The paper proceeds in four major movements. First, it situates Baghdadi biographically, tracing his formation from an obscure religious student in Baghdad through his radicalisation at Camp Bucca and his eventual ascension to the leadership of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Second, it dissects the theological architecture of his ideology, identifying six primary pillars: the absolutism of divine sovereignty (hakimiyyah), the weaponisation of excommunication (takfir), the hegemonic caliphate claim, apocalyptic eschatology, ultra-literalist hermeneutics, and sectarian hatred. Third, it traces the intellectual genealogy of these doctrines from Sayyid Qutb and the Muslim Brotherhood through Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to Baghdadi’s own synthesis. Fourth, it proposes a comprehensive Islamic humanist response grounded in the higher objectives of Islamic law (maqasid al-sharia), the primacy of reason (aql), contextual Quranic hermeneutics, and the recovery of pluralist and humanitarian traditions within the faith.

The Crisis of Authority

When Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al-Badri mounted the pulpit of the Great Mosque of al-Nuri in Mosul on the last Friday of June 2014 and announced that he was henceforth to be known as Caliph Ibrahim — Commander of the Faithful — the act registered across the Muslim world as something more disturbing than mere political theatre. It was, in the first instance, a breath-taking claim of religious authority, one that had not been formally asserted since the abolition of the Ottoman caliphate in 1924. Yet it was also, and more fundamentally, a theological provocation of the gravest kind: the assertion that God’s sovereignty on earth could be concentrated in the person of one man, backed by a private army, and enforced through mass violence, slavery, and public execution.

Baghdadi was not, as some early commentary suggested, a simple warlord who had stumbled into religious rhetoric. He was, at heart, a theologian — one who had earned a doctorate in Islamic studies from the Islamic University of Baghdad and who understood, with considerable precision, the power of religious language to mobilise, to legitimise, and to sanction violence. His message was internally consistent: divine law demanded obedience, the existing Muslim world had apostatised by submitting to human-made governance, and the sword was the only instrument adequate to the scale of that apostasy. In this reading, cruelty was not a deviation from his theology — it was the very expression of it.

To defeat the ideology that Baghdadi represented — and that continues to inspire violence across the world even after his death in a United States Special Forces raid in October 2019 — it is necessary to understand it from the inside. This demands something more rigorous than a catalogue of atrocities or a chronology of military defeats. It demands a sustained theological engagement: an examination of the doctrinal claims upon which the Islamic State’s authority rested, a tracing of their intellectual genealogy, and a systematic refutation grounded in the very tradition that Baghdadi claimed to represent.

That refutation is the business of this paper. It proceeds from a foundational conviction of Islamic humanism: that the Quranic tradition, rightly understood through its historical contexts, its ethical objectives, and its overarching commitment to mercy and justice, is not merely consistent with the dignity and freedom of every human being but actively demands it. The Quran’s insistence that God sent the Prophet Muhammad as a mercy to all the worlds — and not as a commissioning agent for a caliphate of terror — is the ultimate theological rebuttal to everything Baghdadi built.

Historical Background: The Making of a Caliph

Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al-Badri (Baghdadi’s real name) was born in 1971 in the town of Samarra, north of Baghdad, into a family that claimed descent from the tribe of Quraysh — the tribe of the Prophet Muhammad. That genealogical claim, contested by many scholars who found no independent verification of it, would later become central to his bid for caliphal legitimacy. His early religious formation took place within the Sunni Muslim communities of central Iraq, and he proceeded to the Islamic University of Baghdad, where he eventually completed a doctorate in Quranic studies with a concentration in jurisprudence and Islamic history. This academic background was unusual among jihadist leaders and afforded him a scholarly credibility that figures such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi had conspicuously lacked.

His radicalisation appears to have accelerated dramatically in the years following the United States-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. The dismantling of the Iraqi state, the de-Baathification of the army and civil service, and the emergence of virulent sectarianism between Sunni and Shia communities created conditions of extreme political and social dislocation that extremist ideologies were uniquely well positioned to exploit. Al-Badri was detained by American forces in early 2004 and held at Camp Bucca, a detention facility in southern Iraq that has been described by former inmates and intelligence analysts alike as an unwitting incubator for the very extremism the United States sought to suppress. Thousands of jihadist militants, former Baathist officers, and would-be ideologues were held together in conditions that facilitated networking, indoctrination, and the forging of alliances that would later prove decisive in the formation of the Islamic State.

Released in mid-2004, al-Badri — now increasingly operating under the alias Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi — rose through the ranks of the organisation that would eventually become the Islamic State of Iraq. He served as a sharia adjudicator and propagandist, ensuring that the group’s activities were clothed in religious legitimacy. Following the deaths of senior leaders in a United States raid in 2010, Baghdadi was elevated to the leadership of the Islamic State of Iraq. He proved a more capable administrator, strategist, and propagandist than his predecessors. He exploited the civil war in Syria — which erupted in 2011 — to expand his organisation’s reach, dispatching fighters across the border and eventually attempting to absorb the rival jihadist group Jabhat al-Nusra under his authority. This manoeuvre brought him into direct conflict with the central leadership of al-Qaeda, which disowned the Islamic State in February 2014.

The capture of Mosul — Iraq’s second city — in June 2014 provided the dramatic platform for Baghdadi’s caliphal declaration. The subsequent months represented the high-water mark of his movement: at its territorial zenith the Islamic State controlled an area roughly the size of the United Kingdom, spanning parts of Iraq and Syria, governed by Diwans (ministries), sharia courts, a tax system, and an oil revenue stream. It attracted foreign fighters from dozens of countries and produced multilingual propaganda of considerable sophistication. The physical caliphate was progressively dismantled by military campaigns between 2014 and 2019; Baghdadi himself died on 26 October 2019 during a Special Operations Forces raid in Idlib Province, Syria. His death, however, did not extinguish the ideological project he had embodied.

The Theological Pillars of Baghdadi’s Project

Baghdadi’s ideology was not improvised from raw ambition. It was constructed with theological deliberateness upon six interlocking doctrinal pillars. Understanding each pillar in detail is essential not merely for analytical purposes but for the practical work of refutation: an ideology can only be effectively dismantled where it stands, and it stands on specific claims.

The concept of hakimiyyah — the absolute sovereignty of God — was the ideological keystone of Baghdadi’s entire project. He did not originate the concept; he inherited it, primarily from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood theorist Sayyid Qutb, whose prison writings of the late 1950s and early 1960s had transformed it from a theological observation into a revolutionary programme. In Qutb’s formulation, the recognition that God alone possesses the right to legislate entails a corresponding rejection of all human-made legal systems as acts of idolatry — specifically the unforgivable sin of associating partners with God (shirk).

Baghdadi absorbed this framework entirely. In his speeches and in the extensive propaganda apparatus of the Islamic State — including the English-language magazine Dabiq and its Arabic counterpart Rumiyah — the contrast between divine law and the corrupt governance of existing Muslim states was presented as absolute, binary, and requiring violent resolution. Any Muslim who voted in an election, accepted employment in a secular state bureaucracy, served in a national army, or carried a state-issued passport was, in this reading, guilty of participating in a system of collective apostasy. This radical extension of hakimiyyah provided the theological foundation for what proved to be the Islamic State’s most audacious and destructive innovation: the systematic murder of fellow Sunni Muslims — imams, teachers, civil servants, police officers — on the grounds that they were apostates from the true faith.

The Islamic humanist response to hakimiyyah does not deny the sovereignty of God but challenges the inference that Baghdadi drew from it. The Quran’s own political ethics are far more complex, contextual, and attentive to human welfare than the hakimiyyah doctrine allows. Governance in the Quranic tradition is grounded in consultation (shura), justice (adl), and the protection of those under authority — values that are inconsistent with the dictatorship Baghdadi exercised.

From the absolute sovereignty of God flowed Baghdadi’s second and most lethal pillar: the industrialisation of takfir, the practice of declaring a Muslim to be an apostate and therefore — in the most extreme reading of Islamic law — a legitimate target for violence. Excommunication has a long and contested history within Islamic theology. Classical jurisprudence treated it as a grave legal matter, surrounded by procedural safeguards, requiring extraordinary certainty of proof, and generally avoided precisely because of the civil strife (fitna) it inevitably generated. The Prophet himself is reported to have warned his followers in the gravest terms against recklessly accusing their brothers and sisters in faith of unbelief.

Baghdadi’s organisation swept aside these safeguards with systematic ruthlessness. It did not merely declare Yazidis or Shia Muslims to be unbelievers — a horrifying enough stance that provided the theological licence for the Yazidi genocide and the massacre of Shia civilians — it extended takfir to any Sunni Muslim who refused to pledge allegiance to the caliphate, who participated in the political processes of existing states, or who belonged to rival jihadist organisations. The Open Letter to al-Baghdadi, signed by more than 120 leading Muslim scholars from around the world in September 2014, addressed this doctrine directly and at length, citing the Prophetic injunction that any person who declares the shahada — the testimony of faith — cannot be killed except for specific, legally determined violations. The letter emphasised that mainstream Sunni jurisprudence imposed such demanding conditions on excommunication that it could not legitimately be used to justify mass violence of the kind the Islamic State was perpetrating.

Takfirism, in the Islamic humanist analysis, is not merely a legal error; it is a theological inversion. It transforms the humility before God that authentic faith demands into a presumptuous claim to divine judgment, placing finite human beings in the seat of infinite divine authority. The Quran reserves final judgment on matters of faith and apostasy to God alone, and the tradition of Islamic scholarship has, with near unanimity, insisted that this reservation be respected.

The third pillar of Baghdadi’s theology was his claim to the caliphate itself. In classical Sunni political thought, the caliphate was the office of the Prophet’s successor as guardian of the Muslim community — an office with stringent requirements of scholarly learning, moral character, lineage, and, critically, communal consensus (ijma). Baghdadi claimed all of these, and upon his 2014 declaration in Mosul, demanded that every Muslim in the world pledge allegiance to him, on pain of spiritual — and ultimately physical — consequences.

The claim rested on two foundations, each deeply contested. First, Baghdadi asserted genealogical descent from the Quraysh, the Prophet’s tribe — a traditional caliphal requirement. His family did indeed make such a claim, but no independent scholarly verification was offered, and many scholars dismissed it as opportunistic fabrication designed to satisfy a formal requirement without substantive merit. Second, he pointed to the territorial control exercised by the Islamic State as practical evidence that a functional Islamic state — with courts, taxation, and defence — had been established, meeting the material conditions for a valid caliphate.

Both claims were systematically demolished by Muslim scholars. The Open Letter pointed out that a caliphate requires the consensus of the global Muslim community expressed through its recognised scholarly leadership — a consensus that was conspicuously absent from Baghdadi’s unilateral self-appointment. Historical precedent was equally unhelpful to Baghdadi: The Rashidun caliphs were selected through deliberation among the Prophet’s closest companions, not through military conquest and self-proclamation. The very concept of a caliphate that demanded global submission under threat of death contradicted the historical reality of the classical caliphate, which had always been characterised by a degree of political pluralism and which had never claimed theological authority over individual conscience.

The fourth pillar of Baghdadi’s theology was its apocalyptic character, and it is in some respects the most psychologically powerful and analytically interesting of the six. Unlike al-Qaeda, which concentrated its justifications for violence on political grievances against Western imperialism and apostate regimes, the Islamic State was animated by a conviction that it was not merely fighting a political war but fulfilling divine prophecy regarding the end of time. Specific hadith traditions regarding a final battle between the forces of true Islam and the forces of unbelief — located in the Syrian town of Dabiq — were not merely cited but made constitutive of the movement’s identity. The choice of Dabiq as the title of the English-language propaganda magazine was calculated and deliberate.

This eschatological framing was extraordinarily powerful as a recruitment tool precisely because it removed the ideology from the realm of rational deliberation. If one’s violence is understood not as a political act subject to human evaluation but as a divinely scripted role in the final drama of history, then conventional arguments — about proportionality, civilian casualties, or legal constraints — become irrelevant by definition. Setbacks and defeats could be reframed as preludes to prophesied martyrdom and ultimate divine vindication. The more the world opposed the Islamic State, the more its followers could perceive themselves as inhabiting the role of the persecuted righteous awaiting cosmic vindication.

The Islamic humanist response to apocalyptic theology is not to deny the eschatological dimension of Islamic faith but to insist, with the weight of classical scholarship, that the relationship between sacred history and human action is characterised by responsibility, restraint, and mercy — not by the nihilistic acceleration of violence in the hope of triggering divine intervention. The classical Islamic tradition approached apocalyptic hadith with considerable interpretive caution, recognising their metaphorical and contextual dimensions.

The fifth pillar of Baghdadi’s project was its hermeneutical method: a rigid literalism that insisted on reading Quranic verses and hadith in isolation from their historical contexts, their ethical objectives, the diversity of jurisprudential opinion within the tradition, and the fundamental principle that the Quran must be understood holistically rather than through selective extraction. This method — characterised by critics as the cut-and-paste approach to scripture — allowed Baghdadi’s organisation to cite individual verses in support of practices that the weight of Islamic scholarship had consistently regarded as forbidden or impermissible.

The most egregious example was the treatment of the so-called Verse of the Sword (9:5), which commands fighting against polytheists who have broken their treaties. Baghdadi’s ideologues cited this verse as a universal, permanent mandate for offensive warfare against all non-Muslims and all Muslims who refused submission. They insisted that it abrogated the hundreds of verses commanding peace, mercy, forgiveness, and equitable treatment of non-Muslims. Classical Islamic scholarship, by contrast, had consistently read this verse in its specific historical context — the breaking of treaties by the Meccan polytheists — and had explicitly rejected the claim that it constituted a universal licence for aggression. The Quranic injunction in verse 2:190 — to fight those who fight you but not to transgress — had never been abrogated in mainstream scholarship; it expressed a foundational ethical constraint on the conduct of armed conflict.

Beyond this specific misreading, Baghdadi’s theology required the erasure of fourteen centuries of Islamic intellectual history. The sophisticated legal reasoning of the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence, the philosophical contributions of figures such as al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, and Ibn Rushd, the spiritual depth of Sufi thought, the hermeneutical richness of classical tafsir — all of this was dismissed as innovation (bidah) and deviation from the pristine original. What remained was a radically impoverished version of the faith: hollowed of its cultural and intellectual complexity, stripped of its ethical nuance, and weaponised for the purposes of domination and violence.

The sixth and final pillar of Baghdadi’s theology was its profound sectarianism. The Shia Muslim community was portrayed not as a divergent school within the broad family of Islam but as a category of existential enemy deserving extermination. Sufi shrines were demolished. Yazidi communities were subjected to genocidal violence. Christian communities, which had maintained a continuous presence in Iraq and Syria for nearly two thousand years, were expelled or murdered. This sectarianism drew heavily from the most extreme strands of Wahhabi polemics against alternative Islamic traditions, intensified by Zarqawi’s particular fury against Shia Muslims and translated into a systematic programme of ethnic and religious cleansing.

The Quranic basis for this sectarianism was, to put it charitably, threadbare. The Quran repeatedly affirms the diversity of human communities as a divine creation to be respected (49:13) and commands justice even toward those with whom one is in conflict (5:8). The Prophet Muhammad’s own practice — including the Covenant of Medina, which guaranteed the rights of Jewish, Christian, and pagan communities alongside Muslims — provided a direct historical rebuttal to the Islamic State’s model of religious uniformity enforced by violence.

Intellectual Genealogy: From Qutb to the Caliphate

Baghdadi did not construct his theology in isolation. He was the heir to a specific intellectual tradition that had been developing within Sunni Islamism for most of the twentieth century, and his own particular synthesis represented the culmination of a trajectory that can be traced with reasonable precision.

