FIR does not specify the group of religious, racial, language or regional groups or Caste or communities in which hatred or ill will is promoted by the post. The FIR does not specify whether the silence of the followers is false information or rumour or alarming news. The FIR does not specify how the feeling of enmity or hatred, or ill will, can be generated or actually generated by stating that blind followers remain silent. Also, the impugned FIR does not reproduce the alleged posts verbatim, nor does it disclose the exact words, context, or content which allegedly constitute an offence under Section 353(2) BNS. The allegations are purely subjective and stem from political disagreement.

The Petition argues that the most subjective part of the FIR is which political leader who is defamed by the post is not mentioned. A vague apprehension is expressed about the senior leaders of the party by the complainant. Thereafter the Petition quotes from the invoked Section 353(2) BNS which states that, “    _

(2) Whoever makes, publishes or circulates any statement or report containing false iriformation, rumour or alarming news, including through electronic means, with intent to create or promote, or which is likely to create or promote, on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community or any other ground whatsoever, feelings of enmity, hatred or ill will between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.”

The Petition states that ‘there are three important ingredients in the impugned section:I) The statement should be false or rumour, or alarming news. 2) the statement should create a feeling of enmity, hatred or ill will, and 3) There should be specific religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities involved. None of these three components is fulfilled in the said post.

Besides, states the Petition, the FIR has been registered after an unexplained delay of several days from the alleged date of posting, despite the content being publicly accessible. Respondent Number 5 is admittedly the social media coordinator of a political party, and the complaint is motivated by political fear “with the sole intention to intimidate and harass and silence the voice of the people. The petitioner is harassed not for any offence but to teach a lesson to other people to set a precedent of deterrence.

Further, the Petition goes on to state that “the Police Inspector of N .M Joshi Marg Police Station, Mr. Vilas Rane, i.e. the Respondent No. 1, has mechanically registered the FIR without any preliminary enquiry or investigation and non-application of mind, thereby acting with malicious intent and in misuse of police powers, at the behest of Respondent No.5.

Seeking the quashing of both the LOC issued by the authorities pursuant to the FIR registered, Dr Patl has alleged that he faced “faced inconvenience, mental agony, harassment and defamation because of the illegal and unnecessary issuance of the LOC.” Besides he states that he has incurred financial loss as he missed his flight and the opportunity cost of working at his destination workplace. The continuation of LOC is a continuation of harassment by way of using the procedure as punishment. In any case, the FIR that has sought to be quashed is, the Petition states, “an instance of misuse of criminal law to achieve a political vendetta and suppress any kind of different political view or opinion.”

The state is expected to file its response within a week and the next hearing is on Tuesday, February 4.

Related:

Dr Sangram Patil detained by Mumbai Crime Branch, move sharply condemned

The post Bombay HC: Notice to Maharashtra state, police on UK doctor, Sangram Patil’s petition seeking quashing of LOC & FIR appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The petitioners did not dispute that Doyjan Bibi had once been declared a foreigner by a Foreigners Tribunal. What they questioned was the legality of the State’s subsequent conduct. When a person who had been living on bail pursuant to judicial orders suddenly disappears from custody, and the State claims that she has been “sent back” to another country, the most basic requirement of constitutional governance is that the State demonstrate, through documents and procedure, that this removal was lawful. The petition asked the Court to insist on that minimum. Besides, the petition pointed out that it was only economic marginalisation that had precluded Doyjan from appealing the verdict of the Foreigner Tribunal. She had been granted bail post Covid-19 and as per conditions appeared regularly before the police station to record her presence for years.

Every week, CJP’s dedicated team in Assam, comprising community volunteers, district volunteer motivators, and lawyers, provides vital paralegal support, counseling, and legal aid to many affected by the citizenship crisis in over 24 districts in Assam.  Through our hands-on approach, 12,00,000 people successfully submitted completed NRC forms (2017-2019). We fight Foreigner Tribunal cases monthly at the district level.  Through these concerted efforts, we have achieved an impressive success rate of 20 cases annually, with individuals successfully obtaining their Indian citizenship. This ground level data ensures informed interventions by CJP in our Constitutional Courts. Your support fuels this crucial work. Stand with us for Equal Rights for All #HelpCJPHelpAssam. Donate NOW!

From Tribunal declaration to sudden disappearance

Doyjan Bibi’s legal trajectory was typical of thousands of cases in Assam. She was declared a foreigner through an ex-parte opinion of the Foreigners Tribunal, Dhubri, in August 2017. That opinion was later interfered with by the Gauhati High Court, which granted her a final opportunity to contest the proceedings. When she failed to appear within the stipulated time, the ex-parte declaration revived. Yet, this declaration did not result in immediate deportation. Like many others, she was released on bail pursuant to directions issued by the Supreme Court and the Gauhati High Court during the COVID-19 period, when constitutional courts ordered the release of long-term detainees to decongest detention centres.

