Image Courtesy: PTI

Scrapping of Article 370 and stripping Jammu and Kashmir of its special status is expected to be the centrepiece of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s address to the nation on the 72nd anniversary of independence day this year.

That probably explains the hasty and abrupt end to the AmarnathYatra and cancellation of all other seasonal pilgrimages in the state as well as the timing of bringing in the legislation to change the orientation of the most complex and troubled state in the country by stealth in the Parliament.

While this present euphoria over altering the very nature of India’s only Muslim majority state will turn into a grand celebration on a day to commemorate the freedom of the country, attained by the struggles of those stalwarts who had firm faith in liberal values, democracy and secularism, the rights of the people that have been trampled so brutally to make these celebrations possible will be beyond the pale of anyone’s view.

The political and geographical fate of the people of Jammu and Kashmir was decided on August 5 by a simple Presidential order and a resolution while they were cocooned in their homes with curfew or restrictions on the streets.

Far from thinking of consulting the people, a majoritarian government arrogated the right of the state legislative assembly to take a decision on changes to the special status on the Parliament where the ruling party enjoys a brute majority.

The logic behind the exercise being peddled is as delusional as the action is deceitful. The slicing of Jammu and Kashmir and reducing it into two separate entities as Union Territories, not even full-fledged states, is that this will be for the good of the citizens as it will end terrorism and bring development.

Has the state turned into some kind of a control freak that believes citizens are incapable of deciding for themselves what is good for them or not? Whether the stipulated goals, as stated by the Union Home Minister, behind taking this drastic action can actually be realised remains to be seen. What is important, first of all, is at what cost it has been achieved and whether all that has gone into achieving this is worth its salt at all.

Jammu and its neighbouring districts of Samba and Kathua, to its South, are under the spell of Section 144, forbidding an assembly of four or more people. In virtual reality, however, in many areas the Section 144 has been bent to convert it into an unannounced curfew.

Within the state, yet to be officially declared as two Union Territories of Ladakh and Jammu & Kashmir, these areas appear to enjoy the maximum liberty. Phones are working, television channels are on, newspapers are being circulated and the internet is working, even if all these are only partially available.

Further up north from Jammu, along the Jammu-Srinagar highway and Jammu-Poonch highway, (while nothing is known about the vast but sparsely populated and poorly connected Ladakh region) the entire state has been pushed into a freeze under military jackboots and barbed wires. There is not even a trickle of news from the Chenab Valley, which has a fragile demography, or from the sensitive border districts of Rajouri-Poonch.

The only bits and fragments of what is happening is coming from Srinagar, rather the restricted VVIP zone of Srinagar, through television channels whose crews have been huddled in one particular hotel.

From the television studios, the nation is being told that officials have confirmed that things are under control in Kashmir and all the essential stocks and medical facilities are available. The journalists cannot venture beyond the specified ‘lakshmanrekha’. Is it to ensure their security? Or to protect the Kashmiris living beyond the specified confines from them?

Senior journalist Muzamil Jaleel, who was in Srinagar and returned to Delhi, wrote on his facebook post: “I have just come to Delhi from Srinagar. It is worse than 1846. Srinagar is a city of soldiers and spools of concertina wire.

Yesterday, it took me three hours to reach office (Residency Road) from Parraypora. Phone – mobiles and landlines – have been disconnected. Internet is off. There is no money in ATMs. A very strict curfew has been imposed across Kashmir.”

“I could only move around with a lot of difficulty in uptown Srinagar. I have no information outside that small part of the city. However, I did hear there have been protests in old town of Baramulla. A colleague received a text message on his dead phone – some glitch. Everyone I met is in shock.

There is a strange numbness. We heard about killing of two protestors but there is no way to confirm. Kashmir has been turned invisible even inside Kashmir. The forces on checkpoints have specific instructions to disallow journalists to cross the barrier. I saw a TV crew from Delhi inside a hotel outside Rajbagh Police station – they were saying Kashmir is calm.”

This is the most detailed description coming from Kashmir since the historic day of August 5 when people woke up to curfewed streets and their world turned upside down. It is not known how many of them are aware of what has happened.

An unspecified number of extra troops have been mobilised across the Valley and other parts of the region in recent days. Who knows how the vast public is surviving – with or without bare essentials, with or without healthcare?

How many babies are being born and how many people are dying without a mourning and how much do family members have to plead before the uniformed men manning the barricades to allow them to give a decent burial to their departed loved one?

Worse still, are protests happening with a retaliation of bullets and pellets? How many casualties? In a Valley accustomed to crackdowns, raids and arrests, how many have been detained and how many taken to unknown destinations? If the clampdown, lockout and restrictions are unprecedented, in all probability then the end result may be too.

It is hoped that none of this is true but what is known with authenticity strengthens such suspicions. If two former chief ministers are imprisoned, an old and ailing ex-chief minister is put under a spell of house arrest and the one-time darling ally of the BJP also finds himself barricaded under house-arrest, there is no telling what rest of the population, already fed on a regular dose of brutality and trampling of civil liberties, is facing.

But forgetful of all this, the Government and the nation have a reason to go on a celebration spree this Independence Day. Jammu and Kashmir is finally and fully an integral part of India. The freedom, which comes with civil liberties and basic democratic rights, of the people of this more than ever integrated part of the country is completely inconsequential.

(The author is Executive Editor Kashmir Times; the article first appeared in the National Herald and is being reproduced here with the permission of the author)
 

The post The Valley of fear: Is Kashmir finally ‘free’? appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Image: Kashmir Observer

The desperation in the tone matched the unusual bonhomie between her and her main political adversary, Farooq Abdullah, patron of National Conference (NC), on August 8. Media reports said that Mehbooba called on Farooq to discuss the current political situation in the state. Article 35 (A) was said to be the main agenda of the meeting that was held in a ‘cordial’ atmosphere, as vouched by Omar Abdullah in a tweet. Ever since, other opposition parties including the Congress have called for a united voice against this move: rising above party and partisan politics and getting together, in one voice, against any tinkering or weakening the article. They have also suggested an all party delegation led by chief minister Mehbooba Mufti to petition the Centre on this issue; to apprise the people there about the disastrous fallout of the weakening or abrogating Article 35 A.

The row over Article 35 (A) has not only brought Mehbooba’s Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and NC on the same page but also the separatists who have called for protests against moves to tamper with the Article 35 (A). The move is seen as having a potential of inflaming the already tense and sensitive situation in the state.

At the heart of this controversy, which is likely to throw up unique political equations at a certain level, is a petition filed by an RSS backed NGO in the Supreme Court challenging the validity of this constitutional provision. The petition has been pending in the apex court since two years.

Despite persistent pleas by the state government, the Centre has refused to challenge this legal intervention in the Supreme Court, enhancing the dangers of a possible lopsided hearing on the issue. Owing to the overtly sensitive politics of the state and in view of the historic special status, the issue assumes even greater significance.  

Article 35(A) empowers the J&K legislature to define “permanent residents” of the state. This section was added to Article 35 through a Presidential Order called The Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order 1954, issued under Article 370. The order superseded an earlier order issued in 1950, which provided the framework for division of powers between J&K and New Delhi under Article 370. The Article incorporates the safeguards for the citizens of the state provided in the state subject law promulgated by the Maharaja Hari Singh-led government in 1927.

Article 370 which remains the constitutional link between India and Jammu and Kashmir and also guarantees special status to the state stands eroded today and diluted through a slew of central amendments right since 1950s. The permanent resident provision, protected by the Article 35 A, today remains the core of this special status that the state enjoys. Striking down this crucial provision, Article 35 A, which was not passed by the parliament or ratified by the state legislature but came as a presidential order, may create a constitutional crisis, impacting several other such presidential orders altering the state’s special status, including the recent one on GST. 

Any debate on Article 35 (A) naturally invokes one on Article 370 as well, as the former was supposed to be a clarification provision to the latter. In 2015, a division bench of J&K High Court interpreted Article 370 as a permanent provision. “The Article 370, notwithstanding its title ‘temporary provision’ is a permanent provision of the Constitution. It cannot be abrogated, repealed or even amended as mechanism provided under Clause (3) of Article 370 is no more available”, pronounced the court in October 2015. Even if this verdict be challenged, a debate on these issues re-open the entire debate on accession, which is hinged to the constitutional provisions of Article 370 that form the vital link between Jammu and Kashmir and rest of the state.

The legal and constitutional technicality apart, the debates on Article 35 (A) and Article 370 are red rags that will further muddy the waters in Jammu and Kashmir, politically as well as socially, with dangers of not just a more lethal backlash in the Valley but also possible polarisation of state on dangerously communal lines. The issue thus brings political adversaries, NC and PDP, as well as Hurriyat on the same page. The consequences of attempts to tinker with the special status of the state in any way have been well grasped by political parties across the spectrum, barring the BJP. All of them have been advocating for initiation of dialogue and confidence building measures for resolution of Kashmir dispute. The BJP-RSS agenda, on the other hand, is to take away whatever little privileges the state enjoys owing to its special status.

In the midst of this fresh crisis, another petition pleading for striking down Article 35 (A) and Section 6 of the Jammu and Kashmir constitution has been filed in the apex court by a Kashmiri Pandit woman, Charu Walikhanna, who has maintained that she was denied the right to buy land in Jammu and Kashmir because she had married outside the state. The petition contends that the Article 35 (A) perpetuates gender inequality and strips a woman marrying outside the state of her permanent resident status. This narrow interpretation of the law, which is actually silent about gender, is erroneous and based on ignorance. 

Section 6 of the J&K constitution lays down: “Nothing in foregoing provisions of this part shall derogate from the power of the State legislature to make any law defining the classes the persons who are, or shall be permanent residents of the State.” It further states, “A Bill marking provision for any of the following matters, namely:
(a) defining or altering the definition of, the classes of persons who are, or shall be, permanent residents of the State;
(b) conferring on permanent residents any special rights or privileges;
(c) regulating or modifying any special rights or privileges enjoyed by permanent residents; shall be deemed to be passed by either House of the Legislature only if it is passed by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the total membership of that House. It also states, “The permanent residents of the State shall have all the rights guaranteed to them under the Constitution of India.” 
 
The Article 35 (A), thus, defines and qualifies the permanent resident of Jammu and Kashmir as well as guarantees fundamental rights and right to equality to these citizens as per the Indian constitution. Its silence on the rights of women marrying outside the side is settled by the clause that upholds the citizens’ constitutional rights which make no distinction on basis of caste, creed, religion or gender.

The apprehensions raised by the woman moving the Supreme Court are not without reason, however. The flawed interpretation stems from myths perpetuated for a long time, made worse by politicking by political parties over the issue.

In 1960s, the then Jammu and Kashmir revenue minister issued the orders for stamping the permanent resident certificates of women with a stamp saying, “Valid till marriage”. Noted political analyst Balraj Puri writes, “The fact is that neither the state subject law of 1927 nor the act under the state constitution (after which the earlier law in any case lapsed), provide for cancellation of the state subject; nor for different treatment of men and women. The state subject of Mrs. Ghulam Kabra and her right to inherit property was, for instance, challenged in the State High Court as early as in 1939 in Maharaja’s time on the ground that though a State Subject by birth, she had lost that status by marrying a non-state subject. The Court held that Ghulam Kabra was legal heir of the property which she could inherit.” (PUCL Bulletin, April 2004)

On the executive order of 1960s, Puri writes, “this order which lacked the force of law was differently interpreted.” He quoted the case of daughter of a senior bureaucrat of the state, SAS Qadri, who married, Mehmood-ul-Rehman, an IAS officer from outside the state, in 1973. “Her status as a permanent resident of the state and her right to inherit property of her father under that was declared valid by the Revenue Minister on the ground that ‘the constitution of Jammu and Kashmir or any other law does not provide for deprivation of a permanent resident of the state of his or her status’.”

Similarly, in 2002, a full bench of the High Court in a case, State of Jammu and Kashmir vs Dr Sushila Sawhney, said that daughter of a permanent resident of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will not lose status as permanent resident of the State on marriage with a person who is not permanent resident of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. One judge struck a discordant note with the argument that the rights of the woman should be limited only to inheritance of property.

Several similar petitions pending in the courts filed by women whose seniority or jobs were challenged on grounds that they had married non permanent residents since the 60s were also clubbed together by the Supreme Court which finally sent them back to the state government with the direction to come up with a suitable way that addresses the issue. 

Later, the state government appealed in the Supreme Court against the high court judgement of 2002. In 2004 the then PDP government in 2004 withdrew the appeal and moved a Bill in the Legislative Assembly seeking disqualification of a woman marrying a non-State Subject. The bill was passed in the assembly unanimously without anyone raising a whimper but failed the test on the floor of the upper house of state legislature. The BJP turned the issue into an opportunity to give the controversy a saffron colour by equating the state’s autonomy with gender oppression. The row took an ugly turn with regional divides being played up by BJP, Congress and Valley based parties and soon assumed communal overtones. 

 (To say that Jammu opposes Article 370 and Article 35 (A) would be an over-simplified and also an erroneous view. Interestingly, when it comes to preserving the interests of locals, there has been strong opposition to attempts to tamper with the article. Last winter, chemist shops in Jammu were shut for three days to protest against the PDP-BJP coalition government’s decision to allow a non-state subject to open 57 pharmacy shops in violation of the Article 370.)

