These were not routine disputes. They involved some of the most fundamental questions a constitutional democracy can confront.

• What happens when citizenship is assessed through imperfect documents? How should courts respond to allegations of extra-judicial killings by state agencies?
• Can access to reservation be denied despite an undisputed claim to social disadvantage?
• Does privacy survive within the intimate space of marriage?
• To what extent can environmental violations be regularised after the fact?
• How much power can unelected constitutional authorities exercise over the decisions of elected governments?
• And how far may the State intervene in the administration of minority religious institutions?

The answers offered by the Court reveal an important judicial trend. In several of the year’s most consequential judgments, the Court displayed a marked preference for procedural rigour, institutional finality and administrative deference. Questions of substantive justice frequently became secondary to questions of compliance. Structural inequalities often received less attention than formal legal requirements. Concerns about accountability were sometimes met with faith in existing institutions rather than the creation of stronger oversight mechanisms. In matters involving citizenship, reservation, police violence, environmental governance and constitutional accountability, the Court often chose restraint where intervention was sought and certainty where contextual flexibility was urged.

To be sure, judicial restraint is itself a constitutional value. Courts cannot govern, administer or legislate. Yet constitutional adjudication has always demanded more than technical legal reasoning. It requires courts to recognise the unequal realities within which law operates and to ensure that constitutional guarantees remain meaningful for those who possess the least social, political and economic power. It is against this backdrop that the Supreme Court’s major decisions of 2025 must be understood—not merely as isolated rulings on discrete legal questions, but as judgments that collectively illuminate the Court’s evolving understanding of rights, accountability, state power and constitutional governance.

Reintroducing three years bar practice raises concern on deepening structural inequality in judicial recruitment

In All India Judges Association v. Union of India, the Supreme Court delivered their judgment in May 2025, restoring the requirement of prior legal practice as a condition for appearing in lower judicial service examinations, effectively overturning the position adopted in the Third AIJA judgment (1999), which had removed the practice mandate. The Court justified the move on the ground that newly recruited judicial officers often lack practical courtroom experience and familiarity with litigation processes. Relying on the views of several High Courts and earlier observations in the Second AIJA case, the Court held that three years of practice at the Bar would better equip candidates for the responsibilities of trial court adjudication from the very first day of service.

The judgment also clarified that the three-year practice requirement would be calculated from the date of provisional enrolment, and candidates would need certification from an advocate with at least ten years’ standing or from a presiding officer to verify actual legal practice. The Court viewed practical exposure to litigation, client interaction, drafting, and courtroom procedure as indispensable for improving the quality of the subordinate judiciary. In doing so, it sought to standardise eligibility conditions across States and strengthen institutional competence at the grassroots level of the judicial system.

However, the ruling has attracted significant criticism for creating structural barriers that disproportionately affect first-generation lawyers, economically weaker aspirants, women, and candidates from marginalised communities. On of the criticism is that the requirement risks reinforcing nepotism and inherited privilege within the legal profession, as candidates from established legal families are far more likely to secure stable chamber placements, financial support, and meaningful litigation exposure during the mandatory practice period. By contrast, many young graduates—particularly from Dalit, Adivasi, OBC, minority, and rural backgrounds—often struggle to survive financially in the initial years of litigation practice, which remains deeply informal, underpaid, and dependent on personal networks.

The impact on women candidates may be especially severe. Litigation spaces in many parts of India continue to be male-dominated, insecure, and institutionally exclusionary, with persistent concerns regarding harassment, lack of mentorship, unequal briefing opportunities, and unsafe working conditions. For many women aspirants, direct entry into judicial service after graduation had become a relatively stable and dignified avenue for professional advancement and financial independence. The mandatory practice requirement may now force them into precarious professional environments for several years before they can even compete for judicial posts, potentially discouraging participation and reducing diversity within the judiciary itself.

The judgment fails to justify why exactly three years of practice constitutes the appropriate threshold for judicial competence. The Court did not provide any empirical or institutional basis for fixing this duration, raising concerns of arbitrariness under Article 14. It can be further argued that instead of excluding fresh graduates altogether, the Court could have strengthened judicial academies and post-selection training mechanisms, as earlier recognised in the Third AIJA judgment. Additionally, the possibility of exploitation during the mandatory practice period and the emergence of informal “certificate” systems, where young advocates may become dependent on senior lawyers for proof of practice, thereby creating new forms of gatekeeping within judicial recruitment.

Citizenship by Technicality: When documentary perfection trumped substantive justice

The Supreme Court’s decision in Rofiqul Hoque v. Union of India, also delivered in May last year, reflects a deeply formalistic approach to citizenship adjudication in Assam, one that places overwhelming emphasis on documentary precision while paying insufficient attention to the realities of record-keeping, migration, poverty, and bureaucratic inconsistency. While the Court correctly reiterated the legal principle from Abdul Kuddus that inclusion in the NRC cannot override a prior declaration by a Foreigners Tribunal, the troubling aspect of the judgment lies in its treatment of evidence and its unwillingness to contextualise documentary discrepancies.

The Court accepted the Tribunal’s rejection of the petitioner’s evidence based on variations in age, village names, and familial details appearing across electoral rolls spanning several decades. However, such discrepancies are hardly uncommon in rural India, where voter lists, land records, school certificates and identity documents have historically been riddled with clerical errors, transliteration mistakes, inaccurate age recording, and inconsistent spellings. Previous Supreme Court jurisprudence had generally recognised these realities and assessed citizenship claims by examining the cumulative credibility of the evidence rather than demanding documentary perfection. In Rofiqul Hoque, however, minor inconsistencies were elevated into determinative defects without sufficient consideration of whether they actually undermined the core claim of lineage.

Particularly concerning is the Court’s treatment of the village discrepancy. The judgment faulted the petitioner for not explaining the movement of his family between villages and districts over time. Yet migration within Assam for work, river erosion, floods, displacement, marriage and economic necessity is a common social reality. Expecting individuals to produce documentary proof of every movement made by previous generations places an extraordinarily onerous burden on those already struggling to establish citizenship. The Court’s reasoning effectively transforms the burden under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act into a near-impossible evidentiary standard for many poor and rural residents whose lives were never documented with administrative precision.

The consequences of this approach extend far beyond the individual petitioner. Citizenship proceedings in Assam disproportionately affect economically vulnerable communities, linguistic minorities, Muslims, women, landless labourers and persons with limited access to education and documentation. Women, in particular, often face severe documentation gaps because their identities are frequently recorded through male relatives, marriage results in changes of residence, and formal educational records are absent. By treating documentary inconsistencies as fatal without adequately accounting for these structural realities, the judgment risks reinforcing existing inequalities in citizenship determination.

Equally troubling is the Court’s failure to interrogate the broader reliability of the documentation regime itself. Electoral rolls prepared by the State, school records maintained by public institutions, and official identity documents are all products of government processes. When inconsistencies emerge across these records, the burden is placed entirely upon the individual to explain them, while the systemic deficiencies that produced such discrepancies escape scrutiny. The judgment therefore shifts the consequences of administrative failure onto those whose citizenship is under challenge.

While the Court was legally justified in holding that NRC inclusion cannot nullify a Foreigners Tribunal declaration, the judgment ultimately reflects a narrow and technical conception of citizenship adjudication. In a context where the stakes involve detention, statelessness, family separation and loss of fundamental rights, constitutional courts are expected to adopt a more humane and contextual assessment of evidence. Instead, Rofiqul Hoque signals a move towards documentary rigidity, where minor inconsistencies can outweigh the broader evidentiary picture and where procedural exactitude risks eclipsing substantive justice.

Detailed report may be read here.

Reservation reduced to a technicality

In this judgment, delivered in May, the Supreme Court adopted an extremely formalistic approach to reservation by holding that a candidate belonging to the OBC category could be denied the benefit of reservation solely because he submitted a caste certificate in the format prescribed for Central Government employment rather than the specific format required by the Uttar Pradesh recruitment advertisement. The Court held that compliance with the prescribed format was mandatory and that candidates could not seek relaxation merely because they genuinely belonged to a reserved category.

The ruling prioritises procedural compliance over substantive justice. There was no dispute about the candidate’s social identity, caste status, or eligibility for reservation. The rejection was based entirely on the format of the certificate rather than the authenticity of the claim itself. By treating reservation as a matter of paperwork rather than a constitutional mechanism designed to remedy historical disadvantage, the Court effectively elevated bureaucratic requirements above the objective of ensuring representation for marginalised communities.

The judgment is particularly troubling because it ignores the realities faced by many applicants from socially and educationally disadvantaged backgrounds. Recruitment processes are often complex, highly technical, and difficult to navigate. Minor mistakes in documentation are common, especially among first-generation applicants, rural candidates, and those with limited access to legal or administrative assistance. Instead of requiring authorities to verify an admittedly genuine caste claim, the Court endorsed a rigid approach that permanently excludes candidates on procedural grounds.

The consequences of such reasoning fall disproportionately on members of reserved communities, including OBCs, Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, women from marginalised backgrounds, and economically vulnerable applicants who rely most heavily on affirmative action measures. By reducing access to reservation to strict compliance with technical formats, the judgment risks transforming a constitutional guarantee of substantive equality into a bureaucratic exercise where form prevails over social justice.

Passing the buck on encounter accountability in the Assam fake encounters case

In June, the Supreme Court’s decision in the Assam fake encounter case represents a missed opportunity to enforce meaningful accountability for allegations of extra-judicial killings and police violence. The petition placed before the Court was not based on a handful of isolated incidents but on as many as 171 alleged encounter cases, many of which raised concerns regarding compliance with the safeguards laid down in PUCL v. State of Maharashtra. These guidelines were intended to ensure that every encounter death or serious injury is subjected to independent scrutiny precisely because the police cannot be allowed to investigate themselves in cases involving the possible use of unlawful force.

While the Court acknowledged that allegations of fake encounters, if proven, would amount to grave violations of the right to life under Article 21, it stopped short of exercising its own constitutional authority to secure an independent investigation. Instead, it transferred the matter to the Assam Human Rights Commission for inquiry. This approach is difficult to reconcile with the extraordinary nature of the allegations. The very basis of the petition was the claim that existing institutional mechanisms had failed to adequately investigate encounter cases over several years. Referring the matter back to a state-level body, without constituting an independent judicial commission, Special Investigation Team, or court-monitored inquiry, risks reproducing the same limitations that prompted the litigation in the first place.

The judgment is particularly striking because the Court appeared to undertake a preliminary assessment of the allegations and observed that, barring a few cases, it was difficult to infer widespread non-compliance with the PUCL guidelines. Such observations sit uneasily with the Court’s simultaneous decision to direct a fresh inquiry. If the allegations required independent scrutiny, there was little reason for the Court to make broad prima facie observations appearing to endorse the State’s version of events. Conversely, if the material was insufficient to warrant further intervention, the matter could have been dismissed. The judgment attempts to occupy both positions simultaneously, thereby diluting the force of its own concerns.

More fundamentally, the Court declined to confront the structural reality of encounter policing. Allegations of extra-judicial killings involve the most serious exercise of state power—the taking of life without judicial process. In such circumstances, constitutional courts have historically acted as guardians of civil liberties, particularly where victims or their families may be unable to challenge state narratives. The Court recognised that fear, intimidation and power imbalances often prevent victims from coming forward. Yet having acknowledged these realities, it refrained from creating a robust mechanism capable of overcoming them.

The consequences of this restraint are particularly significant for marginalised communities. Encounter killings and custodial violence disproportionately affect poor persons, religious minorities, Adivasis, Dalits, migrant workers and those accused of crimes who lack social or political power. These are precisely the groups least capable of securing independent investigations against the police. By declining to establish a stronger accountability framework despite the unprecedented scale of allegations before it, the Court left unresolved the central question raised by the petition: whether constitutional guarantees against arbitrary deprivation of life can be meaningfully enforced when the alleged violator is the State itself.

In the end, the judgment acknowledges the seriousness of the allegations but avoids the constitutional consequences that such seriousness demands. Faced with claims involving 171 alleged encounter cases, the Supreme Court chose institutional deference over judicial intervention. For a case that raised profound concerns about the rule of law, the decision ultimately places responsibility elsewhere rather than exercising the Court’s own extraordinary powers to uncover the truth.

Privacy sacrificed at the altar of matrimonial litigation

In a judgment with far-reaching implications for privacy within intimate relationships, the Supreme Court in July held that secretly recorded conversations between spouses are admissible in matrimonial proceedings. While the Court framed the issue as one of balancing privacy against the right to a fair trial, the decision arguably weakens one of the most significant constitutional developments of recent decades—the recognition of privacy as an intrinsic part of dignity, autonomy and personal liberty under Article 21.

The Court’s reasoning proceeds on the assumption that once a marriage has deteriorated to the point where one spouse is secretly recording the other, the relationship has already broken down and concerns regarding privacy lose much of their force. This logic is troubling. Constitutional rights do not disappear because a relationship is strained. If anything, privacy protections become more important in situations of conflict, where surveillance, coercion and monitoring are most likely to occur. The judgment appears to reduce privacy to a matter of marital harmony rather than treating it as an independent constitutional value that survives even within family relationships.

Equally concerning is the Court’s reliance on Section 122 of the Evidence Act. The provision was intended to create limited exceptions to spousal privilege in litigation between spouses. It was not designed as a broad endorsement of covert surveillance or secret recording within marriage. By treating admissibility as a natural extension of the statutory exception, the judgment blurs the distinction between permitting evidence in court and legitimising the way that evidence is obtained. The result is that evidence procured through intrusion into private conversations may now be rewarded with evidentiary value, potentially incentivising greater monitoring between spouses.

The practical consequences of the ruling are likely to be felt unevenly. Women, who continue to face disproportionate levels of surveillance and control within domestic relationships, may be particularly vulnerable. In abusive or coercive marriages, phones, messages, and conversations are often monitored as tools of domination. By validating secretly recorded conversations as admissible evidence, the judgment risks normalising forms of conduct that are frequently associated with domestic control rather than legitimate evidence-gathering. The Court does not meaningfully engage with these realities or with the gendered dimensions of privacy violations within the home.

The implications extend beyond women. LGBTQ+ persons, individuals in interfaith marriages, and members of socially marginalised communities often rely upon privacy as a shield against social stigma, family interference, and discrimination. The judgment’s expansive acceptance of covert recordings may create anxieties about whether intimate conversations, personal disclosures, or private vulnerabilities could later be weaponised in litigation. In privileging evidentiary utility over informational privacy, the Court offers little guidance on where constitutional limits to such surveillance should lie.

At a broader level, the judgment sits uneasily with the privacy jurisprudence developed after the Supreme Court’s recognition of privacy as a fundamental right. Rather than asking whether secret recordings constitute a disproportionate intrusion into personal autonomy, the Court approached the issue primarily through the lens of evidentiary necessity and fair trial rights. The result is a decision that substantially expands the admissibility of privately obtained evidence while offering only limited protection against the growing possibility of surveillance within the most intimate sphere of human life—the family itself.

Stray dog verdict undermines animal welfare protections and established legal frameworks

In August, In Re: Menace of Dog Bites and Rabies (2025), the Supreme Court adopted an unprecedented approach to stray dog management by directing authorities in Delhi, Noida, Gurugram and Ghaziabad to immediately pick up stray dogs from public spaces and detain them in shelters without releasing them back into their original locations. The Court further warned that individuals or organisations obstructing the exercise could face legal consequences and contempt proceedings. Emphasising the need to protect children from dog attacks and rabies, the Court declared that “no sentiments should be involved” in addressing the issue.

The judgment marks a significant departure from India’s existing animal welfare framework. The Animal Birth Control Rules, framed under the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, are based on the principle of capture, sterilisation, vaccination and release of dogs back into the same locality. This framework was developed after years of scientific and policy deliberation and has consistently been recognised as the governing legal regime for stray dog management. By directing that no captured dog should be released under any circumstances, the Court effectively displaced the statutory scheme without engaging with the rationale underlying it. In doing so, the judgment elevates a judicially crafted solution over a legislatively enacted framework designed to balance public health concerns with animal welfare obligations.

The ruling is also troubling for its treatment of animal welfare voices and participatory decision-making. The Court refused to entertain intervention applications from animal welfare stakeholders and expressly stated that no sentiments should be involved in the matter. However, questions concerning stray animal management have long involved competing interests, including public safety, animal welfare, municipal governance and scientific expertise. By excluding welfare organisations and discouraging contrary perspectives, the judgment narrows the scope for informed and evidence-based policymaking. The result is a highly securitised approach that treats stray animals primarily as a threat rather than as living beings protected under existing legal frameworks.

The consequences of the judgment are likely to fall disproportionately on both animals and vulnerable communities. The Court’s directions require the creation of large-scale shelter infrastructure capable of housing thousands of dogs indefinitely. Yet many municipal bodies already struggle to implement existing sterilisation and vaccination programmes due to resource constraints. The absence of a clear roadmap regarding shelter capacity, funding, veterinary care and long-term maintenance raises serious concerns about overcrowding, neglect and institutionalised confinement of animals. At the same time, poorer localities—which often face the greatest deficits in public health and municipal services—may bear the burden of implementing an expensive and administratively demanding model that lacks demonstrated feasibility.

Viewed more broadly, the judgment represents a retreat from the rights-based and welfare-oriented jurisprudence that has characterised much of India’s animal protection law over the past two decades. Rather than strengthening implementation of existing legal mechanisms, the Court opted for a sweeping solution that effectively side-lines statutory protections in favour of indefinite detention. In a year that witnessed several progressive rulings expanding constitutional protections for vulnerable groups, this judgment stands out as a notable exception—one that prioritised immediate executive action over legal consistency, scientific evidence and established principles of animal welfare.

Sealed Covers, Finality and the Silencing of Scrutiny: The Vantara judgment

The Supreme Court’s decision accepting the SIT’s clean chit to Vantara raises serious concerns about transparency, accountability and the future of public interest litigation involving powerful private actors. While there is nothing inherently objectionable about the Court relying on an independent investigation, the troubling aspect of the judgment lies in the extraordinary degree of finality it accords to a process that remains largely shielded from public scrutiny. In September, the Court accepted the SIT’s conclusions, directed that the detailed report remain confidential, and simultaneously declared that no further complaints or proceedings based on the same allegations would be entertained before judicial, statutory or administrative forums. In effect, a matter involving wildlife conservation, animal welfare, imports of endangered species and alleged regulatory violations was brought to a conclusive end without the public ever gaining access to the material on which that conclusion was reached.

The judgment reflects an uncomfortable reliance on the sealed-cover method, a practice that has repeatedly attracted criticism in recent years. Although the Court made the summary public, the substantive report, annexures and supporting material remain inaccessible. This makes meaningful public evaluation of the findings impossible. Wildlife regulation, environmental governance and animal welfare are matters of significant public concern. When allegations are dismissed on the basis of evidence that remains hidden from public view, confidence in the process inevitably suffers. The issue is not whether Vantara is ultimately innocent or guilty of the allegations; rather, it is whether the adjudicatory process itself remains transparent enough to inspire trust.

Equally concerning is the Court’s decision to effectively foreclose future proceedings based on the same allegations. Such a direction goes beyond merely accepting the findings of an investigation. It creates a near-impenetrable shield against further scrutiny, even though new evidence may emerge in the future or different complainants may possess material that was not previously examined. Public interest litigation has historically played a crucial role in uncovering environmental harms, wildlife trafficking networks and regulatory failures. By declaring that no further complaints based on the same allegations should be entertained before any judicial, statutory or administrative forum, the Court risks chilling future whistleblowing and discouraging legitimate public oversight.

The judgment also adopts a notably deferential approach towards regulatory authorities. One of the central allegations raised by the petitioners was not merely that violations occurred, but that multiple regulatory bodies had failed to adequately discharge their responsibilities. Yet the Court’s reasoning appears to treat the existence of permits, approvals and official clearances as sufficient answers to many of the concerns raised. Environmental and wildlife jurisprudence in India has historically recognised that formal compliance does not always guarantee substantive compliance. Regulatory approvals themselves may warrant scrutiny, particularly in matters involving endangered species, conservation and large-scale wildlife transfers. The judgment leaves little room for such questioning.

Perhaps most strikingly, the Court not only dismissed the allegations but expressly left open the possibility of defamation actions and criminal proceedings against those responsible for what it termed misinformation. While litigants who make knowingly false allegations should not be immune from consequences, such observations in a public interest matter risk creating a chilling effect on activists, researchers, journalists and conservation groups seeking to raise concerns about powerful institutions. Public interest litigation often operates in spaces where complete information is unavailable to outsiders. If unsuccessful challenges are followed by the threat of defamation or criminal proceedings, legitimate watchdog activity may be deterred.

Ultimately, the judgment signals a shift away from the openness and continuing oversight that have traditionally characterised environmental and wildlife litigation. The Court may well have been satisfied that Vantara committed no legal violations. However, by relying on confidential findings, granting sweeping finality to the investigation, and discouraging future scrutiny, the decision raises larger concerns about transparency and public accountability. In a sector where independent oversight is often the only mechanism through which concerns reach the public domain, the judgment appears to prioritise closure over continued scrutiny.

A deferential approach to the Waqf amendments raises concerns for minority rights

The Supreme Court’s interim judgment on the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025, delivered in September, represents one of the most consequential judicial responses to a religious freedom challenge in recent years. While the Court stayed certain provisions relating to executive determination of property disputes, it declined to suspend most of the legislation, effectively allowing a far-reaching restructuring of waqf governance to operate pending final adjudication. In doing so, the Court adopted an approach marked by substantial deference to legislative policy, even where the amendments alter long-settled understandings of waqf administration and management.

