On his birth anniversary, I would like to share my review of Madhok’s controversial book, Indianisation: What, Why and How, published in 1970. Madhok wrote this book three years before his expulsion from the party, which, according to L. K. Advani, was due to his “inflated ego” (Organiser, 1973: 13). Another reason for his expulsion was his public criticism of the party’s perceived leftward drift in economic policies. According to Madhok, the Jana Sangh’s defeats in the 1971 and 1972 elections were a direct result of this shift (Jaffrelot, 1966: 236). Madhok is also known for his role in movements advocating the full integration of Jammu and Kashmir with India, particularly through the formation of the Praja Parishad Party. Beyond politics, he also had an academic career, teaching history at the University of Delhi.

The concept of Indianisation has a long intellectual history, with some of its philosophical underpinnings tracing back to 19th-century religious revivalist movements that sought to associate ‘Hindustan’ with ‘Hindi’ and ‘Hindu’ identity. These tendencies were shaped by evolving power dynamics, particularly with the advent of the colonial British Raj. The British Raj initiated the processes of census-taking and enumeration in the second half of the 19th century, leading to the emergence of rigid identities. Additionally, the colonial historical construction of India’s past contributed to the portrayal of Hindus as the original inhabitants of the country, while Muslims were depicted as “invaders” and “foreigners.”

This notion was later adopted by the Hindu right to argue that minorities, particularly Muslims, posed a threat to the idea of the modern nation-state. As a response, several scholars, from Bankim and Savarkar to Golwalkar and Madhok, proposed ways to counter this perceived threat. In this book, Madhok argues for the Indianisation of those who, according to him, are not fully loyal to India and have “extra-territorial loyalties.” Unsurprisingly, Muslims are at the top of Madhok’s list, along with communists, Congress members, and other Indian politicians.

It was the Jana Sangh, during its plenary session in Kanpur in 1952, under the presidency of Shyama Prasad Mukherjee—whom Madhok worked with for many years—that first passed a resolution on Indianisation. In his work, Madhok was merely drawing upon this resolution. However, one might ask: why did he publish Indianisation in 1970?

One could argue that this book, representing the conservative forces within the party, was written to criticize the Jana Sangh for not being sufficiently critical of state control over the economy during Indira Gandhi’s regime. At the same time, media reports suggested that Madhok’s differences with senior leaders such as Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Nanaji Deshmukh, and L. K. Advani were growing. It is, therefore, plausible that Madhok felt compelled to reassert the Jana Sangh’s hardcore policies at a time when he was losing his grip on the party. In doing so, he likely sought to demonstrate that its current leadership had drifted away from its core ideology.

It is in this context that Madhok placed his views on Indianisation. According to him, “Indianisation, therefore, is nothing but the inculcation of a strong sense of nationalism in all Indians. It is neither something new nor anything sinister. It is something to which no patriotic Indian worth his name can take exception. Those who oppose it either do not understand what India and her heritage is or they deliberately want to create confusion and scare in some groups for political and partisan ends” (Madhok 1970: 18).

For Madhok, Indianisation is integral to nationalism. He is unwilling to accept the idea that such a process has any political motivation. Like any right-wing leader, he advocates the process of homogenisation as entirely natural. He refuses to acknowledge that society is, in fact, heterogeneous and that the right-wing agenda actively seeks homogenization—often at the cost of diversity and social harmony.

Similarly, Madhok is deliberately ignorant of the fact that the idea of nationalism is not independent of history. Like many right-wing and conservative thinkers, he attempts to discipline citizens into becoming adequately nationalist and loyal to the country. The internal divisions within society and the realities of material inequality are conveniently ignored to construct an artificially monolithic community. As he puts it, “Nationalism is not a question of political loyalties only. It demands a feeling of attachment and sense of pride for the country’s heritage and culture as well… Respect for the National Flag, National Anthem, National Language or Languages, National Heroes, and Great men, National ethos and values are part of nationalism. Aliens also can be absorbed into the national mainstream through inculcation of these feelings of oneness and identification with the national homeland, its culture and heritage” (Ibid).

It is ironic that Hindutva forces frequently distribute certificates of nationalism and loyalty to the country, yet they fail to critically examine themselves. During the anti-colonial struggle, they were either collaborating with the British Raj or disrupting national unity by stoking Hindu-versus-Muslim tensions. While they have often accused minorities, secularists, and leftists of being anti-national, historical reality shows that they themselves have criticized the Indian Constitution and the national flag, favouring the celebration of so-called Hindu culture and symbols over India’s secular national identity.

There are other critical questions that Madhok and other Hindutva leaders are not honest enough to address. For example, if he does not consider a person—be it a minority or a leftist—to be a nationalist unless they take pride in the “country’s heritage and culture,” then how can he and his fellow members of the RSS, Jana Sangh, and BJP claim to be champions of nationalism when the symbols of Hindutva nationalism exclude large sections of Indians—women, Dalits, lower castes, minorities, Tamils, and others outside the Hindi heartland?

It is clear that Madhok’s concept of Indian-ness is rooted in his narrow vision of nationalism. According to this perspective, anyone who does not conform to his own version of a Vedic, Brahminical conception of India is deemed anti-national. Once an individual or community is labelled as anti-national, the disciplinary process of Indianisation is imposed upon them. In other words, for Madhok, national culture is not based on secularism, pluralism, or unity in diversity. Instead, it is deeply sectarian, communal, exclusionary, and reactionary.

For Madhok, the canon is Brahminical/Vedic culture. He disregards the fact that India’s history extends beyond the Vedic period. The Adivasi cosmology, the Dravidian languages, Tamil culture, and the philosophical footprints of Mahavir, Buddha, Guru Nanak, and Kabir—who all challenged Brahminical traditions—are visible across the subcontinent. However, Madhok is so sectarian that he refuses to look beyond the life of the “Vedic Aryans,” who, according to him, provided the “substratum of Indian culture and civilisation” (Ibid: pp. 6-7). Here, one can observe his attempt to equate the essence of India with Vedic Aryan culture and conflate it with Hindu identity.

Instead of acknowledging that his thesis on Indianisation is sectarian, Madhok blames liberal, democratic, and Marxist forces for having “mounted a bitter attack” on his work. He argued that critics of Indianisation had misunderstood the concept. As he stated, “…they have been misinterpreting Indianisation as a means to eliminate religious minorities and re-convert Muslims and others to their ancestral faiths and faith or faiths” (Ibid: 19). In contrast, he defended his stance, asserting, “Indianisation aims at making every citizen to India a better Indians, a good patriot and a nationalist” (Ibid: 20).

As is evident once again, the concept of Indianisation serves as a tool in the hands of Hindutva forces to discipline minorities and other marginalized communities, compelling them to become adequately Indianised. This process leaves very little space for marginalized communities to assert their identities and fight for their legitimate rights. Simply put, Indianisation functions as a means to silence these communities and assimilate them into Brahminical culture under the pretext of making them loyal citizens.

For Madhok, the key terms are “good patriot” and “nationalist.” This raises an important question: what, in his view, prevents certain people from being considered good patriots and nationalists? Madhok provides several reasons. To begin with, he expresses concern over the rise of “regionalism,” arguing that “regional consciousness began to take better of national consciousness” (Ibid: 26). He is particularly critical of what he describes as the “sinister game” behind the creation of linguistic states. In other words, Madhok seeks to attack the federal structure of the Constitution and pave the way for a more centralized state.

It is important to remember that Hindutva forces have long championed a unitary state and often feel threatened by the rise of regional movements. Their discomfort with federalism underscores their broader ideological commitment to a homogenized, centralized form of governance that suppresses linguistic and cultural diversity. For Madhok, only a strong central authority could hold the nation together, and any move toward decentralization was viewed with suspicion. Yet, they failed to acknowledge even the very first article of the Indian Constitution, which defines India as a “Union of States.”

Madhok’s discomfort with regional identities is evident in his assertion: “Most Indians today are Punjabis or Bengalis or Malayalis first and Indians only next or never” (Ibid: 27). It would be a mistake to assume that such views are confined to a particular section of conservative/Hindutva forces in India. Even today, similar sentiments persist elsewhere. A notable example is the 2007 Bollywood film Chak De! India, which revolves around the Indian women’s hockey team. The film echoes these anxieties when the team’s coach, played by Shah Rukh Khan, laments that the players introduce themselves by their regional identities rather than their national identity.

Moving away from “regionalism,” Madhok discusses the danger of “casteism,” which, in his view, further justifies the need for Indianisation. As he puts it, “…casteism is tending to become as great if not greater danger to unity as regionalism. Today most Indians are either Jats, or Brahmins or Rajputs or Harijans first and Indians afterwards” (Ibid: 30). As is evident here, Madhok’s analysis of caste comes from a top-down perspective. Upper-caste scholars and elite leaders often lament that caste identity remains strong in the political domain, preventing leaders from rising above “narrow” and “sectarian” caste loyalties.

However, neither Madhok nor any Hindutva leader has ever examined the root causes of the caste system. They often claim to oppose caste divisions and insist that they treat all Indians as equals. Yet, they have never made a serious effort to dismantle the caste system. They have never launched movements promoting inter-caste marriages and inter-dining. They have never supported initiatives for proportional and effective representation of marginalized castes and communities.

As long as the lower castes silently endure their exploitation and humiliation, Hindutva leaders feel satisfied and consider everything to be in order. However, the moment Dalits, Adivasis, and lower castes organize themselves and raise the issue of caste-based discrimination, upper-caste-led Hindu right-wing organizations launch a bitter campaign against them, branding them as anti-national. This phenomenon was evident during the Mandal agitation. When the 27% reservation for OBCs was implemented, Advani initiated a nationwide Rath Yatra for the construction of the Ram Temple, attempting to drown out the voices advocating for social justice in the noise of religious nationalism. In Madhok’s work too, one can observe a deliberate attempt to obscure caste from public discourse.

After addressing internal factors such as casteism and regionalism, Madhok shifts his focus to the idea of a “glorious India,” which he associates with a Vedic, Hindu, Brahminical culture—excluding large sections of society. He writes: “India has been [a] land of freedom of thoughts and tolerance from the very dawn of her history” (Ibid: 32). However, in glorifying India’s past, Madhok overlooks the reality that a significant portion of the population—Dalits, lower castes, and women—were systematically excluded from education and knowledge. The near-total absence of materialist Charvaka philosophical texts in Madhok’s analysis, which were critical of Vedantic philosophy, raises questions about whether India’s past was truly a symbol of a free society.

Madhok’s response to this issue appears to involve placing the blame on Muslims, who, according to him, came to India and disrupted its supposed unity. He argues: “The situation changed… with the advent of Islam in this country. Apart from the fact that it came to India on the wings of foreign invaders, one of whose main motivations was [the] spread of Islam in this country, its very character was [the] anti-thesis of Indian thinking and attitude in regard to religion” (Ibid: 33). Here, one can clearly see Islam being positioned as an external disruptor. Madhok further attributes the rise of communalism to Islam, stating: “No wonder, therefore, that both the Muslim Arabs and Turks who brought Islam into India behaved towards the Indian people in a most barbaric manner” (Ibid: 34).

This is a time-tested method of Hindutva forces—using the Muslim community as a scapegoat. They conveniently blame the minority community to divert attention from the highly exploitative Hindu social order based on caste hierarchy and gender oppression. However, Madhok does not stop here. He later acknowledges that the encounter between Islam and India gradually eroded much of Islam’s supposed intolerance and exclusivity. In other words, he attempts to credit the majority community’s religion for this transformation.

For Madhok, the history of Islam—spanning several continents and spreading through the message of Prophet Muhammad—is not worth mentioning. Even Indian scholars like M. N. Roy, writing four decades before Madhok, argued that Islam brought peace and tolerance to the world while promoting rationality, the spirit of learning, and equality. Yet, Madhok deliberately obscures these historical facts, as he is eager to prove his thesis that Brahminical culture is supreme and that anyone critical of the RSS or Jan Sangh is anti-national.