In the face of stiff resistance from Jammu based women groups and some political parties in 2004 to the Permanent Resident Disqualification Bill, the government created a select house committee to look into the lacunae which left the law open to interpretation. The contents of the report tabled by the committee are not fully known but it has not sought any changes in the law, nor advised anyone’s disqualification. Successive governments, thereafter, have desisted from bringing back the contentious bill in the legislature. More significantly, the state subject certificates of women no longer bear the stamp ‘Valid till marriage’ since the last one decade. 

There is no way that legally the right of the woman to purchase property or retain her state subject right can be challenged. Article 6 of the J&K Constitution clearly upholds the right to equality as laid down in the Indian Constitution. Article 35 (A) clearly makes no reference to women losing their rights as permanent resident.

This kind of politicking in challenging the women’s status in courts or within the legislature has, thus, stood on a sticky wicket. There are enough safeguards in the existing laws to ensure that women’s status as permanent residents of Jammu and Kashmir cannot be challenged.

Walikhanna’s petition thus raises anxieties that are exaggerated and based on myths, deliberate or otherwise. Is her petition based on presumptions? Did some officials of revenue department prevent her from going ahead with purchasing land? Is it possible that perpetuation of myths and lies has created space for multiple interpretations of the law? Is it just a case of ignorance or a case of poor implementation of law? It is neither. The petitioner in question was never a permanent resident of the state and is Kashmiri by ancestry. Her petition that is based on the rejection of her claims to residentship of Jammu and Kashmir, made in a letter to the Governor, mentions that her family was part of the Kashmiri Pandit exodus during the Afghan period in the 18th century, at a time when the state was not even formed.

Interestingly, her petition to the Supreme Court includes the case of Sushila Sawhney, in which the High Court ruled against depriving her of her permanent resident status after her marriage with a non-permanent resident. The petition does not mention the verdict but selectively picks up the court’s observation (in Sushila’s case), “no law defining the Classes of persons, who are or shall be the permanent residents of the State has so far been enacted by the State Legislature in exercise of its power under section 8 of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Constitution” to argue that “under the guise of Article 370 and 35A, the men and women state subjects are subjected to different treatments and discriminated based on gender.”

These anxieties are as misplaced as the apprehensions created in the Valley of a demographic change through marriage patterns. That having been said, any bid to strike down the Article 35 (A) does enhance the dangers of alteration of the demographic profile of the state. Such fears are not off the mark.

For decades, the RSS has had a historic penchant for suggesting that the demography of the state needs to be changed to resolve the Kashmir issue permanently. Two months ago, union home minister Rajnath Singh suggested, without spelling anything, that the government had found a ‘permanent solution’ to Kashmir dispute. In recent weeks, Article 35 (A) has been raised, again, by right wing groups who are calling for a debate or simply demanding to revoke it along with Article 370. As for Walikhanna’s case, it is not known if it is inspired by presumptions based on half baked knowledge or plain mischief.

In this current context, for Kashmiris suspicious of the designs of the Hindu right wing, it is not difficult to connect the dots and see the RSS’ historic resolve, Rajnath Singh’s remarks, the present discourse, the Centre openly favouring a larger debate and the petitions in the apex court challenging the state’s special status as part of the same project. There is enough potential in the controversy for further causing provocation in an already volatile Valley, besides polarizing rest of the state on communal lines. The dangers of stirring this hornet’s nest are unimaginable. 

Related Articles
Unravelling the Article 370 Rhetoric & Hysteria
J&K: Dangerous Demographics: Linking Article 370 with the Pandits’ return

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Almost a year after Kashmiri militant Burhan Wani’s killing, a cop Muhammad Ayub Pandith was lynched by an angry mob outside Srinagar’s Jamia Masjid while night long Jumat-ul-Vida prayers were going on inside the mosque. The cop was dressed in civvies and generated suspicions while he was taking photographs at the gate of the mosque. An altercation with some people who objected to his presence prompted him to fish out his gun, possibly in self defence, and press the trigger, injuring three people. Whether the provocation to thrash him till death stemmed from the firing, his allegedly suspicious behavior, his identity as a cop, or all of these; the incident marks a new low in Kashmir, where back in the eighties (1980s) murders and stabbings were almost unknown.

How did the Valley descend into this level of desperation, frustration, anger and hatred? The seeds of discontent lay in the preceding years.

Anti-India sentiment was already deepening due to Indian government’s failure in politically resolving a long pending dispute during the decade of comparative calm. Added to that the exacerbating human rights situation despite a diminishing graph of militancy with targeting of peaceful assemblies and stone pelting protestors brutally had already made the Valley restive by 2010, pushing smitten and humiliated young men to join the ranks of militants.  

Burhan Wani belonged to the same crop of young men and became the poster boy of new age of militancy. His death inspired many youngsters to pick up the gun. But there are several other factors that have pushed teenagers and youth to that path.

The repressive action against protestors and by-standers, in the after-math of his death, especially, the liberal use of high velocity lead pellet guns by police and CRPF is one of the main factors. Pellet ridden bodies and blinded faces of children as young as four years old became the most defining images of Kashmir in 2016 after Burhan Wani’s killing. This brutality was seen as continuum and worsening of human rights situation.

Anger was also fuelled by the shabby relief and rescue work during the 2014 floods and in far greater measure by the unholy alliance between PDP and BJP. The PDP, which sought votes in the 2014 elections on the promise of keeping saffron out of the Valley, finally made its peace with BJP and formed a coalition government in Jammu and Kashmir. PDP’s strongest bastion – South Kashmir – is today a hotbed of militancy and reportedly many youth who canvassed for the party in 2014 elections eventually joined the ranks of militants.

An altering idea of India with beef bans, lynchings, Love-Jehad and anti-minority violence by hooligans, patronised by the BJP in power at the Centre, and scripting a new discourse across the country also deepens the insecurities, anxieties of the Kashmiri youth, transforming the already deepening anti-India sentiment into hatred. Needless to point out that this conflict generation has seen only a militarized and brutal face of India, never its democratic one. The sole event of periodic elections since 1996 has been bandied about as democracy, the benefits of which have been insufficient to not just address the political aspirations of the people but also their day to day needs like development and employment.   
  
Post Burhan Wani, Kashmir has been a story of over-all despair where normality has a new definition and where militancy and protests are churning a complex narrative. Even though the Valley has witnessed comparative calm since last October, more and more youth are mesmerised by the idea of picking up guns. They are either inspired by their own harassment, prison terms under the draconian Public Safety Act or the collective oppression around them or they are ex-militants. Some of them are engineering and IT professionals or studying in professional colleges with promising careers. Even some cops deserted their posts and are believed to have joined militant groups. Religious radicalization is also a source of inspiration for some of the new entrants into the fold of militancy.

The newer trends in militancy reveal a far greater brotherhood with foreign militants, teenagers joining militancy and starved of arms and cash, this militancy by and large remains indigenous. Increasing incidents of looting of banks and arms from police installations and ill-trained but determined militants further corroborates that point. The proliferating numbers are not so huge as to ring alarm bells. But respect, sympathy and support for militants across the Valley certainly is. Massive funerals are held for slain militants, including foreign militants. But more significantly, swarms of people descend on the encounter site to shout slogans and pelt stones and queer the pitch for the security forces by making all efforts to rescue holed up militants.

Across the Valley, occasional stone pelting protests over the slightest of provocation has become the new normal. School and college students including young girls, though still very rare, initially provoked by the killing of a student by security forces inside the college campus in Pulwama, have also begun joining street protests, often with stones to pelt.

Anger was also fuelled by the shabby relief and rescue work during the 2014 floods and in far greater measure by the unholy alliance between PDP and BJP. The PDP, which sought votes in the 2014 elections on the promise of keeping saffron out of the Valley, finally made its peace with BJP and formed a coalition government in Jammu and Kashmir. PDP’s strongest bastion – South Kashmir – is today a hotbed of militancy and reportedly many youth who canvassed for the party in 2014 elections eventually joined the ranks of militants.

This generation is no longer deterred by the brutal clampdown of protests or of the lethal consequences of picking up the gun, revealing the depths of desperation.

A young lawyer, I have known since he was an enthusiastic law student with tremendous positive energy, told me in November 2016 of the immense frustration that overcomes him when he is fighting against a legal justice system that fails to deliver or when he witnesses how ten year old boys have been detained because the police wanted to arrest their elder family members. “Sometimes, out of helplessness I myself want to pick up the gun.” The young professional is far too mature and seasoned to do that but even for a thought like that to creep in his mind is disturbing, encapsulating the extent of frustration, desperation and loss of sense of fear that pushes many to take on the mighty Indian State and its security apparatus with guns, stones or even bare hands. What is even more disturbing is that they know that the State will not budge, but for them it is a choice between enduring constant pain and humiliation and committing, what may well be, ‘honour suicide’. 

A worrying trend is sections of militants making the departure from fighting for independence or merger with Pakistan to fighting in the name of khilafat. Two months ago, Zakir Musa, broke away from Hizb-ul-Mujahideen by first threatening the Hurriyat leaders. The likes of Zakir Musa and the theory of khilafat may not find much currency in the Valley which is still bound to its traditional syncretic culture. However, expressions of anger against the Indian State as well as their remote-controlled regime in Jammu and Kashmir, brutality by the security forces and even a weakened and corrupted Hurriyat have turned Zakir Musa into a hero, as witnessed during the night of Jumat-ul-Vida inside the Jamia Masjid where slogans in his support were raised, while a lone cop was being lynched outside. 

As I write this, reports pour in of 7 Amarnath yatris killed and several injured in a militant attack in South Kashmir. At this moment, it will be jumping the gun to presume this as a new norm. It is still not clear whether the attack was a pre-meditated one or a case of being caught at the wrong place and wrong time. Besides, such attacks, even though aberrations, have happened in the past in the Valley.  

Like the cop’s lynching, the attack on the pilgrims has been widely condemned in the Valley which continues to be mesmerized by the plural traditions of the pilgrimage. Many in the Valley believe that the radicalised militants are backed by the Indian agencies, though there is no evidence to suggest the same. Some others fear that the radicalised militants may gradually gravitate towards Islamic State operatives or may already have. Whether or not there is an element of truth in such assumptions, the choking of civilian space and the targeting of liberal voices among those espousing a separatist ideology through constant militarization and brutalization of the society is enlarging the base of radicalized elements.      
 
Massive human rights abuse and the worsening patterns of impunity that have made the transition from silence and inaction over complaints to harassing, intimidating and even registering cases against complainants and victims keeps the pot of frustration and anger boiling. The situation is typified by the haunting image of an army officer strapping a young man to a jeep and using him as a ‘human shield’ for over five hours and its justification by accusing the man of pelting stones and its far more brazen legitimization by rewarding the officer of violating military norms in doing so. Either the Indian government has no policy on Kashmir or it dangerously hopes to cash in on the rich electoral harvest (elsewhere in the country) of demonising Kashmir by pushing it towards chaos through perpetuation of brutality and injustices.

This sense of injustice primarily pushes the Kashmiri youth to make their choices within a choked space of absolute despair – to pelt stones, pick up the gun or carrying on with their mundane life.

Anger, alienation and despair finds manifestation in various forms. Many youngsters transcend their own personal and collective sense of helplessness to punctuate Kashmir’s chaos by charting a creative and imaginative narrative by writing and painting about Kashmir’s despair as well as by making positive interventions by organising relief work for those distressed by the conflict, documenting their tragedies or holding dialogues and workshops on conflict transformation or issues like Right to Information and Climate change on a smaller and low-key level.  On their shoulders, these young people keep aloft the simmering of hope that has no takers in New Delhi.   
     
The Indian government, which wants to believe that the problem is only “5 percent” stone pelters and militants operating in “three districts” of the Valley, turn a convenient blind eye to such positive energy. Recently, a documentary film, “Under the Shade of the Fallen Chinars”, show-casing artistic pursuits of students as an expression against the brutalization of Kashmir, was banned.

It does not suit the official narrative of denial about the causes of Kashmir’s anger and convenient naming of an enemy across the border that “engineers and motivates youth” to pelt stones or pick up the gun. Though motivation through religious radicalization and money cannot be out-rightly denied, there has to be enough sense of desperation to come out on the roads in protest with all the risks involved.  

As long as Indian government’s policy is locked in a grid of denial, obsession with Pakistan, military doctrine and ruling Kashmir through jackboots, disregarding not just the voices of protest but also the sometimes sage advice of the state government or other civil society members, Kashmir will continue to be locked in this vicious cycle of tragedy, pain, grief, brutality and violent reprisal. Only, it will continue to get worse.