Perhaps the most contentious aspect of the judgment concerns the Court’s treatment of waqf by user. For centuries, numerous mosques, dargahs, graveyards and charitable institutions acquired recognition not through formal deeds but through uninterrupted public use and community acceptance. The doctrine evolved precisely because many religious endowments predated modern systems of land registration and documentary record-keeping. By accepting the legislative decision to effectively eliminate this category and by placing considerable emphasis on the failure of mutawallis to register properties despite statutory opportunities, the Court privileges formal documentation over historical reality. Such an approach risks exposing a significant number of longstanding religious properties to future disputes, particularly where documentary evidence has been lost, destroyed, or never existed in the first place. The judgment appears to assume that the absence of registration necessarily reflects neglect or misuse, rather than recognising the complex historical circumstances under which many waqf properties evolved.

The Court’s endorsement of the requirement that a person must have practised Islam for five years before creating a waqf also raises difficult constitutional questions. While the Court accepted the State’s concern regarding potential misuse of waqf protections, it did not sufficiently grapple with the implications of empowering the State to scrutinise the sincerity, continuity, or duration of an individual’s religious practice. Questions regarding who determines religious observance, what evidence would be considered sufficient, and whether such inquiries are compatible with constitutional protections of religious freedom remain largely unanswered. The temporary stay granted by the Court is procedural rather than substantive; the constitutional concerns underlying the provision remain unresolved.

Equally significant is the Court’s acceptance of provisions that narrow who may create waqfs and the circumstances under which waqf claims may be asserted. Historically, waqf law in India developed through a combination of religious principles, community practices and statutory regulation. The amendments shift this balance decisively toward bureaucratic control and formal compliance. By treating these changes primarily as matters of legislative policy, the judgment pays relatively little attention to the broader question of whether the cumulative effect of these provisions alters the essential character of waqf as a community-based religious institution.

The Court’s approach to the inclusion of non-Muslim members in Waqf Boards similarly reflects caution rather than rigorous constitutional scrutiny. While numerical limits were imposed through interim directions, the larger question—whether bodies entrusted with administering specifically Islamic religious endowments can be substantially reconstituted through state intervention—was effectively deferred. This issue strikes at the heart of debates concerning religious autonomy under Articles 25 and 26. Yet the judgment stops short of engaging with these concerns in any meaningful manner.

To its credit, the Court intervened where executive power threatened to displace adjudicatory functions. The stay on provisions permitting revenue officers to determine whether disputed properties constituted government land recognises that questions of title cannot simply be resolved through administrative fiat. However, this intervention also highlights a broader inconsistency within the judgment. While the Court was willing to act decisively when executive encroachment upon judicial functions became apparent, it displayed considerably greater restraint when confronted with concerns regarding religious autonomy, community rights, and the historical protection of waqf properties.

The larger concern arising from the judgment is not merely the fate of individual provisions but the constitutional vision it appears to endorse. The amendments collectively move waqf governance away from historical usage, community recognition and institutional autonomy, towards a framework centred on registration, documentation, state oversight and administrative control. The Court’s refusal to substantially intervene at the interim stage allows this transformation to proceed even before the constitutional validity of the amendments has been conclusively determined.

The significance of the judgment lies not only in what it stayed, but in what it permitted. By largely accepting Parliament’s framing of waqf reform as an exercise in transparency and accountability, the Court afforded limited weight to concerns that the amendments fundamentally alter the legal and institutional foundations upon which waqf administration has historically rested. The result is a judgment that, while cautious in form, may have profound consequences for the future of religious endowments, minority institutional autonomy, and the constitutional relationship between the State and religious communities.

Environmental Compliance Diluted: Supreme Court revives post-facto environmental clearances

In Review in Vanashakti v. Union of India (2025), a 2:1 majority of the Supreme Court recalled the landmark Vanashakti judgment delivered only months earlier, which had prohibited the Union Government from granting post-facto environmental clearances (ECs) to projects that commenced operations without obtaining prior environmental approval. Through the judgment delivered in November, the majority, led by Chief Justice B.R. Gavai and Justice K. Vinod Chandran, held that the earlier judgment had failed to consider certain coordinate bench decisions permitting post-facto clearances in exceptional circumstances. As a result, the Court reopened the question and restored the possibility of regularising projects that began operations in violation of environmental law.

The judgment represents a significant setback for environmental governance in India. The principle of prior environmental clearance lies at the heart of the country’s environmental regulatory framework. Environmental impact assessments are intended to evaluate risks before a project begins, not after ecological damage has already occurred. By permitting the continued use of post-facto clearances, the Court weakens the deterrent effect of environmental law and effectively rewards non-compliance. Instead of treating prior clearance as a mandatory legal safeguard, the judgment risks reducing it to a procedural hurdle that can be cured retrospectively once investments have already been made.

The majority’s reasoning placed considerable emphasis on economic costs, infrastructure investments and the practical difficulties associated with halting or dismantling projects. However, this approach shifts the consequences of illegal environmental conduct away from project proponents and onto affected communities and ecosystems. Once a project is operational, authorities and courts are often reluctant to order closure due to sunk costs and employment concerns. This creates a powerful incentive for developers to proceed without clearances and seek regularisation later. As Justice Ujjal Bhuyan observed in his dissent, it cannot be left to violators to invoke the consequences of their own unlawful conduct as a reason for avoiding legal accountability.

The impact of such a dilution is felt most acutely by marginalised communities. Large infrastructure, mining and industrial projects disproportionately affect Adivasi populations, forest-dwelling communities, fishing communities, small farmers and rural residents whose livelihoods depend on land, forests and water resources. Environmental impact assessments and clearance processes are often the only institutional mechanisms through which these communities can raise objections and participate in decision-making. Permitting post-facto clearances weakens these protections by allowing projects to become fait accompli before meaningful consultation can occur. Women within these communities frequently bear the heaviest burden, as environmental degradation directly affects access to water, fuel, food security and household livelihoods.

The judgment also signals a broader judicial shift from precautionary environmental protection towards regulatory flexibility and economic pragmatism. The original Vanashakti ruling reaffirmed a long-standing environmental principle: that development must comply with environmental safeguards before, not after, ecological harm is caused. By recalling that decision, the Court has created uncertainty regarding the enforceability of environmental law and weakened one of the most important checks on unlawful development. In a year marked by several constitutional decisions expanding rights and accountability, this judgment stands out as a significant retreat from the principles of environmental justice, precaution and sustainable development that have historically guided Indian environmental jurisprudence.

Detailed report may be read here.

Presidential reference dilutes judicial checks on governor and presidential delays

In November, in the Presidential Reference concerning Articles 200 and 201 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court substantially altered the position it had adopted earlier in the Tamil Nadu Governor case. The Constitution Bench held that Governors enjoy discretion while acting on Bills under Article 200 and are not bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers when choosing whether to assent, withhold assent and return a Bill, or reserve it for the President’s consideration. The Court further held that neither the Governor’s decision under Article 200 nor the President’s decision under Article 201 is ordinarily justiciable. While courts may issue a limited mandamus in cases of prolonged and unexplained inaction, they cannot examine the merits of the constitutional functionaries’ decisions.

The Court also rejected the idea of judicially prescribed timelines for Governors and Presidents to act on Bills. Overruling key aspects of its earlier Tamil Nadu judgment, it held that the Constitution deliberately preserves flexibility in the legislative process and that courts cannot impose rigid deadlines where the Constitution itself is silent. The Court further clarified that the concept of “deemed assent” has no constitutional basis and that neither Article 142 nor any other constitutional provision permits courts to substitute the constitutional role assigned to the Governor or President in the legislative process.

The ruling significantly weakened democratic accountability and judicial oversight over constitutional authorities. By recognising broad governor discretion and removing enforceable timelines, the judgment arguably creates space for Governors to indefinitely delay legislation passed by elected State legislatures. This effectively revives the possibility of a “pocket veto” in practice, even if not in name. Given the increasing frequency of political confrontations between opposition-ruled States and Governors appointed by the Union Government, the judgment is seen as tilting the constitutional balance away from representative institutions and towards unelected constitutional offices.

The decision will have critical implications for Indian federalism. Earlier judicial interventions had sought to prevent Governors from obstructing legislative agendas endorsed by democratically elected governments. By treating governor’s discretion as largely insulated from judicial review and rejecting timelines altogether, the Court has weakened one of the few constitutional safeguards available to States against executive delay. It can be contended that the judgment places excessive faith in constitutional morality and convention despite repeated instances where constitutional offices have become sites of political contestation. In doing so, it may leave State legislatures with limited remedies when legislation concerning welfare, education, social justice, reservations, or other state policies remains stalled for prolonged periods without any meaningful constitutional accountability.

Detailed report may be read here.

Conclusion

Viewed together, the Supreme Court’s most consequential judgments of 2025 reveal a Court increasingly inclined towards institutional deference, procedural discipline and constitutional restraint. Again and again, the Court was confronted with opportunities to expand accountability, deepen rights protections or scrutinise the exercise of public power. Just as often, it chose a more cautious path.

In citizenship adjudication, documentary inconsistencies were allowed to outweigh the realities of poverty, migration and flawed record-keeping. In reservation jurisprudence, bureaucratic form triumphed over undisputed social identity. In the Assam encounter litigation, allegations involving the possible unlawful deprivation of life were acknowledged as grave, yet responsibility for investigation was ultimately shifted elsewhere. In the privacy judgment, constitutional concerns about surveillance within intimate relationships gave way to evidentiary considerations. In environmental law, the deterrent value of prior clearance requirements was diluted in favour of practical accommodation. In matters concerning waqf governance and gubernatorial powers, the Court displayed significant deference to legislative and constitutional authorities even where concerns regarding minority rights and democratic accountability were directly implicated. And in the Vantara litigation, finality and closure were prioritised over transparency and continuing public scrutiny.

What emerges is not a Court abandoning rights altogether, but one increasingly reluctant to place itself in direct confrontation with institutions of power. The recurring judicial instinct was not to aggressively police the boundaries of executive authority, administrative action or legislative policy, but to trust existing structures to function within constitutional limits. Whether in relation to the State, regulatory authorities, constitutional officeholders or investigative processes, the Court frequently preferred supervision at a distance over intervention at close quarters.

The difficulty with such an approach is that constitutional rights are rarely tested when institutions function perfectly. They matter most when institutions fail, when power is exercised disproportionately, when vulnerable communities cannot protect themselves, and when procedural neutrality masks deeper inequalities. It is in these moments that constitutional courts have historically played their most important role—not merely as interpreters of law, but as guardians against arbitrariness and as protectors of those who stand furthest from centres of power.

The lasting significance of these judgments therefore lies beyond their immediate facts. Collectively, they raise a larger question about the direction of constitutional adjudication in India. Is the Court entering an era defined primarily by restraint, deference and institutional trust? Or can constitutionalism continue to demand a more searching engagement with questions of inequality, accountability and rights protection? The answer will shape not only future jurisprudence but also the lived experience of citizenship, liberty, equality and democracy itself.

For that reason, the major judgments of 2025 should not be read merely as legal outcomes. They should be understood as constitutional signals—revealing how the Supreme Court increasingly sees its role in relation to power, governance and the protection of rights. Whether that vision ultimately strengthens or weakens constitutional democracy remains one of the most important questions these decisions leave behind.

Related:

Cracks in Environmental Jurisprudence: A study of central India’s High Courts

Guarding Liberty, Marking Limits: The Supreme Court’s defining judgments of 2025

The judiciary’s commitment to protecting rights: notable Supreme Court judgments of 2024

Ramifications of SC judgment on CCTVs in Police Stations

One step forward, two steps back: SC on Abortion rights

Mapping Gender-Based Violence in India: Trends, determinants, and institutional frameworks

Broadcasting Bias: CJP’s fight against hatred in Indian news

2023: India’s Bad Laws, what a weaponised state means for individual freedoms and indigenous rights

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More than two months have passed since the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Amendment Act, 2026 came into force. The Bill was tabled in the Lok Sabha on March 13, passed on March 24, affirmed by the Rajya Sabha the following day, and received the President’s assent on March 30. Among its many far-reaching consequences and years of un-doing of a movement, the amendment left unresolved the question of what would happen to transgender persons already midway through hormone replacement therapy when the law came into force. Since then, petitions challenging the constitutional validity of the law have been filed in the High Courts of Rajasthan, Kerala, Karnataka, Delhi and now the Supreme Court itself. Trans persons and their allies are fighting back.

On May 4, a bench comprising Chief Justice Surya Kant and Justice Joymalya Bagchi issued notice on a batch of petitions challenging the constitutional validity of the Act, directing that the matter be placed before a three-judge bench to be constituted by the Chief Justice. Notice was made returnable in six weeks to the Union government, all states, and Union Territories through their Advocate Generals and Standing Counsels.

A report in the New Indian Express stated that on May 27, Solicitor General Tushar Mehta urged the Supreme Court to consolidate and transfer all pending challenges from the various High Courts to the apex court. The Chief Justice, however, appeared reluctant.

“Sometimes we can have the advantage of a high court view as well,” the CJI remarked. When the law officer pressed the point, the CJI said he “will see.”

What the 2026 Amendment Changes and Why It Is Contested

The Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019 was Parliament’s legislative response to the Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India (2014) in which the Court explicitly rejected the biological test (the principle that chromosomes or genitalia should determine legal sex) in favour of a psychological test. The Court ruled:

“Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution states that all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression, which includes one’s right to expression of his self-identified gender.”

“Article 21, as already indicated, protects one’s right of self- determination of the gender to which a person belongs. Determination of gender to which a person belongs is to be decided by the person concerned. In other words, gender identity is integral to the dignity of an individual and is at the core of “personal autonomy” and “self-determination””

In its operative directions, the Court declared that “any insistence for SRS for declaring one’s gender is immoral and illegal.”

The 2019 Act, with its own imperfections, encoded foundational principles that gender identity is self-perceived and that Trans persons have an enforceable right to a certificate of identity based on self-declaration alone.

The 2026 amendment retreats from each of these principles.

The amendment deletes Section 4 (2) of the 2019 Act, which stated that a person recognised as transgender under sub-section (1) shall have a right to self-perceived gender identity. The Statement of Objects and Reasons justifies this deletion by claiming the Act was never intended to protect persons with various gender identities, self-perceived sex/gender identities or gender fluidities, and that legislative policy was always aimed only at those facing exclusion due to biological reasons.

Under the 2019 Act, Trans persons could also apply directly to the District Magistrate for a certificate of identity and medical evaluation was not a prerequisite. The 2026 amendment replaces this with a mandatory two-stage medical filter. First, the applicant must obtain a positive recommendation from a state-appointed medical board, headed by a Chief Medical Officer or Deputy Chief Medical Officer. Then, the DM may seek further evaluation from ‘other medical experts’ at their discretion. Neither stage specifies what criteria the board is assessing, and no appellate mechanism is prescribed. Since the certificate is the gateway to welfare schemes, healthcare, insurance, educational and employment reservations, and government-funded gender-affirming surgeries, those without it are excluded from all these entitlements.

The new Section 7 (1A) also requires every medical institution where gender-affirming surgery is performed to furnish details of that patient to the concerned District Magistrate and the medical board. However, in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017), the Supreme Court had held that any intrusion into informational privacy must be sanctioned by law, pursue a legitimate state aim, and satisfy proportionality. The burden of demonstrating all three rests on the State.

A few of the key changes have been summarised in the table below for the ease of comparison:

The 2026 amendment also adds four new offences. Abducting and causing grievous hurt to force someone into a trans identity carries ten years to life imprisonment for adults, and life imprisonment where the victim is a child; compelling someone to present as Trans and subjecting them to begging or servitude carries five to ten years for adults and ten to fourteen years where the victim is a child. By contrast, sexual abuse, physical violence, and economic exploitation committed against trans persons remain punishable by a maximum of six months to two years.

In March this year, SabrangIndia had reported that:

“…the language of these provisions is vague and potentially overbroad, as such clauses may inadvertently criminalise support systems that have historically sustained transgender communities, including families, chosen kinship networks, and civil society organisations. There is concern that by framing transgender identity in the context of inducement or coercion, the law risks reinforcing the idea that such identities are not self-originating but externally imposed.”

The full report can be accessed here.

Petitions Filed in High Courts

Kerala High Court

On April 7, Advocate Padma Lakshmy filed two petitions in the Kerala High Court on behalf of Akhil K. Thampi (34) and Neethu (38), plausibly the first petitions challenging the constitutional validity of the Act. Senior Counsel Arundhati Katju, appearing for the petitioners, submitted that both were receiving hormone therapy, which the hospital had discontinued following the amendment act.

“Because the definition excludes me from the definition of transgender persons. There are people who are getting medical attention. But because of the change in the definition of transgender, the institutions which were earlier providing me medical treatment by way of hormonal therapy…Now the private medical institution is declining to provide it to him. It is like a sudden shock to the system.” counsel submitted.

The petitioners had sought a declaration that Section 2 (k) and related provisions are unconstitutional as violative of Articles 13(2), 14, 15, 19, and 21, and that the right to self-identification of gender is a fundamental right under Articles 14, 19, and 21.

Justice Bechu asked the Additional Solicitor General whether a person already undergoing hormone replacement therapy could be affected by the change in definition, and suggested that rather than staying the provision, the Court could grant relief individually to the petitioners.

“There cannot be a stay of statute. There is a presumption of constitutionality of a statute,” he observed orally.

On April 10, the Court permitted the two petitioners to continue hormone replacement therapy, subject to the condition that they had already commenced treatment.

“Having regard to the entirety of the circumstances, this Court is of the view that an abrupt stoppage of the hormone replacement therapy already started by the petitioner, would lead to adverse and absurd results. Such an object cannot prima facie be deciphered from the statutory provisions, as amended,” the order read.

The orders passed by the Kerala High Court may be read here:

Delhi High Court

On April 8, a Division Bench comprising Chief Justice Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya and Justice Tejas Karia issued notice to the Central Government on a PIL filed by Advocate Dr. Chandresh Jain (W.P. (C) 4587/2026). The petition contended that the amendment undermines fundamental rights and dilutes the legal recognition of gender identity as a matter of personal autonomy, and challenged the State-controlled verification and certification mechanisms introduced by the amendment.

The matter has been listed for further hearing on July 22.

Rajasthan High Court

On April 21, a Division Bench comprising Acting Chief Justice Sanjeev Prakash Sharma and Justice Shubha Mehta issued notice in a PIL filed by the non-profit organisation Nai Bhor Sanstha, which claims to be Rajasthan’s first LGBTQ community-based organisation, working on trans and LGBTQ rights for over two decades.

The matter was listed after four weeks; court records however do not appear to reflect subsequent hearings.

Karnataka High Court

On May 7, Justice Sachin Shankar Magadum of the Karnataka High Court passed an interim order in two separate writ petitions (WP 11652/2026 and WP 11655/2026) filed by two trans persons, one undergoing hormone replacement therapy for several years, another also in the process of changing her name and gender in official documents.

The Court found that the medical records produced prima facie indicated both petitioners had been undergoing hormone replacement therapy since November 11, 2023, and that abrupt discontinuation could have adverse and detrimental consequences on their physical and mental well-being.

It directed that the petitioners be permitted to continue hormone replacement therapy as per the existing medical protocol and that concerned doctors and medical authorities facilitate continuation of such treatment without interruption. It also said that the continuation of treatment be subject to the outcome of the writ petitions and any orders passed by the Supreme Court, including in any transfer proceedings.

The matter was listed for further consideration after the summer vacation which were to take place from Monday, May 4, 2026, to Saturday, May 30, 2026.

The Central Question

At its core, the controversy over the 2026 amendment is a question about the relationship between the individual and the State: can identity be subjected to verification, or must it be recognised as an inherent aspect of personhood?

In NALSA, the Supreme Court placed identity firmly within the domain of personal autonomy. The 2026 amendment moves in the direction toward verification, classification, and administrative control. How the Courts ultimately resolve that tension will determine not only the fate of this legislation, but the constitutional foundations on which the rights of trans persons in India rest. 

Update: HC Proceedings Stayed

On June 15, a bench comprising of CJI Surya Kant and Justice V Mohana stayed proceedings before the four high courts and issued notice on the Union government’s plea seeking transfer of all such cases to the apex court to avoid conflicting rulings on the legislation.

Dr. Chandresh Jain, petitioner in the Delhi High Court, opposed the transfer request and informed the court that as a qualified doctor, his challenge was among the most comprehensive and involved substantial medical and scientific issues. He suggested that if consolidation was required, the matters could be heard together by a High Court, so that the Apex Court would have the benefit of a considered judgment before examining the issues- invoking, in effect, the Court’s own wisdom that High Court rulings often enrich constitutional adjudication at the apex level before it is finally undertaken.

Meanwhile, Solicitor General Tushar Mehta also requested that the matter be placed before a three-judge bench. Is this a step toward hoping that NALSA is overruled altogether? The concern is not without basis as Mehta himself appeared to acknowledge the structural problem when he pointed out that High Courts may find it difficult to take a view contrary to the precedent set in NALSA.

Opposing the submission, Dr. Jain contended that his challenge was not founded on NALSA at all, and in fact questioned provisions introduced through the amendment itself. He argued that the new law was not only unconstitutional but also lacked any credible medical basis.

The High Courts were doing their part by issuing interim protections and beginning to develop a record. With those proceedings now stayed, that work is suspended. The centre of gravity has shifted back to the Supreme Court, and with it, the anxiety about what the apex court will do with a precedent the government appears uncomfortable leaving undisturbed.