It is not only Muslims but also communists who come under sharp criticism from Madhok, as he believes they have “extra-territorial loyalties.” According to him, this is why they must be Indianised and inculcated with nationalist and patriotic values. Ultimately, Madhok also turns his attention to Indian politicians, arguing that they too should be Indianised, as they are driven more by vote-bank politics than by national interests. Put simply, anyone who disagrees with the author’s sectarian, supremacist, and exclusionary vision of the RSS/Jan Sangh—or follows a culture or religion other than the Hinduism defined by the RSS—is deemed disloyal and unpatriotic and must immediately be ‘Indianised.’

In conclusion, Madhok’s book was an attempt to reassert the core of Hindutva ideology, which envisions a homogenized nation-state rooted in Vedic, Brahminical culture. This came at a time when the Jana Sangh was experimenting with certain popular economic measures during Indira Gandhi’s regime, becoming less critical of state intervention in economic affairs. The book was published when Madhok was desperate to counter his marginalisation within the party, as his relationship with senior leaders like Advani and Vajpayee was becoming increasingly bitter. However, despite Madhok being an almost forgotten name within his own party, many of the arguments presented in his book continue to be articulated in various ways by Hindu right-wing leaders. This is why a thorough reading and critique of the book remains useful in countering the menace of Hindutva nationalism, which poses a serious threat to the secular and pluralist fabric of the country.

 (This article was originally written as an assignment by the author during his postgraduate studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University from 2009 to 2011. The author took a course at the Centre for Historical Studies, taught by the late Prof. M. S. S. Pandian. The author expresses deep gratitude to Prof. Pandian for introducing him to a critical perspective. The original review has been slightly edited to improve the flow of the text.)

References

Jaffrelot, Christophe (1996). The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics. C. Hurst & Co.

Madhok, Balraj (1970). Indianisation: What, How and Why. S. Chand, New Delhi.

Organiser (1973). Mouthpiece of the RSS, 17 March issue, p. 13.

Related:

Balraj Madhok: A Pracharak-turned-Crusader against His Own ‘Parivar’

How Hindutva forces colluded with both the British & Jinnah against the historic ‘Quit India’ movement: Archives

Kannur University likely to drop works of Savarkar, Golwalkar from syllabus

The post Hindutva, Caste, and Nationhood: A Critical Review of Madhok’s book Indianisation appeared first on SabrangIndia.

It is also a fact that in later years as the Buddhist patrons lost their power to the Sena dynasty of Bengal followed by Mughal rule and invasion, the shrine remained ignored, even assaulted and ultimately got ruined. One of the greatest services to Buddhism in India was actually rendered by great British Surveyor Major General A Cunnigham as well as Indian archaeologist Dr Rajendralal Mitra and many others in the early 19^th century. It was they who were actually responsible for the restoration of the current site and numerous other Buddhist places previously just buried under the rubbles of the ruins.

Nobody has ever doubted that Bodh Gaya is the largest, most significant shrine of the Buddhist world. Several scholars in the past termed have regarded it a fit spot for pilgrimage, as pivotal as Mecca for Muslims, Badri-Kedar for Hindus and Jerusalem for Christians. Almost all the documents and research since the beginning has undoubtedly suggested that this is a Buddhist temple. The Bodhi tree is among the oldest trees of the world right at the sire, despite the fact that it was destroyed and uprooted several times; however it survived.

I am not going far into arguments of authenticity because unlike other religious ‘disputes’ in India, the issue of Mahabodhi Vihar as Buddhist temple has been a settled one. Right from British scholars to the British Indian administrator have treated it as a Buddhist place. The British handled this issue with great care and the negotiations and even at that point there was no questioning the ‘ownership’ of the land as claimed by Shankar Matth today. The Matth’s role was appreciated because it did not convert the shrine into a Hindu temple and also that Buddhists were allowed to worship there. So both the Hindus and Buddhists have been worshipping there in the vicinity of the complex where the Math has built Hindu temple too. Here is what the Bengal District Gazetteer of Gaya, 1906 says about Bodh Gaya and Mahabodhi Vihar.

‘The temple was originally a Buddhist shrine but for a long time past, it has been in the possession of a Hindu Mahanth belonging to an order founded by the bitterest enemies of Buddhism. It has fallen into complete ruin and would have soon disappeared had not government restored it at its own cost, in consequence, they maintain a custodian for the care of the building and to see to its repair. The Mahanth controls the worship and receives the offerings made by the Buddhists and the Hindu pilgrims. Government maintaining an attitude of impartiality on all religious questions affecting the shrine. The Buddhists performs the rites of their religion at the shrine and under the Bodhi tree, just as Buddhists of different countries have done for centuries past and Hindus also make offering under the tree as it is recognized as one of the 45 of places which Hindu visit while performing the religious ceremonies for the salvation of their ancestors which centres around the holy city of Gaya. This Hindu reverence for tree is very old but by the side there is a Hindu cult of a very recent growth, as Hindu worship, which has been pronounced a spurious and unorthodox character, is offered at the shrine itself’[1].

About the historic Bodhi tree, it says,

‘this tree is the oldest historical tree in the world and has an eventful history. It was first cut down by Asoka in his unregenerate days but after he became a believer in the law of Buddha, he lavished an inordinate devotion upon it. His queen jealous of this attachment and grudging the jewel which Asoka offered to the tree, again had it cut down but for second time, it was miraculously, restored to life’[2].

Interestingly, Gurudev Rabindranath Tagore visited Bodh Gaya in January 1922 and was overwhelmed to see this Buddhist shrine. He is recorded to have said,

“I am sure it will be admitted by all Hindus who are true to their own ideals, that it is an intolerable wrong to allow the temple raised on the spot where Lord Buddha attained his enlightenment to remain under the control of a rival sect which can neither have the intimate knowledge of or sympathy for the Buddhist religion and its rites of worship. I consider it to be a sacred duty for all individuals believing in freedom and justice this great historical site to the community of people who still reverently carry on that particular current of history in their own living faith’[3].

While the British Indian government was trying to handle this issue carefully, it was the heroic effort of Anagarika Dharmapala, the Buddhist monk and scholar from Sri Lanka who campaigned for its restoration and internationalised it. Though Chinse travellers and scholars like Hwen Thsang, Faxian had already narrated accounts of the Bodh Gaya shrine centuries ago as well as Burmese Kings, who were already involved in its restoration, it was Anagarika Dharmapala who actually took the issue to United States as well as Japan. British scholars, excavators and archaeologists were already doing their work to maintain and restore various Buddhist sites in India. While Japan was a leading world power at the rime and its involvement really helped as the British authorities to take the issue more seriously. In a typical balancing act symbolic of colonial rule however, the British did not want to ‘hurt’ local sentiments as there was no doubt about the historicity of the site but no local population who could fight for it! Had Dr Baba Saheb Ambedkar been active or involved on the issue at this point of time then things would have been different. Unfortunately, without active local support, a community cannot battle a mighty cause such as this.

The appropriation or occupation of the Buddhist shrines by the Brahmanical elite in India historically happened with the steady decline of Buddhism due to a loss of power of Pala dynasty in the  12^th century as well as rise of Sena dynasty particularly King Sasank, who was a staunch opponent of Buddhism. Subsequently, many stories also make mention of various Mughal rulers and their local chieftains responsible for destruction of these historical places. Both the Indian National Congress and Hindu Mahasabha formed a committee with Babu Rajendra Prasad as its Convenor and passed a resolution on January 21, 1923 that read, “Babu Rajendra Prasad is authorised to investigate the proposal of placing the custody of Bodh Gaya temple in the Buddhist hands and to make report to this committee. Babu Rajendra Prasad is also empowered to coopt suitable persons in the investigations.”[4]

The Hindu Mahasabha of Bihar province too passed the following resolution dated April 6, 1925

‘Lord Buddha is one of the ten avatars of Hindus and the only deity whom the Buddhists worship.  The temple of Bodh Gaya is therefore a sacred place (teerth) for the followers of both the religions. And it is perfectly natural desire therefore, on the part of both the communities to keep this sacred place in their possession. Then at the present day both the communities’ resort to the place for worship and prayer.  People from both the communities’ desire that each one of them should be freely allowed to offer worship and prayer in its own peculiar way, according to its customs and   religious injunctions and that there should not be offered any obstacle in its way of doing so. This conference therefore is of the opinion that the Buddhists of India should be offered due share in the management of the temple and the arrangement of the offering of the worship therein. This conference appoints the following committee to make a report to the Provincial Hindu Sabha within three months as to the steps that should be taken to protect the common rights of both the Hindus and the Buddhists. It also requests the Mahanth of Bodh Gaya to render all possible help to the committee and a due and proper discharge of its duties. This resolution will have nothing to do with the properties attached to the Math of Both Gaya’. [5]

Unfortunately, despite all the noises made by the committee under Babu Rajendra Prasad, finally it concluded that the management of the shrine should be handled by a joint committee of both the Buddhists and Hindus together. There was another issue, which was important, the Hindu Mahasabha had suggested to keep the issue of the ‘ownership’ of the property outside the purview of the management!

The committee recommended based on the suggestion of Hindu Mahasabha ‘that the shrine be managed by both the Hindus and Buddhists and that the Mahant be the ex-officeo member for the ‘time being’. It also made it clear the issue of the property of Math has nothing to do with all this which means the property will remain with the Mahant. Though the Mahant claims to have a farman from Shah Alam but he could not produce anything to the committee. Mahadev Gir was Mahant from 1642 to 1682 and the time period of Shah Alam much later.

After independence the Bihar government brought the Bodh Gaya under the control of special management after passing a law Bodh Gaya Temple Management Act 1949. Under this act, the management of Bodh Gaya temple is defacto in the hands of Brahmins who happened to be a majority. There are four members to be appointed from ‘Hindu’ community and four from the Buddhist Community. The District Magistrate is the ex officio Chairman of the committee. Activist alleged that in most of the ‘temple management committees’, in India, the Brahmins get appointed overwhelmingly everywhere and Bodh Gaya is no exception to it.

UNESCO declared Mahabodhi Vihar as World Heritage site on June 29, 2002. The UNESCO citation says,

Criterion (i): The grand 50m high Mahabodhi Temple of the 5th-6th centuries is of immense importance, being one of the earliest temple constructions existing in the Indian sub-continent. It is one of the few representations of the architectural genius of the Indian people in constructing fully developed brick temples in that era. Criterion (ii) The Mahabodhi Temple, one of the few surviving examples of early brick structures in India, has had significant influence in the development of architecture over the centuries.

Criterion (iii): The site of the Mahabodhi Temple provides exceptional records for the events associated with the life of Buddha and subsequent worship, particularly since Emperor Asoka built the first temple, the balustrades, and the memorial column. Criterion (iv) The present Temple is one of the earliest and most imposing structures built entirely in brick from the late Gupta period. The sculpted stone balustrades are an outstanding early example of sculptural reliefs in stone.

Criterion (vi): The Mahabodhi Temple Complex in Bodh Gaya has direct association with the life of the Lord Buddha, being the place where He attained the supreme and perfect insight.

Now the question before us today is, that when all persons and parties who matter have no doubt about the historicity of Bodh Gaya Maha Vihar, what then is the obstacle in handing over to the Buddhists what is rightfully theirs?

As far as the Hindu Temple or the Matth is concern nobody beyond Bihar knows much about this so called Hindu Mandir at the site. Hindus have important pilgrim centres and temples. Gaya, which is 10 kilometres away from Bodh Gaya is considered to be an important place of Hindu worship and none question that. It was clear since the beginning that the Mahant claimed to have gained a Zagir or Zamindari from the Mughal kings and it was his source of income apart from two other temples.