(The author is Executive Editor Kashmir Times and a peace activist)
 

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दरअसल यह दमन पुलिस की क्रूर ताकतों, कानूनों के खुल्लम-खुल्ला उल्लंघनों और नीति-नियमों और लोकतांत्रिक सिद्धांतों को दरकिनार कर राज्य को पूरी तरह काबू करने की सरकार की बढ़ती चाहत का नतीजा है।

 
प्रोपगंडा का शातिराना इस्तेमाल करें तो लोग जहन्नुम को भी जन्नत मानने लगेंगे और बेहद परेशान हाल जिंदगी भी जन्नत लगेगी।
एडोल्फ हिटलर

हिटलर के नाजी शासन ने जर्मन जनता पर अपने दो औजारों के सहारे शासन किया था- प्रोपगंडा और सेंसरशिप। हर दिन हिटलर को महिमामंडित कर वह जनता पर अपनी पकड़ बनाए रखती थी। लोगों को अच्छी जिंदगी के ख्वाब दिखाए जाते थे लेकिन शासन यह भी पक्का कि ए रहता था कि नाजी शिविरों की जघन्य प्रताडऩाओं और नरसंहारों की बातें बाहर न आएं। लेकिन दुर्दांत यातनाओं, प्रताडऩाओं और हत्याओं की दिल दहला देने वाली कहानियां अंतत: बाहर आ ही गईं। कहीं  कथाओं के रूप में,कहीं उपन्यासों कहीं डायरियों तो कहीं रिपोर्टों के रूप में।

इन कहानियों और तथ्यों को ढक-छिपा कर रखने का कोई तरीका नहीं हो सकता। आखिकार ये ब्योरे वक्त के साथ उभर ही आते हैं। ये बार-बार बयां होते हैं और सुने जाते हैं।

अगर यही सच है तो आखिरकार जम्मू-कश्मीर सरकार यहां के  अखबारों को इतने निर्मम और बुरी तरीके से प्रतिबंधित करके क्या हासिल करना चाह रही थी।

किसी भी प्रतिबंध की जरूर तब पड़ती है,ृ जब कुछ छिपाना होता है। घाटी में 9 जुलाई से मोबाइल फोन और इंटरनेट कनेक्शन आंशिक तौर पर काट दिए गए थे। विरोध प्रदर्शनों से सबसे ज्यादा प्रभावित इलाकों में तो लैंडलाइन फोन भी काट दिए गए थे। कफ्र्यू लगे होने की वजह अखबार भी खुल कर नहीं बंट सके। इन हालातों की वजह से जनता से मीडिया और मीडिया से जनता तक  पहुंचने वाली जानकारियां काफी कट-छंट कर पहुंच रही थी और रोक ली जा रही थीं।

जम्मू-कश्मीर में सरकार के इस कदम को देखते हुए कुछ अहम सवाल जरूर पूछे जाने चाहिए। भारतीय पत्रकारों के एक तबके और बुद्धिजीवियों की ओर से दिखाई गई असाधारण एकता की वजह से सरकार ने यह प्रतिबंध हटाया। लेकिन इस प्रतिबंध के पीछे किसी साजिश से इनकार नहीं किया जा सकता।

सरकार को डर है कि राज्य के मीडिया से जनता को जनता से मीडिया को मिल रही जानकारी अगर अखबारों में छपने लगेगी तो इससे हिंसा और भडक़ सकती है। अखबारों पर प्रतिबंध के बावजूद यह जानकारी डिजिटल तकनीक के जरिये एक छोटे तबके  तो पहुंच ही रही हैं।

 सरकार की एक और  चिंता है । चूंकि छपे हुए शब्द की विश्वसनीयता ज्यादा है और वे दस्तावेजी सबूत के तौर पर ज्यादा दिन तक सुरक्षित रहते हैं इसलिए सरकार अखबारों पर बैन के लेकर ज्यादा दुराग्रही नजर आती है।

कश्मीर में अशांति के दौर में चौबीसों घंटे चलने वाले राष्ट्रीय चैनल प्रतिबंध से बाहर रखे गए। राष्ट्रीय प्रिंट मीडिया पर भी कोई प्रतिबंध नहीं था। सरकार ने अखबारों पर जो बैन लगाया या जिस तरह बैन लगाने की जरूरत समझी उससे कश्मीर के संदर्भ में क्षेत्रीय और राष्ट्रीय मीडिया के बीच की गहरी खाई उजागर हो गई। दरअसल कश्मीर को लेकर राष्ट्रीय मीडिया का रुख अति राष्ट्रवादी हो जाता है जबकि क्षेत्रीय मीडिया संघर्ष से पैदा संकट में आम कश्मीरी और जम्मू के लोगों की आवाज बनता है। दरअसल ये स्थानीय अखबार ही होते हैं जो राष्ट्रीय प्रेस की चु्प्पी या फिर अंध राष्ट्रवाद की वजह से पैदा खालीपन को भरते हैं।  हाल के दिनों में कफ्र्यू  की अड़चनों और संचार माध्यमों के दमन के बीच प्रामाणिक सूचनाओं को हासिल करने की मुश्किल में स्थानीय अखबार ही लोगों पर हो रहे बर्बर अत्याचार की खबरों के स्रोत बने हुए थे। स्थानीय अखबारों के जरिये ही कश्मीर में लोगों को मार दिए जाने की दिल दहलाने वाली खबरें आईं। इन्हीं अखबारों ने बताया कि सुरक्षा बलों की हिंसा की जद में आने वाले कैसे अस्पतालों में घिसट रहे हैं या फिर किस तरह पैलेट गनों ने लोगों को हमेशा के लिए अंधा बना दिया है। इन बंदूकों ने अब तक 130 लोगों को अंधा कर दिया और इनमें से ज्यादातर बच्चे और किशोर हैं। मुख्यधारा के राष्ट्रीय कहे जाने वाले अखबारों में ऐसी स्टोरी शायद ही दिखाई दे। कश्मीर के बारे में राज्य जो झूठ फैलाना चाहता है, उसकी राह में ये स्थानीय अखबार ही चुनौती बन कर खड़े हैं।

कश्मीर को एक तरफ तो अखबारों से महरूम रखा गया वहीं कॉमर्शियल टेलीविजन को पूरी छूट दी गई। दिल्ली से आने वाले उनके क्रू मेंबरों को सुरक्षा मुहैया कराई गई। इन टीवी चैनलों की ओर वही कहा गया जो सरकार को पसंद था।

कॉमर्शियल मीडिया और सरकार मिलकर किस तरह काम करते हैं, उसका एक तय पैटर्न है। स्थानीय मीडिया का गला घोंट कर सरकार जन प्रतिरोध के डर को बढ़ा-चढ़ा कर पेश करती है। और लोगों के दमन को छोटा कर दिखाना चाहती है। इस तरह  वह अंध राष्ट्रवाद की हिस्ट्रिया पैदा करती है। अब तो कश्मीर के बारे में राष्ट्रीय मीडिया कहे जाने वाले अखबारों और टीवी चैनलों में सरकार के इस रुख को पुष्ट करते रिपोर्टों और खबरों का प्रसारण सामान्य मान लिया गया है।

स्थानीय मीडिया पर प्रतिबंध केंद्र से प्रेरित होकर लगाए गए होंगे लेकिन इस तथ्य से भी इनकार नहीं किया जा सकता है कि इसे पुलिस और प्रशासन में मौजूद उसके दलालों के जरिये लागू किया गया। राज्य सरकार भले ही इससे अनजान हो सकती है और वह ऐसा दिखा रही हो लेकिन इसके निष्प्रभावी रवैये और बिना कुछ सोचे-समझे कार्रवाई करने के फैसलों की अनदेखी नहीं की जा सकती। खासकर, इस रवैये की वजह के जो परिणाम निकले हैं, उन्हें देखते हुए तो बिल्कुल भी नहीं।
असल में सरकार के कदम कश्मीर के हालात से जुड़े दास्तानों को जकड़ और काबू में रखने की कोशिश के नतीजे हैं।  यह ब्योरों को बाहर आने से रोकने की कोशिश है। स्थानीय मामलों पर झूठ का मुल्लमा चढ़ा कर गढ़ी हुई कहानियों के जरिये यह सच को रोकना चाहती है। सरकार पेड एजेंट, जिहादी टेरर, हालात नियंत्रण में, दुश्मन पाकिस्तान जैसे जुमलों और सामान्य हालात बहाल होने और पर्यटन की खुशनुमा तस्वीर पेश कर असली हालातों पर परदा डाल रही है। कश्मीर के संघर्ष में सरकार की नैतिक हार का इससे बड़ा सबूत और क्या हो सकता है। गोलियां चलाने, बच्चों को अंधा करने, प्रताडऩा और क्रूरता की बदसूरत तस्वीरों को छिपाने के लिए ही झूठ के ये हथियार चलाए जा रहे हैं और प्रोपंगडा किया जा रहा है।

कश्मीर की दास्तानों को काबू मंे रखा गया है। 26 साल के अशांति के इतिहास में कई हथियारों जरिये मीडिया को चुप कराया जाता रहा है। नब्बे के दशक की शुरुआती में यह आतंकवादियों और सुरक्षा बलों की बंदूकों के बीच फंसा था। यहां पत्रकारों को काम करने से रोका गया। उन पर हमले हुए। उनकी हत्याएं हुईं। इन हालातों और कफ्र्यू के दौर के बावजूद अखबार लगातार प्रकाशित होते रहे। उन्होंने ज्यादा गहरी खबरें लिखीं और आत्महत्या करने की हद तक विस्तृत स्टोरी छापी। यहां तक कि दमन से बचने के लिए एडोटिरयल कंटेंट छापने से भी परहेज किया।

जब स्थानीय मीडिया ने आंदोलन विरोधी रुख और भारतीय राष्ट्रवादी विमर्श से खुद को अलग करना चाहा तो सरकार ने दमन का नया रास्ता निकाला। वह  डीएवीपी विज्ञापनों को बंद कर अखबारों के वित्तीय प्रवाह को रोकने लगी। जबकि यही विज्ञापन जम्मू-कश्मीर के अखबारों की आय के प्रमुख ोत हैं।

2010 में केंद्रीय गृह मंत्रालय की ओर से एक पत्र मिलने के बाद डीएवीपी ने कश्मीर के कई अखबारों के विज्ञापन रोक दिए। बाद के दिनों में मनमाने ढंग से कुछ अखबारों के विज्ञापन जारी कर दिए गए । लेकिन श्रीनगर और जम्मू से निकलने वाले कश्मीर टाइम्स(इसमें मैं कार्यकारी संपादक हूं) को खास तौर पर निशान बनाया गया और इसके लिए डीएवीपी विज्ञापनों के दरवाजे बंद ही रखे गए। आश्चर्य की बात तो यह है कि 2010 की हत्याओं के  बाद सरकार ने यह सुझाव दिया था कि श्रीनगर से राष्ट्रीय अखबार निकालने की जरूरत है क्योंकि स्थानीय अखबार विश्वसनीय नहीं हैं। 2010 में सरकार ने खबरों पर आधारित प्रोग्राम दिखाने के लिए श्रीनगर केबल टीवी चैनलों को यह कर बंद करा दिया था कि ये सही तरीके से रजिस्टर्ड नहीं हैं। हालांकि जम्मू में इस तरह के गैर रजिस्टर्ड चैनल चालू रहे।

कश्मीर में मीडिया पहले से ही जंजीरों से बंधा हैं। राज्य में लगभग स्थायी कफ्र्यू के हालात में काम करने वाले मीडिया के लिए संचार के ोतों पर प्रतिबंध लगा कर और मुश्किल हालात बना दिए गए हैं। फिर मौजूदा दमन और प्रतिबंध अलग कैसे है? इसका मकसद क्या है?

दरअसल यह राज्य में खाकी की क्रूर ताकतों, कानूनों के खुल्लम-खुल्ला उल्लंघनों और नीति-नियमों और लोकतांत्रिक सिद्धांतों को दरकिनार कर राज्य को पूरी तरह काबू करने की सरकार की बढ़ती चाहत का नतीजा है।

केंद्र और राज्य की अब तक की सरकारें स्थानीय मीडिया को ऐसी मारक मिसाइलों की तरह देखती आई हैं, जिन्हेें काबू में रखना जरूरी है। सरकारें उन्हें ऐसी सूचना देने वाले ोत की तरह नहीं देखती जिस पर लोगों की रोजमर्रा की जरूरतों के फीडबैक के तौर पर भरोसा किया जा सके। इन्हें लोगों की राजनीतिक आकांक्षाओं के वाहकों के तौर पर नहीं देखा जाता। सरकार इन अखबारों में छपी दमन की दास्तानों को नहीं मानती। जबकि  राज्य में प्रोफेशनल क्षेत्रीय मीडिया अफवाहों को दरकिनार में अहम भूमिका निभाता रहा है।

एक स्वतंत्र मीडिया सरकार और जनता के बीच एक महत्वपूर्ण संपर्क बन सकता है। संघर्ष से घिरे क्षेत्र में यह जनता की आकांक्षाओं और भावनाओं को सरकार तक पहुंचाने का अहम जरिया होता है। यह याद रखना जरूरी है कि पीएम नरेंद्र मोदी ने 2015 में किस तरह मुफ्ती मोहम्मद सईद की इस सलाह की अनदेखी की थी कि कश्मीरियों से राजनीतिक बातचीत जरूरी है। मोदी ने बड़े ही रुखे अंदाज में कहा था कि हमें क श्मीर पर किसी से सलाह की जरूरत नहीं है। यही वह मानसिकता है जो लोगों को सत्ता में बैठे लोगों को न सिर्फ जनता को कुचलने को उकसाती है बल्कि उनके लिए बोलने वाली आवाजों को भी बंद करने लिए प्रेरित करती है।

The post कश्मीर : स्थानीय मीडिया की आवाज दबाने की दास्तान appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The whys and wherefores behind the recent media gag by the state in Kashmir

Note from the author: The ban is off from July 21 but I can safely say that the article remains relevant, looking at the larger picture.