It is difficult not to feel that the clock has, in some measure, been turned back. The institutional uncertainty and the dependence of an entire community on the disposition of a single court bears an uncomfortable resemblance to the period before 2014.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Tanishka Shah)

Related Articles:

A Law of Identity, Passed Without Listening: Inside the Transgender Amendment Bill, 2026 and the crisis it has triggered | SabrangIndia

Withdraw the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Amendment Bill, 2026 NOW! | SabrangIndia

9 years since the passing of the NALSA judgment, has the cycle of discrimination and ostracism finally been broken for the transgender community? | SabrangIndia

The post A regressive 2026 amendment to rights of Trans persons is under legal challenge even as pride month is celebrated appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The judgment, delivered on June 12, 2026 by First Additional Sessions Judge Tabassum Khan, found Deepak alias Baba Kevat, Ajay alias Ajju Rathore, Prakash Kaushal, Pawan Batham, Amar alias Bhola Batham, Kanhaiya Batham and Ballu alias Anuj Raghuvanshi guilty of offences under Sections 148 (rioting armed with deadly weapons), 307 read with 149 (attempt to murder with common object) and 302 read with 149 (murder with common object) of the Indian Penal Code.

At the sentencing stage, the Court made a particularly noteworthy observation, recording that the prosecution had successfully established that the accused had committed mob lynching. The Court identified several aggravating circumstances, including the formation of an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons, the extreme brutality inflicted upon the victims, the fatal injuries suffered by Najir Ahmed, and the injuries caused to the surviving victims.

Background: Attack on cattle transporters

According to the prosecution case, on the intervening night of August 2 and 3, 2022, truck driver Sheikh Lala was transporting cattle along with Najir Ahmed and Sheikh Mustaq from Nandarwada towards Maharashtra. Around 12:30 a.m., when their vehicle reached near Barakhad village in Seoni Malwa, a group of villagers intercepted the truck.

The occupants were allegedly dragged out and assaulted with lathis and wooden sticks. All three men sustained injuries. Najir Ahmed suffered severe head and bodily injuries and later died during treatment. Sheikh Lala and Sheikh Mustaq survived but sustained serious injuries.

Following the incident, police registered an FIR initially against unknown persons under provisions relating to rioting, wrongful restraint, attempt to murder and murder. During the investigation, officers collected physical evidence from the scene, including bloodstained soil and weapons, recorded witness statements, secured medical records, and obtained the dying declarations of the injured survivors.

Evidence relied upon by the court

The Court’s findings rested upon a combination of eyewitness testimony, medical evidence, forensic examination and recoveries made during the investigation.

The two surviving victims, Sheikh Lala and Sheikh Mustaq, consistently stated that a crowd had stopped their vehicle and assaulted them. Their accounts were corroborated by medical evidence documenting multiple injuries sustained during the attack.

Medical records showed that Najir Ahmed was brought to hospital in a critical and unconscious condition. Doctors noted extensive injuries, including swelling on the face and head, lacerated wounds, contusions and severe trauma. The post-mortem examination revealed multiple external and internal injuries, including skull fractures and significant head trauma.

“Arguments have been presented by the learned counsel for the accused persons that in the P.M. report (Ex. P–68–C) of the deceased Nazir, the cause of death is recorded as asphyxiation due to vomit blocking the throat, which makes it clear that the death of the deceased Nazir did not occur due to the injuries sustained by him. In this context, it is observable that although Dr. Shekhar Raghuvanshi (PW–22) admitted in paragraph 14 of his cross-examination that his opinion was given to the effect that his death occurred due to asphyxiation caused by vomit blocking the throat of deceased Nazir Ahmed, he made no statement to the effect that the injuries sustained by the deceased were insufficient to cause death, nor was any such suggestion given to the said doctor by the defense. From the aforementioned P.M. report (Ex. P–68–C), it is proved that the deceased sustained external and internal injuries, and it is also clear from the evidence of Dr. Shekhar Raghuvanshi (PW–22) that the deceased was brought in an unconscious state, his condition was highly critical, and his oxygen level as well as B.P. were unrecordable; thus, this argument of the defense is not acceptable that the death of the deceased did not occur due to the injuries sustained by him.” (Para 22) (Paragraph translated from Hindi to English)

The defence attempted to argue that Najir Ahmed’s death was caused by asphyxiation due to choking on vomit rather than by injuries sustained during the assault. The Court rejected this contention. It held that although the post-mortem referred to choking as the immediate mechanism of death, the evidence clearly established that Najir Ahmed had been brought to hospital in a grievously injured and unconscious state after the assault. The Court found that the fatal sequence of events was directly attributable to the brutal attack and that the injuries inflicted by the accused could not be separated from the death that followed.

The Court further relied on forensic evidence. Blood-stained weapons, clothing and other articles seized during the investigation were subjected to forensic examination. Human blood was detected on several seized items, including articles recovered from the accused and the deceased’s clothing. The Court noted that the accused failed to offer any satisfactory explanation for the presence of human blood on the recovered materials.

“According to the F.S.L. report Ex. P–103, Benzidine/Phenolphthalein and Crystal tests were performed on the said exhibits. According to the said report, human blood was found on A, B, C, D, E, F, $G_1$, $G_2$, I, K, $N_1$, and $N_2$. According to the said report, the stains on H, J, L, and M were disintegrated. In this manner, on the basis of the aforementioned F.S.L. report Ex. P–103, the presence of human blood on the aforementioned items seized from the accused persons is confirmed.” (Para 78) (Paragraph translated from Hindi to English)

“In the present case, blood-stained items were seized directly from the houses under the possession of the accused persons, on which human blood was found. The seizure proceedings have been duly proved by the prosecution, and according to the F.S.L. report, the chain of custody of the seized exhibits also remained intact. The police station daily log entry (Rojnamcha Sanha) of the proceedings from the date of the incident has also been produced. Under these circumstances, the burden of proof to provide an explanation was upon the accused persons, which was not given. Therefore, the aforementioned legal precedents are not applicable to the present case.” (Para 84) (Paragraph translated from Hindi to English)

Common object and unlawful assembly

A central issue before the Court was whether the accused could be held collectively liable for murder under Sections 302 and 149 IPC.

After evaluating the evidence, the Court concluded that the accused had formed; an unlawful assembly armed with lathis and dandas and had acted in furtherance of a common object. The attack was neither spontaneous nor isolated. Rather, the group acted collectively, used force and violence, and jointly assaulted the victims.

The Court held that the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused, acting as members of an unlawful assembly, intentionally assaulted Najir Ahmed with sticks and clubs in a manner that was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It further found that the assaults on Sheikh Lala and Sheikh Mustaq amounted to an attempt to murder.

“An observation of all the circumstances available on the record establishes the involvement of the accused persons and that the death of the deceased Nazir Ahmed was caused due to the assault. Both the other injured victims, Shekh Lala and Sayyad Mushtaq, were also present along with the deceased. It stands proved that injuries were caused to the injured Shekh Lala on the neck and chest, and to the injured Sayyad Mushtaq on the head, arm, and other vital parts. Therefore, looking at the weapons used by the accused persons, the nature of the injuries of the injured victims, and the facts and circumstances leading to the death of their other companion Nazir Ahmed, the intention of the accused persons to commit murder can be inferred.” (Para 93) (Paragraph translated from Hindi to English)

In one of the key findings of the judgment, the Court observed that the accused, armed with deadly weapons, had formed an unlawful assembly, committed rioting and, in prosecution of their common object, murdered Najir Ahmed while attempting to murder the two surviving victims.

Court recognises mob lynching as an aggravating circumstance

The sentencing portion of the judgment is particularly significant because the Court expressly characterised the crime as a case of mob lynching. While considering punishment, Judge Tabassum Khan identified the following aggravating factors:

• The prosecution had proved that the accused committed mob lynching.
• The accused formed an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons and engaged in rioting.
• The assault was carried out with exceptional brutality.
• Najir Ahmed suffered extensive injuries that resulted in his death.
• The attack also caused serious injuries to other victims.

The Court observed that the violence inflicted upon the victims reflected a high degree of brutality and collective criminality, warranting severe punishment.

Why the court rejected the death penalty

Despite finding the accused guilty of murder in a mob-lynching incident, the Court declined to impose capital punishment. Relying upon the established “rarest of rare” doctrine governing death penalty cases, the Court held that the circumstances did not justify the imposition of the death sentence. Instead, it sentenced all seven convicts to imprisonment for life under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC.

“For murder, there is a provision up to the death penalty, but in the legal precedent Bachan Singh Versus State of Punjab A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 898, it has been held by the Honorable Supreme Court that the death penalty should be awarded only in the “rarest of rare cases”. In the legal precedent Santosh Kumar Singh Versus State through C.B.I. (2010) 9 SCC 747, it has also been opined that when the court has to choose an alternative between life imprisonment and the death penalty, the option of life imprisonment should generally be chosen, unless there are such exceptional circumstances that make the death penalty inevitable. In this regard, the legal precedent Machi Singh Versus State of Punjab (1983) 3 SCC 470 is also followed.” (Para 102) (Paragraph translated from Hindi to English)

The convicts were also sentenced to ten years’ rigorous imprisonment under Section 307 read with Section 149 IPC for the attempted murder of the surviving victims, and three years’ rigorous imprisonment under Section 148 IPC for rioting while armed with deadly weapons. Fines were additionally imposed.

Significance of the judgment

The judgment stands out for two reasons. First, it represents a rare instance where a trial court has explicitly described the offence as mob lynching and treated that finding as a distinct aggravating circumstance while determining punishment. Second, the Court’s reasoning underscores the application of collective liability principles under Section 149 IPC to vigilante violence carried out by groups acting in concert.

At a time when incidents of violence linked to allegations of cattle transportation and cow smuggling continue to generate legal and constitutional concerns, the ruling sends a clear message that vigilante groups cannot substitute themselves for law enforcement and that collective violence resulting in death will attract the gravest criminal consequences under the law.

The complete judgment may be read below:

Related:

Mob lynching: Three separate incidents surface, even minors and partially disabled Muslims not safe

Another cow lynching in Nashik, one dead

Maharashtra’s shame: Cow lynching episode reported in Nashik

Allahabad HC points out misuse of cow slaughter law

K’taka: Bail to cow vigilante, Puneeth Kerehalli, accused of killing Muslim man

Cow vigilantism casts its ugly shadow on Maharashtra

Allahabad HC calls out misuse of law in cow slaughter case as only cow dung recovered from scene

The post Court recognises mob lynching as aggravating factor, sentences seven to life for 2022 cow-vigilantism killing appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The idea of a UCC in India has been debated for decades including within the Constituent Assembly itself, but its recent passage in BJP-governed states has reignited the question of whether this reform is genuinely about protecting women’s rights across communities, or is it primarily a political tool aimed at communalising what is, at its core, a secular problem of gender justice. Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma has openly linked the passage of the UCC to the BJP-RSS ideological project, stating that, “Had I not been a BJP CM and a swayamsevak of RSS, probably I would not have been able to bring the UCC to the assembly.” Interestingly Sarma currently serving as the 15th Chief Minister of Assam was a former member of the Indian National Congress (INC) who joined the BJP only on August 23, 2015!

‘Uniform Civil Code or Gender Justice?’ was the question raised around thirty-two years ago by the 1994 cover story of Communalism Combat. Teesta Seetalvad wrote:

“Through its constant argument that enacting a uniform civil code will bring about national integration, the Sangh Parivar has succeeded in making many Hindus believe that, one, only “separatist-minded” Muslims are opposed to a uniform law, and, two, the uniform civil code will only affect Muslims.”

Remarkably, that observation remains just as germane today. What this narrative however ignores is one, the call to do away with several practices, including polygamy, have come from Muslim women themselves (all while the BJP has adopted this issue as one of its own), and, two, all personal laws irrespective of religion have an-anti woman bias. Reported the Hindustan Times. Practices such as restitution of conjugal rights and the absence of no-fault divorce have existed in many religious communities. The broad powers granted to testators to will away property have long enabled the disinheritance of vulnerable family members across many faiths. The 2018 Law Commission report suggested that the legislature first consider guaranteeing equality within communities‘ between men and women, rather than equality between communities while suggesting that personal law reform over a UCC is recommended.

“Various aspects of prevailing personal laws disprivilege women. This Commission is of the view that it is discrimination and not difference which lies at the root of inequality,” the report read.

What the Bill changes 

The Bill aims to unify all personal family laws, including issues related to marriage, divorce, intestate and testamentary succession, and live-in relationships within the State of Assam. It applies to all residents of the state; including those living outside its territories, but it specifically excludes members of any Scheduled Tribes.

It sets uniform conditions for a valid marriage, including a minimum age of 21 for men and 18 for women, replacing the varying thresholds that existed under some personal laws. The religious ceremony through which a marriage is solemnised (whether a Saptapadi, Nikah, Holy Union, Anand Karaj, or any other recognised rite) remains valid and untouched.

The Bill explicitly prohibits polygamy; however, this is not a novel change as only last year, Assam had passed a law banning polygamy across the state. The UCC also standardises the list of prohibited relationships. This has an impact on Muslim personal law, which permitted marriage between first cousins.

Compulsory registration of all marriages within sixty days of the ceremony is introduced for the first time as a uniform requirement though several states, notably Maharashtra had introduced a separate law for this in 1999 while retaining personal laws (Maharashtra Regulation of Marriage Bureaus and Registration of Marriages Act, 1998). Failure to register attracts penalties, though importantly the UCC clarifies that non-registration does not by itself render a marriage invalid. The Bill also establishes procedures for judicial separation and the restitution of conjugal rights. The framework provides standardised grounds for divorce (such as cruelty, desertion, or mutual consent) and extrajudicial methods of dissolving a marriage or unilateral divorce are no longer legally recognised for any community. Maintenance during the pendency of proceedings and permanent alimony after a decree are available to either spouse, again, without any community-specific distinction.

The UCC’s most far-reaching provisions concern succession, where it departs most sharply from the existing personal laws of several communities. It defines a clear ‘Order of Preference’ for how property is distributed when a person dies without a Will. Class-1 heirs (including the spouse, children, and parents) generally succeed simultaneously and take equal shares. For a detailed understanding of this, read a previous analysis by Citizens for Justice and Peace here

Lack of stakeholder consultation 

Hasina Khan and Mridul Kaintura writing for Sabrang India in 2024 noted that conservative and orthodox religious leaders had failed their community as they sought to control their bodies under the guise of protecting the religion. However, they also wrote, “Despite spearheading the movement to bring reforms within our own communities, including the formulation of Nikah-Nama, protesting against fatwas and advocating reforms in discriminatory personal laws, the state has never taken any steps to hear our concerns and protect our rights effectively,” they added.

The UCC Bill was cleared without con­sult­ing any minor­ity organ­isa­tions who had demanded further consultations before the Bill was passed. Beyond the absence of consultations, even the text of the Bill was not placed in the public domain, despite the 2014 circular mandating that draft legislation be made publicly available for at least thirty days to invite comments and feedback. The Bill was vetted by the Assam Cabinet only May 12 before it was introduced on May 25 in the State Assembly and passed on May 27 after about five hours of discussion and debate. As per reports in both The Hindu and The Shillong Times.

The manner in which the Assam government pushed through the UCC Bill is not an isolated instance but reflective of a growing pattern across India where major legislative changes are introduced with little transparency and minimal consultation with those most affected. Similar criticisms accompanied the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Amendment Act, 2026, and the Delimitation Bill.

CM Sarma in fact went on record to say that Congress’s opposition does not matter because except one Congress MLA, rest of the 18 MLAs represent a particular religion.  He was referring to eighteen of the 19 MLAs of Congress, the largest opposition party, who are Muslims. This brazen vocal exclusion and segregation of elected representatives of the religious minorities bodes ill for any representative and participative democracy. Reported in The Times of India.

Dr Noorjehan Safia Niaz, co-founder of the Bharatiya Muslim Mahila Andolan, had said last December that her organisation had twenty-five points specifically relating to Muslims that must be included in any UCC, among them the preservation of mehr (the compulsory payment by the husband to the wife upon marriage, which provides a measure of financial security). The Bill does not incorporate any of the positive and progressive aspects of Muslim personal law. The mehr, nikahnama (which allows spouses to negotiate mutually agreed and legally enforceable conditions in the marriage contract) have completely omitted or left out, as has the one-third limit rule on willing away property for the first spouse and children, which served as a protection against complete disinheritance. The practice of khula, through which a Muslim woman may initiate divorce on grounds such as irreconcilable differences, neglect, or lack of financial support, has not been codified and extended to all women representing a missed opportunity to give every woman a meaningful right to exit a marriage independently. Such legislative exclusion is reflective of a majoritarian bias through exclusion that fails to introduce or include cultural-religious norms from varied communities that are or maybe progressive. As per a report in reddif.com.

The restitution of conjugal rights, which legally compels an unwilling spouse to return to cohabitation, and in the case of a wife could expose her to the risk of rape and forcible pregnancy, has also been retained at a time when its constitutional validity is actively challenged before the Supreme Court and the 21st Law Commission Report recommended its removal. The Bill is entirely silent on custody, and guardianship which are the areas in which Hindu law and Mohammedan law (after seven years of age) gender-based discrimination has been extensively commented upon as the guardianship of a minor boy or unmarried girl vests in the father before the mother.

Had the government followed stakeholder consultations and the Law Commission’s recommendations, would a Bill ostensibly rooted in gender justice have overlooked such regressive practices?

“Instead of maintaining a silence on all these anti-women and pro-men or pro-Hindu provisions of family laws, should not the debate on reforms in family laws be re-framed by secularists incorporating all these arguments with a correct perspective?” had asked Setalvad in 1994.

Exclusion of Scheduled Tribes

In a report in The Times of India, the most glaring contradiction in a supposedly uniform code is the blanket exemption granted to Scheduled Tribes. As per the last census (which was over 15 years ago!), 12.4 per cent of Assam’s population constitute of scheduled tribes meaning their exclusion removes a significant section of the state’s residents from the scope of legislation. When asked to justify this, CM Sarma reportedly stated that,

“Medicine will be given where there is illness… UCC will give radiotherapy, chemotherapy where there is cancer. Where there is no cancer, there is no necessity of giving radiotherapy.”

“Whether we bring UCC or not, our tribal people never accept polygamy … Our tribal people give equal rights to girls, they do not accept live-in relations. Self regulation is the best regulation. If Hindu and Muslim societies also had customary rights like tribals and our society would have been tied together with equal rights like them, maybe a UCC would not have been required for anyone,” he added.

In his speech in the House, he also stated that the society rarely sees distressed or neglected women within tribal societies, like that of the Shah Bano case because through their customary rights and customary courts, these communities had already been regulating their social systems.

This stance is perhaps ignorant of first, the socio-economic status of tribal women and how that could affect their access to courts and second, the available data and judicial record! Were consultations with tribal women held for the State to arrive at this conclusion?

According to the International Institute for Population Sciences, compared to the national average of 1.4 per cent (NFHS-5), the rate of polygamy was 2.4 among STs. Tribal communities have also historically opposed women’s inheritance rights on the grounds that recognising such rights would result in land being alienated to non-tribals through inter-community marriage. As per reports in The Print and the Hindustan Times.

There are also cases where tribal women have knocked on the doors of courts! In Gopal Singh Bhumij v. Giribala Bhumij (1990), a ST woman who sought the partition of her father’s property, was denied the same by the Patna High Court as she was bound by tribal custom, which excluded daughters from inheritance. In Smt. Butaki Bai v. Sukhbati (2005), a daughter of the Halba tribe similarly failed to obtain inheritance rights because she could not provide sufficient evidence of Hinduisation. In Ram Dev Ram v. Dhani Ram (2016), a daughter of the Uraon tribe was denied inheritance rights because she did not follow the tribal custom. All of this demonstrates that customary tribal law is neither beyond scrutiny nor inherently gender-just.

“What does uniform mean?… The content of this large Bill does not align with its title. Because to be uniform, it has to be the same for everyone staying in this state. I have no objection with someone being left out from it, I respect all tribes and communities, but the name should be changed… The CM and the other MLAs have been talking about ‘rights’ being secured by the Bill, but in that case, aren’t the women of those who are being left out being deprived of their rights?” said MLA Jakir Sikdar. As per a report in the Indian Express.

Mandatory registration of live-in relationships

One of the most controversial features of the recent UCC framework is its mandatory registration framework for live-in relationships which is a significant expansion of state and community oversight into intimate relationships. This applies even if the partners are residents of Assam living outside the state territories. Partners in such a relationship are obligated to submit a statement to the Sub-Registrar; who then conducts a summary inquiry, and must either register the relationship and issue a certificate or refuse to register with written reasons within thirty days. If either partner is below twenty-one years of age, the Sub-Registrar is legally obligated to inform their parents or guardians. In all cases, a copy of the statement is forwarded to the officer-in-charge of the local police station. Third parties are also permitted to provide information or file complaints regarding unregistered live-in relationships.

This means that a woman may marry at eighteen without parental consent, but must wait until twenty-one to enter a live-in relationship without triggering mandatory parental notification. This inconsistency is difficult to justify on any coherent principle of personal autonomy, nor has the State done its bit to explain the reason behind it.

“These are also matters concerning Muslim women, who may once again find themselves subjected to suffering at the hands of the institution of family, the state, and third parties. Here, the third party could be the involvement of any institution, from community Khaps, Jamaats to even Fatwa-judgements. The punitive measures after being unable to register the live-in relationships are in no way a protective measure but to further surveil the relationships that challenge the institution of marriage,” wrote Khan and Kaintura for Sabrang.

The Uttarakhand UCC Rules also require individuals seeking registration of a live-in relationship to furnish certification from a religious leader or community representative. In January 2025, CJP raised concerns that such rules “make it practically impossible for interfaith or inter–caste individuals to be in a live-in relationship. The requirement of religious sanction for two consenting adults to enter a live-in relationship defeats the principle of secularism provided in the Preamble of the Constitution of India.”

The UCC Rules for Assam are expected to be formulated within six months of Presidential assent. One will have to wait and see whether such draconian provisions are a part of the Assam UCC Rules too. On his X, Biswa has already linked the UCC as a panacea from ‘Love Jihad’ signaling the intent to regulate and restrict inter-faith relationships.

