The violence did not end on the street. Singh was allegedly chased towards his third-floor residence and attacked again. His family heard him screaming. When his son opened the door, he reportedly found several men kicking and punching his father. Singh was eventually taken to hospital with severe injuries. He died the following morning.

A Manipuri music teacher, Chongtham Vikram Singh, living in Delhi’s Ashram area was mob lynched by 8 people following a dispute over alleged noise and nuisance outside his residence.

Police said seven accused have been arrested and a minor detained in connection with the case.… pic.twitter.com/4V0LVeVLiJ

— Mohammed Zubair (@zoo_bear) September 7, 2026

Delhi, India. A music teacher from Manipur beaten to death at Kilokari under Sunlight colony police station, South Delhi. Chongtham Vikram has been residing in the area for atleast 10years in the area. He objected to loud noises and nuisance created in front of his house. What… pic.twitter.com/CJm0P5ZFAy

— huidrom athouba (@HuidromAthouba) September 7, 2026

The police have arrested seven adults and apprehended a juvenile. The FIR invokes Section 103(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita along with Section 3(5). Section 103(2) is particularly significant because it concerns group murder where specified identity-based grounds are alleged.

Singh was a Meitei from Manipur living in Delhi. Northeast community organisations have specifically demanded that the possibility of identity-based targeting be investigated. The North East Media Forum, while acknowledging that the motive remains under investigation, called for any possibility of racial or identity-based targeting to be thoroughly examined, pointing to continuing concerns over discrimination and intimidation faced by people from the Northeast.

According to The Hindu, Singh’s son told police that his father had mentioned being threatened by people associated with the nearby dhaba after earlier complaints about excessive noise. If established, that would make the incident considerably more serious than a spontaneous altercation: it would raise questions about a pattern of intimidation that preceded the fatal assault.

Arrests are not accountability

There is an uncomfortable history behind the reactions from Northeast communities. People from the Northeast living in Delhi have repeatedly spoken about racial stereotyping, slurs, discrimination and violence. That history is precisely why the killing of a Manipuri man inside the national capital cannot be understood only through the immediate trigger alleged by the police.

The Delhi Police have arrested the accused and the administration has promised lawful action. Union Minister Kiren Rijiju has said that a strong chargesheet will be filed within two weeks. The Indian Express reported that CCTV recordings captured the accused leaving the building after the assault and, around ten minutes later, Singh’s family carrying him towards hospital.

Congress president Mallikarjun Kharge described the killing as a “chilling reminder” of what he called “utter lawlessness” under the BJP government. Congress leader and Leader of Opposition, Lok Sabha Rahul Gandhi asked what Union Home Minister Amit Shah’s Ministry of Home Affairs and the Delhi Police were doing to stop what he described as growing lawlessness, particularly against people from the Northeast. Arvind Kejriwal also condemned the killing, while Manipur MP Bimol Akoijam demanded exemplary punishment.

Chongtham Vikram Singh ji, a renowned musician from Manipur, went downstairs to ask some men to lower the noise outside his home. He was beaten to death for it.

A father, killed outside his own home, in his own country’s capital. After many such incidents, every Northeast family…

— Rahul Gandhi (@RahulGandhi) September 8, 2026

The merciless lynching of Chongtham Vikram Singh ji, a well-known musician from Manipur, by a mob is yet another chilling reminder of the utter lawlessness under the BJP.

Students are unsafe. Women face atrocities every day. People from Northeast India face discrimination.… pic.twitter.com/uGfjNCYvbn

— Mallikarjun Kharge (@kharge) September 8, 2026

The senseless murder of renowned musician from Manipur, Chongtham Vikram Singh ji, in the heart of Delhi is a national shame. He was brutally beaten and murdered only for asking some people to make less noise.

Is this what it’s come to? Is there no safety for a young father…

— Priyanka Gandhi Vadra (@priyankagandhi) September 8, 2026

The streets are already asking the question

People gathered outside Sunlight Colony Police Station demanding justice. A candlelight march was held. Northeast student and community organisations condemned the killing. These protests are not simply demands for punishment after a murder. They reflect a deeper anxiety: if a person can be attacked outside his own home after objecting to a disturbance, what protection does an ordinary Northeast resident actually have?

The North East Students’ Society at Delhi University and the North East Media Forum have both demanded a serious and impartial investigation. Their insistence that identity-based targeting be examined is important precisely because the burden of proving whether prejudice played a role lies with the investigation—not with the victim’s community.

A Manipuri (Meitei) music teacher Chongtham Vikram was beaten to death yesterday by at least 6-7 men in Ashram, New Delhi.

The men, allegedly drunk, came to his house and beat him to death after he objected to them over making noise at the night at the dhaba just opposite his… pic.twitter.com/c97JkpC9BV

— Meitei Heritage Society (@meiteiheritage) September 7, 2026

Who was Chongtham Vikram Singh?

Chongtham Vikram Singh was a guitarist associated with Manipur’s early rock music movement, having performed with bands including Ultra Vires, Phoenix and Eastern Dark. He had spent years teaching music in Delhi and had built a life there. He was the son of celebrated Manipuri singer Chongtham Kamala, associated with Matamgi Manipur, widely regarded as the first Manipuri feature film. His cousin Lakshmipriya Devi directed Boong, the first Indian film to win a BAFTA. For nearly 17 years, Delhi was his home.

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Pune’s DJ Controversy, Ganeshotsav and Assault: The politics of who gets to make noise

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Two women journalists allege police assault after questioning Delhi CM, say attack intensified after police heard they were Muslim

The post Beaten to Death Outside His Own Home: What Delhi owes Chongtham Vikram Singh appeared first on SabrangIndia.

According to KPSS, a communication dated August 23 and attributed to an outfit calling itself the United Liberation Council (ULC) has surfaced on social media. The communication reportedly carries the names and personal details of Kashmiri Pandit employees. The organisation says security agencies are examining its authenticity and origin, while reports have described the ULC as a suspected Lashkar-e-Taiba-linked proxy. KPSS stresses that irrespective of the eventual findings of the investigation, the circulation of a communication containing identifiable personal information is serious enough to warrant an immediate, transparent and credible security response.

The distinction is important. The press release does not present the authenticity of the threat as an established fact; rather, it calls for the authorities to investigate precisely that question. What KPSS argues is that the potential danger cannot be measured merely by whether the communication is ultimately proven genuine. The very fact that personal details of individuals are allegedly being circulated in a threatening context raises questions about how the information was obtained, who prepared and disseminated the material, and whether any local network or facilitation was involved.

SabrangIndia’s detailed reports featuring conversations with Sanjay Tickoo, president of the Kashmiri Pandit Sangharsh Samiti, on the two threatening letters can be read here, here and here.

A new medium for an old language of fear

For KPSS, the significance of the episode lies not only in the contents of the alleged threat but in the history it evokes. The organisation draws a direct parallel with the forms of intimidation experienced by Kashmiri Pandits in the 1990s. Threats that once travelled through walls, posters, mosque loudspeakers and whispered warnings can now circulate through social media, digital platforms and encrypted channels. The technology may have changed, but, KPSS argues, the psychological objective remains disturbingly familiar: creating the perception that a Kashmiri Pandit’s birthplace is conditional, his property negotiable, his presence temporary and his safety dependent upon the permission of others.

That history makes the present threat particularly significant for those who have attempted to return to or continue living in the Valley. KPSS argues that a Kashmiri Pandit does not become an outsider because extraordinary circumstances forced him or her to leave an ancestral home. Nor does the passage of decades erase ancestral belonging. The organisation frames the right to remember one’s home, return to it and live there without fear as questions of belonging and security rather than matters for which the community should have to seek permission or sympathy.

‘Brotherhood’ cannot replace protection

The press release also takes issue with recent remarks attributed to BJP General Secretary (Organisation), J&K, Ashok Koul, reportedly made at Tirth Raj Kapal Mochan Nagbal in Shopian while speaking about the return of Kashmiri Pandits and the need for social cohesion. According to KPSS, Koul was reported as saying that “targeted killings won’t stop” while emphasising the need to build brotherhood. KPSS says the statement should not be sensationalised or selectively interpreted, but argues that it nevertheless raises an unavoidable question: what does security mean for a community being encouraged to return if targeted violence is presented as something that may continue?

The organisation’s objection is not to the idea of brotherhood itself. It explicitly recognises social harmony as indispensable. Its argument is that social harmony cannot be treated as a substitute for institutional protection. “Brotherhood” without security, KPSS contends, risks becoming an appeal made to those who are already vulnerable while leaving the structural conditions of that vulnerability untouched. Protection requires functioning security mechanisms, intelligence, accountability and preventive action—not simply assurances following an incident.

The question is therefore not whether Kashmiri Pandits should have faith in their neighbours or in Kashmir’s pluralistic traditions. It is whether institutions can guarantee that such faith does not require them to accept an unacceptable level of risk.

The burden of return

KPSS also highlights what it sees as a contradiction in the political and social discourse surrounding the return of Kashmiri Pandits. The community’s return has frequently been described as essential to restoring Kashmir’s pluralistic character. Yet, the organisation argues, returning Pandits are repeatedly asked to adjust to the prevailing situation; concerns over security are met with assurances that conditions are improving; questions over ancestral property are directed towards the future; and when threats emerge again, those same individuals are expected to display patience and faith.

This leads to the central question posed by the press release: How many times must the victim prove his commitment to Kashmir before Kashmir proves its commitment to him?

For KPSS, the answer cannot be another appeal to resilience. Returning home should not require extraordinary courage. It should be an ordinary exercise of citizenship.

Avoiding collective blame—but not collective denial

The press release is also careful to distinguish between militant violence and the wider Kashmiri population. KPSS states that the majority community should not be collectively held responsible for crimes committed by militants, and that the actions of a few should not be indiscriminately attributed to an entire society. At the same time, however, it argues that society must be willing to examine the environment in which intimidation can emerge, personal information can circulate and threats can again be directed at a vulnerable minority.

This distinction is central to the organisation’s argument. Rejecting collective blame, it suggests, cannot mean refusing to examine the social and institutional conditions that allow threats to emerge or circulate.

The real test of security, KPSS argues, is not the response after violence has occurred but whether warning signs are recognised before they become violence. A society’s commitment to its minority communities cannot be measured only by the solidarity expressed after a killing; it must also be measured by whether people can live, work, worship, own property and return to their homes without having to first become victims for their humanity to be acknowledged.

What investigators must establish

The organisation’s most concrete demand is for scrutiny of the threat itself. Rather than reducing the episode to the question of whether a poster or digital communication is authentic, KPSS asks authorities to establish who prepared it, who circulated it, how the personal details were obtained, whether it represents a genuine operational threat, and whether there was any local facilitation or network involved in its preparation or dissemination.

These questions have a significance beyond this particular incident. If personal information belonging to vulnerable employees has been obtained and circulated in a threatening communication, determining the source and pathway of that information is essential to assessing the seriousness of the threat and preventing further targeting. KPSS consequently characterises these not as political questions but as security questions requiring credible answers.

Return must mean more than physical presence

The final portion of the press release turns from the immediate threat to the larger question of what a meaningful return of Kashmiri Pandits would actually entail. KPSS argues that genuine brotherhood must manifest itself through protection, institutional accountability, social vigilance and an unequivocal rejection of intimidation. It says Kashmiri Pandits do not need ceremonial expressions of solidarity but confidence that their lives will be protected before violence occurs. They also need safeguards for ancestral property and institutions capable of identifying threats before they become fatal.

The organisation’s broader concern is that Kashmir cannot convincingly claim to have moved beyond the past if threats against Kashmiri Pandits continue to reproduce the same underlying fear, even through different mediums and under different circumstances. The question, as KPSS frames it, is stark: will Kashmiri Pandits be able to return and live as equal citizens, or will every return continue to carry the warning that their presence is temporary and their safety uncertain?

Its demands are consequently straightforward: threats must be investigated, security must be guaranteed, personal information must be protected, ancestral property rights must be safeguarded, and the right to return must be treated as a matter of security and justice rather than courage and chance.

The complete press release may be read below:

Related:

‘Wherever You Go, We are watching’: Second threat letter to Kashmiri Pandits

How Can Rehabilitation Work If We Are Not Safe?’ Sanjay Tickoo on the fresh threat to Kashmiri Pandit employees

This is what we feared: Sanjay Tickoo on the rising attacks in Kashmir since March

Pleas of non-migrant Kashmiri Pandits have fallen on deaf ears: Sanjay Tickoo

Time has come to go on fast unto death: Sanjay Tickoo

Kashmiri Pandit leader Sanjay Tickoo talks about Governor’s Rule in J&K

A Kashmiri Pandit fact-checks The Kashmir Files

10 reasons why Kashmiri Pandits feel betrayed in the Valley

The post KPSS: Kashmiri Pandits need security, not ceremonial brotherhood appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Sabrang India has accessed the latest letter through the Kashmiri Pandit Sangharsh Samiti (KPSS) but is withholding publication for security risks and reasons. The communication which names around half a dozen Kashmiri Pandits and identifies their residential locations in different parts of Jammu. The individuals have been described as “white collar terrorists” and “traitors” allegedly working for their “masters” in Delhi. The letter, purportedly signed by an individual named Ahmed Bilal and issued in the name of the United Liberation Council (ULC), carries an explicit warning: “wherever you are and wherever you go, we are watching your every move.”