For years thereafter, she remained at liberty. There was no allegation on record that she violated bail conditions or absconded. Her sudden re-arrest on May 24, 2025 therefore marked a decisive rupture. When her husband approached the Court, the State initially stated that she had been lodged in a holding centre in Kokrajhar. Acting on that representation, the Court even permitted the petitioner to meet her and obtain her signature for the purposes of legal proceedings. However, when the petitioner went to the holding centre on June 25, 2025, he was informed that she was no longer there.

The explanation offered by the State was that she had been handed over to the Border Security Force and “sent back to Bangladesh” on May 27, 2025 from an area under the control of an ad hoc BSF battalion. No contemporaneous record of this process was placed before the Court.

What the Petition sought—and what the state did not produce

The petition did not proceed on conjecture. It identified a glaring evidentiary vacuum and asked the Court to address it. If Doyjan Bibi had indeed been deported, the petitioners argued, there ought to exist some documentary trail—proof of nationality verification, a deportation order, a record of handover, or at the very least, an acknowledgment of acceptance by Bangladeshi authorities. In the absence of such records, the only plausible inference was that she may have been illegally pushed across the border.

The State’s response did not deny the absence of documentation. Instead, it relied on affidavits asserting that she had been deported. The judgment records these assertions and accepts them as sufficient. At no stage does the Court direct the State to produce any material to substantiate its claim. The legal question—whether a court can be satisfied about the legality of deportation without seeing a single document—remains unanswered.

The Judgment’s Core Move: Executive assertion as conclusive proof

The fulcrum of the judgment is its treatment of executive power as effectively unreviewable once a person has been declared a foreigner. Drawing extensively on Hans Muller of Nurenburg v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail (1955), the Court reiterates that the power of the State to expel foreigners is “absolute and unfettered.” From this premise, it proceeds to hold that the Court need not inquire into the manner in which that power is exercised.

What the judgment does not confront is that Hans Muller itself imposed limits. The Supreme Court made it clear that an expelled person must leave the country as a free person and cannot be handed over in custody to another State. Nor did Hans Muller suggest that deportation could take place without procedure, documentation, or accountability. By extracting the language of plenary power while discarding the safeguards that accompany it, the judgment converts executive authority into something approaching discretion without record.

Deportation without documents, “pushback” without consequence

One of the most troubling aspects of the judgment is its refusal to meaningfully distinguish between formal deportation and informal pushback. Deportation, in law, is a structured process involving identification, verification, communication with the receiving State, and a documented handover. Pushback, by contrast, is an informal and often violent practice in which individuals are forced across borders without acknowledgment or acceptance.

The petition explicitly raised the spectre of pushback. The judgment, however, treats the State’s use of the word “deportation” as dispositive. Once that label is accepted, the absence of documents is treated as immaterial. This approach effectively collapses the distinction between deportation and pushback, granting judicial cover to practices that would otherwise be legally indefensible.

Bail, judicial protection, and executive override

Another unresolved tension in the judgment concerns the status of judicial bail. Doyjan Bibi had been released pursuant to directions of constitutional courts. Her liberty, fragile though it was, was judicially sanctioned. Yet she was re-arrested and removed without any application for cancellation of bail or judicial oversight.

The Court acknowledges that COVID-era bail orders were temporary in nature, but this observation sidesteps the real issue. The question was not whether deportation was permissible in principle, but whether the executive could override subsisting judicial protection without returning to court. On this, the judgment is silent.

Neither does the Guwahati High Court, a constitutional court, question what it means for an individual not to be able to access all four tiers of justice, available for all. True that the Foreigner Tribunal order of 2017 had not been adequately agitated by Doyjanbi in the High Court, but can this lapse –given the Indian judiciary’s overall approach on delays and condonation thereof—be enough to seize from a woman her very right to agitate citizenship?

From legal adjudication to ideological framing

The judgment goes far beyond what was required to decide the petition. It contains extended references to demographic change, migration narratives, national security concerns, and alleged misinformation about persecution. These observations, while politically charged, do little legal work. Their presence, however, is not neutral. They shift the frame of the case from one about individual liberty and State accountability to one about perceived civilisational threat.

Once that shift occurs, procedural safeguards appear expendable. The petitioner’s wife is no longer a person whose liberty demands justification, but an abstract figure within a larger narrative of migration and security. In such a frame, asking the State for documents begins to look unnecessary, even indulgent.