The foundational figure in that trajectory is Sayyid Qutb, the Egyptian literary critic and Muslim Brotherhood theorist who was executed by the Nasser government in 1966. Qutb’s most influential work, Milestones, written during his imprisonment in the late 1950s, advanced a revolutionary reading of the concept of hakimiyyah that broke decisively with the gradualist, social-reform orientation of the Brotherhood’s founder, Hassan al-Banna. Qutb argued that modern Muslim societies — including ostensibly Muslim states such as Egypt — had fallen into a state of pre-Islamic ignorance so profound that only a vanguard of true believers, physically and spiritually separated from the corrupt society, could wage the violent jihad necessary to overthrow the existing order and establish God’s sovereignty. It is difficult to overstate the influence of this text on subsequent generations of jihadist ideologues; Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Baghdadi himself all drew directly from Qutb’s conceptual vocabulary.

The immediate intellectual channel through which Qutb’s ideas reached Baghdadi’s generation was the Jordanian-Palestinian scholar Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, whose extensive writings from prison elaborated a rigorous Salafi creed that combined Wahhabi purism with the revolutionary political conclusions of Qutbism. Al-Maqdisi’s most important contribution was his systematic application of the charge of apostasy to Muslim rulers who governed by human-made law — an application that radicalised the takfir doctrine beyond even Qutb’s formulation. Al-Maqdisi became the mentor of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian militant who founded the organisation in Iraq that would eventually evolve into the Islamic State. Zarqawi added to this inheritance a particular ferocity toward Shia Muslims, whom he regarded not merely as theologically deviant but as agents of a cosmic conspiracy against Sunni Islam.

Baghdadi, rising through the ranks of Zarqawi’s successor organisation following his mentor’s death in a United States airstrike in 2006, inherited this entire theological toolkit. He was, however, more systematically educated than his predecessors, and he gave a more scholarly, jurisprudential veneer to the same core doctrines. Where Zarqawi had been a violent street-level operative who acquired his theology opportunistically, Baghdadi was a trained religious scholar who could deploy the classical categories of Islamic jurisprudence with the facility of someone who had spent years immersed in the tradition. This credential was essential to the Islamic State’s claim to be not merely a jihadist organisation but the legitimate restoration of the caliphate.

The wider Wahhabi tradition also contributed, more ambiguously, to this intellectual inheritance. The teachings of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792) — emphasising strict monotheism, the prohibition of innovation in religious practice, and the legitimacy of violence against those declared polytheists — provided an ideological arsenal that Baghdadi’s organisation drew upon selectively. Saudi-funded institutions, mosques, and madrasas had disseminated this tradition across the Muslim world since the 1970s oil boom, creating a doctrinal environment in which Baghdadi’s particular syntheses could find receptive audiences. The Saudi religious establishment itself condemned the Islamic State as a deviant movement, and mainstream Salafi scholars characterised it as a modern manifestation of the ancient Kharijite heresy — a sect that had been condemned by the Prophet’s own companions for its extremism. But this condemnation sat awkwardly alongside the structural role that Wahhabi educational institutions had played in creating the conditions for Baghdadi’s rise.

The intellectual genealogy is therefore clear in its broad outlines: The Muslim Brotherhood’s political vision, radicalised by Qutb’s revolutionary hakimiyyah; al-Maqdisi’s systematic Salafi jurisprudence of apostasy; Zarqawi’s sectarian fury; and the wider context of Wahhabi purism — all synthesised by a trained scholar who understood how to dress revolutionary violence in the authoritative language of classical Islamic jurisprudence. Each stage in this genealogy represented an intensification of the rejection of mainstream Islamic authority and a corresponding embrace of violence as the primary instrument of theological purification.

Socio-Political Conditions Enabling the Rise of the Islamic State

Theology does not operate in a social vacuum. The extraordinary resonance of Baghdadi’s message — which attracted foreign fighters from dozens of countries and inspired attacks across four continents — cannot be explained by doctrinal analysis alone. The Islamic State’s rise was simultaneously a product of specific socio-political conditions and an exploitation of them.

The American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the chaotic, ill-planned occupation that followed, created the foundational conditions for the Islamic State’s emergence. The dissolution of the Iraqi army and the de-Baathification of the civil service threw hundreds of thousands of trained, armed, and profoundly alienated Sunni men into a social order from which they were now excluded. The subsequent political arrangements, which concentrated power in Shia-dominated governments that were widely perceived as Iranian proxies, intensified Sunni grievances to the point of desperation. Baghdadi understood these grievances with the clarity of personal experience and made their exploitation the centrepiece of his recruitment strategy.

The Syrian civil war, which erupted in 2011 following the Assad government’s violent repression of peaceful protests, provided the Islamic State with both a territorial base and a continuous flow of recruits radicalised by the experience of watching civilian populations subjected to barrel bombs, chemical weapons, and starvation sieges by a regime that called itself the guardian of Arab nationalism. The combination of political marginalisation, economic collapse, and a sense of civilisational humiliation provided what Baghdadi’s propagandists accurately identified as fertile soil for their message of restoration, dignity, and divine vengeance.

Beyond the immediate regional context, the global appeal of the Islamic State’s message pointed to structural conditions that extended far beyond Iraq and Syria. Economic marginalisation, social exclusion, the experience of Islamophobia, and the crisis of identity among Muslim minorities in Western societies all contributed to the vulnerability of young people in Birmingham, Brussels, and Beirut alike to recruitment narratives that promised belonging, purpose, and significance. The Islamic humanist response to this reality must therefore be not merely theological but socio-economic: extremism flourishes in conditions of hopelessness, and those conditions cannot be addressed by fatwas alone.

The Islamic Humanist Critique

Islamic humanism is not an import from the Western Enlightenment awkwardly grafted onto an alien religious tradition. It is a recovery of modes of thought, ethical commitments, and interpretive practices that have deep roots within the Islamic tradition itself — in the classical rationalist theology of the Mutazilites and the Maturidis, in the philosophical humanism of the Andalusian Golden Age, in the legal theory of scholars such as al-Ghazali and al-Shatibi, and in the prophetic practice of a Muhammad who described himself as sent to perfect noble character. Against Baghdadi’s theology of power and death, Islamic humanism offers a theology of mercy and life.

The most powerful analytical instrument that Islamic humanism offers against Baghdadi’s literalism is the framework of maqasid al-sharia — the higher objectives of Islamic law — developed most systematically by the Andalusian scholar Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi in the fourteenth century but rooted in centuries of earlier jurisprudential reflection. This framework argues that the Sharia is not an end in itself but a means to specific human goods: the protection of life, the protection of intellect, the protection of faith, the protection of lineage and social order, and the protection of property. Any legal ruling, any interpretation of scripture, any exercise of political authority that demonstrably undermines these goods is, on this account, a false interpretation — regardless of the literal support it can muster from individual texts.

When the maqasid framework is applied to the practices of the Islamic State, the verdict is unambiguous and devastating. Mass executions destroy life. The suppression of education and critical thought destroys intellect. The imposition of a singular, totalitarian theology by violence destroys freedom of conscience in matters of faith. The systematic looting of minority communities and the destruction of the cultural heritage of human civilisation — including the deliberate dynamiting of ancient Assyrian ruins at Nimrud and the burning of the Mosul Library — destroys the accumulated property and intellectual heritage of humanity. The Islamic State was not, on any serious reading of the maqasid tradition, implementing Islamic law; it was systematically violating every value that Islamic law exists to protect.

The Quranic tradition places extraordinary emphasis on the exercise of reason. The Arabic root aql — denoting the faculty of rational comprehension — appears in various forms dozens of times in the Quran, almost always in the context of a divine invitation to observe, reflect, reason, and understand. The Quran repeatedly chastises those who follow custom and inherited authority without thinking for themselves and praises those who use their rational faculties to perceive the signs of God in creation and in human history. This Quranic rationalism was developed into sophisticated philosophical and theological traditions by scholars from al-Kindi and al-Farabi in the early medieval period through to Ibn Rushd (Averroes) and his commentaries on Aristotle, which profoundly shaped European scholasticism.

Baghdadi’s ideology was built on the systematic suppression of this rationalist tradition. It demanded blind obedience (taqlid) to a single, politically driven interpretation, condemned philosophical inquiry as heresy, and treated the exercise of independent legal reasoning (ijtihad) with the same suspicion it reserved for all human intellectual autonomy. The Islamic humanist response revives the Maturidi theological tradition’s insistence that good and evil are not merely arbitrary divine commands but realities that can be discerned through human reason — that cruelty and injustice are wrong not merely because God forbids them but because they contradict the nature of a rational moral universe that God has created. If an action is inherently cruel, it cannot be the will of a just God; and if an interpretation of scripture mandates cruelty, the fault lies with the interpretation, not with the God it purports to serve.

Against Baghdadi’s monolithic theocracy, Islamic humanism opposes a tradition of principled pluralism that is as old as the Prophet himself. The Covenant of Medina — the constitutional document established by Muhammad shortly after his migration from Mecca — created a multi-religious community of Muslims, Jews, and pagan Arabs with shared rights, shared obligations, and a shared commitment to mutual defence. This document is not a marginal curiosity of early Islamic history; it is a foundational precedent for the proposition that a polity guided by Islamic values can accommodate and protect the religious diversity of its members rather than demanding their conformity.

The historical record of the classical Islamic caliphate, for all its complexities and failures, is broadly consistent with this pluralist precedent. Non-Muslim communities — Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians, and others — lived under Islamic governance with a degree of legal autonomy and religious freedom that was, by the standards of the medieval world, considerable. The dhimmi system, which imposed certain civic disabilities on non-Muslims, is not defensible by contemporary standards of human rights; but it is radically different from the genocidal elimination of religious diversity that the Islamic State practised. Baghdadi’s model was not a restoration of the historical caliphate; it was a totalitarian innovation that had no serious precedent in Islamic political history.

At the ethical core of the Quranic message lies an affirmation of the sanctity of every human life that is among the most powerful moral statements in the world’s religious literature. The Quran declares that to kill one innocent soul is as if one killed all of humanity, and to save one soul is as if one saved all of humanity (5:32). This principle — cited in the Open Letter to al-Baghdadi as one of the central refutations of the Islamic State’s theology — reflects a Quranic anthropology that treats every human life as of infinite worth. It is complemented by the equally powerful declaration that God has honoured the children of Adam (17:70) — a statement of universal human dignity that applies to every human being regardless of faith, ethnicity, or political allegiance.

The theology of human dignity (karamah) that flows from these verses provides the most fundamental Islamic humanist rebuttal to Baghdadi. A theological system that produces mass graves, public beheadings, the enslaved auction of Yazidi women, and the deliberate targeting of mosques full of worshippers has not merely made errors of legal interpretation; it has committed the deepest possible betrayal of the faith it claims to represent. The Quran’s God is not the tyrant that Baghdadi worshipped; the Quran’s Islam is not the cult of death that Baghdadi built.

One of Baghdadi’s most consequential misappropriations was of the concept of jihad itself — a term whose Arabic root denotes effort, struggle, and striving that has been consistently understood by mainstream Islamic scholarship to encompass a wide spectrum of spiritual, moral, intellectual, and social endeavours, with armed conflict representing a specialised subset governed by strict ethical conditions. The inner jihad against one’s own moral failures, the intellectual jihad of scholarship and inquiry, the social jihad of working for justice and the welfare of the community — these were the primary forms of jihad in the understanding of scholars such as al-Ghazali, whose Ihya Ulum al-Din constitutes perhaps the most sustained exploration of the spiritual life in the Islamic tradition.

Even armed jihad, in the classical tradition, was understood as a defensive instrument, subject to conditions of proportionality, protection of non-combatants, and declaration by legitimate political authority — conditions that the Islamic State’s campaigns of aggressive, indiscriminate violence violated in every particular. Reclaiming jihad for Islamic humanism means restoring its primary meaning as a commitment to justice, moral discipline, and social reform, and insisting that armed struggle, where it is permissible at all, must be conducted within the ethical limits that the tradition has always imposed.

Quranic Hermeneutical Counter-Arguments

The most direct response to Baghdadi’s abuse of scripture is a rigorous, contextual hermeneutics — a systematic approach to the interpretation of the Quran and hadith that reads texts in their historical, linguistic, and ethical contexts and refuses the de-contextualising literalism upon which the Islamic State’s ideology depended.

Classical Islamic hermeneutics has always insisted on the importance of the occasions or causes of revelation in understanding Quranic verses. This principle holds that the meaning and application of a given verse cannot be understood apart from the specific historical circumstances in response to which it was revealed. The Prophet’s companions and their successors preserved extensive traditions about these circumstances precisely because they understood that without them, verses could be misapplied in ways that were both historically erroneous and ethically disastrous.

Baghdadi’s organisation systematically ignored these contextual traditions. Verses revealed in the context of specific military conflicts during the early Islamic period were universalised into permanent, global mandates. Verses addressing the particular situation of the Prophet’s community in Medina, surrounded by hostile powers and subject to constant attack, were stripped of their situational character and treated as timeless directives applicable to twenty-first-century conditions that bore no resemblance whatsoever to seventh-century Arabia. The humanist hermeneutical response insists that this de-contextualisation is not merely a scholarly error but a form of textual violence — a violation of the integrity of the revealed text and a betrayal of the tradition of scholarship that exists precisely to prevent such violations.

Baghdadi’s organisation treated certain verses as abrogating — that is, annulling — a wide range of other verses that enjoined peace, mercy, and equitable treatment of non-Muslims. This abrogation (naskh) argument, in its extreme form, claimed that a handful of so-called sword verses from the later Medinan period of the Quran had cancelled out the peaceable and pluralist verses from the Meccan period and the earlier Medinan period. This claim is not only historically unfounded — classical scholars disagreed significantly about the scope and application of abrogation, and many rejected broad claims of the kind that Baghdadi’s ideologues advanced — it is hermeneutically incoherent.

The Quran begins every chapter but one with the formula: In the name of God, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate. These are not decorative formulas; they are programmatic statements about the character of the God in whose name the text speaks and about the spirit in which it should be read. The Quran describes the Prophet Muhammad as a mercy to all the worlds (21:107) — not to Muslims alone, not to those who agreed with him, but to all created beings. The divine names that recur most frequently throughout the Quran are those of mercy, compassion, and generosity. Any interpretive method that reads these data as subordinate to a handful of contextually specific verses of warfare is not merely making a legal error; it is inverting the entire ethical orientation of the text.

The most significant institutional expression of Islamic humanist hermeneutics in response to Baghdadi’s ideology was the Open Letter to al-Baghdadi, released in September 2014 and eventually signed by more than 120 leading Muslim scholars from across the world. This document was remarkable in several respects. It was written not in the language of Western liberalism but in the classical Arabic of traditional Islamic scholarship, engaging Baghdadi on his own terminological and textual ground. It was not a political declaration but a fatwa-length juridical refutation, working through the Islamic State’s specific claims in detail and demonstrating, with copious references to the Quran, the hadith, and the classical jurisprudential tradition, that each of those claims violated established Islamic legal and ethical principles.

The letter addressed, in turn: the impermissibility of declaring fellow Muslims apostates without meeting the stringent conditions of classical jurisprudence; the requirement that a legitimate caliph be chosen by a council of recognised scholars rather than self-appointed; the absolute prohibition on the killing of non-combatants, clergy, women, and children in armed conflict; the illegitimacy of enslaving people or selling them in markets; the obligation to treat members of other faiths with justice and respect; and the dangerous misuse of the abrogation argument to dismiss vast portions of the Quranic ethical teaching. The letter concluded by warning Baghdadi that he had transformed Islam into a religion of harshness and brutality and that his actions constituted a grave offence against the faith, against Muslims, and against all of humanity.

