At one level, the case concerned two women who said that they had voluntarily embraced Islam and were subsequently confined by their father. But the legal question before the Court was considerably broader: can the alleged illegality of a person’s religious conversion justify the continued physical confinement of that person when she is an adult, competent, and unequivocally asserts that the choice was voluntary?

The Court answered in the negative. More importantly, it refused to allow the criminal investigation into the alleged conversion to collapse the distinction between two separate questions: whether the conversion was lawful, and whether the women could lawfully be detained.

“The present case discloses an exceptionally grave and egregious violation of constitutional rights. The corpus, despite being major, educated and legally competent women, were deprived of their liberty for a prolonged period commencing from the year 2021, solely because they exercised their constitutionally protected freedom of conscience and chose to profess a religion different from that professed by their family. Such prolonged and coercive confinement strikes at the very foundation of constitutional democracy, which recognises the autonomy of every adult individual as sacrosanct and beyond the reach of parental or societal control. The constitutional guarantee of personal liberty cannot be permitted to yield to familial disapproval, social orthodoxy or executive apathy.” (Para 65)

“Before parting, this Court deems it necessary to reiterate that the Constitution does not confer upon parents a licence to incarcerate their major children merely because they disapprove of their faith, beliefs or personal choices. Constitutional rights cannot be eclipsed by parental authority, social morality or majoritarian sentiment. The liberty of an adult individual is inviolable, and any attempt to suppress that liberty by force or coercion invites the constitutional scrutiny of this Court and attracts appropriate public law consequences, including the award of monetary compensation for the infringement of fundamental rights.” (Para 66)

The former, the Court held, could be examined by the competent authority or court. The latter was squarely before the High Court in habeas corpus jurisdiction. The judgment consequently becomes a strong reaffirmation of decisional autonomy, freedom of conscience, the limits of parental authority, the scope of habeas corpus against private detention, and the State’s public-law liability when its machinery permits an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty to continue.

Two adult women before the constitutional court

The petition concerned Anshu Bhatia @ Amina Anshu Bhatia, aged about 35 years, and Diya Bhatia @ Zoya Diya Bhatia, aged about 20 years. By an order dated July 30, 2026, the State was directed to produce both women before the High Court. They were subsequently produced before Justice Sandeep Jain by police officials from the Cyber Crime Police Station, Agra.

The Court then did something crucial for a habeas corpus proceeding involving allegations of coercion: it interacted with the women directly. Anshu told the Court that she had voluntarily embraced Islam in 2020, describing the decision as a conscious and independent choice motivated by mental peace, spiritual fulfilment and inner solace. She stated that the decision was not the result of inducement, influence, coercion, undue persuasion or any extraneous consideration. She further stated that her father strongly opposed the decision and subsequently confined her within the parental home. According to her, physical restraint, intimidation and sustained mental harassment were used to compel her to renounce the faith she had chosen and return to Hinduism.

Diya, who had completed her education up to the Intermediate level, similarly told the Court that she had voluntarily embraced Islam in 2021, motivated by personal faith, conscience, mental peace and spiritual solace. She too denied force, fraud, coercion, undue influence or allurement.

Both women consistently maintained before the Court that their decisions were voluntary and conscious and arose from their own individual faith and freedom of conscience. They also denied that their conversion was motivated by an extraneous, unlawful or pecuniary consideration or intended to advance the interests of any individual or organisation. The dispute therefore came before the High Court in a very specific constitutional form: Were these adult women unlawfully confined by their father against their own wishes?

The State’s case: This was not merely a family dispute

The State strongly opposed the habeas corpus petition. The father had lodged Case Crime No. 228 of 2025 at Police Station Sadar Bazar, District Agra, alleging that the women had been subjected to forcible and deceitful conversion from Hinduism to Islam. The FIR was initially registered under Section 87 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

During investigation, the investigating agency subsequently added:

• Sections 61(2), 111(3), 111(4) and 152 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023; and
• Sections 3/5(1) and 5(2) of the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021.

The State argued that the addition of these provisions demonstrated that the allegations of voluntary conversion could not simply be accepted at face value. But the State went considerably further. Its case was that the alleged conversion was part of a larger and organised conspiracy with ramifications for the sovereignty, integrity and unity of the nation.

It claimed that the investigation had uncovered material indicating the involvement of organised persons pursuing a coordinated design to disturb the social fabric through unlawful religious conversions.

The State also referred to alleged involvement of foreign entities and external influences, arguing that the investigation was continuing and that releasing the women could prejudice the proceedings. It further contended that the women had been projected as victims in the criminal case and that allowing them to reside with persons allegedly connected to the investigation could influence witnesses, prejudice the prosecution and frustrate the administration of criminal justice. The State therefore attempted to place the case within a much larger framework of public order, national interest and security.

The High Court was not persuaded.

Findings of the Court

• What is the scope of habeas corpus?

Before determining whether the detention was illegal, Justice Sandeep Jain examined the nature of the writ itself. The Court relied upon the Supreme Court’s judgment in Home Secretary (Prison) v. H. Nilofer Nisha, where the Supreme Court explained that habeas corpus is available wherever a person is deprived of personal liberty unlawfully or without justification.

Importantly, the Supreme Court authority recognises that habeas corpus is not confined to State detention. It can also be invoked against private detention. The Allahabad High Court quoted the principle that the writ is available for release from detention not only by the State but also from private detention. This becomes central to the case as the father was not a State official exercising a statutory power of detention. The alleged confinement was taking place inside the parental home. But that did not take the matter outside Article 226. The constitutional inquiry was simple: Was there lawful authority for the restraint?

• A parental home is not a legal prison—but it cannot become one

The judgment’s treatment of private detention is especially significant. The women were allegedly confined in their parental home. That fact could easily have been used to characterise the dispute as a family matter. Thankfully, the Court refused to do so. Habeas corpus exists precisely because the law is concerned with the fact of unlawful restraint, not merely the formal label attached to the person exercising it. The relevant question was not whether the father believed he was acting in the interests of his daughters. The question was whether he had legal authority to restrain two adult women. The Court ultimately found that he did not.

• Majority marks the constitutional end of parental custody

The Court relied on a line of constitutional jurisprudence concerning the autonomy of adult women. One of the authorities discussed was the Supreme Court’s decision in Soni Gerry v. Gerry Douglas. There, the Supreme Court held that once an individual attains majority, she is entitled to make her own choices and that courts should not assume the role of a super-guardian merely because a parent disapproves of that choice.

The Allahabad High Court also considered the Kerala High Court’s decision in Rajamohan MS v. State of Kerala, which dealt specifically with parental attempts to restrain an adult woman. That decision recognised that parental authority may extend to advice, counselling and guidance, but not to confinement or detention against the wishes of an adult daughter.

The Allahabad High Court reproduced the proposition that an adult major woman cannot be treated as a “chattel” and that parental authority does not give a parent the right to keep her under restraint against her will. This jurisprudence supplies the conceptual foundation for the present ruling. Once adulthood is attained, the parent-child relationship does not disappear. But its legal character changes.

• The Court rejects the idea that parents know what is “best” for adult women

The reliance on Rajamohan MS case is particularly important because it confronts a deeply embedded paternalistic assumption: that parents should be permitted to control adult women’s decisions because they believe those decisions are wrong, imprudent or harmful. The jurisprudence cited by the High Court rejects that logic.

An adult’s decision does not lose constitutional protection simply because the decision might later prove to be unwise. The Kerala High Court authority, quoted in the judgment, makes the point that courts cannot permit the concepts of parents about what is “right and good” for their adult daughters to override the daughters’ own assessment of what is right for them. This principle is particularly relevant in the present case.

The women’s choice concerned religion—a matter inherently connected to conscience and identity. The Constitution cannot recognise individual autonomy while simultaneously allowing family members to exercise a veto over the individual’s conscience.

• Reliance on Shafin Jahan to hold that constitutional courts are not super-guardians

The judgment also invokes Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M., one of the Supreme Court’s most crucial decisions on individual autonomy. The High Court notes the Supreme Court’s recognition that constitutional courts may exercise parens patriae jurisdiction for persons who are incapable of exercising free will, such as minors or persons of unsound mind. But that principle cannot be extended to competent adults simply because their choices are controversial or disapproved of by others.

The Supreme Court in Shafin Jahan emphasised that decisions concerning intimate and personal matters belong to the individuals concerned and that neither State nor society can intrude into that domain merely because they disapprove of the choice. The Allahabad High Court uses that jurisprudence to reinforce a fundamental distinction: A constitutional court protects an adult’s autonomy; it does not replace it.

The Court therefore did not ask whether it believed the women’s religious choice was sensible. It asked whether the women themselves had made the choice freely. Once the answer was yes, the constitutional duty was to protect that choice from unlawful restraint.

• The Court personally tests voluntariness

This is where the Court’s interaction with the women becomes legally decisive. Justice Sandeep Jain recorded that the responses of both women were: “spontaneous, coherent and unequivocal.”

Nothing emerged during the interaction to suggest that they were acting under coercion, fear, inducement or undue influence. On the contrary, both consistently asserted that they had voluntarily embraced Islam as a matter of personal faith and conscience. The Court therefore did not simply accept the women’s claims because they were petitioners. It independently interacted with them. This matters because the State’s central argument was that their assertion of voluntariness was false and that they had been made instruments of an organised conversion network. The Court found no material before it sufficient to draw that inference.

• Article 25: “Freedom of conscience” includes the freedom to change faith

The Court then turned to Article 25. It held that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of conscience necessarily encompasses the right of a competent adult to adopt a faith, renounce a faith, or change her faith according to her own free will, belief and conviction. The Court did not conceptualise Article 25 merely as protecting the practice of an inherited religion. It recognised conscience as a matter of individual choice.

The Court held that such a decision is an essential facet of: individual autonomy, dignity and personal liberty. It is therefore protected not only under Article 25, but also under Article 21. If freedom of conscience means anything constitutionally, it cannot mean merely the freedom to remain within the religious identity assigned by one’s family. It must include the freedom to arrive at one’s own conviction. And where an adult voluntarily changes her faith, that choice cannot ordinarily be dictated by either the family or the State except within constitutionally permissible restrictions and the authority of law.

• The Uttar Pradesh Conversion Act does not answer the detention question

The State relied heavily on the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021. The Court acknowledged that the Act provides the statutory framework governing unlawful religious conversions and prescribes procedures concerning conversions. But the Court made an important jurisdictional observation: The vires of the 2021 Act had not been challenged before it. Nor was the legality or validity of the alleged conversion itself the subject matter of the habeas corpus proceedings. Any question concerning compliance or non-compliance with the Act was therefore left to the competent authority or court. The Court then reached the central distinction: “The legality of the conversion and the legality of their detention constitute two distinct and independent issues.” This distinction is the backbone of the judgment.

The Court went further. It said that even assuming, for the sake of argument,  that the conversion had not been carried out strictly according to the procedure prescribed under the 2021 Act, that assumption would not itself authorise the father to continue confining the women. This is a crucial rule-of-law proposition. An alleged violation of one law does not automatically create a power under another law to deprive a person of liberty. If the conversion was unlawful, the State could investigate it. If an offence was established, the criminal law could operate.

But the father could not become the custodian of the women merely because he believed their religious conversion was illegal. The State could not use the pendency of that investigation to permit the confinement to continue. Thus, the Court separates regulation from detention. The State may regulate conduct through law; however, it cannot manufacture a detention power that the law does not confer.

• National security cannot rest on assertion alone

The State’s invocation of sovereignty, integrity and national security was also examined closely. The Court found that, apart from broad assertions based on the FIR and the pendency of investigation, no material had been placed before it demonstrating that the voluntary exercise of religious choice by these women, by itself, constituted a threat to the sovereignty, integrity or security of the country. The Court therefore refused to accept the argument.