Historically we also know well, how the Brahmanical lobby scuttled all efforts towards Zamindari Abolition, an issue so dear to then Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru. Zamindari Abolition act came in 1951 and it was mostly challenged in Bihar where Brahmins, Bhumihars, Kayasthas and Rajputs had large Zamindaris (tracts of land). People are misinformed when they believe that it was only Rajputs who owned Zamindaris: in Bihar and Bengal Zamindari was not the sole domain of Rajputs but Brahmin-Bhumihar-Kayasthas too had large Zamindaris in both states.

It was estimated that the Bodh Gaya Matth had over 18000 acres of land (many estimated it over 30,000 acres) and it was the main source of the Mahant’s ‘power’ which he wielded on the poor landless people, a majority of them Dalits particularly Mushahars, Doms, Bhuiyna and other backward communities. Jaya Prakash Narayan addressed a historic gathering of landless peasants and other political activists here on April 18, 1975. The Bodh Gaya land movement continued until 1987 when the Bihar government distributed 18000-acre land among 11000 landless farmers, a majority of them landless women and Dalits. Gaya, Bhojpur, Ara, Jahanabad remained the hotbed for the movement for land rights of the landless communities, mostly mobilised by the far left groups. One needs to understand why the religious-political nexus has always opposed land reforms and found different ways to circumvent land ceiling laws by forming various religious trusts.

At the beginning of 19^th and 20^th century, we did not have enough support for the cause of Buddhism except for that which came from the outside. Japan, China, Thailand, Burma and other countries were interested in Buddhism in the land of its birth and its shrines. All shades of political leaders have felt proud of India’s historical Buddhist past. Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru believed in Panchsheel. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has been speaking about Lord Buddha with great reverence and even participates in Buddhist festivals and events. His government claims a ‘look east policy’ and most of our eastern neighbours are Buddhist countries that have great respect for India as it is truly the land of Buddha.  There will not be a political party which will oppose handing over the greatest shrines of Buddhist world over to the Buddhist community to manage and maintain it.

Before, I conclude, I wish to add this thought-provoking letter of Swami Sachchidananda Saraswati on February 1, 1926 as appeared in the Mahabodhi journal. One may agree or disagree with many of the observations but what is important to understand is his ultimate aim.

‘It is a great shame for all Hindus that they should allow an individual Saivite Mahant to control the greatest Buddhist shrine. Is it just and right? It is great surprise that some Hindus do not raise objection against the forcible occupation by an individual sectarian non-Buddhist Mahant of a temple erected in the memory of Lord Buddha, the only teacher of and revered by the whole Buddhists world of 500 million Buddhists. No Hindu can control any Christian or Muslim shrine by such an undesirable mean. This is a great injustice to Buddha, Buddhism and one third of the World Population which follows Buddha and Buddhism. So long as the Hindus, not to say of an individual non-Buddhist Mahant will keep control of the greatest Buddhist temple, the whole Buddhist world will look down upon Hindus and say that there is a great injustice in India. Therefore, I pray each member of the Indian National Congress and Hindu Mahasabha should take keen interest in the matter and do justice to Buddha and Buddhists. When the Indian National Congress demand complete swaraj from the British government which is due to the Indians Why should not the Congress too do justice by giving the transfer of the Buddhist temple to the Buddhists. We find in our Hindu scriptures that India was a great fount of justice and truth but at present I see with regret the groundless obstacles placed in the sincere and just attempt over the complete management of this greatest Buddhist shrine to its legitimate custodians. If anyone want justice from the others the former should first deal justice with others. In the Khilafat movement days, the Hindus helped Khilafatis, in the Akali movement days they helped the Akalis, why shouldn’t the Hindus help Buddhists to regain their holiest shrine?

The question is one of pure justice. If the Hindu Mahasabha will fail to do justice with the Buddhists. There is no doubt that the Buddhists will be morally affected and be far and far away from it. If it be the aim of All India Hindu Mahasabha, that all the people of different religion should give equal treatment to one another and live amicably with one another then it should give justice and equal treatment to Buddhism and Buddhists also and allow the latter to have the full management of their holiest shrine.

Therefore, let us, the Hindus, with our usual sincere and justice loving heart assure Buddhists of our unanimous opinion that we will give complete transfer of Buddhist temple to them. Let us be also assured that they will allow the Hindus to worship Buddha freely as they should do to Buddha and that neither the Buddhists nor the Hindus should offer fish or meat before the Buddhist statues. I further appeal to all the sincere Hindus that they should criticize the report and support impartially the Buddhists claim for the complete management of the Buddhist temple which is justly due to the Buddhists.

Swami Sachchidananda Saraswati,

Calcutta, February 1, 1926’[6]

A few years ago, when I met venerable Bhante Nagarjun Surai Sasai, a Japanese by birth but an Indian in action now and asked him about Bodh Gaya, he told me that it is the birth place of Lord Buddha. I was surprised and shocked when he said that. He explained this to me: Lumbini is the birth place of prince Siddhartha but it is Gaya that gave birth to Buddha hence Bodh Gaya Mahabodhi Vihar is the most sacred shrine for the Buddhists all over the world. Every Indian should be proud of this rich cultural heritage which the world acknowledges.

It is time for the government of Bihar to take a simple decision. The state government can call an all- party meeting and listen to their views. You can tell them the history of this movement and the archaeological findings. For too long has the far right Hindutva leadership asked Muslims to ‘respect’ Hindu sentiments? The Buddhist are asking the same from the Hindus. Will the Hindutva leadership, Congress as well as the Samajwadis learn a few lessons from their own past and correct them? All their top leadership has accepted and supported the Buddhist claim on the Maha Bodhi Vihar, Gaya. The Ambedkarite fraternity in India is already fighting for a peaceful solution through a democratic and law-abiding struggle. All the political parties and organizations that claim to represent Ambedkarite thoughts and people stand in complete solidarity with the Bodh Gaya Maha Bodhi Vihar movement. Will the Bihar government wake up and listen to the voices and reread its history to handover this shrine to the Buddhists.

Nitish Kumar hails from the JP movement and so does Lalu Prasad Yadav. Bihar’s landless people owe a lot to that historic Bodh Gaya Land movement which ultimately paved the way towards redistribution of the thousands of acres of land to landless people illegally occupied by the Matth. Buddhists have been wronged. Buddha and Buddhist past are India’s glorious heritage which makes us proud. Dalits and Ambedkarites were not before a strong force nor and Buddhism was in physical decline in India but Baba Saheb Ambedkar’s historic Deeksha ceremony on October 14, 1956 and subsequent efforts of the Ambedkarites actually revived Buddhism in India and today the number of Buddhists is increasing in both India and abroad.

Today, the Buddhists in India are ready to take this battle to its end. Buddha was a man of peace and non-violence hence the longer this struggle stretches the more bitter would become the relations between the Hindus and Buddhists. The government must ensure that such a bitterness is not allowed to spread widely and it will only be possible if the shrine’s management is handed over to Buddhists of India.

[1] Bengal District Gazetteers, Gaya by L S S O’Malley, ICS, Calcutta, The Bengal Secretariate Book Depot, 1906,  P 50-51

[2] ibid P-52

[3] https://www.telegraphindia.com/culture/books/rabindranath-tagore-a-poem-that-defined-the-buddha-and-sujata-stupa/cid/1818901

[4]    Mahabodhi and the United Buddhist World Volume 34, January 1926 No 1, P 2,

[5] Ibid P 4

[6] Mahabodhi : March 1926 Volume XXXIV     Volume III, Mahabodhi and the United Buddhist World Volume 34 P 165-166

Disclaimer: The views expressed here are the author’s personal views, and do not necessarily represent the views of Sabrangindia.

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The Coronation …

“By the beginning of 1673 the idea of a public coronation began to materialize, and when preparations were fully completed, the event took place at fort Raigad, on Saturday 5 June 1674, the day of the sun’s entering the constellation Leo.

The orthodox Brahman opinion was not favourable to Shivaji’s claim to be recognised as a Kshatriya by blood, although he had proved this claim by action. More than a thousand years had passed since such a ceremony was last performed, and on that account men’s memories had been entirely dimmed. All ancient learning of the Deccan had migrated to Benares after the invasion of Ala–ud–din Khilji and the Muslim conquest of the Deccan.

Ancient families noted for hereditary learning like the Devs, the Dharmadhikaris, the Sheshas, the Bhattas, the Maunis, had left their hearths and homes at Paithan, with all their sacred books, and opened their new university of letters on the bank of the holy Ganges. The ignorant unthinking folks of Paithan had now no voice of authority left in them. Benares now began to dominate Hindu thought and learning. So Shivaji had to negotiate with Gaga Bhatt of Benares, a learned representative of that school of Hindu law–givers. He was invited to Raigad to arrange the details in such a way as to suit the needs of the present moment as much as to conform to ancient usage.”

(New History of The Marathas, Govind Sakharam Sardesai).

(Archived from the October 2001 issue of Communalism Combat)

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In the extremely polarised era in the India that we live in, a biography of a contentious person, Vinayak Damodar Savarkar (1883-1966) is bound to attract substantial attention. This is not limited to the popular domain of public history but also in the scholarly domain. Historian Janaki Bakhle (Columbia University) has intervened in this sphere, first with two of her long, well-researched essays in 2010. These essays created a temptation among academics and expectations from Bakhle that she brings out a comprehensive biography of Savarkar. The wait took long. Eventually, this large volume has come out. In terms of methodological rigour, the book is indeed an extraordinarily impressive work.

This is perhaps for the first time that Savarkar has been studied not in a hagiographic account but with extraordinary scrutiny of a multitude of sources and evidence: the thick files of police and intelligence reports and a deep engagement with the range of Marathi language sources. This awe-inspiring volume inevitably impresses a discerning student of history with the range of the facets of Savarkar: his anti-colonial revolutionary activities, his anti-Muslim hatred, his radical caste reformism, his Marathi language oeuvres in prose and poetry (creative and rhetorical), the way he looked upon and weaponised history, and the ways he adapted to fashion himself into a legend in his own time through both mythologization and sacralization. In this segment, Janaki Bakhle looks into all hagiographical accounts (around 250 tracts) on and by Savarkar, mostly in the Marathi language. Bakhle says that between 1924 and 1937 Savarkar wrote around 300 essays on various issues, in Marathi, and therefore she makes it clear (p. 423) as to why did she has looked so deeply and closely into Savarkar’s Marathi writings, hitherto untapped by historians:

In this book I have kept in mind Theodor Adorno’s aphorism that one must be steeped in a tradition to hate it properly. By hate, Adorno meant critique, which I take to mean both appreciation and analysis. I have steeped myself in the traditions that surround Savarkar so I could present a new view, scholarly and dispassionate, but also embedded in the traditions and milieu that spawned his life and his legends. I have tried to present Savarkar as a man of intense nationalist passion who was seen as extraordinarily dangerous (hence important and influential) by the colonial authorities, yet who was used (perhaps unwittingly) at the same time by them to further their own agenda.

Janaki Bakhle’s study doesn’t go beyond 1937, even though, while evaluating Savarkar’s “historical” and performable writings, his 1963 account, Six Glorious Epochs has also been subjected to scrutiny and analysis. By terminating the study in 1937, Janaki Bakhle skips the story of Savarkar’s alleged roles in plotting the assassination of Gnadhiji wherein he was acquitted owing to lack of sufficient evidence. The critics of Savarkar may argue that a further trial based on “circumstantial evidence” may have culminated into a different end result This continues to intrigue many as to why neither Nehru, Sardar Patel (who barely spoke against the RSS before January 30, 1948) and Morarji Desai (whose 1974 autobiography hints at something) and other such leaders in power pursued this case further? Was it because such a judicial pursuit may have created administratively unmanageable revulsion from the admirers of Savarkar? Did Savarkar really carry a strong charisma among a section of his fellow castes in parts of his home province?