The letter was not without its limitations. Some critics noted that it represented the perspective of established religious institutions whose authority the Islamic State had already rejected, and that it was unlikely to persuade committed adherents of the ideology. Others pointed out that the letter did not challenge the underlying assumptions of Salafi theology as thoroughly as a fully humanist critique would require. Nevertheless, as a demonstration that the Islamic State’s theology was not — as its propaganda claimed — the authentic expression of mainstream Islamic scholarship, but rather its radical repudiation, the letter remains an invaluable document.

Strategies for Ideological Defeat

The defeat of Baghdadi’s ideological legacy requires a multi-dimensional strategy that operates simultaneously on theological, educational, political, social, and psychological registers. No single approach is sufficient; each is necessary but none alone is adequate to the scale of the challenge.

The foundation of any effective counter-strategy must be a sustained programme of theological deconstruction — systematic, rigorous, publicly accessible refutation of the specific doctrinal claims upon which Baghdadi’s ideology rested. The Open Letter to al-Baghdadi provides an excellent template, but its impact has been limited by its accessibility only to those already engaged with classical Islamic scholarship. What is needed is a programme of translation, popularisation, and dissemination that brings the scholarly refutation of takfirism, false caliphal claims, and hermeneutical distortion to the widest possible audience within the Muslim world.

This requires investment — financial, institutional, and reputational — in the production of counter-theological materials that are both academically rigorous and accessible to non-specialist audiences. Islamic universities, particularly institutions such as al-Azhar in Cairo, Deoband in India, and Zaytuna College in the United States, have a crucial role to play. So do national religious establishments in Muslim-majority countries, provided they command sufficient credibility among the populations they seek to influence. The message must come from voices that are recognisably part of the tradition — not from governments seeking to weaponise religion for political purposes, and not from Western actors whose interference is likely to be counterproductive.

Baghdadi’s ideology thrived in the conditions created by educational systems that prioritised rote memorisation of religious texts over critical engagement with their meaning, historical context, and ethical implications. Any sustainable strategy for preventing the recurrence of movements like the Islamic State must therefore include a fundamental rethinking of religious education across the Muslim world — and, indeed, in Muslim community institutions in Europe and North America.

Educational reform in this context means moving from indoctrination to inquiry: teaching the diversity of opinion within Islamic jurisprudence rather than presenting a single school’s positions as absolute truth; introducing students to the history of Quranic revelation and the classical tradition of contextual interpretation; developing critical thinking skills that enable young people to evaluate competing claims rather than simply accepting the authority of the most confident voice. The Quran itself repeatedly invites its readers to think, observe, and reflect; an educational system that produces uncritical receivers of a pre-packaged orthodoxy is not Quranic in its spirit, whatever its content.

The curriculum must also reclaim the humanist heritage of Islamic civilisation — the extraordinary flowering of science, philosophy, medicine, mathematics, and art that characterised the Abbasid period and the Andalusian Golden Age. Baghdadi’s ideology required the erasure of this heritage because it demonstrated, powerfully and concretely, that Islamic civilisation had been at its most creative, most influential, and most admired by the world when it was engaged in open intellectual exchange rather than self-imposed isolation. Reclaiming that heritage as constitutively Islamic — not as a historical accident that needs to be apologised for or explained away — is an important part of the counter-narrative.

The Islamic State was, among other things, a phenomenon of social media. Its sophisticated multilingual propaganda machine — producing magazines, films, and social media content in English, French, German, Russian, and numerous other languages — enabled it to reach radicalised or radicalisation-vulnerable young people in Birmingham, Brussels, and beyond with a message that was emotionally compelling, aesthetically sophisticated, and attuned to the specific psychological vulnerabilities of its target audience. Defeating that propaganda requires counter-narratives that are equally sophisticated, equally emotionally intelligent, and equally attuned to those vulnerabilities.

Effective counter-narratives must be produced by credible, authentic Muslim voices — not by government information agencies or Western media institutions whose messages will be dismissed by precisely the audience they need to reach. Former members of extremist organisations who have genuinely renounced their involvement and can speak with authority about the gap between the utopia promised by recruitment narratives and the grim reality of life within the Islamic State are particularly valuable voices. So are Muslim scholars, activists, artists, and community leaders who can articulate a vision of Islamic identity that is simultaneously faithful to the tradition and fully engaged with the realities of contemporary life.

The content of effective counter-narratives must also address the specific appeals that extremist recruitment messages make: the promise of belonging and brotherhood, the sense of cosmic significance, the claim to be on the right side of history, the expression of righteous anger at real injustices. Counter-narratives that simply assert that the Islamic State is un-Islamic, without addressing the underlying emotional needs that its recruiting exploits, are unlikely to succeed. Young people need not just theological refutation but alternative sources of meaning, belonging, and purpose.

Ideology does not operate in a vacuum, and counter-ideology alone cannot defeat extremism that is rooted in genuine political grievances. The sectarian marginalisation of Sunni communities in post-2003 Iraq, the Assad government’s mass violence against civilian populations in Syria, the experience of discrimination and social exclusion among Muslim minorities in Western Europe — these were real phenomena, and Baghdadi’s organisation exploited them with considerable skill. Any serious counter-strategy must therefore include advocacy for the political reforms and social investments that address the grievances that extremist movements feed upon.

This means, in the Iraqi and Syrian contexts, advocacy for genuinely inclusive political arrangements that protect the interests of all communities rather than reserving power for one sect or party. It means insisting on accountability for the atrocities committed not only by the Islamic State but by all parties to those conflicts, including state actors. It means supporting civil society organisations, independent media, and cultural institutions in Muslim-majority countries that provide alternatives to both authoritarian governance and extremist ideology. And it means, in Western contexts, opposing the rhetoric and policies of Islamophobia that reinforce the isolation and alienation of Muslim communities and thereby strengthen the recruiting narratives of radical movements.

Sunni-Shia reconciliation is not merely a pious aspiration; it is a strategic necessity for the defeat of extremist movements that depend upon sectarian hatred for their recruitment and their theological justification. The systematic demonisation of Shia Muslims that characterised Baghdadi’s ideology — and that drew upon a tradition of Wahhabi polemics stretching back several centuries — cannot be defeated without a sustained programme of inter-sect dialogue, historical honesty about the origins and instrumentalisation of sectarian divisions, and mutual recognition of the shared ethical commitments that transcend sectarian boundaries.

This is not a project that can be completed quickly, and it cannot be imposed from outside. It requires the willingness of scholars, community leaders, and ordinary believers from both traditions to engage in the difficult, sometimes painful work of confronting historical grievances without allowing those grievances to determine the future. Platforms for intra-Islamic dialogue, jointly sponsored by Sunni and Shia institutions, can play an important role in this process — as can the development of shared theological statements that affirm the common ground of Islamic ethical commitment even in the absence of full doctrinal agreement.

Extremist movements are structurally dependent on patriarchal control: the suppression of women’s agency, the instrumentalisation of women’s bodies as markers of group honour, and the exclusion of women from theological and political authority. Baghdadi’s organisation exemplified this dependence in its most extreme form, reviving the institution of sexual slavery, imposing totalising restrictions on women’s freedom of movement and dress, and excluding women entirely from any role in governance or scholarship.

The Islamic feminist scholarship that has developed powerfully over the past three decades — represented by scholars such as Amina Wadud, Fatima Mernissi, Kecia Ali, and many others — provides both a theological refutation of these practices and an alternative vision of gender relations within an Islamic framework. This scholarship demonstrates, through rigorous engagement with the primary sources, that the Quranic vision of gender relations is characterised by equity, complementarity, and mutual respect rather than by the hierarchy of domination that patriarchal readings have historically imposed. Amplifying these voices, supporting institutions that train women as scholars and religious leaders, and insisting on women’s full participation in the theological work of counter-extremism are all essential elements of a comprehensive humanist response.

The ultimate socio-political answer to Baghdadi’s theology of divine sovereignty enforced by violence is the construction of societies in which political participation is inclusive, governance is accountable, the rule of law protects the rights of all citizens, and peaceful avenues for political reform are genuinely available. This is not to claim that liberal democracy as currently practised in Western societies is the only or the ideal form of Islamic political organisation. It is to insist that the conditions under which extremist ideologies flourish — the closure of peaceful avenues for reform, the concentration of power in unaccountable hands, the systematic exclusion of minority communities — are themselves forms of political injustice that must be addressed if the ideological appeal of violent alternatives is to be diminished.

The promotion of the rule of law, accountable governance, and human rights in Muslim-majority societies is therefore not an imperialist imposition but a demand of Islamic humanism itself — grounded in the Quranic principles of justice (adl), consultation (shura), and the protection of human dignity (karamah) that mainstream Islamic political thought has consistently affirmed. Organisations such as the Cordoba Foundation and scholars such as Abdullahi An-Naim have argued persuasively that these principles are not merely compatible with contemporary human rights standards but that they provided their historical antecedents.

Beyond the Caliphate of Apocalypse

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi built his authority on a theological architecture of extraordinary ambition and equally extraordinary moral depravity. Drawing upon the Qutbist doctrine of divine sovereignty, the classical language of Islamic jurisprudence, the apocalyptic traditions of Islamic eschatology, and the sectarian passions of a post-invasion Iraq torn apart by violence and humiliation, he constructed a movement that for a few terrifying years held territory, governed populations, and inspired violence across the globe.

That architecture was, however, built on doctrinal sand. Its literalism was selective; its historical claims were false; its genealogical pretensions were unverified; its jurisprudential reasoning was condemned by the overwhelming weight of mainstream Islamic scholarship; and its treatment of human beings as disposable instruments of a theological project was a direct violation of the Quranic affirmation of human dignity that constitutes the deepest ethical commitment of the faith. The Open Letter to al-Baghdadi demonstrated that the most powerful rebuttal to this theology was not a Western political argument but a Quranic verse wielded by scholars who knew the tradition from the inside and could demonstrate, with precision and authority, that Baghdadi had not revived Islam — he had betrayed it.

The physical caliphate was destroyed through military force, and Baghdadi himself died in humiliation rather than in the glorious martyrdom his eschatology had promised him. But the ideology he articulated remains alive — online, in the minds of isolated and alienated young people, in the prison networks of detained fighters, in the successor organisations that have already reconstituted themselves in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and sub-Saharan Africa. Defeating that ideology requires more than drones and special operations forces. It requires what has been argued throughout this paper: a revival of Islamic humanism, a recovery of the tradition of mercy, reason, pluralism, and human dignity that constitutes the ethical core of the Quranic revelation.

The Quran’s own vision of the human person — as the vicegerent of God on earth (2:30), honoured above much of creation (17:70), endowed with reason, moral agency, and the capacity for both justice and injustice (76:3, 90:10, 91:7-10) — is the ultimate theological rebuttal to Baghdadi’s vision of the human being as an instrument of divine violence. A theology that sees the face of God in the dignity of every human person (5:32, 49:13, 95:4), that understands the caliphate not as a vehicle for domination but as a trust of justice and service (4:58, 38:26, 57:25), and that reads the Quran not as a warrant for perpetual war but as a call to mercy, wisdom, and peace (16:125, 21:107, 41:34, 5:8, 8:61) — such a theology is not merely a counter-narrative to extremism. It is the authentic Islamic tradition that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi sought to destroy and that must be reclaimed.

The ghost of the caliphate of apocalypse can only be finally exorcised by a more compelling vision — one that sees Islam not as a religion of fear and compulsion but as a religion that, in the Prophet Muhammad’s own words, was sent as a mercy to all the worlds (21:107). Building that vision, in mosques and madrasas, in classrooms and digital spaces, in the courts of law and the chambers of government, in the patient, sustained work of scholarship, education, and community (3:104, 16:90, 39:9, 58:11, 49:10) — that is the work of Islamic humanism. It is more difficult than declaring a caliphate, and more demanding than detonating a bomb. But it is the only work that will endure (13:17, 28:77, 41:33).

Bibliography

Fatima Mernissi. The Veil and the Male Elite: A Feminist Interpretation of Women’s Rights in Islam. Translated by Mary Jo Lakeland. New York: Basic Books, 1991.

Open Letter to al-Baghdadi. Signed by 126 leading global Muslim scholars, 2014. https://rissc.jo/open-letter-to-al-baghdadi/

Sayyid Qutb. Milestones. Chicago: Kazi Publications, 1990.

Robert G. Rabil. The Syrian Jihad: Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency. London: Hurst Publishers, 2015.

The Amman Message. Issued by His Majesty Abdullah II of Jordan and affirmed by over 200 leading Islamic scholars, 2004. https://ammanmessage.com/

The Marrakesh Declaration. Issued by the Forum for Promoting Peace in Muslim Societies, 2016. https://www.abc-usa.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Marrakesh-Final-04-12-18.pdf

Amina Wadud. Quran and Woman: Rereading the Sacred Text from a Woman’s Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

….

V.A. Mohamad Ashrof is an independent Indian scholar specializing in Islamic humanism. With a deep commitment to advancing Quranic hermeneutics that prioritize human well-being, peace, and progress, his work aims to foster a just society, encourage critical thinking, and promote inclusive discourse and peaceful coexistence. He is dedicated to creating pathways for meaningful social change and intellectual growth through his scholarship…..

Courtesy: New Age Islam

The post Extremist Theology: From Syed Qutb’s ‘Milestone’ to al-Baghdadi’s ‘Caliphate’ appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Though often overlooked in official narratives, Shariati remains one of the most influential intellectual figures behind the Iranian Revolution. His ideas, which linked Shi’ism with modern revolutionary theories drawn from thinkers such as Frantz Fanon and Jean‑Paul Sartre, helped shape the ideological climate that culminated in 1979.

Revisiting his legacy is essential not only for understanding Iran’s modern history but also for examining the broader intersections of religion, social justice, and political transformation in the Muslim world.

Born in 1933 in Mazinan, Shariati grew up in a religious household during a turbulent era. The 1953 overthrow of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh and the Shah’s subsequent modernization drive—perceived by many as an attempt to erase cultural and religious roots in favor of Western approval—formed the backdrop of his intellectual evolution. Shariati’s activism led to imprisonment, and later, study in Paris, where exposure to existentialist and anti‑colonial thought profoundly shaped his worldview. He rejected Marxist materialism but embraced its critique of inequality, reinterpreting Islamic history to highlight figures such as Abu Dharr al‑Ghifari as symbols of resistance and social equality.

From this synthesis emerged Shariati’s concept of “Red Shiism,” a dynamic, activist Islam rooted in sacrifice, justice, and resistance, inspired by the legacy of Karbala. His slogan “Return to the Self” urged Muslim societies to break from blind imitation of the West and rediscover their intellectual heritage. His lectures and writings reframed Islam not as a passive spiritual refuge but as a force for liberation, capable of mobilizing the masses against tyranny. By the late 1970s, his ideas circulated widely among students and activists, laying the intellectual foundations of revolution.

Shariati’s critique extended beyond Marxism to liberalism and existentialism, which he faulted for neglecting the spiritual dimension of humanity. In works such as Marxism and Other Western Fallacies: An Islamic Critique, he argued that Islam offered its own emancipatory paradigm, distinct from Western secular traditions. He did not seek to make Islam socialist but rather employed Marxist sociological tools to galvanize Muslims into revolutionary action. His criticism of Iran’s Marxist Tudeh Party underscored his insistence on adapting political thought to Iran’s cultural and religious context.