“By the skillful and sustained use of propaganda, one can make a people see even heaven as hell or an extremely wretched life as paradise”
– Adolf Hitler

Hitler’s Nazi regime ruled the German public with two main weapons – propaganda and censorship – ensuring that they had the public in their grip as they bombarded them on a daily basis with the glorification of Hitler, convincing them about the better prospects of their lives but ensured complete and blanket silence over the gory stories of holocaust and concentration camps. The stories eventually did come out – in the form of narratives, fiction, diaries and reports.

There is no way one can keep a lid on facts forever. Narratives tucked away and hidden, will resurrect to be told, re-told and heard.

If that be so, then what is it that the Jammu and Kashmir government was trying to achieve by banning newspapers — and doing so in a brazen and rash manner of clamping down on newspaper offices by conducting raids and arresting staffers in the dead of the night–amidst one of the worst and violent crisis that Kashmir is presently facing?  Was it trying to stop them newspapers from reporting and journalists from commenting? Was it trying to block all channels of information so that people remained ignorant? Few days down after the clampdown, so far, the PDP led coalition government comes across as unsure on the issue.

After newspaper printing presses and offices were visited on July 15 by unwanted midnight guests in uniform who packed the visit with intimidation, abuse, handcuffs even as they walked off with newspapers, printing material and personnel (technical staffers) of at least two of the newspapers (including my own), media persons in Srinagar staged a protest march. Journalists also met the Divisional Commissioner who, while being evasive on the raid and ban, said that he was in no position to provide the media with any curfew relaxation passes to allow them to discharge their duties, nor could he assure journalists any protection.

Two days later, PDP minister Nayeem Akhtar went to the extent of telling a television news channel that the move to stop publication of newspapers was necessitated sensing ‘trouble’. A day after he took charge of the midnight-declared state of Emergency, chief minister Mehbooba Mufti’s political adviser, Amitabh Mattoo maintained that there was no ban and that the chief minister had no idea about it. The government transferred a superintendent of police, blaming him for recklessly cracking down on the press.

Which of these versions is true? The newspapers hit the stands again after six days on Thursday, July 21, following an assurance from chief minister Mehbooba Mufti. This should, however not be treated as the end of the story.

Important questions need to be asked. A week long ban on newspapers, a belated response of the government necessitated probably by the unusual solidarity from sections of Indian journalists and intellectuals, was not without design. It was nothing but ill advised. Who was the brainchild behind the move which may eventually become a footnote, but is no less significant. The move and the motive need elaboration. First things first, why was this done? Who instructed the now out of favour Superintendant of Police?

The logic behind any bans stems from the necessity to hide. All Internet connections and mobile phones have already been partially snapped since July 9. In the worst affected areas, the landline phones have also been disconnected. Newspapers have not been allowed to be circulated freely due to the prevalent curfew restrictions. All this has made the information from the public to media and vice versa filtered and restricted, as it is.

Important questions need to be asked. A week long ban on newspapers, a belated response of the government necessitated probably by the unusual solidarity from sections of Indian journalists and intellectuals, was not without design. It was nothing but ill advised. Who was the brainchild behind the move which may eventually become a footnote, but is no less significant.

The state government’s worry is not that if these filtered bits and pieces of information find their way to print they would provoke more violence than there already exists. In this day and age of internet and gizmos, that job was being managed partially despite the ban on newspapers who continued to maintain and update their websites and circulate whatever they could through digital applications, even though this meant that news was reaching far fewer numbers of people.

The government’s anxiety is with the printed word becoming an authentic piece of documentation with a longer shelf life. The national television channels were switched on 24X7 and national print media was not subjected to any kind of similar ban. The ban, and the need for the ban from the state and government’s point of view, highlights the vast chasm between the perspectives reflected in the regional press and the national press, with respect to Kashmir.

While an ultra-nationalist narrative inspires the former, the latter give ample space to voices of the common Kashmiri and Jammu resident, suffering due a perpetual state of conflict. It is the local newspapers that fill in the gaps left by either the silence or jingoism of the ‘national’ press. In recent days, despite the hurdles of obtaining authentic information amidst curfew bound streets and crackdown on communication systems, it is the local newspapers that have managed to source and publish the narratives that tell the story of the atrocities on the people; chilling stories about how people got killed and about the injured recuperating in the hospitals, about the pellet guns playing havoc with people’s lives, impairing them physically for their life time; of the 130 blindings by pellet guns of mostly children and teenagers.

It is these stories that rarely make it to the pages of major ‘national’ mainstream newspapers, which are a major challenge for the State peddling its lies about what is happening in Kashmir.

This is not the first time that attempts have been made to muzzle the press. Earlier, in 2010 and 2013, the newspapers were unable to publish newspapers and circulate or distribute copies, because of excessive curfew restrictions and the denial of curfew passes to media persons that prevented journalists from stepping out. In striking contrast, while the Valley was forced to remain without newspapers, commercial television crews who flew in from Delhi were provided escorts to move across the Valley and offer a point of view that suited the government.

There is a definite pattern behind this –in how both the commercial media and government relations operate. Through this cynical game of muzzling the media, it is the Central Government that seeks to reap the rich harvest from this demonizing of a people’s resistance, dwarfing their victimization and creating the a hysteria around ultra-nationalism which is the new normal in much of ‘national’ media’s reportage on Kashmir.

That the present gag on the local, regional media, could have been inspired by Delhi cannot be ruled out, nor the fact that it was effected through orders to some of its cronies within the police and administration. The state government, ignorant or otherwise, cannot be condoned either for its ineffectiveness, or for acquiescing without any application of mind, especially on the consequences.

It is the local newspapers that fill in the gaps left by either the silence or jingoism of the ‘national’ press. In recent days, despite the hurdles of obtaining authentic information amidst curfew bound streets and crackdown on communication systems, it is the local newspapers that have managed to source and publish the narratives that tell the story of the atrocities on the people.

It is all about chaining and imprisoning a narrative, controlling it, stifling its telling and super-imposing on the real, local story, a manufactured narrative of ultra-nationalism, of ‘paid agents’, of ‘jihadi terror’, of ‘things under control’, of an enemy called Pakistan and of normalcy and happy pictures of tourism.

What bigger proof does one need of India’s moral defeat with regard to the Kashmir conflict than this reality of employing weaponry of lies and propaganda to hide the ugliness of bullets, blinded children, torture and brutality?

The narrative, as it is, has been controlled. In the history of 26 years of insurgency, the media has been tamed and silenced through the use of many devices. In the beginning of the nineties, caught between the gun of the militants and the security forces, intimidations, physical attacks, even murders and curfews, though newspapers continued to be published, writing more insightful and detailed stories almost amounted to committing suicide. Many newspapers even went without editorial content to play safe.

When media gradually began to evolve, freeing itself from the clutches of ‘anti-movement’ and ‘Indian nationalistic’ discourse, the government cracked down with fresh arm twisting methods – squeezing the financial flow of the newspapers by stopping their government advertisements particularly the central government-controlled DAVP advertisements, the main source of revenue for newspapers in Jammu and Kashmir.

In 2010, the advertisements to several Kashmir based newspapers were stopped following a letter from the union home ministry, which gave no explanations for this withdrawal of financial support. The order was dutifully followed. In subsequent years, while advertisements of most newspapers have been restored (arbitrarily or otherwise), Kashmir Times (of which I am the Executive Editor), printed out of both Jammu and Srinagar has been singled out and kept starved of funds.

Shockingly, the interlocutors appointed by the Indian government after the 2010 killings to look into the grievances of the people in one of their recommendations suggested that there was a need to publish national papers out of Srinagar as the local newspapers were “unreliable”!

In 2010, the state government also banned the local cable television channels in Srinagar from screening news based programmes on the pretext that these channels were not duly registered. However, in Jammu, similarly un-registered channels continue to operate without any hindrance.

The media, thus, has been already in chains. In a near permanent curfew-imposed situation, the media is further imprisoned by the lack of information and the crackdown on communication systems. So what then makes even the present gag order unique? And what purpose was it meant to serve?

In a fashion, it is just another link in the sequence; in another, it reflects the growing and increasing penchant of the government for absolute control, exercised deliberately through power of the brute force of khakhi, in brazen violation of law, ethics and democratic principles itself.

Now, like then, when gory stories of boys dragged out of their homes and shot at point-blank range, tales of random arrests, crackdowns and molestations, of children blinded by pellet guns who have gone missing, abound, yet another unbridgeable chasm has opened, defying resolution of the churning that is Kashmir.

Successive governments, both in the state and at the Centre, have looked upon local media as deadly missiles that need to be kept under check and control, not as sources of information that the government itself can rely on for feedback about both the day to day needs of the people as well as their oppression, anger and political aspiration. The existence of a professional regional media, rooted in Jammu and Kashmir marginalizes rumour mongering, because –notwithstanding crtain biases — media houses are guided by certain professional ethics. A free media can provide a vital link between the public and the government, conveying what a people are feeling and doing, vital to a region mired in conflict. It is worthwhile now recalling Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s 2015 arrogant snub of then chief minister Mufti Mohammed Sayeed who was urging for political dialogue with the Kashmiris. “We don’t need any advice from anybody on Kashmir”, Modi had famously said.   

It is this mindset that inspires men in power to not just crush a population brutally but also crush the voices speaking for them. Their aim is to make the narrative disappear.

But, as history reveals and as human minds are known to work, and remember, sooner or later the narratives will emerge – emerge to haunt, often with a dash of bitterness and sometimes peppered with rumours. Sometimes dangerously so.

In January 1990, during the infamous days of strict curfew and black-outs in the wake of Jagmohan taking over as Governor, the information flow remained very limited making the reportage of both the flight of Kashmiri Pandits and the slew of massacres starting from Gawkadal that Kashmir witnessed, both rather sketchy and flimsy.

In subsequent years, those stories have been told and re-told at individual and community levels with little possibility of authenticating the narrative: sometimes one does not know where to sift fact from fiction as the stories have emerged with such contradicting and contrasting perspectives that just do not match.

It is this huge chasm, the chasm of the missing truth telling of those dark days that continues to play a role in shaping the communal divide within Kashmir. Now, like then, when gory stories of boys dragged out of their homes and shot at point-blank range, tales of random arrests, crackdowns and molestations, of children blinded by pellet guns who have gone missing, abound, yet another unbridgeable chasm has opened, defying resolution of the churning that is Kashmir.

 (The author is Executive Editor, Kashmir Times)
 

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According to Kashmir Times, over 20 policemen raided its office at Rangreth area in Srinagar outskirts at midnight and arrested its printing press foreman, Fayaz Ahmed and ten other employees.

“The policemen seized the metallic printing plates of Kashmir Times and more than 70,000 printed copies of Kashmir Times and closed down the KT Press Pvt Ltd printing press,” the newspaper said.

“Cops misbehaved with the employees present there and snatched their cell phones. The employees who tried to resist were beaten up by the policemen,” the newspaper said.

Another leading newspaper also said that police raided its printing press at 2 am, seized its printed copies at midnight and detained persons.

Police also seized copies of another leader English daily Rising Kashmir early this morning and raided its press at Sheikhpora (Budgam).

“A police party from Budgam police raided the press to seize the copies of  Rising Kashmir and other publications,” the newspaper claimed. “As the staff had left after printing the copies, police took into custody all the employees including its foreman, Mohammad Yousuf and asked him to identify the distribution site.”

They later reached Press Enclave and seized the vehicle along with the driver. “They caught hold of me in Press Enclave and asked me to follow them to police station” said Irshad Khan, the driver.

The staff was later taken to police post Humhama where they seized all the copies of the newspaper. “The staff of the press was let off later on but only after being harassed and intimidated,” the newspaper said.
The employees were to go on their own to their offices and press on foot when no transport was plying operating on the road and security personnel were not allowing people to move in view of severe curfew restrictions.
The government has already suspended mobile internet and telephony services across Kashmir valley.

At least 41 persons have died in Kashmir valley since July 9 when widespread protests and clashes which erupted after the killing of top militant commander Burhan Wani.

It is pertinent to point that in 2010 and 2013, valley based newspapers were not allowed to be published by placing severe restrictions on their movement and movement of their vehicles. The newspapers were seized and not allowed to be circulated and media persons were not issued curfew passes.

Similar methods of intimidating and gagging the press have been employed by the government and its security agencies in the last two and a half decades.

In 2010, the central government arbitrarily stopped the release of DAVP advertisements of Kashmir Times and six other publications, following a letter circulated by the Union home ministry to the department. Till date, Kashmir Times is the only newspaper which continues to be denied advertisements, the main source of revenue for newspapers.  