The court held that mere apprehensions, however serious they may appear, cannot substitute legally admissible material while adjudicating upon the fundamental rights of citizens. This is not a finding that national-security considerations can never justify restrictions on liberty. Rather, it is a rejection of conjecture as constitutional evidence. The seriousness of the allegation does not eliminate the need for material. A court deciding whether a fundamental right has been infringed cannot treat the language of “national security” as a substitute for proof.

• The Court refuses to infer an “oblique motive”

The Court also rejected the suggestion that the women were merely instruments in a larger unlawful design. After interacting with them, the Court said it could not discern material warranting an inference that they had acted with an oblique motive or had been reduced to instruments in the hands of an individual or organisation pursuing an unlawful agenda.

Such an inference, the Court held, could not legitimately be drawn from conjectures, surmises or allegations that remained to be tested before the competent criminal court. This distinction is significant as the Court did not adjudicate the criminal allegations, rather it simply refused to allow untested allegations to determine the constitutional status of the women before it. The criminal investigation was therefore left intact. But it was not allowed to become a basis for continuing their detention.

The investigation arising from Case Crime No. 228 of 2025 would continue strictly in accordance with law. But, the court held that mere pendency of a criminal investigation cannot, by itself, furnish a lawful justification for curtailing the liberty of adult citizens, particularly where they are not subject to any judicial or other lawful order of detention.

This is one of the judgment’s most important safeguards. A criminal investigation is a process for determining whether an offence has been committed. It is not, by itself, a source of custody. The existence of an FIR cannot turn a private residence into a lawful detention centre. Nor can the seriousness of the allegations eliminate the requirement that any deprivation of liberty have legal authority.

Parental authority yields to constitutional liberty: Compensation and directions

Having found the detention to be wholly illegal, the Court did not confine the remedy to a declaration that the women were free. It recognised that where a serious and prolonged violation of fundamental rights has already occurred, an order of release alone may not provide an adequate constitutional remedy. The Court therefore invoked the established jurisprudence on constitutional compensation, particularly Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar and Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa. These decisions establish that constitutional courts exercising jurisdiction under Articles 32 and 226 can award monetary compensation for egregious violations of fundamental rights as a public-law remedy. Such compensation is distinct from ordinary private-law damages and is intended to provide meaningful redress for the breach of a public duty to protect fundamental rights.

Applying this principle, the Court found the present case to involve an “exceptionally grave and egregious violation of constitutional rights.” It took into account the fact that the women were adults and legally competent, the prolonged nature of their deprivation of liberty, the circumstances in which the confinement allegedly followed their exercise of freedom of conscience, and the mental and psychological consequences of the restraint. The Court also considered the failure of the State machinery to discharge its constitutional obligation to protect their liberty. It described the conduct as a “flagrant affront to the Rule of Law” and found that the State, rather than securing their release, had allowed the detention to continue under the ostensible cover of criminal proceedings. The award of compensation was therefore not presented as punitive damages or an ex gratia payment, but as a constitutional remedy flowing from the gravity of the fundamental-rights violation.

The Court consequently held the father and the State of Uttar Pradesh jointly and severally liable to pay ₹25 lakh, with the amount to be equally divided between the two women. The judgment also incorporated an important mechanism for individual accountability within the State machinery. After satisfying the compensation award, the State was permitted, subject to due process and an opportunity of hearing, to recover the stipulated share from the father and from any delinquent public servant whose acts or omissions contributed to the unconstitutional deprivation of liberty. This aspect of the order is significant because it moves beyond merely compensating the victims and raises the question of institutional responsibility for allowing an unlawful deprivation of liberty to persist.

The Court’s directions were also designed to restore the women’s practical autonomy, rather than merely declare their freedom in abstract terms. It directed that they were free to reside at any place and with any person of their choice and restrained the father from interfering with their personal liberty, movement, residence, profession or religious choices. The State authorities were directed to ensure that no interference was caused to their peaceful life and liberty and to provide protection if required. These directions recognise that liberty can be undermined even without formal physical detention. If a person is denied access to her documents, finances, educational records or other personal belongings, her ability to independently exercise her constitutional choices may remain substantially constrained.

Accordingly, the Court directed the father to hand over the women’s passports, educational certificates, identity documents, bank passbooks, cheque books, conversion-related documents and other personal belongings within seven days, with the State authorities directed to ensure compliance where necessary. At the same time, the Court carefully limited the scope of its intervention: it did not determine whether the alleged conversion was legally valid, whether the criminal allegations would ultimately be established, or whether any offence had been committed. The investigation was permitted to continue strictly in accordance with law. The significance of the judgment therefore lies in the balance it draws between investigative power and individual liberty: the State remains free to investigate an alleged offence, but neither an investigation nor parental disapproval can become a substitute for lawful authority to deprive an adult of her liberty.

The complete judgment may be read here.

Related:

Two FIRs, Four Days In: Pune sees first use of Maharashtra’s controversial anti-conversion law

After NEET protests ended, the battle moved online: Women protesters face threats, doxing and criminalisation

One Death Every Few Days, Zero Accountability: Sanitation workers protest at Jantar Mantar

From Civil Registration to Identity Control: Parliament tightens India’s birth certificate regime without debate

‘Deportation Cannot Begin without Nationality Verification’: Union’s Rajubala affidavit clarifies legal limits on executive power

Brij Bhushan Acquittal: The system vs the wrestlers

The post When Family Becomes Custody: Allahabad HC holds adult women’s faith, residence and liberty cannot be placed under parental control appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Uttar Pradesh & Uttarakhand, June 28 – July 5, 2026

Chronology of Incidents

June 28- Ilaichipur, Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh

BJP MLA for Loni, Nandkishore Gurjar at the inauguration of local development projects is seen addressing a large crowd stating that 99 percent of Indian Muslims were originally Hindus. He added that those who were “weak” converted while those who were “strong” fought “demons” rather than convert.

This was not an isolated incident during the reporting period. Gurjar was also implicated in another hate speech delivered on July 3, which will be listed down in the chronology. (See incident number 6)

CJP is dedicated to finding and bringing to light instances of Hate Speech, so that the bigots propagating these venomous ideas can be unmasked and brought to justice. To learn more about our campaign against hate speech, please become a member. To support our initiatives, please donate now!

Incidentally, two hate speeches in 2025 according to IHL’s report traces directly to Gurjar. On March 17,  2025 in Loni, Uttar Pradesh, Gurjar referred to Muslims as “demons” and “beasts” while glorifying the demolition of Babri mosque. On April 26, he administered an oath to protest attendees, urging them to identify and expel all those who “support Pakistan,” referring to them as “topiwallas,” “jihadis,” and “Rohingya Bangladeshis.”

In addition to this documented history of communal speeches, Association for Democratic Reforms records show that Gurjar has multiple criminal cases in which charges have been framed, including:

• IPC Section 295: Injuring or defiling a place of worship with intent to insult the religion of any class.
• IPC Section 436: Mischief by fire or explosive substance with intent to destroy a house or other property.
• IPC Section 332: Voluntarily causing hurt to deter a public servant from the discharge of duty.
• IPC Section 506: Criminal intimidation.
• Three charges under IPC Section 147: Rioting.
• Two charges under IPC Section 148: Rioting while armed with a deadly weapon.
• Two charges under IPC Section 353: Assault or criminal force to deter a public servant from the discharge of duty.
• IPC Section 427: Mischief causing damage.
• IPC Section 504: Intentional insult with intent to provoke a breach of the peace.

All of this taken together indicates a recurring pattern of inflammatory public statements—often a precursor to targeted violence- alongside a long-standing record of criminal proceedings.

June 29– Champawat, Uttarakhand

Chief Minister of Uttarakhand, Pushkar Singh Dhami, at a Mukhya Sevak Samvad outreach event, Dhami credited his government with implementing the state’s amended anti-conversion law, running Operation Kalnemi, and “freeing” over 12,000 acres of government land from what he called “land jihad.” He also invoked “love jihad,” “thook jihad” (spit jihad) and “mazar jihad” (shrine jihad), calling them anti-social and anti-national. He further accused the political opposition of appeasement politics for opposing action against “illegal” encroachments and mazars (Muslim shrines).

https://www.facebook.com/hindutvawatchIn/videos/location-champawat-uttarakhanddate-june-29at-the-mukhya-sevak-samvad-program-chi/1751173735881458/

This rhetoric is a verbatim repetition of Dhami’s script which he has used in at least half a dozen recorded speeches since 2024 in Haridwar, Dehradun, Chamoli and Sagar. Reported by The Quint and Deccan Herald.

According to IHL, Dhami has “emerged as the most prolific hates speech actor in 2025, with 71 speeches.”

“CM Dhami and his colleagues frequently invoked the anti-Muslim conspiracies of “love jihad,” “land jihad,” and “spit jihad” alongside fear-mongering about demographic change,” the report states.

June 30– Dehradun, Uttarakhand

A Vishwa Hindu Parshad-Bajrang Dal leader Vikas Verma, at a weekly Hanuman Chalisa gathering cited an unverified case of Hindu students allegedly forced to remove their tilak, kalava and janeu at school. He accused Christianity and Islam of long targeting Sanatan Dharma and welcomed Uttarakhand’s dissolution of the Madrasa Board as he alleged madrasas teach students that non-Muslims are “kafirs” who should be beheaded. He also claimed that those who choose to educate from madrasas will not hesitate to practise terrorism.

Verma has delivered near-identical claims about mosques, madrasas and “anarchists” at the same weekly event before. Im May this year, he also led a right-wing group to a prominent footwear showroom in Dehradhun and a clip was circulated where they were purportedly seen selectively confronting Muslim staff and even snatching their name tags and writing “jihadi” on it.

An investigation published by The Wire found Dehradun Bajrang Dal members running dedicated social-media pages built around similar content.

June 30– Loni, Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh

Hindu Raksha Dal leader Sunny Bajrangi, at a Hanuman Chalisa event called “love jihad” a “termite” eating away at Hindu society. He alleged “jihadis” hide their identity to trap Hindu women, and warned that demographic change would become unstoppable within 20 years unless Hindus unite.

July 1- Domariaganj, Siddharthnagar, Uttar Pradesh

Former BJP MLA Raghvendra Pratap Singh at an event marking Shyama Prasad Mukherjee’s birth anniversary said “love jihad” was rising rapidly and cited an unverified ‘kidnapping’ allegation of a Hindu woman against a “Mulla.” Singh urged BJP workers to watch for “vidharmi” (heretic/anti-faith) and “kukarmi” (evildoer) elements. He also called for scrutiny of Christian missionary activity.

https://www.instagram.com/reel/DaavObxMIgW/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link&igsh=NTc4MTIwNjQ2YQ==

In February 2022, a report by Citizens for Justice and Peace documented two FIRs for hate speech against Singh. CJP quoted far more extreme past remarks, including threats to “get their blood tested” against Hindus who did not vote for him. Read the report here.

July 3- Loni, Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh

The incident again implicates Nandkishore Gurjar, the BJP MLA for Loni who was also the perpetrator in the current reported incident 1. At the inauguration of a road-widening project, Gurjar called Muslims “pigs” and a “disease.” He praised a village for barring any “jihadi” from settling there, and said hospitals now stood where   these “pigs” once roamed. He warned residents against renting warehouses to “Bangladeshis” and vowed to drive them out.

https://www.instagram.com/reel/Dad_ttrsEyL/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link&igsh=NTc4MTIwNjQ2YQ==

Ten months earlier, in September 2025, Gurjar was filmed at a yoga event in Baghpat saying, “Swines and Bangladeshi Rohingyas are being settled here, and they will ruin the country.”