Security agencies are examining the authenticity of both letters and attempting to identify those behind them. Officials have previously suggested that the ULC could be another front or shadow organisation of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). The group first surfaced publicly in July, when it issued a poster marking the death anniversary of Hizbul Mujahideen commander Burhan Wani, according to officials cited by The Indian Express.

What makes the latest communication particularly alarming is its apparent attempt to establish a distinction within the Kashmiri Pandit community itself. The letter reportedly claims that Kashmiri Pandits who remained in the Valley after the mass migration of the 1990s are not its target and are “safe”. Its threats are instead directed at those who migrated and subsequently returned to Kashmir for government employment, as well as individuals accused by the letter of attempting to implement an “RSS agenda” in the Valley. That distinction is significant because the latest threats appear closely tied to the government’s rehabilitation and employment programme for displaced Kashmiri Pandits.

The detailed report on the first threatening letter may be read here.

A second letter, a deeper concern

The latest communication follows an earlier threat letter circulated online earlier this month. That letter reportedly named Kashmiri Pandit employees working in the Revenue Department and published their phone numbers. According to The Indian Express, the communication attempted to associate their government duties with the seizure of properties allegedly linked to terrorists.

The first letter had already triggered significant security concerns. The Jammu and Kashmir administration reportedly instructed departments to allow Kashmiri Pandit employees to remain away from work and advised them to stay alert and move to safer locations if necessary. There was, however, no publicly available formal order governing the reported work-from-home arrangement. Different accounts placed the period of leave at August 20, August 25 or until Independence Day.

The second letter changes the nature of the threat. The earlier communication exposed telephone numbers. The latest reportedly exposes residential addresses, down to the house and street level. According to the Indian Express, officials said this is the first time in several decades that threat communications targeting Kashmiri Pandits have reportedly contained such precise residential information. That raises a question that goes beyond the contents of the letters themselves: how are individuals issuing anonymous threats gaining access to such detailed information?

Sanjay Tickoo: ‘How can the government talk about return when it cannot guarantee safety?’

Speaking to Sabrang India on the second threat letter, Sanjay Tickoo, president of the Kashmiri Pandit Sangharsh Samiti, sharply questioned the political narrative around the return of Kashmiri Pandits to the Valley. He pointed specifically to remarks by Jammu and Kashmir BJP General Secretary (Organisation) Ashok Koul, who, while speaking in Shopian, described the return of Kashmiri Pandits as a positive development but said that targeted killings would not stop and that the community would have to face challenges and struggle while rebuilding their lives in Kashmir. For Tickoo, the statement exposes a fundamental contradiction. “How can he say targeted killings won’t stop?” he asked, arguing that if the government accepts targeted violence as an unavoidable reality, then the Union government must also acknowledge the failure of its security and rehabilitation policies rather than celebrating the return of Kashmiri Pandits without addressing the risks they face. He questioned the idea of presenting the return of Pandits as a success while employees continue to fear for their lives.

Tickoo also pointed to what he described as an even more alarming development in the second letter: additional personal information has reportedly been exposed, including the registration number of one employee’s vehicle. According to him, this suggests that the problem may extend beyond information already available on social media and raises questions about possible leaks from within the departments where Kashmiri Pandit employees work. He argued that the increasing presence of PM Package employees across government departments has made them more visible, but also potentially more vulnerable, particularly if confidential information is being accessed by people within or around those institutions. Tickoo questioned the government’s repeated attribution of the threats to an alleged Lashkar-e-Taiba offshoot without first establishing how such precise information is reaching those issuing the threats.

He also raised concerns about overground workers (OGWs) and the security network within government institutions. Referring to reports that hundreds of suspected OGWs had been re-arrested ahead of Independence Day, Tickoo drew a parallel with the 1990s and claimed that, based on his experience, people associated with overground militant networks have existed across different government departments. His concern, he said, is not about labelling individuals without evidence, but about the inability of ordinary employees to know who may have access to their personal information or who can potentially compromise their security. If the government says the threats originate from a LeT-linked group, he asked, how can it establish that conclusively rather than simply attribute every such incident to an organisation operating from across the border?

For Tickoo, the government’s handling of the work-from-home arrangement further demonstrates the problem. Even after the first threat letter, he said, there was no clear official communication informing Kashmiri Pandit employees that they could work from home. The decision was instead conveyed informally, with Independence Day security arrangements becoming an additional reason for employees to remain away from their workplaces. Now that the second letter has emerged, Tickoo said, there is again no clarity over whether employees are expected to return to their offices or continue working from home. “What now?” is the question confronting employees who have already been named and identified.

At the heart of Tickoo’s concern is what he describes as a security problem that may be internal as much as external. The government may identify a militant organisation behind the threats, but that does not answer how the names, phone numbers, residential addresses and even vehicle details of vulnerable employees are reaching those circulating the letters. Tickoo argues that the increasing visibility of Kashmiri Pandits employed across government departments under the PM Package must be accompanied by a corresponding system of protection and data security. Otherwise, the very employment programme intended to facilitate rehabilitation could make employees easier to identify and target.

He also questioned the repeated denial of threats by the Union government and the Lieutenant Governor’s administration since 2019. If authorities continue to insist that there is no broader threat to Kashmiri Pandits, Tickoo asks, how will the latest series of threats, the circulation of increasingly detailed personal information and the continuing fear among employees ever be addressed? For him, the issue is no longer simply whether another threat letter is genuine. It is whether the State is prepared to acknowledge the insecurity faced by the community—and take responsibility for making its promised return to the Valley genuinely safe.

Notably, in his conversation with Sabrang India after the first threat emerged, Tickoo had argued that the latest threat cannot be treated as an isolated incident. For him, the more troubling question is how personal information of Prime Minister’s Package employees continues to reach those issuing threats. Tickoo said that lists containing the names and details of package employees have been circulating on social media for years, including after the 2022 threats, and alleged that the information being used in the latest episode is drawn from the same publicly available lists.

He said the government must establish how such information is being accessed and circulated and why, despite repeated meetings with the Home Department since 2022, no effective solution has emerged. He also pointed to the contradiction at the heart of the rehabilitation policy: employees are expected to return to Kashmir and continue living and working in the Valley, but when threats emerge, they are asked to remain indoors or leave for safer locations. “If such situations happen, Kashmiri Pandits feel unsafe and then move out,” Tickoo said, arguing that they then risk losing the limited benefits attached to a package that requires them to continue living and working in the Valley.

He further questioned the absence of a formal government order directing employees to stay home, suggesting that authorities often avoid putting such decisions in writing because doing so would amount to acknowledging a security failure and could invite legal scrutiny. For Tickoo, the said episode is therefore not merely about another threat letter; it is about the erosion of confidence in the security establishment and the growing contradiction between asking Kashmiri Pandits to return and failing to make that return secure and sustainable.

The detailed report may be read here.

The issue is particularly sensitive because the targeted employees are not simply members of the Kashmiri Pandit community. They are among those who have returned to the Valley under the government’s rehabilitation and employment framework.

Around 6,000 Kashmiri Pandits have been provided government employment under the Prime Minister’s Special Employment Package, introduced in 2010 to facilitate the return and rehabilitation of those displaced from Kashmir following the outbreak of armed insurgency in 1990. The package was designed around the idea that employment could help facilitate the community’s return to the Valley. But the latest developments expose the vulnerability at the heart of that model.

Employees are encouraged to return to Kashmir to work. Yet when threats emerge, they are advised not to attend their workplaces, remain indoors or move to safer locations. Those specifically named in the threats have reportedly been shifted to Jammu. The contradiction is increasingly difficult to ignore: a policy premised on return cannot be sustained if returning employees repeatedly have to be evacuated for their own safety.

The shadow of 2022

The latest threats also carry the memory of the violence of 2022. That year, militants carried out a series of targeted attacks against Kashmiri Pandit employees, killing five. The attacks triggered prolonged protests by employees appointed under the Prime Minister’s Package, who demanded that they be transferred out of the Valley and posted in Jammu. The government did not agree to permanently transfer them to Jammu. Instead, employees were moved to locations in Srinagar and other parts of the Valley considered comparatively safer. The protests exposed a fundamental disagreement over the meaning of rehabilitation.

For the employees, safety was a precondition to remaining in Kashmir. For the government, continued employment in the Valley remained central to the rehabilitation framework. The latest threats have brought that unresolved tension back to the surface.

‘This threat should not be taken lightly’

The seriousness of the situation has also been acknowledged by the political leadership. After the first letter had surfaced, Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister Omar Abdullah had warned that the threats against Kashmiri Pandit employees could not be taken lightly, particularly given the history of targeted killings of minorities in the Valley.

He said that some employees had wanted to leave following the earlier threats but had effectively been confined to their camps for security reasons. According to NDTV, he called for action against those responsible and urged authorities to ensure the safety of Kashmiri Pandit employees.

National Conference president Farooq Abdullah, after the first threat, called for the Union Home Ministry to investigate the threats and questioned why Kashmiri Pandits have been specifically targeted when people of different faiths continue to live and work in Kashmir. He also questioned the use of social media to circulate the threats and asked who was behind the communications.

Security concerns are widening

The threats have emerged amid a broader deterioration in the security environment in parts of Kashmir. On July 22, a policeman was killed in Anantnag town after terrorists allegedly fired at him at close range. Nine days later, on July 31, two migrant workers from Chhattisgarh were killed at a brick kiln in Kulgam. The incidents have contributed to renewed concerns about the vulnerability of civilians, migrant workers and minorities.

The security environment has also affected the Amarnath Yatra. The pilgrimage began on July 3 and was scheduled to continue until August 28. The traditional Anantnag-Pahalgam route was suspended on July 23, while the Yatra was subsequently curtailed and suspended from August 9. Officials cited low pilgrim footfall, weather advisories and repair work on the tracks among the reasons for the changes. It is against this backdrop that the second threat letter has surfaced.

Related:

How Can Rehabilitation Work If We Are Not Safe?’ Sanjay Tickoo on the fresh threat to Kashmiri Pandit employees

This is what we feared: Sanjay Tickoo on the rising attacks in Kashmir since March

Pleas of non-migrant Kashmiri Pandits have fallen on deaf ears: Sanjay Tickoo

Time has come to go on fast unto death: Sanjay Tickoo

Kashmiri Pandit leader Sanjay Tickoo talks about Governor’s Rule in J&K

A Kashmiri Pandit fact-checks The Kashmir Files

10 reasons why Kashmiri Pandits feel betrayed in the Valley

The post ‘Wherever You Go, We are watching’: Second threat letter to Kashmiri Pandits appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The Indian Express, in a social media post said, “A man was beaten to death in Jharkhand’s Chatra district on Tuesday (Aug 4) morning after villagers accused him of confining a minor girl and sexually assaulting her. A top officer in the administration said the allegations of confinement and sexual assault are yet to be confirmed. The father of the man beaten to death has filed a police complaint, and an FIR has been registered under several sections, including one related to mob lynching.

The team visited the village eight days after the incident on August 12, met the family members of Imroj, the survivor victim girl, neighbours and the in-charge of Tandwa Police Station. The team comprised representatives of Jharkhand Janadhikar Mahasabha, Karwan e Mohabbat, Sajha Kadam and United Milli Forum.

The team learnt that a mob of Bargaon’s Hindu villagers led by local BJP leader and husband of Panchayat Mukhiya Vijay Choubey stormed Imroj’s house on the morning of August 4. They tied his father, Md Sultan, to a pole outside their home and beat him. They accused Imroj of kidnapping an underage girl from a neighbouring house, keeping her hostage for two days in the house and raping her. The mob finally found Imroj and brutally lynched him. The police had reached within half an hour of the mob (after Muslims called them). But, according to the version of the family to the factfinding team, the police personnel remained mute spectators and allowed the lynching in front of them.

The girl’s house is right opposite Imroj’s house, across the street, states the findings in the report. Her grandparents stayed in the outer room of Sultan’s house for three days until August 3 as their kuchcha house had collapsed. Furthermore, the rooms in Sultan’s under-construction house do not have doors. The door at the entrance of the house also remained open most of the time as he spent a lot of time on the verandah. All the houses (all Hindu except four Muslim houses) in the lane are close to each other. Hence, the fact-finding team thinks that it is improbable that a girl from across the street could be kidnapped and kept in this house. Imroj was accused of attempting to rape/abetting the attempt to rape of an underage girl in an earlier case. People complained that he used to smoke Ganja and his behaviour was not good. Hence, the allegation needs to be thoroughly and fairly investigated, states the team’s report.