The Consequence: Petition emptied of content

By dismissing the petition without demanding proof of deportation, the Gauhati High Court sets a troubling precedent. It signals that in cases involving declared foreigners, executive assertion will suffice; records are optional; judicial scrutiny is limited; and families may never know how or where a person was removed.

Habeas corpus petitions have historically existed to prevent precisely this situation—to ensure that the State cannot answer the question “where is this person?” with little more than an affidavit. When courts stop asking for proof, the writ loses its meaning.

Perhaps the most consequential aspect of the judgment is the degree of deference it accords to the executive.

The Court accepts:

• Executive affidavits as conclusive proof
• Absence of documentation as immaterial
• Non-production of records as inconsequential

This transforms habeas corpus from a searching judicial inquiry into a ritualistic exercise. Once the State says “we have deported her,” the Court treats the matter as closed.

Is there an established procedure for deportation?

Deportation in India, though grounded in statutory powers, was largely operationalised through internal administrative mechanisms and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) by state authorities. (See here, here and here) following directions from the Centre.

Typical deportation process is as follows:

1.  Identification/Completion of Sentence: A foreign national is declared a foreigner or completes a prison term for violating applicable laws.
2.  Notification: Jail authorities notify relevant police officials (e.g., Superintendent of Police) about the impending release.
3.  Custody and order:

• If the government decides on deportation, a formal order is issued.
• Upon release, the individual is taken into police custody and served with the deportation order.

4.  Physical Removal: Arrangements are made for their removal from the country, often under police escort. The serving officer reports the execution of the order back to the government.
5.  Consular notification (Vienna Convention):

• As per Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Indian authorities must inform the consular representatives of the foreign national’s country about their arrest or detention.
• Indian practice (MEA Office Memorandum No. T.4415/1/91 (CPO/CIR/9)) requires:
  • Asking the arrested foreign national if they wish their consulate to be informed.
  • Immediately notifying the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA).
  • Providing detailed particulars (name, nationality, passport details, offence, arrest details, location) to Joint Secretaries at MEA and MHA, and state authorities.

6.  Deportation for minor violations: In cases of brief overstays or delayed registration, prosecution might be withdrawn with court approval, and the individual directly deported under delegated powers of Section 3(2)(c) of the (now-repealed) Foreigners Act. A record is submitted to the MEA.

Detailed report may be read here.

Conclusion: A quiet but profound Constitutional retreat

This judgment will reverberate far beyond one case. It lowers the threshold of accountability in deportation proceedings and normalises undocumented removals. In border regimes, where power is most concentrated and individuals most vulnerable, such a retreat from scrutiny is especially dangerous.

If this reasoning is followed, it means:

• Deportations can occur without paperwork
• Families need never be informed
• Courts need not verify State claims
• Pushbacks acquire judicial cover
• Habeas corpus becomes ineffective precisely where it is most needed

This is not a minor doctrinal shift. It is a structural weakening of constitutional oversight. The Constitution does not cease to operate at the border, nor does it become optional when the person involved is labelled a foreigner. By refusing to insist on legality through proof, the Court has allowed executive power to move beyond effective constitutional control.

That is the enduring, and deeply unsettling, legacy of this decision.

Details of the proceedings of the said case in Gauhati High Court may be read here, here, here and here.

The order of the High Court may be read here:

Related:

CJP scores big win! Citizenship restored to Mazirun Bewa, a widowed daily wage worker from Assam

Assam’s New SOP Hands Citizenship Decisions to Bureaucrats: Executive overreach or legal necessity?

Assam government to withdraw ‘Foreigner’ cases against Non-Muslims under Citizenship Amendment Act

Assam’s Citizenship Crisis: How Foreigners Tribunals construct an architecture of exclusion and rights violations

No Warrants, No Answers: The Disappeared of Assam

The post Removed Without Process: The Doyjan Bibi case and the Gauhati High Court’s Retreat from demanding deportation records appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Protesters are mostly from the tribal communities of Palghar district. They had started their trek towards the collectorate, demanding better implementation of land rights, reinstatement of the MGNREGA, cancellation of the Vadhavan port and availability of water for drinking and irrigation purposes, among others. Accompanied by protest songs on microphones, striding purposefully with CPI-M flags and banners, chanting slogans, protesters reached the Collectorate office of Palghar on the evening of January 20, where they plan to camp until their demands are met – the most longstanding of which is the enforcement of land rights. Adivasis have been tilling forest and grazing land for centuries but still don’t own the plots they cultivate.

