Post-Kargil, imported mujahideen are pedalling a Talibanised Islam in the Valley. And succeeding in good measure, thanks to the unholy nexus between the BJP-led government at the Centre and an unscrupulous National Conference in the state

There has been a significant change not only in character of the movement but in the mood of  the Kashmiri people post argil. The reason for this is the even deeper and greater sense of alienation and outright bitterness among the local people – in the Valley, in Jammu and in Ladakh. As far as militancy is concerned, there has been a sharp decline in the Kashmiri-speaking people component among the militants. 
 

The actions of the militants, too, signal this sharp shift. Earlier, the victims of militants used to be civilians — soft targets. There used to be harassment and extortion of the local population. This has stopped. Today, post-Kargil, the attacks are directly on the army and BSF headquarters. 
 

The militant activities are more dare devilish, more direct, more desperate in a way. A group has emerged that calls itself Fidayeen (Lovers of God). Unlike the activities of earlier militant groups, their targets are not civilians but the army and security forces. There is now no extortion from the local
population, distinct attempts are being made to ingratiate them and win their sympathy.
 

The Kashmiri movement has, as a result, and very unfortunately, been virtually taken over by outsiders. The Jamaat-e-Islami has never had any faith in the Kashmiri brand of a more liberal Islam. A more standardised version of Islam is being offered to the local population that is completely out of sync with the region, with Kashmiriyat, a characteristic that typified the movement before.
 

This weakness of the Kashmiri movement that is fast-losing its Kashmiri identity — and, for this a variety of factors are responsible — is more than compensated on the other side. RSS and even more extreme brands of Hindu nationalism are gaining currency among Hindus in Jammu, as elsewhere in the country. 
 

What are the factors responsible for this hardening of position on both sides? The sham of the recent elections is one of the most significant contributory factors. It is a sorry tale for any country that is proud to call itself a democracy. Elections were far from free. Official figures themselves reveal a fast-declining rate of voter participation, not only among Kashmiri Muslims, but also Pandit migrants and Jammu Hindus. What does this signify but increasing alienation?
 

In its report published on October 6, 1999, The Times of India revealed that the opinion expressed by me on the recently conducted elections in the state were shared by a team of four IAS officers sent as independent observers to the state. I quote from their report: “Elections were neither free nor fair but full of violence. The electorate was coerced by the security forces to vote. The presiding officer at several polling booths corroborated the charges of coercion made by the voters. The observers found even minors in the queue and several mobile voters”. 
 

The observers saw matadors carrying women voters. They intercepted these matadors. The four senior IAS officers made a demand to the EC to countermand the elections. These demands were not even considered by the EC, while in states like Bihar and elsewhere, more prompt action was taken. 

There has been a significant change in the character of the movement in Kashmir with the presence of a militant outfit like Fidayeen (Lovers of God). The actions of the militants are more sympathetic to the locals and are targeting the Indian security forces

The conduct of the election commissioner (GV Krishnamurthy) on a visit to the state was blatantly partisan, when he commented that the “conducting of the elections was the answer to militancy.” The EC would have performed a far more signal and patriotic service to Kashmiris, residents of Jammu and
the whole country if he had simply concentrated on ensuring that the conduct of the elections was ‘genuinely free and fair’.
 

The boycott call by militants and a heavy presence of the military has been a constant factor in the state since the 1996 elections. How come then, that given these constants in the last three elections, there has been such a sharp decline in voting percentages this time? 
 

Look at the official figures. During the 1996 parliamentary elections, in the Srinagar city segment, 35 per cent of the electorate voted; this was down to 30 per cent in 1998 and touched an all-time low of 12 per cent in 1999. The story is similar for Anantnag. In  1996, 50 per cent of the voters came out; in 1998, this was down to 28 per cent; but in 1999 the voting percentage dropped to 14 per cent. In Baramulla, while 41 per cent of the voters came out to cast their vote in 1996; the turnout was the same in 1998, but this time it plummeted to 27 per cent.     If one goes into further detail and scrutinises figures for the Srinagar segment that has recorded 12 per cent of voters, we see that the Charar-e-Sharif and Badgaon segments recorded 45.50 and 45 per cent of voting respectively while Srinagar city registered barely 3–5 per cent votes. The extent of voter disillusionment or alienation can well be gauged from these statistics. 
 