While this lynching itself is a case of communal violence, there have been visible attempts by the BJP and RSS organisations to use this incident to deepen religious polarisation. BJP Scheduled Caste Morcha President and ex-MLA Kisun Das addressed a mass meeting of Hindu families in the village on 7 August. In his speech, he can be heard saying, “Naam tumhara jab alpsankhyak hai, to kayde-kanun mein rahoge to fayede mein rahoge. Aur agar utpat machaoge, to abhi to ek gaya hai, aur bhi kayio ko jana padega”. The crowd chanted, “Jai Shri Ram” in the background. BJP leader Babulal Marandi, accompanied by the Chatra MP, local MLA and several BJP leaders, addressed a mass meeting in the village on August 9 and addressed a mass meeting. Rather than trying to bridge the communal gap, he also can be heard inciting the Hindu masses. The Hindu vegetable vendors and shopkeepers have stopped selling anything to the Muslims of the village, reports the team.

There are many serious questions regarding the police’s handling of the matter. The SHO told the factfinding team that he was informed about the missing girl on August 3 by one Vijay Choubey. The question is why he did not visit the village and undertake an inquiry. Both the police and the administration allowed BJP leaders to address meetings in the village, despite BNS section 163 prohibitions in place, and did not take any action against their hate speeches. The police officers were unaware of the Supreme Court guidelines on lynching and hate speeches.

The Dalit family lives in dire poverty. Imroj worked as a labourer, and his brothers are migrant workers. It is clear that there is an attempt by the BJP to use this whole incident and also these families to build a communal narrative against Muslims. The incident also exposed Hemant Soren government’s failure in addressing communal violence. While there were many cases of communal-violence inspired lynching under the Raghubar Das government, it has continued under this dispensation too.

Demands from the local administration and state government placed by the fact-finding team include:

• The Tandwa SHO should be removed from the investigation, and a senior officer should be made the investigating officer. The state government should ensure a free and impartial investigation in both the FIRs. The people who mobilised the mob on 4^th August should be identified and arrested, along with the perpetrators of violence.
• Strict action should be taken against the BJP leaders for their hate speeches given after the incident in the village. FIRs should be registered, as per the Supreme Court judgement in the Ashwini Upadhyay case. Action should be taken in accordance with the law against everyone who incited collective hatred, ostracism, or a sense of vengeance against any community.
• The families of the both the girl and Imroj should be provided with police and legal support for the duration of the investigation.
• The administration and police should implement the Supreme Court guidelines in the Tehseen Poonawala case, such as constitution and regular meetings of peace committee.
• The state government should ensure accountability of police and administration in cases of communal violence and lynching. The government should also undertake campaigns to promote communal harmony across the state.

The factfinding team included Praveer Peter, Priyasheela Besra, Afzal anees. Mohammed Shadab Ansari, Raja Bhuiyan and Siraj Dutta.

Details of this report rely on the press note of the organisation Jharkand Janadhikar Mahasabha, dated August 17, 2026

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The post Jharkand government accused of continued communal lynchings by fact-finding team appeared first on SabrangIndia.

As per a report in the Indian Express, the attack took place at the residence-cum-office of a local Trinamool legislator in Kaliganj, Nadia, where Moitra had arrived to hold an internal meeting with party workers following the party’s electoral setback in West Bengal. According to Moitra, what initially appeared to be a small protest rapidly transformed into an organised mob that surrounded the premises, preventing her and other party workers from leaving safely.

Dear @NitinNabin @SamikBJP & of course @AmitShah – a mob lynch by BJP was organised yesterday. Every single person in mob has been identified, named & all are BJP workers. Please see how proudly they are flying your flag pic.twitter.com/0kqJcqYOUz

— Mahua Moitra (@MahuaMoitra) July 2, 2026

Hello @IPUparliament
please watch how police in Indian state of Bengal watch complicit as PM Modi’s ruling BJP goons in a lynch mob attack my premises & keep me confined for 4 hours. No protection for Opposition MP from @loksabhaspeaker pic.twitter.com/0d5NsGboCM

— Mahua Moitra (@MahuaMoitra) July 2, 2026

BJP worker Kalidas Pal of village Jamalpur openly standing, inciting mob to attack me for (of all things) marrying an Odia… at least I’m going to bed smiling. @MohanMOdisha @BJP4Odisha @WBPolice pic.twitter.com/APAO4BwpoU

— Mahua Moitra (@MahuaMoitra) July 1, 2026

I will stand. And this flag will stand. Till death. No BJP vermin will succeed in silencing me. pic.twitter.com/NYeFA3ed9R

— Mahua Moitra (@MahuaMoitra) July 1, 2026

Videos recorded from inside the building and later shared by Moitra on social media appeared to show eggs repeatedly striking the windows of the office while protesters outside shouted slogans. In another video, apparently recorded by persons participating in the protest, groups of men and women could be seen standing outside the premises throwing eggs towards the building while raising slogans. These videos spread rapidly across social media and became the defining images of what Moitra described as an orchestrated political assault rather than a spontaneous public protest.

Broadcasting live during the incident, Moitra repeatedly appealed to the Director General of Police and senior police officials, alleging that despite being informed of the situation, law enforcement authorities had failed to disperse the crowd. She accused the police of remaining “mute spectators” while the gathering outside became increasingly emboldened.

Addressing viewers during the live broadcast, she insisted that the attackers were not ordinary local residents expressing spontaneous anger but workers affiliated with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). She maintained that the entire episode was politically organised and intended to intimidate an elected Member of Parliament inside her own constituency. According to media reports, Moitra stated that she had no intention of leaving under police escort because doing so would expose her and others inside the office to physical assault from the crowd waiting outside.

These are no public outbursts. These are coordinated BJP attacks. See the BJP flags pic.twitter.com/yrGYoaabB9

— Mahua Moitra (@MahuaMoitra) July 1, 2026

As the confrontation continued, Moitra alleged that eggs, mud, stones and even vegetables were being thrown towards the building. She later claimed that one of the projectiles struck her, causing minor injuries. Displaying stains on her clothes during a subsequent video message, she argued that the incident demonstrated not merely political hostility but a complete breakdown of law and order.

Perhaps the most serious allegation levelled by the Trinamool MP concerned the conduct of the police. Rather than accusing the authorities of arriving late, she claimed that police personnel and Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel had reached the location but failed to intervene decisively. According to her, officers merely watched while the crowd continued pelting the premises for hours. She repeatedly questioned why the police were allegedly attempting to persuade her to leave the building instead of dispersing those allegedly committing offences outside.

Currently being attacked by @bjp4india goons with @wbpolice watching on.@MamataOfficial @RahulGandhi @akhliesh @supriya_sule @mkstalin @ArvindKejriwal pic.twitter.com/eD2gYU0NPx

— Mahua Moitra (@MahuaMoitra) July 1, 2026

Later that evening, Moitra escalated her allegations by publicly naming sixteen individuals whom she claimed had led the attack. Through posts on X, she asserted that these persons were BJP workers whose identities had been verified through video footage and local information. She also subsequently alleged that the violence had been orchestrated under the leadership of a local BJP politician who had contested the 2026 Assembly elections from Kaliganj.

Hello @DGPWestBengal @WBPolice more names .Mob attack on me today was led by these @BJP4India goons (caught on camera, verified) :
Santosh Ghosh
Hilal Mallick
Mampi Mondal
Monideepa Pramanick
Sumi Mishra
Rathin Pramanick
Ananta ghosh
Pratik Dhar
Tarun Rajak
Kamalakanto Ghosh…

— Mahua Moitra (@MahuaMoitra) July 1, 2026

Moitra was also supported by other MPs from the party, including TMC MP Dola Sen.

#WATCH | Kolkata: On an egg attack on TMC MP Mahua Moitra, TMC MP Dola Sen says, “…She is continuously doing live… As workers for Mamata Banerjee, we know how to fight; she is fighting…. Law and order isn’t our responsibility… we have faith in the public and in Mamata… pic.twitter.com/1v16LtPQqr

— ANI (@ANI) July 1, 2026

The BJP categorically rejected these allegations. As per Times of India, state BJP leaders denied that the protest had been organised by the party and suggested instead that the incident reflected growing public resentment against Trinamool Congress leaders after the Assembly elections. Some BJP leaders even claimed that internal factionalism within the Trinamool Congress could have contributed to the confrontation. They further maintained that egg pelting was not part of the BJP’s political culture and urged party workers to refrain from such conduct if they were involved.

#WATCH | Kolkata: On an egg attack on TMC MP Mahua Moitra, WB BJP President Samik Bhattacharya says, “If the general public throws an egg or the TMC throws an egg on the TMC, then what can we do about it? This isn’t the police’s job. The police only have metal detectors… There… pic.twitter.com/AiYodlHOpp

— ANI (@ANI) July 1, 2026

The West Bengal Police also disputed Moitra’s version of events. As per Times of India, Krishnanagar SP Atul V stated that officers had reached the location soon after receiving information and had repeatedly requested Moitra to leave the premises for her own safety. According to the officer, reported in TOI, discussions continued for several hours because the MP was unwilling to exit immediately, and she was eventually escorted from the premises without sustaining any serious injuries. Police authorities rejected suggestions that they had deliberately remained passive throughout the episode.

Yet irrespective of these competing narratives, one fact remained undisputed: for several hours, a sitting Member of Parliament was confined inside a political office while a hostile crowd surrounded the building, repeatedly throwing objects towards the premises. Videos from both inside and outside the building left little doubt that the confrontation had escalated far beyond ordinary political protest.

From symbolic protest to organised public humiliation

The incident also carried profound symbolic significance because it occurred against the backdrop of an increasingly visible phenomenon in West Bengal’s political landscape—what many commentators have described as the normalisation of public humiliation as a form of political protest. In recent months, eggs have become the preferred instrument through which political opponents have sought to ridicule rather than merely oppose elected representatives. While egg-throwing has often been dismissed as harmless political theatre, the cumulative pattern of incidents across the State suggested that these episodes were becoming increasingly organised, confrontational and potentially dangerous.

Mahua Moitra was not the first Trinamool leader to face such treatment. Former minister Ujjal Biswas, senior TMC leaders Kunal Ghosh, Vijay Singh, Jayprakash Majumdar, Sabyasachi Dutta and several others had reportedly faced similar attacks in recent weeks. Earlier, Abhishek Banerjee himself had allegedly been targeted with eggs and stones while visiting areas affected by political violence. Reports suggested that the practice had become so frequent that protective helmets were reportedly used during some political visits.

The attack on Moitra therefore represented something larger than an isolated confrontation between rival political workers. It appeared to reflect an emerging culture in which elected representatives are subjected to orchestrated public humiliation through organised crowds, with law enforcement increasingly being accused—rightly or wrongly—of failing to intervene promptly.

Why the Calcutta High Court was forced to intervene

What transformed the incident from merely another episode of political violence into a constitutional controversy, however, was its extraordinary timing. Barely a day before Moitra found herself under siege in Nadia, the Calcutta High Court had delivered a strongly worded order declaring that precisely such incidents of egg-pelting, mob intimidation and public humiliation could not be treated as routine political occurrences. Instead, the Court warned that these practices struck at the heart of constitutional guarantees of dignity, equality and the rule of law.

The remarkable proximity between the Court’s warning and the alleged attack on Moitra would immediately cast fresh attention on the judiciary’s intervention, raising uncomfortable questions about whether political vigilantism had already become entrenched enough to defy judicial caution itself.

The events in Nadia acquired even greater significance because they did not occur in isolation. Rather, they unfolded against the backdrop of an unprecedented series of public attacks on Trinamool Congress leaders that has, over the past several weeks, fundamentally altered the nature of political protest in West Bengal. While political demonstrations have always been a part of the State’s vibrant electoral culture, the recent emergence of organised “egg attacks” has transformed symbolic protest into a recurring form of public humiliation directed at elected representatives and political functionaries. The frequency of these incidents, their increasingly coordinated nature, and allegations of police inaction have collectively raised concerns about the gradual normalisation of mob intimidation as a political tool.

One of the earliest high-profile incidents involved Trinamool Congress national general secretary Abhishek Banerjee. During a visit to Sonarpur to meet families allegedly affected by post-election violence, Banerjee was confronted by protesters who allegedly hurled eggs and stones at his convoy. Media reports suggested that he sustained minor injuries during the incident, while videos circulated widely showing protesters shouting slogans and physically confronting his security personnel. Banerjee later characterised the episode as political violence and alleged that it reflected an organised attempt to intimidate the opposition.

Thereafter, similar incidents multiplied across the State. Former minister Ujjal Biswas reportedly faced an egg attack outside his residence in Krishnanagar. Senior Trinamool leader Kunal Ghosh was targeted outside Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee’s Kalighat residence soon after leaving the premises. Minister Udayan Guha, TMC leader Vijay Singh, Kolkata councillors Bappaditya Dasgupta and Md. Jasimuddin, Jayprakash Majumdar, Sabyasachi Dutta and several other party functionaries also reportedly became targets of similar protests while appearing before courts, travelling under police escort or attending political programmes. In several cases, protesters allegedly shouted “chor, chor” while pelting eggs at politicians accused of corruption or abuse of office.

Although many initially dismissed these incidents as an unusual but relatively harmless form of political expression, the cumulative effect of repeated attacks soon raised serious concerns. Increasingly, elected representatives were being confronted not merely through slogans or demonstrations but through physical acts intended to publicly degrade and humiliate them. The symbolism was unmistakable: eggs were being weaponised as instruments of public disgrace.