The Forest Rights Act, 2006, vests forest land and resource rights in Scheduled Tribes and other traditional forest dwellers who have resided in such areas for generations. Gram sabhas initiate claims, verified through sub-divisional and district committees, protecting dwellers from eviction until their rights are settled. But most of the tribal farmers at the rally have not had their claims approved. The last time that farmers marched in their thousands was from Nashik to Azad Maidan in Mumbai, a stretch of 180 kilometres with several marchers barefoot.

Mass organisations All India Kisan Sabha (AIKS), Centre of Indian Trade Unions (CITU), All India Democratic Women’s Association (AIDWA), Democratic Youth Federation of India (DYFI) and Student’s Federation of India (SFI) and Adivasi Adhikar Rashtriya Manch (AARM) have also joined this March in huge numbers. Beginning the long walk on January 19, the marchers have reached the Palghar Collectorate where they were denied permission for the dharna inside the Collectorate. Undettered they have begun the indefinite protests outside.

Citizens for Justice and Peace has long analysed national and international law on Farmers Rights. Some of these may be read here and here.

The March is being led by CPI (M) Polit Bureau member and AIKS National President Dr Ashok Dhawale, Polit Bureau member and AIDWA National General Secretary Mariam Dhawale, Central Committee member, state secretary and AIKS National Joint Secretary Dr Ajit Nawale, Central Committee member and CITU State Secretary Vinod Nikole, two-term MLA from Dahanu, State Secretariat member and AARM State Convenor Kiran Gahala, and many others. Later CPI (M) Polit Bureau member and AIKS National General Secretary Vijoo Krishnan also joined the March.

1 of 8

According to Palghar Police officials, as reported in The Hindu, around 30,000 protesters joined the long march. The demands include full implementation of the Forest Rights Act, the Panchayats Extension to Scheduled Areas Act PESA, revival of the Jal Jeevan Mission scheme to provide work, cancellation of the smart meter scheme, appointment to all the vacant posts in the government service of Palghar district, providing the benefits of the Gharkul scheme, and cancellation of the development of Vadhavan and Murbe ports.

CPI (M)’s women wing State secretary Prachi Hatiwlekar told the newspaper, “This struggle is age-old, starting from bonded labour to now working for long pending issue of land ownership transfer. Central government is only trying to dilute the Forest Rights Act.”

The protesters are also articulate and vocal against the smart metres, media reports indicate. They want that the government reinstall old meters and instruct their officials not to impose smart meters. Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited (MSEDCL) rolled out the smart meters in 2021, which automatically record real-time power consumption and send the data to the electricity distribution company. However, the device has been criticised for bill hike, no consent for installation, and poor awareness about tariff changes.

Read this story on smart metres here

The protest shows discontent among tribal communities over land ownership, large infrastructure projects in the district and changes to MGNREGA. All the protesters unanimously reiterated that unless and until “we don’t get all our papers stamped, we won’t go home”.

Related:

Kisan Long March ends with Fresh Promises to Farmers

The post 50,000 strong Adivasi, farmers march from Charoti to Palghar, hold indefinite dharna for land rights appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Masood had recently reported on a controversial police drive to collect information on mosques and mosque officials in Kashmir. He was asked to sign a bond, stating that he would not do anything to disturb peace in the union territory, the person said. Interestingly, the police action is not based on a formal first information report, but is being carried out under Section 126 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, the person said.

The provision allows an executive magistrate to pre-emptively seek bonds from people “likely to commit a breach of peace”. Government officials can invoke this section merely on the basis of information they have received about individuals.

Senior journalist Nirupama Subramaniam, on January 19, Monday commented sharply on the developments on social media

Reporters of Delhi national newspapers are being summoned by J&K police, harassed about routine “he said”, “she said” reports and asked to sign bonds they won’t do such reports again. First, the correspondent of one newspaper was summoned repeatedly over three days, and perhaps…

— Nirupama Subramanian (@tallstories) January 19, 2026

For Kashmir’s journalists, the cycle is vicious: repeated summonses, institutional pressure and the lack of a community safety net have become a part of an entrenched system that limits critical reporting, encourages self-censorship and sidelines independent media voices in the…

— Siddharth (@svaradarajan) January 20, 2026

Reportedly, an Indian Express spokesperson confirmed to the media that Masood had been called to the police station. “Bashaarat Masood, Assistant Editor, and a member of the Srinagar bureau of The Indian Express since 2006, was called on four days to the Cyber Police Station, Srinagar, and asked to sign a bond which he has not signed,” the spokesperson said. “The Indian Express is committed to doing what is necessary to uphold and protect the rights and dignity of its journalists.”