This is consistent with a rising trend across India where anti-conversion laws along with the mandatory public notice provisions of the Special Marriage Act, and now the UCC, create records that right-wing and Hindutva vigilante groups use to track and harass interfaith couples. Reports of young couples being attacked, or forcibly separated have become disturbingly common. Read weaponisation of laws to prevent interfaith marriages in Uttrakhand here. Stated a report in The Polis Project.

This was precisely what CJP tried to address when it challenged the constitutional validity of various State enactments regulating religious conversion. Read detailed reports here and here. By forwarding relationship data directly to police stations and permitting third-party complaints, has arguably created a fresh infrastructure for exactly this kind of extra-legal intimidation.

The Bill also maintains a complete silence on the rights of queer and transgender persons within the family, their rights to marry, and their inheritance and succession rights. In a country where the legal recognition of same-sex relationships remains contested and transgender persons continue to face pervasive discrimination, the UCC’s failure to even acknowledge their existence within the family law framework is a profound omission that no claim to progressiveness can easily paper over.

Conclusion

Women across every community have demanded reforms in personal law for decades. That is not the contention here. The concern, however, is that the UCC in name of reform is plausibly being deployed as a selective intervention that leaves comparable inequalities untouched and exempts a portion of the population on grounds it refuses to apply consistently. By introducing registration of live-in relationships, surveillance mechanisms are introduced that go against the right to privacy and dignity guaranteed by the Constitution and judgments by the Supreme Court.

Reports indicate that Madhya Pradesh is next in line and consultations have already begun. A law that is serious about gender justice would incorporate the best practices from every community and also address the silences around queer persons, HUFs, guardianship, and resist the temptation to use intimate relationships as a theatre for communal politics. By these measures, the Assam, Gujarat and Uttrakhand UCCs as passed have already fallen significantly short. Reported The Hindu.

The full draft of The Uniform Civil Code, Assam, 2026 can be accessed here

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Tanishka Shah)

Related:

The Uniform Civil Code (UCC) of Uttarakhand: Advancement in gender justice or violating individual liberties?

Calls for Uniform Civil Code, Population Control Bill by Right-Wing groups amplified with divisive rhetoric

Destroying the basic standards of legislation- the Uttarakhand Model of UCC

The post Assam Becomes Third State to Adopt UCC: Reform for Gender Justice or Communal Politics? appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The National Eligibility Entrance Test (NEET) 2026 was conducted on May 3, 2026, however, it is set to be re-conducted in June. Let’s look at the timeline of events that led to this redo.

Before the May 3 exam, the NTA said the exam was conducted under “full security protocol”, including GPS-tracked paper transport, biometric verification, AI-assisted CCTV monitoring, and 5G jammers at centres. The test was conducted across 551 Indian cities and at 14 overseas centres, with nearly 23 lakh candidates having registered. On the night of May 3, when Suthar (a chemistry teacher from Sikar, Rajasthan) was discussing the NEET questions with his students, he came across a PDF document that went viral a day before the exam. That document had all the chemistry questions that appeared in the actual exam. It further contained ninety of the biology questions that were asked in the exam. Following this discovery, Suthar informed the Rajasthan police and the NTA.

Now, the probe starts. One of the first breakthroughs in the investigation came when Rajasthan Police’s Special Operations Group arrested the alleged mastermind from Dehradun on May 7. A day later, four more persons, all NEET aspirants from Dehradun, were arrested and brought to Sikar for further interrogation. Among the five, the police said that the counsellor is accused of selling the leaked question paper to aspirants as a “Guess Paper.” He had allegedly received it from someone in Kerala, and it was suspected he managed to obtain probable questions of the examination paper even before it was sent for printing. The NTA escalated the matter to Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) for “independent verification and necessary action.”

The Rajasthan Police inquiry linked the suspected document to an MBBS student from Churu who was at the time studying at a medical college in Kerala. It was quickly spread through NEET aspirants who shared it with each other. The probe also revealed that the material was widely shared through encrypted messaging apps and social media, with some recovered chats reportedly carrying the “forwarded many times” label, suggesting that the questions may have reached a large number of students before the exam. The guess paper was sold to students at rates between Rs 20,000 and Rs 2 lakh, with some media reports indicating charges as high as Rs 5 lakh. By the night before the exam, copies were allegedly circulating for around Rs 30,000 each.

On May 12, nine days after the conduct of the examination, the NTA officially cancelled NEET UG 2026 “in the interest of students” and to protect the credibility of the national examination system. However, the probe continued.

In order to understand how structural and rooted the corruption in the national examination system is, it is imperative to look at the findings that followed the probe. On May 13, the Federation of All India Medical Association (FAIMA) moved the Supreme Court challenging the “systemic failure” of the NTA in conducting NEET-UG 2026. The petition sought directions to replace or fundamentally restructure the NTA and to conduct a fresh NEET-UG 2026 examination under judicial supervision, including digital encryption and locking of question papers, a transition to a digital test model, and publication of centre-wise results for detection of statistical anomalies and organised malpractice.

Prahlad Vittal Rao Kulkarni, identified as the alleged kingpin and a domain expert in chemistry from Latur who had for years served on panels involved in setting the NEET question paper, was arrested on May 15, for allegedly exploiting his access to confidential material. He allegedly hosted special coaching classes at his house in the last week of April and dictated questions to a select students. On May 16, the CBI arrested Manisha Gurunath Mandhare, a biology lecturer who was part of the NTA’s paper-setting committee for the NEET exam held on May 3. The arrest was made on the basis of questioning of P V Kulkarni and other accused in the paper leak case. She was allegedly involved in the examination process and appointed by the NTA as an expert with complete access to the Botany and Zoology question papers. Mandhare is alleged to have mobilised prospective NEET examination candidates in April 2026 through Manisha Wagmare of Pune (she was arrested on May 14) and conducted special coaching classes for students at her home, dictating leaked questions and collecting lakhs of rupees as fee. Most of these questions tallied with the questions that appeared in the examination on May 3. The CBI on May 22 arrested Manisha Sanjay Havaldar. She had been appointed by the NTA as an expert to set the question paper for the physics section. Investigators found that she allegedly shared several Physics questions with co-accused Manisha Mandhare in April 2026.

There were several other arrests made by the CBI in relation to this from States such as Rajasthan, Delhi, Haryana.

On May 21, NTA Director General Abhishek Singh appeared before the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Education, Women, Children, Youth and Sports. Singh told the committee that the agency does not view the NEET exam as having been “leaked.” Even when Opposition members pressed for answers, NTA officials stuck to their position that the CBI is investigating, and they would only call it a leak if the CBI finished its probe and confirmed it. On questions from MPs about how the NEET paper was leaked, Singh said it was “not leaked through their system“. Several MPs asked him then how did the paper get leaked and what was the need to cancel the exam and hold a re-test. He had no answer and insisted that CBI was looking into the matter. Some opposition MPs demanded that the probe report be presented before the panel, but BJP members objected, saying the CBI is an independent body and should be allowed to do its work.

On May 29, the NTA informed the Supreme Court that it was all set to conduct NEET UG in digital testing mode from the next year instead of the pen and paper mode. The NTA’s affidavit stated to the Supreme Court in relation to the several petitions (including the aforesaid FAIMA petition) that the transition will be implemented from the next examination cycle in consultation with the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare thereby bringing all major NTA examinations onto the digital testing platform. Regarding the June 21 re-examination, the NTA told the Court that the re-examination scheduled on June 21, will be conducted under a further strengthened SOP framework and with multi-layer authentication.

This paper leak saga shows how deeply percolated corruption is in Indian educational system is. Students who work tirelessly for months and even years are failed by the system consistently. It erodes the faith public has in the government in conducting something as rudimentary as exams. The repercussions of such failures are tragic and extremely disheartening. The next section shall deal with the distress such failures cause to the students and the extreme steps that they are forced to take.

Aftermath, Young Lives lost

NEET is the biggest exam in terms of number of applicants in India, and is mandatory for anyone who aims to take admission in medical courses. In the hope of becoming doctors, students spend years preparing for the exam in extremely competitive and burdensome environments. Therefore, when the news of its cancellation was out, the consequences were tragic.

Pradeep, 21, had taken the exam twice before but failed to secure the needed marks. This time, the moment he walked out of the examination hall, he hugged his father and said, “Papa, this time I have become a doctor.” He had spent lakhs of rupees and countless hours preparing for the exam. As per the answer key of the exam conducted on May 3, Pradeep was securing a seat in a government medical college with ease. However, the news of cancellation put him in so much despair that he died by suicide. Pradeep Manich, 23, was a labourer’s son who had been living in a rented accommodation in Sikar away from his home. Reportedly, his family had sold their land and taken loans to fund his coaching and expenses for NEET. After his third attempt, the news of the paper leak and re-examination left him hopeless and disillusioned. He was devastated and he hanged himself days after the exam. Akanksha Chaturvedi had been preparing for the medical entrance exam in Nagpur and reportedly suffered from severe depression triggered by the cancellation, and ultimately, died by suicide. Her suicide note said, ” I no longer have the courage to take the NEET exam again. I was scoring good marks in my first attempt, but now there is no guarantee that I will perform well again.” Her father, a farmer, worked as a cook in Nagpur, and also put himself in financial debt to support her dreams of becoming a doctor. In Uttar Pradesh’s Lakhimpur Kheri, 21 years old Ritik Mishra died by suicide after reportedly distressed by the cancellation of the examination. Further, a 17 years old boy from Goa district took his life after the cancellation owing to academic stress and concerns over balancing studies with his passion for hockey.

19 years old Divyansh Sharma from Sikar tells how impactful such re-examinations are psychologically. Sharma says that when students spend one or two years preparing and the paper gets leaked, it feels devastating. He made it clear that beyond financial loss, the greatest cost is time. Talking about his own experience, he said Sikar (a hub for competitive exams preparation) as an emotionally draining environment, filled with overcrowded hostels, endless classes, and routines built entirely around mock tests and revision. The competition is so intense that students study throughout the entire day. When news breaks that an exam will be held again due to a leak, it kills motivation. He also points out that the psychological challenge is significant, as students begin to doubt whether they can replicate their previous level of performance. Devadrita Dam, an 18 years old aspirant from Gurgaon, had been genuinely hopeful after the exam because the paper seemed easier compared to previous years. In the week following the exam, she was finally reconnecting with friends after months of social isolation that the exam forces under the guise of rigour of preparation. Then her best friend sent her a message saying the paper had been cancelled. She initially assumed it was a joke, but her uncle called to confirm the news. She broke down crying at the thought of having to go through the entire process again. According to Dam, the leak has seriously shaken students’ faith in the system.

These heart-breaking stories show how disproportionately the cancellation of exams affected students who came from lower income families. And how, the system failed the students by not being able to conduct an exam of such importance with honesty and transparency.

Owing to these incidents in light of systemic failure of the education system towards its students, there were protests as legitimate expression of anguish by students. On May 12, National Students’ Union of India (NSUI) staged a massive protest at Shastri Bhawan. Protestors were seen climbing the barricades at Shastri Bhawan to show their disappointment and anger. Characteristically Delhi Police detained several protestors. This was the same day the NTA officially confirmed the exam’s cancellation showing that the students were in the streets within hours of the announcement. A couple of days later on May 16, NSUI staged a massive protest outside the NTA headquarters in Delhi under the banner of the “NTA Halla Bol” campaign. The protestors rightly pointed out the suicides that took place owing to NTA’s failure that led to the re-examination.

Further, IYC activists took out a protest march from Teen Murti Circle towards the Education Minister’s residence holding posters and banners. However, they were stopped by police barricades and some protestors had been detained as well. Members of the All India Students’ Association (AISA) staged a demonstration demanding accountability for recurring examination irregularities outside the Ministry of Education on June 1. These protestors were also later detained by Police. On May 31 in Bhopal and on June 1 in Bhubaneswar, torchlight marches were organised outside the residence of Dharmendra Pradhan demanding his resignation over the paper leak issue. Moreover, On June 6, IYC President Uday Bhanu Chib led thousands in a protest in Haryana. Protesters faced water cannons and even barricades and police lathis. Despite of such protests the mainstream media has remained silent on both the fronts, raising voice against the government that allowed such a leak to happen, and it has remained silent on these protests by not covering their plight, anguish and courage to protest against such failures. And whenever such protests are shown, the lens is partisan— a political battle between Congress and BJP. Instead of putting the plight of the students at the centre of its coverage, the narrative is completely shifted to party politics. The response by the State that included, barricading, detention, shooting water guns, reflect how the state has increasingly collapsed the distinction between disruption and dissent. A detailed report on the mainstream media’s cold shoulder and on the protests that happened nationwide can be read here.

Repeated Leaks

It is imperative to note that the NEET exam was earlier leaked just two years ago! The 2024 NEET examination had an unusually high number of top rankers. Further, many students received scores that appeared mathematically impossible. This raised the concerns of paper being leaked. The CBI in pursuance of these allegations of paper leak arrested 40 individuals. The government’s initial posture was flat denial. When Dharmendra Pradhan took charge as Education Minister in June 2024, he told reporters that “there is no corruption or paper leak in NEET-UG 2024.” This position was maintained even as police in multiple states were making arrests and producing evidence to the contrary.

Subsequently, the matter reached the Supreme Court. The Court said there would be no re-examination, ruling that the data on record was not enough to show a systematic leak. However, the Court stated that there was a paper leak, though it found it localised to the areas of Hazaribagh and Patna. It simultaneously acknowledged serious weaknesses within the NTA and insisted on structural reform to prevent such instances from repeating. Following this, a committee namely Dr. K. Radhakrishnan Committee was setup. The Court specifically directed the committee to examine the viability of comprehensive CCTV surveillance, surprise inspections, secure transportation systems, digital tracking, and stricter identity verification mechanisms. The court also directed the Ministry of Education to monitor implementation through a Steering Committee. The Radhakrishnan committee submitted its report in October 2024 to the central government, that contained several recommendations to prevent future leaks. These included a shift to digital testing to eliminate the vulnerabilities of physical paper handling, biometric verification, AI-based surveillance, encrypted digital question delivery, and multi-stage examination formats. In January 2025, the Centre told the Supreme Court that it would implement all these corrective measures as suggested by the committee.

Now, the question that crops up is, what did the government do? Unsurprisingly, the answer is nothing. Despite recommendations by the K. Radhakrishnan committee after the 2024 controversy, the examination continued under the same manner as before. The NTA has immense structural problems that facilitates such leaks and other issues commonly faced by students (some problems are left unaddressed by the committee itself). The National Testing Agency was established in 2017 without parliamentary debate, public consultation, or a statutory foundation. It operates as a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 rather than as a body created by legislation. Its memorandum of association (a basic charter that any registered organisation is expected to publish) has never appeared on its website, unlike comparable bodies such as the CBSE. The agency’s financial workings are equally opaque. While institutions like the UPSC and AIIMS publish detailed annual reports with budget allocations and expenditure data, the NTA has simply stated on its website that because the number of exams it conducts varies each year, it is “difficult to maintain Head-wise/Exam-wise Budget.” For an agency that collects fees from over two crore candidates annually and outsources significant work to private contractors, this opacity raised eyebrows to say the least.

The biggest problem that NTA has is its outsourcing tendencies. The NTA contracts out some of its most consequential functions such as setting up exam centres, managing physical security, capturing biometric data, to other parties. This problem needs to understood in tandem with the fact that it coordinates with a network of private actors that has no published standards of governing and nobody knows how those actors are selected, supervised, or held accountable. The result has been visible in examination halls where power cuts lasted over an hour or even when students were handed out rainwater-soaked answer sheets. Nothing about the process of setting question papers is publicly known. The qualifications required of paper setters, the processes they follow, and the safeguards against conflicts of interest is simply not disclosed. The CBSE publishes a detailed document specifying exactly these things, including the duties of “secrecy officers” responsible for maintaining confidentiality through the examination process. The NTA has no equivalent. This goes on to show how much opacity is present in the entire process of conducting the examinations– from setting of papers to the conduct of exam on the final day. In toto, it is a centralised body that works with near zero accountability. In such a setting, bluntly, lapses are inevitable.

NOT JUST NTA OR NEET

However, the problem in the examination framework of India is by no means limited to the NTA but runs much deeper.

In May 2026, the Central Board of Secondary Education declared Class 12 results.  There was a drop in passing percentage this year by 3 points. Consequently, students wanted to check their answer sheets and see what went wrong. However, it was found that, students were receiving wrong answer sheets. Evaluators were marking blurred, illegible scans. Pages had gone missing. This year marked On-screen marking’s (OSM) first use by CBSE. The promise of OSM was quite handsome. In OSM, answer sheets are scanned, digitised, and uploaded to a secure portal. Examiners log in remotely and mark on their screens, this marking is then auto-tabulated by the system. CBSE had, in fact, conceived of OSM back in 2014 but shelved the idea because of logistical difficulties. Cut to 2026, CBSE announced its plan on using OSM. During mandatory mock evaluation sessions on February 26, 2026, teachers reported portal access failures, slow system performance, and errors in teacher data on the registration portal. Knowing all this, and instead of going for a phased launch of the technology, CBSE still decided to rollout the technology all at once, for nearly 1 crore answer scripts. In a March 16 circular, CBSE warned Class 10 and 12 evaluators of legal action for sharing “misleading” information about the marking process on social media and declared that evaluation is confidential, therefore, it should not be discussed.

Once the results were out, students who accessed their answer sheets via the OSM verification portal found pages scanned so poorly that not a single line was legible yet the examiner had marked them. On various Reddit and X posts, students described evaluators placing red ticks and numerical scores on images that were, functionally, blank. These problems gained traction when Vedant Shrivastava posted his Physics answer sheet on X. When he checked his answer script he found out that someone else’s answer sheet was marked instead of his. There was a clear difference in handwriting. CBSE eventually admitted the error and issued the correct scanned copy, but only after Vedant’s post had gone viral.

I am a CBSE Class 12 student.

After receiving unexpectedly low marks in Physics, we applied for photocopies of my answer sheets through the CBSE reevaluation process.

Today we received the copies.

And I am shattered because the Physics answer sheet uploaded by CBSE is not mine

— VEDANT (@VEDANTSHRIV17) May 23, 2026

Along the same vein, Sanjana, found that every page of her Chemistry answer booklet belonged to a completely different person. CBSE later acknowledged it had “discarded around 30 answer sheets due to issues like unclear images and duplicate entries” without re-scanning them, this means some students were potentially evaluated on nothing whatsoever.

I applied for CBSE revaluation. The scanned copy of my chemistry sheet I received does not match my handwriting or written responses.
For reference, I am attaching my English answer sheet, which clearly reflects my actual handwriting. pic.twitter.com/laINaEMAP3

— Sanjana (@Sanjanaopxe) May 25, 2026

These issues could largely be pinned to the vendor who was responsible for the application the of OSM technology. The company entrusted with building and running the OnMark digital evaluation platform for CBSE is Coempt Edu Teck Private Limited, a Hyderabad based education technology firm. It was formerly known as Globarena Technologies Private Limited, and it had in the past made grave errors in technological applications. Those errors had led to several suicides as well.

If this company had such discouraging past, how did it manage to get the tender? The inconsistencies in floating of three tenders before finally settling with Coempt Edu Teck was first reported in the Hindustan Times.  Later, Sarthak Sidhant, a 17 years old Class 12 student from Jharkhand showed gave a breakdown of the requirements were consistently to grant then tender were changed several times in a way that made Coempt eligible for it. He spent days readings official CBSE bidding documents on the Central Public Procurement Portal, and tracked changes across three successive versions of the tender.  He published his findings in a blog post, these findings reveal the deep percolated corruption in the system that allowed Coempt to bag the tender.

The original Request for proposal (RFP) contained three specific clauses that would disqualify a vendor for poor past performance. These clauses were entirely removed from the revised RFP. A company with Coempt’s track record would have been eliminated at the gate under the original standards. Further, the minimum revenue threshold was set at ₹50 crore in an earlier version of the tender. It was pointed out that Coempt, would not to meet this threshold therefore, the same was revised in ways that made the company eligible. Capability Maturity Model Integration levels (these are standard benchmarks for software development capabilities) were also reportedly adjusted in the new tenders. The tender was first issued in February 2025. After the initial process failed to move forward, it was re-issued in May 2025, then again. Each iteration, Sidhant alleged, brought the eligibility criteria closer to Coempt’s actual profile. The cybersecurity standards required of the vendor were also scaled back across each of these successive drafts.

Furthermore, Nisarg Adhikari, a 19 years old ethical hacker broke into CBSE’s OSM portal and found several vulnerabilities. He found out numerous flaws that could allow anyone with basic technical knowledge to bypass OTP authentication, impersonate examiners, reset passwords, and even alter marks scored by students! This demonstrates how poorly the OSM was developed and deployed. The entire process of implementing OMS was marred with corruption that rewarded incompetence.

Across the 18 lakh who appeared for Class 12 board exams this year, there is now an uncertainty about the integrity of their results. Even students who scored well and were not directly affected by the visible failures have no guarantee that their marks accurately reflect their performance. This is the case because the system that produced those marks has been publicly demonstrated to be insecure and badly managed. The Board had twelve years to plan OSM after first conceiving it in 2014. It chose to deploy it overnight. It awarded the contract 74 days before exams began. It accepted security certificates covering other people’s systems. It threatened teachers who raised concerns with legal action

The response to these revelations

Instead of any of this being on the front page, it was a teenager that cracked the story open. Several right-wing social media accounts started heckling Vedant (student who received the wrong physics answer script) as anti-national. He was also derogatorily called as a Pakistani. Among those who amplified this heckling was Ashok Shrivastav, a journalist and primetime anchor at Doordarshan News. Shrivastav posted a screenshot of Vedant’s profile location (which showed South Asia) and commented “Did Pakistanis also appear for CBSE exams?!!”