Although Shariati died in 1977, two years before the revolution, his intellectual imprint was unmistakable. Pakistani writer Mukhtar Masood recorded that Iranians across social strata identified Shariati as the architect of the movement. Yet, as the revolutionary state consolidated power, charismatic leadership overshadowed intellectual activism, and Shariati’s role receded into obscurity. His story illustrates how revolutions often celebrate political victories while neglecting the thinkers who shaped their ideological foundations.

Shariati’s legacy endures as a reminder that religion, when reinterpreted through the lens of justice and resistance, can become a powerful agent of social transformation. His vision of Islam as a force for liberation continues to resonate in debates over faith, identity, and political change across the Muslim world.

Author is freelance journalist.

Courtesy: CounterView

The post Faith recast as social justice? Revisiting Shariati’s vision of Islam as liberation appeared first on SabrangIndia.

There was a section of political opinion consisting of mainly conservative Hindus and those arguing that India should become a Hindu nation; who opposed the Constitution right from the start. The views of these leaders of Hindu nationalist politics, supported by a conservative section of society were articulated in an article in Organiser, the RSS mouthpiece, which opposed the Indian Constitution; saying that there is/was nothing Indian about it and that it will not be accepted by Hindus. Savarkar, went on to (CNBC TV18) say that Manusmriti is the Constitution today. In this spirit Swami Avimukteshwaranand recently stated (Navbharat Times) that Manusmriti is “above” the Indian Constitution.

This stream is not the only one within India to undermine the Constitution by showing the primacy of ‘word of God’ or sacred scriptures as above its docrine. Maulana Mufti Shamail Nadwi made a similar statement recently. This Maulana has come to prominence in the last few days after his debate with Javed Akhtar on “Does God exist?”. In a viral clip, he asserts that “Muslims erred by accepting secularism and the supremacy of national institutions over Shariah, criticises democracy and the notion of placing the nation (desh) above religion. He questions whether believers should passively accept court verdicts conflicting with Islamic law. These statements (The Chenab Times), while presented as theological opinions, have been interpreted by critics as undermining India’s constitutional secularism and promoting religious supremacy.”[1]

While Manusmriti is a scriptural compilation representing the values of Brahmanism, the dominant stream within Hinduism, Sharia is based on multiple things. Sharia (Arabic: the path) is the Islamic legal-ethical system derived from:

“Qur’an, Hadith (sayings/actions of Prophet Muhammad), Ijma (consensus of scholars) and Qiyas (analogy)” It guides personal conduct and law, not just punishments. In practice, Sharia is interpreted through schools of jurisprudence (Sunni: Hanafi, Shafi‘i, Maliki, Hanbali; Shia: Ja‘fari), so there is a diversity within the legal system of Sharia.

Out of nearly 55 Muslim majority countries it shapes the laws etc. only in Saudi Arabia, Iran and Afghanistan fully. It is partly i implemented in a few other Muslim majority countries. In India it forms a base in matters of Muslim personal laws only.

So, what does one do with changing times and the social patterns, which have occurred over a period of centuries when these laws were devised? Those indulging in politics in the name of religion in India harp on bringing in the Manusmriti and countries like Iran, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia are implementing the Sharia in entirety. In many Muslim countries it is not implemented or implemented only in part.

Can Sharia be above the Constitution as the Mufti claims? The legal luminary Faizan Mustafa in a video https://youtu.be/T8BCr27fA24 argues that in every country the Constitution is supreme. The Constitution does consider Sharia in many countries and integrates some aspects of that in the Constitutions.

So, what is the status of democratic institutions in Muslim majority countries? There are different degrees of ‘democracy’ in these countries.  At the moment many social media accounts have been criticizing Shamail for encouraging Muslims not to follow the Constitution, as an anti-patriotic act. On the other hand, many are praising the Mufti for upholding the Sharia! It is interesting to note that during the medieval period of Indian History, the Muslim Kings did not make the Sharia law obligatory for the state.

While Mufti Shamail has one opinion there are others like Asghar Ali Engineer, the foremost scholar of Islam in India; who have different idea about the role of Sharia viv a vis the Constitution. Dr. Engineer harps on Shura (Mutual consultation); to argue that democracy and related principles are possible in the contemporary World. Dr. Engineer says a Quranic concept – and modern-day representative democracy – merely a human concept – may not be exactly similar. However, “the spirit of modern democracy and the Qur’anic injunction to consult people is the same”.

As per him “New institutions keep on developing and human beings, depending on their worldly experiences, keep on changing and refining these institutions. And in the contemporary world, the concept of Shura should mean democratic process and constitution of proper democratic institutions of which elections are a necessary requirement.” The Qur’anic text not only gives the concept of Shura (democratic consultation) but “does not support even remotely any concept of dictatorship or authoritarianism”.

During India’s freedom struggle, which was based on democratic principles and aimed at democratic institutions, a very highly regarded Islamic scholar Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and a dedicated Muslim leader Khan Abdl Gaffar Khan (to name but a few) strove for the values and institutions of democratic secular country. Just a few years ago the Muslim women through the Shaheen Baug movement showed their democratic strength in protecting the community from the fear of disenfranchisement.

What is needed in contemporary times? In India as Muslims are being targeted by Hindutva politics, they have become a besieged community. The conservatism among Muslim community is on a sharp rise. The major issue confronting them is enforcement of their rights using the law and its instruments, asserting representation and accountability from modern institutions.

Even in Islam there are various streams of laws and systems of jurisprudence. Since this is part of Sharia, in that case what Sharia recommends will be another contentious issue. Since Muslims are a minority in this country, they already have Personal laws, which are again under opposition.

Today within the extreme Hindu right wing there is a dominant retrograde tendency trying to bring to fore the values of Manusmriti. Such assertions which want to bring inequality in the garb of religion are not welcome. We need to also look to some European countries where religion is on the back foot.

We are living in contradictory times. On one side human society has developed the principles of dignity and equality as represented in the UN charter and on the other religious right-wing has become stronger during the last few decades. While the Mufti may be knowledgeable in concepts of Islam, we also need to know what are the trends of contemporary society and values of democratic institutions.

[1] This controversial debate has been sharply questioned by political observers, funded as it was by the Maulana himself and his Wahyain Foundation (based in Kolkata) and the Delhi based “Academic Dialogue Forum” reportedly associated with social activist Shabnam Hashmi.

Related:

India 2025: Plight of the Christian minority

Identity issue to the fore: Vande Mataram controversy

Hindu Nationalism’s sectarian nationalism and its concept of ‘duties and rights’

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This debate was, at its core, a philosophical exercise, not a theological trial. Even if we accept Mufti Nadvi’s logical arguments for a Creator, they do not automatically validate the specific beliefs of his religion. To confuse a philosophical “First Cause” with a religious “Personal God” is a leap of faith, not logic. Here is a breakdown of why this debate cannot be claimed as a victory for organized religion, based on a scientific and critical review of the proceedings.

1. The “First Cause” is Not a Religious Victory

The central pillar of the Mufti Nadvi’s argument was the “Argument from Contingency” (or the Cosmological Argument)—that the universe is contingent and thus requires a “Necessary Being” or a First Cause to exist. While this is a powerful philosophical concept, utilizing it to prove a specific religion is a bait-and-switch tactic.

• The Trap of the “First Cause”:Proving that a “Necessary Being” exists only leads us to Deism—the belief in a creator who set the universe in motion. It does not lead us to Theism—the belief in a God who sends books, prophets, and laws.
• Javed Akhtar’s Real Contention:As noted in the debate, Akhtar’s primary objection is not necessarily against a distant, abstract “First Cause” (which he dismisses as irrelevant). His intellectual battle is with the character of God as portrayed by religions—a God who demands worship, intervenes in human affairs, and allows massive suffering.
• The Metaphysical Reality:Both debaters agreed that God is not a physical entity. If the “Necessary Being” is a metaphysical reality not subject to physical proof, then it is equally not subject to religious anthropomorphism.

2. The Flaw of Imposed Rules

A significant procedural flaw in the debate was the framing of the rules.

• Unilateral Rule Setting:At the outset, the mufti set the parameters: no scriptural evidence, only logic. In a fair debate, one participant cannot unilaterally impose the epistemology. By restricting the debate to “logic only,” the Mufti Nadvi attempted to shield religion from the scrutiny of history and

morality, arenas where religious dogmas often falter.

• Breaking His Own Precedent:The most critical breakdown occurred when Javed Akhtar raised the logical problem of evil and suffering (e.g., children dying in Gaza).

The mufti, unable to answer this strictly through the “logic” he demanded, retreated into religious apologetics. He invoked concepts of “divine wisdom,” “tests,” and “afterlife justice”—all of which are religious beliefs, not logical proofs. This violated his own rule that religious arguments were inadmissible.

3. The Problem of Evil: Logic vs. Apologetics

The clash over the existence of evil was the debate’s turning point, and it highlights why the “religion won” narrative is flawed.

• Logic, Not Just Poetry:Critics often dismiss Javed Akhtar’s arguments as emotional poetry. However, the Problem of Evil is a rigid logical argument. If God is All-Powerful and All-Good, evil cannot exist. Since evil exists, God is either not All-Powerful or not All-Good. This carries as much logical weight as Mufti Nadvi’s “First Cause” argument.
• The Logical Fallacy of “The Test”:The mufti attempted to argue that God and Evil coexist simultaneously, and while God created Evil, He is not responsible for it (attributing it to free will or tests). This is a logical fallacy. If a “Necessary Being” is the source of all reality, it cannot absolve itself of the reality it created.
• The Atheist’s Conclusion:For Javed Akhtar, the existence of suffering is not just a complaint; it is positive evidence that a benevolent, intervening God does not exist.

4. The False Binary of Theist vs. Atheist

The debate also suffered from the rigid binary through which both sides view the world.

• Religious Blindness:Religious apologists tend to view every non-religious individual as a hard core atheist. They fail to recognize deists, agnostics, or spiritual seekers who reject organised religion but accept a higher power.
• Atheistic Blindness:Conversely, atheists often group all believers into the category of “religious fundamentalists,” ignoring those who view God philosophically rather than dogmatically.

The real issue facing humanity is not the abstract existence of a deity, but the concrete existence

of suffering. While the Mufti Nadvi offers religious belief as the solution and Javed Akhtar offers secular values and collective human effort, the debate highlights that since suffering is a universal human experience, it demands a universal, secular framework for integration rather than a solution limited to the boundaries of a single faith.

5. The Irony of “Western” Arguments

Perhaps the greatest irony of the debate lies in the tools used by Mufti Nadvi.

• Imported Philosophy:The “Argument from Contingency” and the “Cosmological Argument” are deeply rooted in Western philosophy (Aristotle, Plato) and later adapted by Muslim philosophers (like Avicenna).
• Theological Contradiction:Historically, orthodox religious authorities often opposed these philosophical methods, tagging supporters of logic, science, and philosophy as heretics orkafirs. It is paradoxical that modern religious apologists now rely on the very same “Western philosophical arguments” their predecessors despised to defend their faith.

6. From Indoctrination to Education

Ultimately, the discussion shouldn’t be about which specific religious God supposedly

revealed, but rather acknowledging that the greatest divine gift is the human capacity for reason. If we rely on this reasoning rather than the ‘ready-made’ arguments of religious doctrine, we can identify the actual, tangible causes of human suffering. The way forward requires a shift from indoctrination to education—moving humanity from the comfort of unquestionable beliefs to the scrutiny of accountable facts.

7. The Paradox of “Universal” Religion

While many might accept the spiritual concept of ultimate accountability before God, the problem arises when religion oversteps this boundary. Organized religion rarely stops at spiritual accountability; it intervenes in logic, scientific development, and politics. Furthermore, there is a fundamental contradiction in its claim of ‘universal acceptability.’ In reality, every religion is bound by its own regional characteristics—specific nomenclature, dressing styles, ‘godly’ languages, and cultural practices. A system that is so deeply rooted in a specific regional culture cannot truly claim to be universal without imposing that culture on others.”

Conclusion

The debate was a collision of two different worlds: the philosophical search for a First Cause and the humanistic demand for justice. While Mufti Nadvi may have presented a coherent argument for a Deistic Creator, he failed to bridge the gap to a Theistic God who cares about human worship.

Javed Akhtar’s critique remains unanswered: We do not need to prove the existence of a Creator as much as we need to question the silence of that Creator in the face of human suffering. Until religion can solve the problem of evil without resorting to circular belief, it cannot claim victory over reason.

The post Beyond Victory and Defeat: Why the ‘Does God Exist’ Debate Was Not a Win for Religion appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Compiled by New Age Islam News Bureau

URL: https://newageislam.com/islam-women-feminism/taliban-tried-employing-afghan-women/d/135873

—–

The Taliban Tried To Stop Lida Mangal From Employing Afghan Women

By Isabella Ross

15-06-2025

Lida Mangal says her Afghan garment business in Western Sydney is a form of “resistance and representation”. (ABC News: Jack Ailwood)

———

LidaMangal vividly remembers the “golden years” of her childhood in Afghanistan.

Decades on, Ms Mangal has found freedom in Australia — though her country of origin and the “very strong” women who remain there never leave her thoughts.

“I thought how could I provide a means of income to these women? They had experience in tailoring and textiles. Some were widowed or without a male companion … Afghan women deserve freedom.”

Photo shows A woman wearing a blue burqa covering shields her eyes from the sun and camera while she walks in the streetA woman wearing a blue burqa covering shields her eyes from the sun and camera while she walks in the street

Virtue laws introduced by the Taliban ban women from speaking or showing their faces in public as a senior UN official called it an extension of the “already intolerable restrictions” on Afghan women.

That same year, Ms Mangal founded her business, Ghan Fashion, where she brings traditionally designed dresses from Afghanistan to Australia.

Initially, she was able to openly hire women who were still working in Afghan textile factories, but in recent years, the “barbaric regime’s agenda” has made that effort extra difficult.

“I’ve got 20 women who are working now from home, because of the restrictions of the current regime. They have their own materials and equipment they use. I explain my designs … and they prepare and make it,” she said.

A former refugee and now Australian citizen, Ms Mangal works full-time in a separate occupation, as well as running her fashion business from her Western Sydney home.

The garment transportation process is a challenge — the Taliban use sharp tools to check packages for anything being smuggled out of Afghanistan, meaning some of Ms Mangal’s dresses arrive ripped and damaged.

“This new chapter has allowed me to reclaim my voice and write a story that I choose — one filled with hope, ambition and determination.”

Kabul Social is run predominantly by female refugees from Afghanistan, notes Shaun David-Christie (far right). (Supplied: Kabul Social/Kitti Gould)

Kabul Social, founded by Plate It Forward director Shaun Christie-David, is run by a team of predominantly female refugees from Afghanistan, bringing their country’s flavours to Sydney’s CBD.

It was predated by Colombo Social, which has the same intention of celebrating culture and cuisine while employing migrants and refugees.

“What truly humbles me is seeing our refugee workforce and their families thrive, building a legacy of generational change,”  Mr Christie-David said.

Mr Christie-David said his aim was to “give people a chance that wouldn’t get one otherwise”, given the challenges of having international qualifications recognised in Australia.

Marjorie Tenchavez is the founder and director of Welcome Merchant, a social enterprise that elevates refugee and people seeking asylum entrepreneurs.

“Often they [refugees] have family members relying on them in their home countries as well. Refugee merchants also don’t have mainstream access to much support, such as borrowing from the banks, given many are on bridging visas.”