July 4- Barabanki, Uttar Pradesh

Vimlesh Sharma of the Shri Ram Sanatan Seva Samiti and the Gau Raksha Dal along with a group of 15-20 men confronted a Muslim man over alleged remarks about a cow. In the video, they are seen repeatedly slapping and hurling abuses at him as he tries to offer an explanation. The group dragged him to a shed, and forced him to kneel and touch a calf’s legs and later chants “Jai Shri Ram.” Sources also document that he was forced to drink cow urine.

Location:Barabanki, Uttar Pradesh, India ,
According to reports, Vimlesh Sharma, State President of the Shri Ram Sanatan Seva Samiti, along with members of the Gau Raksha Dal, allegedly assaulted a Muslim man after accusing him of making objectionable remarks about a cow.

The… pic.twitter.com/BFPrrT5Ik1

— Rising Falcon (@TheRFTeam) July 5, 2026

The Siasat Daily also reports that the Hindutva group’s own Instagram post accused the man of threatening a violent, blood-soaked Holi.

In a video posted on X, Vimlesh Sharma justified the assault by alleging that the victim had abused their mothers and sisters and mocked their dietary practices, stating that these actions prompted the group to respond as they did.

Location: Barabanki, Uttar Pradesh

Vimalesh Sharma, the state president of Shri Ram Sanatan Seva Samiti, released a video in which he said that he beat a Muslim man accused of making offensive remarks about cows and forcibly made him drink cow urine. https://t.co/K8zCAB2L17 pic.twitter.com/eYt8ux4M8Q

— The Muslim (@TheMuslim786) July 7, 2026

According to media reports, the Public Relations Officer (PRO) of the Barabanki Superintendent of Police stated that the police were unaware of the incident.

Congress MP Syed Naseer Hussain has condemned such acts of forced religious worship and described it as “deeply disturbing.”

The assault and humiliation of a Muslim man in Barabanki, including forcing him to perform religious acts against his will, is deeply disturbing. Such acts are not expressions of faith but crimes that violate human dignity and the Constitution.

When vigilante groups believe they… pic.twitter.com/jq7Hlgb0Ki

— Dr Syed Naseer Hussain, M P (@NasirHussainINC) July 4, 2026

July 5- Kaintholi, Tehri Garhwal, Uttarakhand

One, Amit Thapliyal along with a few associates stopped a Christian Sunday prayer meeting, asserting that Hinduism is the village’s only permitted religion. Thapiyal accused attendees of attending for payment, and told them to surrender their Scheduled Caste (SC) reservation benefits if they wished to practice Christianity.

Assessment

No reports of any FIR or case registered has emerged against any of these incidents. Most, in fact, were not found reported in mainstream media at the time of writing. This unfortunately is evidence if such were needed of the cavalier and casual manner in which legacy and mainstream media treats such hate speech; avoidance of which allows for a continued prevalence of a culture of impunity. However, the videos show a pattern of anti-minority mobilisation that is consistent with established scholarship on communal politics, majoritarian nationalism, and hate speech in India. They demonstrate how political rhetoric, vigilante action, and symbolic performances of dominance reinforce one another to construct religious minorities, particularly Muslims and Christians, as threats to the nation, culture, and social order.

The incidents are examples of moral panic and conspiracy framing in which minority communities are portrayed as engaging in coordinated efforts to undermine the demographic, territorial, or cultural integrity of the Hindu majority. This assessment is not to paint any one community as total saints and another as perpetrators. However, such rhizomatic organisation and hate speech by creating an atmosphere of perceived threat only legitimises exceptional state action and public hostility.  They create an imagined internal enemy whose existence justifies exclusionary politics.

The repeated and exhausting invocation of various forms of ‘jihad,’ portrayal of Muslims as ‘Bangladeshis,’ or ‘swines,’ disruption of Christian prayer meetings, and performative humiliation by asking someone to forcefully chant a religious slogan suggest diffusion of a shared ideological repertoire of how political authority and vigilante mobilisation reinforce one another.

Importantly, 3 out of 8 incidents have been attributed to a sitting Chief Minister and an MLA. This convergence of official political speech and vigilante action is a significant feature of democratic backsliding and ethno nationalism. Uttarakhand held municipal elections on June 9, 2026, and Uttar Pradesh has delayed its three-tier panchayat elections, with voter-list work underway through the summer of 2026 across nearly 58,000 gram panchayats

But a similar language appearing across chief ministerial speeches, local political leaders, and organisations such as the Bajrang Dal, Hindu Raksha Dal, and cow-protection groups suggests the diffusion of a shared ideological repertoire. One that is unconstitutional. However, such language has frequently been used, even at a national level, including from the head of government.

The trajectory of hate speech leading up to the 2024 General Elections has been documented by India Hate Speech Monitor. It can be accessed here.

Several of these incidents cannot be separated from a broader, well-documented campaign. Since May 2025, Indian authorities have detained and, in many cases, summarily expelled thousands of people to Bangladesh, a substantial number of them Bengali-speaking Indian Muslims with valid citizenship documents. UP has seen its own share of wrongful detentions of West Bengal migrant workers holding valid Aadhaar and voter identification.

In Uttrakhand, disruption of prayer meetings is documented. In July 2024, an 11-person FIR followed a mob attack on a Dehradun prayer meeting that vandalised a crucifix.

Uttarakhand: Hindutva mob attacks Christian prayer meet in Dehradun. A group of Hindutva ‘activists’ barged into the house and assaulted people including women present inside, Forcefully entered inside the house and vandalised a Christian cross, prayer room and bedroom, made… pic.twitter.com/BLD7vbXp2Y

— Mohammed Zubair (@zoo_bear) July 16, 2024

Similarly, in May 2022 in Purola,Uttarakhand a prayer meeting was stormed by an armed group. The coercive demand to renounce SC reservation status is a recognisable feature of this genre nationally. However, the groups are also apprehensive of forced-conversion practices.

Sections 196 and 299 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 penalises promoting disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill will. This is the only remedy for hate speech between religious, racial, linguistic or regional groups. The maximum sentence is three years, rising to five if the act occurs at a place of worship or religious ceremony.

However, the structural problem, independent of any single case, is enforcement and conviction rates. In May this year, the Supreme Court said that separate guidelines for heat speech were unnecessary. This climb-down by the apex court to its own earlier interventionist directions and orders around such mobilisations is also a sign of institutional disregard to a culture of growing anti-minority public rhetoric. A detailed analysis on the Supreme Court’s final judgement on the issue may be read here and here.

According to IHL, documented 1,318 hate speech events nationally in 2025, roughly four events a day, with 98 percent targeting Muslims either alone or alongside Christians.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Tanishka Shah)

Related:

Targeted as ‘Bangladeshis’: The hate speech fuelling deportations

A Targeted Campaign: The orchestrated crackdown on Bengali Migrants and the rising pushback from courts, Bengal government, and civil society

India Hate Lab Report 2025: How Hate Speech has been normalised in the public sphere

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Jakira Bibi and Naseruddin Sheikh

For Naseruddin Sheikh and Jakira Bibi, an elderly couple from Shernagar village under Agomani Police Station in Dhubri district, that question arrived in the form of notices from the Foreigners Tribunal. The notices did not merely initiate legal proceedings; they brought an extraordinary degree of fear into the ordinary life of a family that had spent generations rooted in Assam.

The allegation against them was that they had entered India illegally from Bangladesh on or after March 25, 1971. The consequence of such an allegation is immense. For a person of limited means, an appearance before a Foreigners Tribunal can mean confronting a legal system that demands historical documents, family linkage, oral evidence and a coherent explanation of one’s identity and residence, often going back decades. The burden is particularly heavy for those who are elderly, poor, uneducated or physically unwell.

Naseruddin was an ageing handcart puller whose life had been spent in physical labour. Jakira was an elderly woman suffering from several health problems who had spent her life caring for her family. Neither possessed the resources to comfortably navigate a prolonged legal battle.

The couple therefore faced something far larger than two legal cases. They faced the possibility that the country in which they been born and lived, could question their allegiance and their lives could suddenly become a question mark.

Their story, however, is also a story of legal intervention, documentary evidence and persistence. With the assistance of the intrepid para-legal and legal team of the Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP), the couple was able to place their evidence before the Foreigners Tribunal. After examining the materials and testimony presented in the respective proceedings, the Tribunals ultimately declared both Naseruddin Sheikh and Jakira Bibi “Not Foreigner.”

The two orders are significant not only because they brought relief to an elderly couple but also because they demonstrate how citizenship-related proceedings can turn on the careful reconstruction of family history, legacy linkage and documentary continuity—and how access to quality and sensitive legal assistance can be critical when ordinary citizens are required to defend themselves against allegations that challenge their very belonging. The final order in Naseruddin’s case is dated May 8, 2025, while the order in Jakira’s case was pronounced on November 1, 2025. It took the Assam team of Citizens for Justice and Peace, that provided this quality legal aid, eight months in accessing the order of the Foreigners Tribunal.

Foreigners Tribunal Court, Dhurbi

Naseruddin Sheikh: A man who spent his life pulling a handcart, now forced to defend his Indian identity

Naseruddin Sheikh is now close to 76 years old. His life has been shaped by hard work rather than privilege. Born on January 12, 1950, he belongs to Bidyadabri village in the Dhubri region and is the son of late Basaruddin Sheikh and grandson of Sukur Ali @ Khasar.

He never received an education and, from a young age, had to depend on physical labour for survival. For nearly three decades, he worked as a handcart puller in Agomani market, transporting vegetables, rice and other goods. At different times, he also worked as a daily wage labourer, taking whatever work was available to support his family.

His life was not one of comfort, but it was a life firmly rooted in the place he knew as home. Together with his wife, Jakira, he raised six children—three sons and three daughters. While he worked outside, she managed the household and cared for the family.

Today, Naseruddin’s body bears the consequences of decades of physical labour. Yet, even at an advanced age, he sometimes continues to pull his handcart because the economic circumstances of his family leave little room for retirement. It was against this background that the Foreigners Tribunal proceedings began.

The case against Naseruddin was registered as FT-9/113/GKJ/2019. The reference originated from the Superintendent of Police (Border), Dhubri, following a citizenship verification process and raised the question of whether Naseruddin was an illegal migrant or foreigner of the post-1971 stream or any other relevant stream. The Tribunal’s order records that Naseruddin appeared in response to notice, filed a written statement, produced documents and contested the allegation that he was a foreigner.

For Naseruddin, the proceedings were frightening not simply because of their legal implications but because of the practical reality of defending himself. A man whose daily existence depended upon manual labour was suddenly required to reconstruct his family history through documents and testimony. The cost of legal representation, travel to court and the loss of working days could have placed an unbearable burden upon him.

The legal system, however, required him to answer the allegation with evidence. That is where the intervention of CJP became crucial.

CJP Team Assam along with Jakira Bibi and Naseruddin Sheikh

When the CJP team came to his door: After receiving the notice, Naseruddin did not know where to turn. He was confronted with a legal proceeding whose consequences he could not fully understand and whose financial demands he could not easily meet. It was at this point that he came into contact with CJP Community Volunteer Ilias Sarkar, who connected him with the wider CJP team. State In-Charge Nanda Ghosh, Advocate Iskandar Azad and Community Volunteer Habibul Bepari became involved in assisting the couple.

The team visited Naseruddin’s home, examined the available records and began working to understand the documentary history of his family. This intervention was important because citizenship proceedings of this nature often require something that is not easy for ordinary people to provide on their own: the ability to transform scattered documents from different periods into a legally coherent narrative.