(Anuradha Bhasin Jamwal is Executive Editor Kashmir Times and a peace activoist abd this information is being made available on behalf of the Kashmir Press Association)
 
 

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The casualties will eventually become one more scorecard, a footnote in Kashmir’s beleaguered history. All the complexities and nuances will fade and the July 2016 eruptions will be remembered under just one blanket banner, one name Burhan Wani.

Burhan has, somehow, become a symbol of both this youthful defiance on streets and the oppression of the Indian security forces. The 22 year-old Hizb-ul-Mujahideen commander, Burhan Muzaffar Wani, was shot dead by security forces in an encounter in an obscure village of Kokernag, south Kashmir. The encounter itself remains mired in mystery and key questions, in Jammu and Kashmir at least, are being asked as to whether this killing was a part of the ‘catch and kill’ policy of intelligence agencies and security forces.

(Note: Sources reveal that Burhan was being carefully trailed by Indian security agencies for over 18 months so the time of the shooting is inexplicable and sinister, coming as it did when the Amarnath Yatra was on, a fallout on the Yatris whch could have led to an even more violent fallout, but did not. The name of a ‘target’ of encounter, this time Burhan Wani was also quite glibly given out to the media, something that police and intelligence are not only normally loth to do but in fact, often seek to conceal)

However, that alone is not the reason for Burhan Wani’s death having inspired Kashmiri youth to so fearlessly pour out on the streets in open defiance of the curfew, other restrictions, defying the brutality simply to oppose the Indian state. They are out on the streets, consumed by a ‘do or die’ spirit.

Why was Burhan Wani so important that his death seems to have inspired close to a revolution? He is considered a youth icon in Kashmir, not because he picked up the gun to fight the Indian state six years but because of the sentiment his short life represented. His personal narrative was shaped by events that are important markers in Kashmir’s history and in the collective memory of the people.

In turn his own personal narrative, a symbolic representation of the collective, is now charting a new course for Kashmir. Burhan’s story began on a summer evening in 2010 (during the summer agitation when 130 civilians were gunned down by Indian security personnel), when he, his brother Khalid and a friend were riding a motorbike in Tral and were stopped by so called the security forces, ordered to get cigarettes for them, and in return beaten and humiliated for no reason at all.
In 2015, Khalid was killed for being the brother of a militant. The loss further strengthened Burhan’s resolve to fight the Indian state and entice Kashmiri youth through the social networking media. Burhan did not embark on a lonely journey. Many teenagers and youth in the Valley have been victims of similar oppression or are influenced by the excessive daily humiliations of tyranny and excessive militarization. Some among them picked up the gun, forced by the stifling and oppressive atmosphere and inspired by political aspirations of ‘azaadi’ (freedom) which remain unaddressed, politically. Burhan Wani is a symbol of the oppression and, in a virtually leaderless Kashmir, also symbolic of the defiance against it.

This angry generation has reached where it is today due to a culmination of several factors and complex nuances within the Kashmir conflict.

The genesis of the anger begins from a political ideology and a history of violation of democratic norms by the Indian government that culminated in the insurgency that began in1989, which enjoyed a wide mass appeal in initial years.

However, later tired of the vicious cycle of violence caught between the gun of the militant and the security forces, the monstrous graph and scale of human rights abuse by security forces, and the many faults of the militancy grid with its many groups, splinter groups and cases of extortion and harassment, the Valley’s people were disenchanted with the gun and instead reposed faith in the peace process which eventually never came about even as India and Pakistan engaged with each other in a meaningful and purposeful dialogue –on other issues –post 2002 for a couple of years.

In turn his own personal narrative, a symbolic representation of the collective, is now charting a new course for Kashmir. Burhan’s story began on a summer evening in 2010 (during the summer agitation when 130 civilians were gunned down by Indian security personnel), when he, his brother Khalid and a friend were riding a motorbike in Tral and were stopped by so called the security forces, ordered to get cigarettes for them, and in return beaten and humiliated for no reason at all.

Oscillating between enmity and friendly overtures, India and Pakistan pursued this peace process with an utter lack of consistency and guided by a deficiency of sincerity.

The peace process moved from wars to the Lahore bus route opening up, from skirmishes to the famed (Vajpayee) Agra summit, from jingoistic rhetoric to Sharmel Sheikh and finally got completely snapped in the aftermath of the Mumbai terror attacks.

But with respect to Kashmir, and the Kashmir conflict, between India and Pakistan, barring some marginal movement, mostly gestural, there was no meaningful and serious process of engagement.

Two former prime ministers Atal Behari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh met select separatists during their tenures but there was no follow-up. Barring Line of Control related Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) like ceasefire and opening of trade and bus routes, though not insignificant, there were no CBMs on the crucial issue of political dialogue on the more alienated population of Jammu and Kashmir: to provide them a relief from the tyrannical impact of militarization.

Yet, consistently and vocally, there were dominant voices that raised this issue, demanding that the political solution to the Kashmir conflict be included within the India-Pakistan peace process which remained ignored.

The round table conferences famously organized by Manmohan Singh ended with reports that recommended among other things addressing the human rights situation(s), the demand for the repealment of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA)and excessive militarization but no heed was paid to these simmering demands and indicators. The patience of the people began to wear off.

In 2008, when Kashmiris poured out on the streets to oppose the Amarnath land deal, it was a peaceful expression of that impatience. The protestors were allowed to march on the streets for some days with no interference from security forces or police. Peaceful protests turned into stone pelting only after security forces began to stop these consistent and continuing protests with the use of brute force, jackboots and bullets. Seventy people were shot dead that summer in the Valley despite by and large peaceful protests in comparison to only two persons killed in Jammu where the counter protests were far more violent.

That is when the metamorphosis took place. The stone pelting mobs of Kashmir evolved from mild occasional stone pelting groups to protesters raining stones, during and after the 2010 summer agitation. It was only after 2010 and Afzal Guru hanging in February 2013 that the gun found its place back as a glorified mantle-piece within youngsters and the Kashmir conflict. 

While the numbers of youth picking up the gun are very few, they command a wide appeal among the masses, especially the younger generation of this turmoil as they have become expressions of their collective anger, dismay and humiliation. This is why Burhan Wani’s death has sparked a huge outburst, which is the overflow of a long pent up anger that is now becoming uncontrollable. It is further exacerbated by the use of disproportionate force against the protesting mobs.

The argument that non-lethal methods of controlling mobs are no match for the deadly storm of stone pelting that forces have to face on the streets may be a huge exaggeration and a half-truth, if not entirely a lie. The normal policing methods of controlling mobs have never been tried, even in the days when protests were peaceful (2008) or mildly violent (beginning of 2010), not even when the protests are completely non-political in nature (in Kashmir) limited to demands on issues of water supply, electricity, roads and jobs. The only known so-called non-lethal weapons in use since 2010 are rubber pellets and chilli sprays; for use of which the security forces simply have not been adequately trained. Thus use of these result in heavy casualties. Other than that young protesting boys have been killed at point blank range, shot at, mostly above the waist.

Image: Indian Express

The brutality of the security agencies and police, coupled with a silence of the (elected) government or its well-packaged lies make Kashmir, today, potentially a recipe for disaster.

Burhan Wani was only one trigger. Instead of blaming everybody else for the mess in Kashmir, including Pakistan and militant groups operating from there, who certainly would be having a Kashmir specific agenda to perpetuate violence and crisis, New Delhi should look inwards and introspect to realize that the crisis today is a making of its own multiple failures, primarily its inability to politically deal with the issue of Kashmir and its tacit perpetuation of human rights abuses there.
Treating Kashmir militarily when it requires a political solution, an intervention of which can be made during periods of uneasy calm, is like prescribing a wrong medicine for the disease. When symptoms are a silent and defiant resentment, the misplaced celebration of a non-existent  ‘normalcy’ amounts to injecting doses of slow poison into the polity. 

The Centre is completely off the track by continuing to not only criminalise the protests in Kashmir but by also blaming Pakistan or Hafiz Sayeed for the present outrage. Belated statements from the prime minister calling for peace and calm cannot be substitutes for the kind of healing that Kashmir urgently needs.

First of all, the truth that is out in the open must be grappled with, howsoever harsh and bitter. The protests are spontaneous and are a continuing reflection of the deepening anger and alienation of the public against Indian rule and its repressive policies in Kashmir; the residue of pent up anger cannot be negated, they must be seen for what there are. Underlying this pent up resentment is a wider, and potentially dangerous reflection, of public’s endorsement of not just the sentiment but also the gun that Burhan Wani represented.

Secondly, New Delhi needs to come out of its denial mode and acknowledge Kashmir as a political dispute.

Third, it must have the courage to acknowledge its multiple failures and flaws in handling the Kashmir situation in the past and also apologise for the gross violation of human rights.

Fourth, as a long term measure, it must begin a process of providing relief through phased de-militarisation and subsequently engage with the people of Jammu and Kashmir to resolve the dispute. Whether an immediate acknowledgement of such a kind will help calm the tempers immediately cannot be said with certainty but is certainly worth a try.

But if New Delhi continues being obstinate and obdurate as ever, from wherever we look, the Burhan Wani moment could become a defining marker in Kashmir’s politics. It is difficult to predict with exact precision what impact this would have. But there is every likelihood of a rise in militancy. With youth continuing to occupy centre-stage in this mass mobilization, with violent street battles turning more vitriolic and metamorphosing into a kind of permanent civil war between the civilians and the men in uniform, who are the visible symbols of the State.

The argument that non-lethal methods of controlling mobs are no match for the deadly storm of stone pelting that forces have to face on the streets may be a huge exaggeration and a half-truth, if not entirely a lie. The normal policing methods of controlling mobs have never been tried, even in the days when protests were peaceful (2008) or mildly violent (beginning of 2010), not even when the protests are completely non-political in nature (in Kashmir) limited to demands on issues of water supply, electricity, roads and jobs.

This also has the grissly potential of then pitting people against people, creating divides of pro-azaadi Kashmiris and those who are popularly called collaborators. It will also lead to marginalization of mainstream parties and also push senior Hurriyat leaders into oblivion. The chasm between Kashmiris and New Delhi would be grow both wide and deep enough to become virtually unbridgeable.

It is then that the situation could certainly take an even more critical and dangerous turn, the ramifications of which will impact not just Kashmir but also rest of India. At the minimum, more and more Kashmiri youth will be criminalized and thereafter, brutalized through repressive measures. Consequently, this will dehumanize society further aggravating prevailing sentiments of anger, hatred, cynicism and despair.

Kashmir has bled for years. It will continue to do so but this time, it will also bleed India, and badly.

For the Indian government, its grip over Kashmir would be further lost if it continues to hold on only through military might – leading to a colossal waste of money and human resources. What will be lost is not just money and manpower but also the spirit and idea of India through an abject and brazen betrayal of India’s very core principles of democracy; more brutally put, the murder of the ethos of liberty and values of humanity and just governance– a process that has been in the making for years now.

If I ever wondered whether the word ‘occupation’ was far too strong to describe the presence of the Indian state in the Valley, and India’s excesses here which are reflective of its overall flawed policies in Kashmir, today post Burhan Wani, I stand corrected.

(Anuradha Bhasin Jamwal is Executive Editor Kashmir Times and a peace activist)
 

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Last week, January 25, when the announcement of the Padma Bhushan award to the former Jammu and Kashmir governor Jagmohan was made, there were notes of both jubilation and criticism from the two major communities of Kashmir. Both these communities view his role in the flight of the Kashmiri Pandits(KPs) after militancy erupted in the Valley and the massacres of Kashmiri Muslims, in striking contrast.

The narratives are so far apart that, to date even the figures of the Pandits killed in Valley during the years of militancy and those who were displaced remain strongly contested. Official figures suggest 219 Pandits were killed and about 50,000 Kashmiris are registered as displaced families.[1] These also include some Kashmiri Muslims and non-Kashmiri speaking Hindus. However, Hindutva-driven right wing groups among the Kashmiri Pandits talk about thousands being killed and put the size of the displaced community to anything between 5 to 7,00,000. Incidentally, this number is far higher than the total population of Pandits, according to the 1981 census. [2]

A more realistic figure of the number of slain Pandits is offered by the Kashmiri Pandit Sangarsh Samiti (KPSS)—a non-migrant KP organization. The KPSS president Sanjay Tickoo, who claims to have documented all cases of Kashmiri Pandit killings since 1989 maintains that 670 Pandits have been killed in Kashmir in militancy related violence. Tickoo also deflates the theory of “holocaust day” observed by some right wing Pandit groups on January 19 when their flight from the Valley began, maintaining that only 6 Pandits were killed in 1989. “We oppose observing January 19 as ‘Holocaust/ Exodus Day’ as we stayed put in Kashmir and faced tough times along with our Muslim brethren and the day has no meaning for us,” he said in a recent interview to a newspaper. [3]

Two and a half decades after militancy began and Kashmiri Pandits fled en masse due to fear from the Valley, the events viewed from these exclusivist and coloured prisms have failed to reconcile the narratives of Kashmiri Muslims and Hindus. The greater tragedy is that it is the bitter narratives, though by no means in a majority, that have been louder and dominating. This manufactured and dominant minority voice creates barriers and totally fails in any attempt to build bridges between the two communities. Neither does it facilitate any enabling plan for the return and rehabilitation of Kashmiri Pandits who have been displaced. Many of those displaced live a sorry life in camps getting a meagre cash relief of Rs 2500 per head per month.