“It’s now more important than ever to give them a platform because there has definitely been a waning interest in the refugee space.”

Adama Kamara, deputy chief executive officer of Refugee Council of Australia, said the event was a way to champion the resilient nature of many refugees.

“Refugees are among Australia’s most entrepreneurial newcomers … this incredible drive, often born out of necessity and a desire to contribute, adds significant economic and social value,” she said.

Later this year, the 1 millionth permanent refugee visa will be issued since Australia’s post-war resettlement program began in 1947, according to the Refugee Council.

Source: www.abc.net.au

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-06-15/former-refugee-helps-women-in-afghanistan-via-sydney-business/105365380

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‘I Wish I Weren’t A Girl’: 700,000 Women Struggle For Menstrual Hygiene In War-Torn Gaza

By Supratik Das

15 Jun 2025

Representational Image | Credit: Reuters

———–

At the centre of an relentless humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip, an often overlooked crisis is unfolding with quiet urgency, that is women’s and girls’ menstrual well-being. During Israel’s months-long siege and heavy shelling, close to 700,000 menstruating women and girls are finding it difficult to cope with their periods with dignity and safety. The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) has cautioned that lack of access to essential hygiene products, clean water, and safe facilities has converted a normal biological process into a deep humanitarian and public health emergency.

According to UN global data, 1.8 billion people menstruate worldwide, but in conflict areas like Gaza, menstruation becomes far more than a monthly inconvenience, it becomes a human rights concern. In overcrowded displacement shelters and temporary tent camps, girls getting their first period are doing so in unimaginable conditions. They have no sanitary pads, no soap, and no private toilets. “I only had one pad, so I wrapped it in toilet paper to make it last. I couldn’t wash, and the pain was horrible. I sat in silence crying until the end of the day,” a displaced teenage girl told UNFPA. These stories are no longer isolated. Since March, the blockade of humanitarian relief has severely limited the introduction of hygiene material. While a partial suspension of the ban allowed for some relief, distribution of aid which is now organised by channels outside the UN system is still woefully insufficient. Current levels of delivery are far below the colossal demand, with only a small portion of more than 10 million sanitary pads needed monthly reaching Gaza’s displaced persons. “This crisis is not just about hygiene; it is about dignity, health, and the protection of basic human rights. “Food keeps us alive, but pads, soap, and privacy let us live with dignity,” a displaced woman from Khan Younis, said in a UNFPA statement.

With over 90 per cent of the region’s water and sanitation infrastructure destroyed and water pumping fuel out of reach, the hygiene crisis is assuming a deadly dimension. Women are resorting to makeshift substitutes such as worn-out clothing, used cloths, or sponges which are often unclean and unsuitable for prolonged use heightening the threat of urinary tract infections, reproductive disorders, and long-term health impairment. A father of four girl child from Jabalia recounted his sorrow, “I ripped my single shirt apart so my daughters could wear it as an alternative to pads,” he explained to UNFPA. Another girl admitted, “Every time my period comes, I wish I weren’t a girl,” she said to the UN agency. A local physician recounted how normal phenomena like menstruation, pregnancy, and giving birth are becoming traumatic because of the absence of essential materials. “These should be routine experiences. But now, I witness pain, humiliation, and desperation in women’s eyes on a daily basis,” she said to UNFP

While the health of menstruation has gone disastrous, the overall situation for women in Gaza is equally bleak. As per UNFPA, food insecurity is catastrophic, with one person out of every five starved. For approximately 55,000 pregnant women, every skipped meal increases the likelihood of miscarriage, stillbirth, and giving birth to underweight infants.

According to UN nearly 17,000 pregnant and breastfeeding women are projected to require urgent treatment for acute malnutrition in the coming months. Gaza’s already fragile health infrastructure is on the brink of collapse after prolonged bombardment of hospitals and healthcare facilities. Healthcare workers do not have the medicines and equipment they need.

Source: www.Thedailyjagran.Com

https://www.thedailyjagran.com/world/i-wish-i-was-not-a-girl-women-struggle-for-menstrual-hygiene-in-war-torn-gaza-heres-what-report-says-10245149

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TikTok Murder Sends Chill Through Pakistani Influencers: ‘Every Woman Knows This Fear’

15 Jun 2025

Since seeing thousands of comments justifying the recent murder of a teenage TikTok star in Pakistan, Sunaina Bukhari is considering abandoning her 88,000 followers.

“In my family, it wasn’t an accepted profession at all, but I’d managed to convince them, and even ended up setting up my own business,” she said.

Then last week, Sana Yousaf was shot dead outside her house in the capital Islamabad by a man whose advances she had repeatedly rejected, police said.

News of the murder led to an outpouring of comments under her final post – her 17th birthday celebration where she blew out the candles on a cake.

In between condolence messages, some blamed her for her own death: “You reap what you sow” or “it’s deserved, she was tarnishing Islam”.

Yousaf had racked up more than a million followers on social media, where she shared her favourite cafes, skincare products and traditional shalwarkameez outfits.

Source: Www.Scmp.com

https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/south-asia/article/3314505/tiktok-murder-sends-chill-through-pakistani-influencers-every-woman-knows-fear

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UN Human Rights Council to spotlight rights of Afghan women at 59th Session

by Milad Sayar

June 15, 2025

The United Nations Human Rights Council is set to open its 59th session on Monday, June 16, in Geneva, where delegates will consider an agenda that includes the worsening rights crisis in Afghanistan, particularly the treatment of women and girls under Taliban rule.

According to the Council’s official schedule, the session will run through July 9 and will feature reports and interactive dialogues addressing human rights violations in more than a dozen countries, including Sudan, Myanmar, Iran and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Among the most closely watched items will be a presentation by Richard Bennett, the UN special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan.

Bennett’s report, titled “Access to Justice and Support for Women and Girls and the Impact of Multiple and Intersecting Forms of Discrimination,” concludes that the restrictions imposed by the Taliban on women and girls amount to a system of gender apartheid. It calls on the international community to recognize such policies as crimes under international law.

“The Council must take urgent and decisive action,” said Sima Nouri, a human rights activist who is among those calling for an independent fact-finding mission. “We need a mechanism to document the full scope of Taliban abuses — from gender-based discrimination and ethnic killings to the violent suppression of peaceful protests. Afghanistan’s case should be referred to the International Criminal Court.”

Since retaking power in 2021, the Taliban have barred most Afghan women and girls from work, education, and even freedom of movement without a male escort. MasoudaKohistani, another rights advocate, called the situation “a human rights emergency that demands global attention.”

Though Afghanistan will be discussed on the opening day, it is one part of a broader session that includes topics ranging from the human rights impacts of climate change to racial discrimination, digital rights, and the situations in Palestine, Venezuela and Belarus. No general debates are scheduled this session, but several high-level interactive dialogues will take place throughout the four weeks.

The Human Rights Council, which meets three times a year, is the UN’s primary intergovernmental body dedicated to the promotion and protection of human rights around the world. Its 59th session will include reports from special rapporteurs, commissions of inquiry and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.

Rights advocates say they hope the international community will not lose focus on Afghanistan amid competing global crises. “This is a pivotal moment,” Nouri said. “The world must not abandon Afghan women.”

Source: amu.tv

https://amu.tv/180591/

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Pakistan names women’s squad for AFC qualifiers amid bid to elevate football’s profile

Arab News Pakistan

June 15, 2025

ISLAMABAD: The Pakistan Football Federation (PFF) on Saturday unveiled its squad for the AFC Women’s Asian Cup 2026 Qualifiers, as the country seeks to uplift its women’s football program and strengthen its profile in a sport where its men’s team has also struggled to gain traction.

Pakistan’s men’s national team, briefly competitive in regional tournaments in the decades following independence, has long languished near the bottom of Asian rankings amid administrative issues and lack of sustained investment.

In contrast, women’s football in Pakistan began to take shape in the early 2000s, with the formation of the country’s first women’s football clubs in 2002 and the launch of the National Women’s Football Championship in 2005.

“The Pakistan Football Federation has named a squad for the upcoming AFC Women’s Asian Cup 2026 Qualifiers, set to take place in Jakarta, Indonesia from June 29 to July 5,” said the PFF in a statement.

Placed in Group E, the team will open its campaign on June 29 against Chinese Taipei, confront host Indonesia on July 2 and conclude the group stage against Kyrgyzstan on July 5.

Athletes have recently expanded into Olympic swimming and achieved international success in javelin, demonstrating a broader ambition to elevate sports beyond one stronghold.

Pakistan will be seeking its first-ever Women’s Asian Cup appearance, while the men’s side continues to fight for relevance amid FIFA rankings that reached a historic low before recent suspensions were lifted.

Pakistan’s national women’s football team was officially formed in 2010 and has yet to qualify for a Women’s Asian Cup or World Cup, but played in multiple SAFF Championships and remained a bright spot in domestic football.

Source: Www.Arabnews.com

https://www.arabnews.com/node/2604523/pakistan

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‘Pakistan-born’ woman booked in UP’s Bareilly for procuring fake Aadhaar, ration card

by Manish Sahu

June 15, 2025

The Uttar Pradesh Police on Friday booked a 68-year-old woman of Pakistani origin in Bareilly for allegedly obtaining an Aadhaar card and ration card through fraudulent means. The woman has been residing in India for nearly six decades on a long-term visa.

The police said that during a campaign to spot Bangladeshi and Pakistani nationals staying illegally in the district, they received a tip-off about a Pakistan-born woman allegedly availing of benefits of government schemes using forged documents.

The case has been filed against the woman, identified as Farhad Sultana, under relevant sections of the Citizenship Act and for cheating at the Baradari police station, said a police officer.

The police learned that Sultana, born in Karachi, arrived in India in 1965 at the age of eight with her mother and sister, on a long-term visa.

Source: Indianexpress.Com

https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/lucknow/pakistan-born-woman-booked-in-ups-bareilly-for-procuring-fake-aadhaar-ration-card-10067350/

Courtesy: New Age Islam

The post The Taliban Tried To Stop Lida Mangal From Employing Afghan Women appeared first on SabrangIndia.

He rode camels because they were available

He ate dates because they grew around him

He used Arabic because it was his mother tongue

He covered his head because the sun demanded it.

He used miswak because toothbrushes hadn’t been invented.

He used kohl (surma) because it was a protection against desert sun and sand.

The desert terrain was hot, rough, and full of dust, dirt, and animal waste. He wore his lower garments above the ankles for hygiene, mobility, and durability, not as a divine dress code.

These were tools of his time, not eternal truths

But somehow today, we turn them into markers of piety as if Islam is a costume, not a conscience. Following the Prophet’s Arabian culture is NOT Sunnah.

No my dear Muslim friends. No.

A Muslim in a white thawb is seen as more religious than one in dhoti or any traditional dress

A woman in black abaya is called modest, but one in a saree or jeans with dignity is questioned

A child who learns Arabic alphabets is praised — even if he doesn’t understand them, but a child who reads Quran in Hindi is advised to learn how to read in Arabic.

What are we preserving – faith or performance?

We live in India. Not in tribal Quraysh.Not in the sands of Najd.

But in a country of poetry, diversity, art, and ancient spirituality. We live among Sikhs who believe in service, Hindus who light lamps for love, Jains who preach nonviolence, and Buddhists who renounce hatred.

And instead of growing with that beauty – we fear becoming “less Muslim” or  if we smile during Holi, or greet a neighbour on Diwali, or say – merry Christmas, or light a diya in remembrance, or visit a Gurdwara to pay respect.

Why is your Islam so weak it breaks with kindness?

The Prophet taught mercy, truth, and wisdom.Not brand loyalty to the Arabian Peninsula.

If Islam was meant to be Arab-only, it would’ve stayed there. But it travelled. It adapted.

It bloomed in Persia, Africa, Indonesia, and yes even India.

So why are we now trying to reverse it into cultural regression, when the message was meant to transcend culture?

You can be deeply Muslim and proudly Indian.

You can pray in Arabic and speak in Tamil, Hindi, English, Sanskrit. You can use Chandan, Jasmine, not Oudh necessarily

You can fast in Ramadan and share sweets on Diwali.

You can follow the Sunnah and wear a saree.

You can love the Quran and still find peace in Kabir’s dohas, in Rahim’s couplets, in Amir Khusrau’s verses

You follow Muhammad and still love Guru Nanak. You can listen to Hadith and still listen to Ramayana or read Guru Granth Sahib.

This isn’t syncretism. This is the soul of Indian Islam – a soul that once healed, harmonized, and humbled. Islam doesn’t demand imitation. It demands intention.

You have made culture your qibla, not truth. The Prophet didn’t teach us to erase our identity

He taught us to elevate it with integrity, not imitation.

So yes – you can be deeply Muslim and unapologetically Indian. You are still stronger because you allow your faith to coexist with diversity – the beauty of our country!!

Posted by Munaz Anjum on his Facebook

(https://www.facebook.com/share/p/18f76Liet1/)

The post Not everything the Prophet practiced was religion  appeared first on SabrangIndia.

• Why did I use the term Islamist instead of Islamic?

My Response: The term Islamic is a broad, neutral adjective that refers to anything related to Islam—its religion, culture, civilization, and traditions. It applies to concepts like Islamic art (art influenced by Islamic culture) and Islamic law (Sharia, the ethical and legal framework derived from Islamic principles). This term does not carry any inherent political meaning.

Islamist, on the other hand, is a more specific term with political connotations. It refers to individuals, movements, or ideologies that seek to implement Islamic principles in governance and society, often advocating for a political order based on their interpretation of Islam. While some Islamists pursue their goals through democratic means, others adopt more radical or militant approaches. Importantly, Islamist does not equate to Islamic—not all Muslims are Islamists, and Islamism represents a distinct political ideology rather than the religion itself.

The choice of Islamist in my article was deliberate. It accurately reflects the political dimension of the subject being discussed, distinguishing it from the broader religious or cultural aspects of Islam. Precision in terminology is essential, especially when addressing political ideologies or movements within the Islamic world.

• Another criticism levelled at my work is that it merely presents others’ viewpoints without a clear, cohesive argument.

My Response: This critique misinterprets the article’s purpose. Far from lacking direction, my work deliberately highlights the diversity of perspectives on secularism and Islam—concepts that are inherently contested and open to multiple interpretations. The absence of a rigid, singular definition is not a flaw but a reflection of the discourse itself.

Contrary to the claim that my argument is unclear, I explicitly advocate for secularism as religious neutrality and Sarva Dharma Samabhava—equal respect for all religions. This framework stands in direct opposition to theocratic visions promoted by Islamist groups, which reject pluralism in favour of a monolithic religious order.

Rather than weakening my case, the inclusion of diverse perspectives strengthens it. By engaging with a spectrum of viewpoints, I demonstrate the complexity of the debate while reinforcing secularism as the most viable model for a pluralistic society like India. My article is not a passive compilation of opinions but a structured, purposeful defence of secularism—one that gains depth, not dilution, from the multiplicity of voices it engages.

• What we now call secular values—human rights, equality, compassion, and justice—are deeply rooted in religious morality. Modern secular societies did not emerge in isolation; rather, they evolved from centuries of religious teachings that laid the groundwork for these principles. Paradoxical as it may seem, secular values originate from religion itself, making secularism an inherent part of religious traditions rather than a departure from them.

My Response: I do agree. Secularism is not inherently anti-religious but can align with religious values by promoting neutrality, freedom, and equality. It ensures the state doesn’t favour any religion, protecting religious diversity and allowing all faiths to coexist peacefully. This aligns with religious principles like freedom of conscience (e.g., “no compulsion in religion” in Islam) and treating others with respect (e.g., “love thy neighbour” in Christianity). Secularism also fosters collaboration on shared goals like social justice, reflecting religious values of compassion and service. By separating religion from state power, it prevents extremism and respects moral autonomy, allowing individuals to practice their faith freely. In essence, secularism supports religious values by creating a fair, inclusive society where diverse beliefs thrive.