A voter list from decades ago may establish the presence of an ancestor. A later electoral roll may establish continuity. A land deed may support residence or possession of property. A witness may explain the relationship between generations. None of these pieces necessarily tells the whole story in isolation. Their significance emerges when they are connected into a credible chain of evidence.

For Naseruddin, the legal task was therefore not simply to produce an Aadhaar card or an EPIC card. The more fundamental challenge was to demonstrate the historical continuity of his identity and his connection to his family and to India.

CJP took responsibility for assisting him in the proceedings, and Advocate Iskandar Azad represented him before the Tribunal. The support gave Naseruddin something that he had been missing since the notice arrived: the confidence that he would not have to face the legal process alone.

As Naseruddin later recalled, “After getting the notice we did not understand where to go. Even with papers, people become foreigners here. So the fear remains, but after you came we got courage.”

His words capture the psychological reality behind the legal case. The presence of legal assistance did not merely provide representation; it restored a measure of confidence to a man who had suddenly been made to question his own security in the country where he had spent his entire life.

The legal strategy: The central challenge in Naseruddin’s case was to establish his connection with his family lineage and demonstrate the continuity of his presence in India. The evidence presented before the Tribunal therefore went back across generations.

One of the important pieces of evidence was a 1966 electoral roll of Bhamandanga Part-II, in which the name of Gerpu Sheikh, son of Sukur Ali, was recorded. Naseruddin identified Gerpu Sheikh as his paternal uncle and Sukur Ali as his grandfather. The Tribunal also considered a 1966 electoral roll from Jaldhoya, where the name of Naseruddin’s father, Basiruddin, was recorded.

The importance of these records lay in their historical character. They were not documents created for the purpose of the present litigation; rather, they were old electoral records that predated the proceedings by several decades. Their evidentiary value, therefore, arose from the fact that they could potentially connect Naseruddin’s present identity to members of his family who were recorded as voters in the relevant period.

The case was further supported by electoral rolls from 1994, 1997, 2005, 2015 and 2022, reflecting the names of Naseruddin and his wife in successive electoral records. The Tribunal’s order records these documents as part of the 13 exhibits produced by Naseruddin in support of his claim.

The defence also relied upon Registered Deed No. 473 dated 24 January 1976, together with Naseruddin’s EPIC, PAN and Aadhaar documents. A licence issued by the Agomani Gaon Panchayat for operating a push cart and certificates issued by the relevant Gram Panchayat were also placed on record.

The evidence was not confined to documents. Naseruddin himself appeared as DW-1 and gave evidence regarding his birth, his father and grandfather, the family’s movements between Assam and West Bengal, his father’s death, his subsequent residence and his own connection with the places in which he lived. His relative Yashomuddin Munshi was also examined as a defence witness.

The Tribunal therefore had before it a combination of historical electoral records, later electoral continuity, land documentation, identity records and oral testimony. Legally, the importance of this combination lies in the way the evidence was intended to work together. The case was not based upon the proposition that any single document, by itself, conclusively established citizenship. Rather, the defence sought to establish a consistent narrative of family lineage and residence through multiple sources of evidence spanning different periods. That approach was central to the Tribunal’s assessment.

Why the evidence was found sufficient in Naseruddin’s case: The Tribunal’s reasoning is particularly important from a legal perspective because it did not simply list the documents and declare the case proved. It examined the documentary record alongside the oral evidence.

The Tribunal scrutinised the 1966 electoral roll of Bhamandanga Part-II and the corresponding electoral evidence from West Bengal. It considered the oral evidence concerning Gerpu Sheikh and Basiruddin, whom Naseruddin identified as members of his paternal family. The Tribunal also noted that Naseruddin’s own testimony supported his existence in India from his birth in 1950.

The Tribunal also considered Naseruddin’s account of his father’s movements between Assam and West Bengal. His evidence was that his father had moved to Jaldhoya in Cooch Behar in the mid-1950s, remained there for a period and had cast his vote in the West Bengal electoral roll, before returning to Assam and subsequently residing in the Bhamandanga area. Naseruddin further described the circumstances following his father’s death and his own later residence in Shernagar.

This is legally significant because the Tribunal was required to assess not only whether individual documents existed but whether the overall evidence formed a credible and consistent account. The Tribunal ultimately found that the historical electoral evidence, together with the oral testimony, supported the existence of Naseruddin in India from birth and established the parental linkage relied upon by him. The evidence of his defence witness was also considered in support of his version.

The significance of the decision, therefore, lies in the Tribunal’s acceptance of a cumulative evidentiary approach. Historical voter records, family linkage, oral testimony and subsequent documentary continuity were considered together rather than in isolation.

The final conclusion was unequivocal: Naseruddin did not appear to be a foreigner of the post-1971 stream or of any other stream, and the reference against him was answered in the negative. In practical terms, Naseruddin Sheikh was declared “Not Foreigner.”

For a man who had spent his entire life working with his hands, the order represented the end of an extraordinary legal ordeal. It meant that the elderly handcart puller who had always said, “I was born here, my father was born here, my grandfather was also born here,” had succeeded in placing before the Tribunal the evidence necessary to support that claim.

The complete order may be read below:

Jakira Bibi: When an ailing elderly woman had to defend the home she had always known

While Naseruddin fought his legal battle, his wife, Jakira Bibi, was facing a Foreigners Tribunal proceeding of her own. Jakira is above 60 years old and suffers from several health problems. Her life, like her husband’s, has been one of family responsibilities and modest means. She was born on July 12, 1964 in Shernagar village, the same region where her family had long been rooted.

Her father was Bataullah Sheikh, also referred to in the proceedings as Batasulla Sheikh, and her mother was Jelmoti Bibi. Her family history, as presented before the Tribunal, extended through historical electoral records and NRC legacy data.

Jakira’s case was registered as FT-9/112/GKJ/2019. The reference alleged that she had entered India illegally from Bangladesh on or after March 25, 1971. The order records that the reference originated from the Superintendent of Police (Border), Dhubri, and that Jakira contested the allegation, asserting that she was an Indian citizen by birth and that her parents and family were rooted in Assam.

For Jakira, the proceedings came with a particularly heavy physical burden. She was an elderly woman living with health problems, while her husband was himself an ageing daily wage worker. The prospect of travelling, collecting documents and participating in litigation was therefore not merely inconvenient—it was a serious hardship. But the evidence in her case was substantial.

Her defence sought to establish her identity through her parents, her family lineage and her own long history of residence and participation in the electoral process.

The evidence in Jakira’s case: The legal case presented on behalf of Jakira was built around a combination of historical electoral records, family linkage, land documentation and oral evidence. The Tribunal considered a 1958 electoral roll of Shernagar in which the names of Jakira’s parents, Batasullah Sheikh and Jelmoti Bibi, were recorded. The defence also relied upon a 1966 electoral roll, which reflected the name of her mother along with her stepfather, Goher Ali. Later electoral records from 1985, 1994, 1997, 2005, 2015 and 2022 were produced to demonstrate continuity of the family’s presence and Jakira’s own electoral history.

The defence further relied upon 1951 NRC legacy data, which was cited in support of the family linkage, as well as Registered Sale Deed No. 456 dated 20 January 1983, relating to ancestral land. Jakira’s own EPIC, PAN and Aadhaar documents were also placed on record. Importantly, the case did not rest solely upon documentary evidence. Jakira herself appeared as DW-1, while her elder brother Jahir Ali appeared as DW-2 to support the family linkage and her account of the family’s presence in India.

The Tribunal’s order records that Jakira produced as many as 16 exhibits in support of her claim, including historical and subsequent electoral rolls, the 1983 registered deed, identity documents and the identity documents of her brother. The evidentiary structure of the case is important.

The older electoral records were relevant to establishing the presence of Jakira’s parents and family in the earlier period. The later electoral records helped demonstrate continuity. The land deed supported the family’s connection to property in the area. Her own testimony and that of her brother addressed the relationship between the generations. Thus, as in Naseruddin’s case, the legal significance lay in the cumulative effect of the evidence.

The legal significance of Jakira’s victory: The Tribunal’s order makes an explicit reference to Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946, observing that the burden was upon the proceedee to prove her nationality and that, accordingly, the liability of the prosecution was dispensed with.

In a Foreigners Tribunal proceeding, the legal question is not merely whether a person possesses contemporary identity documents. The person proceeded against must establish the case put forward regarding their nationality and status in accordance with the applicable legal framework. That makes historical evidence especially important when the allegation concerns illegal entry after the March 25, 1971 cut-off.

Jakira’s case therefore required her to establish more than her present-day identity. Her evidence sought to demonstrate her familial and historical connection to Assam, beginning with the electoral presence of her parents and continuing through her own life and electoral records.

The Tribunal examined the historical voter lists and the oral evidence of Jakira and her brother. It noted that her father and mother had cast votes in Assam and that the relevant electoral records supported the defence version. The Tribunal also considered the subsequent electoral rolls in which Jakira and her husband were recorded as voters.

The Tribunal further noted that the Election Office, Dhubri, had confirmed the authenticity of the exhibited electoral rolls. This was an important corroborative element because it strengthened the evidentiary reliability of the historical electoral records relied upon by the defence.

The Tribunal also considered the oral evidence of Jakira’s brother, Jahir Ali, regarding her paternal linkage. His testimony was treated as corroborating Jakira’s own evidence, and the Tribunal found that the parental linkage with Batasullah Sheikh had been established adequately.

The legal significance of this reasoning lies in the Tribunal’s reliance on multiple mutually supporting forms of evidence. The historical electoral records established the presence of the family; the later rolls demonstrated continuity; the land record supported the family’s connection to the area; and the oral evidence provided the relational bridge linking Jakira to her parents.

The Tribunal ultimately found that Jakira was a descendant of genuine Indian parents and that she had successfully discharged the burden placed upon her. She was declared “Not Foreigner.”

The complete order may be read below:

What triggered the proceedings against them?

The question of how a person first comes to be referred to a Foreigners Tribunal is an important part of every citizenship case. The legal battle before the Tribunal is only one stage of the process. Before that, there must be a basis for the initial reference and the decision to question the person’s nationality.

In the case of Jakira Bibi, the reference was originally forwarded by the Superintendent of Police (B), Dhubri, through SP (Border) I(M)DT Case No. 2389/98. The order records that the reference was made on the basis of a doubt regarding her nationality, with the purpose of determining whether she was or was not an illegal migrant. The matter was subsequently re-numbered before Foreigners Tribunal No. 2, Dhubri as F.T. Case No. 3494/GKJ/2011, under the provisions of the Foreigners Act, 1946, read with the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964.

In Naseruddin Sheikh’s case, the order provides a somewhat more specific description of the origin of the reference. It states that the case was originally forwarded by the Superintendent of Police (B), Dhubri, Assam, vide IM(D)T Case No. 2388/1998, on the basis of a report made by the Local Verification Officer for determination of his citizenship. The case was initially registered before the Foreigners Tribunal No. 2, Dhubri and was later transferred to the present Tribunal following the constitution of additional Tribunals.

The order further records that, upon consideration, the Tribunal found “sufficient grounds to proceed” and accordingly issued notice to Naseruddin, providing him an opportunity to show cause in respect of the matter. These details are significant because they bring the question of the “first cause of action” into focus.

In Naseruddin’s case, the order specifically refers to a Local Verification Officer’s report as the basis for the original reference for determination of his citizenship. In Jakira’s case, the order states that the reference arose from a doubt regarding her nationality. The documents, however, as quoted above, do not themselves set out the substantive contents of the Local Verification Officer’s report in Naseruddin’s case or explain in detail what specific material gave rise to the doubt regarding Jakira’s nationality.