A close reader of the last three chapters of Bakhle may get some hint/clue about the answers to the last question. In fact, just as a powerful fiction leaves readers thinking for long after having finished reading the story, Bakhle leaves her discerning readers thinking on so many aspects of Savarkar. Bakhle’s relevant chapters clearly suggest that Savarkar, the poet-politician, rhetorical essay-writer, and playwright, the “nation’s bard”, was a sort of cult among a section of the Marathi literary world (for communalisation of this segment of Marathi population, see T C A Raghavan’s 1983 essay). Thus, Savarkar’s pre-Cellular Jail life when he was fiercely anti-colonial revolutionary, and his post-1924 life when he fashioned himself first and foremost as a poet and Marathi litterateur besides a rationalist anti-caste social reformist, helped him become quite a charismatic figure for a section of the Marathi-speaking population. That he “was not sporadically or episodically anti-Muslim; he was deeply and systematically anti-Muslim” (p. 148) could be no less significant factor in his popularity among certain quarters.

The first two chapters rely much upon a critically insightful examination of intelligence reports of the colonial police. The author rightly says that Savarkar spent all his public life under state surveillance (even after independence too). Bakhle is very clear about (a specific contention around Savarkar) that his anti-Muslim hatred always existed and that it had nothing to do with the rumour that he turned anti-Muslim only after he received maltreatment at the hands of a Muslim in the Cellular Jail. However, Savarkar’s anti-Muslim hatred became much more pronounced with the start of the Khilafat Movement, and it served the colonial interest very well. He looked upon Khilafat agitation as an “international conspiracy to steal Hindu sovereignty”.

Bakhle deals with colonial motives in great detail while detailing the Savarkar-Gandhi-Khilafat issue. It provokes scholars of the field to re-look into the hitherto untold impact of the pan-Islamist Khilafat agitation upon a section of Hindus. Apprehensions of Lala Lajpat Rai (Intezar Husain’s 1999 Urdu biography of Hakim Ajmal Khan, Ajmal-e-Azam, records it) were not far different from those of Savarkar on the issue. The colonial power-play of pitting the two religious communities of India against each other is brought out very deeply and comprehensively by Bakhle. Bakhle, quite rightly, makes it a point to mention that many eminent Muslim leaders and scholars were not for the institution of Khilafat, such as, Sir Syed (1817-1898), Ashraf Ali Thanwi (1863-1943), Ahmed Riza Barelvi (1856-1921), Shibli Numani (1857-1914) and Anwar Shah Kashmiri of Deoband. Despite this, by the time the World War-I began, Indian Muslims became so agitated in favour of the Khilafat keeping themselves quite oblivious to the anti-Caliphate upsurge of the Turks at home in Turkey. This aspect needed little more detailed treatment, in order to understand the sentiments of those segments of Hindus who were apprehensive about pan-Islamist “designs” of Indian Muslims. Yet, Gandhiji extended unconditional support to them in the early 1920s.

A further engagement with Azmi Ozcan’s 1997 book, Pan Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britain, 1877-1924 would have further enriched the book under review. Ozcan makes it clear that Indian Muslims turned sympathetic to the Turkish Caliphate only in the 1870s, when the Ottoman-British relations began to deteriorate. Otherwise, the Ottomans and Mughals were not on good terms. There are indications that the former remained in apprehension that Mughals might snatch away their Caliphate. Mughal princess and writer Gulbadan Begam (1570s; see Rumer Godden’s 1975 biography), Sikandar Begum of Bhopal (1861) and the Tonk State administrator (1871) faced hostilities of the Haj administrators under the Ottoman Caliphate (see Ziauddin Sardar, 2014, Mecca: The Sacred City). Janaki Bakhle however does benefit from Naeem Qureshi (2014) who explains the Ottoman anxiety and insecurity, as they were the first Caliphs to have been non-Arab and non-descendant of the Prophet Mohammad (p. 91).

Bakhle misses to note that, not only Savarkar, long before that, since 1877-1878, Indian Muslim leaders too, were under colonial surveillance for their growing sympathies with the Ottomans. Just two decades back, in 1857, the Mughal state had already been liquidated. It would be pertinent to note that Turkish Cap became a fad in the MAO College of Aligarh (which was founded in 1877). Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hameed II (1876-1909) was reclaiming the Caliphate, calling himself, Imam-ul-Muslimeen, which had receptivity across Asia, Africa, including British India. Soon after Hameed, India’s Pan Islamists would form Anjuman-e-Khuddam-e-Kaba (Society of the Servants of Kaba) in 1912-13.

The colonial intelligence reports about India’s Khilafat leaders and Savarkar’s vitriol against the same carry some degree of resemblance in tone, tenor and vocabulary. She devotes considerable number of pages on the evolution of colonial policing and surveillance, which is quite useful for evidence-based historical research.

Savarkar’s deep antipathy against the Ali Brothers is understandable. While the former looked upon Kemal Ataturk as a secular saviour, the later was agitating passionately about the preservation of Caliphate. Interestingly, Jinnah too displayed a limited, essential resemblance with Savarkar on this specific issue. Also, in the post-Tilak phase of the nationalist mass movement both Savarkar and Jinnah developed an antipathy against Gandhiji. Contrary to assertions from some circles, at least for once, by 1927, we do find Savarkar speaking against Jinnah. In Savarkar’s understanding all Muslim leaders were for enhancing Muslim numbers through conversion, and that they bargained to obtain concessions from Hindus, issuing a threat that “whatever demands Muslims make, all of them have to be immediately granted by Hindus, otherwise with the help of Afghanistan or some other Muslim country we will establish Muslim rule in India” (p. 124).

Subsequently, like Savarkar, Shaukat Ali too (in 1933) would seek clemency from the colonial state to secure his pension to be restored from 1919, rather than from 1933 (something Janaki Bakhle has ommitted). Nonetheless, with meticulous and detailed surveillance reports obtained about Savarkar from the colonial state, helps Bakhle conclude almost irrefutably that the Colonial state always looked upon Savarkar as a tool to be used for creating Hindu-Muslim hostility (p. 423) and made a greater use of him after 1937.

Janaki Bakhle brings out the merits of Savarkar’s caste reformism, something which has remained largely unacknowledged among the non-Marathi readers. She however doesn’t gloss over the limitations of Savarkar’s reformism. “[H]e never developed a critique of caste that acknowledged its deep connections to structures of power, access, and wellbeing” (p. 151). This chapter makes comprehensive engagement with the positions of Gandhi, Ambedkar and Savarkar on the issues of caste and untouchability. Savarkar’s pathologically obsessive pursuit of ethno-nationalism wanted to convert caste (jati) into Hindu ethnicity through an upper-caste Brahminic lens (p. 153). However, on this count, for a more informed critique of Ambedkar and its divergence as well as convergence (in terms of anti-Muslim utterances) with Savarkar, an engagement with Keith Meadowcroft’s works could have proven more useful.

Savarkar’s ethnonationalist project is analysed quite brilliantly in each chapter. He wanted to cure his “nation” of the “narcoleptic sleep disorder”, suggests Bakhle (p. 352). Scrutinizing him as “nationalist historian” she looks into his 1963 text, Six Glorious Epochs as a “defensive tract about the Hindu Mahasabha, which had held itself aloof from Gandhi and the INC-led Quit India Movement [of 1942]”, and where he “appears both angry and tired”.

This is a commendable work not only to know of many lesser known aspects and psyche of her subject (Savarkar) but also to learn much more about the divisive power-play of the British, the crucial decades of the nationalist movement during the 1920s and 1930s, and it unpacks new layers of Hindu anxiety around the Pan-Islamist Muslims of India. Janaki Bakhle’s historiographic rigour, insight (and beautiful prose) uncovers the genesis behind contemporary resurgence of Hindutva. A must read both for the specialists as well as popular reading which settles many contentions of public history on the subject.

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The post Savarkar and the Making of Hindutva: Book Review appeared first on SabrangIndia.

What would Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi have made of a society, which has turned its back so soon on his attempts to usher in a culture of progress, science, and tolerance in a fundamentally violent society where the lives of the traditionally disadvantaged castes were nasty, brutish and short? An extreme example is provided in Nisha Pahuja’s documentary The World Before Her, in which Prachi Trivedi, 24, a stocky Durga Vahini, women’s youth wing of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, activist who fiercely says: “Frankly, I hate Gandhi.” Probably his lifelong adherence to Jesus’s maxim of turning the other cheek would have made him accommodative of her antagonism also.

This culture of forgiving, which the Mahatma advocated made him a moral exemplar for statesmen and world leaders such as Rev. Martin Luther King, Nelson ‘Madiba’ Mandela, Rev. Desmond Tutu and Rev. Jesse Jackson. “Prior to reading Gandhi, I had concluded that the ethics of Jesus were only effective in individual relationships. The ‘turn the other cheek’ philosophy and the ‘love your enemies’ philosophy were only valid, I felt, when individuals were in conflict with other individuals; when racial groups and nations were in conflict, a more realistic approach seemed necessary.

But after reading Gandhi, I saw how utterly mistaken I was. Gandhi was probably the first person in history to lift the love ethic of Jesus above mere interaction between individuals to a powerful and effective social force on a large scale. Love for Gandhi was a potent instrument for social and collective transformation. It was in this Gandhian emphasis on love and nonviolence that I discovered the method for social reform that I had been seeking.” – Stride Toward Freedom {p.96-97}, Martin Luther King; who warmed to the Mahatma post-Montgomery.

Decades later, in an address at the unveiling of the Gandhi Memorial on June 6, 1993, in Pietermaritzburg, Mandela was to declare : “He negotiated in good faith and without bitterness. But when the oppressor reneged he returned to mass resistance. He combined negotiation and mass action and illustrated that the end result through either means was effective. Gandhi is most revered for his commitment to non-violence and the Congress Movement was strongly influenced by this Gandhian philosophy, it was a philosophy that achieved the mobilisation of millions of South Africans during the 1952 defiance campaign, which established the ANC as a mass based organisation. The ANC and its alliance partners worked jointly to protest the pass laws and the racist ideologies of the white political parties.”

In the domain of economics, where Gandhian views are considered antediluvian and Luddite, there is a necessary and differing Occidental academic opinion. Delivering the Gandhi Memorial Lecture at the Gandhian Institute of Studies at Varanasi in 1973, Dr. EF Schumacher, the humane socialist economist, narrated this story: “A German conductor was asked who he considered as the greatest of all composers. ‘Unquestionably Beethoven’ was his answer. He was then asked ‘Not even Mozart?’ He said ‘Forgive me. I thought you were referring to the others.’

Drawing a telling parallel Schumacher said the same initial question might be put to an economist as to who was the greatest. The reply invariably would be ‘Definitely Keynes.’ ‘Would you not even consider Gandhi?’ ‘Forgive me; I thought you were referring to the others.’”

And in the Orient, Masanobu Fukuoka, the Japanese author of One Straw Revolution, which inspired many to convert to Natural Farming too was inspired by Gandhi. In Fukuoka’s words: “I believe that Gandhi’s way, a methodless method, acting with a non-winning, non-opposing state of mind, is akin to natural farming. The ultimate goal of farming is not the growing of crops, but the cultivation and perfection of human beings.”

Such striving for a life of ethical rectitude can be glimpsed from this episode from My Experiments with Truth. Gandhi mentions the bitter fight he had with Kasturba over her refusal to clean the latrine, wanting a ‘bhangi’ to do it instead. When Kasturba refused to give in, Gandhiji did the job himself. This brings to mind the anecdote of a chance visitor catching President Abraham Lincoln polishing his own shoes: “Mr. President, you are polishing shoes?” “Of course, I do my own,” answered Lincoln innocently, “So, whose do you polish?”

Mahatmaji’s culture of secularism needs special mention. The first principle of democratic secular humanism is its commitment to free inquiry, which opposes any tyranny over the mind of man, any efforts by ecclesiastical, political, ideological, or social institutions to shackle free thought. Free inquiry entails recognition of civil liberties as integral to its pursuit, that is, a free press, freedom of communication, the right to organise opposition parties, and freedom to cultivate and publish the fruits of scientific, philosophical, artistic, literary, moral and religious freedom.