Jammu and Kashmir also recorded the highest rates of invalid votes anywhere in the country; EC statistics tell us there were 9-12 per cent invalid votes in the state. It is worth analysing the factors responsible for such a low voting percentage and high rate of invalid votes in the state. 
 

As stated before, the boycott call by militants, the heavy and obtrusive army presence, the acute disillusionment of the Kashmiri people over the Kargil episode were the main factors. 
 

But an additional factor was the acute disillusionment of the Hindu migrant voters in the Valley and Hindu Pandits in the Jammu region with the BJP. This is evident from the number of Pandits who voted for the BJP. The BJP vote in the Jammu-Poonch region fell from 7,90,000 in 1998 to 2,90,000 this time. This means that only one-third of Pandit voters who supported the BJP last time extended their support to the same party this time. In Udhampur, too, the Pandit vote for the BJP declined from 5,23,000 votes in 1998 down to 1,94,000 this year. 

If there is such a sharp decline of votes within one year, from a particular segment with a particular party, what does it show? Obviously that, completely disillusioned with the BJP, which is also the ruling party at the Centre, Pandits have turned away from it. The BJP has led them up the garden path with false promises.
 

In the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir, the percentage of Muslim voters is high. Within the Jammu region, too, 30 per cent of the electorate is Muslim.
 

With an open alliance between the BJP and NC, is it really believable that seats with a high domination of Muslim voters would so willingly back the NC’s collaboration with the BJP? There is hardly a constituency anywhere in India where Muslim votes are sizeable in number and where they have wholeheartedly supported the BJP. So, it is hardly believable that they would do so in Jammu and Kashmir.

The disillusioned local population, both Muslim and Hindu, were looking for an alternative, a secular outlet to channelise their protest against the unholy nexus between the BJP and the National Conference
 

In short, both the Hindus and Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir are completely disillusioned with the ruling parties — the National Conference and the BJP.
 

There was blatant coercion of voters at the voting stage and subsequent manipulation of the results. My opinion is corroborated by EC observer’s report. 
 

In the midst of all this, secular parties, particularly the main opposition party, the Congress, that had converted secularism into a mantra all over the country, was conspicuous in that it put up only a nominal fight in the state. Since nothing can be expected from the opportunistic politics and regime of Farooq Abdullah’s National Conference and the communal worldview of the BJP, secular forces within the country must take their share of blame for the situation in Jammu and Kashmir.
 

Why did they betray the interests of Kashmiri Muslims, Jammu Hindus and the migrant Pandits living in the Valley? This is not what secularism is about. They had a wonderful opportunity during the last elections to intervene. They not only squandered an opportunity for themselves but have also compromised the national interest. The disillusioned local population, both Muslim and Hindu, were looking for an alternative, a secular outlet to channelise their protest against the unholy nexus between the BJP and the National Conference. 

The National Conference was a regional party which should have necessarily pitted itself against the insensitive and centrist politics of the Indian state. But, today, it has willingly been reduced to a mere tool of the BJP. It has completely lost the raison d’être of its existence. The Jammu Hindus, who were against Kashmiri Muslim domination, had under certain circumstances arising out of this, supported the BJP in the past. With the BJP shamefully allying with the NC, the raison d’être of this support, too, has also been completely eroded.

Given this state of a huge political vacuum and accumulated discontent what happens? Like I said before, it was the ideal situation for a secular formation with civil liberties, human rights perspective to intervene. 
 

In its absence, the local population has been pushed to the wall and a fresh lease of life has been given to militant activities. Without local support, no sophisticated weapons, no armed training can help militants succeed in any region.
 

This choice has, in my opinion at least, been forced on both the Kashmiri people and the people of Jammu. In 1996, when Farooq Abdullah’s National Conference came before the people, despite his past record, the people were willing to give him another chance. But over the past three years, his rule has been the worst ever, extremely corrupt, allowing no avenues or channels of protest.
 