Two Cases, One Common Lesson: Citizenship proceedings are often about reconstructing a life through evidence

The cases of Naseruddin Sheikh and Jakira Bibi are legally distinct proceedings, but their evidentiary journeys reveal a common pattern. In both cases, the defence had to reconstruct a family history that stretched back decades. In both, historical electoral rolls played an important role, electoral records helped demonstrate continuity, and oral testimony was used to establish family relationships and explain the documentary record. And in both, the evidence was considered not as isolated pieces but as part of a larger narrative of identity, ancestry and residence.

In citizenship proceedings, the strength of a case may lie not in one document but in the consistency between several independent sources of evidence. A historical electoral roll may establish the presence of a parent or grandparent. A later electoral roll may demonstrate continuity. A land document may reinforce residence and family connection. A witness may explain the relationship between individuals appearing in different records.

The value of legal representation, therefore, is not limited to arguing before the Tribunal. It also lies in identifying which documents matter, tracing family linkage, locating historical records and presenting them in a manner that allows the Tribunal to assess the evidence as a coherent whole. For Naseruddin and Jakira, the CJP team’s intervention helped transform a collection of old documents and family memories into a structured legal defence. That is where access to justice becomes particularly important.

The human cost behind the case numbers

Behind FT-9/113/GKJ/2019 and FT-9/112/GKJ/2019 were not merely two case files. There was an elderly man who had spent his life pulling a handcart to feed his family. There was an elderly woman who was already battling illness. There were six children whose parents were suddenly living under the shadow of a citizenship proceeding.

There was a family that had to search through decades of records to prove a history that had always been part of their everyday lives. The legal proceedings also reveal the disproportionate impact that such litigation can have on people living in poverty.

For Naseruddin, appearing in court could mean losing the day’s earnings. For Jakira, the physical strain of participating in proceedings was compounded by her health problems. For both, the financial cost of engaging a lawyer could have been beyond their means. This is why legal aid in citizenship proceedings is not simply a matter of convenience. It can determine whether a vulnerable person is able to meaningfully participate in the legal process.

A person may possess relevant documents but not know which ones are legally significant. They may have a family connection but lack the ability to explain it in the form required by a legal proceeding. They may have old electoral records but not understand how those records can establish a historical linkage. Legal assistance can bridge that gap. In Naseruddin and Jakira’s cases, that bridge ultimately helped them present their evidence before the Tribunal.

The day the order came home

On July 18, the CJP team visited the couple’s home to deliver copies of the order. The team included Advocate Iskandar Azad, Office Driver Asikul Hussain, Community Volunteers Ilias Sarkar (Rabbi), Habibul Bepari, Deep Ghosh and Ilias Rahman, along with State In-Charge Nanda Ghosh. This time, they did not arrive with another notice; they came carrying the order.

For the couple, the moment represented the end of months of uncertainty and fear.  Naseruddin had feared that the proceedings might eventually lead to detention. Jakira had endured the physical and emotional burden of litigation despite her health problems. Together, they had lived through the uncertainty of not knowing whether the country they had always called home would continue to recognise them as belonging to it. When the order were placed in their hands, the relief was overwhelming.

Naseruddin recalled the terror he had experienced when the notice first arrived and how the support of CJP had given him the courage to continue. Jakira expressed her gratitude through tears, remembering how the team had come to their home, helped organise their documents and ensured that they had legal representation. Their words reveal something that legal orders alone cannot capture.

A favourable order may end a proceeding, but it cannot immediately erase the fear created by the proceeding itself. The couple had won, but the memory of having been forced to defend their belonging would remain.

Beyond Two Victories: The larger citizenship question

The legal victory of Naseruddin and Jakira is deeply significant to them and their family. But their cases also raise broader questions about how citizenship proceedings affect ordinary people, particularly those who live on the margins of society.

A person may have lived in a village for decades and still be required to reconstruct their family history through records that may be more than half a century old. Historical documents may contain variations in names or spellings. Families may have moved between districts or across state boundaries. Electoral records may exist in different places. Land may have been acquired, sold or requisitioned. All of these factors can make the process of establishing continuity complex.

The two cases demonstrate why citizenship proceedings cannot be viewed purely as administrative exercises. They involve questions of identity, family history, dignity and belonging. They also raise crucial questions of maintainability, accountability and mala fide by authorities, unused to being questioned on these foundational aspects.

The legal orders also demonstrate the importance of the evidentiary process. In both cases, the Tribunals considered the documentary record alongside oral evidence and assessed whether the evidence, taken as a whole, was sufficient to discharge the applicable burden.

In Naseruddin’s case, the Tribunal accepted the evidentiary chain connecting him to his paternal family and his presence in India. In Jakira’s case, the Tribunal accepted the evidence establishing her parental linkage and the family’s historical presence in Assam.

The outcomes therefore underline the importance of access to legal assistance, preservation of historical records and the careful presentation of evidence. At the same time, the emotional experiences of the couple remind us that the human consequences of citizenship proceedings extend far beyond the courtroom. For the poor and elderly, the process itself can become a source of profound anxiety. The question, therefore, is not only whether justice can ultimately be obtained. It is also whether vulnerable people have the support necessary to reach justice in the first place.

From Fear to Dignity: The meaning of “not foreigner”

For Naseruddin Sheikh and Jakira Bibi, being declared “Not Foreigner” means more than winning a legal case. It means that the fear and uncertainty they lived with after receiving the notices have finally come to an end.

The judgments have brought them relief and restored their sense of security. The evidence they collected, the family records they preserved and the testimony they gave were accepted by the Tribunals.

Naseruddin is still the elderly man who spent decades pulling a handcart in Agomani market. Jakira is still the woman who devoted her life to caring for her family. But now, they can return to their home without the fear that once followed them. Their story is about belonging, but it is also about the importance of having the chance to be heard and to present one’s evidence before the law. For both, the journey began with fear. It continued through old electoral rolls, land records, family documents and witness testimony, supported by legal assistance and the determination to prove their history. And it ended with two words that brought them immense relief: “Not Foreigner.”

or CJP, the victory of Naseruddin Sheikh and Jakira Bibi is not the end of the struggle, but a reminder of why access to justice and legal support remain so important for Assam’s poor and marginalised communities. The CJP team says it will continue to stand with those whose citizenship and dignity are challenged, with the hope that no Indian will ever have to face the fear of proving that they belong to their own country.

Today, Naseruddin and Jakira can finally smile without the shadow of the notices hanging over them. After a long journey of fear, uncertainty and legal struggle, they can return to their home with renewed confidence and say what they have always believed: “We are Indian.”

 Related:

Another CJP Victory: Barpeta Tribunal declares Alam Khan ‘not a foreigner’

When a narrow reading of documents decide citizenship: GHC in Aminul Hoque

‘Fairness & reason ‘: SC rules that due process is a must for citizenship determination

Gauhati High Court upholds foreigner declaration, rejects mental illness plea

When a Spelling Error Can Cost Citizenship: Supreme Court stays deportation of five Assam women

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Alam Khan outside his home in Barpeta

In an order delivered on January 6, 2026, the Foreigners Tribunal No. 1, Barpeta, presided over by Member Ms. Anurupa Dey, declared that Alam Khan is not a foreigner, concluding that he had successfully established his Indian citizenship through reliable documentary evidence, credible oral testimony and a consistent chain of records demonstrating that his family had been residing in Assam prior to the statutory cut-off date of March 25, 1971.

The decision represents another important legal victory for Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP), which provided legal assistance to Alam Khan throughout the proceedings. The matter was argued by Advocate Abhijeet Choudhury, whose legal strategy addressed complex questions of lineage, documentary continuity and evidentiary burden arising under the Foreigners Act, 1946.

Alam Khan along with CJP Team Assam, outside his home

However, the significance of this decision extends beyond one individual’s relief. The Tribunal’s order is noteworthy for its careful appreciation of evidence, its refusal to allow administrative lapses to prejudice the proceedee, and its recognition that family circumstances such as divorce and remarriage cannot, by themselves, undermine a genuine claim to Indian citizenship.

A citizenship dispute dating back more than two decades

Alam Khan’s case originated as IM(D)T Reference Case No. 1371 of 2000, when the Superintendent of Police (Border), Barpeta, referred him as a suspected foreigner. Following the Supreme Court’s order striking down the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act in Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India, pending references under the IM(D)T regime stood transferred to Foreigners Tribunals for adjudication under the Foreigners Act, 1946 and the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964. Alam Khan’s case was one such transferred proceeding.

Although the reference itself was over two decades old, Alam Khan received a fresh notice from the Tribunal only in October 2024, compelling him once again to defend his citizenship. For a daily wage labourer with limited financial means, this meant returning to prolonged litigation, collecting decades-old documents, tracing family records and proving facts that ordinarily no citizen is ever expected to establish.

The proceedings eventually culminated in January 2026, though the certified copy of the order reached Alam Khan only several months later. On July 16, 2026, CJP’s legal team, represented by Advocate Abhijeet Choudhury and Assam State In-charge Nanda Ghosh, formally handed over the order copy to him, marking the end of a legal battle spanning almost twenty-six years.

A case made difficult by family history rather than law

Unlike many Foreigners Tribunal proceedings where documentary continuity alone becomes the principal issue, Alam Khan’s case presented an additional layer of complexity arising from his family’s personal history. Alam Khan was born to Late Abdul Hakim Khan and Joytan Nessa. During his childhood, however, his parents divorced. Following the separation, his mother returned to her parental home, while Alam Khan continued residing with his father. Subsequently, his father remarried, and his stepmother, Jahura Khatun, became part of the family. These personal circumstances later translated into significant documentary complications.

By the time Alam Khan’s own name began appearing in electoral rolls, his father had already passed away. Consequently, subsequent voter lists reflected his residence alongside his stepmother rather than his biological mother. Since he did not possess a birth certificate, establishing the identity of his biological mother, and distinguishing her from his stepmother, became one of the most difficult factual questions before the Tribunal.

Ordinarily, such inconsistencies are capable of creating serious doubts in citizenship proceedings, particularly because the burden of proof under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act rests upon the proceedee. Had these inconsistencies remained unexplained, they could easily have undermined Alam Khan’s defence despite his genuine claim to citizenship. It was this challenge that shaped CJP’s legal strategy before the Tribunal.

CJP’s Legal Strategy: Addressing documentary gaps through credible evidence

Recognising that the case hinged not merely on producing documents but on explaining the circumstances behind apparent inconsistencies, CJP adopted a legal strategy that combined documentary evidence with carefully structured oral testimony. Representing Alam Khan, Advocate Abhijeet Choudhury sought to establish an unbroken narrative of lineage, residence and citizenship, while simultaneously demonstrating that the deficiencies in the documentary record arose from circumstances entirely beyond the proceedee’s control. The defence first addressed the most fundamental issue in the case—Alam Khan’s parentage.

To resolve the confusion arising from the divorce of his parents and his subsequent residence with his father and stepmother, CJP produced Joytan Nessa, Alam Khan’s biological mother, as Defence Witness No. 2 (DW-2). Through her sworn affidavit and oral testimony, she confirmed that Alam Khan was indeed her son and explained the family’s history, including her separation from Abdul Hakim and her return to her parental home. The Tribunal found that her evidence fully corroborated Alam Khan’s own testimony and expressly recorded that it found no reason to disbelieve her evidence.