It was against this backdrop that the Trinamool Congress approached the Calcutta High Court seeking judicial intervention. The petition argued that the repeated attacks were no longer isolated incidents but part of a systematic pattern of targeted violence directed against members of a particular political party. It further alleged that despite repeated complaints, the police had failed to prevent such attacks or take effective action against those responsible.

Ironically, barely a day after the High Court issued significant directions aimed precisely at preventing such incidents, Mahua Moitra herself became the latest alleged victim of the same phenomenon. The chronology made the events particularly striking.

‘Dignity Is Not a Privilege’: Inside the Calcutta High Court’s constitutional reasoning

On June 30, 2026, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court comprising Acting Chief Justice Tapabrata Chakraborty and Justice Partha Sarathi Chatterjee heard a Public Interest Litigation filed by Md. Danish Farooqui. Less than twenty-four hours later, on July 1, Mahua Moitra alleged that she had remained trapped inside a party office for nearly four hours while protesters hurled eggs, mud and stones at the building. What had until then appeared to be a broader debate about political conduct suddenly acquired immediate constitutional relevance.

The Court’s order reveals that the litigation extended far beyond isolated incidents of egg pelting. The petition presented before the Court described a disturbing pattern of public violence, mob intimidation, targeted humiliation of accused persons and alleged failures by the State machinery to protect individuals from organised attacks. The petition did not merely seek directions against throwing eggs at political leaders; it sought judicial intervention to prevent mob violence, ensure prompt registration of criminal cases, prohibit public humiliation of persons in custody, and restrain authorities from treating accused persons in a degrading or dehumanising manner.

Senior Advocate Kalyan Bandopadhyay, appearing for the petitioner, argued that despite repeated complaints regarding assaults, targeted violence and public humiliation, the State had failed to discharge its constitutional obligation to protect individuals associated with a particular political party. Referring to specific incidents detailed in the petition, he submitted that allegations of mob violence, assaults and even attacks on pregnant women had gone inadequately addressed despite police complaints having been lodged. He relied upon recent Supreme Court decisions, including Zulfiquar Halder v. State of Uttar Pradesh, In Re: Manoj Tibrewal Akash, and In Re: City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price, to argue that the State bears a positive constitutional obligation to protect citizens against mob violence and unlawful vigilantism.

The State, represented by Additional Advocate General Rajdeep Mazumdar, responded that wherever specific complaints had been filed, First Information Reports had already been registered and arrests had been made. Seeking additional time, the State requested an opportunity to place supporting records before the Court demonstrating the action already taken by law-enforcement authorities.

However, what followed constituted perhaps the most important part of the Court’s order—and one that extends well beyond the immediate politics of West Bengal. Rather than treating the controversy as a routine dispute between rival political parties, the Bench framed the issue squarely as one involving constitutional rights, human dignity and the limits of public vigilantism. The Court emphasised that the complaints before it could not simply be dismissed as everyday political incidents but had to be examined “from a fundamental viewpoint.” It declared that the constitutional guarantee of human dignity flowing from Articles 14, 19 and 21 is engaged whenever individuals are publicly dehumanised or subjected to arbitrary humiliation. The Bench further observed that dignity and security are not privileges conferred by those in power but inherent constitutional rights belonging to every individual irrespective of status, political affiliation or circumstance.

The Bench’s observations are particularly significant because they consciously moved the discussion away from the political identity of those involved. Whether the victims were members of the ruling party, the opposition, or ordinary citizens was, in the Court’s view, constitutionally irrelevant. The question before the Court was whether the State could permit a situation in which members of the public assumed the role of judge, jury and executioner by humiliating individuals outside the framework of law. In emphatic terms, the Court reminded the State that no person—even one accused of criminal misconduct—loses the protection of the Constitution merely because allegations have been levelled against them.

Mandatory directions to the state

The Court unequivocally held that the State has a positive constitutional obligation to shield accused persons from “inhumanity and barbarity.” It observed that the increasing incidents of egg-pelting, public humiliation and mob intimidation reflected a disturbing tendency of citizens taking the law into their own hands. Such conduct, the Bench held, cannot be tolerated in a constitutional democracy governed by the rule of law. Public outrage, political disagreement or allegations of corruption, however serious, cannot legitimise acts of vigilantism or justify degrading treatment of any individual. The Court therefore declared that the recurring practice of throwing eggs at accused persons and portraying them as objects of public ridicule had to be curbed through immediate administrative intervention.

Significantly, the Court did not stop at making broad constitutional observations. Recognising that repeated judicial pronouncements often remain ineffective unless translated into concrete administrative measures, the Division Bench issued a series of mandatory directions to the State machinery.

First, it directed the Director General of Police, West Bengal, to immediately formulate and circulate comprehensive guidelines across every police station in the State for preventing incidents of egg-pelting, mob violence, public disorder and lynching. These were not intended to remain abstract advisories. The Court specifically required that the guidelines be communicated with mandatory directions requiring strict compliance by all police officers throughout West Bengal.

Secondly, the Court instructed the police administration to maintain continuous vigilance so that prompt preventive and coercive action could be taken immediately upon receiving information about such incidents. This direction reflects an important shift in judicial thinking. Instead of merely requiring investigation after an incident has occurred, the Court emphasised the State’s preventive responsibility to anticipate and stop mob violence before it escalates. In constitutional terms, this aligns with the principle repeatedly articulated by the Supreme Court that the right to life under Article 21 imposes positive obligations upon the State, including the duty to protect individuals from foreseeable harm at the hands of private actors.

Thirdly, the Division Bench directed the Director General of Police to file a comprehensive affidavit before the Court detailing every step taken in compliance with its directions. This reporting requirement serves a dual purpose. It ensures judicial oversight over the implementation of the Court’s orders while simultaneously placing institutional accountability upon the highest police authority in the State rather than leaving compliance to local police stations alone.

The State Government was also directed to file an affidavit-in-opposition responding specifically to the allegations raised in the Public Interest Litigation and to furnish a complete list of criminal cases already registered in connection with the incidents referred to in the petition. By requiring disclosure of all registered cases, the Court sought to examine not merely whether FIRs had been lodged, but whether the State’s response reflected a consistent policy against mob violence or merely isolated instances of enforcement.

Beyond Mahua Moitra: Why this order matters for constitutional democracy

Viewed in isolation, these directions may appear to concern only the administration of law and order. Their constitutional significance, however, is considerably deeper. The order implicitly recognises that public humiliation itself can become a form of punishment—one imposed not through judicial process but through organised crowds acting outside the law. In doing so, the Court reaffirmed a foundational constitutional principle: punishment in a democratic society is the exclusive domain of courts established by law. Neither political supporters nor political opponents possess the authority to inflict symbolic or physical punishment upon individuals, irrespective of public opinion regarding their conduct.

This principle assumes particular importance in an era increasingly characterised by what scholars have described as “trial by crowd.” Across India, accusations of corruption, criminality or political misconduct are frequently accompanied by campaigns of public shaming, social media condemnation and, at times, physical intimidation. While such acts may not always amount to grievous violence, they nevertheless erode the fundamental distinction between lawful accountability and extra-legal punishment. The Calcutta High Court’s order is therefore best understood not as an attempt to shield politicians from criticism but as a reaffirmation, that constitutional governance cannot coexist with mob justice.

Indeed, the language employed by the Bench deliberately invokes the constitutional vocabulary of dignity, equality and liberty rather than the narrower language of public order. By grounding its reasoning in Articles 14, 19 and 21, the Court acknowledged that dignity is not merely an abstract moral value but an enforceable constitutional guarantee. Public degradation—whether by physical assault, forced parading; humiliating treatment in custody or organised acts of ridicule—strikes directly at that guarantee. The Constitution protects individuals not because they are innocent, influential or politically favoured, but because their humanity itself commands respect.

It is precisely for this reason that the timing of the alleged attack on MP Mahua Moitra is so striking. Barely a day after the High Court reminded the State of its constitutional obligation to prevent precisely such incidents, allegations emerged that a sitting Member of Parliament had remained confined inside a political office for hours while protesters repeatedly hurled eggs, mud and stones at the premises. If those allegations are ultimately found to be true, the incident would represent not merely another episode of political confrontation but an immediate test of the effectiveness of the High Court’s directions—and, more fundamentally, of the State’s willingness and capacity to translate constitutional principles into meaningful protection on the ground.

The significance of the Calcutta High Court’s order extends well beyond the immediate controversy surrounding Mahua Moitra or the recent spate of attacks on Trinamool Congress leaders. At its core, the order is an emphatic reaffirmation of a constitutional principle that is increasingly being tested across India—that the criminal justice system cannot be replaced by public spectacle, and that constitutional rights do not disappear merely because a person is politically unpopular, accused of wrongdoing, or belongs to a rival political party.

The complete order may be read below:

Can guidelines alone prevent political vigilantism?

In recent years, public humiliation has emerged as a recurring feature of India’s political and criminal justice landscape. Accused persons have been paraded before television cameras, assaulted by mobs outside courts and police stations, forced to endure public abuse while in police custody, and subjected to relentless campaigns of social media vilification. In several cases, these incidents have occurred in the presence of law enforcement personnel, raising troubling questions about whether the State has adequately discharged its constitutional obligation to protect those in its custody or under its protection.

Detailed story on public shaming may be read here and here.

The Calcutta High Court’s intervention must therefore be understood against this wider national backdrop. Although the immediate trigger for the litigation was the repeated targeting of Trinamool Congress leaders through organised egg-pelting incidents, the principles articulated by the Bench are deliberately universal. The Court consciously refrained from limiting its observations to members of any particular political party. Instead, it repeatedly emphasised that every individual—including an accused person—is entitled to dignity, security and equal protection of the law. That emphasis is perhaps the most important aspect of the order.

By invoking Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution together, the Court underscored that the issue before it was not simply one of maintaining public order but one of preserving constitutional governance itself. Article 14 guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the laws. Article 19 protects the freedom of speech and peaceful political participation, while permitting only constitutionally permissible restrictions. Article 21 guarantees that no person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law—a guarantee that the Supreme Court has repeatedly interpreted to include the right to live with dignity, privacy, reputation and bodily integrity. The High Court’s reasoning reflects the settled constitutional position that these guarantees are not suspended because allegations have been made against an individual. Constitutional rights belong equally to the innocent, the accused, the convicted, political supporters and political opponents alike.

The Court’s reliance upon recent Supreme Court decisions reinforces this constitutional approach. In Zulfiquar Halder v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the Supreme Court reiterated that the State bears a positive obligation to protect individuals from mob violence and cannot remain a passive spectator where constitutional rights are threatened. Similarly, in In Re: Manoj Tibrewal Akash, the Supreme Court emphasised the duty of constitutional courts to intervene where executive authorities fail to protect the rule of law. By relying on these authorities, the Calcutta High Court situated the present controversy within an evolving jurisprudence that treats mob violence not merely as isolated criminal conduct but as a constitutional failure requiring institutional accountability.

Equally noteworthy is the Court’s recognition that humiliation itself can amount to a constitutional injury. Much of the public discourse surrounding the recent incidents in West Bengal has trivialised egg-pelting as a harmless form of political satire or symbolic protest. Yet the Court declined to accept that characterisation. Its observations acknowledge that when organised crowds repeatedly surround individuals, throw projectiles, prevent free movement, publicly ridicule them and seek to degrade them in full public view, the issue ceases to be one of symbolic expression and becomes one of intimidation and coercion. Constitutional democracies permit robust criticism—even harsh criticism—of political leaders. They do not, however, legitimise organised acts of public degradation that seek to replace lawful accountability with collective punishment.

This distinction is crucial. Citizens unquestionably possess the right to protest against corruption, maladministration or abuse of power. Peaceful demonstrations, slogans, criticism in the media and political campaigns all fall within the democratic process. What the Constitution does not countenance is the substitution of judicial processes with public punishment. Once crowds begin determining how accused persons should be treated, when they should be publicly shamed, or what forms of humiliation they deserve, the rule of law gradually gives way to the rule of the mob.

The Real Constitutional Question: Who punishes in a democracy?

The allegations made by Mahua Moitra acquire significance beyond partisan politics. Whether every allegation ultimately withstands judicial scrutiny remains a matter for investigation. Equally, the State’s assertion that police acted promptly and that arrests have already been made deserves fair consideration. However, the constitutional concern does not depend solely upon the outcome of competing factual narratives. Even if some details remain disputed, the repeated emergence of videos showing elected representatives surrounded by hostile crowds, projectiles being thrown at political meetings, and allegations of delayed police intervention reflects a disturbing erosion of the distinction between democratic dissent and organised intimidation.

The episode also exposes a recurring dilemma confronting constitutional democracies: the temptation to tolerate unlawful conduct when directed against politically unpopular individuals. It is often easier to defend constitutional protections in cases involving sympathetic victims. The true test of constitutional fidelity, however, lies in extending the same protections to those who may be widely criticised, politically controversial or facing criminal allegations. Courts have consistently recognised that constitutional rights are most meaningful precisely when they protect unpopular individuals from the passions of the moment. The Calcutta High Court’s order is a reminder that the Constitution does not operate selectively; it protects all persons because it is founded upon the inherent dignity of every individual.

