Detention and allegations of police brutality

According to Baadal, a BSCEM member, the students were painting murals late on February 3 when they were confronted by security guards, who then called the police. The students were subsequently taken to Vasant Kunj Police Station. “When we reached the police station, we learned that they were brutally beaten. We were also informed that officials from NIA and IB were questioning them,” Baadal told Maktoob Media.

BSCEM released a statement condemning the detentions, calling them illegal and an attack on democratic rights. “The students were raising awareness about the killing of Maoists and Adivasis in Bastar, specifically in the Maad region, under Operation Kaagar. This operation is part of a broader military crackdown known as the Surajkund Scheme, initiated in 2022 under the BJP-led NDA government,” the statement read.

Connections to the larger crackdown on maoist-linked activism

This incident is not isolated. Reports indicate that Delhi University and Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) have been at the centre of alleged Maoist indoctrination efforts. Law enforcement agencies have expressed concerns over student activism being linked to a pro-Maoist ideology, often citing incidents like the clash at JNU in 2010 over a meeting against ‘Operation Green Hunt’. Furthermore, accusations have surfaced in the past regarding Delhi University professors allegedly meeting Maoist leaders to strategise resistance against state operations.

The broader scrutiny of academic institutions as hubs of Maoist influence has intensified over the years. A report by The Caravan detailed interactions between security forces and activists like Nandini Sundar, who has been accused of sympathising with Maoists. Her work in Bastar has highlighted police excesses and alleged fake encounters, making her a target of state authorities. This increasing surveillance of intellectuals and students under the pretext of counterinsurgency raises concerns over academic freedom and the right to dissent.

The case of professor G.N. Saibaba: A legal battle against suppression

The treatment of students in this case bears some similarities to the prolonged legal ordeal of Delhi University Professor G.N. Saibaba, who was arrested in 2014 under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) on allegations of Maoist links. Saibaba, who is 90% disabled, was incarcerated for nearly a decade, much of it in solitary confinement, before being acquitted by the Bombay High Court in March 2024.

The court found that there was no substantial evidence to prove conspiracy to wage war against the state, ruling that mere association with suspected individuals does not constitute terrorism. Despite this, Saibaba’s trial was marked by repeated legal obstructions, including a controversial Saturday hearing at the Supreme Court in 2022 that stayed his earlier acquittal. His case has since become a symbol of how counterterrorism laws are being misused to target dissenters and academics.

The involvement of the Supreme Court in finally upholding his acquittal underscores the systemic failures within India’s criminal justice system when it comes to political dissent. Civil rights groups argue that the prolonged incarceration of individuals like Saibaba and the recent detention of DU students reflect a broader trend of criminalising those who challenge state narratives on insurgency and human rights violations.

In this climate, the detention of the four students appears to be part of a wider pattern of criminalising dissent. The involvement of the NIA and IB in the case further underscores how student activism on contentious issues is increasingly being framed as a national security threat. Civil rights groups argue that this approach not only violates fundamental freedoms but also fosters an atmosphere of fear, discouraging engagement with social and political issues that are crucial to democratic discourse.

Police denial and ongoing concerns

Despite these allegations, the police denied any mistreatment or unlawful detention. When contacted, Vasant Kunj Police Station SHO Inspector Balbir Singh dismissed the claims, stating, “Nothing like that is happening here.”

However, student activists insist that the authorities are concealing details of the detention. “This crackdown on dissent is alarming,” said a fellow BSCEM member. “The arrest and abuse of students for merely raising awareness about human rights violations are a direct attack on free speech and democratic rights.”

This incident comes at a time when global discussions on state violence and human rights violations are intensifying. Many activists argue that the government’s crackdown on student-led protests and demonstrations is indicative of a larger pattern of suppression of dissent in India.

Related:

GN Saibaba released from Nagpur central jail after acquittal by Bombay HC

Mere association or support to terror organisation, not sufficient to attract UAPA: SC

The post DU 2025 crackdown: Students detained, allegedly tortured appeared first on SabrangIndia.

More importantly, this policy could be seen as violating Article 15 (2)(a) of the Indian Constitution. Article 15(2(a) prohibits discrimination on grounds of sex, among others, to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment

Oyo’s policy disproportionately affects opposite-gender pairs, as they are more likely to be perceived as couples and be required to provide proof of marriage. In contrast, same-gender pairs, whether romantic or not, are less likely to face such scrutiny. For example, a man and a woman may be denied accommodation without proof of marriage, while two men or two women in the same situation may not encounter this barrier.

This differential treatment imposes unequal access conditions based on the sex of the individuals involved, effectively discriminating against opposite-gender pairs. Despite the policy’s neutral appearance, its implementation creates a disparity that contravenes Article 15(2) (a) by restricting access to hotel accommodations in a manner that is inherently sex-based.

Now, what could be done against discrimination is a natural question to arise. One would be to file a case under a statute but this is a specific right under Constitution but might not be enshrined in any statute. Can the Court be approached?

To address such discrimination and to answer the question, it is essential to explore the horizontal application of fundamental rights, which extends these rights to interactions between private individuals and entities, not just between individuals and the state.

Traditionally, fundamental rights have been viewed as protections against state action. However, with private entities exerting significant influence over essential services, there has been a discourse to consider the horizontal application of fundamental rights in a much more expansive scale than before. This article will examine the concept of horizontal application of fundamental rights and where we stand as of today, as far as jurisprudence is concerned.

The traditional vertical approach to fundamental rights

Fundamental rights in India have historically been seen as constraints on state power. This is known as the vertical application of fundamental rights, where rights are enforced only against the State (Malik, 2007). The reasoning behind this approach is that fundamental rights are guaranteed to citizens as protection from the State, with private actions being addressed through ordinary laws (Bhatia, 2021).

Under this traditional model, a private hospital denying treatment might not be directly liable for violating fundamental rights. Remedies would typically be sought through consumer protection laws or tort claims, rather than constitutional challenges. However, globalization and neoliberalism have transferred welfare responsibilities to the private sector without corresponding constitutional obligations (Bhatia, 2021). This has created power imbalances that the traditional vertical model fails to address.

The need for a horizontal application of fundamental rights

The horizontal application of fundamental rights extends constitutional protections to private actors, ensuring they also respect basic rights. In many cases, private entities hold economic and social power comparable to the State, necessitating constitutional oversight. This concept has been recognized in global legal frameworks, as seen in the constitutionalisation of private law, which integrates fundamental rights into private contracts, torts, and property law (Smits, 2010).

The horizontal effect can manifest in different forms:

• Direct horizontal effect: Fundamental rights are directly enforceable against private actors, much like they are against the state (Walkila, 2011). This means that an individual can directly bring a legal claim against another private party for violating their fundamental rights (Bhatia, 2021).

• Indirect horizontal effect: Fundamental rights influence the interpretation of private law provisions (Walkila, 2011). In this case, courts interpret existing private law in a way that gives effect to fundamental rights. This is not a direct enforcement but rather an interpretation or application of fundamental rights through other legal provisions.

• State-mediated effect: Rights are applied through the actions of public authorities (Walkila, 2011). This involves the state intervening to ensure private actors respect the rights of individuals. It is neither direct nor purely indirect but involves the state acting as a mediator to ensure fundamental rights are observed in private interactions (Frantziou, 2019).
• Functional equivalence: This approach seeks to equate private parties with the state, in character, functions, or impact, and hence subject them to constitutional obligations (Bhatia, 2021)

Critics argue that horizontal application may infringe on private autonomy (Friedmann & Barak, 2001). However, proponents emphasize its necessity in addressing social inequalities and mitigating power imbalances (Frantziou, 2019). Before the Horizontal Rights approach is discussed in Indian context, it is necessary to see how different legal system across the world have approached this matter so that at the end, we can not only compare our jurisprudence with the standards set by our own necessities but also with the standards set internationally.

Horizontal approach and jurisdictions across the world

Different countries have adopted varying approaches to the horizontal application of constitutional rights, which refers to the application of these rights to disputes between private parties, rather than solely between individuals and the state (Bhatia, 2021) This is because new power centres and mechanisms of oppression have emerged, necessitating departures from the default vertical approach where rights only apply between the state and individuals.

Germany has a strong tradition of applying constitutional rights in private law (Frantziou, 2019). The German approach is characterized by the concept of “indirect horizontality” (mittelbare Drittwirkung) (Frantziou, 2019; Walkila, 2016). In this model, constitutional rights do not directly bind private parties (Frantziou, 2019; Walkila, 2016). However, these rights influence the interpretation and development of private law rules (Frantziou, 2019; Walkila, 2016). The German Federal Constitutional Court has played a significant role in developing this concept (Frantziou, 2019; Walkila, 2016). In the landmark Lüth case, the court established that while fundamental rights do not override conflicting rules of private law, they must be considered when formulating private law (Henne & Riedlinger, 2005). This means that general clauses of the (private) civil codes are interpreted in light of the fundamental rights (Henne & Riedlinger, 2005). The German approach, therefore, does not impose direct obligations on private parties but ensures that the private law is consistent with constitutional values (Henne & Riedlinger, 2005, Katharina Stein, 2022)

The United States employs the “state action doctrine,” which limits the application of constitutional rights to actions by the government or those acting under its authority (Balkin, 2014). This doctrine means that, generally, constitutional rights do not apply to private actors (Balkin, 2014). In Shelley v. Kraemer (1948), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that courts cannot enforce agreements that stop people from buying homes because of their race. These racial covenants, were private contracts where homeowners promised not to sell to certain racial groups. While individuals could still make these agreements, the Court decided that if a judge enforced them, it would count as government action and violate the Constitution (Henkin 1962). This reasoning was subjected to criticism, rightly so, by the scholars of that time, saying that such reasoning is antithetical to personal liberties (Nerken, 1977). It wasn’t until the Fair Housing Act of 1968 that the inclusion of racially restrictive covenants in property agreements was explicitly prohibited by law.