This was a crucial intervention. In Foreigners Tribunal proceedings, discrepancies concerning parentage or family relationships often become decisive, particularly where birth certificates or other foundational documents are unavailable. By placing the biological mother in the witness box and allowing her testimony to withstand cross-examination, the defence transformed what appeared to be a documentary weakness into a coherent and credible explanation supported by oral evidence.

Equally significant was CJP’s response to another obstacle that had nothing to do with Alam Khan himself—the absence of certified electoral rolls for 1985 and 1989. The relevant Election Commission office was unable to produce certified copies of these electoral rolls because they had not been preserved. This was an institutional failure entirely attributable to the authorities. During the proceedings, Advocate Abhijeet Choudhury argued that a citizen cannot be expected to suffer adverse consequences because the State failed to preserve public records that were legally required to be maintained. The inability to produce those electoral rolls, therefore, could not be treated as evidence against the proceedee.

Instead of insisting upon documents that no longer existed, the defence invited the Tribunal to examine the continuity of evidence through earlier and subsequent electoral records, legacy documents and witness testimony. The Tribunal accepted this broader evidentiary approach, demonstrating that the absence of a particular document does not necessarily break the chain of proof where surrounding evidence establishes continuity.

Documentary evidence establishing citizenship

To discharge the burden imposed under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946, the defence produced an extensive body of documentary evidence tracing Alam Khan’s family across multiple decades. The foundation of the case lay in the 1951 National Register of Citizens (NRC). The Tribunal noted that Alam Khan’s grandfather’s name appeared in the 1951 NRC Legacy Data under Legacy Data Code No. 120-0041-8547, establishing that the family was residing in village Katla, Mouza Bhawanipur, long before the citizenship cut-off date prescribed under the Assam Accord. The documentary chain was then strengthened through certified electoral rolls spanning more than five decades.

The 1965 and 1970 voter lists contained the names of Alam Khan’s father, Abdul Hakim Khan, and his mother, Joytan Nessa. The 1970 electoral roll also reflected the presence of his stepmother following his father’s remarriage, a circumstance that aligned with the factual explanation advanced before the Tribunal. Alam Khan’s own name subsequently appeared in the electoral records from 1997 onwards, demonstrating continuity of residence in the same village. Certified copies of the voter list for 1997, 2005, 2010, 2019 and 2021 were produced before the Tribunal.

The defence also produced Alam Khan’s Voter Identity Card, land records (Khatian) and a certificate issued by the Gaonburah of Katla village. Significantly, the Gaonburah himself appeared before the Tribunal and proved the certificate, explaining that it had been issued after verification of the 1965 electoral records relating to Alam Khan’s father. This substantially enhanced the evidentiary value of the certificate, which was no longer merely a supporting document but one whose authenticity stood established through oral testimony.

An equally important aspect of the proceedings was the State’s own conduct. While Alam Khan examined three witnesses, including himself, and produced extensive documentary evidence, the State did not lead any evidence whatsoever to substantiate the allegation that he was a foreigner. The Tribunal specifically recorded that no witness appeared on behalf of the State to adduce evidence.

Tribunal rejects a mechanical approach to citizenship determination

The order is particularly significant because it rejects a narrow or mechanical assessment of documentary evidence in favour of a holistic evaluation of the entire factual record. Foreigners Tribunal proceedings are frequently characterised by intense scrutiny of documentary inconsistencies. Minor discrepancies in names, ages, family relationships or electoral records have often proved fatal to citizenship claims. In Alam Khan’s case, however, the Tribunal recognised that documentary records must be assessed in light of the social realities that produce them.

Rather than treating the absence of a birth certificate or the appearance of a stepmother’s name in later electoral rolls as circumstances adverse to the proceedee, the Tribunal examined whether those circumstances had been satisfactorily explained through credible evidence. Finding that they had, it accepted the explanation offered by the defence.

This approach reflects an important principle in citizenship adjudication: documentary evidence does not exist in isolation. Electoral rolls, family records and legacy documents must be read together with oral testimony and surrounding circumstances. Where the evidence collectively establishes a coherent and credible narrative, isolated inconsistencies cannot automatically justify declaring an individual a foreigner. That reasoning is one of the most significant aspects of the order and reinforces the principle that citizenship determinations must rest on a comprehensive appreciation of evidence rather than on rigid technicalities.

Tribunal finds Alam Khan successfully discharged the burden under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act

One of the most important aspects of the decision lies in the Tribunal’s application of Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946, which places the burden of proving Indian citizenship upon the proceedee once a reference is made against them. While the statutory burden remained upon Alam Khan, the Tribunal emphasised that this burden had to be assessed on the basis of the quality, credibility and cumulative effect of the evidence rather than through a piecemeal examination of individual documents.

After considering the oral testimony and documentary record together, the Tribunal held that Alam Khan had successfully discharged this burden. It observed that the evidence placed on record was trustworthy, internally consistent and sufficiently established that he was born to Indian parents who had been residing in Assam prior to March 25, 1971.

This finding is significant because it reiterates an important evidentiary principle governing Foreigners Tribunal proceeding. Although Section 9 reverses the ordinary burden of proof, it does not authorise a mechanical rejection of citizenship claims merely because every conceivable document is unavailable. Instead, what is required is a credible evidentiary chain capable of establishing ancestry and residence. The Tribunal found that Alam Khan had done precisely that.

Oral evidence receives equal evidentiary weight

The order is equally noteworthy for the importance it accords to oral testimony. Citizenship cases before Foreigners Tribunals often become document-centric, with oral evidence receiving comparatively little attention. In Alam Khan’s case, however, the Tribunal carefully evaluated the testimony of both the proceedee and his witnesses instead of confining itself to documentary records alone.

The evidence of Joytan Nessa (DW-2) proved particularly decisive. Her testimony not only established that she was Alam Khan’s biological mother but also explained the family’s circumstances following her divorce from Abdul Hakim. The Tribunal categorically recorded that her affidavit corroborated Alam Khan’s own evidence and that there was no reason to disbelieve her testimony.

Similarly, the Gaonburah of Katla village, who had issued the hereditary certificate relied upon by the defence, appeared before the Tribunal and proved its contents. The Tribunal specifically noted that the certificate had been issued after verification of the 1965 electoral records relating to Alam Khan’s father, thereby enhancing both its authenticity and evidentiary value.

Together, these witnesses bridged the documentary gaps that arose because of divorce, remarriage and the absence of a birth certificate. Rather than treating oral evidence as secondary, the Tribunal relied upon it to contextualise and reinforce the documentary record.

Administrative negligence cannot defeat citizenship

The proceedings also exposed a troubling administrative lapse. During the course of the case, certified copies of the 1985 and 1989 electoral rolls could not be produced because the Election Commission had failed to preserve those records. This was not a case where Alam Khan had failed to produce documents in his possession; rather, the relevant public authority itself was unable to furnish records that ought to have been maintained.

Recognising the implications of this failure, CJP argued that a citizen cannot be deprived of his legal rights because of omissions committed by the State. The absence of public records attributable to administrative negligence cannot be converted into evidence against the very citizen who seeks to rely upon them.

Although the Tribunal’s written opinion ultimately rested on the strength of the remaining documentary and oral evidence, its acceptance of the defence case effectively recognised that missing public records, when unavailable due to official lapses, cannot by themselves negate an otherwise credible claim of citizenship. The decision therefore reflects a fair and pragmatic approach to evidentiary evaluation in citizenship proceedings.

This aspect of the case is likely to assume wider significance. Across Assam, numerous citizenship proceedings have been complicated by missing electoral rolls, damaged records and administrative deficiencies that are entirely beyond the control of the persons facing proceedings. The reasoning adopted in Alam Khan’s case reinforces the principle that such institutional failures should not become instruments for denying citizenship.

A holistic appreciation of evidence

In this order, rather than isolating each document and asking whether it independently established citizenship, the Tribunal examined the evidence as a connected chain extending across several decades. It considered the 1951 NRC legacy data, the certified electoral rolls from 1965, 1970, 1997, 2005, 2010, 2019 and 2021, the voter identity cards, the land records, the Gaonburah’s certificate and the oral testimony of the proceedee and his witnesses. None of these documents, viewed in isolation, answered every question raised in the proceedings. Taken together, however, they established a consistent narrative regarding Alam Khan’s ancestry, family history and continuous residence in Assam.

The Tribunal expressly recorded that the evidence relied upon by Alam Khan appeared trustworthy, that there was nothing on record to disbelieve his version, and that the documents produced were admissible and duly proved. On that basis, it concluded that he had been born and brought up through genuine Indian parents and, being their descendant, could not be termed a foreigner.

“The evidence of Proceedee, coupled with the above-mentioned documents relied upon by him appears to be trustworthy and there is nothing on record to disbelieve him. I find sufficient proof on record to come to a definite conclusion that the Proceedee was born and brought up through genuine Indian Parents and as such, he being the descendent of his Indian Parents cannot be termed as a foreigner as alleged in the above-mentioned case.” (Para 8)

In doing so, the Tribunal reaffirmed an important legal principle: citizenship adjudication is ultimately an exercise in evaluating the totality of evidence. The law does not require perfection in documentation; it requires credible proof. Where multiple independent pieces of evidence corroborate one another and collectively establish the proceedee’s claim, isolated inconsistencies or documentary gaps cannot outweigh the cumulative force of the record. That is precisely the approach adopted in Alam Khan’s case, making the decision an important example of reasoned and evidence-based adjudication under the Foreigners Act.

The Final Verdict: Tribunal declares Alam Khan ‘not a foreigner’

Having examined the oral testimony, documentary evidence and the submissions advanced by both sides, the Foreigners Tribunal unequivocally held that the allegations made against Alam Khan could not be sustained. The Tribunal observed that the proceedee’s testimony, read together with the evidence of his biological mother and the documentary record produced before it, constituted a credible and reliable chain of evidence. It found no material on record that cast doubt upon the authenticity of the documents or the veracity of the witnesses. On the contrary, the Tribunal held that the evidence consistently established that Alam Khan belonged to a family that had been residing in Assam long before the statutory cut-off date and that he was the descendant of genuine Indian citizens.

Accordingly, by its order dated January 6, 2026, the Tribunal answered the reference in the negative, holding that Md. Alam Khan, son of Late Abdul Hakim Khan of village Katla, Barpeta, is not a foreigner within the meaning of the Foreigners Act, 1946.

The decision finally brought an end to a proceeding that had remained unresolved for over two decades, restoring to Alam Khan what should never have been placed in doubt—his recognition as an Indian citizen.

Alam Khan holds up the Foreigners’ Tribunal Order

Why this order matters

While the order grants relief to one individual, its importance lies in the principles it reinforces for citizenship adjudication before Foreigners Tribunals. First, the order demonstrates that family complexities cannot be viewed in isolation from social realities. Divorce, remarriage and blended family structures are lived realities across society. The absence of a birth certificate or the appearance of a step-parent’s name in electoral records cannot automatically negate a person’s citizenship. By accepting oral evidence that satisfactorily explained these circumstances, the Tribunal adopted an approach rooted in evidentiary fairness rather than technical formalism.

Secondly, the case highlights the consequences of administrative negligence. The inability to produce certain electoral records did not arise because Alam Khan had failed to preserve them; rather, the relevant public authority itself had failed to maintain those records. Had the Tribunal adopted an inflexible documentary standard, Alam Khan could have been penalised for omissions committed entirely by the State. Instead, the Tribunal assessed the available evidence in its entirety and declined to allow institutional lapses to determine the outcome of the proceedings.

Thirdly, the decision reiterates that the burden under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act is discharged through credible and cumulative evidence, not through the production of any one document in isolation. Legacy data, electoral rolls spanning several decades, land records, voter identity documents, certificates issued by local authorities and reliable witness testimony together formed an unbroken chain that satisfied the Tribunal. The order therefore reinforces the settled principle that citizenship claims must be evaluated on the basis of the totality of evidence rather than isolated discrepancies.