A journalist at a taxpayer-funded national broadcaster took a grievance from a student who had received the wrong answer sheet, checked the geolocation setting of his fresh social media account, and concluded that the most plausible explanation was Pakistani subterfuge.

This shows the levels that Indian Media has stooped down to. Vedant and his family were inundated with abuse. They were called “Pakistani agents,” “anti-national,” “Soros agents,” and members of the “Deep State.” 17 years old who had spent the year studying for his boards, who had done nothing more than post proof of an institutional failure affecting his own marks, was now managing a mental health crisis on top of everything else.

This response is not exclusive to Vedant, even Nisarg and Sarthak who did a commendable job in showing the truth behind the tender allocation and the various infirmities of the present OSM system were treated with the same vitriolic response. The logic of this rhetoric works like this. Any complaint about a government system is, by definition, motivated by hostility to India. Anyone motivated by hostility to India is acting on behalf of India’s enemies. Pakistan is the most convenient enemy. Therefore, any complaint = Pakistani.

CONSTITUTONAL DIMENSIONS

The right to life under Article 21, as interpreted through Unnikrishnan and subsequent decisions, encompasses the right to education. The judiciary has consistently read Article 21 expansively to include not just bare survival but the conditions necessary for a dignified human existence. Access to a fair, uncorrupted examination is not peripheral to this right. For millions of students, particularly those from lower-income families who cannot afford private alternatives or second attempts, NEET and CBSE board exams are the singular pathway to a livelihood and a dignified future. When those pathways are sabotaged by institutional negligence and structural corruption, the right to a dignified life is contravened. The suicides that followed the 2026 NEET cancellation are the most extreme indictment of this constitutional violation. Moreover, paper leak that was facilitated by state appointed officials violated the right to equality.  It gave an undue advantage to some candidates over others who attempted the examination honestly. Two candidates sit for the same exam. One has seen the questions. One has not. They are not equal before that paper, and the State made them unequal. The Supreme Court’s commitment to protecting the integrity of competitive examinations was further reinforced in a 2015 decision (Tanvi Sarwal v. Central Board of Secondary Education) involving the CBSE, where the Court directed that a fresh all-India medical entrance examination be held after concluding that widespread use of electronic devices had compromised the process beyond repair.

The Public Examinations (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2024 represents the legislature’s acknowledgment that examination fraud is a criminal offence. It contravenes the foundational principles of constitution such as equal treatment of everyone. The Act criminalises question paper leakage, unauthorised access to confidential material, organised distribution networks, impersonation, and digital facilitation of cheating. It extends liability beyond individual bad actors to service providers, vendors, printing contractors, and institutional officers, making negligence and collusion equally punishable. The existence of this statute makes the State’s failure 2026 constitutionally indefensible. The legislature had already recognised, through this law, that paper leaks violate the foundational conditions of fair competition. That recognition maps directly onto the Article 14 guarantee of substantive equality. When the executive arm of the State allowed an institutional architecture that permitted paper setters with unrestricted access to confidential material to operate without oversight. It significantly increased the chances of such leaks, and in turn, increased the chances of constitutional violations as written above.

The way the State responded to the protests that broke out in response of these constitutional violations are quite telling. The Supreme Court has recognised in multiple decisions that the right to protest is implied in Article 19 and that the State must make genuine arrangements for dissent to be heard rather than suppressed. When Delhi Police detained students within hours of the cancellation announcement, when water cannons were deployed in Haryana, when IYC marchers were stopped before they could reach the Education Minister’s residence, the State directly prevented public accountability. The restrictions that Article 19(2) permits on these freedoms must be reasonable and proportionate. Treating students the way they were treated for protesting the loss of an examination they spent years preparing for fails any honest proportionality test.

References for this analysis may be found here.

(The programme research team also consists of interns; this resource has been worked on by Hamzah Patel)

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The post The system that keeps failing appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The complaints, both dated April 27, 2026, concern speeches allegedly delivered by Union Minister of State for Education and BJP MP Sukanta Majumdar in Panihati, North 24 Parganas on March 29, 2026, and BJP candidate Jagannath Chattopadhyay in Suri, Birbhum on April 9, 2026.

According to CJP, both speeches amounted to appeals on religious grounds, promotion of hostility between communities, and attempts to influence the electoral process through communal polarisation. The organisation has sought intervention from election authorities and police officials, urging registration of criminal cases, issuance of show-cause notices, and other corrective measures.

CJP’s complaint against Sukanta Majumdar

On April 27, 2026, in its complaint addressed to the Chief Electoral Officer of West Bengal and the Commissioner of Police, Barrackpore, CJP alleged that Sukanta Majumdar delivered what it described as an explicitly communal and divisive speech during an election campaign in Panihati on March 29.

According to the complaint, Majumdar defended the idea of being “communal” as necessary for the protection of religion and culture and asserted that secularism had failed after Partition. CJP contends that these remarks amounted to a direct rejection of constitutional secularism and sought to create hostility toward a religious minority.

The complaint reproduces portions of the speech in which Majumdar allegedly stated that understanding the “true condition” of West Bengal required visiting districts with significant Muslim populations, specifically naming Malda and Murshidabad. CJP argues that these references portrayed Muslim-majority areas as symbols of decline and disorder and were intended to provoke suspicion and hostility against members of the minority community.

The organisation further alleges that Majumdar linked the political participation of Muslims with adverse consequences for Hindus by claiming that the Trinamool Congress deliberately allotted electoral tickets to Muslim leaders and by alleging restrictions on the use of microphones during Durga Puja celebrations in certain areas.

According to CJP, these remarks created a narrative in which the political representation of Muslims was portrayed as a threat to Hindu cultural and religious practices. The complaint argues that such rhetoric was designed to influence voters by invoking religious identity and fears of cultural displacement.

Allegations of religious polarisation

CJP maintains that the Panihati speech relied heavily on references to religion, communal violence, and Partition. According to the complaint, the repeated invocation of these themes was intended to establish a binary opposition between Hindu cultural interests and Muslim political participation.

The organisation contends that describing secularism as a failed project and presenting communal identification as necessary for cultural survival undermines the constitutional commitment to equality and secular governance. It argues that these statements sought to legitimise exclusionary politics and encourage electoral mobilisation based on religious identity.

Particular emphasis is placed on references to Malda and Murshidabad. CJP alleges that these districts were singled out not for administrative or developmental reasons but because of their demographic composition. The complaint argues that such references encouraged audiences to associate Muslim-majority regions with social or political deterioration and thereby contributed to communal stereotyping.

The complaint further characterises allegations regarding restrictions on Durga Puja festivities as attempts to create resentment and distrust toward minority communities. According to CJP, these statements transformed a religious and cultural issue into a political weapon during an election campaign.

Legal grounds raised against Majumdar

The complaint alleges that Majumdar’s speech violated provisions of the Model Code of Conduct prohibiting activities that aggravate differences or create hatred between religious communities.

CJP also invokes Sections 123(2), 123(3), 123(3A), and 125 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. According to the complaint, the speech amounted to undue influence upon voters, appeals on religious grounds, promotion of enmity between communities, and attempts to foster hatred during an election.

The organisation further alleges violations of Sections 196, 197(1), 299, 352, and 353 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. It argues that the speech promoted enmity between groups, undermined constitutional values, insulted a religious community, provoked public disorder, and disseminated claims intended to create fear and hostility.

The entire complaint may be read here:

Complaint against Jagannath Chattopadhyay

In a separate complaint on April 27, 2026 addressed to the Chief Electoral Officer, the District Magistrate of Birbhum, the Superintendent of Police, Birbhum, and the Inspector of Police, Suri Police Station, CJP raised allegations against BJP candidate Jagannath Chattopadhyay in connection with a campaign speech delivered in Suri on April 9, 2026.

According to the complaint, Chattopadhyay repeatedly framed the election as a battle to save Hindu culture and religious symbols. CJP alleges that he appealed directly to religious sentiments by urging voters to support the BJP in order to protect practices and symbols including Kanthi, Tilak, Panchali observances, Satyanarayan rituals, Shakha, Pola, Sindoor, and various places of worship.

The complaint reproduces portions of the speech in which Chattopadhyay allegedly declared that the election was necessary to safeguard these religious traditions and to protect the honour of “Sanatani Bengali women.”

CJP argues that such statements transformed the election from a contest over governance into what it describes as a religious mobilisation campaign directed at Hindu voters.

References to “Jihadis” and “Love Jihad”

A central aspect of the complaint concerns statements allegedly made by Chattopadhyay regarding “jihadis” and “Love Jihad.”

According to CJP, Chattopadhyay claimed that if the BJP did not come to power, “jihadis” would attack the Tulsi Mancha and Maa Kali would be placed in a prison van. The complaint also refers to statements concerning “Love Jihad,” which it characterises as an anti-Muslim conspiracy theory employed to create fear and hostility toward the minority community.

The organisation contends that these statements presented Muslims as existential threats to Hindu religious practices, women, and sacred spaces. According to the complaint, such rhetoric was intended to generate insecurity and resentment among voters and to encourage political support on explicitly religious grounds.

CJP argues that references to attacks on shrines, threats to deities, and dangers allegedly posed by “jihadis” served no legitimate electoral purpose and instead functioned as deliberate provocations designed to heighten communal tensions.

Electoral and constitutional concerns

The complaint states that Chattopadhyay’s speech repeatedly connected electoral success with the protection of religious symbols and practices. According to CJP, this transformed religious identity into a determining factor in electoral decision-making and thereby violated the principle that elections in a secular republic must remain free from religious appeals.

The organisation further alleges that the speech portrayed minorities as hostile actors while presenting the BJP as the sole defender of Hindu culture and safety. Such framing, according to the complaint, creates a climate of fear and exclusion that is incompatible with constitutional guarantees of equality and equal citizenship.

The complaint also contends that repeated references to “Love Jihad” and attacks on sacred sites created an atmosphere conducive to communal hostility and social unrest.

Legal provisions invoked

As in the complaint against Majumdar, CJP alleges violations of the Model Code of Conduct as well as Sections 123(2), 123(3), 123(3A), and 125 of the Representation of the People Act.

The organisation argues that the speech constituted an appeal to vote on religious grounds, promoted enmity between communities, and amounted to undue influence over voters through fear-based narratives.

CJP additionally invokes Sections 196, 197(1), 299, 352, and 353 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, alleging that the speech promoted hostility between groups, attacked constitutional values, insulted a religious community, and was likely to provoke public disorder.

The complaint relies on the same line of Supreme Court jurisprudence cited in the complaint against Majumdar, arguing that religious appeals during elections and speech targeting religious communities undermine democratic principles and constitutional values.

Common themes across both complaints

A striking feature of both complaints is CJP’s argument that the speeches were not isolated political remarks but formed part of a broader pattern of electoral mobilisation through religious polarisation.

In both cases, the organisation alleges that Muslim communities were portrayed as threats to Hindu culture, religious practices, and public life. Both complaints assert that references to demographic realities, religious symbols, festivals, and communal narratives were used to create divisions between communities and influence voter behaviour.

CJP further argues that both speeches were delivered during an active election period when the Model Code of Conduct was in force and therefore carried heightened implications for the integrity of the electoral process.

The entire complaint may be read here:

Reliefs sought by CJP

In both complaints, CJP has requested election authorities and police officials to initiate immediate action against the individuals concerned.

CJP has sought issuance of show-cause notices for alleged violations of the Model Code of Conduct, registration of FIRs under provisions of the Representation of the People Act and Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, and action against event organisers.

It has also requested that the individuals concerned be censured and barred from further election campaigning, that dissemination of the speeches be restricted, and that authorities disclose whether the events were videographed in accordance with Supreme Court directions relating to hate speech monitoring.

Related

Three Inflammatory Speeches, within two months prompt CJP to file complaint with Minority Commission and seek intervention

CJP files 5 hate speech complaints before CEO Maharashtra as violated MCC

CJP files 3 MCC violation complaints with CEO Maharashtra against Suresh Chavhanke for hate speech

The post CJP flags ‘communal polarisation campaign’ in Bengal polls, seeks action against BJP leaders over election speeches appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In its final judgement, the Court held that hate speech is “fundamentally antithetical” to Constitutional values of fraternity. It also found hate speech at odds with the ethos of Indian civilisation that are best captured by the maxim “vasudhaiva kutumbakam”. While the Court pronounced these notions splendiferously in the obiter, the operative part of the judgement remained minimal when it came to reliefs sought by the petitioners. Speech delivered by persons in positions of high political influence was also high in vitriol and the discrimination and harm test. As a result of the judgement dated April 26, BJP politicians and ministers Anurag Thakur and Kapil Mishra remain judicially uncensored for their inciteful conduct as have other protagonists who have contributed to a fragile social climate where, religious minorities most especially live in constant fear of harm, attack and acts of overt discrimination.

This piece analyses how and where the Supreme Court limited itself in this case. Before doing so, we examine hate speech itself. We contextualize how the efforts towards making a breakthrough in jurisprudence in understanding and tackling speech that causes harm (hate speech) –including the 267^th Law Commission Report—have been qualitatively diffused by this final verdict of the Supreme Court.

What is Hate Speech?

Hate speech is any speech that attacks a person or group on the basis of their race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexuality, or any other characteristic. It can be subtle or overt, and can have a profound impact on the targets of the speech. Primarily hate speech reduces the social standing of a particular group in the society. Hate speech can lead to stigmatisation, societal discrimination, physical and other kinds of harassment, and violence, including gendered violence where women and children are vulnerable. Hate speech creates a climate of intimidation, fear and division in society.

As per Jeremy Waldron, hate speech damages two related qualities. Firstly, he argues that it affects inclusivity. In pluralist democracies, we observe a milieu of different identities living together forming a heterogeneous social fabric. In such social fabrics, inclusiveness entails an assurance to each person that they can lead a regular life in the polity without facing “hostility, violence, discrimination or exclusion by others.” Secondly, he contends that dignity is damaged by hate speech too. Dignity as defined by him is one’s “basic [and equal] social standing… as a proper object of society’s protection and concern”. Hate speech—as we defined earlier—pierces through the heart of these values. Hate speech, ontologically, is a type of speech that aggressively shows groups as “others” by belittling them. At this juncture, it is important to note that speech, at least on some level, is constitutive of social reality. The existence of certain forms of expression makes a noticeable difference to the environment in which we live our lives. In an environment that is marred with hate speech the message of ‘exclusion’ and ‘hostility’ becomes part of the very look of that environment (becomes an intrinsic feature of that society), and thus breaks down the assurance of inclusiveness and damages dignity of groups.

Issues that have dogged the Courts, given the high decibel hate speech that India has been witnessing are evident in several judgements, analysed by the 267^th Law Commission Report (Chairman was Justice B.S. Chauhan). This report is itself worth a reference read as it analyses evolving hate speech jurisprudence the world over. We recommend that you read this report that is available here. Submitted by the Law Commission to the Ministry of Law and Justice on March 23, 2017, this critical document was made available to the public only on August 16, 2022.

Infact it was the orders passed by the Supreme Court in Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. UOI, 2014 that led to the 267^th Law Commission Report on Hate Speech in the first place.

Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. UOI

This was the first case of recent times that made some breakthrough in outlining the harm and discriminatory components that qualify hate speech. In Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. Union of India (2014), the Supreme Court was called to adjudicate, on merits, a PIL requesting it to frame guidelines prohibiting political hate speech. The court owing to the doctrine of Separation of powers, delegated this task to the Law Commission of India. However, while deferring the case the Court made certain observations that laid down the legal framework for hate speech laws vis-à-vis free speech. The Court then went on to hold that

“Hate speech is an effort to marginalise individuals based on their membership in a group. Using expression that exposes the group to hatred, hate speech seeks to delegitimise group members in the eyes of the majority, reducing their social standing and acceptance within society. Hate speech, therefore, rises beyond causing distress to individual group members. It can have a societal impact. Hate speech lays the groundwork for later, broad attacks on vulnerable that can range from discrimination, to ostracism, segregation, deportation, violence and, in the most extreme cases, to genocide. Hate speech also impacts a protected group’s ability to respond to the substantive ideas under debate, thereby placing a serious barrier to their full participation in our democracy.”

(Paragraph 7)

By putting “marginalisation and delegitmis [ation]” as the fulcrum of determining hate speech, the Court effectively, held dignity and equality to be the grundnorm that speech must respect. It further clarified that hate speech is not directed towards individuals, or rather, is not about personal offence. It is as a matter of fact, an offence against a people. The Court goes on to adopt a consequentialist approach and lays down that hate speech has “societal impact” that could lead to violence. Hence, it establishes a causal link between speech and its (violent) reactions. Lastly, the Court says that hate speech is anathema to democracy.

This judgment lays the stepping stone for the “Proactive approach” that Supreme Court adopts in dealing with hate speech for the next few years.

This report by CJP, that may be read here, calls for a re-look at the provisions on hate speech, calling for a definition that takes into account recent jurisprudence and moves away from the colonial construct in Indian penal laws

Amish Devgan v. UOI

Another judgement, both recent and relevant, is the 2020 Amish Devgan v Union of India. Here, the Supreme Court was called upon to quash FIR filed against TV journalist Amish Devgan who had allegedly made derogatory remarks against an Islamic saint. The Court denied the relief. However, while refusing to quash the FIR the Court gave further directions on how to classify hate speech;

“The ‘context’, as indicated above, has a certain key variable, namely, ‘who’ and ‘what’ is involved and ‘where’ and the ‘occasion, time and under what circumstances’ the case arises. The ‘who’ is always plural for it encompasses the speaker who utters the statement that constitutes ‘hate speech’ and also the audience to whom the statement is addressed which includes both the target and the others. Variable context review recognises that all speeches are not alike. This is not only because of group affiliations, but in the context of dominant group hate speech against a vulnerable and discriminated group, and also the impact of hate speech depends on the person who has uttered the words. The variable recognises that a speech by ‘a person of influence’ such as a top government or executive functionary, opposition leader, political or social leader of following, or a credible anchor on a T.V. show carries a far more credibility and impact than a statement made by a common person on the street.” …

(Para 51)

“Further, certain categories of speakers may be granted a degree of latitude in terms of the State response to their speech. Communities with a history of deprivation, oppression, and persecution may sometimes speak in relation to their lived experiences, resulting in the words and tone being harsher and more critical than usual. Their historical experience often comes to be accepted by the society as the rule, resulting in their words losing the gravity that they otherwise deserve. In such a situation, it is likely for persons from these communities to reject the tenet of civility, as polemical speech and symbols that capture the emotional loading can play a strong role in mobilising. Such speech should be viewed not from the position of a person of privilege or a community without such a historical experience, but rather, the courts should be more circumspect when penalising such speech.”

(Para 51)

While seemingly obvious, the Court in this case gives a crucial direction about contextualisation when deciding on hate speech. The Court recognises two realities. Freedom of expression as a facilitator in a diverse and plural society, critical to equality and free thought within a democracy. However, just like a regular marketplace, the marketplace of ideas is also rife with inequalities. These inequalities include limitations in access, opportunity and socio-cultural status: persons with executive/political influence, journalists, and public figures command a much wider reach and audience. Hence, when such public figure spew hate speech, the impact is significantly higher, ergo they should be more cautious. Second, the Court humanises the speaker and the audience. In most cases, the social standing of the speaker and the audience is different; certain communities have a historic disadvantage while others hold a dominant position in society even today. Subsequently, the Court gave a wider margin of speech to the marginalised communities owing to their lived realities and historic experiences; it further conceded that hate speech made by dominant group against vulnerable groups has a significantly more impact.

While recognising these realities, the Court did its job in tailoring a hate speech jurisprudence that is suitable with the Indian social structure blemished with caste, religious differences and patriarchy. These two previous judgements laid the foundation for a proactive approach against hate speech. They will continue to guide future legal interventions.

Coming back to the 267^th Law Commission that remains a crucial and seminal document for anyone who wishes to engage with hate speech. After a close and thorough examination of the Constituent Assembly debates, Indian constitutional courts jurisprudence and International law (a crucial reference), the Law Commission recommends that measures which limit or restrain freedom of speech and expression, may/can do so when the “three-part test” is justified [(UN HRC, “General Comment 34” One Hundred and Second Session July 11-29, 2011 (July 21, 2011)]:

i) Measure/s must be prescribed by law;

ii) Measure must satisfy legitimate aims;

iii) Measure must be necessary to achieve its stated aim and must be proportionate to the harm that it attempts to prevent or redress. The standard of proportionality in this context has also been understood to include a requirement for minimum impairment of the right being restricted, i.e., the restriction must not do any more damage to the right than is absolutely necessary to meet its aim. [Necessity and proportionality]

Finally, the 267^th Law Commission Report makes relevant and sharp recommendations. Concluding that the Supreme Court, in the case of Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 2014 SC 1591, observed that the issue of hate speech deserved deeper consideration by the Law Commission of India. Quoting the Court, the Law Commission stated that “…we request the Law Commission to also examine the issues raised herein thoroughly and also to consider, if it deems proper, defining the expression “hate speech” and make recommendations to the Parliament to strengthen the Election Commission to curb the menace of “hate speeches” irrespective of whenever made”.

The Law Commission quoting the Supreme Court referred to its consistent clarifications that directions are issued only when there appears to be a total vacuum in law, i.e. “complete absence of active law to provide for the effective enforcement of basic human rights”. In case there is inaction on the part of the executive for whatsoever reason, the court has always stepped in to discharge its constitutional obligation to enforce the law. The Court further observed “in case of vacuum of legal regime, to deal with a particular situation, the court may issue guidelines to provide a solution till such time as the legislature acts to perform its role by enacting proper legislation to cover the field.”