The return of those displaced Kashmiris, suffering for over two decades in camps or even those living in plush houses cut off from their roots, has been jinxed by many factors – the serious trust deficit between the two communities, the lack of political will and ill-conceived and poorly implemented packages. Added to this, is the vulnerability of the Kashmiris to right wing politics and petty politicking of political forces out to exploit their plight which has further closed the doors on their return.

The displacement of this minuscule population from the Kashmir Valley has hugely impacted on the social and economic fabric of the entire state. The importance of bringing back Pandits to their homes minus the ugly demand of a separate homeland or the impractical option of fully secluded safe zones cannot be underscored. The Pandits have suffered from both an identity crisis and also other factors caused by displacement –and this includes socio-economic exclusion — and thus need to return to their roots. This homecoming is as important for Kashmiri Muslims, who too have suffered a great deal with the total erosion of the Kashmiri plural culture, added to their lived trauma of experiencing an everyday gun culture and a huge rise in the graph of human rights violations.

A small and negligible population of Pandits do continue, even today, to live in the Valley but a majority of Kashmiri Muslims do not even get to interact with them. A new generation of Kashmiris in and outside the Valley, born in the last two decades, is therefore totally oblivious of their existence and in absolute ignorance of a plural culture as a way of life. Such a plurality is vital for any civilization to escape the web of stagnation.

To date, there has been no real political will to bring back displaced Pandits to the Valley, either from the governments at the State or Centre. The last decade or so has seen introduction of a slew of hurriedly thrashed out rehabilitation and return plans, none of which have been effectively implemented on ground.

One reasonable exercise was started by the UPA-II government at the Centre with the creation of Committee for Action Plan for Return and Rehabilitation of Kashmiri Migrants, in which several members from both communities were involved in a consultation process with the government. However, the Committee became the victim of usual official boredom and procrastination among policy makers. No serious effort was put in after the first few rounds of meetings. Corresponding to this move, the government announced 3000 jobs for displaced Kashmiris willing to return as part of the Prime Minister’s package in 2011. The scheme has not been effective because of the poor and shabby arrangements in flats reserved for the beneficiaries of the scheme. The flats are inadequate, in terms of quality and quantity. 723 flats for transit accommodation had been constructed at various locations in the Kashmir valley which were then being utilised for accommodating migrant employees.

The1981 census put the population of Pandits to less than 1.25 lakh (1,23, 828). According to 1941 census, the Kashmiri Pandit population was 76,868 as against the Muslim population of over 17 lakh.  (quoted by Kulbhushan Warikhoo in his book Cultural Heritage of Kashmiri Pandits, page 339)

Under the recent plan for Kashmiri migrants, and as part of the Prime Minister’s Rs 80,000 crore package for Jammu and Kashmir, the construction of 6000 additional units for transit accommodation in the Kashmir valley for migrants to whom state government jobs had been provided was also approved. The accommodation for these employees is scattered across the Valley – Vessu Qazigund, Sheikhpora (Budgam), Hawal (Pulwama), Khanpora (Baramulla), Nutnussa (Kupwara) and Mattan, (Anantnag).

As part of this fresh package, 3000 additional jobs have also been approved. However,  what is not much talked about is the fact that the 3000 posts created through the earlier package, have yet to be filled in.

These 3000 posts had been created within various government departments in 2011 for providing employment to Kashmiri migrant youth, who were interested in serving in the valley. Out of 2184 selections made by the recruiting agencies, 1446 candidates have so far already joined various departments. Of the remaining 1554 vacancies, 1443 posts had been referred to the Jammu and Kashmir Services Selection Board (JKSSB) and 111 Class-IV posts to the Relief Organization (M) in 2012. JKSSB had since issued a select list of 430 candidates while the Relief Organization issued a select list of 87 candidates against the 111 Class-IV posts referred to them.

The return policy is ineffective due to several reasons. The main one being that there are few takers for the job opportunities being created. The package has come too late in the day. Many youth among displaced Kashmiri Pandits families, including some still living in camps in Jammu, Udhampur and Delhi, have already dispersed to other parts of the country and joined a world outside of Kashmir –be it in education or employment — many of them are well settled and not keen to return. Secondly, the reports of beneficiaries of the employment package reeling under neglect and poor living conditions has further discouraged others to embark on this adventure. Thirdly, a feeling of insecurity exacerbated by suspicions of Muslims continues to exist. 

This trust deficit, instead of being bridged, has widened ever since the BJP took over the reins of power in New Delhi and later also entered into an alliance with PDP to rule in Jammu and Kashmir. Last year, the present government under prime minister Narendra Modi, announced cluster colonies and separate safe townships for Kashmiri Pandits. The announcement was met with stiff resistance in the Valley because it invoked fears among the Muslims of the BJP pursuing a saffron agenda.

The fears were enhanced as the announcement came in the backdrop of similar reports in the media, quoting union home ministry sources. No official then made any clarification about such reports that played a huge role in arousing misgiving and suspicions and created perceptions among moderates in both communities that such policy further damages the sanctity of secular and plural traditions of Jammu and Kashmir, the Kashmir Valley in particular. The media reports defined the broad elements of the policy as creating three separate cities within the Valley for Kashmiri Pandits and of further extending its benefits to all refugees by obliterating the difference between the refugees from Pakistan Administered Kashmir, who are state subjects of Jammu and Kashmir, and the West Pakistan refugees, who are historically not residents of the state. If this proposal was ever conceived or existed in the minds of Delhi’s policy makers, it is one laced with not just ambiguity but by blatant mischief.

This brand of mischief finds continuity within the overall narrative within which the official word is missing or wanting.  In more recent times, Kashmiri Pandit leaders with right wing leanings (the latest to join the bandwagon is Bollywood actor Anupam Kher)[4] have begun to link the revocation of Article 370 with the return of Kashmiri Pandits. Such voices inspire fears of the BJP trying to fulfill its Hindutva agenda of artificially changing the demography of the only Muslim majority state in the country. 

The return of the Pandits is an essential, though not the only component, to conflict resolution in Kashmir. Official plans and packages will always have their limitations. The exodus of the Pandits from the Valley happened within the general feeling of mistrust between communities and ultimately created even more mistrust, fuelled by right wing elements on both sides, including hawks within the government. Therefore, any policy for return and rehabilitation requires a more comprehensive policy of facilitating and laying the ground work for building bridges for which communities need to be involved, not turned antagonistic to each other through confusions, whisper campaigns and unverified media reports.

It would be important to revive the UPA government’s half-hearted attempt to involve communities and all stake holders through the creation of a Committee for Action Plan for Return and Rehabilitation of Kashmiri Migrants. The present union government, if it is sincere about the return of the Pandits to the Valley, could do well to pick up the threads from where this last official attempt was left off, because any plan of return and rehabilitation rooted in a policy of segregation would ultimately breed more malice, animosity, mistrust and othering, especially if it was imposed from above without the involvement of all communities.

It is also important to make a real beginning by preserving the vital link between the two communities who remain in Kashmir — the Pandits who refused to flee in the face of all odds and Kashmiri Muslims. Protecting them and their interests can effectively aid the process of building bridges. Sight cannot be lost of the fact that the valley Pandits are reeling under a deep fear psychosis, far greater than the Muslims of the Valley by virtue of there being a minute, negligible minority. They are also suffering due to acute economic distress stemming from years of neglect. This is where the government needs to step in.

While, the lure of jobs and building flats can be good inducements to bring back the Pandits, their stay can sustain only with a re-doubled, genuine community level effort, for which the government ought to play the role of facilitator, not aggravtor. The active involvement of the communities in any return plan will ensure the necessary opinion building which will in turn create a more conducive, amicable and welcoming atmosphere for not just the Pandits but all other minorities.

In any normal situation, where the trust deficit between communities has been seriously damaged, the onus of restoring confidence apart from the government lies with the majority community. However, the majority community of the Valley battered and shattered by the conflict, is today extremely powerless. The Kashmiri Muslims themselves live amid a stifling atmosphere of excessive militarization and it would not be easy for the Muslims to play the normal role of pro-active engagement, without genuine efforts made by officialdom. Despite and inspite of their plight, however, Kashmiri Muslims ought to rise to the occasion and show the magnanimity of accepting Pandits warmly, irrespective of what their ideologies are. Pandits have been and continue to be a part and parcel of Kashmiri society.

The Pandits willing to return would also need to keep these limitations of local Muslims in mind, rather than being hamstrung with their own victimhood. They have suffered immensely but they are not the only sufferers. The two communities need to come together on an equal footing, start at the minimal level of trust and build on from there, not view each other within the equation of perpetrator and victim, as some hardliner right wing KPs are trying to do. Such ‘othering’ and demonising of an entire community is a dangerous position to begin from.  Breaking out of the miasma requires both commitment and vision.

A community level participation is the most vital component of any return plan. Such genuine participation should highlight the need for continuing dialogue(s) at the community level, would require initiatives to move out of conference halls into the homes of people. The good thing is that many people at an individual level have maintained that contact. Besides, many Kashmiri Pandits, Sikhs and non-Kashmiri speaking Hindus have continued to live in Kashmir through the years of conflict. So, all that is required is the significant move of building further, multiplying in a sense the contact between the two major communities. This will then ensure that this dialogue percolates down from one generation to another – with greater focus on the generation that has grown up oblivious to each other’s existence. That is where the key to any return of the Kashmiri Pandit lies.

The post Beyond the Miasma: The Plight of Kashmiri Pandits appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Well known Bollywood actor, Anupam Kher, now better known for his extreme right wing views, in a recent article in the Times of India, has advocated revocation of Article 370 of the Constitution of India and settlement of people from outside the state as a remedy to the sufferings of the Kashmiri Pandits, to enable their safe return to the Valley. [1]The suggested panacea is worse than the disease. It is based on not just a poor understanding of an issue but is born out of a pernicious ideology that has made no secret of its desire to orchestrate a change in the demographics of Jammu and Kashmir. It is mischievous, at its root.

Kher was recently in Jammu. He was visiting camps, talking about Article 370. He was also in the city to inaugurate a two day literary festival. The lit fest was poorly organized and after the inaugural session, there was nobody left in the audience but the speakers. The avowed aim was to talk about literature delinked from politics. However the real motive behind Kher’s visit seems to have been to flag the abrogation of Article 370, and yet again inject a dose of hatred into public discourse, in the bargain.

‘Scrap Article 370’ has been one of the pet projects of the RSS and the BJP, raked up overtly and covertly, time and again, over the past six decades. Two years ago, in the run up to the Lok Sabha elections, prime ministerial candidate Narendra Modi sought to induce some legitimacy to this chorus demanding the revoking of Article 370 by invoking Nehru’s “desire” to do the same.

Jawaharlal Nehru — responsible for the first setback to the Article 370 when the first draft manipulated without the consent of Sheikh Abdullah was passed, and also Prime Minister when the erosion of the essence of the Article took place since 1953 — was also the one (before this dilution) to first define this provision of the Indian Constitution. Article 370 acts as a bridge between India and Jammu and Kashmir: He announced that the association and allegiance of the State to India, was provisional, subject to a plebiscite.

In Srinagar’s Lal Chowk, Nehru made the historic promise of a plebiscite to the people with the guarantee that the political future of the state would be decided as per the wishes and aspirations of the people. Nehru was conscious that constitutionally and legally, Article 370 could not be dispensed with, without inviting the risk of a real severing of Kashmir from the rest of India. And so, he played the balancing act, marrying his ambition of integrating India through the hollowing out of Article 370, while not opposing it politically. The Sangh Parivar, in striking contrast, has made the Constitutional provision of Article 370 a potent tool for ‘othering’ of the state, linking it erroneously to the issue of ‘integration’ and ‘assimilation.’

It is erroneous to construe that any revocation of Article 370 would amount to the complete integration of Jammu and Kashmir with India. Constitutionally, Article 370 will continue to remain a provisional agreement binding Jammu and Kashmir to the rest of the country because the accession to India signed by the Maharaja of Kashmir in October 1947 was meant to be provisional until the views of the people on the political future of the state, were fairly ascertained. That exercise has never taken place; thus this link between the disputed state and rest of India remains mired in subsequent political developments, ambiguities and interpretations. Not to mention, politicking.

Article 370 has today become a slogan across the political spectrum – whether for the formations who profess to protect it or those that advocate its abrogation. Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, suffixed with the word ‘temporary’ in its annals, offers a kind of a political autonomy to the state. Constitutionally and legally it became imperative for the Indian government to retain the state as part of the greater Indian mainland only through this Article. Challenging it, scrapping it, revoking it, would run the serious risk of creating a path for the secession of Jammu and Kashmir from the grand Indian Union. The only other alternative to Article 370 would be complete coercion and conquest of the state; indeed an ugly notion for a democratic country. (http://lawmin.nic.in/olwing/coi/coi-english/Const.Pock%202Pg.Rom8Fsss%2827%29.pdf)

According to Kashmir’s Instrument of Accession, barring Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communications, the Central government had no jurisdiction over Jammu and Kashmir. However, New Delhi’s near pathological insecurity with respect to the only Muslim majority state may have inspired its leaders to begin hollowing out this Constitutional provision that was the sole link to the State, providing it with the historical, special status.