Finally, the order underscores the importance of effective legal representation in Foreigners Tribunal proceedings. Citizenship litigation often turns upon nuanced questions of evidence, lineage and documentary continuity. Alam Khan’s case demonstrates how careful legal strategy, supported by thorough documentation and credible witness testimony, can overcome seemingly insurmountable evidentiary hurdles.

A victory beyond the courtroom

For Alam Khan, the order marks far more than the conclusion of litigation. For years, the proceedings imposed severe emotional, social and financial burdens on a man whose livelihood depended on daily labour, farming and fishing. Living on the banks of the Dhumarkur River, Alam Khan has long battled forces beyond his control. Every monsoon, floodwaters enter his home, eroding both land and livelihood. Yet, for over two decades, nature was not his only adversary. As he poignantly puts it, “On one side, the floods threaten to wash away my home. On the other, the government sought to take away my citizenship.” His victory before the Foreigners Tribunal has ended one of those battles, even as the other returns with every monsoon.

Like countless individuals facing citizenship proceedings in Assam, he lived with the uncertainty that accompanies every notice, every hearing and every adjournment. The prolonged litigation affected not only his legal status but also his ability to live with dignity and security.

Upon learning of the Tribunal’s decision, Alam Khan broke down in tears. Describing the years of mental distress and financial hardship that accompanied the proceedings, he acknowledged that without the legal support extended by Citizens for Justice and Peace, it would have been extremely difficult for him to establish his citizenship and secure justice.

On July 26 2026, Advocate Abhijeet Choudhury and CJP Assam State In-charge Nanda Ghosh formally handed over the certified copy of the order to Alam Khan, symbolising the end of a legal struggle that had lasted almost twenty-six years.

CJP’s continuing commitment

Alam Khan’s case is another reminder of the indispensable role that sustained legal aid plays in protecting the rights of vulnerable communities facing citizenship proceedings in Assam. Over the years, Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP) has represented hundreds of economically and socially marginalised individuals before Foreigners Tribunals, assisting them in tracing legacy documents, reconstructing family histories, producing witnesses and navigating a complex legal process that is often inaccessible to those with limited means.

The organisation’s intervention in Alam Khan’s case illustrates that citizenship litigation is not merely about producing documents; it is about reconstructing lives, explaining family histories, addressing administrative failures and ensuring that constitutional guarantees are not defeated by poverty, illiteracy or bureaucratic lapses.

With this order, another individual has been spared the devastating consequences of an erroneous declaration of foreigner status. Yet the case also serves as a broader reminder that citizenship adjudication must remain anchored in fairness, careful appreciation of evidence and the rule of law.

The complete order may be read below:

Related:

When a narrow reading of documents decide citizenship: GHC in Aminul Hoque

‘Fairness & reason ‘: SC rules that due process is a must for citizenship determination

Gauhati High Court upholds foreigner declaration, rejects mental illness plea

When a Spelling Error Can Cost Citizenship: Supreme Court stays deportation of five Assam women

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Recent decisions of three different High Courts, the Bombay High Court, the Madhya Pradesh High Court and the Allahabad High Court, although arising from entirely different factual situations, reveal a remarkably consistent judicial approach towards police accountability. Each case concerns a distinct stage of the criminal process. The Bombay High Court examined the legality of custodial violence committed during investigation and the extent to which statutory protection under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure could shield police officers accused of assaulting a suspect. The Madhya Pradesh High Court dealt with compliance with the newly enacted Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita and the constitutional requirement that every arrested person be informed, in writing, of the grounds of arrest. The Allahabad High Court, on the other hand, addressed what appeared at first glance to be a routine bail application but eventually transformed it into an inquiry into police negligence that had delayed adjudication of the applicants’ liberty.

Viewed independently, each judgment addresses a different procedural or substantive question. One concerns custodial violence, another concerns arrest procedure, and the third concerns administrative negligence in criminal proceedings. Yet, when read together, these decisions reveal an emerging constitutional narrative that extends well beyond their immediate facts. Collectively, they reject the notion that police accountability is confined to instances of spectacular misconduct such as torture or illegal detention. Instead, they emphasise that accountability permeates every stage of criminal administration—from the manner in which investigations are conducted, to the procedural safeguards accompanying arrest, to the institutional obligation of police authorities to cooperate with courts in the timely administration of justice.

Significantly, none of these judgments merely reiterates settled legal principles. Each court fashions remedies that seek to strengthen institutional compliance. The Bombay High Court refuses to allow police officers to invoke statutory immunity where allegations concern custodial assault to extract a confession, thereby reaffirming that violence cannot be characterised as an act performed in discharge of official duty. The Madhya Pradesh High Court, while declining to invalidate the arrest on the peculiar facts before it, nevertheless directs the Director General of Police to issue fresh circulars, warns that future violations of constitutional safeguards may invite departmental action, and treats repeated non-compliance with binding precedent as a matter of grave institutional concern. The Allahabad High Court goes a step further by imposing monetary costs on the State for police negligence that delayed adjudication of a bail application and permitting recovery of those costs from the erring officials after departmental enquiry.

What unites these judgments is not merely judicial criticism of the police. Courts have, on numerous occasions, criticised investigative lapses, custodial violence and administrative inefficiency. The significance of these three decisions lies in the manner in which the High Courts conceptualise police accountability. Rather than treating constitutional guarantees as abstract ideals, they recognise that the rule of law depends upon everyday institutional compliance. A police officer who assaults a suspect during investigation, an investigating officer who disregards mandatory constitutional safeguards while effecting an arrest, and officials whose negligence prolongs a person’s incarceration each undermine the administration of criminal justice, albeit in different ways. The constitutional injury is not confined to physical violence or illegal detention; it also extends to procedural disregard and bureaucratic indifference that compromise personal liberty and erode public confidence in the justice system.

Equally noteworthy is the evolving understanding of judicial supervision reflected in these decisions. Traditionally, courts have confined themselves to determining the legality of individual executive actions. These judgments demonstrate a willingness to move beyond adjudication of individual disputes towards ensuring institutional compliance. Directions to police headquarters, recommendations for departmental action, warnings of disciplinary proceedings, recovery of costs from erring officers, and rejection of statutory immunities collectively indicate that High Courts are increasingly employing their constitutional jurisdiction not merely to remedy individual violations but also to improve systemic functioning of law enforcement agencies. In doing so, they reaffirm the constitutional proposition that executive discretion remains subordinate to judicially enforceable standards of legality.

Another common feature is the courts’ refusal to permit procedural or statutory provisions to become instruments of impunity. In the Bombay case, Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, intended to protect honest public servants from vexatious litigation, is interpreted in a manner that prevents its misuse as a shield against allegations of custodial torture. In the Madhya Pradesh case, Section 47 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita is read in harmony with Article 22(1) and Supreme Court precedent, emphasising that communication of grounds of arrest is not a technical formality but a substantive constitutional guarantee. In the Allahabad case, the Court treats delays caused by police negligence not as mere administrative lapses but as failures that directly affect the timely adjudication of liberty.

These developments assume particular importance in the context of India’s ongoing transition from the Code of Criminal Procedure to the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita. While legislative reform has altered statutory language and introduced procedural modifications, these judgments underscore that the constitutional foundations governing criminal procedure remain unchanged. Police powers continue to derive their legitimacy from constitutional limitations rather than statutory discretion alone. Neither investigative convenience, administrative inefficiency nor claims of official duty can dilute the guarantees embedded in Articles 14, 21 and 22.

Against this backdrop, the three decisions merit close examination—not merely as isolated judicial pronouncements, but as markers of an emerging jurisprudence that insists upon constitutional discipline at every stage of policing. Each judgment contributes a distinct dimension to that jurisprudence. Read together, they illuminate how High Courts are increasingly deploying constitutional principles to strengthen police accountability, reinforce procedural safeguards, and preserve the rule of law in everyday criminal administration.

Custodial Violence Is Never ‘Official Duty’: Bombay High Court

The first judgment in this piece comes from the Bombay High Court, which reaffirmed a fundamental constitutional principle: the authority to investigate crime does not include the authority to use violence. In Sanjay Bapuso Dalvi & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, the Court held that assaulting a suspect to extract a confession can never constitute an act performed in the discharge of official duty, thereby denying police officers the protection of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Facts and the question before the court: The case arose from allegations that a man summoned to the Shivaji Nagar Police Station in Ichalkaranji during a murder investigation in November 2008 was detained overnight, assaulted and forced to confess. Following medical evidence and the complainant’s allegations, the Magistrate issued process against the police officers for offences including voluntarily causing hurt, wrongful confinement and criminal intimidation. The Sessions Court refused to discharge them.

Before the High Court, the officers argued that the alleged acts occurred during investigation of a cognisable offence and therefore attracted the protection of Section 197 CrPC, which bars prosecution of public servants for acts committed while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duty without prior governmental sanction.

The central issue was whether custodial assault allegedly committed to extract a confession could be regarded as an act connected with official duty.

Section 197 protects official functions, not abuse of power: Justice Sandesh Patil answered the question in the negative. The Court reiterated the settled principle that Section 197 is intended to protect honest public servants from vexatious litigation arising out of acts reasonably connected with their official responsibilities. It is not a substantive immunity from prosecution but a procedural safeguard available only where the impugned act bears a reasonable nexus with official duty.

Drawing upon the Constitution Bench decision in Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari and subsequent rulings including Ganesh Chandra Jew v. State of Orissa, Om Prakash v. State of Jharkhand and Devinder Singh v. State of Punjab, the Court reaffirmed that even acts committed in excess of authority may require sanction if they remain connected to lawful official functions. However, criminal conduct wholly divorced from those functions cannot claim statutory protection merely because it occurred during official employment.

The distinction was decisive in the present case. Investigation of offences is undoubtedly an official function. Assaulting a suspect to secure a confession is not. The Court therefore rejected the argument that every act committed during an investigation automatically becomes an official act. The setting of the misconduct cannot determine its legal character.

Drawing a constitutional boundary: The Court emphasised that the police possess statutory authority to interrogate suspects, collect evidence and investigate offences, but no law authorises “third-degree” methods or custodial violence. Such conduct is not an excess committed while performing official duty; it is conduct wholly outside the scope of lawful police functions.

Justice Patil accordingly held that assaulting a suspect for a confessional statement “would never be said to be an act in discharge of official duty.” Accepting the prosecution case at face value—as required at the stage of issuance of process—the requirement of prior sanction under Section 197 had no application.

Importantly, the Court confined itself to the legal issue before it. It did not determine the guilt of the accused officers but only whether the prosecution could proceed without governmental sanction. Questions relating to the truth of the allegations were left to trial.

Constitutional significance: Although framed as a dispute over Section 197 CrPC, the judgment is rooted in the broader constitutional prohibition against custodial violence. It aligns with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa and Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani, all of which recognise that coercive interrogation is incompatible with Articles 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution.

The decision also reinforces the evidentiary policy underlying the law governing confessions. Indian criminal law has long treated police-obtained confessions with suspicion, recognising the dangers of coercive investigation. By refusing to extend statutory protection to allegations of custodial assault, the Bombay High Court ensures that Section 197 cannot become a procedural shield against accountability for torture.

More broadly, the judgment restores Section 197 to its intended purpose. The provision exists to protect bona fide exercise of public functions, not to immunise criminal misconduct. Had the Court accepted the petitioners’ argument, virtually every allegation of custodial violence could have been insulated behind the requirement of prior sanction simply because it occurred during an investigation.

