52. The complicity of the administration
52.3 It can be observed that there was a complete want of honest approach while providing security to the disputed structure. The administration not only collaborated in fleshing out the skeleton by the state government and putting it in its manifesto but also connived and abetted in the demolition of the structure, and the aftermath, to achieve the political object of the political party in power and the object of its election manifesto.
52.4 It would not be out of place to recall yet again that the BJP formed the government led by Kalyan Singh as the chief minister in Uttar Pradesh in June 1991. Prior to the 6th of December 1992, the chief minister changed the local officers of the administration holding key posts, including the commissioner, inspector-general of police, director general of police, district magistrate, superintendent of police, deputy inspector-general of police and other officers, by liberally exercising the power of transfers. Prakash Singh [former DGP, Uttar Pradesh], categorically stated that officers like DV Mehta, DIG, and [himself], being inconvenient persons, were transferred out while people with sangh parivar affiliations or political ambitions, like DB Rai [SSP, Faizabad], AK Sharan, etc, were posted at Ayodhya despite his objections. He stated that DB Rai used to hobnob with the local political leaders at Ayodhya. Other pliable officers with particular affiliations, or having a political agenda, or [who] did not even have any experience of situations like the one in hand, were transferred to sensitive offices or posts. It was well known and an open secret that AK Sharan, the IG of Lucknow zone dealing with the Ayodhya issue, was close to the BJP leadership and was pliable even to the local leadership. His conduct and partiality, particularly on the fateful day, make his ties with the BJP even though he was in uniform, unacceptable. So is true of DB Rai, who was even more strongly devoted to the BJP and the Hindu Mahasabha which was anti-Muslim.
52.5 The commissioner of Faizabad [SP Gaur] himself categorically admitted that he did not know about policing. It is astonishing that an officer who is legally required to supervise not only professionally but also to supervise an entire institution or an organisation does not have basic knowledge of the subject. The people who mattered in the administration, either knowingly or otherwise, having or [having] had strong views on Hinduism and about the partition of the country, were put in key posts especially. They also had political ambitions as revealed by later events i.e. when he contested elections on a BJP ticket. Akhilesh Mehrotra [additional SP, Faizabad] did not hesitate to coin and put forward incredible, blatantly unbelievable stories like that there was firing from the house of a Muslim on the 6th of December. I can observe here that he evaded all inconvenient questions about undisputed facts during the course of examination.
52.6 DB Rai patently described the crowd present at the disputed structure in July as well as on the crucial day, the frenzy, [the emotional] surcharge of the religious fanatics, as peaceful. This was not only a blatant lie but a deliberate attempt to mislead with the intention to further the political agenda of the BJP. AK Sharan, the seniormost police officer, not only deliberately visited Ayodhya just once despite the gravity of the situation and the judicial restraint on any demolition or construction at the site. He neither responded nor reacted on the 6th of December 1992, not even when the provocative and emotionally charged slogans were being raised and speeches made at Ram Katha Kunj with a view to create an ambience of hatred towards a particular community. He did not give any orders nor took any steps to stop the vandalism and the demolition. He did not even reach the Ram Katha Kunj where the only available public address system had been installed. He never approached the leadership with a request to take any steps nor suggested any means to end the destruction. He failed to prepare any plan for security beforehand or even to acquaint himself with the past happenings at the disputed site or to consider the implications. These lapses are inexcusable for an officer of this rank. He did refer to one solitary traffic plan, which he said had been operationalised on the 6th of December, but failed to produce it before me despite numerous opportunities given for that reason. His intermixing with the local leadership of the temple movement is clear. However, he neglected to create any sources of intelligence amongst the sadhus or sants or the kar sevaks. I cannot refrain from observing specifically that officers like AK Sharan, DB Rai, SP Gaur, RN Srivastava [district magistrate. Faizabad], etc were in fact not merely officers of the government, as they posed, but really the representatives of the political party in power and of the organisers of the movement and the political executive and charged with the task of promoting and achieving the promises made by the RSS, VHP, Bajrang Dal, etc for creating a Hindu Rashtra.
52.7 Kalyan Singh made a sweeping statement that the transfers were made in the course of administration. It does not appear to be so in the case of transfers of the complete administration, particularly connected with the Ayodhya administration or district Faizabad. Merely stating that officers were put in the posts they deserved cannot be accepted, especially in view of the statement of the DGP before the commission. Equally telling is the commissioner’s admission that in 1990 the police and administration were hostile to the kar sevaks and vice versa while in 1992 the police and administration were neutral and rather friendly, particularly when the organisers or their party were partners in the government. The state government tacitly used to affirm the claim of the protagonists of the temple movement that the government of the state of UP of the time was of them, by them and for them. Further, though other subordinates accepted and asserted that the instructions issued orally or otherwise were compiled and kept in the form of notings in their official record, no such record was produced before me. I find truth in it, as in the ordinary course of the process of governance, it is an accepted norm.