Given the above observations and directives of the Supreme Court in the Pravasi Bhalai Case, “the Commission considered the laws on hate speech in various jurisdictions, judicial pronouncements of the Supreme Court and the High Courts and analysed the existing provisions relevant to the subject matter. “Consequently, the Commission made concrete suggestions.

“The Law Commission suggests amendments to the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 by adding new provisions on ‘Prohibiting incitement to hatred’ following section 153B IPC and ‘Causing fear, alarm, or provocation of violence in certain cases’ following section 505 IPC, and accordingly amending the First Schedule of the CrPC.”

These suggestions have been put together in the form of the Commission’s Report No. 267 title “Hate Speech”, which was submitted for consideration by the Government in March 2017.

What did the Union Government do, however?

The present government, in its first term in 2017, is currently in its third. While the Law Commission found, previous sections in the Indian Penal Code (IPC) –Section 153a, 153b, 153c and 505 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) wholly inadequate in identifying and prosecuting the growing corrosive phenomenon of hate speech and recommended legislative additions through amendments. The newly implemented Criminal Laws, the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) 2023 broke no new ground and completely bypassed or ignored both the Supreme Court and Law Commission.

In fact, the new criminal laws, that were hurriedly rushed through Parliament while 146 Members of Parliament were suspended, with no amendments being discussed not entertained –and no referrals to a Joint Select Committee as is the norm. Infact the new criminal laws had been evolved in a secretive fashion by a “Committee” consisting of former Vice Chancellor, National Law University, Delhi (NLUD), Professor Srikrishna Deva Rao, present VC, NLUD, GS Bajpeyi and advocate Mahesh Jethmalani, Rajsya Sabha member, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). That such a committee also ignored Supreme Court judgements with clear-cut directions on sections in our law for prosecuting hate speech, as also the Law Commission’s 267th Report is the moot point.

Read this CJP’s Report on Comparisons between the IPC/CRPC and BNSS here. The new criminal laws dealing with the subject matter are simply not sufficient to cope with the menace of ‘Hate Speeches’. Hate/derogatory/inflammatory speech has not been defined in the new Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita 2023 and neither in any other penal law. An opportunity to amend our laws to the betterment of a diverse society has been lost.

It is in this context, and failure by the executive, again, that the journey of the present litigation, interim orders and then the final judgement dated April 26, 2026 needs to be understood and read.

In the Interim: Several Preventive Orders to Curb Hate Speech

The backdrop to multiple Interim Orders lies in petitions filed before the Supreme Court arising from the Haridwar Dharam Sansad of December 2021, at which Hindu religious leaders made genocidal calls against Muslims. These petitions, filed by journalist Qurban Ali, former Patna High Court Judge Anjana Prakash, activist Tushar Gandhi, and advocates Firoz Iqbal Khan and Harpreet Mansukhani Saigal, were clubbed together and heard by a bench of former Justice K.M. Joseph and Justice B.V. Nagarathna (Tushar Gandhi vs. Rakesh Asthana).

In September 2022, a bench comprising of J K.M Joseph and Hrishikesh Roy (in Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay vs. UOI) expressed serious concern at unregulated television news channels and directed the Union of India to state on affidavit whether it intended to legislate against hate speech in line with the Law Commission’s 267th Report.

Shaheen Abdullah and Suo Moto FIRs: In October 2022, the same bench (J K.M Joseph and Hrishikesh Roy) in Shaheen Abdullah vs. UOI passed a watershed order in these clubbed matters directing the Governments of Delhi, Uttarakhand, and Uttar Pradesh to take suo-moto action against any hate speech crime without waiting for a complaint, warning that failure to act would be contempt of court. The order may be found here.

In January 2023, in the Tushar Gandhi contempt petition, a bench of CJI Chandrachud and Justice Narasimha pulled up the Delhi Police for taking five months to register an FIR against Sudarshan News editor Suresh Chavhanke, who had administered a violent oath to make India a Hindu Rashtra, in violation of the earlier Tehseen Poonawalla directions. The Order can be found here.

On February 3, 2023, the bench of former Justice Joseph and Justice Pardiwala passed preventive orders in the Shaheen Abdullah matter. Hearing a plea against a proposed Sakal Hindu Samaj rally in Maharashtra, the Court recorded the state government’s undertaking that the meeting would only be permitted if no hate speech was made, directed the police to invoke Section 151 CrPC for preventive arrests if necessary, and ordered that the event be video-recorded. In a visible on-ground effect of this order, the Uttarakhand government refused permission to a Dharam Sansad in Roorkee. This order may be found here.

On April 28, 2023, in the matter of Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay vs Union of India, the Court extended this suo moto FIR obligation from Delhi, Uttarakhand, and Uttar Pradesh to all States and Union Territories. The order for such extension may be found here.

On August 2, 2023, a special hearing was convened in the Shaheen Abdullah matter following anti-Muslim violence in the Nuh district of Haryana triggered by a Bajrang Dal and VHP procession. A bench of Justices Sanjiv Khanna and SVN Bhatti directed the Delhi Police and the governments of Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, and Haryana to ensure no untoward incident took place at upcoming VHP rallies and to video-record events in sensitive areas. This order may be found here.

Moving towards “practical and effective” steps to curb hate speech

On August 25, 2023, the same bench (Sanjiv Khanna and SVN Bhatti) in the Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay Matter urged “practical and effective” steps to implement earlier directions and sought compliance reports from States on the Tehseen Poonawalla Judgement (2018) requirement to designate a Superintendent of Police-rank nodal officer in each district. This order can be found here.

Responding to this, in November 2023 the Ministry of Home Affairs filed an affidavit confirming that 28 States and Union Territories had appointed such nodal officers. An order of November 29 then directed nodal counsel to prepare a consolidated chart of all pending petitions and their prayers. This order may be found here.

In January 2024, a freshly constituted bench of Justices Sanjiv Khanna and Dipankar Datta directed the District Magistrate and Superintendent of Police in Yavatmal (Maharashtra) and Raipur (Chhattisgarh) to take appropriate steps to prevent hate speech at upcoming rallies of the Hindu Janajagruti Samiti and BJP MLA T. Raja Singh. This order may be found here.

Throughout all these orders, while the Court consistently refused to grant pre-emptive gag orders on rallies, it simultaneously imposed obligations on the State to take effective measures. This is the proactive approach in its fullest expression, not the silencing of the speaker, but the activation of the State as a guarantor of inclusive public space.

Detailed report on previous Supreme Court’s orders in this case may be found here and here.

The Gavel Falls: 2026 Judgement in Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay vs Union of India

Facts:

The 2026 judgement of Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay vs Union of India saw a sharp departure from this proactive approach. The judgement delivered clubbed all the above-mentioned petitions in its scope and adjudication.

To better understand this departure let us look at the facts of the case, and what the Court was called to adjudicate on. The petitioners, from various parts of the country, filed 13 writ petitions seeking a range of reliefs. These included directions to the Centre to implement the Law Commission’s 267th Report, directions to stop the dissemination of fake news and communally biased media content, directions to lodge criminal cases against persons committing violence against minorities, and issuance of a continuing mandamus to ensure registration of FIRs in hate speech cases. Some petitions pertained to specific incidents, such various alleged hate speeches made by public figures across different States including “desh…….” by Anurag Thakur.

In addition to the writ petitions, several contempt petitions were also filed. These alleged violation of the Court’s interim orders (as noted above) dated October 21, 2022 and April 28, 2023, both of which had directed authorities to take suo moto action against hate speech without waiting for a formal complaint.

This reveals that Indian citizens have always been on the forefront of combatting hate speech. From filing cases seeking specific reliefs that prevent hate speech to calling Court to formulate hate speech guidelines. Indian citizenry has consistently voiced its concern over legitimisation of escalating hate speech and strongly condemned it. However, in this case it was the Court that showed a marked reluctance in taking the requisite action against hate speech.

Decision:

The Court held that there exists no legislative vacuum and the pre-existing penal framework is sufficient to address hate speech. Further, it stated that no contempt proceedings could be initiated against the police for not taking suo moto actions, as it would be an overbroad interpretation of the Order that mandated such suo moto actions. Lastly, the Court dismissed filing of an FIR against the two accused citing that “no cognizable offence” can be made out.

Analysis of the Findings by the Court

On the question of legislative vacuum and need for hate speech laws

Herein, firstly, the Court had to decide whether there exists a legislative vacuum with respect to hate speech law that could prompt the Court to order guidelines or ask the government to bring in specific laws combatting hate speech. The Court declined the plea and held that Indian Criminal law has sufficient laws dealing with hate speech and therefore, no legislative vacuum exists that could prompt the Court to take any action. The Court makes no referral or mention of the developments in its own court (Pravasi Bhalai..) that led to the 267^th Report of the Law Commission and its detailed findings and recommendations. By passing this jurisprudence, the Court has done little justice to a corrosive phenomenon that is negatively impacting the equality and dignity of millions of marginalised Indians.

In Para 37, the Court held that “several provisions which penalise acts that promote enmity between different groups, outrage religious sentiments, or disturb public tranquillity [exist]”, later the Court goes on to list the provisions of the IPC that cover the previously mentioned. Now, with respect, this is where the Court’s understanding of hate speech is lacking. Hate speech is not necessarily the same as “outraging religious sentiments” or “disturbing public tranquillity”; these are separate offences that have separate requirements. The Court here has conflated these offences with hate speech, and owing to the confusion, held that there exists no legislative vacuum.

The Court mentions Section 124A, 153A, 153B, 295A, 298, and 505(2) of the Indian Penal Code to be covering hate speech.

Section 124A criminalises sedition. Sedition is a fundamentally different act as compared to hate speech, the former deals with inciting violence against the country while the latter is about lowering dignity of a people. Sedition laws clearly have nothing to do with hate speech (as also highlighted by the Law commission’s report on hate speech in paragraphs 6.19 & 6.20).

Further, Section 153 and 505 disallows promotion of feeling of enmity, hatred or ill will between different religious or racial or language or regional groups or castes and communities and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony. While prima facie it seems to prohibit hate speech, the judicial interpretation of these provisions show a different picture. Moreover, to repeat the aspect of impact and intent in causing harm and denial of equal rights and dignity –aspects dealt with at length in Pravasi Bhalai and subsequently the 267^th Law Commission Report, have been left un-mentioned in this verdict.

On the question of Contempt Proceedings against Authorities

Secondly, the Court was called to decide whether contempt proceedings should be initiated against the Police in pursuance to its own order dated April 28, 2023. As per the Order the police was expected to file a suo moto complaint against hate speech whenever an instance comes across them. Any failure or hesitation on the part of the authorities in complying with the previously mentioned directions would be viewed seriously and may attract proceedings for contempt of Court. In pursuance of this Order, several petitioners asked for the contempt proceedings to be started against the responsible authorities. However, the Court denied the plea and held,

“The element of “hesitation” or failure to act despite knowledge of a cognizable offence is a sine qua non for invoking the contempt jurisdiction of this Court. In cases where the petitioner has not even approached the authorities or placed the relevant material before them, it would be wholly inappropriate to infer disobedience or “hesitation” on the part of the authorities. In the absence of such foundational facts, the contempt jurisdiction cannot be invoked.”

(Paragraphs 159 & 160)

The Court therefore held that in the absence of material placed before the authorities, it can be assumed that the authorities had no knowledge, and therefore, it could not be said that they were hesitant in starting proceedings against the accused. This reluctance or failure to hold police authorities responsible for such egregious conduct (hate speech) can only add to the prevalent climate of impunity. Previous and several Orders by the Supreme Court, it is mandated for police to “monitor” and “videotape” speeches in sensitive areas where there is a likelihood of utterance of hate speech. Now, in the final judgement, the Court’s failure to initiate action on the police authorties’ failure or reluctance to act, the Court permits inaction on such crimes committed. In doing so, it failed to take into account its own Orders that mandated monitoring of rallies and speeches by the police. The authorities now can, refuse to monitor the rallies where hate speech is made and claim immunity from contempt proceedings that arise out of their inaction by simply pleading ignorance. In essence, it appears that the Court made non-compliance with its previous order (monitoring) as a defence to contempt proceedings in instances of no suo moto action being taken!

On the question of appeal of Delhi High Court’s Order [“no cognizable offence made out”]:

The Supreme Court was also required to check the correctness of the Delhi High Court order that dismissed the Writ petition pleading the High Court to file FIR against Anurag Thakur and Parvesh Varma. Before we analyse the Supreme Court’s response to the appeal, it is pertinent to first look at the High Court’s order.

Owing to the bar on prosecution of public servants under Section 197 of the CrPC (that is without sanction granted by the executive), the magistrate refused to file an FIR against Anurag Thakur and Parvesh Verma as there was no “prior sanction” to prosecute the public servant as required in Section 197. The writ in the High Court dealt exclusively dealt with this question of jurisdiction, i.e., “the only question for consideration before this Court is limited to the extent of adjudicating whether the [Magistrate] has rightly dismissed the complaint [owing to lack of sanction]” The High Court, congruent to the Trial Court, did not delve into the merits of the complaint. Hence, neither the Trial Court nor the High Court adjudged whether the contents of the speech itself made by the accused constituted the crime of hate speech. The High Court on the question of jurisdiction sided with the Trial Court’s finding and held that no FIR could be filed wanting sanction. It is in this backdrop, that the Supreme Court’s was required to examine the speeches themselves

The Supreme Court in this appeal, did, overrule the High Court’s finding on the question of jurisdiction. The High Court had incorrectly concluded that government sanction needed to be obtained before a Magistrate could direct the police to register an FIR under Section 156(3) CrPC.

The Supreme Court clarified that this requirement of prior sanction only kicks in at the later stage of a court taking cognizance of an offence; it has no application at the earlier stage of simply setting the criminal justice process in motion through FIR registration.

Later, however, in Paragraphs 136-138 of the Supreme Court judgement when the Court starts to assess the merits of the complaint, we find several evasions. The Court held that “the High Court has, on an independent assessment, held that the speeches in question do not disclose the commission of any cognizable offence, observing that the statements were not directed against any specific community nor did they incite violence or public disorder” (Paragraph 136). This is, with respect, factually incorrect. The High Court had not taken any independent assessment of the speech, it merely dealt with the jurisdictional (procedural) aspect of the complaint and had not paid any heed to the content of the speech. In the following paragraph,

“Upon a careful consideration of the material placed on record, including the alleged speeches, the status report dated February 26, 2020 submitted before the Trial Court, and the reasons recorded by the courts below, we are in agreement with the conclusion that no cognizable offence is made out.”

(Para 137 of the Supreme Order).

The Court again, with respect, is mistaken in these considerations. At the cost of repetition, neither the Trial Court nor the High Court had held that “no cognizable offence is made out” while adjudicating on the content of the speech. Both Courts had merely limited themselves to the question of jurisdiction. In any case, merely agreeing with the Order of the lower Courts without giving any reasoning violates the principles of natural justice. Fundamental natural justice principles require that the Court provides some (not necessarily lengthy) reasoning for agreeing with the lower Court’s decisions. However, in this instance, the Supreme Court has overturned the legal basis of the High Court’ Order yet, without providing any reason, agreed with the outcome.

While arriving at its conclusions, the Court stated,

 “Accordingly, while we disapprove the reasoning adopted by the High Court on the issue of prior sanction, we find no ground to interfere with the ultimate conclusion” (Paragraph 138).

The reason previous Courts had held that no FIR could be filed against the accused is only on grounds of the lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction was proper, and the police could file an FIR against the accused without the sanction. The natural course of action here would then have been delving into the merits of the complaints or ordering the Magistrate to delve into the merits of the complaints. The Supreme Court however does neither. It absolves itself of providing any reasons for its decision by simply holding that “[there] are no grounds to interfere”.

The Court here, in effect, gives a clean chit to the accused without any application of judicial mind to the actual content of the speech, which makes out an alleged offence. At no level of judiciary was there an application of judicial mind to the content of the impugned speech. Despite that, the accused have got “a clean chit.”

Keeping in mind that the Court did not delve into content of the impugned speech, it is important for us to independently examine the speech by the two main accused can, at all, be classified as hate speech.

I. Anurag Thakur

Location: Delhi

Date: January 27, 2020

Link: <https://www.groundxero.in/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Delhi_riots_Fact_Finding_2020_compressed.pdf>

 “These [Protestors at Shaheen Bagh] are Traitors to our Country, Shoot them”

Anurag Thakur, a prominent member of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in his infamous speech had called for killing of the supposed “traitors” of the Country. Before we delve into the call for outright physical violence, it is pertinent to decode the euphuisms used, as context is very important in determining hate speech as held by the Amish Devgan judgment. The backdrop of the speech was the protestors at Shaheen bagh who were peacefully protesting against the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019. It is very evident from the context of the speech that the traitors referred to in the speech are these protestors, none else.

Most of the people who were involved in these protests at Shaheen Bagh were Muslims. Anurag Thakur deliberately invokes the slur, calls Shaheen Bagh protestors as “traitors” of the Nation and several times ask the crowd to echo his call for violence, making a clearly inciteful speech. By calling for violence against these protestors in a charged environment (that are largely Muslims demographically), Thakur indirectly calls for violence against Muslims at large.

Moreover, Thakur was a Union Minister of State when he uttered these statements. Therefore, his statements had the potential to have far-reaching consequences owing to both the reach and influence that politicians yield. These are important considerations when classifying hate speech applying the Amish Devgan Judgement.

II. Parvesh Verma

Location: Delhi and ANI News (Cable network through TV)

Date: January 28, 2020 & January 27, 2020

Link: <https://www.groundxero.in/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Delhi_riots_Fact_Finding_2020_compressed.pdf>

“They will enter into your homes. They will abduct your women and rape and kill them.”

[Via TV on ANI News]

Parvesh Verma uses verbal imagery the protestors at Shaheen Bagh (largely Muslims) to instil fear in the audience. He remarks that these protestors will barge into the Hindu homes, kill, and rape Hindu women. This communally charged sentence aims at fear mongering. This is also intended to create division and disharmony between the two communities.

“If my government is formed in Delhi, then give me only one month’s time. Will not leave any mosque built in my constituency on government land, I will remove them all.”

[Via TV on ANI News]

This statement is ipso facto inflammatory, communal and a threat to Muslims. By calling for destroying all the mosques in Delhi, Varma is intimidating and threatening Muslims of Violence at large. Parvesh Verma is a politician with great reach and influence, this reach is amplified by the fact that his first two impugned statements came via Television, meaning his speech could have been accessed immediately by millions of people. This becomes an important consideration in determining hate speech.

“If the BJP comes to power in Delhi, we will clear Shaheen Bagh of all protestors within 1 hour. Not a single person will be visible.”

This statement does not require much explanation. It is direct threat to violence against the protestors of Shaheen Bagh. These statements carry greater weight as they were uttered by an influential person. He is currently the Deputy Chief Minister of Delhi.

It is these three aspects of the final judgement (a. failing to give any directions on combatting hate speech, b. failing to initiate contempt proceedings c. and giving clean chit to the accused), that we can discern a clear shift in the Court’s approach during the adjudication of these cases, over five years. Interim Orders were proactive, the final judgement status quo-ist. Despite several and specific complaints, the Supreme Court chose not to take any action against hate speech.

The Court missed an important opportunity here to carve out specific directions to combat hate speech, neither did it attempt to fill up the legislative vacuum.

The Law Commission of India in its 267^th Report recognised this legal vacuum and had recommended adding specific sections to strengthen the law(s) dealing with hate speech. Worse, the Court watered down its own previous order that required suo moto actions against instances of hate speech.

By shifting the onus on complainants to file FIRs the Court restored the status quo and negated its own previous directions wherein it had placed the onus squarely on the shoulders of the authorities to prevent and take action against hate speech. Lastly, by giving a clean chit to the particular accused without even an examination into the content to merit of the speeches, the Court has set an undesirable precedent.

In the final judgement, the judges have over dozens of pages warned against dangers of hate speech in a democratic societies, in fact, the judgement had a specific section titled “Epilogue: An ode to ‘Fraternity’ in the Preamble vis- à-vis the idea of ‘vasudhaiva kutumbakam’”.

Yet, by failing to issue specific directions, it has not acted on its own wise words. Finally, this verdict will act not as a check but a possible enabler wherein influential protagonists can get away with their inflammatory speeches. Though the judgement recognises that politicians have a special duty to be mindful of their words owing to the wide reach and influence they have, the Court stops short of ensuring any accountability. The overall impact of this judgement on the hate speech jurisprudence in India is limiting. Instead of listing sharp directives to the executive to act, even directing he legislature to examine the legislative lacuna, the Court has missed an excellent opportunity.

Though India, experiences, on an average,  five instances of hate speech occurring every day, these may well continue without check. In choosing general observations over specific actionable directive, the Supreme Court, also known as the “Court of last resort” has caused an acute disappointment.

The complete judgment of the Supreme Court may be read here:

Interim Orders in these cases from September 2022 to January 2024 may be found here:

The High Court Judgement in the matter may be read here:

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Hamzah Patel)

Related:

India Hate Lab Report 2025: How Hate Speech has been normalised in the public sphere

BNS 2023 does nothing to bring in a nuanced effective understanding of Hate Speech, making its prosecution even more difficult

Supreme Court in 2023: Several steps forward, miles to go in the fight against hate

Hate Speech and the Supreme Court: From constitutional alarm to institutional closure

Hate Speech by BJP’s Top Brass fuelled Build Up to Delhi Violence: Minorities Commission

The post The Supreme Court blinks when it comes to Hate Speech appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The judgment came in a writ petition filed by Dabir Rahman challenging a 2018 opinion of a Foreigners Tribunal which had declared him to be a foreigner who entered India after 25 March 1971 — the statutory cut-off date under the Assam Accord framework.