Typically, the U.S. follows a strict approach: a right either applies in a given situation or it doesn’t, without much consideration of the specific circumstances (Balkin, 2014). This is different from other countries that use “proportionality analysis,” which means they look at the context and details of each case to decide how rights should be applied (Balkin, 2014)

South Africa’s constitutional approach has evolved from indirect to more direct horizontal application of rights (Frantziou, 2019; Van der Walt, 2012). Under its Interim Constitution, there was a subtle shift from indirect horizontal effect to direct horizontal effect under the Final Constitution (Frantziou, 2019; Van der Walt, 2012). The South African Constitution grants some provisions of the Bill of Rights direct horizontal effect, making all ordinary legislation subject to compliance with the Bill of Rights (Frantziou, 2019; Van der Walt, 2012). This means that national courts are obligated to protect the realization of fundamental rights and provide effective remedies (Frantziou, 2019; Van der Walt, 2012). South African jurisprudence reveals that the horizontal effect operates through general provisions in the Bill of Rights, which apply to all law and bind private parties (Frantziou, 2019; Van der Walt, 2012).

In Canada, the approach to horizontal rights is often described as the “governmental functions” approach which follows the logic of state action but is narrower in its operation (Weinrib and Weinrib, 2001). The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms does not directly bind private persons or apply to the common law governing their relations (Weinrib, 2001). The Supreme Court of Canada case R.W.D.S.U. v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd. held that the rights and freedoms in the Charter do not apply to private persons (Saunders, 2005; Weinrib, 2001). However, the common law can be adapted to the Constitution, with courts developing the common law in a way that is consistent with constitutional values (Saunders, 2005; Weinrib, 2001). This is called a parallel development of the common law, where courts exercise their inherent jurisdiction to interpret the common law to align with constitutional rights (Saunders, 2005; Weinrib, 2001). Some scholars note that the Canadian approach ignores the extensive German debate about direct and indirect application (Weinrib, 2001).

The United Kingdom does not have a single written constitution but has a quasi-constitutional statutory bill of rights – the Human Rights Act 1998 which raises similar issues to other jurisdictions (Hunt, 1998). The debate in the UK after the entry into force of the Human Rights Act, has focused on which form of horizontality is appropriate to the UK’s political constitution (Hunt, 1998). There are various opinions ranging from supporting a conception of horizontality through interpretation and incremental development of the common law compatibly with Convention rights (Hunt, 1998). Some legal scholars argue for an absolute duty to develop all existing common law compatibly with Convention rights, or simply to apply human rights directly (Hunt, 1998). The interaction of EU and UK law in the field of fundamental rights has influenced this debate in recent years, so that it would be fair to say that both direct and indirect forms of horizontal effect are available in the UK in respect of certain rights (Hunt, 1998).

Ireland: The Irish legal system has accepted the doctrine of full direct horizontal effect of constitutional rights. This means that the Irish Supreme Court interprets some constitutional rights to be directly binding and producing effects on the legal relationships between private parties. Every citizen in Ireland is entitled to invoke constitutional rights directly against another citizen, and not only against the State. The Irish Constitution itself, however, does not specifically provide for horizontal application. This approach contrasts with many Continental European approaches to the effect of fundamental rights. The Irish model allows for a direct application of constitutional rights in private disputes, meaning that an individual can bring a claim directly against another individual for violating their constitutional rights. The Irish model is considered a “constitutional tort,” where a violation of constitutional rights by one private actor against another can give rise to a legal claim (O’Cinneide, 2007).

Spain recognizes the direct horizontal application of human rights. The Spanish Constitutional Court has aligned its approach to the degree of protection guaranteed in EU law (Walkila, 2014, p. 133). In the Netherlands, both direct and indirect horizontal effects are recognized (Walkila, 2014, p. 164). Direct horizontal effect means fundamental rights are directly enforceable in the same way as in vertical relations, while indirect effect serves as an aid for interpretation, ensuring private law provisions conform to the contents of fundamental rights (Walkila, 2014, p. 147). A similar distinction exists in the Czech Republic (Walkila, 2014, p. 164), where the horizontal effect of constitutional rights has been addressed relatively recently. The Czech Republic is noted as having followed a strategy of constitution-conform interpretation and is among the jurisdictions that recognize both direct and indirect horizontal effects.

Slovakia, like the Czech Republic, has undergone recent constitutional reforms, leading to a more recent focus on the horizontal effect of fundamental rights. Before 2002, Slovakia’s Constitutional Tribunal could not review decisions of ordinary courts. However, the country has been recognized as having adopted a strategy similar to that of Poland, where high courts of the ordinary judiciary implement the horizontal effect of basic rights. In Poland, indirect horizontal effect is realized through general clauses and the interpretation of statutes in conformity with constitutional values, along with the review of constitutionality. Direct horizontal application of clear and precise constitutional provisions is also possible in exceptional cases (Walkila, 2014, p. 147).

Kenya’s Constitution of 2010 contains provisions that allow for the direct horizontal application of constitutional rights. This means that these rights can be applied in relationships between private parties, not just between individuals and the state. Specifically, Article 20 of the Kenyan Constitution does not formally limit the reach of horizontality. The Kenyan courts have also shown a willingness to apply the institutional approach to horizontal rights, particularly in cases of discrimination. However, while the courts have made some strides in this direction, they have been hesitant to articulate a fully consistent normative account of horizontality. This has resulted in an application of horizontality that is inconsistent and partial.

Jamaica’s 2011 Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms also introduced the concept of bounded interpretive horizontality. Section 13(5) of the Charter allows for the application of constitutional rights to private relationships. However, this application is not unlimited. The Jamaican Constitution does not subject every private relationship to the Constitution, nor every fundamental right. Like South Africa, the Jamaican Constitution was intended to tackle disparities in power between private parties. The Jamaican courts have grappled with the challenge of balancing competing rights and determining the limits of horizontal application. The courts have tended towards a “balancing” doctrine and focusing on whether “adequate alternative remedies” exist in other laws to limit the application of horizontality. The Jamaican courts have engaged in depth with judgments from other jurisdictions, using comparative examples in their judgments.

Both Kenya and Jamaica’s horizontal rights doctrines are works in progress. While both jurisdictions have embraced the idea of applying constitutional rights to private relationships, they continue to grapple with questions around the limits of this application, and the need for a clear normative framework to guide decision-making in horizontal rights cases. An institutional approach, taking into account the institutionally-mediated power differences, may be a useful way to address the gaps in the current doctrine (Bhatia, 2024).

EU Law

The EU legal order incorporates all three dimensions of horizontality (direct, indirect, and state-mediated effect) (Frantziou, 2019; Walkila, 2016). However, in practice, the EU focuses almost exclusively on direct horizontal effect or its absence (Frantziou, 2019; Walkila, 2016). The EU law is influenced by different legal traditions but has its own method of systematisation of law (Frantziou, 2019; Walkila, 2016). The Court of Justice of the EU tends to pronounce itself on a case-by-case basis, which has led to complex concepts (Frantziou, 2019; Walkila, 2016).

Key Considerations:

• Public Interest: The application of horizontal effect is often justified by a ‘public interest’ reason that constitutionally justifies applying constitutional rights in private relationships (Frantziou, 2019; Walkila, 2016).
• Interchangeability of Approaches: Different forms of horizontality are seen as complementary and interchangeable (Frantziou, 2019). What is key is the effective constitutional justification as a means of recognizing private relations in which fundamental rights are relevant (Frantziou, 2019).
• Context: The application of rights can be influenced by the context of the specific situation, with proportionality analysis allowing for a more nuanced application of rights (Frantziou, 2019).

The horizontal application of constitutional rights is a complex and evolving area of law (Frantziou, 2019). Different jurisdictions have adopted various approaches, influenced by their unique constitutional and legal traditions (Frantziou, 2019). While some, like Germany, favor indirect application, others, like South Africa, have embraced a more direct approach (Frantziou, 2019; Van der Walt, 2012). The United States, with its state action doctrine, stands out as more restrictive on the direct application of constitutional rights to the private sphere (Balkin, 2014). The EU legal order incorporates various dimensions of horizontality, focusing more on direct effect (Frantziou, 2019).

With this awareness, let us discuss Horizontal Approach in Indian context.

The Indian Constitutional Framework for Horizontal Rights

Unlike many constitutions that focus solely on state action, the Indian Constitution explicitly recognizes horizontal rights in specific provisions:

• Article 15(2): Prohibits discrimination in access to public spaces and services.
• Article 17: Abolishes untouchability.
• Article 23: Prohibits human trafficking and forced labour.
• Article 24: Prohibits child labour in hazardous industries

These provisions directly regulate interactions between private parties, reflecting India’s commitment to addressing deep-rooted social inequalities and how private entities have taken an active part in perpetrating such inequalities.

Case law and institutional interpretation

Indian courts have interpreted fundamental rights in a manner that extends their applicability beyond state actors, particularly through an institutional approach (Bhatia, 2021).

The horizontal application of fundamental rights in India, where these rights are enforceable against private individuals and entities, has been a significant aspect of the country’s constitutional jurisprudence. This approach ensures that fundamental rights are not only protected against state actions but also in interactions between private parties.

In 1982, the Supreme Court addressed this concept in the case of People’s Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR) v. Union of India (1982 AIR 1473). The Court examined the exploitation of labourers involved in the construction projects for the 1982 Asian Games in New Delhi. The petitioners argued that the workers were subjected to inhumane conditions, denied minimum wages, and coerced into labour, violating their fundamental rights. Invoking Article 23, which prohibits trafficking in human beings and forced labour, the Court recognized that forcing individuals to work for less than the minimum wage constitutes a form of forced labour. This judgment expanded the interpretation of forced labour to include economic coercion and underscored the state’s obligation to protect vulnerable workers from exploitation.