Free inquiry requires that we tolerate diversity of opinion and that we respect the right of individuals to express their beliefs, however unpopular they may be, without social or legal prohibition or fear of sanctions. The guiding premise of those who believe in free inquiry is that truth is more likely to be discovered if the opportunity exists for the free exchange of opposing opinions; the process of interchange is frequently as important as the result. This applies not only to science and to everyday life, but to politics, economics, morality, and religion.

Because of their commitment to freedom, secular humanists believe in the principle of the separation of religion and state. The lessons of history are clear: wherever one religion or ideology is allowed dominant status, minority opinions are jeopardised. A pluralistic, open democratic society allows polyphony or multiplicity of voices. Compulsory religious oaths and prayers in public institutions {political or educational} are also a violation of the separation of powers principle.

A repeated usage of the term occurs early in Gandhi’s writings and speeches in 1933. Later, on January 27, 1935, Gandhi, addressing some members of the Central Legislature, said that “even if the whole body of Hindu opinion were to be against the removal of untouchability, still he would advise a secular legislature like the Assembly not to tolerate that attitude.” {Collected works}. On January 20, 1942 Gandhi remarked while discussing the Pakistan scheme: “What conflict of interest can there be between Hindus and Muslims in the matter of revenue, sanitation, police, justice, or the use of public conveniences? The difference can only be in religious usage and observance with which a secular state has no concern.”

In September 1946, Gandhi told a Christian missionary: “If I were a dictator, religion and state would be separate. I swear by my religion. I will die for it. But it is my personal affair. The state has nothing to do with it. The state would look after your secular welfare, health, communications, foreign relations, currency and so on, but not your or my religion. That is everybody’s personal concern!”

A part of his conversation with Rev. Kellas of the Scottish Church College, Calcutta, on August 16, 1947, was reported in Harijan thus: “Gandhiji expressed the opinion that the state should undoubtedly be secular. It could never promote denominational education out of public funds. Everyone living in it should be entitled to profess his religion without let or hindrance, so long as the citizen obeyed the common law of the land. There should be no interference with missionary effort, but no mission could enjoy the patronage of the state as it did during the foreign regime.” This was subsequently reflected in Articles 25, 26 and 27 of the Constitution.

Gandhi observed in a speech at Deshbandhu Park, Calcutta on August 22, 1947: “Religion was a personal matter and if we succeeded in confining it to the personal plane, all would be well in our political life… If officers of Government as well as members of the public undertook the responsibility and worked wholeheartedly for the creation of a secular state, we could build a new India that would be the glory of the world.”

On Guru Nanak’s birthday on Nov 28, 1947, Gandhi opposed any possibility of state funds being spent for the renovation of the Somnath temple. He reasoned thus: “After all, we have formed the Government for all. It is a ‘secular’ government, that is, it is not a theocratic government, rather, it does not belong to any particular religion. Hence it cannot spend money on the basis of communities.”

Six days before Gandhi was felled by a Chitpavan Brahmin, he presciently wrote: “A well-organised body of constructive workers will be needed. Their service to the people will be their sanction and the merit of their work will be their charter. The ministers will draw their inspiration from such a body which will advise and guide the secular government.”

Both Gandhi and Nehru favoured territorial nationalism, clearly demarcating themselves from the Hindu Mahasabha, which would define nation or nationality on the basis of religion.

Perhaps Gandhi’s greatest achievement in the historic Non-cooperation movement of 1920-22 was the amazing participation of Muslims, which lent it an inclusive and mass character. This, in turn ensured communal harmony, rending to shreds the till then successful snare of the British in playing off the two communities against each other. In fact, so pronounced was Muslim support to the cause of the freedom struggle that history is our witness that in some places two-thirds of these arrested were from that community.

This remarkable spirit of the man who could bend the societal arc of his time to the moral compass of his conscience was best grasped by a little known Australian-born British classical scholar and public intellectual. “Persons in power,” Gilbert Murray prophetically wrote about Gandhi in the Hibbert Journal in 1918, “should be very careful how they deal with a man who cares nothing for sensual pleasure, nothing for riches, nothing for comfort or praise, or promotion, but is simply determined to do what he believes to be right. He is a dangerous and uncomfortable enemy, because his body which you can always conquer gives you so little purchase upon his soul.”

There is a reason for this reminder to ‘persons in power’. As per reports on December 25th at a function in Patna organised by a former Union minister in Modi’s cabinet folk singer Devi was stopped from singing Gandhi’s favourite Bhajan, ‘Raghupati raghav raja ram’, when she reached the stanza ‘Ishwar Allah tero naam’. She was allegedly forced to apologise by BJP workers at Bapu Sabhagar auditorium gathered to celebrate the 100th birth anniversary of former Prime Minister Vajpayee. Following the apology, it is further reported that the audience chanted “Jai Shri Ram” in full volume.

These bigoted hatemongers will yet come to realise that the syncretic teaching of Gandhi, mirroring the composite ethos of our accommodating shores, which still resonates in the hearts of his beloved daridra narayans and narayanis, will prevail forever. For the flame that was lit on that funeral pyre in 1949 is and will be the lingering light of the innumerable flickering chirags that brightens lives across India.

Courtesy: The AIDEM

The post Gandhi, the Flame Eternal appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Although “Parakram” means valour, in the era of the Sangh Parivar, it has also come to mean aggression against the weak and defenceless.

Subhas was never a “Parakrami” in the sense that the Sangh interprets. He was a true hero who united the weak and oppressed against the mighty British, risking his life in the struggle.

On this day, the Sanghis claiming to be “heirs” to Netaji’s legacy were the ones who diligently served the British army’s efforts to defeat Subhas during World War II. While Subhas was rallying soldiers worldwide against the British, these Hindutvavadis under Savarkar’s leadership,were brokering the recruitment of Hindus into the British army.

Yet, they now praise Netaji with clear ulterior motives.

Firstly, the Sanghis, who have no legacy of participating in the freedom struggle, are attempting to hijack the legacy of all non-Congress or dissident heros who were leaders of different streams  of the freedom struggle, portraying themselves as the heirs to these streams.

Secondly, they exploit the natural and healthy political and ideological differences that existed within the Congress and between Congress and other streams, and around them, they craft a false narrative to claim that all who disagreed with Gandhi and Nehru were pro-Hindutva nationalists, utilizing this for their current Hindutva nation agenda.

This is the real intention of the Sangh Parivar.

With this malicious intent, they have engaged in propaganda backed and filled with lies and fabrications that Gandhi and Nehru conspired against Subhas Chandra Bose and that the Hindutvavadis like Savarkar stood by him, thereby insulting Subhas to a great extent.

To fulfil their ulterior motives, they obscure the political, ideological, and secular perspectives between themselves and Gandhi-Nehru that Subhas had, as well as publicly expressed disdain towards communalists like the Hindu Mahasabha and Muslim League.

At the same time, they conceal the disdain Subhas had for communalists like Savarkar, the Hindu Mahasabha, and the Muslim League.

This article primarily attempts to explain Subhas’s views on secularism, Hindu-Muslim unity, and his opinions about people like Savarkar. It relies mainly on Subhas’s own writings in “An Indian Pilgrim” and “Indian Struggle” and on works by his grandson and scholar Sugata Bose in “His Majesty’s Opponent” and the edited volumes “Collected Works Of Subasha Chandra Bose.”

All these books are available online, and interested parties can read them to understand the political-historical misdeeds of the Sangh Parivar.

Subhas Chandra Bose was not only a prominent leader of Congress but also martyred in the effort to oust the ruling British during World War II by forming the Azad Hind Fauj.

History textbooks have recounted to non-Bengali students anything more than this bare fact.

Subhas was above all else, an exceptional proponent of communal harmony and Hindu-Muslim unity. As a top-notch nationalist, he dreamed of building a future India based on socialist ideals. His views on the history of India, the way he formed the Azad Hind Fauj, and his clear disdain for figures like Savarkar are evident in these respects.

The Tiger of Tipu was the flag of the Azad Hind Fauj!

The Sanghis who attempt day and night to demonise the revered Tipu-Haider as fanatic monsters should be ashamed when considering the respect Subhas Chandra Bose and the Azad Hind Fauj held for them. Subhas used the flying tiger symbol of Tipu as a symbol of anti-British struggle on the first flag of the Azad Hind Fauj. While unveiling the flag, Subhas explained to his soldiers that this flying tiger was a symbol of Tipu Sultan’s resistance against the British.

That is not all. On October 21, 1943, the Azad Hind Fauj declared the provisional government of India. While making this proclamation, the Azad Hind Fauj and Netaji acknowledged several real leaders of the country along with Tipu and Haider, expressing their gratitude. Reading this makes it clear that it is impossible to appropriate Subhas for the RSS agenda.

The proclamation of the Provisional Government of Azad Hind begins like this:

“Ever since Bengal first faced defeat at the hands of the British in 1757, the people of India have continuously waged a struggle against British rule for a hundred years. This period is filled with the unmatched courage and selfless sacrifices shown by the people of India. During this period in the history of India, the names of Sirajuddaula of Bengal, Mohan Lal, Hyder Ali, Tipu Sultan, Velu Thampi….and others are inscribed in golden letters…”

Interested parties can read the full text and see pictures of this proclamation at the following web address:[https://www.roots.gov.sg/Collection-Landing/listing/1278996]

Hindu-Muslim Unity: the foundation of the Azad Hind Fauj

The Modi government is intent on imposing Brahminical Hindi as the sole language of the country. In contrast, the official language of Subhas’s Azad Hind Fauj was Urdu-Hindustani, commonly used by the people of North India, and English was used to be understood by the soldiers from South India. The motto of the Fauj was written in Urdu:

“Itmad (Trust), Ittefaq (Unity), and Qurbani (Sacrifice).”

In 1857, during the First War of Indian Independence, the Indian forces under the leadership of the last Mughal Emperor Bahadur Shah Zafar called for “Delhi Chalo.” In September 1943, Subhas’s Azad Hind Fauj also embarked from Rangoon (now Myanmar) to expel the British from India, remembering the 1857 uprising, and Subhas called for “Delhi Chalo” during this grand departure.

That is not all either. On September 26, 1943, a special prayer meeting was held by the Azad Hind Fauj near the tomb of Bahadur Shah Zafar.

As described by Subhas’s grandson Sugata Bose in his scholarly work, the proportion of Muslim soldiers in the Azad Fauj was slightly higher than others, and many of Subhas’s closest associates were Muslims. In 1943, during a secret submarine adventure journey, the only companion who travelled with him was Abid Hasan from South Hyderabad. Throughout his travels across Europe and Asia, Hasan was Subhas’s close assistant.

The first division commander of the Azad Hind Fauj was Mohammad Zaman Kiani. The first to hoist the Tricolor flag of India in Imphal, Manipur, was Fauj officer Shaukat Malik. On their tragic last journey, Habibur Rahman perished alongside them. However, this uprising failed, and the soldiers of the Fauj were captured by the British, who charged them with sedition and held a trial. The three Azad Hind Fauj soldiers who were symbolically tried at the Red Fort were:

Prem Sehgal, a Hindu, Shah Nawaz Khan, a Muslim, and Gurbaksh Singh Dhillon, a Sikh.  This also symbolically represented the secular patriotism prevailing in Subhas’s Fauj.

(His Majesty’s Opponent, p. 4)

Netaji’s rejection of the Hindu-Muslim division in Indian history

The Hindutvavadis depict the history of India as having been engulfed in 1200 years of aggression to suit their communal polarisation agenda. Thus, they portray the entire era under Muslim rule before the British and the Muslim rulers before them as a period during which Hindus suffered under Muslim aggressors.