52.8 The chief minister had assumed all the powers to transfer in or out officers, etc, in his own hands. In addition, he also took direct control of all issues or matters connected directly or otherwise with Ayodhya. All powers converged in these hands. He made full use of this unregulated power. He neither had any such delegated authority nor in fact or in law or otherwise was it so delegated to him. The local administration was given instructions from time to time, to comply with the decisions taken at the highest level. The DGP, police [SVM Tripathi]; AK Sharan, IG; US Bajpai, DIG [Faizabad] as well as the commissioner of Faizabad admitted that oral directions used to be given to the local administration from time to time without any record being maintained of the instructions or orders given. …
53.1 The chief minister, on assuming office, administratively took all latent and patent measures or steps, orally or otherwise, to ensure that no force of any nature was used against kar sevaks or leaders or the organisers and protagonists of the temple construction movement or the sadhus, sants, and, if one may say so, the sangh parivar. Chief Minister Kalyan Singh directed against the use of force against kar sevaks or leaders or the organisers and protagonists of the temple construction movement or the sadhus, sants…
53.2 In December [1992], the chief minister ordered in writing not to open fire on kar sevaks, etc in any eventuality. Requisitioning the paramilitary forces after getting permission from the government in December 1992, the chief minister pointed out that the administration did not have the authority to act or discharge its statutory obligations without formal orders from the government to requisition paramilitary forces in case of need. The conduct of the administration in totality shows that they had completely surrendered all statutory power and discretion to their political executive.
53.3 Anju Gupta [security officer attached to LK Advani] stated that a call for kar seva was given by LK Advani, MM Joshi, Vinay Katiyar and Ashok Singhal, etc. She further stated that in a brief meeting on the 5th of December 1992, taken by AK Sharan, IG, measures required to be taken in the eventuality of an attack/assault on the disputed structure were discussed by Haridas Rao [ADGP, law and order] and CK Malik [IG, security]. She said that the route of the leaders whom she was escorting was altered by Vinay Katiyar. Paramhans Ramchandra Das admitted [that] crowd management during the religious festival was done by the administration; no other organisation takes it on exclusively. [Anju Gupta] stated that 50 people of the Bajrang Dal were doing so yet, in view of the fact admitted by all the witnesses as well as by the administration and the organisers, that RSS workers (swayamsevaks) were deployed for it, no further observations are required on it. …
53.6 It cannot be denied that there was no restraint in the language of the speeches or in the provocative slogans or during press interviews, etc. The slogans and intemperate language was even videotaped and produced before the commission. Swami Chinmayanand, even after giving an undertaking to the Supreme Court, incited the kar sevaks by saying that the undertaking was only meant for satisfying the Supreme Court. Such instances and the slogans are well reported in the media and were accepted before the commission as well. The administration took no action in such a blatant case of [defiance and ridicule] of the hon’ble Supreme Court.
53.7 Prakash Singh on a question posed by the advocate general, admitted that the forces are affected by these utterances and discourses and, consciously or subconsciously, are prejudiced. There cannot be any dispute again that highly emotional and provocative religious speeches, during the course of the so-called attempts for awakening the injured feelings of Hindus by referring to the history of hundreds of years, were made to politically awaken and unite them. Still the administration did not take any steps to contain them, either at Ayodhya or at any other place. The administration or the organisers put no restraint on anybody from making provocative speeches or slogan-raising…
53.24 The bureaucracy, police, administration, political executive, legislatures, media, even the common man was alive to the militancy as well as the frenzied nature of the crowds which used to gather at Ayodhya, especially after 1990. Yet no substantial steps were taken for smooth administration, much less ensuring security, particularly in view of the contradictory stand taken by the political executive as well as the party governing the state. That is, on the one hand, proclaiming for providing security to the disputed structure; on the other hand, chief ministers along with cabinet colleagues of BJP-governed states were leading the mobilisation of kar sevaks for construction of the temple, which inherently includes demolition. …
CHAPTER 6
MOBILISATION OF KAR SEVAKS…
CHAPTER 7
SECURITY SET-UP AND ENVIRONMENT…
CHAPTER 8
CIRCUMSTANCES…
CHAPTER 9
ORGANISATIONS AND THEIR INTER SE LINKS…
CHAPTER 10
THE JOINT COMMON ENTERPRISE…
CHAPTER 11
PRESIDENT’S RULE…
CHAPTER 12
SECULARISM…
CHAPTER 13
THE ASSAULT ON THE MEDIA…