Later, in the landmark judgment of Indian Young Lawyers’ Association v. State of Kerala ((2017) 10 SCC 689), commonly known as the Sabarimala case, the Supreme Court further explored the horizontal application of fundamental rights. The case centred on the exclusion of women aged 10 to 50 from entering the Sabarimala Temple, a practice based on notions of purity related to menstruation. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, in his concurring opinion, invoked Article 17, which abolishes “untouchability” in all its forms. He argued that the exclusion of women based on physiological factors perpetuated a form of social exclusion akin to untouchability, thereby violating constitutional values by a religious trust rather than by a state. He emphasized that such practices stigmatize individuals and have no place in a constitutional order.

More recently, in the case of Kaushal Kishor v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2023) 4 SCC 1), the Supreme Court delved deeper into the horizontal application of fundamental rights. The Court examined whether fundamental rights under Articles 19 and 21 could be enforced against private individuals and entities. In a 4:1 majority decision, the Court held that these rights are indeed enforceable against non-state actors. This, being the latest and a specific judgement on the horizontal approach—with a question being formulated and answered in the judgement—is worthy of consideration for a better understanding.

On Kaushal Kishor judgment on horizontality:

In 2016, a writ petition was filed in the Supreme Court of India seeking action against a U.P. government minister who called a gang rape case a “political controversy”. The petitioner in the case, Kaushal Kishor v. Union of India, also sought a fair investigation and transfer of the trial outside of Uttar Pradesh. The minister then apologized to the Supreme Court, and the matter should have rested, but in October 2017, the case was referred to a five-judge Constitution Bench.

During this time, the Court also took up a Special Leave Petition (Diary) that raised similar questions about statements made by a Kerala government minister and tagged it with the original writ petition. The Constitution Bench then framed five questions for resolution:

• Whether restrictions on free speech could be imposed on grounds not found in Article 19(2) of the Constitution
• Whether fundamental rights could be claimed against non-state actors
• Whether the State has a duty to protect citizens’ rights against threats from private parties
• Whether a minister’s statement could be attributed to the government
• Whether a minister’s statement violating a citizen’s rights constitutes a “constitutional tort”

The majority opinion, delivered by Justice V. Ramasubramanian, held that a fundamental right under Article 19 or 21 can be enforced against persons other than the State or its instrumentalities.

Evolution of “State”: The court traced how the concept of “State” has broadened over time. Initially, fundamental rights were enforced only against the State. However, this understanding expanded to include “Authorities,” “instrumentalities of State,” “agency of the Government,” entities with “governmental character,” those with “monopoly status conferred by State,” those under “deep and pervasive control,” and ultimately to include entities based on the “nature of the duties/functions performed”. This evolution was crucial in recognizing that fundamental rights could be infringed upon by private actors.

Technological Advancements: The court acknowledged the increasing role of private players in infringing upon fundamental rights due to technological advancements. The court pointed out that infringement of the right to privacy was now mostly by private players. If fundamental rights cannot be enforced against non-State actors, these rights would be severely undermined.

Interpretation of Article 21: The court emphasized the broad interpretation of the right to life under Article 21. This right now includes a variety of rights, making it possible to hold non-state actors accountable for violations. The court noted that the focus has shifted from “who the respondent was” to “the nature of the duties/functions performed” by the respondent in determining amenability to jurisdiction under Article 226.

Paramountcy of Personal Liberty: The court highlighted that the right to personal liberty is paramount, and the state has a duty to protect it even from non-state actors. This emphasized the state’s positive obligation to protect citizen’s rights.

Horizontal Effect: The majority acknowledged that some fundamental rights are specifically granted against non-State actors, such as Article 15(2) (a) (access to public places), Article 17 (untouchability), Article 23 (forced labour), and Article 24 (child labour). Additionally, aspects of Article 21, like the right to a clean environment, have been enforced against private parties.

Dissenting Opinion on Horizontality:

Justice Nagarathna’s dissenting opinion offers a different perspective on the issue of horizontality. While agreeing that Article 19(2) is exhaustive regarding restrictions on free speech, she argued that fundamental rights under Articles 19 and 21 cannot generally be enforced against non-state actors. She distinguished between common law rights and fundamental rights, stating that common law remedies are available in cases of infringement by private individuals. She also pointed out that a writ petition to enforce fundamental rights would not be entertained against non-state entities, especially because such matters involve disputed questions of fact.

Exception for Habeas Corpus: Nagarathna J. noted an exception in cases where a writ of habeas corpus is sought against a private person based on Article 21, in which case a constitutional court could hear the matter.

Rejection of Broad Horizontality: The dissenting opinion explicitly rejected the notion of allowing fundamental rights to operate broadly between private citizens. It suggested that doing so would render the tests and doctrines developed by the Court to define “State” under Article 12 redundant.

Despite a seemingly progressive stance, the judgement was criticised for taking upon a question of law on itself without having the explicit need to.

Conceptual Confusion and Conflation: A major point of criticism is that the judgment demonstrated a fundamental misunderstanding of horizontality. The court, according to some, conflated different concepts related to the application of constitutional principles to non-state actors. These concepts include state action, where the state is directly involved; indirect horizontality, where the law affects private parties through interpretation; and situations where the judiciary itself is considered part of the state. This lack of conceptual clarity was seen as a significant flaw, muddling the understanding of how constitutional rights should apply in different contexts. The judgment was criticized for conflating distinct legal approaches, misrepresenting countries’ positions on horizontality, and providing an outdated, inaccurate comparative analysis.

Lack of Engagement with Doctrinal Nuances: The judgment was criticized for not engaging with the nuances of how horizontality is understood and applied in different jurisdictions. Critics argue that the judgment ignores the structure of the Indian Constitution, which explicitly provides for horizontal application of certain fundamental rights (Articles 15(2), 17, 23, and 24), while being silent on others. This is interpreted to mean that the constitution intends for horizontal application only in specific carve-outs. The judgment was criticized for failing to explain why it departs from the obvious result of this textual structure, thereby opening the Pandora’s box of litigation wherein people approach constitutional courts for recourses that exist in common law. The critique went to the extent of arguing that the judgement is ‘unconstitutional informal constitutional changes’—meaning that the judgement has an effect of changing the constitutional goals so radically that it falls under the category of ‘constitutional dismemberments’

Is it so radical?

It is radical to the extent of saying in unequivocal terms that Article 19 and 21, the 2/3 of the commonly known Golden Triangle is enforceable against private parties. However, to say that the judgement falls under the category of ‘constitutional dismemberments’ would be an exaggeration.

While a result of uncalled judicial enthusiasm to philosophize constitutional issues, the judgement merely posits that if there is a fundamental right (Articles 19 and 21) violation by a private party, the right can be enforced.

The Kaushal Kishor judgment should not be interpreted as an open invitation for individuals to approach the Supreme Court for grievances that can be addressed through common law remedies. Instead, it must be understood within the context of Indian realities, where marginalized individuals often lack the means to navigate complex bureaucratic and legal systems to seek redress for violations of their fundamental rights. The Supreme Court has historically served as a beacon of hope for such individuals. In this context, empowering the Court to enforce fundamental rights, particularly the expansive rights under Articles 19 and 21, against private parties is both practical and necessary.

Conclusion

The judgement appreciably, defines, the concepts of vertical and horizontal effects of constitutional rights. It clarifies that constitutional rights have a “vertical effect” when they regulate the conduct of the government and governmental actors in their dealings with private individuals, while they have a “horizontal effect” when they impact the relationships between private individuals. [Para 74]

Moreover, the expansion of this doctrine will not rest on this single case but will develop through multiple rulings, allowing for corrections over time. Viewing it as a radical upheaval is unwarranted.  India’s stance has evolved, with Kaushal Kishor v. State of Uttar Pradesh recognizing the enforceability of Articles 19 and 21 against private entities. While this brings India closer to South Africa and Ireland, one could rightly argue that it lacks doctrinal clarity and risks overextension. Unlike Germany or Canada, India has not developed a robust framework for indirect horizontality, leaving room for judicial refinement.

(The author is part of the organisations legal research team)

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22. Walkila, S.H.I., 2016. Horizontal effect of fundamental rights in EU law. Europa Law Publishing.
23. Weinrib, L.E. and Weinrib, E.J., 2001. Constitutional values and private law in Canada. In D. Friedmann & D. Barak-Erez (Eds.), Human rights in private law (pp.41-72). Hart Publishing.

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It was during tea with Zakia appa – where she tussled with her daughter-in-law about how many biscuits she could have – or the little meals we shared, where she would just hold my hand and stroke it, reaching out with empathy and mutual support. These are the memories that coming rushing back. It is as if we both knew and felt the enormity of the task we had jointly undertaken.

When we look back and take stock of the steely support from Tanveer bhai, Duraiappa (Durreshwar), Nargis, Najid bhai, the family and, not to forget, the dedicated team at Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP), we couldn’t have known where it would lead – to some cracks in the otherwise hostile and unbreachable walls of accountability and justice? Or a cold rejection of a simple, hitherto unique plea –acknowledgement of the role of state actors as a murderous mob roamed unchecked for days?

February 28, 2002

I had first walked in alone into the charred remains of the Gulbarg society on March 4, 2002, armed with a small tape recorder and a notebook. Shards of broken glass bottles, tiny vials and their lids dotted the ground as I trudged across the eerie expanse where embers still burned.

No fire-brigade had come to its aid either on February 28 or at any point since then. I made my way to house number 19, Ahsan Jafri’s iconic home, heavy with the knowledge of what we knew until then of the man, his family, neighbours and his brutal death.

The home was no home any more, reduced to a haunting shell. It was bleak. Walls blackened with soot of the intense burning caused by flung gas cylinders. Fans gutted, gnarled and twisted. Miraculously, I found a signed postcard stamped with Jafri Sahab’s name, a diya-swastika and ‘Happy Diwali’ message written on it, on the stairwell – my precious memento of that first of dozens of visits.

A purple-pink bougainvillea that still lends defiant colour to the sombre ruins hung that day with barely surviving leaves and some overhanging blossoms. It had survived hours of mass arson. How could the flowers live on after the hell of February 28, 2002, I remember asking myself in some bewilderment.