However, Subhas rejected this communal view of Indian history as propagated by the British, aimed at dividing India along Hindu-Muslim lines. He also noted:

“History will bear me out when I say that it is a misnomer to talk of Muslim rule when describing the political order in India prior to the advent of the British. Whether we talk of the Moghul Emperors at Delhi, or of the Muslim Kings of Bengal, we shall find that in either case the administration was run by Hindus and Muslims together, many of the prominent Cabinet Ministers and Generals being Hindus. Further, the consolidation of the Moghul Empire in India was effected with the help of Hindu commanders-in-chief. The Commander-in-chief of Nawab Sirajudowla, whom the British fought at Plassey in 1757 and defeated, was a Hindu, and the rebellion of 1857 against the British, in which Hindus and Moslems were found side by side, was fought under the flag of a Muslim, Bahadur Shah.” (An Indian Pilgrim, p. 15)

Subhas’s outrage against communal organisations like Hindu Mahasabha and Muslim League

During the period of the freedom struggle, Subhas held deep contempt for the Hindu Mahasabha and Muslim League, which were working for the British and causing divisions among the people. When he was elected president of Congress in 1938, he emphasized this issue, saying:

“We often hear talks of a Hindu Raj. This serves no purpose. Can these communal organizations solve the problems faced by India’s working class? Do these organisations have any solution to the issues of unemployment and poverty?” he questioned vehemently.

He also banned members of the Hindu Mahasabha and Muslim League from holding Congress memberships. The reason? Because:

“Jinnah’s idea is to obtain his dream of Pakistan with the help of the British, not to fight jointly with Congress for India’s liberation.”

“On the other hand, Savarkar’s only goal is to collaborate with the British and get military training for Hindus by joining the  British army. After meeting both, I have concluded that nothing can be expected from them for India’s independence.” (The Indian Struggle, p. 344)

Thus, even if one reads Subhas Chandra Bose’s own writings and the scholarly works about him, it becomes clear how malicious the portrayal of Subhas by these fascist Sanghis is.

Beyond the servitude to British colonialism, corporate capitalism, and communal hatred, these fascists have no history of building or fighting for the country. Now, they are hijacking leaders who had differences with Gandhi and Nehru and were non-Congress, and portraying them in a way that insults these leaders, this country, and its history.

A staunchly secular, anti-communal, and socialist nationalist like Subhas Chandra Bose can never be appropriated by the RSS. Nor should he be allowed to be.

The only way to do this is to expose their false narrative through an exposition of real history, which itself must become a movement, right?

(The writer is a political commentator based in Bengaluru)

Disclaimer: The views expressed here are the author’s personal views, and do not necessarily represent the views of Sabrangindia. 

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PM Modi to attend Subhas Chandra Bose’s 125th birth anniversary celebrations in Kolkata

The post Can RSS co-opt Subhas Chandra Bose, a staunch secular-socialist and a fond admirer of Tipu Sultan? appeared first on SabrangIndia.

We shall make an attempt to debunk the more “popular myths” associated with Bose through his own writings and correspondence. The three primary myths to be debunked are about one, Nehru and Bose’s relations, two, Bose and Patel’s relations and three, why and how Bose’s appropriation by the majoritarian communal forces reflects a greatest irony.

‘The rift between Nehru and Bose’

It is one of the most favourite pastimes of various right wing organizations to pit Bose against Nehru in their attempt to show how they were antagonistic to each other. However, the reality is contrary to what is being portrayed. Subhash Chandra Bose had been deferential to CR Das and Motilal Nehru since his inception in politics. With the passage of time, Subhash and Jawaharlal came to be seen in a similar light, both representing the left wing within the Congress. Both of them surged ahead as icons and the favourite leaders of youth. Their popularity could be gauged from the fact that the charismatic youth leader of the time, Bhagat Singh, himself wrote an article on the two titled, ‘New Leaders and their Different Ideologies’ in Kirti magazine in 1928. The two had opposed the dominion status of the Nehru Report and had been adamant to amend this clause at the Calcutta session of the Congress in 1928. The All India Congress Committee passed Gandhi’s resolution that, if the British did not accede to their demand for Dominion status within two years, then a call for complete independence should be given, by 118 votes. Subhash got 45 votes in his favour.

A meeting of the left wing within the Congress had taken place in Lucknow in 1928 attended by both Nehru and Bose. After the meeting both of them began organising branches of the Independence League all over the country. (Subhash Chandra Bose, An Indian Pilgrim: The Indian Struggle, 1935, pp.136-137) The first All Bengal Conference of Students was held in August 1928 at Calcutta presided by Jawaharlal Nehru. (Bose, 1935, p.137) The Independence League was formally inaugurated at Delhi in November and according to Bose it attained the importance that it did largely because of Nehru’s association with it. (Bose, 1935, p.152)

At the time when the Gandhi-Irwin pact was about to be signed, Bose hoped that Nehru would be successful in getting Gandhi to agree to more favourable terms for the nation. He wrote that there was no one with sufficient personality to force their views on Gandhi except Jawaharlal Nehru. (Bose, 1935, p.181)

The difference between Bose and Nehru regarding Gandhi was that while both were deferential to him, Nehru was not ready to break with him, unlike Subhash. We shall see this more vividly as we move forward. The relations between Nehru and Bose were extremely friendly during this time and as argued by Rudrangshu Mukherjee in his Nehru and Bose: Parallel Lives (2014), Bose had started to think of Nehru as an elder brother and mentor but Nehru was perhaps unaware about the change. Bose took great care of Kamla Nehru during her treatment in Europe and regularly kept himself updated regarding her health despite his peripatetic nature of stay. (Letter from Bose to Nehru dated October 4, 1935, p.121, Bunch Of Old Letters). He was also with Nehru in his hour of bereavement and wrote a letter to him to that effect on 4th March 1936 (Bunch Of Old Letters, p.166).

On his return to India, Bose was detained and shortly imprisoned. This did not go down well with the youth of the nation and their admiration for Bose was given expression by Nehru who declared the day, May 10, to be celebrated as Subhash Day. (Rudgranshu Mukherjee, Nehru And Bose: Parallel Lives, 2014, p. 213)

In Bose’s letter to Nehru dated June 30, 1936 he expressed his concern for Nehru’s health and went on to advise him a couple of things regarding his priorities as Congress President.(Bunch Of Old Letters, p.195) The two had grown e quite close and spoke in almost one voice over all matters of the Congress. When the infamous Tripuri incident took place and he saw no cooperation forthcoming from his Working Committee, Bose resigned. At the time, he wrote a letter to his nephew. This letter which is quoted by almost all the accusers as “evidence of Nehru’s malice towards Bose” should be read in context and in entirety. Though the letter says, no one had done more harm to me than Nehru in my cause, this comment was meant in the context to the Tripuri incident. This emerges from the fact that Bose despite his admiration for Gandhi was ready to part ways with him which Nehru was not. Rudrangshu Mukherjee points out that at this time Bose even invited Nehru to discuss the situation (Rudrangshu Mukherjee, Nehru and Bose: Parallel Lives, 2014, p.243)

We must also not forget that Nehru was made the chairman of the Planning Committee during Bose’s tenure as Congress President and Nehru makes it a point to mention this. (Nehru, Discovery Of India, Classic Reprint, 2010, p.412)  When the news of Bose’s death reached Nehru, he was moved to tears, one of the very few occasions when he cried in public. He even donned the lawyer’s coat after 25 years to defend the INA prisoners alongside Bhulabhai Desai. Nehru contrasts Bose’s heroic resistance from Japan with the lethargic attitude of a few Congressmen. (Nehru, Discovery of India, Classic Reprint, 2010, p.521). Bose on his part named one of the battalions of his army after Nehru. They had their differences but those were probably very few and their mutual respect and admiration was tremendous. As Rudrangshu Mukherjee highlights, it is their friendship, the partnership they had, which has been overlooked by historians.

‘Patel and Bose did not see eye to eye’

There can hardly be any misconception as great as this, for which, often, historians have been responsible. Bose and Patel had their differences and often quite sharp ones but they greatly admired each other. When Patel had become the ‘Sardar Patel of India’ after the Kheda satyagraha, Bose referred to his achievement at Kheda as a “glorious victory.”(Rajmohan Gandhi, Patel: A Life, 1991, p.168). While Bose was closer to Nehru, when Nehru was made the president of Congress in 1929, Bose wrote in his Indian Pilgrim that the general feeling in Congress circles was that the honour should go to Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel. (p.169) The Karachi session, apart from vital interjection/inclusion of the section/chapter on fundamental rights, was notable for the unity displayed by Gandhi, Patel, Nehru and Bose. (Rajmohan Gandhi, 1991, p. 204)

Rajmohan Gandhi also narrates an incident which displays Patel’s curiosity to learn from Bose as well as a competitiveness between the two through Mahadev Desai’s diary. Mahadev Desai notes in his diary on May 29, 1932 that Patel asked him a question which he found interesting, even amazing. He asked who was Vivekananda?  Mahadev Desai thought that this thought might have risen because of Bose claiming Vivekananda his inspiration in an article in Leader. He suggested Romain Rolland’s books on Vivekanand and Ramkrishna Paramhans. While the latter part is correct, it appears to have transpired in June and not on May 29. Also, Mahadev Desai himself offers this suggestion to Patel and not on any particular query raised by Patel. If this fact, what was said is true, then Rajmohan Gandhi might have used a different version of Mahadev Desai’s diary –one which may be in physical existence —as against the one accessible on the Internet.

Vithalbhai Patel (Sardar’s brother) was in Austria where he met Bose. Vithalbhai’s health had been on a decline and in September 1933 it reached a position where he had to be attended by doctors most of the time, aound the clock. As his last but not insignificant political act, Vithalbhai Patel along with Subhash Chandra Bose signed a joint statement against Gandhi’s passive resistance stating that he had failed as a leader and India now needed new methods for its independence. (GI Patel, Vithalbhai Patel: Life And Times, Volume 2, 1950, pp.1217-1218) Vallabhbhai Patel was in prison at this time but he was deeply attached to his brother despite a few bitter memories which marred Vithalbhai’s move to Europe. Vallabhai rote multiple letters to Vithalbhai. It was probably the close monitoring (surveillance) by the the British that ensured these letters never reached Vithalbhai who thought that his brother had probably neglected him. (GI Patel, Vithalbhai Patel: Life And Times, Volume 2, 1950, p.1226) Bose who had this remarkable gift of nursing and doting on the ill, looked after him extremely well. Gandhi remarked on this aspect; observing that Bose had outdone himself in his care of Vithalbhai.

Vithalbhai made his Will at the Clinique de Linegeure, Gland in which he wrote that three fourth of his estates were to be used by Subhash for India’s political upliftment and publicity work on behalf of India’s freedom struggle. He appointed Dr. P.T. Patel and G.I. Patel as executors of the Will.(G.I. Patel, Vithalbhai Patel: Life And Times, Volume 2, pp.1250-1251) GI Patel further mentions that though he asked Bose for the original Will several times, he could only muster a copy of the Will that he sent to GI Patel. GI Patel met Vallabhbhai in Nashik prison and showed him the Will. Vallabhbhai subjected the Will to cross examination enquiring why Vithalbhai’s signature was not attested by a medical person when he was in failing health. Since he would not have been able to dictate the Will in one go because of his illness, why was the original handwritten copy not produced? He was also suspicious as to why all three men who attested Vithalbhai’s signature were Bengalis and two of them merely students when eminent people like Bhulabhai Desai and others were present nearby.