At the same time, the order also invites scrutiny of the adequacy of institutional responses. While directing the Director General of Police to frame state-wide guidelines is an important administrative step, guidelines by themselves cannot eliminate political vigilantism. Their effectiveness will ultimately depend upon consistent implementation, prompt preventive policing, and impartial registration of criminal cases and swift prosecution of those who organise or participate in mob attacks. Unless these directions are accompanied by visible enforcement, there remains a risk that judicial pronouncements may be viewed as symbolic rather than transformative.

The timing of the Mahua Moitra incident makes this challenge particularly stark. If, as alleged, a sitting Member of Parliament remained confined inside a party office for several hours while a crowd hurled eggs, stones and mud at the premises, the incident would represent an immediate test of the State’s capacity to implement precisely the constitutional obligations that the High Court had reaffirmed only a day earlier. Conversely, if the State’s account is accepted, that police acted promptly, attempted to secure her safe exit and eventually escorted her without major injury, it nevertheless underscores the importance of transparent investigation, accountability and public confidence in law-enforcement institutions.

Ultimately, the controversy is about far more than eggs, slogans or partisan rivalry. It concerns the resilience of constitutional governance in the face of growing political polarisation. Democracies are strengthened not when governments protect only their supporters or when courts intervene only for politically convenient causes, but when institutions consistently uphold the rule of law irrespective of ideology or electoral affiliation. Public anger, however genuine, cannot become a substitute for legal process. Political disagreement, however intense, cannot justify intimidation. Constitutional democracy demands that accountability be secured through investigation, prosecution and adjudication—not through crowds gathered outside courtrooms, police stations or party offices.

The Calcutta High Court’s order is therefore best understood as a constitutional warning against the normalisation of vigilantism. By reaffirming that dignity, equality and personal security belong to every individual, including those accused of offences and those occupying contested political spaces. The Court has reiterated one of the Constitution’s most fundamental promises: that the law, and not the mob, must remain the ultimate arbiter of justice.

Related:

Public Shaming & Constitutional Courts: Guidelines without teeth?

Rajasthan’s Public Shaming: Police humiliation practices defy law and human dignity

From Fringe to Framework: How AHP’s hate ecosystem reconfigured law, society, and electoral politics

From ‘Tauba Tauba’ to ‘Expel the Ghuspaithiya’: The language of exclusion in Bihar’s election season

Right to Food: How the ban on sale of non-veg food is an issue where imposed majoritarian faith clashes with the Indian Constitution

The post Politics of Humiliation: Mahua Moitra, mob intimidation and the Calcutta High Court’s warning appeared first on SabrangIndia.

“These violent attacks — while Central forces are still deployed in the state — not only signify the utter and complete breakdown of any semblance of the Rule of Law in West Bengal,” the signatories declared. “They send out grim warning signals to the rest of the country.”

The collective statement also criticised the conduct of the Central Election Commission, noting “91 lakh previous voters [were] divested of their voting rights.” The statement linked the violence to what it described as unchecked repression following the May 2026 assembly election results.

The signatories include former union minister Yashwant Sinha, writers and journalists Susie Tharu, Raju Parulekar, Navin Kumar, Venkitesh Ramakrishnan Teesta Setalvad, Javed Anand, Chitra Palekar, Indra Kumar Theradi, retired civil servant Ashish Joshi, Aditi Mehta, danseuse Mallika Sarabhai, activists Shabnam Hashmi, Ram Puniyani, Dolphy D’Souza, Virginia Saldanha, artists Shakuntala Kulkarni, Navjot Altaf, Kripa, photographer, Ram Rahman, Nandita Narain , Associate Professor( Retd), St.Stephen’s College, Delhi University among several others. Gandhian Tushar Gandhi, Jesuit leaders Father Frazer Mascarenhas and Cedric Prakash, film maker Avinash Das. Medical practioner Harsha Hege are also signatories.

The statement recalled the 2001 assassination of MP Phoolan Devi, when Parliament “took note” of the attack. In contrast, the signatories said today’s institutions have responded with “institutional freeze and silence.”

“We remain mute spectators only to our own peril,” the statement warned, urging citizens to organize and speak out against violence and repression.

The entire statement may be read here:

Concerned Citizens

Mumbai, June 3, 2026

The Saturday May 30-31, 2026 brute attacks in West Bengal, first on Lok Sabha Member of Parliament (MP), Abhishek Banerjee and thereafter on another MP of the Trinamool Congress (TMC), Kalyan Banerjee mark yet another, but new, all-time low under the present regime under the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the current prime minister. The violent attacks 26 days after an election result that has been shrouded under a cloud with the conduct of the Central Election Commission (CEC) –with 91 lakh previous voters divested of their voting rights—needs to be condemned with rigour and foresight.

These violent attacks –while Central forces are still deployed in the state —not only signify the utter and complete breakdown of any semblance of the Rule of Law in West Bengal. They send out grim warning signals to the rest of the country, and are a sign that all out fratricide (more physical, unchecked attacks on the Opposition) may follow. Widespread physical threats and violence in states governed by the same party may well become the norm and it is time, for those Indians, with conscience and voice, to speak out. Now.

Just a day after the controversial May 4, 2026 results in West Bengal, none less than another discredited and authoritarian oligarch leader of the world’s second largest (and ‘oldest’) democracy, Donald Trump doled out widely-publicised words of congratulation to the Indian Prime Minister. These words from one head of state to another, after a state/federal election where several parties participate, were sharply condemned by some members of the Opposition who deemed this as ‘direct interference in internal affairs’ and an ‘attack on Indian federalism.’ Trump is a discredited world leader who’s moral and other failures on the domestic and international front, bear no recounting. Yet the overall immunity that this Regime is functioning under/with, clearly comes from this unholy alliance that it has individually built with a world leader and its state, at the cost of Indian economic and defence interests and its sovereignty.

We, Indian writers and activists who condemn in no uncertain terms the near fatal attacks on Abhishek Banerjee and Kalyan Banerjee, both Members of Parliament, have little hope that the Indian Lok Sabha (Lower House of Elected Representatives) will either move a Privilege Motion nor out rightly demand a response from the ruling dispensation as is the well-established law and practice. On one previous and rare occasion, when an MP like Phoolan Devi was attacked and killed outside her New Delhi residence, in July 2001 in broad daylight, it was also a previous NDA government, led by Bharatiya Janata Party’s Atal Behari Vajpayee that was in power in Delhi. However, there was not just uproar and condemnation but Parliament took note.

This time, the brute attacks that have been widely documented on social media have been met, largely with institutional freeze and silence. This silence from autonomous and independent bodies bodes ill for India and Indians. We remain mute spectators only to our own peril.

Signatories

Raju Parulekar, Writer
Teesta Setalvad, Rights Activist, Journalist and Educationist
Navin Kumar, Journalist and Academic
Yashwant Sinha, former Union Minister for Finance & External Affairs, GOI
Parakala Prabhakar, Political Economist and Author
Anand Patwardhan, noted Film-maker and Activist
Navaid Hamid, Secretary Peoples Integration Council
Ram Puniyani, All India secular forum
Yashodhan Paranjpe
Sheeba Aslam Fehmi, Journalist, Researcher, New Delhi
Lalita Ramdas, Peace Activist
Javed Anand
Mallika Sarabhai
Bharat Bhushan, Columnist and Editor
Mondira Jaisimha
Navaid Hamid, Secretary Peoples Integration Council
Kunwar Danish Ali
Chitra Palekar Theatre Personality & Author
Col Pavan Nair
Sooraj Samant
Yashodhan Paranjpe
Dev Desai
Gautam Mukhopadhaya
Nandini Manjrekar
Aditi Mehta
डॉ. लक्ष्मण यादव, लेखक व सामाजिक कार्यकर्ता, दिल्ली
Meena Karnik
Zeenat Shaukat Ali, Director General Wisdom Foundation
Nikhil Sanjay-Rekha Adsule
Kripa
Frazer Mascarenhas
A C Michael
Indra Kumar Theradi
Kedar Vaidya
Susie Tharu
Tushar A. Gandhi
Harsha Hegde
Cedric Prakash
Avinash Das
Kumud karnik
Jawad A J
Dr. Michael Williams
N.D.Jayaprakash
Atul chakravarty
Mridula Mukherjee
Niloufer Bhagwat
Joy Sengupta
Atul
Shabnam Hashmi
Venkitesh Ramakrishnan
Deb Mukharji
Javed Ali Khan
Naazish Shah
Kamal Malhotra
Suhel Tirmizi
Balveer Arora
Harminder Soni
Manoj Nair
Muniza Khan, Activist and Researcher
Anita Rampal
Niharika JINDAL
Atul Kochar, Under water SME
Sudhir Wilson, Technical Advisor
Navdeep Mathur, Academician
Rajeev Bhargava
Ashish Joshi, Former Civil Servant & Member CCG and CFF
Gautam Vir, Retired
Meera
Priyanka Parulekar, Student
Premanand, Social Activist
Sanjeev Gupta
Balasangameshwara Vollepore , Member AIPC
Nandita Narain , Associate Professor( Retd), St.Stephen’s College, Delhi University
Ram Rahman, Photographer
Lalita Deonalli , Retired
Laly Randolf, Citizen Activist
Ebin Gheevarghese , Journalist
Rajiv Kapoor, Hotel Premdeep Partner
Sancia Sequeira, Tourisn
Natasha Pereira , Self-employed/ part time envt activist
Anand Kumar , President, Citizens for Democracy
Alok Rai
Adv Dr Lubna Sarwath, Indian National Congress, Hyderabad
Ramesh Dixit , Professor (retired) Lucknow University.
Sandhya Honawar, Retd
Sharmeela de Vas , Writing & Copy editing Consultant
Amitabha Basu, Retired scientist, CSIR-NPL, New Delhi
Mohan Abraham
Sanjeev
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Related:

Bengal after the Ballot: Fear, retaliation and the politics of territorial power

‘Bangla Pokkho’ founder Garga Chatterjee arrested over alleged EVM misinformation ahead of Bengal polls

As lynchings “normalise” in ‘New India, a Bihar imam is ‘thrashed, pushed’ from train to die in Bareilly

The post Brute Violence in Bengal sparks citizens’ urgent warning appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The outraged demonstrators damaged some shops and a BJP office, setting fire to party flags, chairs and tables. Local residents said the statues of Sidhu and Kanhu — revered figures of the Santhal rebellion against British rule — had been installed nearly a decade ago.

“This morning, we saw that the hands of the statues of Sidhu and Kanhu had been broken and BJP flags had been placed there. From this, we suspected BJP involvement,” said Khudiram Mardi, a protester. This led to public outrage and hundreds of agitated villagers, many carrying bows, arrows, sticks and brooms, blocked the Buniadpur–Daulatpur road with bamboo barricades. Women were seen leading much of the demonstration.

Last Saturday, protesters started with a road blockade began around 7am, bringing traffic to a halt. A large contingent from Bansihari police station, along with central forces and combat personnel, rushed to the spot. The protesters demanded that those responsible for damaging the statues be immediately identified and given strict punishment. The officers assured them that necessary steps would be taken, and the blockade was withdrawn around 11.30 am.

The matter turned into a slugfest between the now ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Trinamool Congress (TMC). While the BJP was quick to deny any involvement, the Trinamool leaders brushed aside the claims.

West Bengal and Adivasi rights

West Bengal, of which South Dinajpur is a part is affected by the Sonthal Parganas Act, 1855 is a classic example of a colonial law, not yet repealed. Enacted by the British as a response to the Santhal uprising against the East India Company, the Act excludes certain districts in the erstwhile Bengal Presidency from the application of the ‘general Regulations and Acts of Government’. This exclusion is based on a simple premise – Santhals are too ‘uncivilised’ a people to be governed by the legal system. This is shockingly even stated explicitly in the preamble of the Act.

What was the Santhal uprising and who were its leaders? A vibrant protest and rebellion in this region in colonial times with Sidhu and Kanhu Murmu as its heroes but who have rarely featured in any Indian history book. Ironically, the Sonthal Parganas Act, 1855 remains prominent in another book – the Indian statute book.

Indian Adivasis including those who live in several districts of West Bengal are inflicted with certain laws. For instance the 1952 Habitual Offenders’ Model Bill that replaced the Criminal Tribes Act, 1871 and served as the basis for state-level Habitual Offenders’ Acts; while the previous law, the 1871 Act described certain tribes as ‘addicted to the systematic commission of … offences’ and enabled the government to notify them as ‘criminal tribes’. Using this power, nearly 200 tribes were branded hereditary criminals. However, with the repeal of this Act, the ‘criminal tribes’ came to be ‘de-notified’. As one would expect, the Habitual Offenders’ Acts, unlike their colonial counterpart, do not explicitly single out these tribes. However, in practice, not much has changed. In almost every state where Habitual Offenders’ Acts are in force, individuals belonging to the de-notified tribes have been disproportionately targeted. The substantive provisions are worryingly similar to those in the 1871 Act.