Ironically, Zakia appa had spent that night of February 28 in the premises of the Shahibaug police station barely two kms away from the Gulbarg society in Chamanpura. She was alone. Only the next day was she shifted to the home of some distant relatives where she met her son Tanveer Jafri two days later.

Chamanpura falls under the Meghaninagar police station. Traumatised and shaken by the events that she witnessed from the terrace of her home, she was unable to sleep, full of anguished questions to which she had to find answers. Zakia appa has recounted that night to me several times over the years.  She had spent the night haunted by cries and screams of a gory bloodshed – in the midst of the very same force who she saw had let her people down.

Eighty-six years, the day before yesterday, when she left us, Zakia appa was 63 in 2002, no age to hear the cries she did, no age to witness what her eyes could not turn away from. Over 69 persons were killed in cold blood that day as a 15,000-strong mob began attacking residents at 11 in the morning. No police help arrived till 6 pm.

Late that night, in the precincts of the Shahibaug police lines, she found several policemen present in their homes on the compound. Perplexed, her simple query to them was, “Why did you not come to my husband, my society, our neighbour’s rescue beta? We made so many calls” she asked. “We were given the day off,” one police officer casually replied.

This reply by one of them has gnawed at her, since. On June 18, 2009, six years later, she recounted this to the Special Investigation Team (SIT) appointed by the Supreme Court. In her official statement, she said “…No police turned up and the police came only at six in the evening and I was taken to Shahibaug police line. I saw that the police staff were present at home. They told me that they were not called for duty today (that day).”

Who was Ahsan Jafri?

Zakia appa’s husband of several decades, father of their three children, Tanveer, Nargis and Zubair had been the sole target of the mob. He was 72 when he was killed. Formerly with the Communist Party of India (CPI), he was later the city chief of the Indian National Congress in Ahmedabad, and a formerly elected member of parliament. Ahsan Jafri was a lawyer, thinker and poet.

If the ‘Happy Diwali’ postcard I had found offered a glimpse of the man – whose name soars above and beyond the hatred that was unleashed on the streets of Gujarat in 2002 – then Zakia appa’s moistened eyes, quivering smile and warm hands, Tanveer’s stoic clarity amidst pain and Nargis’ powerful articulations over two decades have actualised Jafri’s inviolable moral core and persona. In the Jafris’ resolve to calmly demand accountability from the high and mighty, Zakia appa, Tanveer and Nargis have always echoed Ahsan sahab’s deeply ingrained beliefs, his credo.

I first met Tanveer through his uncle in early March 2002. It had been Tanveer’s task to hold and help his mother heal even as he went back to Gulbarg society, his childhood home, around March 4. He had rushed to Ahmedabad from Surat where he resided. It was Tanveer who lovingly collected the remains of Ahsan sahab from outside their home, more from the Civil Hospital, Ahmedabad and laid his father to some peace and rest.

Zakia appa now lies there with her husband, friend and guide, after she had come as a young bride to Ahmedabad from Burhanpur, Madhya Pradesh. Though there had been nothing peaceful about Jafri’s passing. The utterly stoic and adamant refusal of the Jafris to let go of their belief in the India that Ahsan sahab lived and died for, is special and rare.

Zakia appa and the Jafris turned their back on any bitterness born out of the realisation that even their neighbours had joined the mob on February 28. This is what made Zakia appa stand out with her children, as the stellar human rights defender she was.

She inspired millions, including us, and if there is some consolation today, 22 years after the massacre, it lies in the fact that a complicit media has had no choice but to reflect this in the coverage of her demise. For me personally, as a fellow human rights worker who has stood by the Jafri’s through every legal battle since February 28, 2002 – notwithstanding what it cost me personally and our team at CJP – it has been a rare privilege to embark on this unique journey.

Quiet dignity

Zakia appa had been a young mother, and Tanveer just six years of age, in September 1969, when Gujarat experienced the worst communal violence that the country had seen since Partition. Ahmedabad was the most acutely affected epicentre of the statewide violence.

A vast majority of the nearly 500 persons killed then were also Muslims. Ahsan Jafri lived in Dr Gandhini chawl, a tenement near Gulbarg society with his parents and family. He had already registered the Gulbarg society earlier in 1961 and it was under construction.

As the violence spread, young Tanveer watched in horror as Aiyub bhai’s shop was burned down. Why was this happening, they asked? Soon, there was no time for more questions, they just had to flee. Returning home in panic, Jafri sahab guided his family as they ran two-and-a-half kms down a railway track – the Asarva Udaipur railway line – past the rail crossing. There, some SRP vans came to their rescue and they were taken inside the Relief Camp located inside the police stadium at the same Shahibaug location where Zakia appa was to spend that fateful night of February 28, 2002, 33 years later.

Tanveer remembers playing out in the open and queuing up for tea which they drank in brightly coloured plastic glasses, a novelty at the time. “We lived there for a month, then for another month inside Ubair Shaikh’s Dunlop agency-cycle shop and after that moved into the barely constructed House No. 19 of Gulbarg society. There were no doors and windows, we used sheets to cover sight and sound. Despite this displacement and tragedy, even the fact that all our belongings had been burned and destroyed, Abba just did not let this mean anything to us, did not allow this loss to eat at us,” Tanveer recalls.

“How we lived, how he lived (Ahsan sahab) after the 1969 displacement, is how we have tried to regroup ourselves and live after the unforgettable tragedy of 2002,” says Tanveer. “Dangai hamaaree soch nahin badal sakte hai. Agar aisa hoga to dangaeeon kee jeet hai. Hamaara nuksaan hamen badal nahin sakta. (Rioters cannot change our way of thinking. If that happens, they win. Our losses cannot change us.) They cannot change our choices, the way we are or how we we think. It is this conviction that has ensured that the tragedy of 2002 does not change us,” he adds.

This profound resolve and dignity in the face of unspeakable loss is what epitomises Zakia appa and her family. It is this dignity that she brought to her battle for justice and accountability.

22 years in grief

Zakia appa lived for 22 years after her husband’s brutal killing in deep personal grief, battling sleepless nights and guilt – the guilt of surviving. Her beloved Ahsan sahab had sent her to the top storey of her home to safety, where dozens with her were saved, while many others perished. Those who stood by Ahsan till he finally gave himself up to the mob, just after he said his last prayer, were witness to his calm fortitude, his determined and desperate efforts to make calls (including to the high and mighty) and even his willingness to offer himself to the mob if other lives could be saved.

For the blood-thirsty and determined mob, that was not to be. Apart from the particularly brute way of his killing, young women were subject to gendered violence. To repeat, 69 persons lost their lives at just one location in Gujarat that day. The total number of the post Godhra killings – if we peruse official charge sheets – is close to 2,000.

Zakia appa’s guilt of being alive is evident in an unrelated incident that Nargis recounted in a letter, ‘Bless Us Abba’, in 2016.

“Ammi is never tired of recounting the incident when in the bedroom of your old house while you were sleeping, the small kerosene lamp on the side of the bed fell off and the curtain caught fire. You were sleeping on the side of the fire and Ammi was next to you. As the heat woke you up and you saw the fire, instead of jumping out of the bed immediately, you first woke Ammi up and asked her to get to safety. But when she woke up and saw the fire, she thinks she quickly jumped out of bed and ran to the door without even knowing where you were or what you were trying to tell her. It is more than 40 years since, but she still remembers and regrets that incident and feels guilty of putting herself first that day and not grabbing your hand as she ran to the door.”

I met Nargis for the first time in 2002 in the United States, as I deposed before the International Commission on Religious Freedom. I had that copy of Communalism Combat with me, a testimony of all the eye-witness accounts and FIRs. With swollen eyes, this young woman had only one question to ask me, was the killing of her darling Abba as brutal as she had heard? Lowering my head in shame, I half shook, half nodded, trying to conceal both the documents and facts. It was not to be.

Bearing witness carries an unbearable load. I have often wondered, even as Nargis and I spoke, laughed and squabbled over the years, “Has she ever forgiven me?”

On Saturday (February 1), as I stood inside Saraspur Roza in Ahmedabad, Nargis said, as she held my hand, “She is free now, my Ma. Free of the pain.” Then together we cried.

Journey for justice

Mass media, especially one that has become fearful and complicit, is selective in its coverage and often responsible for erasure of history. But Zakia Appa and Ahsan sahab’s sheer moral worth and the grit of her battle just could not be ignored. This is evidenced from the vast coverage of her demise. But what of the fact that the same coverage is de-fanged and de-contextualised? Especially when it chooses to ignore the venality of the state and the attempted decimation of a principled legal battle. From the start, attempts were made to dilute and erase the scale of the violence, not just across Gujarat after Godhra in 2002, but especially the targeted violence at the Gulberg Society and against Ahsan Jafri on February 28, 2002.

The journey for justice and accountability for the survivors of 2002 has seen its up and downs and as I take stock two days after Zakia appa left us, I wonder if  the glass half empty or half full? Was it all worth it? In all, we, at CJP,  collectively managed 172 convictions, 124 to life imprisonment. Never mind that higher courts often reversed decisions. On principle, we stood against death penalty.

Evidence of state complicity, absence of fire brigades and police response, documentary evidence on intelligence and police control records, was ignored by investigating agencies, and unfortunately, even our courts. Yet, the exemplary efforts put in by our band of dedicated human rights workers and lawyers, we managed to put all this substantive investigations on public record, all this evidence for history to judge.

While the Zakia Jafri case has seen its end, the trial in the Gulbarg society massacre is pending appeal in the Gujarat high court. On June 17, 2016, the trial court judge had convicted 11 persons to life while 13 other accused received sentences up to ten years. All charges of conspiracy were rejected, as was the evidence of three police witnesses, fire brigade records and those from the police control room. As Tanveer, in his own special way says it, “Victory in the courts is only half the story. In the annals of people’s recall and history, that we fought, that Ahsan sahab and Zakia appa are an inspiration to millions, that our collective battle has given others the confidence to fight; that we could through CJP put all this wealth of evidentiary material on record, that is our victory.”