All this must be seen in the context of heightened ‘national’ and ‘patriotic’ interest on the territory of the state during the Kargil conflict. The earlier ‘conviction’ and ‘assertion’ of the Indian authorities that, after Kargil, militancy would collapse has been disproved comprehensively.
 

Indian arrogance and insensitivity was manifest throughout the Kargil conflict?  The Indian media, most of it, swooped down on Kargil. But none mentioned the people of the state, the people of Jammu and Kashmir, where the war was being fought. Little mention was made then of the displaced persons either. This failure of the Indian media to even cursorily look at the plight of the Kashmiri people, with an ongoing struggle for democratic rights for decades, in my mind, constitutes a significant omission on the part of the Indian media. 
 

Conversely, there was a studied detachment among the local people at the war being waged. Unlike earlier occasions, there was no enthusiasm for the Indian army, throughout the operation, no donations for the jawans were collected, no blood banks held here. No state government ministers, with a few exceptions, even visited the front at the time.
 

I had made a special visit to Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee on this question. This visit was an attempt to apprise the Indian political leadership with the issues crucial to the people of the Valley, the Jammu region and Ladakh. The Shia Muslims who live in Kargil have a continuing disenchantment and discontent with Pakistan across the LOC, so even tactically it would have been wise of India to address their grievances. Though I was given assurances during my meeting with the Prime Minister, nothing has resulted.
 

The Indian government and the Indian people have consistently refused to address the grievances of the state. There is the struggle for Kashmiriyat. There has also been the expression of Jammu Hindus against Kashmiri Muslim domination. There has also been a movement for autonomy within the Ladakh region in which Kargil falls. 
 

For a month or so, things were silent after Kargil. The Pakistan-sponsored militancy movement remained silent. Local disillusionment with Pakistan, US and UN was also simmering. Pakistan had to do something to keep the movement alive. But what helped Pakistan significantly was the chief minister of the state, Farooq Abdullah’s coming out in open support of the BJP. At an RSS-sponsored function, he sang praises for the organisation and went to the extent of declaring that “the RSS is the most patriotic organisation”.
 

The political vacuum, the issue of acute discontent and disenchantment, during Kargil and post-Kargil especially at election-time, was unfortunately not addressed by any Indian political party, not even the so-called ‘secular’ Congress. 
 

The biggest betrayal of the state was in fact by the ‘secular’ Congress, as we can expect nothing from the BJP outside its self-declared divisive agenda. How interested the Congress party is in reflecting the genuine aspirations of the people of the state can be seen from the fact that the party had one member in Parliament and another in the Assembly. It got rid of both leaders, including Mufti Mohammed Sayeed just before the elections simply for suggesting dialogue with the militants. 

Has the party forgotten that during the last Congress government, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s cabinet colleague, Bhuvanesh Chaturvedi (then minister of state in the PM’s office), had, around 1995, offered unconditional talks with militants in Kashmir? How do political parties accept a resolution of the Kashmir issue without having such a dialogue?
 

If the government can talk to Naga leaders in Paris, and other people ‘without conditions’ why not in Kashmir? This was the issue on which Mufti Mohammed Sayeed felt let down and resigned, and the Congress put up a token fight during the recent elections in the state.
 

The failure of secular forces to give an adequate response to the ground-level reality in Jammu and Kashmir was most visible in the failure of established political parties and NGOs and civil liberties groups to campaign for Saifuddin Soz who stood as an independent. It was Soz’s single vote on which the BJP’s central government had fallen.
 

None of the national secular parties have raised a single voice against Farooq Abdullah’s support to the BJP. There has been not a word of disapproval for this open and unprincipled collaboration. The Congress goes to town criticising Sharad Pawar and Mulayam Singh for their individual “hobnobbing with the BJP”. But here is a leader who is openly allying with a communal force and there are no comments, no condemnations, no interventions from the top Congress leadership.
 