• The term “Islamism” originated in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Initially, it was used in European languages as a neutral synonym for Islam, much like “Christianism” for Christianity. Early Western writers, including Voltaire and Encyclopædia Britannica (first edition, 1771), used “Islamism” simply to refer to the religion of Islam.

My Response: Islamism and Islam are used interchangeably. Most Islamophobes adopts this method. This approach is wrong. This is equal to equating of Hindutva with Hinduism and Zionism with Judaism.

• Islam itself is however already an “-ism” – given this, why did European languages create “Islamism” instead of just using “Islam”?

My Response: The term “Islamism” was indeed coined in European languages to create a clear distinction between Islam as a religion and the political movements or ideologies that seek to implement Islamic principles in governance and society. While “Islam” refers to the faith, spirituality, and practices of Muslims, “Islamism” specifically denotes political ideologies that advocate for the implementation of Islamic law (Sharia) and the establishment of Islamic-based political systems. This distinction emerged in the late 20th century as a way to analyse the political dimensions of Islam separately from its spiritual and theological aspects, providing clarity in discussions about religion versus ideology.

However, the distinction between Islam and Islamism is not always clear-cut, and the term “Islamism” itself has been subject to debate. It can oversimplify the diversity of political movements within the Muslim world and may be used to stigmatize legitimate political expressions of Islamic identity.

The interpretation of Islamic values is a topic of ongoing debate, particularly between Islamists and those who prioritize Quranic values. Islamists often focus on implementing Sharia law, emphasizing legalistic interpretations over broader ethical values. In contrast, the Quran highlights values such as justice, mercy, compassion, and human dignity. One of the fundamental principles of the Quran is freedom of religion, as stated in verse 2:256, “There is no compulsion in religion.” However, some Islamist movements have been accused of imposing religious practices, undermining this principle.

The Quran also promotes fraternity and equality, envisioning the ummah (global Muslim community) as a brotherhood of equals. Nevertheless, some Islamist regimes have faced criticism for fostering sectarianism and discrimination. Individual self-determinism is another key value in the Quran, emphasizing personal responsibility and individual accountability. In contrast, Islamist ideologies often prioritize collective identity over individual freedoms. The Quran is clear in its advocacy for justice, fairness, and human rights, including those of women and minorities. However, some Islamist policies have been criticized for being discriminatory or unjust, particularly toward women and religious minorities. In addition, the Quran encourages coexistence and dialogue among diverse groups, promoting pluralism and diversity. Unfortunately, some Islamist movements reject pluralism, seeking to establish homogeneous Islamic states. The Quran promotes peace and reconciliation, yet some Islamist groups have been linked to violent extremism, contradicting these principles.

Finally, the Quran advocates for economic justice, prohibiting usury and mandating charity (zakat). While Islamist attempts to implement Islamic economic systems have had mixed success in achieving justice, the importance of economic fairness remains a core Islamic value.

• The term “Islamist” has developed a pejorative connotation, especially in modern political discourse. While Islamic governance has existed for centuries—without the need for a distinct label—”Islamism” emerged in Western discourse to specifically refer to political movements advocating for governance based on Islamic principles, with an implicit tone of disapproval.

My Response: You are right. The term “Islamist” has become a focal point in the broader issue of Islamophobia, reflecting and reinforcing deeply ingrained biases in Western discourse. Historically, the West’s engagement with the Islamic world—from colonialism to the Cold War and the post-9/11 era—has shaped a narrative that associates Islam with backwardness, violence, and authoritarianism. This narrative has been perpetuated through the pejorative use of “Islamist,” which is often applied indiscriminately to a wide range of Islamic political movements, from moderate reformers to extremist groups. By conflating these diverse movements under a single, stigmatized label, the term contributes to a perception that Islam itself is inherently incompatible with democracy or modernity. This framing not only delegitimizes legitimate political expressions of Islam but also fuels Islamophobia by portraying Muslims as a monolithic group prone to extremism. The lack of equivalent terms for religiously motivated movements in other faiths, such as “Christian democracy” or “Hindu nationalism,” underscores the double standard at play, further entrenching stereotypes and fostering fear and mistrust of Muslim communities.

• Your article is about “Why Quranic Principles Advocate Secular Democracy Over Theocracy” is not about “making a compelling case for secularism as the best model for a pluralistic society like India.” India is not even mentioned in the article and rightly so because what has India to do with Why Quranic Principles Advocate Secular Democracy Over Theocracy? You seem to have lost track of what the article is about.

My Response: My critique presents a theoretical and theological challenge to the imposition of Sharia within political Islam, examining its far-reaching implications for societal structures, governance frameworks, and individual liberties. At its core, my argument questions whether enforcing Sharia as state law aligns with fundamental principles of legal pluralism, human rights, and the separation of religion and state.

A critical analysis reveals that such enforcement poses significant risks, including marginalizing non-Muslim communities and silencing dissenting voices within Muslim societies. It also risks clashing with universal human rights standards, particularly in areas such as gender equality, freedom of religion, and freedom of expression.

From a theological perspective, my critique emphasizes that Sharia is not a monolithic entity, but rather a complex and dynamic system subject to diverse interpretations shaped by historical, cultural, and contextual factors. Rigid enforcement of Sharia within modern political systems disregards its inherent adaptability, distorting its original principles and fostering authoritarianism—where religious elites consolidate power, stifling intellectual and social progress.

Politically, my critique contests the exploitation of Sharia as a means of consolidating power and exerting control over populations, thereby exacerbating societal fractures and eroding social cohesion. A comprehensive review of historical precedents and comparative analyses demonstrates that imposing religious law often leads to the suppression of dissenting voices and the erosion of individual liberties.

Ultimately, my critique calls for a critical reassessment of Sharia’s role in modern governance. It advocates a framework that safeguards legal pluralism, human rights, and the separation of religion and state—fostering a more inclusive, tolerant, and equitable society.

• The (Iranian) regime is not corrupt; it is principled. It has prioritized principles over political compromises. It faces sanctions because it supports Palestine—ironically, as a Shia state, it is the only one backing Sunni Palestine. The suffering of its citizens is primarily due to sanctions and military spending for national defence. Iran remains the only Muslim state capable of standing up to the U.S. in conventional warfare, making it the last bastion that the U.S. and Israel seek to bring down.

My Response: While Iran adheres to a distinct ideological framework, its governance is driven by both principled and pragmatic considerations, with internal power struggles and instances of corruption undermining the system’s integrity. The significant economic influence wielded by the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) and political elites has raised allegations of nepotism and financial malfeasance. Moreover, prioritizing principles over pragmatic political compromises is not inherently virtuous if it results in widespread hardship for citizens.

A balanced approach is essential—one that upholds fundamental principles while carefully considering their impact on human welfare. Iran’s troubling human rights record, as seen in the case of Mahsa Amini, highlights the urgent need for such scrutiny.

While sanctions and military expenditures contribute significantly to economic difficulties, internal economic mismanagement and political repression also play substantial roles. Many Iranians hold their government accountable for economic struggles, citing corruption, lack of transparency, and crackdowns on dissent. The government’s resource allocation, such as funding regional militias versus domestic welfare initiatives, is a contentious issue debated among Iranians themselves. Rather than being merely a victim of external pressures, the Iranian regime actively shapes its domestic and regional realities, with consequences both positive and negative.

• “The notion that Islam requires the integration of religion and state is a historical development, not a Quranic mandate.” “Fight until there is no more oppression and injustice and the Law of Allah prevails.” (Q.8:39)

My Response: This verse can be interpreted in another way. A humanistic interpretation of Q.8:39 would focus on the broader ethical and moral principles it conveys, emphasizing themes of justice, freedom, and the pursuit of a harmonious society. From this perspective, the verse could be understood as a call to resist oppression and work toward a world where human dignity, equality, and fairness are upheld. The “Law of Allah” could be interpreted symbolically as a universal moral order that aligns with humanistic values such as compassion, justice, and the common good. The emphasis on ceasing hostilities if the opposition stops (“if they desist”) could be seen as a call for reconciliation and peace, highlighting the importance of resolving conflicts through dialogue and mutual understanding rather than violence. This aligns with humanistic ideals of nonviolence and the belief in the potential for positive change in human behaviour. The reading would focus on the underlying message of striving for a just and equitable world, where all individuals are free from oppression and can live in dignity and peace. It would encourage reflection on how these principles can be applied in contemporary contexts to promote social justice and human flourishing.

• Q. 5:44 clearly affirms that governance must align with divine law.

My Response: Q.5:44 emphasizes the importance of divine guidance in governance and justice, reflecting the principle that laws should align with moral and ethical values rooted in faith. From a Quranic perspective, this verse can be understood as a call for governance that upholds justice, compassion, and the dignity of all human beings. Divine law, in this context, is not merely a rigid set of rules but a framework that seeks to promote the well-being of individuals and society. It emphasizes accountability, fairness, and the protection of human rights, which are universal values shared across cultures and faiths. I interpret divine law as a means to foster a just and equitable society where the welfare of people is prioritized. It encourages leaders to govern with wisdom, mercy, and a deep sense of responsibility toward all members of society, regardless of their faith or background. This aligns with the broader Islamic principle of Rahmah (mercy) and the concept of Maqasid al-Shariah (the higher objectives of Islamic law), which include the preservation of life, intellect, faith, lineage, and property. In essence, governance aligned with divine law, from an Islamic humanistic viewpoint, is one that serves humanity, promotes justice, and ensures the dignity and rights of all individuals are respected and protected. It is a call to integrate spiritual and ethical principles into leadership, ensuring that power is exercised with humility and a commitment to the common good.

• Islamic governance, in both theory and practice, incorporated consultation, judicial impartiality, and legal pluralism—values that align with modern democratic ideals.

My Response: My critique of contemporary political Islamists centres on their deviation from the historical and ethical principles of Islamic governance, rather than an attack on Islam itself. Many modern political Islamist movements have distorted these principles, centralizing power, side-lining diverse voices, and imposing rigid, exclusionary interpretations of Sharia. These movements often prioritize ideological purity over practical governance, using religion as a tool for political control rather than a means to promote justice and welfare. For example, the concept of hakimiyyah (sovereignty of God) has been weaponized to justify authoritarian rule, while the dynamic and adaptive spirit of early Islamic law, exemplified by ijtihad (independent reasoning), is often ignored. This rigidity leads to the suppression of dissent, the marginalization of women and minorities, and a failure to address pressing socio-economic challenges. Moreover, the politicization of religion by these groups undermines the spiritual and ethical dimensions of Islam, reducing it to a mechanism for power consolidation. By rejecting democratic principles as “Western impositions,” many political Islamists alienate broader populations, particularly the youth, who seek inclusive and pragmatic solutions to modern problems. My critique targets the authoritarian, exclusionary, and rigid practices of contemporary political Islamists, which diverge sharply from the pluralistic, consultative, and justice-oriented spirit of early Islamic governance. By reclaiming these historical principles, it is possible to envision a form of governance that is both authentically Islamic and aligned with the aspirations of modern societies for fairness, inclusivity, and good governance.

(V.A. Mohamad Ashrof is an independent Indian scholar specializing in Islamic humanism. With a deep commitment to advancing Quranic hermeneutics that prioritize human well-being, peace, and progress, his work aims to foster a just society, encourage critical thinking, and promote inclusive discourse and peaceful coexistence. He is dedicated to creating pathways for meaningful social change and intellectual growth through his scholarship. He can be reached at vamashrof@gmail.com)

Courtesy: New Age Islam

The post The inherent problem with political Islam appeared first on SabrangIndia.

On the day, Ex-Muslims International, a coalition of ex-Muslim groups and activists, is calling on women to remove their hijab and for men to wear it as a humorous way of highlighting a serious violation of women’s rights.

Of course, adults who want to wear the hijab should be able to. (Child veiling is a different matter and nothing less than child abuse.) But it’s important to recognise that on a mass and global scale, innumerable women and girls are coerced into wearing it in order to comply with Islam’s modesty rules. Acquiescence to coercion or religious directives is not the same as choice. Until women are allowed to refuse or remove it, there is no real choice involved. Choice must be preceded at the very least by legal, social, and sexual equality for it to have any real meaning.

Algerian sociologist Marieme Helie Lucas says that the use of the word ‘choice’ regarding the wearing of the hijab is reminiscent of an old debate on

workers’ ‘freedom to work’ at the time of Britain’s industrialisation, i.e. a time when in order to not actually starve and die, workers’ only ‘free choice’ was to work 14 hours a day in hellish circumstances that also killed many of them, including women and children under the age of 10.

Islamists and the religious right always gift-wrap their rules as ‘choices’ and ‘rights’ to manufacture consent and legitimacy when they are not in power. When they are, their imperatives on women are always backed by threats of hell, shunning, violence, morality police, and even imprisonment and murder. The killing of Jina Mahsa Amini in Iran, which sparked the Woman, Life, Freedom revolution in 2022, is a clear example of the level of violence used by the religious right—and also the contestation of and resistance to it that exists there and everywhere.

To defend the hijab, apologists and Islamists even use the slogan ‘My Body, My Choice’, which came out of the feminist movement in the 1960s during the fight for abortion rights. A more accurate slogan would be ‘Woman’s Body, Man’s Choice’.

The call for men to don the hijab on No Hijab Day is to show that modesty is always the remit of women. How many times have we seen a woman in full burqa walking behind a man dressed in shorts and a T-shirt? This is because men will apparently not cause fitnah, or chaos, in society if they show their hair. Rivers will not run dry. Earthquakes will not follow from seeing men’s bare heads. And men certainly don’t fill hell; immodest and ungrateful women do. Hence why there is never a men’s modest clothing line sold at M&S and Dolce & Gabbana.

Modesty culture sexualises girls from a young age and puts the onus on them to protect themselves. In her 2005 book Bas les voiles! (Veils Off!), Chahdortt Djavann argues that the psychological damage done to girls from a very young age by making them responsible for men’s arousal is immense and builds fear and feelings of disgust for the female body. It also removes male accountability for violence, positioning men as predators unable to control their urges if faced with an unveiled or ‘improperly’ veiled girl or woman. It feeds into rape culture. Women are to be either protected or raped depending on how well they guard their modesty and the honour of their male guardians. Many an Islamist has absurdly argued that modesty is an important deterrent for society’s well-being: if unveiled women mix freely with men, women will lead men astray and will need to be stoned to death for adultery, so better to prevent such an outcome from the get-go by imposing modesty rules on women!

It is important to note that the hijab is the most visible symbol of a broader, all-encompassing system of sex apartheid that uses systematic violence and terror to oppress, persecute, and kill women in order to deny them equality and autonomy and exclude them in every field, including education, employment, health, the law, and the family and from public and political life. It means, for example, that a woman’s testimony is worth half that of a man’s, that she cannot travel or work or study without her male guardian, that she must use a separate entrance to access government buildings, that she must sit at the back of the bus… In Afghanistan, this system is so heinous that the International Criminal Court Prosecutor has announced this month that he will seek arrest warrants against Taliban leaders over the persecution of women and girls.

Diane Nash, a leader of the 1960s US Civil Rights Movement, once said:

Segregation was humiliating. Just the reality of signs that said you couldn’t use front doors or you couldn’t use this water fountain implied that you were subhuman… Every time I complied with a sign, I felt like I was acquiescing to my own inhumanity. I felt outraged and hated it.