In sum, as I said in tribute to Zakia appa, the day before yesterday, “You graced the courts, our homes and hearts. You did so with unwavering fortitude. Theirs is the loss who could not recognise the scale and magnitude of the loss for just what it was.” For the Jaffris and us, at CJP, who handed over 68 cases concerning the Gujarat carnage, despite all efforts, the state has never fully succeeded in curtailing some substantive successes of the wider battle.

As a footnote, I would like to record here what Zakia Appa, Tanveer, and I often discussed over the years: how high the costs have been, especially for some. For us at CJP, the stellar legal aid provided by our teams epitomises a constitutional right under Article 39-A, and at significant cost, we undertook this battle. Our trustees stood in staunch support. Alongside a committed group of High Court and Supreme Court counsel, we owe a special debt to advocate Suhel Tirmizi of the Gujarat High Court. His sacrifice, commitment, and services were invaluable – not only in being the guiding force behind setting up multiple legal teams of senior and junior lawyers to handle various trials, but specifically in the Zakia Jafri case. From 2006 to 2011, when the case first reached the Supreme Court, his contribution has been immense, and the personal costs he paid, heavy. We pay our tributes to him. There are too many lawyers – at the trial court, High Court, and Supreme Court – to mention here, but their efforts have been equally vital.

I end with this powerful poem penned by Farahdeen Khan and sent to be my dear friend Rukmini, who recognised how personal this loss was for me.

The Betrayal of Fire

She stood, a woman forged in the furnace of grief,

a widow not of one, but of a thousand souls,

each name etched in ash, in silence, in the acrid smoke

that curled from the pyres of justice undone.

Zakia, they left you among ruins, among bones

that the earth itself shuddered to cradle.

They call this nation a mother, but what mother devours

her daughters and spits their bones to the wind?

The gavel did not fall—it was hurled,

a cudgel masquerading as law.

Each robed man who turned his back

added another brick to the mausoleum of truth.

And what of the one who stood beside her?

Teesta, shackled for daring to bear witness,

for daring to say what history chokes on,

for dragging the carcass of conscience into the light.

What price for remembrance, for defiance?

A cell, a charge, a silence enforced—

For in this land, to fight for the fallen

is to fall yourself, and fall alone.

Tell me, you who avert your gaze—

what use is your silk, your scented wealth,

when the very soil beneath your feet

stinks of the unburied dead?

You recoil now, do you not?

Once, you drank with me, laughed with me,

shared in the hollow spoils of comfort.

But truth is a bitter draught, and you spit it out.

Yet I will stand, though my voice be drowned

by the thunder of cowardice and complicity.

For to be silent is to wield the knife,

to be neutral is to be an accomplice.

And so, when the reckoning comes—

not in the courts of men, but in the halls of time—

she will rise, they will rise,

and those who failed them will find no name to call their own.

Teesta Setalvad is a rights activist and journalist.

This article was first published on The Wire

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In a joint press statement, the National Alliance of Journalists, Delhi Union of Journalists, Press Club of India, Kerala Union of Working Journalists, Press Association, Indian Women’s press Corps, Andhra Pradesh Working Journalists’ Federation and the Brihanmumbai Union of Journalists specifically criticised the deterioration of working conditions, including excessive working hours and inadequate compensation.

Their demands include restoring the Working Journalists’ Act, extending its coverage to digital media, and establishing an independent Media Commission to address journalists’ welfare and harassment.

The organisations also emphasised the crucial social role played by journalism and the need for stronger protections for journalists’ rights.

“The day is an occasion to reflect on the collective achievements of the Indian press, especially that of the working journalists and press workers over the years. Despite epochal developments like the constitution of the first National Press Commission that led to the enactment of the Working Journalists’ Act, 1955 and the Press Council, in recent years, the press as a whole has seen several setbacks in the form of arbitrary lay-offs, unfair labour practices and deteriorating working conditions. Bodies like the Press Council have been rendered redundant over the years. The press, just as it was censored during the British Raj under one pretext or the other, faces similar pressures. Additionally, its corporatization poses a severe threat to the rights of journalists and to the nature of journalism itself,” said the joint statement.

The organisations noted that journalists and press workers today are expected to work beyond the hours specified in the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Rules.

“Journalists are expected to be on call at all hours of the day and work simultaneously on the print, digital and electronic space – all within the same pay package. Even though the Act excludes editors, reporters, photo journalists and camera persons from ‘shift’ duties, some prominent media groups have introduced the biometric pattern of attendance, making physical presence of correspondents mandatory in office for a specified number of hours”, the statement added.

The journalist organisations also demanded the restoration of the Working Journalists’ Act in its original, and that it be extended to cover electronic and digital media as well.

Courtesy: Newsclick

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Sudhir Dhawale, a Dalit rights advocate, poet, and publisher of the Left-leaning Marathi magazine Vidrohi, and Rona Wilson, a Kerala-based activist and founding member of the Committee for the Release of Political Prisoners, represent the human cost of a deeply flawed and punitive legal system. Both were part of a group of 16 intellectuals, activists, and lawyers arrested under the draconian Unlawful Activities Prevention Act for their alleged involvement in the Bhima Koregaon violence and purported links to the banned Communist Party of India (Maoist). These charges, widely criticised as politically motivated, led to their prolonged incarceration without trial.

Wilson and Dhawale’s release at 1:30 pm, after completing bail formalities, was bittersweet. It underscored the agonising delay in justice for political prisoners in India, many of whom remain behind bars for merely exercising their right to dissent. The bail conditions imposed by the court—a ₹1 lakh surety, weekly appearances at the National Investigation Agency’s headquarters, surrender of their passports, and restrictions on travel outside Mumbai—serve as a reminder of how the system continues to control and limit their freedom.

Their case highlights not just the weaponisation of the legal process against activists but also the glaring delays and inequities in the Indian judiciary. The release of Wilson and Dhawale is a small but significant victory, the first to receive bail on account of delay, yet it remains overshadowed by the years of their lives lost and the continuing struggles of those who remain in jail under similarly dubious charges.

Rona Jacob Wilson v. State of Maharashtra & Anr.

The Bombay High Court’s decision in Rona Jacob Wilson v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. represents a nuanced intersection of procedural law, constitutional rights, and judicial discretion. This order granted bail to the appellant, Rona Jacob Wilson, who had been incarcerated for over six and a half years under stringent provisions of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) and other penal statutes.

Background and case details

The charges and context of arrest: The appellant, Rona Jacob Wilson, was implicated in the Bhima Koregaon case, a matter that has drawn significant legal and political attention. He was arrested on 6 June 2018 under charges including Sections 153(A), 505(1)(B), 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), and Sections 13, 16, 17, 18, 18(B), 20, 38, 39, and 40 of the UAPA. These charges relate to promoting enmity between groups, conspiracy, and alleged involvement in acts of terrorism.

The case, originally investigated by the Pune Police, was transferred to the National Investigation Agency (NIA) owing to its complexity and the gravity of allegations. The NIA contended that Wilson, as a co-conspirator, was part of a larger plot involving Maoist groups intending to destabilise the nation.

Prolonged pre-trial detention: By the time the appeal for bail was heard, the appellant had spent over six and a half years in pre-trial detention without charges being framed. The prosecution’s case involved an extensive witness list of approximately 363 individuals, making the prospect of an early trial conclusion unlikely. Despite filing several charge sheets, the procedural stages of trial—such as addressing discharge applications filed by co-accused—remained incomplete, further delaying the framing of charges.

Legal framework and judicial reasoning

Prolonged incarceration and Article 21: The court noted that the appellant’s primary argument rested on the violation of his right to personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution, which encompasses the right to a fair and speedy trial. The Supreme Court’s decision in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb provided pivotal guidance. This landmark ruling established that even under special legislations like the UAPA, prolonged incarceration without trial constitutes an infringement of fundamental rights and may justify the grant of bail.

The court extensively cited K.A. Najeeb and earlier cases, such as:

1. Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. Union of India (1996) – Gross delays in trials under special laws, such as the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA), were held to justify bail based on Article 21.
2. Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee v. Union of India (1994) – Highlighted that undertrials cannot be indefinitely detained pending trial, particularly when the possibility of early resolution is remote.
3. Babba v. State of Maharashtra (2005) – Granted bail where delays in trial under special statutes were unreasonable.

The Bombay High Court applied these precedents to hold that constitutional protections take precedence over statutory restrictions when fundamental rights are at stake.

Evaluation of charges and sentence: The court acknowledged that under Section 13 of the UAPA, the maximum sentence was seven years, which aligned closely with the appellant’s period of incarceration. It further noted that for the specific offences attributed to the appellant, no minimum sentence was prescribed, making the prolonged detention disproportionate. This weighed heavily in favour of granting bail.

Arguments by the prosecution: The NIA, represented by the Additional Solicitor General of India, argued that delays were not solely attributable to the prosecution. Factors such as discharge applications filed by co-accused and the complexity of the case contributed to the prolonged timeline. While conceding that procedural delays existed, the prosecution maintained that the appellant’s role in a serious conspiracy justified continued detention.

Bail conditions and final order

Bail was granted with stringent conditions to mitigate any potential interference with the trial:

1. The appellant was required to furnish a personal bond of ₹1,00,000 with solvent sureties.
2. He was prohibited from tampering with evidence or contacting witnesses.
3. He had to report to the NIA office in Mumbai on the first Monday of every month.
4. His travel was restricted to the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court unless permitted otherwise.
5. The appellant was directed to surrender his passport before release and provide a permanent contact number.

Recognising the procedural delays, the court directed the trial court to expedite proceedings, specifically mandating that the stage of framing charges be completed within nine months. Importantly, the court clarified that the bail order was based solely on the appellant’s prolonged incarceration without trial and not on the merits of the allegations. This distinction underscored the judiciary’s focus on procedural justice rather than prejudging the appellant’s innocence or guilt.