It (Article 370) has been eroded excessively through deals like Delhi Agreement in 1952 and through the clandestine control of the political sphere of Jammu and Kashmir by New Delhi through induced corruption, rigged elections and support to puppet regimes. Article 370 was completely hollowed out post-1953, that legally provided for the application of Central laws to Jammu and Kashmir; doing away with the permit system for visitors from outside the State; and by allowing the Centre greater control over matters like Excise, Customs and Posts and Telegraphs. The Indira-Sheikh accord of 1975 was the last nail in the coffin, which allowed New Delhi to change the narrative of the Special Status of the State with the words “Constituent” of India.   

The call for scrapping the Article 370 makes a complete mockery of due processes of law and completely disregards the potential that such a slogan has in engendering a Constitutional crisis. The legitimacy to the Article 370, which grants special status to the state of Jammu and Kashmir, comes from the Draft and Resolution prepared by the first Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir. There is no Constitutional procedure to review or revoke the Article (370) without re-creating the Constituent Assembly. Needless to re-iterate, that any revocation of the Article would only pave the way for severing the State from rest of the country.

Article 370 was brought in to serve a twin purpose. Of both acting as a Constitutional bridge between a State with its exceptional history (Jammu and Kashmir) with India, while safe-guarding its autonomy in all areas barring Defence, Foreign affairs and Communication. However, six decades down, a trajectory of shady accords backed by remote-controlled politics from Delhi and this ‘safeguard’ — Article 370, this unique provision and Constitutional provision–has been reduced to a hollowed-out shell within Constitution of India. The mere words ‘Article 370’ still evoke strong reactions, though.

The bitter reality today however for Jammu and Kashmir is that that far from enjoying any autonomy, the Centre enjoys powers of manipulation and manouevre over the state affairs in Jammu and Kashmir. A man once hailed as ‘the Lion of Kashmir’, Shaikh Abdullah, was brought to his knees, put behind bars and stripped of his powers. Only when he bowed to the might of New Delhi was he ‘allowed’ to remain in power.

Constitutionally, Article 370 will continue to remain a provisional agreement binding Jammu and Kashmir to the rest of the country because the accession to India signed by the Maharaja of Kashmir in October 1947 was meant to be provisional until the views of the people on the political future of the state, were fairly ascertained.

Little of the original autonomy envisaged in the original Article 370 today remains. Diluted and hollowed out, Article 370 is a shallow replica of the original. Nevertheless, the continuance of this Article, even in its present form is critical: not for purposes of protecting the autonomy of the state but to ensure the legal validity of the state’s integration with the rest of India. The only untouched and undisturbed portion of the original Article 370 relates to the protection of the state Subject Laws, created during the time of Maharaja in 1920s and now called the Permanent Residentship Law: this Law does not allow people who settled in Jammu and Kashmir after 1942 to attain proprietary rights over property nor the right to get government jobs. 

Hindutva  proponents, from time to time have linked the revocation of Article 370 to orchestration of a demographic change in Jammu and Kashmir. Anupam Kher’s outpouring may be the first time that its abrogation is linked, in any way to the Kashmiri Pandit question! The core of the sinister argument being that, once people from rest of India are allowed to settle in Jammu and Kashmir, the Pandits will be far more secure in returning to the Valley!

This proposition has more than a touch of irony. Almost a century ago, Kashmiri Pandits were the most educated and affluent class in Jammu and Kashmir and naturally felt threatened when affluent outsiders from Punjab began settling in and becoming a formidable challenge to the might of the Kashmiri Pandits. It was the latter, the Kashmiri Pandits, that were the main motivating force behind the creation of the State Subject laws and this is history.

There are serious flaws in the proposition that the revocation of Article 370, or the manipulation/change of the religious demography of the State can enable the return of Kashmiri Pandits.

Firstly, Kashmiris have a cultural and ethnic identity that is distinct from rest of South Asia. Kashmiris – both Muslims and Pandits – have traditionally shared bonds of syncretic and plural culture that finds no parallels elsewhere in the country (India) or South Asia. Cutting across religious affiliations, Kashmiris have always been conscious of their distinct identity and of protecting it. It serves the interests of neither community, neither the Pandits nor Kashmiri Muslims, to scrap Article 370 or the Permanent Residentship Law. They would not wish to preside over the destruction and dilution of their own unique identities and.

Secondly, any talk of abrogation of Article 370 in a sensitive place like Kashmir and Jammu is like waving the proverbial red flag before a bull. Any Hindutvawaadi design on the state’s demography invokes acute insecurities and imaginations of a future akin to that of Palestinians on the Gaza strip. This insecurity is also located in the reality of the fact that the Muslims– despite being in majority in the State — continue to be powerless in view of the way in which political control is exercised by Delhi. 

Thirdly and most importantly, this red herring flung out by the politicians of the RSS-BJP-VHP combine (Sangh Parivar) is based on the misplaced presumption that the displacement and insecurity experienced by the Kashmiri Pandits’ is on account of the Muslims being a majority in the State. Pandits were not ever threatened by the majority community to flee the Valley. Though the threat perception to the community cannot be negated (this was a natural product of the years when the character of the resistance changed from Azaadi to Islaamiyat; when youth from the Valley crossed the borders and decided to pick up the gun to fight the Indian state), it cannot be simplified to a Muslim versus Hindu problem. Had that been the issue, no Pandits would have survived in the Valley in 1947, when the rest of the sub-continent was caught in the grip of communal violence. In fact, inspired by the communal bonhomie of Kashmiri Muslims and Pandits, in those distressing times, Gandhi had famously talked about seeing a “ray of hope” in Kashmir.

The majority of the Pandits fled the Kashmir Valley in the 1990s and ever since, the forced migration has been a bone of real and academic contention – right from their numbers to the reasons they fled. It is not uncommon to find a Kashmiri Muslim concluding that Pandits suddenly fled one day when militancy began, often holding former J&K Governor Jagmohan responsible for the enmasse exodus. The Pandits vehemently challenge this theory; quoting instead from the reality of an  atmosphere filled with xenophobia – open threats, selective killings and fear – that triggered the flight in different batches, the first one being January 19, 1990. Both popular narratives are located within black and white extremes, often throwing up some contradictions. Both narratives, however, are historically placed in the exemplary harmonious relations between the two communities before the 1980s and to some extent through the 1980s as well.
 
It would be significant to take a re-look at those fading last days of a freezing winter, when the Pandits actually fled the Valley. The right wing groups among Kashmiri Pandits recall January 19 (1990) as ‘Holocaust day’. For Kashmiri Muslims too, January 19 is a turning point, not particularly owing to the flight of Pandits and other minorities that also eventually robbed the Valley of its secular fabric, but more for the intensified curfew on the streets and the slew of shocking massacres by security forces that followed. For both, the day forms an important part of collective memory, for entirely different sets of reasons.

The Pandits vehemently challenge this theory; quoting instead from the reality of an  atmosphere filled with xenophobia – open threats, selective killings and fear – that triggered the flight in different batches, the first one being January 19, 1990. Both popular narratives are located within black and white extremes, often throwing up some contradictions.

The day also coincides with Jagmohan taking over the reins of Jammu and Kashmir as Governor of the state, suddenly placed under Governor’s rule. The move had probably been coming, given the heightened militancy-related incidents between September and December 1989. New Delhi had been sending in extra reinforcements of armed forces and the number of troops had doubled since the beginning of January. The last vestiges of State Government control had virtually collapsed by end of December itself; the situation was already under New Delhi’s direct control by the time Jagmohan took over and began his work. The Valley had already been placed under strict unprecedented curfew for days. A large chunk of Pandits left the Valley on the intervening night of January 19 and 20, amid a strict curfew, many in buses of government controlled J&K State Road Transport Corporation. On January 20, house to house searches, raids, cordons, random arrests with allegations of harassment and atrocities began in many areas of Srinagar city, particularly Muslim majority areas.  Citizens of the Valley, caught between the devil and deep sea, started pouring out on streets in protest, violating prohibitory orders. Street protests with slogans of ‘Azadi’ with the added embellishment of Islamic religious symbols became a regular, everyday feature.

As did the massacres on streets. Starting from Gawkadal on the morning of January 21, leaving an estimated 50 to 80 people dead and hundreds injured, many of whom succumbed to their injuries later[i]. The Alamgari Bazaar massacre followed on January 22, and the Handwara killings on January 25. It is difficult to presume that these varied events taking place simultaneously were just a matter of coincidence.

Neither sets of facts, the fear and insecurity of the minorities, nor the persecution of the majority at the hands of a reckless administration can be denied. The massacres lie at the core of a deep-rooted sense of alienation of the Kashmiri Muslims as does the exodus, facilitated to serve the communal bias of a certain Governor. Whatever else Jagmohan did or did not do, as governor, instead of playing a role to ensure safety of the minorities in Valley, he certainly chose to play up their insecurities and sense of fear, paving the way for their flight. With the population that remained, strong arm tactics could be thereafter easily used.

The hazy fog of memory around the events have become important markers in how the historical narratives based on two sets of identities have shaped up. There are internal contradictions and a disregard of the ‘other’. These ‘gaps’ need to be bridged, the lacunae clarified more than ever, with a dispassionate and unbiased engagement with facts.

The events preceding these massacres of both Pandits and the Muslims, have been crucial to the snapping of Kashmir’s historic and much famed ‘secular and syncretic’ ties. Any possibility of return of the Kashmiri Pandits and the restoration of a genuinely secular polity has to be rooted in not just generating goodwill but in the exchange of a dialogue starting from the memory of those days that has generated an unfathomable bitterness; making it impossible to understand how two well knit communities living in exemplary harmony, became totally oblivious of the sufferings, pain, fears and trepidation of each other within a matter of days.

In such an inclusive approach, could be found the key to a renewal of communal harmony between the two major communities of the Valley, embittered and separated 25 years ago. It is this road that must be revisited, anew, so that the Pandits can return honourably and with a sense of security, not by further erecting walls of hatred and division between communities.

(The author is Executive Editor, Kashmir Times and also a human rights activist)

References from our Archives:
1. How Green Is My Valley   https://sabrangindia.in/sabrangthemes/how-green-is-my-valley
2. Talibanisation of Kashmir   https://sabrangindia.in/article/talibanisation-kashmir
3. Day of the ‘mujahid’    https://sabrangindia.in/article/day-%E2%80%98mujahid%E2%80%99
 

The post J&K: Dangerous Demographics: Linking Article 370 with the Pandits’ return appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Outside a small temple a group of Kashmiri Pandit women hold hands and sing Kashmiri songs as a new bridegroom drives away in a flower-bedecked car. The women return to the temple courtyard, form a circle and continue to sing, their traditional dejhor earrings glistening under a feeble sun. Standing in the centre, the groom’s aunt holds out two earthen plates filled with flower petals. The others sing, drizzling petals from one plate to the other. Many in the gathering are unable to explain the origin or the significance of the ritual. But it is a must after Kashmiri Pandit weddings when the bridegroom seeks the blessings of the goddess before he goes to the bride’s house to bring her home.

Customs, rituals and language are things that renew the energy and hopes of these migrant Kashmiri Pandits who have been living in squalid camps on the outskirts of Jammu for the last 20 years. Observing these rituals, speaking a language that may be alien in Jammu but is one they proudly call their own, offers some form of reassurance even as hopes of a return to the Kashmir valley grow dimmer with each passing year.

Forgetting for a moment their stark surroundings and the harsh realities of daily life, the women seem happy, singing as they now await the bride’s arrival. Participating in the ritual with an almost childlike enthusiasm, they are a little shy but friendly. "Look, here comes another groom to pay obeisance to the goddess," one of them exclaims, as another groom jumps out of his car, walks in with some friends, prays to the goddess and then zooms off to fetch his bride.

For most of these women home is the sprawling migrant camp by the banks of a small seasonal stream in Nagrota. Some of them were fortunate enough to have graduated from the squalid camps to the more airy and comparatively spacious two-room flats that have recently been constructed just behind the old camp. The temple is situated opposite the camp, near a few shops: a provision store, a Kashmiri bakery, a tailor, a vegetable vendor, a spare parts dealer and even a beauty parlour. Life seems complete in many ways for the camp’s inmates. But not quite!

Meeting a cross-section of people in the camps is revealing in many ways. Over the last 20 years many of them have learnt to adjust to life in the camp. But there is also a desperation to get out of there, compounded by the uncertainty of not knowing where to go. The despair, frustration and dilemma spring from a 20-year separation from their original homes in the valley while they have been neglected and condemned to live in the shabby congested camp that is now their home. It is difficult to determine whether they would in fact be ready to return to the valley if the government were to make a serious move in this direction. Many say they do want to go back but they are very sceptical about the prospects of that happening. The reasons for this are several.