A Division Bench comprising Justice Sanjay Kumar Medhi and Justice Pranjal Das dismissed the challenge and upheld the Tribunal’s findings, holding that the petitioner had failed to discharge the mandatory evidentiary burden imposed by Section 9 of the Foreigners Act.

Yet, beyond the immediate outcome of the case, the ruling once again exposes the deeply contentious architecture of citizenship determination operating in Assam — a framework built upon a colonial-era reverse burden law, extraordinary evidentiary expectations, and a process in which impoverished and document-deficient individuals are often compelled to prove lineage, residence, and belonging across generations through fragile and inconsistent archival traces.

Court reiterates that burden of proof “never shifts”

At the heart of the ruling lies the Court’s reaffirmation of the exceptional evidentiary framework governing Foreigners Tribunal proceedings in Assam. The Bench observed that Section 9 of the Foreigners Act creates a complete departure from ordinary evidentiary principles and squarely places the burden upon the person proceeded against to prove that he or she is not a foreigner. Stressing the overriding nature of the provision, the Court held:

The Bench observed:

“With regard to the aspect of burden of proof as laid down in Section 9 of the Act of 1946, the law is well settled that the burden of proof that a proceedee is an Indian citizen is always on the said proceedee and never shifts. In the said Section, there is non-obstante clause that the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act would not be applicable.” (Para 18)

The Court rejected the petitioner’s contention that, in the absence of rebuttal evidence from the State, the Tribunal ought to have accepted his claim of citizenship. The Bench made it clear that citizenship cannot be presumed merely because the State fails to adduce contrary evidence. In proceedings under the Foreigners Act, the initial and continuing burden remains solely upon the proceedee throughout.

The ruling therefore reinforces a long-standing judicial position that citizenship claims before Foreigners Tribunals are not adjudicated through adversarial balancing of evidence in the conventional sense, but through a statutory reverse burden mechanism requiring the proceedee to affirmatively establish citizenship through reliable documentary linkage.

One cannot forget that the Foreigners Act, 1946 is not merely a pre-Constitution statute — it is a pre-Independence colonial enactment originally designed to regulate the entry, presence, and departure of foreigners during British rule. Significantly, the statute itself contains no detailed machinery for identification or detection of foreigners. That role eventually emerged through the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964, which vested wide discretionary powers in quasi-judicial tribunals tasked with determining citizenship status.

What makes Section 9 particularly extraordinary is that it creates a reverse burden framework unlike ordinary criminal or civil adjudication. In conventional jurisprudence, the State must first establish foundational facts before the burden shifts onto an accused person. Reverse burden clauses in statutes such as narcotics, customs, or dowry laws operate only after certain threshold facts are established by the prosecution.

Citizenship proceedings in Assam, however, frequently begin merely on the basis of suspicion, “D-voter” marking, vague border police references (notices issued without any prior investigations), or unverifiable allegations of illegal migration — after which the entire burden shifts onto the proceedee to prove citizenship.

The present judgment strongly reiterates this framework but does not substantially engage with the constitutional tensions underlying such an approach.

Detailed piece on this legal and existential dilemma may be read here.

A constitutional court’s treatment of documentary discrepancies

One of the most striking aspects of the ruling lies in the Court’s treatment of discrepancies in names, ages, electoral entries, and village descriptions.

Before the Tribunal, the petitioner had relied upon electoral rolls of 1966, 1971, 1997 and 2018, a voter identity card, NRC acknowledgement receipt, legacy data code, and a Gaonburah certificate to establish linkage with his projected father and claim Indian citizenship.

However, the High Court found “lots of inconsistencies” in the documents. The Court noted that the names of the projected parents differed across the 1966 and 1971 voter lists. It also pointed to changes in village names and inconsistencies relating to the petitioner’s projected brother, who appeared as a 27-year-old in the 1971 voter list despite his absence in the earlier 1966 roll.

The Bench noted:

“So far as the Voters Lists of 1966 and 1971 are concerned, apart from the fact that the same would not serve as link documents, it is found that there are lots of inconsistencies. In the Voter List of 1966, the names of the parents were Jasi Seikh (father) and Moujan Nessa (mother) and the village was Bhelenganari Part No.54. On the other hand, in the Voter List of 1971, the names are Jasimuddin (father) and Matujan (mother), there is also a change in the village to No.3 Nangli Char. Further, though the same contains the name of a projected brother, Tabibar Rahman, it is seen that the said projected brother was 27 years of age in 1971 and therefore, it was necessary for his name to be featured in the earlier Voters List especially, in the List of 1966 along with his parents. Though the Voters Lists of 1989 and 1993 have been referred, those have not been exhibited.” (Para 23)

One of the most damaging aspects of the petitioner’s case, according to the Court, was the unexplained absence of documentary continuity over several decades. The Bench noted that by 1997, the petitioner was already shown as being 45 years old. Yet, there were no exhibited voter lists or contemporaneous records from the earlier years reflecting his presence.

The Court remarked:

“What is intriguing is the fact that though in 1997, the Page No.# 13/14 petitioner was aged 45 years why Voters List of earlier years did not contain his name and have not been proved. As regards the Voters List of 2018, the same is not a certified copy. It is also noted that there is inordinate and unexplained delay in the Voters List produced and exhibited. As noted above, the first Voters List wherein the name of the petitioner finds place is of the year 1997 and the previous Voters List which has been relied upon is of the year 1971 and the huge gap of more than 25 years remains unexplained. Even thereafter, the Voters List produced, though uncertified is of the year, 2018 which is after a gap of about two decades.” (Para 24)

This aspect of the ruling is particularly important because it reflects the judiciary’s increasing insistence upon documentary continuity in citizenship adjudication. Merely producing isolated voter lists from scattered years, without establishing a consistent and traceable documentary chain, may not suffice to prove citizenship claims. The Court’s reasoning indicates that unexplained gaps in documentary history can themselves generate adverse inferences regarding the authenticity and reliability of the citizenship claim.

These inconsistencies were ultimately treated as fatal to the petitioner’s claim.

Yet, the judgment raises larger concerns regarding how constitutional courts evaluate documentary irregularities in Assam’s citizenship litigation. Spelling variations, phonetic inconsistencies, transliteration errors, age discrepancies, and changes in village nomenclature are endemic to rural documentation practices in Assam, especially among poor and marginalised communities whose records often span decades of floods, displacement, illiteracy, migration within districts, administrative restructuring, and inconsistent clerical practices across Assamese, Bengali, and English records.

Women, landless labourers, internally displaced families, and Bengali-speaking Muslims are particularly vulnerable to such documentary instability. The judgment, however, appears to approach these discrepancies through a framework of suspicion rather than social context.

Notably, the Supreme Court itself in Sirajul Hoque v. State of Assam had intervened against precisely such rigid treatment of documentary inconsistencies, setting aside a Foreigners Tribunal order where spelling discrepancies in ancestral names had been treated as determinative of foreignness. The present ruling, however, appears to adopt a far stricter evidentiary posture.

Citizenship through documents — or documentary survival?

The High Court also reiterated that oral testimony, in the absence of reliable documentary corroboration, carries limited evidentiary value in Foreigners Tribunal proceedings. Rejecting the petitioner’s attempt to rely upon oral assertions and unproved certificates, the Court held:

“In the case of Bijoy Das Vs. UOI reported in2018 (3) GLT 118, this Court Page No.# 14/14 has laid down that in proceedings of this nature, oral evidence alone would not be enough and such evidence is required to be supported and corroborated by documentary evidence and contemporaneous records. However, in this case, the same has not been able to be done by the petitioner. We are of the view that the petitioner as proceedee had failed to discharge his burden to prove his citizenship.” (Para 26)

The Gaonburah certificate relied upon by the petitioner was also rejected on the ground that it had not been proved in accordance with law.

At one level, the reasoning reflects settled evidentiary principles repeatedly applied in Foreigners Tribunal jurisprudence. At another, however, the judgment once again foregrounds a deeper structural paradox within Assam’s citizenship regime: citizenship has increasingly become dependent upon documentary preservation across generations in a country where millions historically lacked formal birth registration, land ownership, literacy, institutional access, or bureaucratic continuity.

The Citizenship Act, 1955 itself does not prescribe any singular document as conclusive proof of citizenship for natural-born citizens. Yet, in practice, Foreigners Tribunal proceedings have evolved into extraordinarily document-centric adjudications where the inability to produce perfectly consistent records from decades ago may itself generate suspicion of foreignness.

The burden imposed upon proceedees is often particularly severe because the documents demanded by the system are precisely those least likely to have survived among impoverished populations vulnerable to floods, erosion, displacement, or chronic administrative exclusion.

In Assam, where river erosion has destroyed entire villages and displaced lakhs over generations, the expectation of seamless documentary continuity across fifty or sixty years often sits uneasily with lived social realities.

Tribunal opinion upheld

After examining the entire evidentiary record, the Division Bench concluded that the petitioner had failed to discharge the statutory burden imposed under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act.

The Court ultimately held that the petitioner as proceedee had failed to discharge his burden to prove his citizenship. Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed and the Foreigners Tribunal’s 2018 opinion declaring the petitioner to be a foreigner who entered India after 25 March 1971 was affirmed.

Suspicion, alienage, and the missing foundational question

The ruling also revives a larger jurisprudential question that has long haunted citizenship litigation in Assam: when does suspicion become sufficient to trigger adjudication under the Foreigners Act?

While Section 9 shifts the burden to the proceedee, critics of the citizenship determination framework have repeatedly argued that the State must nevertheless establish at least some foundational material pointing toward alienage before invoking such an extreme reverse burden mechanism.

This distinction becomes crucial because failure to conclusively prove citizenship does not automatically establish foreign nationality.

Yet, in many citizenship proceedings in Assam, the inability to produce satisfactory documents gradually transforms into a judicial declaration that the person is a Bangladeshi who entered India illegally after 1971 — often without independent evidence establishing foreign origin, foreign domicile, or cross-border migration.

The present judgment does not substantially engage with this conceptual distinction. Instead, the Court proceeds from the premise that failure to satisfactorily establish Indian citizenship is sufficient to sustain the Tribunal’s conclusion.

This approach reflects a broader tendency visible across many Foreigners Tribunal proceedings, where suspicion of foreignness frequently operates as the starting point rather than the conclusion of adjudication.

The shadow of Sarbananda Sonowal

The judgment also sits within the continuing shadow of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India and its subsequent sequel, both of which fundamentally reshaped Assam’s citizenship regime. Those decisions are frequently invoked by the State to justify stringent detection and deportation mechanisms. However, the jurisprudence emerging from Sarbananda Sonowal is considerably more layered than official narratives often suggest.

While the judgments strongly endorsed mechanisms for identifying “illegal migrants,” they also discussed the need for application of mind, prima facie satisfaction, and foundational material before initiating proceedings.

Similarly, the Gauhati High Court’s own decision in Moslem Mondal recognised that references cannot mechanically proceed without some degree of satisfaction regarding the allegation of foreignness.

These nuances are often overshadowed in contemporary citizenship adjudication, where Section 9 is invoked as though it entirely absolves the State from producing any foundational basis whatsoever.

The present judgment aligns firmly with the stricter strand of this jurisprudence.

Contrasting Realities: When courts accept documentary continuity

The present ruling also sharply contrasts with several other tribunal decisions where courts and Foreigners Tribunals have accepted broader patterns of documentary continuity despite minor inconsistencies.

One such case recently supported by Citizens for Justice and Peace involved Anowara Khatun of Goalpara district, who had similarly been marked a “D-Voter” and subjected to prolonged citizenship proceedings. Detailed report on her case may be read here.

In that matter, the Tribunal accepted decades-old land deeds from 1947, 1952, and 1959, electoral rolls from 1966 and 1970, inheritance records, and oral testimony establishing linkage with her father, Alom Shah, who had long resided in Assam.

Despite poverty, illiteracy, mental health struggles, and years of bureaucratic suspicion, the Tribunal ultimately concluded that Anowara Khatun was an Indian citizen and rejected the State’s allegations.

The contrast between such cases reveals the deeply uneven nature of citizenship adjudication in Assam, where the fate of individuals often turns on how particular tribunals and courts interpret documentary inconsistencies, oral evidence, and historical gaps.

For thousands of marginalised residents, citizenship has become less a stable constitutional status and more an ongoing exercise in documentary survival.

Beyond Law: The human consequences of citizenship adjudication

The present judgment ultimately reinforces the severe evidentiary standards governing Foreigners Tribunal proceedings in Assam. The Court concluded that the petitioner had failed to discharge the burden imposed under Section 9 and accordingly upheld the declaration of foreignness.But beyond the legal reasoning lies a larger and deeply troubling constitutional question.

In Assam, citizenship adjudication no longer concerns merely nationality in the abstract. It determines access to liberty, political participation, livelihood, detention, and belonging itself. Over the years, the architecture surrounding citizenship determination — D-voter tagging, Foreigners Tribunals, NRC exclusions, detention centres, alleged “push-backs,” and prolonged litigation — has created a system in which poor and marginalised communities are repeatedly compelled to prove their existence before the State.

Detailed piece may be read here.

The present ruling therefore does more than decide one individual’s citizenship claim. It reflects the continuing evolution of a legal regime where documentary imperfections increasingly become grounds for exclusion, and where the burden of proving belonging falls most heavily upon those least equipped to navigate the evidentiary demands of the system.

The complete judgment may be read below:

Related:

The Immigrant Expulsion from Assam Act, 1950: Re-evaluating executive powers in light of judicial pronouncements and due process

CJP Assam: A journey without parallel, evolving & expanding rights jurisprudence

Assam’s “Doubtful Citizens”: CJP secures justice for Anowara Khatun, declared Indian citizen after decades of state persecution

Dead Voters, Forged Forms, and Political Interference: CJP flags systemic manipulation in Assam’s electoral roll revision, seeks ECI probe

“Premier agency?” SC slams Assam Police for “appalling” two-year UAPA detention without chargesheet

Assam’s New SOP Hands Citizenship Decisions to Bureaucrats: Executive overreach or legal necessity?

The post Gauhati High Court treats documentary inconsistencies as fatal, upholds Foreigner Tribunal opinion appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The judgment is remarkable for three interconnected reasons. First, it forcefully restores the constitutional framework laid down in KA Najeeb, which had recognised prolonged incarceration and delay in trial as an independent ground for bail despite the statutory rigours of Section 43D(5) of the UAPA. Second, it openly expresses “serious reservations” regarding the correctness of the January 2026 ruling in Gulfisha Fatima v. State — the judgment that denied bail to Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam in the Delhi riots larger conspiracy case. Third, it mounts a broader institutional critique against the gradual dilution of larger-bench constitutional precedents through restrictive interpretation by smaller benches.

The judgment must therefore be read not simply as a bail order, but as a constitutional correction to the increasingly punitive trajectory of UAPA jurisprudence.

The Constitutional Foundation: Bail as a principle of liberty, not mere procedure

One of the most significant contributions of the judgment lies in the Court’s attempt to relocate the principle of bail from the narrow confines of statutory criminal procedure into the broader domain of constitutional liberty.

Justice Justice Ujjal Bhuyan, authoring the judgment for both him and Justice Nagarathna, observed:

“The often invoked phrase ‘bail is the rule and jail is the exception’ is not merely an empty statutory slogan flowing from the CrPC as Gurwinder has stated. It is a constitutional principle flowing from Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution and the presumption of innocence which is the cornerstone of any civilised society governed by the rule of law.” (Para 35)

This paragraph is foundational to understanding the judgment. The Court is consciously rejecting the tendency to treat bail merely as a discretionary procedural question. Instead, it roots the concept directly in constitutional structure — specifically Article 21’s guarantee of personal liberty and the presumption of innocence that underlies criminal justice systems governed by the rule of law.

The significance of this reasoning becomes even more pronounced in the context of UAPA prosecutions. Over the past several years, courts have increasingly approached bail under anti-terror statutes through the lens of statutory embargoes alone, often reducing constitutional scrutiny to a secondary consideration. The Andrabi judgment reverses that hierarchy.

The Court unequivocally held:

“The statutory embargo of Section 43-D(5) must remain a circumscribed restriction that operates subject to the guarantee of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution. Therefore, we have no manner of doubt in stating that even under the UAP Act, ‘bail is the rule and jail is the exception’; of course, in an appropriate case, bail can be denied having regard to the facts of that particular case.” (Para 35)

This observation is doctrinally critical because it clarifies that Section 43D(5) does not override constitutional guarantees; rather, it operates within constitutional limitations. In other words, the Constitution remains supreme even in national security prosecutions. This is perhaps the strongest reaffirmation in recent years that anti-terror legislation cannot create a parallel constitutional order where liberty stands suspended indefinitely.

Reaffirmation of KA Najeeb and the constitutional right against endless pre-trial incarceration

The central doctrinal axis of the judgment is its reaffirmation of Union of India v. KA Najeeb.

The Court repeatedly emphasised that KA Najeeb had already settled the principle that constitutional courts retain the power to grant bail under the UAPA where prolonged incarceration and delay in trial render continued detention constitutionally unjustifiable.

The bench noted that KA Najeeb specifically recognised the structural dangers inherent in Section 43D(5). Because the provision creates an exceptionally stringent threshold for bail, trials that move slowly can result in undertrials remaining imprisoned for years before guilt is determined.

The Court observed:

“A plain reading of Najeeb will show that it was trying to prevent precisely this possibility from arising when it cautioned that Section 43-D(5) must not become ‘the sole metric for denial of bail or for wholesale breach of constitutional right to speedy trial.” (Para 27.8)

This paragraph is perhaps the conceptual heart of the judgment.

The Court is acknowledging that when bail adjudication is governed exclusively by Section 43D(5), and trials continue indefinitely, the criminal process itself begins to inflict punishment irrespective of conviction. The danger identified is not merely procedural delay, but the transformation of pre-trial detention into substantive punishment.

The Andrabi judgment therefore restores the original constitutional logic of KA Najeeb: anti-terror statutes cannot be interpreted in a manner that destroys the right to speedy trial.

Importantly, the Court rejects the argument that KA Najeeb applies only in extraordinary or narrowly exceptional situations.

The Court stated:

“…we make it clear that Najeeb is binding law entitled to the protection of stare decisis. It cannot be diluted, circumvented, or disregarded by trial courts, High Courts or even by Benches of lower strength of this Court.” (Para 39)

This is a direct response to the narrowing interpretations that emerged in later judgments.

Direct Critique of Gulfisha Fatima and Gurwinder Singh

One of the most extraordinary aspects of the ruling is the Court’s explicit criticism of Gulfisha Fatima v. State and Gurwinder Singh v. Union of India.

The Court observed that both judgments appeared to take a “divergent view” from the law laid down in KA Najeeb.

The Bench stated:

“In our view, the decision in Gurwinder inasmuch as it refuses to be bound by Najeeb, is difficult to be followed by us as a matter of precedent. It is plain that a judgment rendered by a Bench of lesser strength is bound by the law declared by a Bench of greater strength. Judicial discipline mandates that such binding precedent must either be followed or, in case of doubt, be referred to a larger Bench. A smaller Bench cannot dilute, circumvent, or disregard the ratio of a larger Bench.” (Para 27.2)

This observation has enormous institutional significance. The Court is effectively warning against a judicial technique where binding precedents are not expressly overruled, but are instead gradually weakened through restrictive interpretation. Such an approach undermines certainty in constitutional adjudication and destabilises the doctrine of precedent.

The Court’s criticism becomes particularly important because both Gulfisha Fatima and Gurwinder Singh, authored by Justice Aravind Kumar, had significantly narrowed the scope of KA Najeeb.

In Gulfisha Fatima, the Court had held that KA Najeeb applied only in exceptional cases. The present bench expressly disagreed with that understanding.

The Court also expressed “serious reservations” regarding the direction in Gulfisha Fatima effectively preventing the accused from seeking bail for one year. This criticism is constitutionally significant because bail adjudication necessarily involves continuing judicial supervision over deprivation of liberty. A blanket embargo on future bail applications risks freezing constitutional scrutiny despite changing trial circumstances.

Rejection of the “two-prong test” and the recognition of punitive pre-trial detention

The judgment contains a particularly powerful critique of the “two-prong test” evolved in Gurwinder Singh.

Under that approach, bail could be considered only if:

1. there was prolonged incarceration; and
2. the accused could also demonstrate that the prosecution case lacked prima facie merit.

The Supreme Court rejected this formulation outright.

Justice Bhuyan observed:

“If this twin-prong test is accepted, the State need only satisfy a low prima facie threshold while the trial may continue for years with the result that pre-trial incarceration begins to acquire a post-trial punitive character and even then, no court could ever grant bail no matter the length of period of such incarceration because the case stood prima facie made out against the accused.” (Para 27.8)

This paragraph is one of the strongest judicial recognitions yet of the phenomenon commonly described as “process as punishment.” The Court identifies the structural reality of UAPA prosecutions: once the State crosses the low threshold of prima facie satisfaction under Section 43D(5), undertrials may remain imprisoned for years because trials move slowly and courts refuse to reconsider liberty claims.

The Court correctly recognised that in such circumstances, incarceration ceases to be preventive or regulatory and instead becomes punitive — despite the absence of conviction. The judgment therefore rejects the idea that constitutional courts must indefinitely defer to prosecutorial allegations where the criminal process itself becomes oppressive.

Limiting the reach of Watali

The Court’s treatment of NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali is another crucial aspect of the judgment. Watali has frequently been used to argue that courts should not meaningfully scrutinise prosecution evidence at the bail stage in UAPA cases.