Former information and broadcasting minister, Pramod Mahajan was blatant about this cosy relationship before elections were held. On a visit to the state, when asked to comment on the prospects of the BJP-led NDA coming to power, he said that the “six seats from Jammu and Kashmir (all these are seats over which the National Conference had claim) are already in the NDA basket.”
 

How can we complain against the BJP and their agenda? Their agenda is clear and open, as is the Jamaat-e-Islami’s. But Farooq Abdullah’s open support to both these ideologies has been ignored and allowed to pass by secular parties. This is a great act of omission on their part.
 

There is every evidence of a serious comeback of militancy in the state. If militants can get at the very nerve centre of the Indian security system, the army, it means they are back. But what needs to be emphasised is that it is out of sheer desperation that local sentiments are being exploited like this. This is the only way they can express their resentment and that is why there is this silent but growing support for militant activities.
 

The political vacuum, if unaddressed, will be filled by extremists on both sides. The process has been assisted by lack of secular commitment on the part of Indians to the state. In Jammu, the BJP’s failure to meet the aspiration of the Hindu section of the population, will, soon give birth to outfits that are more extremist than the BJP even. 

The local Kashmiri leadership, too, is isolated and cannot be heard. Shabbir Shah is a leader who had projected a more tolerant ideology but whose voice was hardly heard in between. Soon after the recent elections, he and others were jailed by the National Conference without any charge. Why? 
 

Personally, I am not inspired by All-Party Hurriyat Conference, especially after they accepted the leadership of the Jamaat-e-Islami’s Syed Ali Shah Geelani, who is openly pro-Pakistan. Yasin Mallik, who once showed so much potential as the young and daring leader of the secular JKLF, has also fallen in with the official Hurriyat line. None of these Kashmiri leaders, by the way, condemned Pakistan’s conduct during Kargil and that I think was a major failure on all their part. 
 

India is obsessed with blocking the Kashmir issue internationally, outwitting Pakistan etc. Why are we not concerned with trying to solve problems within our control? If we regard the people of the state as our own, why do we not espouse or display any desire to hear their legitimate grievances and thereafter attempt solutions?

I now fear the political eclipse and redundancy of saner voices such as mine in such a situation. Physically, too, I am vulnerable. So far, I have been able to communicate with both sides in the dispute. But with the complete shrinking of space for sane and secular dialogue, I fear that with hardening, extremist stances on both sides, I will lose my space completely. 
 

A far stronger figure, like Gandhiji, found himself redundant in 1947 and eliminated in 1948; what chances has a far smaller man like me under the circumstances?
 

Just like the RSS and the BJP have assumed the sole monopoly on the Indian point of view, the Kashmiri protest movement has increasingly been epitomised by a Pakistani Muslim fundamentalist flavour. On both sides, extremists have taken over. The military coup has not helped matters but generated further confusion.

A very stable and dangerous triangle has emerged after the last elections. 
 

The three points in the triangle are Farooq Abdullah, the BJP (driven by the extremist RSS) and the Hurriyat (now openly supported by a pro-Pakistan, Jamaat-e-Islami).  While the three points of this triangle appear to oppose each other, they are in fact supporting each other. Hindu communalism supports Muslim communalism and an opportunistic National Conference makes political gain for itself, crucially dependant as it is on both the extremes. No points ever threaten each other; they depend on the other for their own survival. 

Archived from Communalism Combat, November 1999, Year 7  No. 53, Cover Story 1

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The massacre of 35 Sikhs at  Chhitsinghpora in Kashmir  on March 20 and the way the  situation was subsequently  handled by the state government and the security forces have exposed the crisis of governance in the state and indicate the dangers ahead.

The massacre caused great outrage within and outside the state. Not only because it was the largest toll of innocent civilians allegedly taken by the militants but also because the victims were Sikhs who were considered safe so far. Forgetting their differences, the entire community united in launching massive protests everywhere against the outrageous act. At some places Hindu extremists tried to form a united front with them and divert their anger against Muslims. But as the latter, particularly in Kashmir, expressed full solidarity with the bereaved families and the Sikh community, through hartals and protest demonstrations, the designs of the communal forces were frustrated.