Scroll also contacted the senior superintendent of Srinagar police, asking about the reasons for summoning journalists and asking them to sign the bonds. The official did not respond to our calls and messages. This story will be updated if he responds.

The police summons

It was on the evening of January 14, Masood first received a phone call from the cyber police in Srinagar, asking him to come to the police station the next afternoon, according to the person familiar with the events that followed. As he got there, he was made to wait for nearly three hours after which a police officer asked him to come back the following day. The officer assured Masood that he would only have to spend half an hour at the police station the next time he came. However, the senior journalist ended up spending the whole of Friday and Saturday running from one government office to another.

Masood was reportedly first sent to the deputy commissioner’s office from the police station, where he was asked to sign a Section 126 bond. The police officials were unwilling to provide reasons for their demand, said the person. When Masood refused to comply, a police official told him that he would then have to go to Srinagar central jail.

From the deputy commissioner’s office, the journalist was sent back to the police station. There, one of the officers told him that he was being asked to sign the bond because of a story he had written on the political reaction to the police drive in mosques in Kashmir.

On Monday afternoon, he was called in again, the fourth day he had been forced to turn up at the police station. This time, though, the police did not keep him at the station for very long. The three other journalists got similar summons. One of them was out of Srinagar when he got a call from a police official, asking him to come in. None of the other journalists have, as of yet, reported to the police station.

‘Serious attack on press freedom,’

The four journalists summoned had reported on the political reaction to the Jammu and Kashmir police’s drive to collect information on mosques, which has been the subject of much controversy over the past week in Kashmir.

Police officials are reportedly distributing copies of a four-page form to mosques in the Muslim-majority region. The form seeks extensive information pertaining to the family background and financial details of those involved in the upkeep of the places of worship.

The exercise has drawn fire from Kashmiri politicians cutting across party lines as well as prominent religious organisations, who argue that this goes beyond looking into the legal status of mosques.

Indian Express also reported that J&K Director General of Police Nalin Prabhat was not available for comment. Another officer, who did not wish to be named, told the newspaper that the police called him following his news report about the police distributing a four-page document to all mosques in the Kashmir valley and seeking detailed information about their budget, funding sources, and management committees.

Masood has been a member of the Srinagar Bureau of The Indian Express since 2006. “His work over the last two decades speaks for itself. He has not signed the bond as asked by the police. The Indian Express is committed to doing what is necessary to uphold and protect the rights and dignity of its journalists,” said Raj Kamal Jha, Chief Editor, The Indian Express as quoted in the newspaper.

Related:

Interim bail to Gujarat journalist Mahesh Langa: SC

“This system breaks the body when it cannot break the spirit” — Ipsa Shatakshi on her jailed husband, journalist Rupesh Kumar Singh

The post J & K: Attempt to muzzle FoE, Media? Police summons to media, journalists appeared first on SabrangIndia.

A quick search of the 142-page judgement, delivered by a bench comprising Justices Aravind Kumar and NV Anjaria, finds these key words missing. Instead, the judgement expanded the contours of terrorism. Further, it created two categories of accused – leaders and followers. Researchers Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam were designated as “architects” of the conspiracy and denied bail, whereas student activist Gulfisha Fatima, Meeran Haider, Shifa-ur-Rehman, Mohd. Saleem Khan and Shadab Ahmed were granted bail under stringent censorial conditions. All of them have been in jail since 2020.

While freedom of speech and the right to political dissent are significant contextual elements in the judgment, the Supreme Court explicitly clarified that they are not the core legal issues determining the outcome of the bail applications.

Critics, however, argue that the top court’s judgment sets a dangerous precedent by classifying political dissent and protest speeches as acts of terrorism.

Conditional freedom that robs the right to speak

Supreme Court imposed strict conditions while granting bail to the Fatima, Rehman, Khan, Haider and Ahmed. Apart from the ₹2 lakh personal bond each with two local sureties of the like amount, the top court also gagged the five activists from speaking about any issue from any platform after their release.