Similarly, sex apartheid is humiliating and deems half the population subhuman. This is why a global campaign is calling for sex apartheid (also known as gender apartheid) to be considered a crime against humanity like racial apartheid.

Despite the cost to the lives of women and girls, criticism of the hijab is often labelled ‘Islamophobic’. But as Egyptian feminist Aliaa Magda El Mahdy has put it, ‘Hijab is sexism, not anti-racism’.

In a recent submission to the Women and Equalities Committee’s session around ‘Gendered Islamophobia’, Southall Black Sisters, One Law for All, and Council of Ex-Muslims of Britain stated:

The term Islamophobia…carries a problematic history. Anti-racists may use the term to refer to attacks on Muslims but the term Islamophobia has the effect of moving these experiences from an analysis of structural, systemic, and institutionalised racism to an irrational individualised fear or ‘phobia’ of Islam. It erases the connections with other forms of racism, which are often manifestations of exactly the same axis of power, violence, ideology and policies [thus shutting down much-needed conversations about women’s rights].

No Hijab Day’s theme this year is #HijabSilences (as a subversion of World Hijab Day’s theme #HijabisUnsilence), which speaks directly to the hijab’s role in erasing and silencing women and girls.

As the Ex-Muslims International statement says:

A symbol that has been used to shame, control, and suppress women cannot be used to combat intolerance and racism. A sexist tool to control and erase women is antithetical to women’s empowerment and visibility. Whilst anti-Muslim bigotry and xenophobia are undeniable, racism cannot be combatted with sexism and the hijab, rooted in modesty culture and oppression.

No Hijab Day stands in solidarity with women who resist… [and] calls for global recognition of the struggle against sex apartheid and the hijab and a commitment to supporting the fight for women’s freedom, equality, and rights.

How to take part in No Hijab Day

We are calling on women of all beliefs and backgrounds to take off their hijabs and put them on a man on 1 February. Men should also feel free to don a hijab in solidarity.

Use this opportunity to spark meaningful conversations about purity culture in Islam, challenge sex apartheid, and show your solidarity with ex-Muslim, Iranian, Afghan, and other women around the world who refuse to wear the hijab.

Share your thoughts, experiences, and support using #NoHijabDay and #HijabSilences.

Let your voice inspire real change for women’s rights.

Maryam Namazie is an Iranian-born campaigner, writer and Spokesperson of the Council of Ex-Muslims of Britain and One Law for All. Author photograph: Emma Park.

Courtesy: The Freethinkers

The post Ex-Muslims observe ‘No Hijab Day’ appeared first on SabrangIndia.

History of Kumbh Mela

The history of the Kumbh Mela goes back to the Hindu myths of Samudra Manthan, or the churning of ocean, which was done by the Gods and the Demons, to obtain invaluable jewels and amrita, the nectar of immortality. In the churning, the God Dhanvantari appeared with a pot in his hand filled with amrita. The son of Lord Indra, Jayant, saw the pot and snatched it from the hands of God Dhanvantari and ran to prevent the demons from consuming the amrita and becoming immortal. Jayant ran for 12 days, while taking rest at 4 places in a 3 days interval, Haridwar, Prayag, Nashik – Trimbakeshwar and Ujjain. At all these four places when Jayant stopped, he spilled some of the amrita, giving these places mystical powers. All these four places are located at the banks of holy rivers, Haridwar located on the banks of Ganga, Prayagraj has the confluence of the Ganga, Yamuna and the mythical river Saraswati, Ujjain has the Kshipra, and Nashik – Trimbakeshwar has the Godavari, often referred as Ganga of the South. It is believed that by taking a dip in these holy rivers during Kumbh, washes away one’s sins and helps them gain punya (spiritual merit).

As per divine counting, one day for the Gods is considered to be equal to one year for the humans. And therefore, every three years, Kumbh Mela takes place in one of the four cities of Prayag, Haridwar, Nashik – Trimbakeshwar and Ujjain. Normal Kumbh Mela takes place every three years, whereas the Ardh Kumbh Mela is held every six years at Haridwar and Prayagraj, and the Purna Kumbh Mela takes place every four years in one of the four cities based on the locations of planets. The Maha Kumbh Mela takes place once in 144 years at Prayagraj, after 12 Purna Kumbh Melas, as per the official website of the Kumbh Mela.

The location of Kumbh Mela is determined by the location of the Sun, moon and Jupiter in different zodiac signs in that time period.

Maha Kumbh 2025

The festivities and the celebrations in this year’s Kumbh is expected to be more extravagant than all previous iterations. With the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) ruling both in the Centre and the state of U.P., the event is expected to be more overt. The festival is viewed by many to be a potential symbol of Hindu unity and power. Backed by huge state resources and widespread PR campaigns, this year’s Maha Kumbh is expected to be the most expensive on record. Estimated 40 to 45 crore visitors are expected to visit the Maha Kumbh in Prayagraj, as reported by the Economic Times.

As per reports, a sum of 7,000 crore Rupees has been spent by the U.P. State Government on the Maha Kumbh Mela of 2025 on infrastructure projects and sanitation facilities, with nationwide posters of Chief Minister of U.P., Hindu monk Adityanath Yogi, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi on promotional material for the Maha Kumbh, 2025. 

The festival has also become a ground for sowing seeds of communal tensions between Hindus and Muslims thus making it the most polarised Kumbh Mela in history. One of the senior-most priests of the festival, Mahant Durganand Bhramachari, stated that “Kumbh Mela is a great convergence of humans, gods and our sacred rivers”, and expressed concern and dismay over attempts at using the festival to promote sectarianism and religious divide in the country.

He further added stating that “What bothers me this time is how some people are trying to polarise the atmosphere on communal lines. There has to be peaceful coexistence and hate should have no place. We see some people are trying to create Hindu-Muslim tensions,” as reported by the Guardian.

Digital innovations and AI have also been used to help with multiple problems faced by chaotic and large–scale festivities. Thousands of drones have been employed to monitor the security at the celebration. Meanwhile, devotees have each been given radio frequency wristbands to help locate lost family members that might get separated in the crowd.

While the Kumbh Mela is celebrated to promote spirituality, there have been various shortcomings with regards to the organization of the event as well as behaviours of extremist Hindu devotees who have used the festival and attempted to incite communal disparity.

Communal Disparity

The Maha Kumbh which is a spiritual and religious festival for Hindus has sadly become a ground for promoting communal disparity and rising communal tensions due to various instances. Even the Government has diverted its attention from major concerns such as the cleanliness of the rivers Ganga and Yamuna and the efficient management of the Maha Kumbh, towards petty issues creating further rifts between the Hindus and the Muslims. 

• Prohibiting Muslims from participating in the Maha Kumbh

The All India Akhara Parishad (AIAP), which has been formed by the Saints and Sadhus of 13 affiliated Akharas, has been pushing for banning the entry of Muslims and their business participation as well from the Maha Kumbh Mela, 2025. For the first time the AIAP is taking active steps by garnering support of other devotees and saints in banning the participation of Muslims and restricting their business activities in the Mela.

The rationale behind this demand of the AIAP stems out of an incident during the Kanwar Yatra, where allegedly Muslim hotels and restaurants served non-vegetarian food to the devotees taking part in the Yatra, thus hurting their religious sentiment. This, the Akhara Parishad argues, justifies their demands of restricting the participation of Muslims from the Mela.

​​Maulana Mufti Shahabuddin Razvi Barelvi, National President of the All India Muslim Jamaat, has requested the U.P. Government to intervene. He stated that “The Akhara Parishad’s decision is fostering division and promoting communalism. Such actions only serve to create rifts in society. I urge the state government to reverse this decision and take strong action against those spreading communal hatred,” as reported by India Tomorrow.

Shankaracharya Avimukteshwaranand Saraswati, supported the decision of the Akhara Parishad by arguing that just as Hindus are not allowed to visit Mecca and Madina, even Muslims should not be allowed to participate in the Maha Kumbh. He stated that “Mecca and Madina are Muslim sacred sites, and Hindus are restricted from going there. Similarly, the Kumbh is our religious festival; Muslims should have no business being involved.”

While Shankaracharya’s statement provides prima facie support to the claims of the Akhara Parishad, his claims are based on unfounded reasoning. Mecca and Madina are hosted in foreign countries and the Indian Government only exercises jurisdiction over events in India. Furthermore, with India’s history of co–existence between the Hindu and Muslim religions and taking part in each other’s festival, it is only right to allow Muslims to be a part of the biggest Hindu festival of the century.

Jamiat Ulama-e-Hind’s Uttar Pradesh legal advisor, Maulana Kaab Rashidi stated that “Such calls violate the rights enshrined in the Constitution because India is known all over the world as a secular country. So, talking about banning Muslims from Maha Kumbh is like crushing the soul of the Constitution,” as reported by Livemint.

Even the U.P. Chief Minister, Adityanath Yogi has become a part of the controversy as he stated that “Anyone who has respect for India and Sanatan traditions can come to Kumbh….people with bad mentality should not go there….they may face problems,” as reported by the Deccan Herald.

Reference can be made here to Gandhiji’s reflections of the Kumbh Mela of 1915 in his famous book My Experiments with Truth. While traveling from Saharanpur to Kumbh Mela in Haridwar, Gandhiji highlighted the inhumane conditions in which people had to travel. He then went ahead to focus on the prevalent religious prejudices, where orthodox Hindus would not consume water if the person offering them the same was Musalmani. By witnessing the dividing of food and beverages on religious lines, Gandhiji understood the extent of religious polarisation in the country. He expressed his disappointment at such a state of affairs.

These attempts at restricting the entry and business activities of Muslims in the Maha Kumbh furthers the rift between the society and becomes a ground for promoting cultural disparity in a country where different religions and cultures have coexisted for a long time.

• Fake news

Outrage sparked on January 10, 2025, as a man was caught urinating on one of the banners for Maha Kumbh in Raebareli. Media outlets and users of social media soon gave the incident a communal twist, circulating videos of the man being verbally and physically assaulted for his actions.

UttarPradesh.ORG News shared a video of the man being abused on X and said that a man from “another community” was thrashed by locals on accusations of urinating on a poster of Maha Kumbh.

Multiple users shared similar videos of the incident and labelled the man as a Muslim terrorist and expressed their concerns causing outrage over social media handles.

However, on 11 January, 2025, Raebareli police issued a statement clarifying that the name of the accused was Vinod, a Hindu vendor, and the claims that the man belonged to “another community” were entirely false. According to the statement of the Police, the accused was in an intoxicated state and urinated 3-4 feet away from the wall that had the poster and banners of Maha Kumbh, however, people present at the scene soon surrounded him and began accusing him of being from another community and started assaulting him, as reported by ALT News.

Such incidents reflect the deeply entrenched stereotypes and prejudices in the minds of people which get flared up and are exaggerated further by social media posts and false new reporting. A question however arises here, why such accusations are attributed to the Muslim community alone? Why is it that when any miscreant does any action to disturb the peace, the first assumption is made regarding his religion and his labelled as a Muslim terrorist.

There have also been incidents where people have assumed false identities as a Muslim and threatened violence just to worsen the communal rifts in our country. In the first week of January, a post on social media emerged, where a user named Nasar Pathan threatened a bomb blast at the Maha Kumbh taking the lives of at least 1000 devotees. However, after investigation by the Police, it was revealed that a student of class 11th, Ayush Kumar Jaiswal had created this fake account under the name of Nasar Pathan and posted the threat on social media handles, which spread like a wildfire, as reported by The Quint.

This incident is a recent case of a concerning trend where people impersonate themselves as Muslims to spread hateful content, make threats, or commit crimes.

This trend has become a cause of concern as it is being used to spread communal hatred and hamper the societal structure of India.

• Heightened cultural sensitivity amongst Hindus

A man was beaten up by Sadhus at the Maha Kumbh Mela, 2025, for dressing up as a sheikh at the festival. The man, who is a social media influencer, dressed as a sheikh identifying himself as Sheikh Premanand at the festival, to film content. Not much later he caught the attention of Sadhus who found his attire and his behaviour as outrageous towards their religious feelings, and physically assaulted him. His actions were perceived by the Sadhus as offensive towards the holy place and the festival, as reported by Munsif News.

However, this incident raises severe concerns about the declining cultural sensitivities of Hindus, where a man’s attire was enough to be offended upon.

Is our faith in our religion so weak that a man dressed as a sheikh could shake it, and force us to take action against him to protect our religion from his clothes of a different religion?

• Hate Speech

Yati Narsinghanand, a right-wing Hindu priest, has caused an uproar after his recent statements regarding the Maha Kumbh. The priest added another thread to the Islamophobic narrative he has been weaving by making various hate speech comments in the past as well.

The priest said that “This might be the last Maha Kumbh Mela if the population of jihadists increases and they make India an Islamic nation. Even a single temple will not be left.” He further added that “Not just temples, if the number of jihadists increases there will not be a single woman left in your house nor my house.”

The 58–year old priest has faced various criminal cases and complaints for making communally charged statements under the Indian law for hate speech. Despite his Islamophobic and misogynistic comments, Yati Narsinghanand has been allowed to roam scot–free even after having been arrested multiple times, as reported by the Siasat Daily.

On January 21, 2025, two individuals including a journalist were arrested in U.P. for allegedly making offensive comments on Maha Kumbh on social media. The content of the two individuals offended the members of the Hindu community, which led the authorities to issue alerts and increase social media monitoring, as reported by Hindustan Times.

Kamran Alvi, a journalist, was arrested after his remarks were found offensive. SHO Alok Mani Tripathi stated that “The accused was promptly arrested, and a case was registered under section 299 (deliberate and malicious acts, intended to outrage religious feelings of any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs) of the BNS Act for insulting religious symbols. He will be presented in the court.”

In a separate case, SHO Amit Pratap Singh stated that, “Abhishek Kumar, a resident of Boja village near Jaidpur, made objectionable remarks on social media about Hindu deities and the Maha Kumbh. A case has been registered and the accused arrested.”

Critics have pointed out the double–standards adopted by the Police in dealing with cases regarding hate speech. Individuals such as Yati Narsinghanand roam scot–free and remain outside the reach of law after making hateful comments, whereas reporters from minority communities or even the ones who report instances of hate speech are immediately arrested.

Plight of Sanitation Workers

The Maha Kumbh, 2025, which is expected to have more than 40 crore devotees take a dip in the holy Triveni Sangam, the confluence of Ganga, Yamuna and mythical Saraswati, is the largest ever religious gathering.

The expected footfall poses the significant challenge of sanitation and public health. The organisers have installed more than 1,50,000 temporary toilets across the campsite on the river banks, and more than 5,000 workers have been hired to clean those toilets nearly all of whom belong to the lower rung of the archaic and rigid societal hierarchy that divides Hindus based on their roles and functions in the community. As per the official data, 9 out of the 10 sanitation workers are from marginalized communities, majority of them being Dalit, also known as the “untouchables”, as reported by The Wire.

Cleaning a toilet piled with faecal matter, Suresh Valmiki, a sanitation worker said that “I clean and clean, but people make a mess of it in barely ten minutes.” 

Five years ago, when the festival was held, Prime Minister Narendra Modi washed the feet of five sanitation workers. Many say that the move, which came 3 months before the general election, was an attempt to appeal to Hindu unity casting aside age-old caste differences in the Hindu society. However, not much has changed for the marginalised sanitation workers. 