The tragedy had occasioned a rethinking on the part of many Kashmiris about the role of violence in achieving their objectives. For it is damaging their cause and defaming their movement. Moreover the militant groups were no longer under their control; they are now controlled from across the border. Since 1998, Hindus have became the direct targets of these militants simply because they were Hindus.

The killing of 25 Kashmiri Pandits at Wandhama and the mass killing of Hindus at Prankote, Champnari and Kishtwar in the Jammu region have taken a heavy toll of innocent lives. The secessionist leaders in Kashmir have tried to absolve the militants of such inhuman crimes by attributing them to the Indian security forces “in order to discredit the azadi movement.” But they have not produced any shred of evidence to prove their allegations whereas some contrary evidence has often been produced.

Despite Pakistan’s charge that Chhitisinghpora killings were done by the Indian army, most Kashmiri Muslims were willing to suspend their judgement and supported the demand for a credible inquiry. If the government had responded to this and handled the situation intelligently and tactfully, the militants could have been isolated and further bloodshed in the state could have been stopped.

But why did the state government and the security forces behave in a manner exactly opposite to what should have been done? This is not the first time this has happened. When Mirwaiz Maulvi Farooq was killed in May 1990, the indiscriminate firing on his funeral diverted the anger of his devout followers against militants to against the Indian government. Since then a number of similar incidents can be cited. In recent years, the Wandhama killing of Hindus was soon followed by the killing of seven innocent Muslims in Kishtwar.

Perhaps the security forces are provoked by the senseless and brutal killing of Hindus by militants who are Muslim. They are also encouraged to be more ruthless by cries of “free hand to the security forces” and warnings to human rights activists to desist from criticising the security forces. In its haste to claim it has successfully eliminated the militants responsible for the killings of the Sikhs, the army apparently was not careful enough to distinguish between the militants and local Muslims. And the state government showed callous indifference to the demands of the parents of the missing youth to trace them and hold an inquiry into what had been done to them. After week–long protest demonstrations, as the ranks of demonstrators swelled, the state police fired on them and killed seven civilians. Whatever the provocation, why were other methods not used to disperse the mob? Why were tear gas and water cannons not used before resorting to firing?

Chhitisinghpora wounds would not heal so soon. The bereaved families, Sikhs of the Valley, the community outside and many Hindus will continue to be haunted by the tragedy. But the Anantnag firing on Muslims tends to somewhat unburden the sense of guilt that they had felt over the killing of Sikhs in the name of their religion. Whatever extra security arrangements may be made for the protection of the Sikh community in the Valley, including supply of arms, they have not become securer after the latest police firing.

The situation may perhaps be retrieved even now if an independent inquiry is held, if possible in association with Amnesty International, into both incidents — Chhitisinghpora and Anantnag — to locate the responsibility. Those held guilty must be punished severely. Even if the government is confident that Chhitisinghpora massacre was committed by the militants, the failure of various agencies to prevent it still needs an inquiry. Moreover, all those who were rightly agitated over the killing of Sikhs should equally strongly condemn the killing of Muslims.

Unless the killing of innocents, irrespective of their religion, and irrespective of who was responsible for it, is universally condemned, the cleavage between communities would widen and one set of killings would be justified by another set of killings; the victims in both cases will be innocent.

Archived from Communalism Combat, April 2000, Year 7  No. 58, Special Report 1 

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Kargil has quite naturally dominated the Indian media’s attention ever since intruders from Pakistan were discovered on its glaciated peaks. Every aspect of the situation has been analysed form every possible angle by experts from every discipline. But I have yet not come across any mention of the impact of the event on the minds of the Muslims in Ladakh, in Kashmir and Jammu, on Buddhist–Muslim relations in Kargil, and Muslim–Hindu relations in the other two regions which have important implications for the future of the state.

While writing in the present context, many experts have re–examined the lessons of earlier experiences of Indo–Pak wars, from diplomatic, strategic and other angles, viz., terms of cease fire agreements, territories gained or lost. But again, no one has made any mention of the relationship between external involvement and the local mood of the people, and the impact of war on them.