The latest endeavour, inspiring both hope and doubt, is the constitution of an Apex Advisory Committee to oversee the return and rehabilitation of Kashmiri migrants, set up by the government of Jammu and Kashmir in close coordination with the union government in September 2009. This comes after several failed attempts during the last two decades. The committee is comprised of 32 members, including, for the first time, some Pandits who still live in the valley. Hopes were further raised when a consensus emerged for the inclusion of valley-based Muslims in the committee as well. But the apex committee has not met since then, except during the union home minister, P. Chidambaram’s visit to Nagrota in November when he inaugurated the new flats meant for migrants. Hardcore Kashmiri Pandit groups like Panun Kashmir have so far boycotted the meetings.

But what adds to the scepticism of the Kashmiri migrants living in the camp near Jammu is their non-representation in the apex committee. "They have never included us," says an angry Sunny Raina, 30. "All decisions are taken by the Srinagar-based Pandits. What about the rural poor rotting in the camps? After all, it is we who have borne the brunt of displacement over the last 20 years," he says angrily.

Sunny, who has fond memories of his days in Kulgam, his original home, recalls his early teenage years and the days they spent in a tented camp at Jhiri, west of Jammu, after they had to leave the valley suddenly. "From big houses and open spaces, we ended up in tents. During the windy wintry days we had to cling to the tent poles to make sure the tent didn’t collapse and in summer we had to brave snakebites and the heat which we weren’t used to. From those tents we moved to these shabby tenements, one room per family is all that we had for all these years. We lived in such penury for all these years, you learn to get used to it. Things are better now. We’ve shifted into these two-room flats and I just got a government job. But is this the life for us?"

Asked whether he would like to return to the valley, he is quick to respond: "Of course, we all want to go back. But what are the possibilities? When – a hundred years from now? We won’t even know our next-door neighbours when we return. The only option is to keep us in safe zones, not isolate us in a jail-like camp but just shift us with minimal security. If the government is serious about shifting us back and has a genuine plan, why are we being settled in these new colonies here instead of there?" The government’s indecisiveness seems to compound his dilemma.

Many of Sunny’s contemporaries at the camp oscillate between similar doses of pessimism and optimism from one moment to the next. Take, for instance, Ashwini Raina and his younger, college-going brother, Sonu. Ashwini considers himself lucky to have found a job in the private sector after getting his MBA degree and claims that many of his friends at the camp who have come back after completing their studies in Pune or elsewhere are jobless.

"You see, there is so much frustration and despair here. We do want to go back but is that really possible?" Sonu, the more talkative of the two, shares his sense of hopelessness but he is nonetheless an enthusiastic and bubbly youngster. He was born in the camp. "It was only when we went to Khir Bhawani that I visited our village in Ganderbal for the first time and saw our huge but dilapidated house and the open space around it. Until then, I had no idea what I had missed. Hearing stories was one thing but the one-room accommodation at the camp was the only place that I could think of as home in all these years." He wants to return and is sad that he cannot. "Things are still not secure; we don’t even know our next-door neighbours."

His enthusiasm however is undiminished as he proudly escorts me to his newly constructed two-room flat which the family shifted to four months ago after years spent in a shabby one-room tenement. The flat is airy and, with a small terrace and a separate kitchen and toilet, relatively spacious. His mother welcomes me with a smile and serves us tea and fresh biscuits from the bakery, a Kashmiri favourite. Life has been difficult in the past 20 years but traditions and customs have not changed. On that cold November morning, as I sit on a Kashmiri namdah on the floor, she offers me a blanket to keep me warm and insists that I eat another biscuit. Sonu ensures that I have enough cushions for a backrest. These are such typical gestures of Kashmiri hospitality that I am at once transported to the valley. But the conversation brings us back to the reality of their forced existence in camps like this one, set up in the wilderness on Jammu’s outskirts, for almost two decades now.

There are other camps located in Udhampur and Delhi where conditions are much the same as in this one.

The majority of Kashmiri Pandits were once well off, mostly literate and held government jobs or owned sizeable portions of land in the villages. Pushed into these congested spaces, life seems to have frozen for the internally displaced Pandits torn between the Kashmiri identity they cherish and the bitterness they harbour against the valley’s Muslims. The younger generation, which has few or no memories of the valley, is particularly ambivalent. Many of them don’t even speak the Kashmiri language. They make a conscious effort not to do so and to adjust to their new surroundings. Sonu agrees that his generation is not very happy speaking "our own language".

"Youngsters still speak Kashmiri in the camps but elsewhere they speak a mixture of Hindi and Dogri, the local language of Jammu," he maintains. "They’re not just confused, they are frustrated, and anyone can exploit that situation. Last year [2008] we allowed the BJP to exploit our youth. We took the lead in shouting ‘Bam Bam Bhole’ during the Amarnath agitation but later realised our mistake. You see, the frustration runs so deep that if anyone exploits our situation, we may even be ready to take up guns and become terrorists."

Do they feel hatred, harbour bitterness against Muslims? Both Sonu and his brother are quick to respond that though there is some bitterness, there is no hatred. "We don’t hate them but we just don’t know them," says Ashwini. Sonu chips in, "There are some Kashmiri Muslim boys also studying in my college and we often argue about what happened in 1989-90 and thereafter. Earlier, I only blamed them for our plight. But now I do understand that they have also suffered. We don’t want to suffer but we don’t want them to suffer either."

Sonu’s mother however does not share this empathy and is suspicious of Muslims. "When we were forced to leave, they never did anything for us. So how can we trust them now? If we go back and something happens again, they will get swayed by that and not bother about us. Who knows if some of them were also involved [in driving the Pandits out] earlier?" she says. For her "there is just no possibility of return", since the trust that once existed cannot be restored.

Most other adults in the camp are sceptical and ambivalent about Muslims in the valley. Bal Kishen, who has been running a small provision store at the camp ever since he retired from a government job, says: "If conditions improve, we would surely go back. We want safe zones for ourselves but we don’t want to be excluded. We want to be part of Kashmir. But there is still a lot of insecurity, the situation is still not encouraging. We fear that something untoward will happen after we return. Of course, bonds with old neighbours and friends still exist but it is not the same thing after 20 years. Their children have grown up and so have ours. They don’t know each other, I don’t know their children. Sometimes we are not even sure if they want us to come back. They come and meet us and once when I went back to my village in Kulgam for some work, I did stay with them. But whenever we meet, after exchanging pleasantries and talking about the good old times, they ask us to sell our land to them, since we are not going back. This makes us doubtful." But hope still lingers. Kishen claims that unlike the Pandits from urban areas, most of the migrants from the villages have yet to sell off their properties. This is partly because they yearn to return to their homeland and partly because village people tend to treat the land as something sacred and it would be almost sacrilegious to sell it.

Notwithstanding the shared experience of forced migration, the urban-rural divide among the Kashmiri migrants is apparent. The camp inmates have a serious grudge against the urbanites, who get to play a greater role in any decision-making about their plight and the possibility of their return. Vijay Bakaya, a retired bureaucrat, a legislator in the upper house of the state legislature and a member of the apex committee, is among those who recognise the existence of this divide. He readily agrees with the idea of greater representation of migrants living in the camps and Pandits with rural backgrounds in all decision-making, including the recent deliberations on the return of migrants to the valley.

Unlike most Pandits in the camps, he is quite optimistic about the outcome of the apex committee initiative. "You see, 3,000 new posts have already been created for Kashmiri Pandits and it was on the committee’s recommendation that all these posts are to be in the valley so that youngsters are motivated to move back. They are likely to be filled by March 2010. Agreed, these are only short-term measures and we need to evolve long-term strategies too. Setting up clusters in different districts of the valley so that migrants from those districts can return with a sense of security and comfort is one such idea. Even on this there was near consensus among the apex committee members that these should be set up as transit camps so that once things improved and intercommunity relations improved, individual families could make a final decision on whether to return to their earlier homes or sell them off."

Pandits who stayed on in the valley through the two turbulent decades are the most enthusiastic about the latest initiative. Their enthusiasm is understandable considering that at present there are only about 8,000 of them left in the valley. The return of the migrant Pandits will add to their cumulative sociopolitical weight in the valley and help restore its plural identity. In addition to braving onslaughts by both the security forces and the militants, like their Muslim counterparts, these Pandits have also had to face the vagaries of life as experienced by a minuscule minority. Yet, to their credit and despite their insignificant numbers, they have attempted to organise themselves into groups and lobby both successive governments and local leaders for greater security and the promotion of the social and economic interests of the community.

Pandits in the valley may be a divided lot but their choice to stay put and to defend their interests has contributed to the diversity within an otherwise monochromatic social milieu in the last two decades. While these Pandits have divergent voices, from the very beginning theirs has been a voice in sharp contrast to that of the Kashmiri migrants. The valley-based Pandits have always lamented the stand taken by hardcore migrant leaders, as it only contributed to a greater sense of unease and insecurity amongst themselves.

Throughout the Amarnath land dispute in 2008, when almost all migrant Kashmiri Pandit organisations unconditionally supported the Shri Amarnath Yatra Sangharsh Samiti that was spearheading the anti-Kashmir agitation, Pandits in the valley felt extremely insecure, caught between Islamist slogans on one side and fellow Pandits from the camps aligning with the other. For their part, the migrants view the Pandits who continue to stay in the valley as some kind of traitors.

Some years ago a colony was built on the outskirts of Srinagar to house migrants who were willing to return. However, only a few families, those who had migrated from Sangrampora in North Kashmir following a massacre by militants, were temporarily settled there. The rest of the flats remained empty. "But the government made no attempt to bring back some Pandits from the Jammu camps, neither did it settle those internally displaced within Kashmir so as to discourage any fresh exodus," says ML Bhat, a prominent Kashmiri Pandit activist based in the valley.

Many Pandits who fled to Srinagar from rural areas in the last 20 years today live in small shanties, including one at Ganpatyar, in the heart of the city. All they have are some rooms in a temple complex that is occupied mainly by CRPF men. "While the migrants get relief and other government assistance, we have been totally forgotten," says Bhat. "It is important to protect us first because we are the link – the root – and we can be an ideal bridge between the two communities." Many other valley-based Pandits echo his sentiments.

It is in this context that the latest move for the return of the migrants is being welcomed by the Pandits in the valley who have been included in the apex committee because they are a vital link between the Kashmiri Muslims and the migrant Pandits. Significantly, the apex committee meeting in September 2009 ended on a promising note, with the decision to involve Kashmiri Muslims in the process. Welcome though the initiative is, there has been very little progress since September. As mentioned earlier, the only other time that the apex committee members met was during Home Minister P. Chidambaram’s visit to Jammu in early November. All that happened during this meeting however was a reiteration of the proceedings in September.

Meanwhile, two important but hardcore Pandit groups continue to boycott the apex committee. There are also differences about whether the 3,000 new posts created for Kashmiri migrants should all be within the valley. Despite all the differences and the reservations of certain groups, the fact remains that for the first time there appears to be a sincere effort on the part of the authorities to chart a clear road map before embarking on a journey: the return of the migrant Pandits to the valley.

Though it has been decided, in principle, to include Kashmiri Muslims in the process, there has been no action so far in that direction. This is quite critical. Although people on both sides have managed to maintain cordial relations on a personal level, intercommunity reservations and bitterness persist. This is especially true of the younger generation, who are not only strangers to each other but have also grown up on two mutually contradictory histories of the other.

Opinion on how Muslims should be included is still divided. While some want them to be brought within the ambit of the apex committee, others feel it would be more fruitful to encourage and facilitate greater intercommunity interaction. Social activists have been organising informal meetings and workshops for reconciliation. Individuals have also played a significant role. A good example of this is ML Bhat, who continues to run his 80-year-old school in the valley against the odds. In the current situation, where few symbols of pluralism and diversity are visible, Bhat’s school, where Pandit children study alongside Muslim children, acts like a beacon.

There is also the example of Dr Sushil Razdan, a leading neurologist from Kashmir, who was among those displaced from the valley in 1990. His private clinic in Jammu is thronged by patients throughout the day. The vast majority of them are Muslims from the valley who still hold him in high esteem. "When they come, I do not ask them about their problems. I first talk to them about the valley. It’s like a healing stimulant," the doctor says. He talks excitedly about receiving regular letters from his friends in the valley, with whom he still maintains very good relations.

Especially during the winter taxi-loads of Muslim patients from South Kashmir come to Dr Razdan for consultation. "Patients from one village all come together, having made an appointment months in advance. On the day of their appointment they leave home early in the morning, reach here by noon, spend the day at my clinic, consulting me and picnicking in the lawns. They return to their villages in the evening. It gives me immense pleasure because Kashmir is not just the name of a place, it is also about people. When they arrive in such large numbers, it’s like a part of Kashmir is always with me."

With their children now having settled abroad or in other states in India, several well-to-do migrant Pandits have themselves decided to return to the valley, for that is where their friends are. More than anything else, it is such individual accounts that keep hope afloat. The return of Kashmiri migrants to the valley after two decades may indeed be a Herculean task. But there are obvious signs that this is not altogether impossible.

Archived from Communalism Combat, January 2010 Year 16    No.147, Special Report

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