Conditions also include that they are:

• Required to stay within the territorial limit of Delhi NCT for the pendency of the trial. Not allowed to leave the city without court’s permission. Any request for travel shall disclose reasons, which would then be considered by the trial court “strictly” on its “merits”
• Surrender passports if any. If there is no passport, then an affidavit to be filed to that effect. Furthermore, immigration authorities have been direction to prevent any exit from the country without the court’s permission
• Twice weekly check-ins at the Delhi Police Crime Branch police station. The police are then required to submit monthly attendance reports to court; Furnish full current address and all contact details with the investigating officer of the case. there must be a seven-day notice before any change to the same.
• Co-operate during the trial, appear at every date unless exempted by court and ensure they don’t act in any way to delay the same
• No witness tampering, or any contact with them at all – direct or indirect. Not allowed to participate in the activities of any group or organization linked to the subject matter of the present FIR/ final report
• Complete media gag
• Gag on attending any rallies – political or otherwise, physically or virtually till the conclusion of the trial
• Not allowed to distribute any posts, handbills, posters, fliers, banners
• “Maintain peace and good behavior.” Violation of this condition gives the police “liberty” to seek revocation of bail

UAPA comes a full circle

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Gulfisha Fatima vs State (2026 INSC 2) represents a ‘coming to a full circle’ moment for the Unlawful Activity (Prevention) Act (UAPA), 1967. The UAPA, which was originally meant to address “secessionist” activities, was later amended and rebranded as India’s anti-terror law.

Around 1962-63, the then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru envisioned UAPA to act as a deterrence against secessionist ideologies and preserve national integration. In the backdrop of the 1965 India-Pakistan war, UAPA was primarily intended to tackle the strong secessionist movement in Tamil Nadu which wanted to be a sovereign state. It was followed by a series of preventive detention laws and, when India signed and ratified all major United Nation counter-terrorism conventions after 9/11, the UAPA was specifically amended in 2004 to align with the country’s international obligations.

The law, in its current avatar, is so vast and vague, that even expressing disaffection towards the state or affection for another state, as in the case of the three Kashmiri youth who were jailed under sedition charges for allegedly cheering for Pakistan’s cricket team when it won the 2021 T20 World Cup, is liable for prosecution.

When protest becomes an act of terrorism

Can protest speeches, public meetings and WhatsApp group membership constitute conspiracy under Sections 16–18 of the UAPA at the bail stage?

According to the Supreme Court: Yes, they can. Even if the protests were peaceful assemblies.

The Supreme Court’s January 5 judgement essentially redefined terrorism. Even though the judgment recognized freedom of speech as a protected right, it stopped where an allegedly pre-planned conspiracy for systemic violence began. Ironically, cases against BJP politicians like Kapil Sharma, who made incendiary speeches on the eve of the breakout of violence in Delhi in 2020, continue at a snail’s pace,

Yet, the January 5 judgement read: “The factual record placed by the prosecution repeatedly returns to a distinction that is central to the case: the differentiation between a conventional dharna and a chakka jam. This is not treated as semantics. It is treated as strategy.”

“A dharna may be expressive; a chakka jam, as alleged, is disruptive by design. The prosecution case is that the sustained choking of arterial roads, replication of blockade sites, and the movement of crowds from minority clusters into mixed population areas were not accidental expressions of dissent, but calibrated acts meant to generate confrontation, overwhelm law enforcement, and create conditions for violence,” it added.

The top court said Delhi Police did not rely on a “single speech, a single meeting, or a single blockade” to oppose bail, rather it relied on “a course of conduct, spread over weeks, involving repeated meetings, formation of coordinating bodies, issuance of directions, and alleged preparations for escalation.”

“The Court cannot, at the bail stage, segregate this course of conduct into isolated benign fragments and assess each in abstraction,” the judgment read.

The Supreme Court reiterated that “dissent and protest occupy a protected space in a constitutional democracy,” however, that protection does not extend to a design that involves “systemic disruption, engineered confrontation, and preparatory steps towards violence”.

“At this stage, the Court must resist from committing two errors. The first is to criminalise speech merely because it is politically charged. The second is to immunize a continuing course of conduct merely because it contains language of non-violence,” the judgment read.

“In the application of such law, the Court does not proceed on identity, ideology, belief, or association. It proceeds on role, material, and the statutory threshold governing the exercise of jurisdiction,” the judgment read. “…[the judgment] neither endorses the prosecution case nor prejudges the guilt of any accused,” the court said adding that it applied the law as it stands, “recognising that individual liberty must be protected, but that it must also withstand the legitimate demands of national security and collective safety.”

“This balance is not a matter of preference rather it is a matter of constitutional duty,” the court added.

Selective application of law

While the Supreme Court’s judgment could be seen as a mixed bag of relief for some accused, in the denial of bail to Imam and Khalid, the top court selectively applied its own judgement and those of the high court on free speech or even bail under section 43d of the UAPA.

In cases like Vernon Gonzalves, Shoma Sen, Arvind Kejriwal, Manish Sisodia, Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh, Sheikh Javed Iqbal, the top court granted bail due to prolonged incarceration despite the bar under section 43D of the UAPA act.