Despite this fact we must keep in mind that Gordhanbhai Patel and not Vallabhbhai Patel moved the Bombay High Court in January 1939. Bhulabhai Desai, Chimnalal Setalvad and Motilal Setalvad represented GI Patel and others whereas PR Das (CR Das’s brother) and Manekshaw represented Bose. Justice B.J Wadia held that the reference in the Will to objects on which Subhash was to spend Vithalbhai’s money was vague and thus invalid. Vallabhbhai Patel announced that the money would go to Vithalbhai Memorial Trust. Subhash Chandra Bose appealed against the judgement but Justice Sir John Baumont and Justice Kania reaffirmed Justice Wadia’s ruling. (Rajmohan Gandhi, Patel:A Life, 1991, p.237)

Now studying the relation between the two, Rajmohan Gandhi tells us about the Haripura session of the Congress at which the relation between Patel and Bose seemed free of friction and consensus marked the session’s decisions (Patel: A Life, 1991, p.265). When Khare had accused Patel of malicious intent towards him in side-lining him, Bose had defended Patel in this episode. Similarly, when the Muslim League headed coalition government fell in Assam, Patel backed Subhash who said Congress should make a bid to power as against Azad and Prasad’s opinion on the matter.(Rajmohan Gandhi, Patel: A Life, 1991, p.277) When life was made difficult for Bose as president at the Tripuri session Sarat Bose (Subhash Chandra Bose’s brother) wrote to Gandhi that Patel had a hand in the mean, malicious and vindictive propaganda against Bose.( Patel: A Life, p.281) While Patel was apprehensive of Bose’s candidature for President at Haripura, at Tripuri, Patel and others were simply toeing the line of Gandhi.

When Subhash was leading the INA, Vallabhbhai claimed Subhash as a colleague and fellow-fighter and was willing to help the personnel and dependents of the INA. He also headed the Congress Committee set up to assist relatives of those in a members killed by the Allies. (Patel: A Life, p.348)

Thus, we find that despite all their differences Bose and Patel had immense respect for each other and assisted each other for the attainment of the goal of Indian independence.

‘Bose was closer to Hindu communalists’

This myth emanates from the fact that Bose had gone on a hunger strike in support of the Durga Puja celebration in Burmese jail. The entire episode is reproduced in Bose’s own book An Indian Pilgrim’s chapter 7, “In Burmese Prisons.” Bose wrote that “in October 1925, our national religious festival — the Durga Pujah …falling …, we applied to the Superintendent for permission and for funds to perform the ceremony. Since similar facilities were given to Christian prisoners in Indian prisons, the Superintendent gave us the necessary facilities, in anticipation of Government sanction.” (An Indian Pilgrim, pp.123-124) The Government, however, refrained from giving sanction and censured the Superintendent, Major Findlay, for acting on his own steam. Thereupon, Bose was forced to commence a hunger-strike in February 1926. Three days after the hunger-strike began, the Calcutta paper, Forward, published the news of the hunger-strike and also the ultimatum Bose had sent to the Government. Bose further wrote that, “about the same time Forward published extracts from the report of the Indian Jail Committee of 1919-21. Before this Committee a high official of the Prison Department, Lieutenant Colonel Mulvany, had given evidence to say that he had been forced by his superior officer, the Inspector-General of Prisons of Bengal, to withdraw the health reports he had sent of some state-prisoners in his jail and to send in false reports instead.”(An Indian Pilgrim, p.124) T.C. Goswami, a Swarajit member of the Legislature, moved an adjournment motion in the house over the hunger strike in Mandalay jail. This alongside the disclosures of the report and Lieutenant Colonel Mulvany’s evidence ensured that after 15 days of hunger strike Subhash Chandra Bose carried the day. This clearly shows, he was rooting for fundamental rights of freedom and appealing to reason as he gave the example of the cultural rights enjoyed by Christian prisoners.

Like Gandhi and Nehru, he too was a staunch believer of Hindu-Muslim unity and believed in the shared cultural heritage of India. His appeal for the demolition of the Holwell monument and celebration of July 3, 1940 as Sirajuddaula Day was not just a tactical move to gain Muslim League support but came from a deep conviction in Hindu -Muslim unity that he firmly believed in. He named one of the battalions of the INA after Maulana Azad. He accorded a place of honour to General Shahnawaz in the INA and adopted as the slogan of the army, Jai Hind, a secular slogan praised by Mahatma Gandhi himself. The man had no bigoted bone in his body.

Conclusion

Bose was a charismatic leader of the national movement who gave his all for the freedom of the nation. He might have had differences with people but was not an enemy with anyone. None of the leaders of the national movement acted with malicious intent against one another. They were all fellows in arms often with different views but with a common aim. These facts need to be reiterated frequently and often in the public domain so that myths regarding the national movement and the a-historicity of those myths can be countered.

(The authors are both PhD candidates at the department of history, Aligarh Muslim University-AMU)

Related:

Second killing of Bhagat Singh & Subhash Chandra Bose by the Hindutva Gang

India’s Post Truth Era in ICHR’s Book on Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose

PM Modi to attend Subhas Chandra Bose’s 125th birth anniversary celebrations in Kolkata

The post Debunking “Popular Myths” through a study of Bose appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Take Fatima Sheikh, India’s first Muslim woman teacher. Her life and work alongside Savitribai and Jyotirao Phule embody the very essence of solidarity and resistance. Together, they challenged Brahmanical patriarchy and caste exclusion, striving for an inclusive education system that empowered the most marginalised. Yet there is an ongoing attempt to erase Fatima Sheikh from mainstream history, her legacy buried under layers of casteist and communal erasure. Her erasure is not a mere oversight but a calculated act, one that seeks to deny the very existence of intersectional struggles against oppression.

This politics of erasure is not isolated; it is part of a broader project to sanitise history, neutralise dissent, and normalise inequalities. By excluding figures like Fatima Sheikh, Dalits, Muslims, Adivasis, women, and persons with disabilities are systematically pushed to the margins of public memory and denied their rightful place in the nation’s narrative.

Historical Revisionism: Sanitising the Past for Oppression

The deliberate erasure of figures like Fatima Sheikh reveals a pattern of historical revisionism designed to sustain existing hierarchies. History is manipulated to present reform movements as caste-neutral, male-driven, and Hindu-led, obscuring the intersectional struggles that shaped them. By erasing Fatima Sheikh, the radical solidarity between Dalits, Muslims, and women is invisibilised, and the convenient, dominant narrative of typical prototype reformers as saviours is reinforced.

B.R. Ambedkar, for instance, is sanitised into a token figure, hailed as the architect of the Constitution but stripped of his scathing critique of caste and his revolutionary vision for an egalitarian society. His advocacy for reservations, a lifeline for educational equity, is sidelined even as these policies are viciously attacked today. Ambedkar’s fiery critique of Hinduism’s role in upholding caste oppression is deliberately erased from school curricula and public discourse, making it easier to appropriate him while gutting his radical ideas.

Similarly, the contributions of Muslim freedom fighters like Ashfaqulla Khan and Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan are systematically downplayed to sustain communal stereotypes. Women like Jhalkaribai, the Dalit warrior who fought alongside Rani Lakshmibai, and Begum Rokeya, a Muslim reformer who championed women’s education, are excluded to uphold patriarchal and casteist narratives. Even Adivasi leaders like Birsa Munda, who fought against colonial exploitation and for Adivasi rights, are reduced to hollow symbols, their histories carefully erased to sustain their marginalisation.

But the silence is uneasy most of all when it comes to disabled individuals. Their absence from historical narratives is not just glaring but insidious. It reflects the deeply entrenched ableism in Indian society, which sees disability not as a social issue but as a private affliction to be ignored. This erasure denies disabled people even the most token representation, ensuring they remain outside the frameworks of education, policy, and society itself.

The Violent Silence of Ableism

The absence of discourse on disability in historical narratives is perhaps the most violent form of erasure. It is not just a denial of disabled lives but a refusal to even acknowledge their struggles and contributions. Ableist attitudes perpetuate the idea that disabled people are incapable of agency or participation in society, reinforcing their marginalisation.

Statements like “the deaf and blind do not go to school with others” go unchallenged, as though their exclusion is natural. This systematic exclusion reinforces invisibility of disabled, creating a narrative of othering and leaving a place only at the bottom of the social hierarchy, with no place in history and no claim to justice.

Ableism is a tool of domination, one that intersects with caste, gender, and religion to maintain systems of oppression. By refusing to document the lives and struggles of disabled people, society ensures an easy othering where disabled are invisible, unaccounted for, and unrepresented. This silence is not benign, it is violent.

Education: A Weapon of Exclusion

The erasure of marginalised voices from history is deeply tied to the politics of education. Education is not merely a tool for liberation; it has also been weaponised to exclude. By controlling whose stories are taught, dominant groups perpetuate the myth that Dalits, Muslims, Adivasis, women, and disabled people are undeserving of knowledge, power, or leadership.

This exclusion is evident in the privatisation of education, which transforms a fundamental right into an elitist privilege. Marginalised communities, already struggling under systemic oppression, are locked out of educational spaces, ensuring a continued cycle of poverty and exclusion. Reservation policies, which aim to provide equitable access, are constantly undermined. Their necessity is questioned as the struggles that birthed them are erased from public memory.

For disabled people, the exclusion is even starker. Accessible education systems and infrastructure are virtually non-existent, leaving them reliant on charity rather than rights-based systems. The very idea of education for the disabled is treated as an afterthought, ensuring they remain on the margins, locked out of opportunities for participation in society.

Reclaiming Radical Histories

To resist the politics of erasure, we must reclaim the radical histories of marginalised communities. Fatima Sheikh’s story must be restored not simply as a tribute to her legacy but as a weapon against the narratives that erase the struggles of Dalits, Muslims, Adivasis, women, and disabled people. The histories of Ambedkar, Jhalkaribai, Ashfaqulla Khan, Birsa Munda, and countless others must be told in their entirety, with their radical critiques and intersectional struggles at the forefront.

The absence of disability discourse must also be addressed. Disabled people’s lives and struggles must be documented, acknowledged, and integrated into mainstream narratives. This requires dismantling ableist attitudes and creating systems that recognise disability as a social and political issue, and not a personal battle.

The Politics of Memory and Justice

The politics of historical erasure is not just about the past, it is about controlling the present and foreclosing the future. By denying Fatima Sheikh and others like her their rightful place in history, the ruling elite seeks to sustain a system of exclusion that privileges dominant castes, religions, and abilities.

Fatima Sheikh’s legacy reminds us that education is not a privilege for the few but a right for all. Her work challenges the casteist, communal, patriarchal, and ableist narratives that underpin Indian society, offering a vision of education as a tool for liberation and solidarity. To honour her is to fight against the forces that erase her.

The fight against historical erasure is, ultimately, a fight for justice. It is a fight to ensure that history reflects the struggles and contributions of all communities, and that education becomes a tool to dismantle hierarchies rather than perpetuate them. This fight demands that we challenge the dominant narratives, expose their silences, and reclaim the radical potential of memory to inspire resistance and solidarity. Let us carry forward this fight, with the legacy of all those erased from history as our guide; while it remains important to ask ‘who benefits from these erasures?’

Shirin Akhter is Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Zakir Husain Delhi College, University of Delhi. Sharamisthaa Atreja is Assistant Professor at the Department of Philosophy, University of Delhi. The views are personal.

Courtesy: Newsclick

The post Fatima Sheikh: Politics of Historical Erasure, Exclusion appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The Mubarak Manzil in Agra, a historic monument of the Mughal-era, has been largely destroyed even after directions by the State Archaeological Department for its protection. Built during the reign of Mughal emperor Aurangzeb, Mubarak Manzil held a significant historical value. Important Mughal figures such as Shah Jahan, Aurangzeb and Shuja resided in the structure, as per an article by The Observer Post. The original structure was later transformed into a customs house and salt office under British rule and was known as Tara Niwas by the year 1902. Aurangzeb commissioned the construction of Mubarak Manzil post his victory at the battle of Samugarh.

A builder allegedly in collusion with the local authorities carried out the demolition recently. There was no action taken by the authorities even after several complaints had been filed by the locals of the area. More than 70% of the structure has been demolished.

Through a tweet, on X, the Scottish Historian William Dalrymple has heavily criticised the demolition of Mubarak Manzil in Agra. He expressed how India, a culturally rich and vast country is destroying its own appeal as a tourist destination as per reports by Deccan Herald and Times of India.