This judgment exemplifies the judiciary’s role as a guardian of constitutional rights, even in cases involving national security. The court reaffirmed that:

1. Constitutional supremacy – Provisions like Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA, which impose stringent bail conditions, must harmonise with constitutional safeguards, especially when delays threaten the right to a fair trial.
2. Balancing justice – The decision balances the need to uphold national security with the individual’s right to liberty, setting an important precedent for undertrials facing indefinite detention under special laws.

This case highlights the importance of procedural fairness in the criminal justice system and serves as a reminder that justice delayed can amount to justice denied, even under the framework of anti-terror legislations.

The complete order may be read here.

Sudhir Dhavale Vs. the State of Maharashtra & anr

Background and case details

The charges and context of arrest: The appeal was filed by the appellant Dhavale seeking bail under Section 439 of the Cr.P.C., after being incarcerated since June 6, 2018. The appellant’s case is part of a larger investigation into offences under the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA). The trial has been delayed, and the appellant argues that his prolonged incarceration without trial, without any clear timeline for the completion of the trial, justifies his release on bail.

The case involves serious charges such as promoting enmity between different groups (Section 153A IPC), creating public mischief (Section 505 IPC), and various provisions of UAPA related to terrorist activities and conspiracies. The investigation was transferred to the NIA, and the trial is currently pending before the Special Court.

Arguments presented by the appellant: The appellant’s counsel argued that the prolonged detention of over six years without trial violates the constitutional right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution. He stated that the trial court has not framed charges yet, and given the likelihood of the trial being delayed further, the appellant should be released on bail on this ground alone.

Legal framework and judicial reasoning

Article 21 of the Constitution: The right to a speedy trial is an essential part of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21. The Supreme Court has consistently held that prolonged incarceration without trial can be a violation of this right, especially when the trial is unlikely to conclude in a reasonable time.

UAPA and Bail Provisions: Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA places a bar on granting bail in cases involving certain terrorist activities, stating that the accused shall not be released on bail if there is a reasonable ground to believe that they have committed the alleged offence. However, the Supreme Court has clarified that the constitutional right to a speedy trial takes precedence if the trial is delayed unjustifiably.

Arguments by the prosecution: Mr. Vyas, representing the NIA, acknowledged the delay but explained that the delay in the trial process was partly due to the filing of discharge applications by other accused, which slowed the progress of framing charges. The prosecution, however, expressed willingness to abide by the court’s decision.

Prolonged incarceration: The court observed that the appellant has been in custody for over six years without trial, and the likelihood of the trial concluding in the near future was remote. Given the delay, the court found that the prolonged incarceration without trial could be seen as a violation of the appellant’s constitutional rights under Article 21, justifying bail.

Reference to Supreme Court judgment: The bench cited the Supreme Court judgment in Union of India vs. K.A. Najeeb to underline that prolonged pre-trial detention, where the trial is unlikely to conclude soon, can justify granting bail. The Court referenced several decisions where undertrials were granted bail due to the unlikelihood of their trials concluding in a reasonable time. The principles from this case are now settled law and form the core basis of granting bail in situations of prolonged incarceration.

Balancing rights and societal interests: The Court carefully balanced the appellant’s constitutional right to liberty against the interests of justice and public safety. It reiterated that while special legislations like UAPA impose strict bail conditions, the violation of fundamental rights due to excessive delay in trials cannot be ignored.

Bail conditions and final order

The bail conditions imposed by the Bombay High Court in the present case were:

1. The appellant is directed to execute a personal bond of ₹1,00,000/- with one or more solvent local sureties to make up the amount.
2. The appellant shall not tamper with prosecution witnesses or evidence in any manner.
3. Before release from jail, the appellant must inform the NIA, Mumbai, and the trial court of their prospective place of residence.
4. After release, the appellant shall attend the NIA office in Mumbai on the first Monday of every calendar month between 11:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m. to mark their presence, continuing until the conclusion of the trial.
5. The appellant is prohibited from leaving the territorial jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court without prior permission from the trial court.
6. The appellant must attend all trial court dates unless precluded on medical grounds.
7. The appellant is required to surrender their passport, if in possession, before the trial court prior to release from jail.
8. The appellant must provide their mobile and/or landline number to the NIA, Mumbai, and the trial court, ensuring they can be contacted.

The judgment reinforces the principle that an individual’s right to a speedy trial is an integral part of the right to life and liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. In cases of prolonged detention without trial, the courts are obligated to take steps to ensure that such detention does not continue indefinitely, as it constitutes a violation of constitutional rights. Furthermore, tThis judgment will serve as a critical reference in future cases where there are delays in the trial process, particularly in matters involving national security laws like UAPA. The case reaffirms the need for courts to act swiftly to avoid undue prejudice to the accused while also balancing public safety concerns.

Additionally, the decision calls for the expeditious handling of cases involving serious charges like those under UAPA. The Court specifically requested the trial court to expedite the framing of charges within a set timeline of 9 months, indicating that delays in the judicial process will no longer be tolerated, especially when fundamental rights are at stake.

The complete order may be read here.

Related:

Constitutional ideals vs. public order: SC delivers split verdict on Christian burial rights, fails to confront structural discrimination

Sambhal Custodial Death: A systemic failure exposed

Bombay High Court grants bail to Rona Wilson and Sudhir Dhawale in Bhima Koregaon case

Kin of incarcerated anti-CAA activists question Selective use of ‘Bail is the Rule’ principle

Apex court says excessive bail conditions, amounts to no bail

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On January 20, 2025, Irfan, a 40-year-old resident of Sambhal, was detained by police following a complaint alleging non-repayment of a loan. Within hours of his detention, Irfan passed away. His family alleged that he was denied access to essential medications despite informing the police of his critical condition. They accused the authorities of custodial torture, a claim denied by the police, who asserted that Irfan suffered a heart attack and cited CCTV footage as evidence.

Eyewitnesses, including Irfan’s son, reported that the police ignored repeated pleas to allow Irfan to take his medication. His wife, Reshma, stated that the family had informed the officers of Irfan’s heart condition, yet their concerns were dismissed. This negligence was highlighted as not just an operational lapse but a systemic disregard for detainee rights and basic humanity. Testimonies from neighbours and community members described Irfan as a law-abiding individual whose arrest and subsequent death were deeply shocking for the local population

Medical reports submitted by the family suggested pre-existing cardiac ailments, further calling into question the police’s decision to ignore his health condition. Legal experts pointed out that procedural safeguards under the BNSS (earlier CrPC) and the guidelines issued by the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) were blatantly ignored. No medical evaluation was conducted before taking him into custody, a critical violation of NHRC mandates.

 

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The custodial death unfolded in a state notorious for its high incidence of such cases. According to the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB), Uttar Pradesh leads in custodial fatalities, pointing to systemic lapses in police accountability and adherence to legal procedures.

Outrage and protests

The news of Irfan’s death spread rapidly, sparking widespread public outrage in Sambhal. Hundreds of locals, activists, and political leaders gathered outside the Raisatti police outpost, demanding justice and accountability for what they termed an egregious instance of custodial torture. The protesters carried banners and chanted slogans, urging an independent investigation into the incident. Allegations of inhumane treatment, including the denial of essential medical care, intensified public anger. Eyewitnesses described how the police abandoned the outpost as tensions escalated, leaving it temporarily unmanned. Law enforcement reinforcements, including personnel from the Rapid Action Force, were eventually deployed to manage the situation and restore order.

Political reactions amplified the significance of the protests. Akhilesh Yadav, president of the Samajwadi Party, denounced the custodial death, calling it a “dark stain on the rule of law” under the BJP-led government. He accused the administration of institutionalizing impunity for police excesses. Similarly, Chandra Shekhar Azad, leader of the Bhim Army, pointed to a disturbing trend of custodial deaths disproportionately affecting marginalized communities. He demanded immediate action against the responsible officers and called for systemic police reforms to address such incidents.

Community leaders emphasized that the protests in Sambhal reflected deeper grievances among minority groups, who view custodial deaths as symbolic of institutional bias. Activists highlighted the disproportionately high number of such incidents in Uttar Pradesh, noting that these acts erode trust in law enforcement, especially in minority-dominated areas. The protests became a rallying cry for justice, drawing attention to broader issues of systemic inequities and police misconduct

Judicial commission’s investigation

In response to widespread public pressure and growing national scrutiny, the Uttar Pradesh government established a judicial commission to investigate the custodial death of Irfan and other recent incidents of violence in Sambhal. Headed by retired High Court judge Devendra Arora, the commission visited the region to conduct a thorough inquiry into the events. The investigation aimed to uncover procedural lapses and examine whether Irfan’s fundamental rights were violated during his detention.

The commission undertook multiple tasks, including recording statements from Irfan’s family, community members, and local law enforcement officers. It also reviewed medical evidence, including post-mortem reports, which suggested discrepancies in the police’s official narrative. Reports highlighted a lack of adherence to mandatory procedures, such as the requirement for medical evaluation upon arrest, which is stipulated under the NHRC guidelines and the CrPC (now BNSS).

In addition to investigating Irfan’s case, the commission also expanded its mandate to review broader issues of police conduct in Sambhal. This included an examination of the November 24, 2024, riots, which erupted during a controversial land survey near the Shahi Jama Masjid. Witnesses testified that police inaction and delayed intervention exacerbated communal tensions, leading to widespread violence and property damage. Many residents alleged that the authorities selectively targeted certain communities during the subsequent crackdown..