Pyare Lal, a sanitation worker employed at the Maha Kumbh said that “Now, this grand Maha Kumbh is being organised, there are so many ads of ‘luxurious Kumbh’ but did anything change for us sanitation workers.” He further added, “We have been watching ads for Tent City, but nothing has changed in our tents.” Pyare Lal lives in one corner of the Maha Kumbh in a make-shift tent with no proper supply of electricity or water.

As reported by The Print, several sanitation workers also complained that they applied for a house under the Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana (PMAY), however, they have not heard anything back from the authorities, and find their futures bleak.

The jobs of sanitation workers have been made even more difficult as there are no water connections in the toilets, which has been done purposefully by the organisers to avoid the frequent suctioning of the septic tanks. As a result, the users must fill a bucket of water from a tap outside, and to avoid the same, the users carry bottles with them which they dump inside the toilet, increasing the work and difficulty for the cleaners.

A cleaner named Geeta Valmiki said, “People say it’s our job to clean the toilets, so why should they bother?” 

The plight of the sanitation workers highlights the lackadaisical attitude of the Government regarding protecting the basic human rights and the right to dignity of the cleaners. Further, not proper awareness campaigns have been conducted by the Government for the devotees who are visiting the Maha Kumbh, regarding maintaining cleanliness and the usage of toilets to avoid the over–exploitation of cleaners.

Furthermore, the abysmally inadequate and insufficient pay provided to the sanitation workers is a matter of concern. The workers who are spending all their time cleaning up after others use the toilet facilities, are being paid a daily wage of less than Rs500.

All these concerns raise questions about the management of the Maha Kumbh Mela, 2025 and the unabashed disregard towards the violation of human rights of the sanitation workers.

Influencing Media Coverage

In December 2024, the publicity wing of the Uttar Pradesh government, published a letter directing how the reporters and journalists should cover the Maha Kumbh Mela, 2025 while praising the exemplary work done by the ruling government for the organisation of the event.

The festival presents itself as a great opportunity for the journalists to report on the celebrations, however, the U.P. government has made sure to spoon–feed the journalists as to how the festival should be reported and covered in news.

The letter contains 70 detailed themes that the reporters could potentially cover, along with directions to approach the stories and whom to interview for every particular story.

Shishir, the director of the information and public relations department of the Uttar Pradesh government, sent the document to editors in Lucknow, emphasizing the need to focus on the “pre–determined” themes as mentioned in the document.

As reported by The Wire, Shishir stated “As the Mahakumbh draws closer, various related topics of immediate relevance are likely to emerge. Alongside addressing such immediate concerns, our aim is to focus on the predetermined themes as well.” 

This attempt by the government to thwart the journalists and reporters to report the festival based on their own perspectives and perception, and hampering the most fundamental element of the media, its freedom, is alarming.

Impact on Environment and Public Health

Kumbh Mela, which was recognized as an intangible cultural heritage of humanity by the United Nations, Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 2017, poses significant environmental and health risks that need to be mitigated.

While the World Health Organisation (WHO) has noted that due to increase in seasonal epidemics in respiratory influenza, the acute respiratory infections increase at this time of the year, along with the alert in India over the spread of the Human Metapneumovirus (HMPV), mass gatherings such as Maha Kumbh, may pose serious health risks.

An article published in Travel Medicine and Infectious Disease in 2024, available on the Researchgate website, stated that “The upcoming Kumbh Mela [2025], one of the largest religious gatherings globally, is expected to draw millions of pilgrims across India and beyond. While this event is deeply rooted in tradition and spirituality, it also presents significant public health challenges.”

Further, as per a study published by the Journal of Travel Medicine, it has been indicated that “acute respiratory infections, fever, skin disorders, diarrhoea and other infectious diseases like influenza, gastroenteritis, chickenpox, hepatitis etc can spread more easily during the Kumbh Mela because of the numerous religious events, cramped living quarters, and solid and liquid waste produced throughout the event.”

There have been various outbreaks of diseases and sporadic epidemics at the Kumbh Mela previously as well, such as in 1892, 1948, and in the 1960s, as per a report published by the International Journal of Infectious Diseases. The earliest documented record of such epidemics is the outbreak of Cholera in the year 1817.

It is also to be noted that the Kumbh Mela in 2021 had a huge impact of large gatherings which played a significant factor in the rise of COVID–19 cases.

As reported by LiveMint, Upper Mela Officer Vivek Chaturvedi has mentioned that continuous workshops are being conducted for the doctors and consultants so that they are fully equipped to handle any situation.

Further, the influx of millions of devotees has the potential to severely damage the ecological balance and harm the biodiversity. Fouling of rivers to a large number of bathers harms the aquatic ecosystem. Due to close proximity of a large number of people, the risk of water–borne diseases also drastically increases.

With millions of devotees expected to visit this year’s Maha Kumbh, the health and environmental risks are higher than ever, and would require constant monitoring and extensive efforts by the Government to mitigate the same.

Other issues with the management of Maha Kumbh

While the major challenges posed by the Maha Kumbh have been discussed, there are multiple other instances which reflect inefficient planning and management at the end of the Government.

• Stampede

In Uttar Pradesh’s Jhansi, as the devotees rushed to board a train at the Veerangana Laxmibai Railway Station, panic ensued due to a stampede. Officials reported that as the train was being repositioned, the devotees mistook the train’s movement for repositioning as departure and rushed to board the train, whereby two individuals narrowly escaped being run over by the train as reported by ETV Bharat. This incident that stemmed from a misunderstanding, led to chaos which could have claimed lives of multiple people present there.

This incident reflects the lack of vigilance and proper management of large crowds by the authorities which could have resulted in a tragic accident.

• Fire at the Kumbh Mela

In another incident, the tent city that has been set up by the Government to accommodate the visitors at the Maha Kumbh, became a centre of attention as a tragic fire consumed approximately 180 cottages, 70 to 80 huts, more than 10 tents, and goods worth crores. The fire began as a result of a gas cylinder leak in the Geeta Press Gorakhpur camp’s kitchen. Although there have been no casualties due to the fire, one individual suffered injuries while attempting to escape from the fire as reported by Financial Express. After the incident, the U.P. Government issued a fire safety advisory to all the camps at the Maha Kumbh Mela. The advisory consists of detailed important guidelines to be followed by individuals to avoid any such incidents in the future and for smooth functioning of the Maha Kumbh Mela.

However, it is pertinent to note here that potential of such incidents was not taken into account and the Government is attempting to address every challenge as it props up. Had such advisory and mandatory guidelines been issued beforehand, huge damages could have been prevented and the fire at the Maha Kumbh Mela could have been avoided.

• Use of Technology 

The Government has efficiently employed technology and Artificial Intelligence (AI) for the better management of the Maha Kumbh. The Integrated Command and Control Centre (ICCC) which was originally built for Kumbh Mela – 2019, has been upgraded with latest technology to better manage and monitor the large volume of crowd expected at the festival. “Around 1,650 new CCTV cameras, 24 ANPR cameras, 40 VMCDs, 100 smart parking systems, and AI components for crown management and vehicle counting have been installed for Maha Kumbh, 2025,” as reported by the Times of India.

Crowd management and surveillance systems have been ramped up with AI controlled CCTV cameras. Pilgrims have been given Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) wristbands to ensure their safety and security. Predictive models have been used for better resource management. Internet of Things (IoT) has increased energy efficiency by optimizing electricity usage, enabling sensors in trash cans to notify when they need to be emptied, monitoring water quality of the river, etc. as reported by Boston Institute of Analytics.

With the use of technology and AI for management of Maha Kumbh, it becomes imperative to ask why such revolutionary technologies and methods are not used for crowd management and control in cases of any riots or public unrest? Why is such technology not used for better resource management in cases of natural disasters? The potential benefits of technology are vast and the same must be used by the Government in times of crisis for better management of situations.

Conclusion

The Maha Kumbh, 2025 holds special religious value for the devotees as it is celebrated once every 144 years. The festival promotes spirituality and the religious sentiments in devotees, as millions of people from the World gather to celebrate Maha Kumbh. While this is a remarkable cultural event, it poses various challenges that need to be addressed. The festival is being used by certain individuals to create communal disparity, and harm the social fabric of our society. While the sanitation workers are in a plight as their right to dignity is being violated and they are forced to work in inhumane conditions at less than subpar pay, the journalists and reporters face challenges as the most basic element of media, its freedom is being taken away. Various other instances also reflect the need for better management by the Government of the celebration. For Maha Kumbh to be truly successful, the government must ensure inclusivity, uphold human rights, address environmental and public health concerns, and prioritize effective planning and transparency to make it a celebration that truly honours its spiritual and cultural significance.

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Afghanistan and Pakistan are the countries wherein this monster is all set to eat violently those who nurtured it for their own vested interests. This left doing politics, normal living, and meeting people all at risk. And thousands of children, the elderly, and young people have fallen victim to it.

Media and scholarly, academic reports reveal that Muslims living in the West too are now influenced by their preachers and imams. They have begun to believe in sectarian conflicts as well as emotional slogans like a revival of the old Caliphate. Amazingly, thousands of youth born and bred in the West were recruited or joined the forces of the fake Caliphate established by the notorious Abubakar Al-Baghdadi a decade ago?

Pakistan was created in the name of Islam, but what is the condition of Islamic ideology there? What is the sanctity of a human life? From time to time, a fanatic mob would rise, blaming a person for blasphemy. No matter whether he is a Muslim or non-Muslim, it would kill him in cold blood or often burn him alive. The police simply watch the spectacle, indeed, occasionally participate in the crime. Later, religious people would start justifying the heinous act by citing old jurists and their fatwas. And secularists and liberals would start condemning the act. The administration remains deaf and dumb. Judiciary very seldom takes suo motu cognizance. After a few days, the matter is normalised.  The cruel bloody mob then goes out in search of another prey. All businesses of life and religion continue to thrive!

The killing of the then Governor of Punjab Salman Taseer by his own official bodyguard a few years ago on fake charges of blasphemy is a case in point. The dastardly killer was then turned into a saint! The presumably educated advocates in Pakistani courts threw rose petals over him when he came to face the charges of murder. After his execution, his grave has been turned into a shrine. Thousands visit it regularly to pay their obeisance. What Fanaticism!

While the West is thinking of building colonies on Mars and China is conquering new vistas with AI, what is the favourite pastime of the great Muslim ulama, clergy and religious scholars of Pakistan and India, indeed even Bangladesh?  It is to make ordinary Muslims blindly believe in unverifiable predictions about the appearance of the supposed Imam Mahdi. These people are saying, day in and day out, particularly sice the genocide of Palestinians started, that Dajjal is about to come out and Mahdi has to appear and after that Jesus will come and the rule of Islam is just about to be established on the whole planet.

Religious Muslims are generally simple-minded and naive. They believe in these myths. They do not feel the need to move forward in the world. Our task should be to promote science and technology, indeed first create a scientific temperament among the rank and file of Muslims.

 History shows that this situation will finally lead to the point when the political leaders will have to resort to fighting the monster of their own making as Pakistan is compelled to do with the Taliban now. Muslim clergy and ulama in the Indian subcontinent must also repent and take a vow never to use religion for political purposes. If Muslims come to this point, they must put before them some hard facts to eradicate extremism from its foundation.

First, this demon of extremism did not come down from heaven directly. It is a cherished baby born of religious thought which is taught and studied in our religious schools and madrasas under different titles, such as the enforcement of Sharia, Jihad and eradication of infidelity, polytheism, apostasy, etc. Radicalised people and extremist movements draw inspiration from this traditional theology. They propagate it for their dastardly purposes. This prominent religious thought and its political interpretations popularly called Political Islam have been logically criticized by some thinkers and brilliant minds of Islam like Maulana Waheeduddin Khan and Javed Ahmad Ghamdi. Had there not been stirring uproar, protests, and threats from ulama in the face of scientific reasoning, certainly the thought of these thinkers would have changed people’s minds and popular narratives.

Now to counter the religious radicalism in Muslim societies we have to develop a counter-narrative to the propagated traditional religious thought. Still, it is unfortunate and tragic for Muslim societies that violence and extremism prevail to protect religion and preserve Sharia.

Unfortunately, the culture of disagreement with politeness and respect has not yet developed. These situations require us to be sensitive to freedom of opinion in religious ideas and thinking. And to be frank, our clerics and religious preachers exert a policy of pressure to prevent the freedom to express free opinion. If they want to reveal the error to those who disagree with them, they can do so in an open way by resorting to the weapon of knowledge and reasoning. The world of knowledge does not accommodate compulsion, protests, uproar, and tyranny. It is a counter-narrative of popular religious thought presented by the likes of Mr. Ghamidi that alone can reform the situation in the Muslim community, not propaganda of secularism or anti-religionism. Iqbal the poet and philosopher tried a century ago to draw our attention to the same truth in his lectures on the need for reconstruction of religious thought that he delivered in Aligarh and elsewhere. Sir Syed and his school of thought made the same effort.

Second, in secular fields, we do not allow someone to establish institutions to graduate children and boys as doctors, engineers, or skilled in any division and department of science and arts. This cannot be done without giving Muslim children general education for twelve years or so. But children and young people are trained as religious scholars in madrasas and centres of religious learning. These madrasas close the door of modern learning on them altogether and play with their future lives. Some of them could have been doctors, some of them engineers, poets, writers, photographers, etc.. But these madrasas, regardless of their aptitude, taste, inclinations, or qualifications, make great efforts to make them religious scholars only and deprive them of all opportunities to choose an area of science and art of their own choice.  They cut their ties to society and made them aliens in their own societies by depriving them of general public education for twelve years. Therefore, it has become necessary to prohibit religious schools, like all other institutes of specialized education, from interfering with a student without giving him general education up to 12 grade.

We can say with confidence that this one step alone will change the current situation created by the institutes of religious education. As Founder-Editor of NewAgeIslam.com, Mr. Sultan Shahin told the UN Human Rights Council at Geneva some time ago, madrasa education is the biggest violation of the human rights of Muslim children. Every child has the right to acquire general education before going in  for specialisation in any field. If we don’t give our children medical or engineering education at the age of five, then why burden them with theology at such a tender age. Young children and adolescents need general education first. They should have the choice to go in for any specialisation they want.

Thirdly, it is necessary to end the dominance of clerics and preachers of hate in masjids and mosques. They generally use Friday pulpits for their vested interests in Muslim societies. If we don’t do this, we cannot escape extremism. Who does not know that the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) established a Sunnah regarding the Friday prayer? It was that the Imam (head of government) or whoever he appoints is entitled to lead the Friday prayer and deliver the sermon. No one else is permitted to use this pulpit unless they have this specific instruction from the ruler.

However, throughout the decadent age, Muslim monarchs typically lacked the necessary tools to perform this function. They gave the Friday pulpits to the clergy and Ulama. Since then, the Ulama and clergy have gained such clout that they utilize Jumma (Friday) sermons and mosque pulpits to push their objectives and vested interests in Muslim societies.

This has resulted in deepening the sectarian lines. Now separated along sectarian and Fiqhi lines,  in lieu of God’s mosques we have Ahle Hadis mosques and the Hanaf mosques, Deobandi mosques, and the Barelvi mosques, etc. They ought to be God’s mosques alone wherein worship of Allah is practiced.

 Mosques are now becoming hubs for extremism and sectarianism. The mosque must be run by a collective management of Muslims and should not be used by individuals, movements, or organizations to spread a particular theological or political message. Mosques are houses of God. They must not be transformed  into sites of conflict and disunity among Muslims. They should never be used to radicalise Muslims for a particular purpose. This is an essential step.

Research Associate with Centre for Promotion of Educational and Cultural Advancement of Muslims of India, AMU Aligarh.

Courtesy: New Age Islam

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