On free speech, the Supreme Court in its 2015 Shreya Singhal judgment said that dissenting discourse is not a crime. In its Balwant Singh judgment, the court emphasized that shouting stray slogans like “Khalistan Zindabad” were not a crime.

In fact, the Delhi High Court granted bail to student activists Devangana Kalita, Natasha Narwal and Asif Iqbal Tanha—co-accused in the 2020 Delhi Riots conspiracy case—and pulled up the Delhi Police for its “wanton use” of the UAPA.

In this case, the High Court clearly stated: “… in its anxiety to suppress dissent and in the morbid fear that matters may get out of hand, the State has blurred the line between the constitutionally guaranteed ‘right to protest’ and ‘terrorist activity’. If such blurring gains traction, democracy would be in peril.”

“… the intent and purport of the Parliament in enacting the UAPA, and more specifically in amending it in 2004 and 2008 to bring terrorist activity within its scope, was, and could only have had been, to deal with matters of profound impact on the ‘Defence of India’, nothing more and nothing less,” it added.

Process is the punishment

In the past decade, the State (or corporations) has often been accused of (mis)using the law to stifle dissent. In effect, making the process of law the punishment. Sedition (the old and new avatar), UAPA, defamation, Copyright Act are all being used against free speech.

The NewsClick founder editor Prabir Purkayastha was charged under the draconian UAPA for publishing “propaganda” reports on China that allegedly served to endanger the “sovereignty, unity and security of India.” He secured bail after seven months in custody after the Supreme Court held that his arrest was “invalid in the eyes of the law.”

Sedition, in its new avatar, has been used against climate activist Sonam Wangchuk, Ashoka University professor Ali Khan Mahmudabad, stand-up comic Kunal Kamra, satirists Madri Kakoti and Shamita Yadav better as Dr Medusa and Ranting Gola respectively, Bhojpuri singer Neha Singh Rathore, TV star and Big Boss winner Akhil Marar, a 20-year-old autorickshaw driver Sahil Khan and even Pushpa Sathidar, wife of the late actor Vira Sathidar, who was booked for merely reciting the acclaimed Faiz Ahmed Faiz poem ‘Hum Dekhenge’ at a meeting.in Nagpur in May 2025.

Even after sedition cases are dropped, the punishing process does not end, as the ordeal of Manipuri journalist Kishore Wangkhemcha, booked for speaking out about the struggles of leaders of Manipur or film maker Aisha Sultana, charged for criticising the Lakshadweep administrator, bears out..

Clearly, the price of dissent and critical thought is extremely high. And now, a Supreme Court order penalises peaceful protest and expression as acts of terror, effectively putting an undemocratic premium on the freedom to speak freely.

*About the Author: After an almost decade-long career as a photojournalist in Mumbai, Ritika now covers the Indian judiciary and hopes to simplify the law and decode the judiciary. Now based in Delhi, Ritika is a writer, part-time dreamer & full-time K-drama addict who escapes the city when she’s not bingeing on K-dramas.

Courtesy: Free Speech Collective

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Clearly, after the widespread criticism and the sensitiveness of the issue given he upcoming local corporation elections (municipal corporation elections are on  Thursday January 15), on January 8, Yogesh Sabale, Senior Police Inspector of the Mata Ramabai Ambedkar Nagar Police Station, called Deepak Pawar and who informed him that they were dropping the case and hence they did not need to appear in court! Since no formal intimation (or confirmation of the withdrawal of the misconceived case by the police has yet been received) Pawar raised the question: “…ahead of the elections, are you suggesting that I should not come to court on January 12 because the government does not want unnecessary trouble over the Marathi issue? However, does that mean the case has been withdrawn? On this point, Sabale could not give a definitive answer—nor could he!”

Pawar further writes, “For a grassroots activist, if within the span of ten days one is first ordered to appear in court and then requested not to appear, one can imagine the mix of happiness and astonishment this would cause. Over the past two or three decades, the decline of street-based movements has meant that even the police are unsure how to deal with people who come out onto the streets through lawful means—especially for causes like language and schools. Therefore, if those who ordered the registration of the case and instructed that charges be framed changed their minds within 24 hours, there may be reasons for this that we are not aware of. What are those reasons?”

Deepak Pawar, a renowned figure in Maharashtra also queries that,” If a case was to be registered, it should have been registered against Uddhav Thackeray, Sanjay Raut, Harshvardhan Sapkal, and Nitin Sardesai for the June 29 programme. Similarly, cases should have been registered against all leaders of political parties present at the December 18 programme. This clearly shows how convenient and selective the police’s process of registering cases is.”