Systemic concerns and broader implications

The custodial violence in Sambhal is not an isolated incident but a reflection of systemic issues that plague law enforcement across the country. For instance, the case of Somnath Suryavanshi in Parbhani, Maharashtra, on December 15, 2024, mirrors similar patterns. Suryavanshi, a 35-year-old Dalit activist, was arrested following communal violence triggered by the desecration of a replica of the Constitution. While in judicial custody, he complained of chest pain and died shortly thereafter in a state-run hospital. His family alleged police brutality, claiming he was targeted for his Dalit identity and activism. This led to widespread protests, with political leaders, including Rahul Gandhi, asserting that Suryavanshi’s death was a “cent per cent custodial death.” The protests intensified demands for justice and highlighted recurring instances of misuse of power by law enforcement agencies, especially against marginalized communities. These incidents underline the urgent need for systemic reforms to ensure accountability and prevent custodial violence from becoming a normalized aspect of governance

Legal framework governing custodial deaths and torture

The legal implications of custodial torture and deaths in India highlight critical gaps in both legislative enforcement and systemic accountability. Drawing from constitutional mandates, criminal law provisions, and NHRC guidelines, custodial violence remains a grave violation of human rights and judicial directives. Article 21 of the Constitution enshrines the right to life and personal liberty, encompassing protection against inhumane treatment. This is supplemented by Article 22, which provides procedural safeguards during arrest and detention. Yet, these constitutional guarantees are undermined by systemic abuse.

The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023, replacing the CrPC, introduces critical procedural safeguards to address such violations. Section 196 mandates a magisterial inquiry in cases involving custodial deaths or rapes, emphasizing the role of judicial or metropolitan magistrates over executive magistrates to ensure impartiality. Section 194 empowers district magistrates to conduct inquests, highlighting the increasing responsibility of civil authorities in ensuring transparent investigations. These provisions align with prior guidelines under Section 176(1A) of the CrPC but aim to bridge enforcement gaps by centralizing accountability within the judicial framework.

NHRC guidelines further reinforce this by mandating independent autopsies, immediate reporting of deaths, and time-bound investigations. However, despite these safeguards, the enforcement remains lacklustre. Data reveals that over five custodial deaths occur daily, underscoring the persistent misuse of authority by law enforcement agencies.

Judicial precedents have consistently emphasized the importance of due process in custodial situations. In D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal 1997 (1) SCC 416, the Supreme Court issued comprehensive guidelines to prevent custodial torture, mandating arrest memos, family notifications, and access to legal representation. Similarly, in Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration 1980 SCC (3) 488, the apex court decried the use of third-degree methods and indiscriminate handcuffing, terming them violative of Articles 21 and 19.

The lack of adherence to these safeguards in cases like Sambhal and Parbhani not only underscores institutional bias but also highlights the urgent need for systemic reforms. It is imperative that police training incorporates a human rights perspective and that civil society acts as a watchdog to bridge enforcement gaps. Furthermore, India’s failure to ratify the UN Convention against Torture reflects a broader reluctance to institutionalize accountability mechanisms at the international level. This reluctance, coupled with the rising trend of custodial violence, demands immediate legislative and administrative intervention to safeguard the dignity and rights of individuals.

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Custodial deaths highest in Gujarat over 5 years; jails overcrowded

A Muslim man in Hyderabad detained on suspicion of theft reportedly subjected to custodial torture for 5 days

The post Sambhal Custodial Death: A systemic failure exposed appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The incidents documented here range, from communal targeting and inflammatory speeches to acts of inhuman violence and systemic discrimination, took place in the month of January till now. Public platforms and political events have been weaponised to spread hateful ideologies, with prominent leaders openly calling for boycotts, violence, and exclusion of minority communities. Vulnerable groups, particularly Muslims, Dalits, and tribals, have borne the brunt of this assault, facing economic sabotage, public humiliation, and even physical attacks.

This alarming trend is not just an affront to individual victims but a grave threat to Maharashtra’s legacy of cultural diversity and harmony. The state, once celebrated for its progressive movements and commitment to social justice, now finds itself mired in a toxic environment where fear, division, and hate dominate public discourse. These incidents expose the failure of the government to uphold the rule of law and protect its citizens, raising urgent questions about accountability and justice.

What follows is a detailed account of some of the most glaring incidents of hate and discrimination in Maharashtra in the month of January 2025. These accounts are not isolated events but part of a larger, systemic assault on the principles of secularism, equality, and human dignity. They demand immediate action and an unwavering commitment to restoring the ideals enshrined in India’s Constitution.

Detailed reports of hate incidents

• Targeting of Muslim-owned businesses in Yavatmal

On January 14, two Muslim-owned restaurants in Wani, Yavatmal, were forcibly shut down by members of the Bajrang Dal. The group accused the establishments of serving beef, leading to the police seizing the meat without providing any evidence or conducting a fair investigation. This incident underscores a worrying pattern of weaponising religious sentiment to economically and socially marginalise Muslims. Such acts not only deprive individuals of their livelihoods but also perpetuate a climate of fear and exclusion, eroding the rights of minority communities.

• Brutal assault on a tribal elderly woman in Amravati

In one of the most horrifying incidents, a 77-year-old tribal woman in Retyakheda village, Amravati, was subjected to medieval-style violence on December 30, 2024. While the incident occurred on December 30, it surfaced on January 5, 2025 after a police complaint was lodged by the victim’s son and daughter-in-law.

As per a report of Siasat, accused of practising black magic, the tribal woman was tied up, beaten with sticks, branded with hot iron rods, and forced to inhale chilli smoke. The assailants, led by the village head, further degraded her by making her consume urine and dog excreta and parading her through the village adorned with a garland of slippers. Despite the gravity of the attack, authorities have yet to invoke the Anti-Superstition Act, raising serious questions about the systemic apathy towards tribal and marginalised communities.

The victim’s family has since approached higher authorities, including the Maharashtra State Women’s Commission and the Inspector General of Police, seeking justice. While the district collector assured them of further investigations, such delays and the initial reluctance to file appropriate charges reflect a larger failure to deter such barbaric acts.

#Horrific An elderly tribal woman was tied with a rope, beaten and forced to eat dog excreta, burnt with a hot iron rod, incident took place in Amravati, Maharashtra. pic.twitter.com/GRd8bWe8sv

— The Dalit Voice (@ambedkariteIND) January 19, 2025

• Anti-Muslim rhetoric at Kurla event

At the “Samrast Yatra” event in Kurla, Mumbai, organised by the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and Bajrang Dal, a Jain monk disseminated hate speech rife with anti-Muslim propaganda. He falsely attributed statements to Dr B.R. Ambedkar, claiming the Dalit leader had called for the expulsion of Muslims from India. Such deliberate distortions of history weaponise revered figures to justify communal hatred.

The monk’s speech also demonised Bangladeshi Muslims, referring to them as “lungiwallas” and inciting Hindus to take violent action against them. This open propagation of hate speech at a public event, without any fear of legal consequences, underscores the emboldenment of extremist voices under the current political climate.

• Minister Nitesh Rane’s hate-filled speech

Maharashtra cabinet minister Nitesh Rane has become a recurring figure in the spread of communal hatred. At the Hindu Jagran Sabha in Sangli on January 10, Rane openly called for the economic boycott of Muslims, accusing them of using their businesses to fund fabricated plots like “love jihad” and “land jihad.” He further stoked paranoia by claiming that Muslims aim to turn India into an Islamic nation by 2047.

As per multiple media reports, Rane also coined the communal slur “every vote against Mulla” as a divisive rallying cry. His speech, laced with inflammatory rhetoric and veiled threats, exemplifies how elected representatives are misusing their positions to deepen communal fissures, rather than promoting harmony and inclusivity.

• Sadhvi Ritambhara’s provocative speech in Dadar

At an event organised by the Vishwa Hindu Parishad’s Matrishakti and Durga Vahini in Dadar on January 5, Sadhvi Ritambhara delivered a speech designed to incite violence. She vilified historical Muslim figures as well as women, proclaiming that “women who give birth to people like Aurangzeb and Taimur can’t be our ideal women.” Such statements not only demonise entire communities but also perpetuate divisive stereotypes.

Ritambhara amplified the baseless conspiracy theory of ‘love jihad,’ urging Indian women to “poke out the eyes of love jihadis.” The event concluded with participants taking an oath against this fabricated menace, further cementing hatred against a specific group.

• Casteist slur by Shiv Sena MLA Sanjay Gaikwad

At a public gathering in Buldhana, Shiv Sena MLA Sanjay Gaikwad demeaned voters by accusing them of selling their votes for paltry amounts of money, alcohol, and meat. He shockingly stated, “Even a prostitute is better than that,” displaying an utter lack of respect for both voters, women and marginalised groups. Such derogatory remarks from a public representative not only degrade the dignity of citizens but also highlight the normalisation of casteist and classist language in political discourse.

While addressing a public gathering in #Maharashtra‘s #Buldhana, #ShivSena (#EknathShinde faction) MLA #SanjayGaikwad says, “The voters here were sold for 2-5 thousand rupees, alcohol, and meat. Even a prostitute is better than that” pic.twitter.com/MXKRf6bhy0

— Hate Detector (@HateDetectors) January 7, 2025

A dire need for accountability and action

These incidents are not isolated but part of a broader, systematic pattern aimed at normalising hatred, targeting minorities, and eroding India’s pluralistic ethos. What is particularly troubling is the state’s apparent complicity, whether through direct endorsement, tacit approval, or sheer apathy. Police inaction, delayed investigations, and the absence of legal consequences embolden perpetrators and send a dangerous signal that hate crimes and divisive rhetoric will go unchecked.

The rise in hate incidents also points to a calculated strategy to divert attention from pressing socio-economic issues by deepening communal and caste divides. Elected representatives and influential figures who engage in hate speech must be held accountable under the law? Furthermore, civil society must amplify its efforts to counter such narratives, and judicial interventions must be swift and decisive in upholding justice.

The escalation of hate incidents in Maharashtra underlines the urgent need for introspection and systemic reform. The state government must decisively act to restore public trust by cracking down on hate speech and violence, irrespective of the political or social standing of the perpetrators. Anything less would not only betray the ideals of justice, equality, and secularism but also embolden those seeking to dismantle the fabric of Indian democracy.