The present tilt of international opinion against Pakistan is being variously explained as the achievement of able diplomacy of the BJP government, realisation on the part of America of the threat of Islamic fundamentalism, which has become powerful in Pakistan, or the importance that India has acquired as a market and an investment avenue.

These explanations may be true to some extent. But the fact that is being completely ignored is that international opinion is also influenced by the merit of a case. The package is important but not more than the material it covers. Every nation watches its national interest but that concern must also include its influence and image among the rest of the nations.

That India did not get much international support against Pakistan during the decade–long insurgency in Kashmir was due to the fact that, inter alia, people of the Valley, rightly or wrongly, supported it. Kashmiri youth used to cross the LoC and get arms and training and return as militants for the cause of ‘Azadi’. The ruthless manner in which the insurgency was sought to be suppressed in the initial phase invited universal ondemnation.

In contrast, today it is essentially an operation of the Pakistan army with the support of specially recruited and specially indoctrinated Mujahids in an area where there is no freedom movement. Of course, India’s restraint in dealing with the situation has also paid diplomatic dividends. 

But why did Pakistan change its position as a champion of the rights of Kashmiris to that of an aggressor? The BJP blames the Congress Party for defeating its government, which tempted Pakistan to exploit the consequent political instability in the country. The Congress blames the naivete and gullibility of the Prime Minister who was mesmerised into complacency due to the euphoria created by his bus diplomacy.
More objective experts offer a number of strategic theories for the gamble that Pakistan played in Kargil, viz., it wanted to do a Siachen on India, or to open an alternative route of infiltration to the Kashmir valley.

In short, all debate on Kargil that dominates the national agenda is based on the presumption that the entire conflict between India and Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir is based on the title over real estate. This approach errs in ignoring the fact that Pakistan’s behaviour is influenced by the political mood of the people and that it has political motives also. In other words, it means a ref usal to accept the vital fact thatpeople of the state also matter. 

If the way the situation was developing or drifting within the state in the recent period was watched  carefully, any observer could not have missed the writing on its political wall regarding what has happened in Kargil.
A further confirmation would have been available if turmoil across the LoC, too, had been noticed. For understanding Kargil, an understanding of the wider ethno-cultural milieu of which it is a part is necessary. But that requires much more rigorous homework which is beyond our tribe of Kashmir experts.

Let me recount some of the evidence that gave an indication of the shape of things to come. Pakistan was under a compulsion to convert the Kashmiri movement for Azadi into a Muslim movement for Pakistan.
For, Kashmiri nationalism was a double–edged weapon. India used it against Pakistan from 1947 to 1953 and from 1975 to the mid–eighties. The ideological gap between the Kashmir movement and Pakistan could be a political threat to the latter. Thus Pakistan wriggled out of its commitment to the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, the pioneer of militancy in Kashmir, for Azadi. Pakistan gradually reduced and then withdrew all support to it. Instead, it sponsored pro–Pakistan and Islamic fundamentalist groups of militants. The leadership of its  verground political wing, under the banner of All Parties Hurriyat Conference, too, shifted accordingly.

Meanwhile the J and K chief minister, Farooq Abdullah, shifted his allegiance from the Left–supported United Front to the BJP and issued a certificate of patriotism to the RSS. The effective political choice for the people of Kashmir was thus confined to a pro–RSS face of India and a pro-Pakistan Jamaat–led Hurriyat Conference. But to close their options, Jammu and Ladakh needed to be communalised. Hence the Muslim pockets within them became a target of the militants.

Their task was facilitated by the communal polarisation of Jammu between the National Conference and BJP, and of Ladakh between the former and the Ladakh Buddhist Association. The voting in the parliamentary election of 1998 was a neat reflection of this polarisation. It suited the National Conference rulers if the perennial regional discontent in Jammu and Ladakh was divided along communal lines.
Thus as a reaction to some voices for separate statehood of Jammu and Union Territory status for Ladakh, the National Conference started a campaign for separation of Muslim majority parts from their respective regions. In April 1999, the state government formally proposed re–demarcation of these regions on communal basis, of course for public discussion.