There is also the hindrance caused by the old colonial idea of primitivism continues under the guise of protecting cultural autonomy. The Fifth and Sixth Schedules of the Constitution lay out a set of special provisions for tribal areas. Among other things, governors are empowered to prevent or modify the application of both central and state laws to these scheduled areas.

These areas were previously ‘typically and really backward tracts’ under the Government of India Act, 1919 and ‘partially and wholly excluded areas’ under the Government of India Act, 1935.

It has been argued that both the Fifth and Sixth Schedules of the Constitution perpetuate the language, and more worryingly, the patronising logic of these colonial statutes – that there is a need to ‘protect’ the tribal population and ‘help’ them. If that means keep them in a state of permanent exception away from the regular legal system intended for all citizens, so be it.

This is not to say that it is not the duty of the government to address the social and educational backwardness affecting members of the tribal population. But the starting point cannot be one of protection or assimilation, but rather respect and equality.

Sardar Patel, echoed Jaipal Singh Munda and grasped this instinctively in the Constituent Assembly, “All the laws that have given them protection are there. But have they protected them?” If the aim is to disrupt colonial continuities and decolonise our laws, the first step is to decolonise our minds.

Related:

Bengal after the Ballot: Fear, retaliation and the politics of territorial power

The post Statues of icons of the Santhal Revolt, Sidhu Murmu & Kanhu Murmu vandalised in South Dinajpur village, BJP blamed appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The result represented far more than a routine change in government. It signalled the collapse of a political order that had dominated Bengal since 2011 and the arrival of a new ruling formation that had built its campaign around promises of othering, a fair dose of hate-letting. political change, institutional restructuring and the dismantling of what it described as the entrenched patronage networks of the Trinamool regime. At the same time, the BJP’s rise in Bengal was also shaped by an increasingly sharp politics of religious polarisation and majoritarian mobilisation, with electoral campaigns over recent years marked by heightened communal rhetoric, debates around identity and citizenship, and efforts to consolidate Hindu political sentiment across the state. Not surprising then, that within hours of the results being declared, large parts of the state began witnessing violence, retaliatory attacks, intimidation campaigns and vandalism — developments that rapidly overshadowed the democratic significance of the electoral transition itself.

Reports emerging from Kolkata, Howrah, Birbhum, Murshidabad, North 24 Parganas, Paschim Bardhaman and several other districts described clashes, attacks on political offices and at least four reported deaths, including Abir Sheikh in Nanoor, Birbhum; Biswajit Pattanaik in Beleghata, Kolkata; Madhu Mondal in New Town, North 24 Parganas; and Jadab Bar in Udaynarayanpur, Howrah, rapidly overshadowing what should have been a major transition. Political offices were attacked, flags replaced, rival supporters assaulted, shops vandalised, homes targeted and neighbourhoods gripped by fear.

The violence was neither entirely spontaneous nor entirely uniform. In some areas, it appeared as organised assertions of territorial dominance following the transfer of political power. In others, it took the form of retaliatory clashes between rival groups with long-standing local tensions. Elsewhere, rumours and misinformation circulating online appeared to aggravate already fragile conditions.

As the unrest spread, Bengal once again found itself confronting a familiar reality: elections in the state are often not experienced merely as democratic contests, but as struggles over control of territory, institutions, neighbourhoods and everyday political life.

The First 72 Hours: How the violence spread across the state

The immediate aftermath of the election results witnessed a rapid escalation of incidents across multiple districts. Within the first 24 hours, scattered reports of clashes began emerging from localities where political rivalry had already been intense during the campaign period. By the second and third day, the violence had spread into a broader pattern involving vandalism, intimidation, occupation of political offices and allegations of targeted attacks on grassroots workers.

The post-poll unrest also witnessed incidents of symbolic vandalism targeting historical and ideological figures, reflecting how political assertion in Bengal often extends beyond party offices into the realm of cultural and ideological symbolism. According to reports by The Quint, The Telegraph and regional Bengali media outlets, statues and images associated with figures such as Raja Ram Mohan Roy, Mother Teresa and Vladimir Lenin were vandalised or defaced in isolated incidents during the violence. In some areas, posters and murals carrying their images were torn down alongside party symbols, while local residents and opposition leaders alleged that the attacks reflected attempts to symbolically erase ideological and cultural markers associated with Bengal’s reformist, secular or Left political traditions. The incidents also carried wider political resonance because Bengal’s public culture has historically attached strong symbolic value to statues, murals and memorial representations of intellectual, religious and political figures. At the same time, police officials and local administrators reportedly cautioned against amplifying unverified claims circulating online regarding the scale and intent behind such vandalism, noting that several viral images lacked immediate contextual verification.

In a mere two minutes these fellows have managed to desecrate all the idols Bengal cherished for decades if not a century-Sister Nivedita, Swami Vivekananda, Mother Teresa et al! pic.twitter.com/Bd0DoWI28o

— sanjoy ghose (@advsanjoy) May 7, 2026

As discussion worthy were social media accounts of a flex banner of Shivaji, an iconic ruler of Maharashtra being unfurled over a clock tower in Bengal: while Shivaji ruled in the early medieval period, the later Maratha invasions of Bengal in the 18^th century have a different echo and interpretation in the state. Shivaji, contrary to wholistic historical interpretation has been sought to be appropriated by modern day Hindutva bigots as a symbol of ‘Hindu supremacy and rule.’

Here are Bengali Bhakts installing pic of Shivaji on a tower

Lest they forget that Marathas literally killed milions of Bengali during Bargi Invasion of the 18th Century.

But then we can’t expect History knowledge from these Wahtsapp University Graduates. pic.twitter.com/vpOQhhgzLk

— Nehr_who? (@Nher_who) May 8, 2026

Media reports carried by PTI, Reuters, The Telegraph, The Hindu, India Today, Hindustan Times, The Quint, The Indian Express and Bengali-language media outlets described a state experiencing multiple simultaneous flashpoints rather than one centrally coordinated episode. The incidents varied considerably in scale and character:

Street clashes and procession violence- Many of the earliest incidents of post-poll unrest were linked to victory processions and celebratory marches that allegedly turned confrontational after entering politically sensitive neighbourhoods.

According to reports by The Telegraph and India Today, clashes were reported in Kolkata’s Kasba and Tollygunge areas after victory rallies passed near local Trinamool Congress offices, with rival supporters accusing each other of provocation, vandalism and intimidation. Videos circulating online showed damaged motorcycles, broken storefronts and groups of men carrying sticks moving through neighbourhood lanes, although India Today noted that several clips could not be independently verified.

In Baranagar and Kamarhati in North 24 Parganas, The Telegraph reported that groups carrying BJP flags allegedly entered areas long considered TMC strongholds, leading to confrontations involving stone pelting, damage to vehicles and attacks on roadside kiosks. Residents quoted in local reports stated that slogan shouting outside party offices escalated after rival groups assembled nearby.

Reports from Hindustan Times and regional Bengali media also described clashes in parts of Howrah district, particularly around Udaynarayanpur and Domjur, where rival political supporters allegedly confronted each other after post-result rallies moved through opposition-dominated areas. Local accounts described the use of bamboo sticks, iron rods and stones during clashes, following which police reportedly conducted patrols and flag marches in sensitive localities.

In Birbhum, especially in politically tense pockets around Nanoor, PTI and local media reports noted that tensions escalated after processions and counter-gatherings took place following the declaration of results. The death of Abir Sheikh further intensified accusations and counter-accusations between political camps over targeted violence.

Residents interviewed by The Telegraph described hearing continuous slogan shouting late into the night in several neighbourhoods, with groups moving through localities carrying party flags, bursting firecrackers and allegedly threatening rival supporters. Some residents reportedly switched off lights and remained indoors fearing escalation.

Attacks on homes and local establishments- Alongside clashes in public spaces, reports also emerged of attacks on homes and establishments allegedly associated with rival political workers.

According to reports carried by The Quint and Bengali-language media outlets, houses belonging to opposition supporters in parts of South 24 Parganas and Hooghly were allegedly attacked shortly after the election results, with windows smashed, gates damaged and parked motorcycles set on fire. Some residents claimed they were specifically identified because of party flags displayed outside homes during the election campaign.

In portions of Murshidabad and North 24 Parganas, local businesses allegedly associated with rival political affiliations were vandalised. The Quint reported incidents involving damaged shop shutters, torn signboards and attacks on roadside stalls in isolated pockets witnessing heightened political tension.

Several residents interviewed by regional media described an atmosphere where even civilians with no formal political affiliation feared being perceived as aligned with one side or the other. Some reportedly removed political stickers, flags and campaign material from homes and vehicles after violence began spreading.

Reports from The Telegraph on Durgapur and Purulia stated that local TMC leaders accused BJP supporters of threatening party workers and their families to either “accept the new order” or vacate local political spaces. BJP leaders denied orchestrating intimidation and accused the TMC of exaggerating incidents for political purposes.

Rural fear and night-time intimidation- In rural Bengal, the atmosphere following the election results was marked not only by actual violence but also by fear, rumours and uncertainty spreading rapidly through villages.

Reports by Reuters, The Quint and local Bengali media indicated that in politically contested pockets of Birbhum, Bankura, Purulia and Murshidabad, rumours circulated through WhatsApp groups and local political networks claiming that armed groups were moving from village to village targeting rival supporters.

Several families interviewed by local media claimed that political workers temporarily fled homes fearing reprisals after the change in power. Women in some villages reportedly described spending nights awake after rumours spread that houses belonging to rival supporters would be attacked before dawn.

In some villages, residents reportedly gathered at road entrances during the night after rumours circulated online about impending attacks. Even in areas where no actual violence followed, the rumours themselves contributed to widespread panic and anxiety.

Local reports also suggested that villagers in certain areas were informally warned against openly displaying support for defeated candidates or retaining party flags outside homes and shops. In several places, residents quietly removed political banners after results day to avoid attracting attention.

At the same time, India Today and other outlets cautioned that not every rumour or viral claim translated into verified violence. Police officials and journalists repeatedly warned that misinformation, exaggerated claims and recycled videos spreading online were significantly contributing to panic in already tense regions.

Here are some social media links:

TMC’s Abhishek Banerjee has alleged that BJP workers are inciting violence across West Bengal, claiming that Trinamool Congress offices are being vandalised in multiple areas. The accusations come amid heightened political tensions in the state, with the TMC accusing the BJP of… pic.twitter.com/wbiJDr9L1L

— Mojo Story (@themojostory) May 6, 2026

TMC party office set on fire & BJP flag tied in front of it in Jamuria, West Bengal

BJPigs who used to condemn poll violence in West Bengal before are now doing this & celebrating it #electionresult2026 pic.twitter.com/r0PUl1GnPs

— Veena Jain (@Vtxt21) May 4, 2026

Political Offices as Targets: The battle for territorial control

One of the defining characteristics of the post-poll unrest has been the systematic targeting and symbolic takeover of political offices. Across Bengal, party offices became visible markers of changing power relations. According to multiple reports, TMC offices in Tollygunge, Kasba, Baruipur, Baranagar, Kamarhati, Durgapur, Purulia, Bankura, Baharampur and parts of north Bengal were attacked, vandalised or forcibly occupied by groups carrying BJP flags shortly after the election results.

Videos and photographs circulating in media reports showed:

• party signboards torn down,
• furniture smashed,
• walls repainted,
• offices ransacked,
• posters destroyed,
• and saffron flags replacing TMC insignia.

In some areas, offices reportedly functioned as local command centres for political patronage and organisation. Their takeover therefore carried significance beyond symbolism.

In Bengal’s political culture, local party offices often operate as:

• spaces for dispute resolution,
• centres for welfare access,
• hubs for employment recommendations,
• sites of local mobilisation,
• and markers of territorial influence.

As a result, capturing a party office is frequently understood not merely as an act of vandalism but as a declaration that political authority in that locality has changed hands.

Several TMC leaders alleged that these occupations occurred in the presence of police personnel who either failed to intervene or acted too late. BJP leaders, meanwhile, argued that many offices had been “voluntarily vacated” by TMC workers fearing public backlash after the election outcome.

The competing narratives reflected a deeper struggle over legitimacy:

• whether the developments represented organised political intimidation,
• spontaneous local retaliation,
• or a chaotic mix of both.

Post-poll violence erupted across West Bengal after results, leaving at least 4 people dead and several others injured. Clashes were reported between TMC and BJP supporters in multiple districts, including Kolkata and Howrah.

(West Bengal elections, TMC, BJP, Mamata Banerjee,… pic.twitter.com/UREaEosrl5

— THE WEEK (@TheWeekLive) May 6, 2026

West Bengal — Incidents of violence have been reported in West Bengal following the elections, raising serious concerns over law and order.