Related:

Massive all-party march in Parbhani demands justice for Dalit youth’s custodial death

CJP calls for electoral action against BJP leader’s hate speech at Rohini Chetna event

From fact-checking to chaos: How meta’s new moderation model risks eroding trust and democracy

Unity Beyond Religion: Stories of shared humanity and mutual respect

The post Maharashtra’s Descent into Hate: Six incidents reported in January 2025 highlight Maharashtra’s rising communal and caste-based violence appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Quoting the Guidelines: An Ethical Dilemma

Under the new policy, Meta states:

“We do allow allegations of mental illness or abnormality when based on gender or sexual orientation, given political and religious discourse about transgenderism and homosexuality and common non-serious usage of words like ‘weird.’”

Additionally, the revised policy allows content such as:

“Comparing people to household objects, calling entire ethnic groups ‘filth,’ or arguing that LGBTQIA+ individuals should be excluded from certain spaces or professions.”

This represents a stark departure from previous hate speech policies that prohibited such dehumanising language, recognising its potential to create “an environment of intimidation and exclusion.”

Employee and Advocacy Group Backlash

Meta’s own employees have criticised the decision as “appalling,” with one post reading:

“I am LGBT and “mentally ill”. Just to let you know that I’ll be taking time out to look after my mental health.”

Advocacy groups have been equally vocal. GLAAD, for instance, stated:

“Meta is giving the green light for people to target LGBTQ people, women, immigrants, and other marginalised groups with violence, vitriol, and dehumanising narratives.”

The Consequences of hate normalisation

Meta’s history provides troubling evidence of its platforms enabling real-world atrocities, most notably the Rohingya genocide in Myanmar and the Capitol riots in the United States. In Myanmar, Facebook was identified by UN investigators as a key tool in spreading dehumanising rhetoric against the Rohingya Muslim minority, with hate-filled posts labelling them as “vermin” and “threats.” This unchecked hate speech incited widespread violence, resulting in over 700,000 people being displaced and thousands killed. Similarly, in the U.S., Meta’s platforms played a significant role in facilitating the organisation of the January 6 Capitol riots by allowing misinformation and extremist content to proliferate unchecked. These events demonstrate how Meta’s platforms, when deregulated or permissive, become breeding grounds for hatred and violence. With its new policies permitting users to call LGBTQIA+ individuals “mentally ill” or compare women to “household objects,” Meta risks repeating these disastrous patterns. By legitimising dehumanising rhetoric, these policies pave the way for escalating offline violence, societal polarisation, and the erosion of public safety. Without decisive corrective action, Meta could again find itself at the centre of global crises fuelled by its own platforms.

Way forward

While the world moves forward to embrace inclusivity and champion LGBTQIA+ rights, Meta’s recent policy changes reflect a regressive step reminiscent of the discriminatory attitudes of past generations. The global momentum for LGBTQIA+ equality is evident in initiatives like the United Nations’ Free and Equal campaign, which tirelessly works to combat harmful practices, promote legal protections, and foster societal acceptance of LGBTQIA+ individuals in regions as diverse as Africa, Albania, Brazil, and Vietnam​. These efforts underscore a commitment to ensuring dignity and equality for all, yet Meta’s decision to permit users to call LGBTQIA+ individuals “mentally ill” directly undermines this progress. By sanctioning such language, Meta is aligning itself with outdated, oppressive ideologies at a time when the global community is advocating for inclusion and acceptance. Human rights activists and allies worldwide must stand in solidarity to condemn this policy and demand accountability from Meta. It is imperative that Meta rescind these harmful changes and reaffirm its commitment to safeguarding dignity, equality, and respect for all users.

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The post Meta’s policy shift: Fuelling hate in an era of LGBTQIA+ inclusion appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The False Equivalence of Free Speech and Misinformation

Meta justifies the shift as a step towards fostering free expression, as echoed in Mark Zuckerberg’s Georgetown speech about empowering individuals to voice their opinions. However, unmoderated free speech often becomes a breeding ground for falsehoods and malicious narratives. Professional fact-checking, though imperfect, provided a critical layer of accountability by separating genuine discourse from deliberate misinformation. Community-driven models, on the other hand, often amplify the loudest or most popular opinions, regardless of their genuinity.

Challenges of Crowdsourcing Moderation

Meta’s shift to community-driven moderation under the “Community Notes” model presents several critical challenges. These systems are frequently vulnerable to partisan bias, enabling dominant narratives to suppress minority perspectives, and organized manipulation, where bots and coordinated groups distort facts. This was starkly evident during the 2018 Cambridge Analytica scandal, where Facebook data was exploited to influence political outcomes, raising serious concerns about digital democracy. Another glaring example is Facebook’s involvement in the Myanmar Rohingya crisis, where unchecked hate speech on the platform contributed to widespread violence, with the UN citing Facebook as having a “determining role.” Similarly, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the platform became a hub for anti-vaccine propaganda, undermining global public health initiatives. During the 2024 Indian general election, Mark Zuckerberg inaccurately stated that the incumbent government lost due to its handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. This claim was incorrect as Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government was re-elected for a third term. The misinformation sparked outrage, leading Union Minister Ashwini Vaishnaw to publicly refute the statement. In response, Meta India’s Vice President Shivnath Thukral issued an apology for the “inadvertent error” and reaffirmed Meta’s commitment to fostering accurate information.

If Meta introduces the Community Notes system, it risks being hijacked by organized political groups like the BJP IT cell, which has previously demonstrated its ability to exploit similar systems on platforms such as Twitter. Numerous reports have documented coordinated campaigns by the BJP IT cell to spread propaganda, disinformation, and polarizing narratives, often under the guise of organic community engagement. This manipulation not only distorts public discourse but also influences public perception on critical matters. Replicating such tactics on Meta’s platforms could lead to a systematic spread of partisan falsehoods, eroding democratic processes and undermining the platform’s credibility as a space for truthful and balanced discussions.

#BJP IT Cell Exposed: How lies and propaganda are spread.. https://t.co/6iDbgW4xD3 I found this hilarious. You must watch too #AAPAtWork

— Amit Malviya (@amitmalviya) September 16, 2016

In regions governed by strict regulations like the European Union’s Digital Services Act (DSA), this policy could lead to significant regulatory challenges and possible sanctions.

A Reputational Risk for Meta

Meta’s decision also jeopardizes its own credibility and the trust of advertisers. By downgrading professional oversight, the platform risks becoming a hub for disinformation, deterring reputable companies from associating with it. Advertisers may hesitate to place their brands in an environment where false claims could damage their reputation.

The Need for a Hybrid Model

While professional fact-checking alone is not a panacea, it serves as a vital deterrent against the unchecked spread of misinformation. A more effective solution would be a hybrid model that combines expert oversight with community involvement, enhanced by transparent algorithms and robust accountability mechanisms. This approach could ensure that free expression does not come at the expense of truth.

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The post From fact-checking to chaos: How meta’s new moderation model risks eroding trust and democracy appeared first on SabrangIndia.

I trust this missive finds you in the pink of health and high spirits, as one must be when presiding over a nation in such a state of unparalleled prosperity and contentment as is reflected in current wobbly growth, unemployment, currency depreciation and runaway inflation.

It is with the utmost reluctance that I dare to disturb your reverie with a few modest suggestions that might, perchance, enhance the already dazzling brilliance of your socio-economic policies.

Firstly, given that we are on the cusp of the annual Budget, might I propose the radical notion of abolishing personal income tax for the poor and middle class? I am certain that the mere thought of such a measure will have you clutching your pearls in horror, but consider, if you will, the delightful irony of allowing the common folk to retain a modicum of their hard-earned pittance. I know, I know, it sounds crazy. But think of it as a radical social experiment! Let the little people keep a bit of their own money. Who knows, they might spend it on frivolities like food, clothes, and data. Wild idea, right? This, in turn, could spur demand and private investment, thereby possibly creating a veritable utopia of economic activity.

Secondly, one cannot help but marvel at the astronomical prices of fuel, which have undoubtedly contributed to the nation’s coffers in ways too numerous to mention. However, in a moment of uncharacteristic whim, might I suggest a dramatic reduction in fuel prices? Imagine the joy! Suddenly, people will have more cash to burn. It could be like an economic miracle! But hey, what do I know? I’m just a guy with a calculator and a dream.

“What about the farmers?” Ah, yes! The farmers! The backbone of our great nation, and yet, they’re being treated like, well, like a bunch of old socks. Do provide them with minimum support prices, would you? It’s the least one can do to help them stay afloat.

Of course, I would be remiss if I did not caution against certain drastic measures that might, in your boundless wisdom, seem tantalizing, given the past history. For instance, the dollarization of the economy by rendering the rupee redundant might appear to be a masterstroke, but one must consider the potential pitfalls of such a move.

Similarly, slashing public education and health budgets – it’s tempting to keep the populace uneducated and unhealthy to keep them in control. But please refrain.

And selling off public assets to esteemed crony business friends for a song might not be the panacea the nation desires.

Taxing the 200 million stock market investors for their capital losses may be the FM’s way of boosting morale!

Will taxing the wealth of the rich folks fleeing to Dubai, Canada, or Singapore definitely make them stay?

Both are ill-advised moves.

And let us not forget the potential backlash from lashing out at millions of youths complaining about exam paper leaks and delays in government jobs, or imposing a ‘stay at home’ cess on those who work from home or are homemakers. Moves that may rock an already faltering nation.

Criminalising the dissent of farmers protesting for fair prices or causing unchecked ecological havoc through indiscriminate building of roads, bridges, and townships would be appealing but will only deepen the chasm of discontent.

In conclusion, I remain, as ever, your most obedient servant, humbly offering these suggestions in the spirit of constructive criticism and unwavering loyalty. I have no doubt that your unparalleled acumen will guide the nation to even greater heights of prosperity and glory.

Yours most sincerely,

A Humble Voluntary Worker, unemployed by choice

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The post Open Letter to an Imaginary Supreme Leader of a country of billions appeared first on SabrangIndia.