The present bench clarified:

“The position of law emerging from Najeeb and Sk. Javed Iqbal is therefore clear: Watali cannot be invoked to justify indefinite incarceration of the accused under the UAP Act. For the aforesaid reasons, the attempt in Gurwinder to read Watali as laying down a general rule of denial of bail notwithstanding the period of incarceration is difficult to reconcile with this Court’s own subsequent clarification of what the ratio in Watali actually meant.” (Para 27.6)

This clarification is significant because Watali has often functioned in practice as a near-automatic barrier against bail. The Andrabi judgment restores doctrinal balance by clarifying that Watali cannot be interpreted in isolation from constitutional guarantees and from KA Najeeb.

Even where a prima facie case exists, constitutional courts remain obligated to assess whether prolonged incarceration and delayed trial have rendered continued detention unconstitutional.

The Court’s Reliance on NCRB Data: An empirical critique of UAPA incarceration

One of the most striking features of the judgment is its reliance on empirical conviction data.

Referring to NCRB statistics placed before Parliament by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs, the Court observed:

“…it is evident that the country-wide percentage of conviction under the UAP Act for the five years comprising the period 2019-23 hovers between 2% to 6%. In other words, there is 94% to 98% possibility of acquittal in such cases in the country. When it comes to the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir, the percentage of conviction is abysmal, to say the least. For the aforesaid period, the annual rate of conviction is always less than 1%. It means that at the end of the trial, there is 99% possibility of acquittal in such cases. With these kind of statistics staring at our face, the question is, should we continue the detention of the appellant or defer the consideration to a later stage, simply because the charges are serious?” (Para 42.3)

This reasoning is extraordinary because the Court explicitly connects low conviction rates with the constitutional legitimacy of prolonged detention. Ordinarily, anti-terror jurisprudence focuses almost exclusively on allegations and national security considerations. The Andrabi judgment shifts attention to outcomes: if acquittal rates are overwhelmingly high and trials take years, then prolonged incarceration cannot be justified solely on the basis of accusation.

This represents a subtle but important constitutional shift. The Court is effectively recognising that the practical operation of the UAPA must be assessed not only in theory but also through its systemic consequences.

Article 21, Speedy Trial, and the Constitutional Crisis of Delay

The Court repeatedly foregrounded Article 21 and the right to speedy trial by observing:

“We do not want to join issue any further with the two-Judge Bench either in Gurwinder Singh or in Gulfisha Fatima. As noted supra, Gurwinder Singh has already been explained in Sheikh Javed Iqbal and in Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh, reiterated in Arvind Dham, this Court has categorically held that Article 21 applies irrespective of the nature of the offence. Ideally, more serious the accusations are, the speedier the trial should be.” (Para 40)

This statement directly challenges the prevailing judicial logic where grave allegations often justify more restrictive bail standards and slower constitutional scrutiny. The Court instead inverts the framework: the greater the seriousness of allegations, the greater the constitutional obligation upon the State to ensure expeditious adjudication.

The judgment therefore recognises that prolonged detention without trial is not merely an administrative problem; it is a constitutional injury.

The Court’s reasoning implicitly acknowledges a larger systemic reality: UAPA trials often involve enormous witness lists, voluminous documentary records, and prolonged delays that make timely completion virtually impossible. When combined with restrictive bail standards, this creates a carceral structure where accused persons may spend years imprisoned irrespective of eventual guilt or innocence.

Conclusion: A constitutional warning against “punishment through process”

The Andrabi judgment ultimately functions as a constitutional warning against the gradual normalisation of punitive pre-trial detention under anti-terror laws.

The Court restores several foundational propositions:

• that Article 21 survives even in UAPA prosecutions;
• that Section 43D(5) cannot eclipse constitutional liberty;
• that KA Najeeb remains binding law;
• that Watali cannot justify endless incarceration;
• that smaller benches cannot dilute larger-bench precedents;
• and that prolonged delay itself may render detention unconstitutional.

Most importantly, the judgment recognises a reality that has increasingly shaped anti-terror prosecutions in India: where trials take years, conviction rates remain exceptionally low, and bail thresholds are interpreted rigidly, incarceration itself becomes the punishment.

The Court’s intervention is significant precisely because it identifies this not merely as a policy concern, but as a constitutional crisis.

Related report may be read here.

The complete judgment is attached below:

Related:

Supreme Court reasserts KA Najeeb, warns against “hollowing out” constitutional protections in UAPA cases; questions Umar Khalid bail verdict

CJP files complaint against BJP MLA & Minister Nitesh Rane and right-wing leaders over alleged hate speeches in Maharashtra and West Bengal

NSA slapped on journalist, DU scholar in Noida workers’ protest case amid allegations of crackdown on dissent

Caged Voices, Silenced Truths: FSC’s expansive indictment of India’s press freedom crisis

From Cow Slaughter to “Public Order”: Allahabad High Court’s expanding use of preventive detention

The post Andrabi Judgment: Section 43D(5) UAPA cannot override right to speedy trial, restores primacy of Article 21 in UAPA cases appeared first on SabrangIndia.

CJP stated in the complaints that the alleged hate speeches violated constitutional guarantees under Articles 14, 15 and 21 and attracted offences under provisions relating to promotion of enmity between groups, criminal intimidation, statements conducing to public mischief, deliberate acts intended to outrage religious feelings, and incitement to violence.

The complaints concern speeches delivered in Chandivali and Malad Malvani in Mumbai, Kalyani in Nadia district of West Bengal, and Junnar in Pune district.

Complaint against Nitesh Narayan Rane over Chandivali speech: May 12, 2026

In a complaint dated May 12, 2026, addressed to Shri Nikhil Gupta, Additional Director General (Law & Order), Maharashtra, Addl. Commissioner of Police, West Region, Mumbai, and Senior Police Inspector, Sakinaka Police Station, Mumbai, CJP sought registration of an FIR against BJP MLA and Maharashtra Cabinet Minister Nitesh Narayan Rane for allegedly delivering a divisive communal speech during a Hindu convention held in Chandivali, Mumbai on May 3, 2026.

CJP stated in the complaint that Rane utilised dehumanising language against Muslims, spread conspiracy theories regarding “Love Jihad,” “Land Jihad,” “Corporate Jihad,” and “Ghazwa-e-Hind,” and openly encouraged social and economic boycott of Muslims. The complaint alleged that the speech attempted to create fear and hostility by portraying Muslims as an existential threat to Hindus and India.

According to CJP, Rane repeatedly referred to Muslims as “green snakes” and urged the audience to confront them. The complaint reproduces the speech transcript, including the following statements:

“[They] should come to Maharashtra. This writhing of green snakes (referring to Muslims) must stop. That is why the saffron flag has been unfurled in Maharashtra, remember this.”

“And therefore, while moving around as a Hindu, do so with self-confidence. Move with courage. If any green snake is writhing here, take guidance from Tai and then give me a call.”

The complaint further stated that Rane repeatedly described India as a “Hindu Rashtra” and suggested that Muslims were attempting to convert India into an Islamic nation through organised conspiracies.

CJP also stated in the complaint that Rane attempted to create fear among Hindus by claiming that Muslims would prevent Hindu religious practices if their population increased.

The complaint reproduces the following statements:

“You won’t be able to perform puja in your home. This saffron flag won’t be able to fly here. You won’t be able to apply the Tilak on your forehead.”

“Mothers and sisters won’t be able to apply vermilion (Sindoor) on their heads.”

According to CJP, the speech also included references to alleged communal incidents in Palghar and Virar to reinforce hostility against Muslims. The complaint additionally highlighted Rane’s remarks calling for economic boycott of Muslims:

“So, when we are dealing with them, buying from them, or giving them jobs—first, if someone is sitting at a shop, even if the shop’s signboard says ‘Jay Shri Ram,’ sometimes Abdul is sitting inside.”

“First tell him, ‘Recite the Hanuman Chalisa for me first.’ If you recite the Hanuman Chalisa only then will I buy from you, otherwise I won’t.”

“Therefore, if jobs are to be given or purchases are to be made, it should only be for Hindus—this should be the stance of all of us.”

CJP stated in the complaint that these remarks amounted to explicit encouragement of discrimination and exclusion of citizens based on religion and constituted a direct appeal for economic boycott of Muslims.

A copy of complaint dated May 12, 2026 can be accessed here

Complaint against Nitesh Rane over Malad Malvani speech during Ram Navami Yatra

In another complaint dated April 28, 2026, addressed to Maharashtra Police authorities, CJP sought registration of an FIR against Nitesh Narayan Rane over a speech delivered during the Ram Navami Yatra held in Malad Malvani, Mumbai, on March 26, 2026.

According to CJP, the speech promoted communal hostility, issued direct threats of violence, and attempted to alienate Muslims by declaring India a “Hindu Rashtra” and describing the locality as belonging exclusively to “saffron-clad” Hindus.

CJP stated in the complaint that Rane used references to “Pakistan” as a dog-whistle against Muslims and openly threatened those opposing Hindutva ideology.

The complaint reproduces the following portions of the speech:

“Perhaps some people here in Malvani have forgotten that this is our Hindu Rashtra, this is not someone’s Pakistan. If anyone tries to remove that saffron flag, we will not let their cylinder come up again. If anyone again looks at our saffron flag with dirty eyes, then their eyes will be taken out and played with like marbles.”

CJP alleged that these remarks amounted to open threats of violence and intimidation. The complaint further stated that Rane specifically directed slogans toward a mosque in the locality, thereby attempting to provoke confrontation and disturb communal harmony. The reproduced statement reads:

“That voice must reach the big mosque.”

According to CJP, such statements sought to intimidate the Muslim community and portray them as outsiders within the constitutional framework of India. The complaint also alleged that Rane invoked the authority of a “government with a Hindutva ideology” to suggest political backing for aggressive communal mobilisation.

A copy of complaint dated April 28, 2026 can be accessed here

Complaint against Hari Mishra in West Bengal over hate speech during election campaign in Nadia

In a complaint dated May 6, 2026 addressed to the District Magistrate and Superintendent of Police in Nadia district, West Bengal, CJP sought registration of an FIR under Sections 196, 197, 299, 302, 352 and 353 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 against BJP leader Hari Mishra for a speech delivered during an election campaign in Kalyani, Nadia district, on April 23, 2026. CJP stated in the complaint that Mishra spread anti-Muslim conspiracy theories and falsely claimed that Hindu festivals could not be celebrated in Muslim-majority areas.

The complaint reproduces portions of the speech including:

“In any area where the Muslim population is above 30-35%, Saraswati Puja will not happen. In places like Malda and Murshidabad… you first have to take permission from the nearest mosque. A situation worse than Bangladesh is going to happen on the soil of West Bengal.”

CJP further alleged that Mishra falsely claimed that the Constitution of India did not function in parts of West Bengal. The reproduced transcript includes:

“The Constitution of India does not work in many parts of Malda and Murshidabad. In about 25-30% of the areas in Malda and Murshidabad, the Constitution, rules, laws, and regulations of India do not apply.”

The complaint also referred to statements linking demographic change with political exclusion: “The day Muslims reach above 40-45%, not a single Hindu MP, MLA, counselor, or chairman will remain in West Bengal.”

According to CJP, these remarks sought to portray Muslims as a threat to democratic institutions and communal coexistence and were intended to create fear and polarisation during the election period.

A copy of complaint dated May 6, 2026 can be accessed here

Complaint against Harshu Thakur in Junnar, Pune over speech delivered at Virat Hindu Sammelan

In a separate complaint dated May 6, 2026, addressed to the Additional Director General (Law & Order), Maharashtra, the Superintendent of Police, Pune Rural, and the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Junnar Division, CJP sought registration of an FIR against Harshu Thakur over a speech delivered at the Virat Hindu Sammelan held in Junnar, Pune district, on April 19, 2026. CJP stated in the complaint that Thakur spread anti-Muslim rhetoric through references to “Forest Jihad,” “Love Jihad,” and “Land Jihad,” while also making statements encouraging militarised responses and targeting Islamic institutions and burial practices.

The complaint reproduces the following statements:

“Wherever there is open land, there are graves. If you start funding madrasas, then only terrorists will be produced there. Mulla-Maulvis give them training on how to trap girls in ‘Love Jihad’ and how to carry out ‘Land Jihad’. They are taught how to make bombs.”

CJP further highlighted remarks targeting Muslim men and encouraging women to arm themselves:

“All these ‘Abduls’ are the same. Every Hindu woman just needs to be given a weapon.”

The complaint also alleged that Thakur attempted to frame Muslims as inherently violent while encouraging religious segregation and hostility.

A copy of complaint dated May 6, 2026 can be accessed here

Judicial precedents on which CJP relied upon

In the complaints submitted before police authorities in Maharashtra and West Bengal, CJP also relied upon multiple judicial precedents of the Supreme Court concerning hate speech, communal targeting, and the constitutional obligation of authorities to act against inflammatory rhetoric. Referring to the Supreme Court judgment in Firoz Iqbal Khan vs Union of India [W.P. (Civ.) No. 956 of 2020], CJP highlighted the Court’s observations that “the edifice of a democratic society committed to the rule of law under a regime of constitutional rights, values and duties is founded on the co-existence of communities. India is a melting pot of civilisations, cultures, religions and languages. Any attempt to vilify a religious community must be viewed with grave disfavour by this Court as the custodian of constitutional values.”

CJP stated that the speeches delivered by Nitesh Rane, Hari Mishra, and Harshu Thakur collectively portrayed Muslims as conspirators, outsiders, extremists, and demographic threats, thereby directly undermining constitutional values of equality, fraternity, and peaceful coexistence. The complaints further referred to Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. Union of India [AIR 2014 SC 1591], where the Supreme Court observed that “hate speech is an effort to marginalise individuals based on their membership to a group,” and warned that such speech can lay the groundwork for discrimination, ostracism, violence, and even genocide. CJP stated that the repeated references to “Love Jihad,” “Land Jihad,” “Forest Jihad,” “Corporate Jihad,” alleged demographic conspiracies, and calls for economic boycott sought to institutionalise fear and hostility against Muslims and therefore warranted immediate criminal action.

The complaints additionally cited the Supreme Court’s order dated April 28, 2023 in Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India [W.P. (C) No. 943 of 2021], wherein all States and Union Territories were directed to register suo moto FIRs against hate speech irrespective of religion whenever offences under Sections 153A, 153B, 295A, 505 IPC and related provisions are attracted.

Provisions related to hate speech under BNS, 2023

CJP further stated that the speeches attract multiple provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, particularly Sections 196, 197, 299, 302, 352 and 353. According to the complaints, the repeated targeting of Muslim religious institutions, educational spaces, and social identity through references such as “green snakes,” “Forest Jihad,” “Land Jihad,” and allegations that madrasas produce “only terrorists” amounted to promoting enmity between religious groups and acts prejudicial to communal harmony under Section 196 BNS.

CJP stated that the speeches also made imputations against the constitutional allegiance of an entire community by portraying Muslims and Islamic institutions as threats to the State, thereby attracting Section 197 BNS. The complaints further alleged that mocking Dargahs, Mazars, burial practices, Islamic scholars, and Muslim religious practices constituted deliberate insults to religion and religious beliefs under Sections 299 and 302 BNS.

CJP additionally argued that the repeated calls for mobilisation, warnings regarding demographic change, threats of violence, references to arming civilians, and calls for economic boycott amounted to intentional provocation intended to breach public peace under Section 352 BNS and dissemination of false information likely to create fear and communal unrest under Section 353 BNS.

The complaints maintained that the speeches delivered across Mumbai, Pune, and Nadia reflected a continuing pattern of inflammatory communal rhetoric aimed at deepening religious polarisation and normalising hostility against Muslims, thereby necessitating immediate registration of FIRs and preventive intervention by the concerned police authorities in compliance with constitutional obligations and Supreme Court directives.

Maharashtra DGP circulars cited by CJP

CJP also referred to circulars issued by the Director General of Police, Maharashtra, in February and April 2023 concerning preventive and penal action against hate speech.

According to the complaint, Circular No. DGP 20/Petition No.940/2022/54.2023 dated February 2, 2023 highlighted the Supreme Court’s order dated January 13, 2023 directing police authorities to take suo motu action whenever speeches attract offences under Sections 153A, 153B, 295A and 505 IPC.

The circular had directed all Unit Commanders to follow the Supreme Court order and entails “measures to be taken to maintain law and order due to agitations, morchas, speeches etc.”

It gives detailed instructions on what steps are to be taken when any morchas are to be held:

“2. All the Unit Commanders should hold a meeting with the concerned organisers before such a morcha and fix the route of the morcha with appropriate terms and condition. A combined meeting of all social groups should be taken to convey clearly to all that they should maintain peace and keep law and order during the morcha. Preventive action against Anti-social elements should be taken. Those elements who help in maintaining peace and harmony should be encouraged. Audio Video recording of the morcha should be done. Police Head Quarters should ensure adequate supply of equipment’s, like Lathi, Helmets, etc. to police men deployed for morcha bandobast. If any law-and-order situation arises, offences should be registered immediately and arrest should be made. Intelligence machinery should be activated to collect advance information about morcha, agitation and efforts should be made to pre-empt any communal incidents.”

Supreme Court directions on preventing/prosecuting hate speakers

CJP further referred to multiple Supreme Court orders concerning hate speech and preventive policing. According to the complaints, on February 3, 2023, the Supreme Court issued directions regarding a proposed event by Sakal Hindu Samaj in Mumbai and directed that if permission was granted for the event, it would be subject to the condition that no hate speech would be delivered.

The court also outlined directives with respect to taking preventive action in such cases:

“We also direct that the Officer(s), in case, permission is granted and, in case, the occasion arises for invoking the power under Section 151 of Cr.P.C. as aforesaid, it shall be the duty of the Officer(s) concerned to invoke the said power and to act as per the mandate of Section 151 of the Cr.P.C.” 

Even in 2024 itself, while on January 17, the Supreme Court bench of Justices Sanjiv Khanna and Dipankar Datta had expressed their anguish at the petitioners being forced to approach the Supreme Court multiple times against individuals and organisations even after there being guidelines for tacking and taking action against hate speeches. During the said hearing, the Supreme Court issued an order directing the District Magistrate and Superintendent of Police at Yavatmal, Maharashtra and Raipur, Chhattisgarh to take ‘appropriate steps’ to ensure that no incitement to hate speech occurs at the rallies scheduled in the said districts in the coming few days of January.

The said order was passed following the concerns raised by the petitioners over delivery of potential hate speeches at rallies planned by Hindu Janjagruti Samiti and Bharatiya Janata Party Legislator T Raja Singh in the month of January.

CJP stated that the court had outlined directives with respect to taking preventive action in such cases:

“We would require the authorities to be conscious that no incitement to violence and hate speech are permissible. The concerned District Magistrates and Superintendent of Police of Yavatmal, Maharashtra and Raipur, Chhattisgarh will take necessary steps, as may be required. If necessary and deemed appropriate, police/administration will install CCTV Cameras having recording facility, so as to ensure identification of the perpetrators in the event of any violence/hate speech.”

Background: Profile of Nitesh Rane and previous complaints filed by CJP

CJP stated in its complaints that the speeches delivered in Chandivali and Malad Malvani were not isolated incidents but formed part of a continuing pattern of inflammatory speeches allegedly delivered by Nitesh Rane across Maharashtra. According to CJP, the organisation had previously filed complaints dated March 7, March 18, and March 28, 2025 concerning speeches delivered by Rane in Sindhudurg, Pune, and Ratnagiri districts.

The complaints related to events including:

• “Hindu Rashtra Adhiveshan” in Kundal on February 8, 2025
• “Shivjanmostav” event in Sawantwadi on February 19, 2025
• Public felicitation programme at Nanijdham, Ratnagiri on February 20, 2025
• Religious gathering in Wagholi, Pune on February 5, 2025

CJP stated that across these events, Rane repeatedly invoked terms such as “Love Jihad” and “Land Jihad,” portrayed Muslims as a collective threat, and made statements capable of inciting hostility, fear, and social boycott against the Muslim community. The complaints further stated that such rhetoric, particularly when delivered by a sitting Cabinet Minister, was inflammatory, unsupported by evidence, and violative of constitutional protections.

FIRs and ongoing legal scrutiny against Nitesh Rane

Under the judicial oversight of the Bombay High Court in Aftab Siddique & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra (2024), multiple FIRs have already been registered against Nitesh Rane in connection with alleged hate speech cases. CJP reproduced details of these FIRs in its complaints and stated that they reflected a continuing pattern of communal speeches delivered by Rane in different parts of Maharashtra.

Mankhurd Police Station (C.R. No. 152/2024)

Registered against Nitesh Rane under Sections 153A, 503, 504 and 505 IPC. According to the complaint, this case originated from speeches perceived as threatening to the Muslim community and capable of inciting public disorder.

Ghatkopar Police Station (C.R. No. 521/2024)

Registered against Nitesh Rane and Subhash Ahir under Sections 153A, 504, 506 and 188 IPC in connection with inflammatory speeches delivered in Mumbai suburbs.

Kashimira Police Station (C.R. No. 259/2024)

Registered against Nitesh Rane and Geeta Jain in relation to the Mira-Bhayander incidents under Sections 153A, 153B, 143, 504 and 506 IPC along with Section 37(1) read with Section 135 of the Maharashtra Police Act.

Malwani Police Station (C.R. No. 298/2024)

Originally registered against Bhagwan Thakur, with Nitesh Rane later added as an accused under Sections 153A, 504 and 506 IPC in relation to speeches targeting specific religious communities.

CJP further pointed out that Nitesh Rane’s October 2024 election affidavit reportedly disclosed 38 FIRs registered against him, including 20 cases relating specifically to allegations of hate speech.

Related

Free and Fair Elections: CJP’s 2025 fight against hate and voter intimidation

CJP’s 2025 intervention against ‘Digital Hate’: Holding television news channels accountable before the NBDSA

Law as Resistance: A year of CJP’s interventions against a rising tide of hate

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