In Kolkata’s New Market area, a crowd allegedly demolished a party office using a bulldozer, while nearby shops were also damaged during… pic.twitter.com/NnXa968Dl9

— Dalimss News (@Dalimss_News) May 6, 2026

The Human Cost: Deaths, injuries and displacement

As the unrest intensified, reports of deaths and serious injuries began emerging from multiple districts. Political parties quickly accused one another of orchestrating targeted killings. Among the deaths reported in media coverage were:

• Abir Sheikh in Nanoor,
• Biswajit Pattanaik in Beleghata,
• Madhu Mondal in New Town,
• Jadab Bar in Udaynarayanpur, along with several other individuals linked, directly or indirectly, to local political activity.

However, even as political narratives hardened, investigators and journalists repeatedly noted that the precise circumstances behind several deaths remained contested. Police officials reportedly cautioned that not every killing could immediately be categorised as purely political. In some cases, investigators examined whether:

• personal disputes,
• longstanding local rivalries,
• criminal conflicts,
• or factional tensions

may have intersected with the broader post-election atmosphere. This uncertainty did little to slow political mobilisation. Both the BJP and TMC rapidly circulated lists of allegedly targeted workers, held protest demonstrations and amplified emotionally charged narratives around victimhood and retaliation. At the ground level, however, the impact extended far beyond official party structures.

Injuries, fear and local trauma- Beyond the headline incidents of political clashes and killings, reports from multiple districts suggested that the post-poll unrest also produced a broader atmosphere of fear and psychological distress within affected communities.

According to reports carried by Hindustan Times, The Telegraph, PTI and regional Bengali media outlets, hospitals in districts including Howrah, Birbhum, North 24 Parganas and Paschim Bardhaman reportedly treated individuals with injuries allegedly sustained during clashes between rival political groups. Local accounts described injuries caused by sticks, stones, bamboo poles and sharp weapons during street confrontations and attacks linked to post-result tensions.

In parts of Howrah and Birbhum, residents interviewed by The Telegraph described localities where people avoided stepping outside after dark because of fears of retaliatory attacks, intimidation marches or sudden clashes between rival supporters. Some residents reportedly stated that groups carrying party flags moved through neighbourhoods late into the night shouting slogans and issuing warnings to political opponents.

Local Bengali media reports from parts of North 24 Parganas and Murshidabad suggested that schools in certain sensitive pockets witnessed lower attendance as tensions continued in the days following the election results. Parents reportedly feared allowing children to travel through politically tense routes or areas where clashes had recently occurred.

The atmosphere described in many reports was not always one of continuous large-scale violence, but rather one of persistent uncertainty and intimidation. Residents repeatedly referred to rumours spreading through neighbourhoods, sudden gatherings of political workers, loud slogan campaigns and fears that clashes could erupt again at any moment.

Several local journalists noted that even in areas where violence had subsided, the psychological impact lingered. Families reportedly remained indoors after sunset, local businesses closed early in some pockets, and ordinary residents feared being publicly identified with the “wrong” political affiliation.

Temporary displacement and forced movement- Reports from several districts also indicated patterns of temporary displacement and forced movement linked to post-poll tensions.

According to The Quint, Reuters, The Telegraph and Bengali-language media reports, families associated with rival political groups allegedly fled homes temporarily in parts of Birbhum, Murshidabad, Purulia, South 24 Parganas and North 24 Parganas fearing retaliatory attacks after the election outcome.

In some villages, local political workers reportedly left their homes and stayed with relatives in neighbouring areas after rumours spread that supporters of defeated parties would be targeted. Women interviewed by local reporters described hurriedly sending children to relatives’ homes after hearing that clashes were expected overnight.

Reports from politically sensitive rural pockets suggested that some houses remained locked for days after results were declared because families feared returning immediately. In a few areas, residents alleged that local workers were pressured to either publicly switch allegiance or stop visible political activity altogether.

This pattern has appeared repeatedly during previous episodes of post-poll violence in Bengal. Following earlier elections — particularly the 2018 panchayat polls and the 2021 Assembly elections — media reports similarly documented:

• defeated party workers leaving villages,
• families seeking shelter with relatives,
• local offices being abandoned,
• and visible political realignment occurring under pressure.

While such movement is not always formally recorded as “displacement” in administrative terms, it nevertheless reflects the coercive social impact of post-election violence at the neighbourhood level.

In Bengal’s highly localised political culture, where party affiliation is often closely tied to social protection, livelihood access and local influence, even temporary flight from one’s home can become politically significant. It reflects not merely fear of physical violence, but fear of exclusion from the local social and political order emerging after the election result.

At the same time, several reports also cautioned that claims regarding mass displacement circulating on social media were often exaggerated or unsupported by independent verification. Journalists and fact-checkers repeatedly noted the importance of distinguishing between verified incidents and politically amplified narratives spreading online.

Communal Undertones: When political violence intersects with religious polarisation

Several incidents during the unrest also appeared to acquire communal overtones. Reports by The Quint and local journalists suggested that certain Muslim-majority neighbourhoods in Kolkata, Barasat and adjoining regions witnessed threatening slogan campaigns, intimidation and vandalism. Eyewitnesses reportedly described:

• mobs entering Muslim-dominated areas,
• shops allegedly being pressured to remove Muslim names,
• threats against traders,
• vandalism involving symbols associated with Muslim historical figures,
• and aggressive communal sloganeering.

In some places, residents stated they were uncertain whether attacks were fundamentally political or communal because the two appeared deeply intertwined. This overlap reflects a broader transformation in Bengal’s political landscape over recent years.

India’s West Bengal Post-Election Violence against Muslims & minorities by BJP Goons pic.twitter.com/slWRHfJ5cL

— Tanvir Chowdhury (@tanvirbengal) May 5, 2026

On May 5 in West Bengal, after the BJP’s victory results, the atmosphere remained tense in Uluberia (Dishipur). The shops of Muslim fruit vendors present in that area were targeted, and Hindu groups completely vandalized the Muslim shops pic.twitter.com/JD0mp9414L

— The Muslim Matter India (@TheMuslimMatter) May 6, 2026

Historically, Bengal’s political violence was often rooted more in ideological and organisational rivalry than overt communal mobilisation. However, the last decade has seen increasing communal polarisation become embedded within electoral politics in the country itself. As political competition intensified, religious identity increasingly entered:

• campaign rhetoric,
• local mobilisation,
• social media propaganda,
• and neighbourhood-level tensions.

Consequently, moments of political unrest now carry a heightened risk of communal escalation — especially when amplified through misinformation online. At the same time, police and journalists repeatedly cautioned against accepting viral communal claims without verification. Several videos and allegations circulating online were reportedly misleading, recycled or stripped of context.

This dual reality became central to the current crisis:

• real fear and intimidation existed,
• but misinformation also significantly distorted the situation.

The Information War: Fake news, viral claims and manufactured panic

If violence defined the streets, misinformation defined the digital landscape. Within hours of the election results, social media platforms were flooded with:

• unverified videos,
• edited clips,
• exaggerated casualty figures,
• recycled riot footage,
• communal rumours,
• and partisan propaganda masquerading as breaking news.

The volume of misinformation was extraordinary.

A social media page of Kolkata Police, fact-checkers and journalists identified multiple instances where:

• videos from earlier Bengal elections were re-shared as current footage,
• clips from Bangladesh or other Indian states were falsely labelled as Bengal,
• unrelated criminal incidents were presented as political murders,
• and communal narratives were inserted into incidents without evidence.

Several media outlets themselves explicitly stated that many circulating visuals could not be independently authenticated. India Today specifically noted that videos shared by political actors and supporters lacked independent verification.

Several fake and misleading posts are being circulated on social media regarding the imposition of Section 144.

It is clarified that no such order under Section 144 has been imposed within Kolkata Police jurisdiction.

Kolkata Police is closely monitoring such content. Legal… pic.twitter.com/7Q3REvxtO4

— Kolkata Police (@KolkataPolice) May 7, 2026

Certain posts/videos being circulated on social media are fake, misleading and intended to spread misinformation. Preliminary verification indicates that these visuals are from other places and do not pertain to West Bengal/Kolkata.

Strict legal action is being initiated against… pic.twitter.com/VaAM7fcIKB

— Kolkata Police (@KolkataPolice) May 7, 2026

This “advisory” is fake and misleading.

The law and order situation within Kolkata Police jurisdiction remains completely normal and is under constant and vigilant monitoring.

Strict legal action is being initiated against those responsible for circulating such false… pic.twitter.com/jW0vv7bgk7

— Kolkata Police (@KolkataPolice) May 6, 2026

Several misleading posts are being circulated on social media by falsely linking unrelated videos and photos from other places to Kolkata after the election results.

Kolkata Police is closely monitoring such content. Strict legal action is being taken against those spreading… pic.twitter.com/a6dqboQWiF

— Kolkata Police (@KolkataPolice) May 5, 2026

https

कांग्रेस नेता श्रीनिवास BV, तृणमूल कांग्रेस सांसद कीर्ति आज़ाद सहित अन्य ने बंगाल में BJP की जीत के बाद हिंसा दिखाते हुए एक वीडियो शेयर किया. जबकि ये वीडियो बंगाल चुनाव के दूसरे चरण के मतदान से भी पहले से ऑनलाइन मौजूद है. #AltNewsFactCheck | @AbhishekSayhttps://t.co/8ZTOyMrROX

— Mohammed Zubair (@zoo_bear) May 8, 2026

A video from January showing a crowd on its way to join an Ijtema in Hooghly district of Bengal is FALSELY viral as illegal immigrants leaving the state post BJP’s win. #AltNewsFactCheck by @anindyahazra96 https://t.co/G95GrpHgvv

— Mohammed Zubair (@zoo_bear) May 8, 2026

NDTV से जुड़े आदित्य राज कौल, पत्रकार अभिजीत मजूमदार और अन्य ने एक वीडियो बंगाल में बीजेपी की जीत का जश्न बताकर शेयर किया. ऑल्ट न्यूज़ की पड़ताल में मालूम चला कि वीडियो प्रयागराज का है जहां T20 विश्व कप जीतने का जश्न मनाया जा रहा था. | @onkeyta_ https://t.co/FLfREOVzjr

— Mohammed Zubair (@zoo_bear) May 8, 2026

The administrative response and questions of institutional trust

As violence escalated, both the Election Commission and law enforcement agencies came under intense scrutiny. The Election Commission directed the administration to adopt a “zero tolerance” approach toward post-poll violence and instructed police to take immediate action against those involved in attacks and vandalism.

According to reports:

• over 200 criminal cases were registered,
• more than 400 arrests were made,
• central forces conducted flag marches,
• and additional deployments were sent to sensitive districts.

Yet questions about institutional neutrality quickly emerged. The TMC accused sections of the administration and police of enabling attacks after the transfer of power.
The BJP, meanwhile, alleged that parts of the local police machinery remained aligned with the previous regime and selectively targeted BJP workers.

This mutual distrust significantly complicated policing efforts. In politically polarised environments, even administrative action becomes interpreted through partisan lenses:

• arrests are viewed as selective,
• police presence is interpreted as political alignment,
• and institutional legitimacy itself becomes contested.

This has long been one of Bengal’s structural democratic challenges.

#WATCH | Kolkata, West Bengal: Kolkata Police Commissioner Ajay Kumar Nand says, “The elections have been conducted peacefully. There have been no incidents of violence or threats, and people have voted freely and fairly. I just want to say that the atmosphere on that day will be… pic.twitter.com/nxPvKWozRM

— ANI (@ANI) May 6, 2026

BJP Leadership’s Position: Distancing, damage control and internal contradictions

As reports of post-poll violence and vandalism spread across districts, sections of the BJP leadership publicly attempted to distance the party from the attacks and project an image of administrative restraint and democratic legitimacy.

According to reports by PTI, The Hindu and The Telegraph, West Bengal BJP president Samik Bhattacharya stated repeatedly in press briefings and public interactions that attacks on political opponents, intimidation of local workers and forcible occupation of party offices would not be tolerated under the new government. He reportedly warned that BJP workers found engaging in violence or vandalism would face disciplinary consequences.

In one statement carried by PTI, Bhattacharya reportedly said that “revenge politics” would not be permitted and that the BJP leadership wanted the transition of power to appear “peaceful and constitutional” rather than coercive.

These public statements came amid mounting reports of TMC offices being vandalised, occupied or rebranded with BJP flags in districts including North 24 Parganas, Purulia, Durgapur and parts of north Bengal.

In certain areas, local BJP leaders reportedly intervened directly after criticism over forcible takeovers intensified. According to The Telegraph and regional Bengali media reports, BJP leaders in Balurghat and Raiganj allegedly ordered party workers to remove saffron flags that had been placed on occupied TMC offices following the election results. In some cases, local BJP representatives reportedly returned office keys or vacated premises after allegations emerged that local cadres had seized party offices during victory celebrations.

Media reports suggested that these interventions were partly aimed at countering the growing perception that the post-election transition was becoming associated with retaliatory street-level assertion rather than orderly democratic change. At the same time, the incidents exposed an important contradiction within the BJP’s position in Bengal. While the party’s senior leadership sought to frame the election result as a democratic mandate for governance change and institutional restructuring, reports from several districts suggested that sections of the grassroots cadre viewed the victory in territorial terms — as an opportunity to visibly assert control over neighbourhoods, local offices and political spaces long dominated by the TMC.