This recent demolition of the Mubarak Manzil points to a much larger issue, the desperate attempts of charged religious-nationalist politics to disconnect Indian Muslims from India’s past, and thereby denying them a legitimate place in India’s future. In order to have a “Hindu Rashtra (nation), Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his supporters whose ideological parent is the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), are not only attempting to establish Hindu dominance in the present, but also systematically rewriting the history of India. As per an interview by The Guardian Professor Imtiaz Ahmed, of Delhi’s Jawaharlal Nehru University said “By destroying the symbols of a community you destroy the community itself.” 

By labelling Muslims as foreign invaders who destroyed a thriving Hindu civilization, all Mughal-era constructions have been designated as sites of desecration and have attracted unwarranted conflicts due to extremist Hindu Propaganda. History and archaeology have become the battlegrounds of the RSS to form and shape a nation of a monolithic Hindu identity.

It is imperative to understand here that the architecture that has been built by Muslim monarchs in India, is our collective South-Asian heritage. The Sultanate or Mughal architecture is not found anywhere in the world but on the Indian subcontinent as per Hindustan Times. However, this rich cultural heritage has been caught in the middle of a conflict where a political party is seeking the supremacy of one identity by systematic erasure of the other by display of violence and destruction.

The deliberate destruction of Muslim past is not limited merely to cultural heritage sites. In 2023, more than 300 Muslim homes were destroyed in the city of Nuh, Haryana. The century-old Azizia Madrasa in Bihar was burned down along with 4500 rare books in its library, by an angry mob chanting “Jai Shree Ram” in the year 2023. As per a report published by The Guardian, more than 230 unique Islamic sites were destroyed in Gujarat alone during the 2002 riots, which is similar to destruction of Afghanistan’s Bamiyan Buddhas and the destruction of Tibetan Monasteries by the Red Guard. Further, the names of places connected to Islamic past are being changed. For instance, Allahabad was renamed as Prayagraj in the year 2018 as an attempt to detach it from its Muslim origins. The railway station Deen Dayal Upadhyay junction was previously known as Mughal Sarai. Feroz Shah Kotla stadium in Delhi was renamed as Arun Jaitley Stadium in the year 2019. In an article by Maktoobmedia, it has been mentioned that certain Hindu nationalists have claimed that Qutub Minar was previously a “Vishnu Pillar”. Even the Taj Mahal has not been spared and there have been demands to rename it as “Tejo Mahalaya” and it be declared as a Shiva Temple.

Another point at issue is how Aurangzeb Alamgir, India’s most targeted and controversial Muslim ruler has been brought back to life by the country’s far right regime and organisations associated with the same majoritarian ideology, as a “savage oppressor”, from whose taint, India needs to be purified. Aurangzeb is central to the quest of rectifying the past of Hindus in India and to right the perceived wrongs. It has been claimed by Richard Eaton, professor at the University of Arizona, who is also known for being an authority on pre-modern India, that the temples destroyed by Aurangzeb were slightly more than a dozen as opposed to the claim that thousands of temples were destroyed by him, and the same was done for political reasons and not entirely religious as per an article of AP News. (Also refer to the original work, Temple Destruction and Muslim States in Medieval India. However, Aurangzeb has been weaponized to promote extremist right wing cultural propaganda.

Hindu nationalists have attempted to erase Aurangzeb’s presence from the public sphere. After protests from BJP leaders, New Delhi’s Aurangzeb Road was renamed in the year 2015. Following that, school textbooks in certain state governments were rewritten to deemphasize Aurangzeb. In May, 2022, the mayor of Northern Agra city went on to describe Aurangzeb as a “terrorist” and said that his traces should be erased from all public places as per AP News. The Mubarak Manzil, which was constructed by Aurangzeb, can be said to have been destroyed as a result of this historical revisionism and active efforts to erase all traces of Aurangzeb from Indian history.

A parallel can be drawn between India and Israel here. India is very closely following the steps taken by Israel to systematically erase the Palestinian culture, legacy and history from the landscape. India seems to be taking inspiration by how more than 530 Palestinian villages have been destroyed in Israel after the Nakba of 1948 as per an article by Aljazeera. The Ben Gurion Airport in Israel has been built on the remains of the ground from where Palestinian communities were forced out of their homes, just as on the debris of the historic Babri Masjid mosque, a new temple of Hindu god Ram has been raised.

India takes more inspiration from Israel by removing chapters of Islamic history from school textbooks much like the way there is no mention of Palestinian or even acknowledgment of their existence as a separate community in Israeli museums.

Gregory Stanton, the President of the Genocide Watch, who had predicted the Rawandan Genocide in 1989, has warned that India is following a similar path as per Aljazeera.

Taking into perspective the current state of communal disparity in India, a question is raised, that by these violent acts of destroying and burning libraries, demolishing mosques and cultural heritage sites, forgetting old city names, what part of our identity as India are we losing and what monolithic nation are we building?

Related:

How India’s Hindu Nationalists Are Weaponizing History Against Muslims

How India’s demolition drive is alienating its Muslim population

Politics of ruin: Why Modi wants to demolish India’s mosques

India’s Mosques Are Under Siege. The Destruction of the Babri Masjid Explains Why

The post The targeted vandalisation caused by revisionist history: Agra’s Mubarak Manzil appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Vivekananda also emphasised that the message of Jesus of Nazareth was meant for all of humanity, showing us the path of truth. As he put it, “In him is embodied all that is the best and greatest in his own race, the meaning, the life, for which that race has struggled for ages; and he himself is the impetus for the future, not only to his own race but to unnumbered other races of the world.”

While Swamiji was deeply respectful of Jesus Christ and acknowledged that His message was universal, he did not fully engage with the core aspects of Jesus’ teachings, particularly His focus on addressing the profound inequalities of the material world and His sacrifice for the downtrodden.

Rather than confronting these real-world issues, Swamiji sought to place Christ in the framework of a “Great Soul,” interpreting His life and teachings through the lens of his own Vedantic philosophy. In simpler terms, Swamiji seemed to suggest that the message of Jesus was essentially an articulation of the non-dualist Vedantic thought that he himself espoused.

Although Swamiji praised Jesus extensively in his lecture, a significant part of his effort was spent creating an artificial binary between the East and the West. Influenced by Orientalist writings, Vivekananda appeared to present an East-versus-West dichotomy to a Western audience in the early twentieth century. During this time, rapid industrialization had unsettled many Europeans, prompting some to seek solace in the “spiritual” East. The Western fascination with Swamiji’s words should be understood within this historical context.

In his lecture, Vivekananda strongly argued that Jesus belonged to the Eastern world (Asia). He went even further, boldly claiming that all great souls and incarnations originated in the Orient. As he stated, “No wonder, the oriental mind looks with contempt upon the things of this world and naturally wants to see something that changeth not, something which dieth not, something which in the midst of this world of misery and death is eternal, blissful, undying. An oriental Prophet never tires of insisting upon these ideals; and, as for Prophets, you may also remember that without one exception, all the Messengers were Orientals.”

However, Vivekananda failed to recognise that human races, religions, and spiritual practices are not confined to a specific region. People live beyond the Oriental world, practicing a wide range of faiths and relating to God in diverse ways. Even the concept of God is not central to some religions. Some faiths possess sacred texts while others have no history of revealed scriptures. These complex sociological and theological practices were overlooked by Vivekananda in his effort to create a sharp distinction between the Oriental and Occidental worlds.

Vivekananda extended this argument further, making the unsubstantiated claim that European society is primarily “political,” while the Eastern world is “religious.” According to him, “‌The voice of Asia has been the voice of religion. The voice of Europe is the voice of politics.” To support this view, he asserted that “the voice of Europe is the voice of ancient Greece.” He also suggested that because the ancient Greek civilization was primarily focused on the material world, its profound influence on Europe led the continent away from religion.

As he explained, “The Greek lives entirely in this world. He does not care to dream. Even his poetry is practical. His gods and goddesses are not only human beings, but intensely human, with all human passions and feelings almost the same as with any of us. He loves what is beautiful, but, mind you, it is always external nature; the beauty of the hills, of the snows, of the flowers, the beauty of forms and of figures, the beauty in the human face, and, more often, in the human form—that is what the Greeks liked. And the Greeks being the teachers of all subsequent Europeanism, the voice of Europe is Greek.”

Vivekananda largely overlooked that an influential segment of the Western world had claimed the Greek tradition as part of its own cultural heritage. However, the image of Greece has shifted throughout history; some scholars argue that Greece was once viewed as a part of African civilization. Moreover, the dominant discourse in post-Enlightenment Western civilization has often failed to acknowledge adequately the influence of Islam and other non-Western traditions on the rise of Europe.

It appears that Swami Vivekananda spoke within the framework of the dominant European narrative, which positioned Greek culture as the foundational heritage of post-Enlightenment European civilization. However, he gave this argument an intriguing twist by attributing Europe’s secular outlook to the ancient Greeks, claiming this to be the primary cause of Europe’s distance from religion.

The binary opposition that Swamiji established between the religious East and the materialistic/secular West profoundly influenced India’s nationalist movements and post-independence politics. Decades later, when Rabindranath Tagore delivered his lectures on nationalism, he appeared to draw on a similar logic, explaining societal phenomena through binary oppositions. In his lectures, Tagore framed a dichotomy between the social and the political, famously stating, “Our real problem in India is not political. It is social.”

While Swamiji rejected both Greek and European modes of thought, he crafted his own version of religion, which he saw as complementary to the teachings of Jesus. For Vivekananda, religion was crucial in Asia, uniting people despite their differences. Although the unifying role of religion cannot be denied, Swamiji’s lecture overlooked that this so-called religious solidarity is often fractured along caste, class, and gender lines. In other words, divisions by caste, class, and gender are frequently obscured by ruling elites who use religion as a tool to artificially forge unity.

Claiming that people in Asia are inherently religious, Swamiji argued that, unlike the Greeks, Asians are not confined to the material world but instead seek to transcend it, looking for something immutable and indestructible. Drawing on Vedantic philosophy, he suggested that religious individuals in the East go beyond the empirical world in search of “the changeless.”

In his depiction of the religious individual, Vivekananda presented a figure who disregards the material world, focusing instead on what is eternal and imperishable. In contrast, materialist and Buddhist philosophies critique this denial of the material world, emphasizing the dynamic nature of existence. Interestingly, even Jesus Christ—who fought for the rights of the poor and challenged social injustices—is appropriated within the broader Vedantic framework.

In my reading of Vedantic philosophy, I find that it contains some elements of equality, particularly in its belief that God resides within all beings. Since it claims that every individual embodies God, Vedanta has the potential to broaden the social foundation of Hinduism.

Vivekananda expanded on this concept in his lecture, emphasizing that God resides within the soul of every person. This aligns with the message that all are children of God. He expressed it as follows: “As man advanced spiritually, he began to feel that God was omnipresent, that He must be in him, that He must be everywhere, that He was not a distant God, but clearly the Soul of all souls. As my soul moves my body, even so is God the mover of my soul. Soul within soul. And a few individuals who had developed enough and were pure enough, went still further, and at last found God.”

However, the limitation of this perspective is its failure to address social inequality. If all are embodiments of God, then how do we define the oppressed and the oppressors? In other words, Vivekananda’s religious theory acknowledges the existence of sorrow but does not consider the causes of sorrow in the world. To escape from sorrow, Vedantic philosophy suggests transcending the material world. Yet, the philosophers of oppressed communities urge people not only to examine the roots of inequality but also to actively work toward eliminating them. The life of Jesus, as the Messiah of the downtrodden, offers numerous examples of the fight for an egalitarian world—an aspect that Vivekananda overlooked in his Los Angeles lecture.

[The author holds a PhD in Modern History from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. His research focuses on minority rights and social justice. Email: debatingissues@gmail.com]

Related:

Vivekananda: Monk who highlighted Humanism of Hinduism

Redefining Indian Tradition Minus Christianity & Islam is Intellectual Dishonesty

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