By this time, fresh initiatives came from America–based think tanks for the solution of the Kashmir problem on the basis of traditional official American thinking that the problem must be resolved “accordingly to the wishes of the people, Hindus, Muslims and Buddhists”. This simplistic thinking completely ignores the ethnic identities and their aspirations. 

Reflecting the same thinking, the US–based and influential Kashmir Study Group recommended that “the state be reconstituted through an internationally supervised ascertainment of the wishes of the people on either side of the Line of Control”. This portion be constituted “as a sovereign entity (but without an international personality)”. Two Indian representatives who had participated in the meeting which made
this recommendation later clarified that it meant the reconstituted state should be within Indian sovereignty. But obviously they did not object to reconstitution.

Pakistan came nearer to this position when its foreign minister proposed a district–wise plebiscite to determine the future of the state; thus limiting its claim to, besides the Kashmir Valley, to the Muslim majority districts of Rajouri, Poonch and Doda in Jammu region and the district of Kargil in Ladakh. After extending militant activity to the former area, Kargil appeared to be its natural target. It may merely have been more encouraged by internal developments and external proposals on the subject.

The Pakistan government had not properly taken into account the lack of response of the Muslims of Kargil, the formidable military challenge of the Indian armed forces and hostile international reaction to its action. But India’s decisive victory would depend on how far it can meet the political fall–out of Kargil. Can it help Kargil to feel a secure and proud part of a secular Ladakhi identity, which requires restoration of traditional friendly and cordial relations between Buddhists and Muslims? Can a part of the solidarity and sympathy that the whole nation is expressing for valiant soldiers and their families be extended to the patriotic people of Kargil and about 30,000 homeless, famished refugees?

Again, how would India meet the international pressure, which would turn on it after Kargil crisis is over, to solve the Kashmir problem with some semblance of popular satisfaction? Can India satisfy the urge for identity, democracy and good administration of the people of Kashmir and help them to have friendly relations with peoples of the other two regions of the state?

There are some lessons of Kargil for the nation as a whole, too. While it has generated sentiments of patriotism, sacrifice and fellow feeling, a few reactions exceed legitimate limits of patriotism and, in fact, undermine its moral and psychological basis. The government ban on PTV is, for instance, a reflection on the patriotism of an average citizen which is supposed to be so fragile that it cannot stand a hostile propaganda. If Pakistan can continue its confrontation with India in Kargil, and if India has fought earlier four wars without a ban on the foreign media, why should the present government presume that Indians have become less mature now.

What makes the ban silly is the fact that it is totally unimple-mentable in Kashmir and on the entire Indo–Pak border. Moreover, PTV’s non–news programmes, particularly its plays, are very popular in many parts of India. Why should even the entertainment offered by PTV be banned? Another display of misplaced patriotism is the plea by veteran cricketer Kapil Dev to snap all sports relations with Pakistan. It is true that Indo–Pak matches often arouse jingoist sentiments in both countries and, on this ground, a case could be made to suspend them till tempers cool down. But to argue a sort of sport boycott of Pakistan for its action in Kargil is a case of over–reaction. Does Kapil suspect that every sportsman and sportswoman or sports lover in Pakistan is involved in sponsoring intrusion in Kargil and is an enemy of India? In the past persons belonging to the fields of sports, culture, literature and music have in the worst of times, been messengers of peace and friendship
between the two neighbours. We have to draw a distinction between the people of Pakistan and their rulers. Among the former there has always been an India- friendly constituency which, in our own interest, we
should not let down.

There are some voices demanding of some eminent Muslims that they prove their patriotism, or advocating a ‘final solution’ to the centuries–old aggression upon India from Mohammad Bin Kasim to Mian Nawaz
(Bal Thackerey and the RSS weekly, Panchajanya, respectively. These are too absurd to be discussed; but if such views gather more support, that would pose a greater threat to the existence of a united and civil
India than the military, political, ideological and diplomatic threat ever posed by Pakistan.

Archived from Communalism Combat, July 1999, Year 6  No. 51, Cover Story 1

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