This tension was visible in multiple reports:

• senior leaders publicly appealed for calm,
• while local clashes and office occupations continued in some districts;
• party spokespersons denied organised involvement in attacks,
• even as videos circulated showing groups carrying BJP flags during incidents of vandalism and intimidation.

The BJP, however, also argued that many incidents were either exaggerated by political opponents or falsely attributed to its supporters. Some BJP leaders claimed that local factional conflicts within the TMC were being portrayed as post-poll attacks by BJP workers.

This gap between official messaging and local political behaviour is not unique to the BJP. Similar contradictions have historically appeared under previous ruling formations in Bengal as well.

During earlier political transitions — including the rise of the Trinamool Congress after the decline of the Left Front — allegations similarly emerged that grassroots workers interpreted electoral victory as territorial control over local institutions and neighbourhood political structures.

What makes the present situation politically significant is that such contradictions shape how democratic transition is experienced at the ground level. For party leaderships, elections may represent constitutional transfer of power. But for local workers and residents in politically polarised areas, the transition is often experienced more immediately through:

• control over party offices,
• neighbourhood processions,
• intimidation campaigns,
• symbolic displays of dominance,
• and the visible assertion of who now controls the locality.

It is within this localised political culture that post-poll violence in Bengal repeatedly acquires both symbolic and coercive significance.

Bengal’s long history of post-poll violence

The present violence is not an aberration in Bengal’s political history. Rather, it fits into a long-standing pattern that has persisted across changing governments and ideological regimes. Political scientists have frequently described Bengal as a “party society” — a system where political affiliation becomes deeply intertwined with:

• welfare access,
• employment opportunities,
• local protection,
• social legitimacy,
• dispute resolution,
• and institutional access.

Under such conditions, elections become contests not merely over governance but over control of local life itself.

During the Left Front era, allegations of cadre violence, suppression of opposition and territorial domination were widespread in several districts. When the TMC came to power in 2011, many of the same accusations resurfaced against the new ruling establishment.

The 2018 panchayat elections witnessed extensive reports of intimidation and clashes.
The aftermath of the 2021 Assembly elections similarly saw widespread allegations of revenge attacks and political killings.

Data cited from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) indicated that the 2021 election period witnessed approximately 300 violent incidents and dozens of deaths. This continuity is important because it suggests that Bengal’s post-poll violence is structural rather than episodic.

Democracy under strain

The 2026 election should have been remembered primarily as a major democratic transition in Indian politics. Instead, its immediate aftermath has once again raised serious questions about the normalisation of political violence in Bengal.

Across districts today, the visible consequences remain stark:

• vandalised offices,
• grieving families,
• displaced workers,
• frightened residents,
• communal anxieties,
• aggressive digital propaganda,
• and a deeply polarised atmosphere where truth itself has become contested.

The violence has also demonstrated how quickly misinformation can intensify already fragile conditions. Viral videos, partisan narratives and fabricated claims did not merely accompany the unrest — they became active participants in it. At its core, the crisis reflects a deeper democratic problem.

When elections become associated with fear, retaliation and territorial coercion, the distinction between democratic competition and political domination begins to blur. West Bengal has now witnessed this pattern under multiple political dispensations. The central question therefore extends beyond which party currently governs the state. It is whether Bengal’s political culture can eventually move beyond a cycle in which every major electoral transition risks producing violence, intimidation and social fragmentation.

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Declaring on March 31, 2026, that the Maoist insurgency in central India had been defeated after six decades, Union Home Minister Amit Shah announced the redeployment of battle-hardened Central Armed Police Forces from Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Odisha, promising to end insurgency in the hills before the 2029 general elections.

Shah described the period since Narendra Modi became Prime Minister in 2014 as a golden era for internal security, covering Kashmir and the north-east alongside the defeat of left-wing extremism.

Shah has not indicated how he intends to help the Manipur government resolve the crisis that continues to grip the state, where more than 260 people were killed, mostly Christian Kuki-Zo, over 300 churches and some 10,000 houses destroyed, and a lakh of persons displaced. Around 60,000 shelter in churches and private refuges in the hills where the Kuki-Zo have lived for generations; several hundred others are scattered across Delhi, Bangalore, Shillong and Guwahati as migrant workers.

The violence began on May 3, 2023, in the Meitei-dominated valley with arson and sexual assault. Political groups loyal to then Chief Minister Biren Singh paraded through the streets alongside police as naked women, just raped, were forced to walk in public view.

Singh, compelled to resign on February 9, 2025, has not reconciled to his removal and is considered still capable of manipulating volatile public opinion; he is also allegedly in the know of the drug economy that underpins instability in this border state.

For the Kuki-Zo still in relief camps or rented accommodation in Delhi, Bangalore, Shillong and Guwahati — dispossessed, un-rehabilitated, watching the third anniversary of their ethnic cleansing pass with no arrest for rape or murder — the prospect of more boots in Manipur carries a particular, bitter meaning.

More than 270 lives have been lost since May 3, 2023, including several central and state force personnel. Not one person has been convicted.

The CRPF, the force being redeployed from Chhattisgarh, is the same force that on April 7, 2026, fired on civilian protesters in Bishnupur district, killing three. More men and weapons — without accountability, without justice, without rehabilitation — is not a peace plan.

The immediate political crisis is in Imphal. COCOMI, the most powerful Meitei civil society umbrella body, announced in mid-April a complete boycott of the BJP in Manipur, appealing to the public to refuse to participate in any party activities and demanding a statement from Chief Minister Yumnam Khemchand Singh on his government’s failure to protect civilians.

On April 25, after a statewide shutdown and processions from multiple Imphal neighbourhoods, a COCOMI delegation submitted a seven-point memorandum, warning: “We will not be submitting a memorandum anymore after this.”

The seven demands — abrogating the Suspension of Operations agreement with Kuki-Zo armed groups, updating the National Register of Citizens, securing accountability for killings since May 2023, ending narco-terrorism, and ensuring accountability for the Tronglaobi deaths — reflect Meitei political grievances.

What the Meitei group is pressing for is not justice for Kuki-Zo rape survivors but the elimination of Kuki underground groups and the exclusion of alleged illegal immigrants from Myanmar who are kin tribes of the Kuki-Zo.

The two communities’ definitions of justice are irreconcilable without political mediation that has yet to arrive. A Kuki-Zo political bloc of ten MLAs — seven of them BJP members — has said it will not re-enter government without written commitments on a separate administration.

For 864 days after violence began, Prime Minister Narendra Modi did not visit Manipur, speaking of the crisis for the first time only on July 20, 2023, more than two months after it erupted.

He finally visited on September 13, 2025 — a three-hour trip to Churachandpur, headquarters of the Kuki region, and Imphal. He promised housing for internally displaced persons without specifying location or timeline, since the return of Kuki tribals to the valley depends on talks that remain inconclusive.

Congress general secretary Priyanka Gandhi Vadra responded: “It is unfortunate that he allowed this to go on for so long, with so many killed and so much strife, before deciding to visit. That has not been the tradition of Prime Ministers in India.”

The government officially confirmed 58,821 displaced persons in 174 relief camps, 7,894 permanent houses destroyed and 2,646 partially destroyed. It had promised all displaced would return home by March 31, 2026.

That deadline passed without a single return. The Kuki-Zo cannot return to the Imphal valley — their homes no longer exist or are occupied by others. National highways between the hills and the valley function, in effect, as ethnic frontlines, with members of both communities unable to cross safely into each other’s areas.

Human rights defender Babloo Loitongbam, himself a Meitei who faced assault and threats for speaking out, stated: “Thousands are still unable to return home — not by choice, but due to ongoing fear and insecurity. Numerous homes have been destroyed, while others remain occupied by vigilante groups, making return impossible without proper state intervention and guarantees of safety.”

Amnesty International India’s chair Aakar Patel said in May 2025: “It is unacceptable that the Indian government has failed to address the humanitarian needs and implement a rehabilitation policy for displaced communities who remain in relief camps two years since the ethnic violence began. This inaction has left tens of thousands in limbo, forced to endure life in inhumane conditions with no end in sight.”

The thousands of Kuki-Zo in Delhi, Shillong and Bangalore receive no official recognition as internally displaced persons and have no status under any central government scheme. Their children are enrolled wherever schools will accept them; their elders are dying far from their ancestral villages. The Kuki Students’ Organisation, Delhi and NCR, has functioned as a government in exile — maintaining documentation, filing petitions, holding vigils at the Constitution Club — with no other institution stepping forward for them.

The single most damning fact, at the start of the fourth year, is that no one has been convicted for any act of violence, murder, rape or arson committed since May 3, 2023.

The Supreme Court expressed shock at the fourteen-day delay in registering a Zero FIR for two women stripped, paraded naked and gang-raped by a mob whose perpetrators were clearly visible in a viral video circulated in July 2023.

One of those survivors, aged eighteen at the time of the assault, spent nearly three years moving between hospital wards in Guwahati. She died on January 10, 2026, aged approximately twenty, from injuries sustained during the violence.

Aakar Patel said: “This woman’s death is a devastating indictment of the Indian state’s continuing failure to deliver timely justice to survivors of sexual violence.” Committee on Tribal Unity spokesman Ng. Lun Kipgen noted: “Our brave girl survived the violence, but not the silence.” No perpetrator has been arrested. No senior police officer has faced disciplinary proceedings for the delay in filing the FIR or for failing to pursue the investigation.

The Wire’s investigative correspondent Greeshma Kuthar stated: “The Arambai Tenggol led mobs to Kuki-Zo villages that were burnt down, killed people and slaughtered them. There are FIRs naming them as accused in sexual assault of Kuki-Zo women. There are viral videos of their members beheading people — with no consequences.” No Arambai Tenggol leader has been arrested. Neither the central government nor Manipur state officials condemned the group’s violence.

The PUCL Independent People’s Tribunal, chaired by former Supreme Court judge Justice Kurian Joseph, released its report in August 2025 after taking testimony across Manipur and Delhi over more than a year. It documented survivors’ deep-rooted belief that the state either allowed the violence to happen or actively participated in it.

Many deponents attributed the killings to the political and administrative decisions of former Chief Minister Biren Singh. The jury recorded its disturbance at the brutality — people killed, butchered, tortured, dismembered, disrobed and sexually assaulted in public, their suffering then displayed on social media.

Audio evidence submitted to the court suggested that Singh had prior knowledge of the village attacks. The government’s own Commission of Inquiry, headed by former Guwahati High Court Chief Justice Ajai Lamba (he resigned and was replaced by retired Supreme Court judge Balbir Singh Chauhan as chair in February 2026), has had its mandate extended multiple times and now runs to May 2026.

The Supreme Court’s observation of an “absolute breakdown of law and order,” its shock at police delays in registering FIRs for sexual violence, and its orders transferring certain cases to the CBI produced documentation but not accountability.

The International Crisis Group, in its February 2025 report, called on New Delhi to urgently address the Kuki-Zo demand for a separate administration, noting that the constitutional precedent already exists in the autonomous district councils of Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram. That call has not been answered.

More CRPF battalions were present in Manipur on May 3, 2023, than in most Indian states. They did not stop the burning of churches in Churachandpur. They did not prevent the looting of police armouries. By October 2023, an estimated 6,000 weapons and 600,000 rounds of ammunition had been seized, along with mortars, grenades and police uniforms, of which only approximately a quarter had been recovered. They did not arrest Arambai Tenggol commanders. On April 7, 2026, they fired on Meitei protesters in Bishnupur, killing three. Armed force, without political will or accountability structures, does not resolve ethnic conflict.

Benjamin Mate, chairman of the Kuki Organisation for Human Rights Trust, has stated what justice requires: “The Government of India must appoint an independent commission to thoroughly investigate the role of senior officials, state bureaucrats, police officials and armed groups during the ethnic violence. Accountability is essential, and only through a transparent and impartial inquiry can justice be delivered to the victims. By consistently failing to hold those suspected of serious human rights violations accountable, the government risks signalling that impunity will persist — ultimately paving the way for further abuses.”

Courtesy: India Currents

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Police said Mohammed Arif, 25, and Syed Imran, 31, were allegedly attacked while they were out for a walk. Deputy police superintendent Madolappa said five suspects were arrested in connection with the assault. “The accused were reportedly under the influence of alcohol,” Madolappa said. Names of the accused have not been released by the authorities.

Unfortunately, the news reports are based only on police sources. HT reports that the police said the incident took communal colour as the Muslim community alleged it was a targeted attack. They cited the complaint filed in the case and said that six to seven assailants made death threats and attacked Arif and Imran with stones, causing head injuries.

Further, the newspaper also reported that the police stated that tensions escalated when protesters gathered outside the station. Some protesters allegedly attacked police personnel, including assistant sub-inspector Mukhtar Patel, and threw stones. “Another case has been registered against 49 Muslim community members for attempting to lay siege to the police station, assaulting Patel, other police staff, and throwing stones,” Madolappa said.

Though the situation was reportedly brought under control thereafter, the original assault on teachers who happened to be Muslim and the motive of the attackers remains a mystery, unreported.

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