The entire tale runs thus:

On January 7, a letter was published on social media in my (Deepak Pawar’s) name and in the name of Anand Bhandare. That letter concerned the case registered by the police in connection with the march we had organised on December 18, 2025—from Hutatma Smarak to the Municipal Corporation headquarters—to save Marathi schools, and about appearing before the Mazgaon court on Monday, January 12, for the framing of charges. The post highlighted that, in Maharashtra, carrying out a lawful agitation for Marathi schools has effectively been treated as a crime. After the text was published on social media, it was widely shared. Citizens’ reactions strongly condemned the government and the police in harsh terms.

नमस्कार,
७ जानेवारी रोजी समाजमाध्यमांवर मी आणि आनंद भंडारे यांच्या नावाने एक पत्र प्रसिद्ध केले होते. १८ डिसेंबर २०२५ रोजी हुतात्मा स्मारक ते महानगरपालिका मुख्यालय या दरम्यान मराठी शाळा वाचविण्यासाठी आम्ही आयोजित केलेल्या मार्चाबाबत पोलिसांनी दाखल केलेला गुन्हा आणि सोमवार, दिनांक… pic.twitter.com/hDqmJAZkJe

— Dr. Deepak Pawar दीपक पवार (@drdeepakpawar) January 11, 2026

Hello,

(Continued text of tweet)…Even if it is difficult for our voices to reach a government with a brute majority, there is a possibility that the police may still be somewhat sensitive to public criticism. Accordingly, the very next day I received a call from Yogesh Sabale, Senior Police Inspector of the Mata Ramabai Ambedkar Nagar Police Station, who informed me that they were dropping the case. I asked him to convey this in writing, and by the end of the day I received a letter from him, which is attached here. Three days later, letters addressed to Anand Bhandare, Girish Samant, and Pranali Raut arrived. Notably, while Pranali Raut had never received a letter asking her to appear in court, she did receive a letter telling her that she need not appear in court.

If an agitation has taken place under my chairpersonship (Deepak Pawar), then at the very least, the names of everyone who participated in that agitation should have appeared in my letter. That did not happen. Not only that, but while we were initially instructed to appear in court on Monday, letters began arriving one after another—right up to Saturday night—saying that there was no need to appear. If the police are sending such letters via a police station’s WhatsApp, some basic questions arise: does each police station have an email ID, and if so, why is it not being used for this purpose—what exactly is it used for?

Yogesh Sabale, Senior Police Inspector of the Mata Ramabai Ambedkar Nagar Police Station, spoke to me at length over the phone. The very system that officially exists to maintain law and order often ends up suppressing the rights of ordinary citizens. Officers like him work at the intermediate level within this system, and therefore their authority has limits. Perhaps their personal integrity and goodwill exceed their formal powers. That may be why he said to me (Deepak Pawar), “I request you not to appear in court on Monday.”

For a grassroots activist, if within the span of ten days one is first ordered to appear in court and then requested not to appear, one can imagine the mix of happiness and astonishment this would cause. Over the past two or three decades, the decline of street-based movements has meant that even the police are unsure how to deal with people who come out onto the streets through lawful means—especially for causes like language and schools. Therefore, if those who ordered the registration of the case and instructed that charges be framed changed their minds within 24 hours, there may be reasons for this that we are not aware of. What are those reasons?

The question I (Deepak Pawar ) put to Sabale was this: ahead of the elections, are you suggesting that I should not come to court on the 12th because the government does not want unnecessary trouble over the Marathi issue? But does that mean the case has been withdrawn? On this point, Sabale could not give a definitive answer—nor could he. He merely said that cases had been registered against workers of political parties. However, this claim does not hold water. I (Deepak Pawar) had already demonstrated this by citing the names of those against whom cases were, and were not, registered in connection with the June 29 programme protesting unjust government resolutions. If a case was to be registered, it should have been registered against Uddhav Thackeray, Sanjay Raut, Harshvardhan Sapkal, and Nitin Sardesai for the June 29 programme. Similarly, cases should have been registered against all leaders of political parties present at the December 18 programme. This clearly shows how convenient and selective the police’s process of registering cases is.”

At the point of writing this detailed post on social media, Pawar informs people of Maharashtra “all of us activists from the Marathi Abhyas Kendra are busy in Shirur with preparations for the 9th Marathi-loving Parents’ Conference.”

The letters sent by the police may be read here:

(The original tweet on X was in Marathi)

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The post Academic, Deepak Pawar to Mumbai Police: Are frivolous cases against us –filed after a peaceful demonstration to save Marathi schools –being dropped because of the upcoming BMC polls? appeared first on SabrangIndia.