Instead, the Court reaffirmed a fundamental constitutional proposition: official authority ends where illegality begins. Police powers derive legitimacy from law, and once those powers are exercised through violence or coercion, they cease to be protected as official acts. In doing so, the Bombay High Court laid down the first principle that runs through all three judgments—constitutional policing begins with recognising that the State’s coercive powers are always subject to constitutional limits.

The complete judgment may be read below:

Procedural Safeguards Are Constitutional Guarantees: Madhya Pradesh High Court

If the Bombay High Court’s decision placed substantive limits on police power, the Madhya Pradesh High Court focused on how that power must be exercised. In Dharmendra Lodhi v. State of Madhya Pradesh, the Court examined the constitutional requirement that an arrested person be informed of the grounds of arrest in writing under Section 47 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), while issuing far-reaching directions to ensure institutional compliance by the police.

Facts and the legal issue: The petitioner challenged his brother’s arrest under the NDPS Act through a habeas corpus petition, contending that the arrest was illegal because the investigating agency had failed to communicate the grounds of arrest in writing, as mandated by Section 47 BNSS and the Supreme Court’s decisions in Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra and Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana.

The State argued that although no separate written memorandum of grounds of arrest had been served, the accused had received a written notice under Section 50 of the NDPS Act, the seizure memo recording recovery of 86.85 kilograms of ganja, and information regarding the arrest had been conveyed to his family. The question before the Court, therefore, was whether these documents constituted sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.

Section 47 BNSS gives statutory effect to Article 22: The Division Bench of Justices G.S. Ahluwalia and Anuradha Shukla treated Section 47 BNSS not as a mere procedural provision but as a statutory expression of Article 22(1) of the Constitution, which guarantees every arrested person the right to be informed of the grounds of arrest.

Relying on Pankaj Bansal, Mihir Rajesh Shah and Vihaan Kumar, the Court observed that the requirement of written communication is intended to eliminate disputes over whether the grounds of arrest were actually conveyed. Written communication enables an arrested person to effectively challenge detention, seek legal representation, oppose remand and apply for bail, thereby making Article 22 a meaningful safeguard rather than an empty formality.

Substantial compliance, but a strong institutional warning: On the facts, however, the Court declined to invalidate the arrest. It held that the Section 50 NDPS notice, the seizure memo signed by the accused and the communication made to his brother sufficiently informed him of the reasons for his arrest. Although no independent document titled “grounds of arrest” had been furnished, the constitutional objective underlying Section 47 BNSS stood substantially fulfilled.

The significance of the judgment, however, lies less in this conclusion than in what followed. The Bench expressed serious concern that investigating officers continued to violate binding constitutional requirements despite repeated Supreme Court decisions, earlier High Court rulings and even a circular issued by the Madhya Pradesh Police Headquarters directing strict compliance. Such repeated lapses, the Court observed, pointed either to negligence or deliberate disregard of constitutional safeguards—both of which it described as “alarming”.

In one of its strongest observations, the Court remarked that if investigating officers routinely ignored mandatory procedures, the police department had to introspect whether it was inadvertently helping offenders secure release through illegal arrests rather than effectively prosecuting them. Procedural safeguards, the Bench emphasised, strengthen criminal investigations; they do not weaken them.

From individual relief to institutional accountability: Recognising that constitutional rights cannot depend solely upon post facto judicial intervention, the Court issued prospective directions to the Director General of Police to circulate fresh instructions requiring strict compliance with Section 47 BNSS and the Supreme Court’s decisions. It further directed that where investigating officers violated these requirements, the department should ordinarily presume deliberate non-compliance, initiate departmental proceedings and consider suspension and major penalties.

These directions mark an important shift from correcting individual violations to addressing institutional deficiencies. Rather than treating procedural lapses as isolated mistakes, the Court sought to embed constitutional compliance within police administration itself.

Significance of the decision: The judgment expands the understanding of police accountability beyond cases of excessive force or illegal detention. It recognises that constitutional policing also demands faithful adherence to procedural safeguards governing arrest. By reading Section 47 BNSS as a statutory embodiment of Article 22, the Court reaffirmed that procedural requirements are not technicalities but constitutional guarantees protecting personal liberty.

Although the Court upheld the arrest on the peculiar facts of the case, it left no ambiguity about the law going forward. Police powers remain legitimate only when exercised in accordance with constitutional procedure. Compliance with written grounds of arrest is therefore not a matter of administrative convenience but an indispensable component of due process.

In doing so, the Madhya Pradesh High Court adds a second dimension to the emerging jurisprudence on police accountability. While the Bombay High Court held that custodial violence can never be protected as official duty, the Madhya Pradesh High Court emphasised that even lawful police powers lose constitutional legitimacy when exercised without scrupulous adherence to mandatory procedural safeguards.

The complete judgment may be read below:

Administrative Negligence as a Constitutional Wrong: Allahabad High Court

If the Bombay High Court’s decision drew a constitutional boundary around the misuse of police power, and the Madhya Pradesh High Court underscored that lawful policing is inseparable from procedural fairness, the Allahabad High Court’s decision introduces a third, and equally significant, dimension to constitutional policing. It recognises that the rule of law may be undermined not only through abuse of authority or violation of procedural safeguards, but also through institutional indifference, bureaucratic inertia and administrative negligence.

Unlike the previous two cases, the controversy before the Court did not concern custodial violence, illegal arrest or investigative excesses. It arose from what appeared to be an ordinary bail application. Yet, in deciding that application, Justice Arun Kumar Singh Deshwal transformed a routine criminal proceeding into a broader examination of how police inaction can obstruct judicial administration and unnecessarily prolong deprivation of personal liberty.

The judgment is important because it expands the constitutional understanding of police accountability beyond the exercise of coercive powers. It reminds that the constitutional obligations of investigating agencies do not end with lawful arrest or fair investigation. They equally encompass timely cooperation with judicial proceedings. Where police negligence delays adjudication of liberty, the constitutional injury is no less significant merely because it results from omission rather than affirmative abuse of power.

Facts and background: The proceedings arose from a bail application filed by the parents-in-law of a deceased woman, who were accused of offences under Sections 80(2) and 85 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita read with Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

Upon examining the material on record, the Court found no sufficient evidence indicating that the applicants had subjected the deceased to cruelty or harassment for dowry soon before her death. The statements of independent witnesses pointed instead to ordinary matrimonial discord between the husband and wife. Finding no material to sustain the allegations against the parents-in-law, the Court concluded that they were entitled to bail.

Ordinarily, the matter would have ended there. Instead, before disposing of the application, the Court turned to an entirely different question—why a bail application that could have been decided much earlier had remained pending for more than ten additional days.

The answer, according to the Court, lay not in judicial delay or legal complexity, but in the repeated failure of the investigating agency to furnish the necessary instructions and case diary despite repeated communications from the High Court. It was this administrative lapse, rather than the merits of the bail application itself, that became the central focus of the judgment.

The institutional failure that prompted judicial intervention: The chronology recorded by the Court revealed a sustained pattern of administrative indifference rather than an isolated procedural lapse.

The Office of the Joint Director (Prosecution), attached to the Allahabad High Court, supplied a copy of the bail application to the police pairokar on June 17, 2026. This was followed by an alert to the Superintendent of Police on June 19 and a reminder on June 29. Despite these repeated communications, the investigating agency failed to furnish the necessary instructions to enable the Government Advocate to assist the Court.

Even when the matter was taken up on 3 July 2026, the Court attempted to facilitate compliance by directing the prosecution to obtain the case diary electronically through the Crime and Criminal Tracking Network and Systems (CCTNS), thereby eliminating any practical difficulty in transmitting records.

Yet even this direction went unheeded. Instead of producing the case diary, the police supplied only the criminal antecedents of the accused, leaving the Court without the material necessary to decide the bail application. The sequence demonstrated that the delay was not the consequence of unavoidable administrative constraints. The High Court had repeatedly reminded the investigating agency, suggested alternative methods of compliance and afforded ample opportunity to furnish the requisite records. Nevertheless, the necessary instructions remained unavailable, preventing timely adjudication of a matter directly affecting personal liberty.

Translating judicial censure into institutional accountability: Having concluded that the delay in deciding the bail application was attributable solely to police negligence, the Court declined to treat the lapse as a matter warranting only administrative criticism. Instead, it imposed costs of ₹50,000 upon the State Government, directing that the amount be paid to the applicants. Simultaneously, it granted the State liberty to recover the amount from the erring officials after conducting an appropriate departmental enquiry.

This direction is perhaps the most significant aspect of the judgment. Indian courts have frequently expressed dissatisfaction with administrative inefficiency or investigative lapses, but far fewer decisions translate such criticism into enforceable consequences. By imposing monetary costs, the Court recognised that bureaucratic negligence is not a victimless administrative failure. Where executive inaction delays adjudication of liberty, the prejudice is suffered by litigants whose incarceration continues solely because the State failed to discharge its institutional obligations.

Equally significant is the Court’s refusal to allow the burden of that negligence to remain permanently upon the public exchequer. By permitting recovery from the responsible officials after due enquiry, the judgment carefully distinguishes between institutional liability and individual accountability. The State remains constitutionally answerable for the functioning of its agencies, but the financial consequences of proven negligence need not ultimately be borne by taxpayers. In doing so, the Court fashioned a remedy that simultaneously compensates those affected, reinforces governmental responsibility and preserves personal accountability within the police hierarchy.

More importantly, the order signals that constitutional accountability is not exhausted by declarations of illegality. Administrative indifference that obstructs judicial proceedings may itself attract tangible consequences. The judgment therefore moves beyond symbolic judicial disapproval and adopts a remedial approach aimed at improving institutional discipline within the criminal justice system.

The complete judgment may be read below:

Police Accountability: From individual misconduct to institutional constitutionalism

At first glance, the three High Court decisions appear to address entirely different questions. The Bombay High Court considered whether police officers accused of custodial assault could invoke the protection of Section 197 CrPC. The Madhya Pradesh High Court examined whether the constitutional requirement of communicating the grounds of arrest in writing under Article 22 and Section 47 BNSS had been complied with. The Allahabad High Court dealt with police negligence that delayed adjudication of a bail application.

Read individually, each judgment resolves a distinct procedural issue. Read together, however, they articulate a broader constitutional doctrine on police accountability. The common thread running through all three decisions is that the legitimacy of policing does not flow merely from statutory powers but from faithful adherence to constitutional limitations. Police accountability is no longer confined to punishing overt abuse such as custodial violence or illegal detention. It now extends to every stage of the criminal justice process—from investigation and arrest to procedural fairness, administrative diligence and cooperation with judicial institutions.

The Bombay High Court establishes the first principle: official duty cannot be used as a shield for unconstitutional conduct. Custodial assault and coercive violence are fundamentally incompatible with lawful policing and therefore fall outside the protection of Section 197 CrPC. The decision reinforces that statutory immunity exists to protect bona fide public functions, not acts that violate Article 21.

The Madhya Pradesh High Court adds a second dimension by treating procedural safeguards as constitutional guarantees rather than technical formalities. Reading Section 47 BNSS through Article 22 and the Supreme Court’s decisions in Pankaj Bansal, Mihir Rajesh Shah and Vihaan Kumar, the Court holds that informing an arrested person of the grounds of arrest in writing is integral to constitutional fairness. More importantly, it moves beyond the individual case to address systemic police non-compliance, directing institutional reforms and departmental accountability so that constitutional safeguards become part of everyday policing rather than case-specific judicial corrections.

The Allahabad High Court completes the trilogy by recognising that constitutional injury may arise not only from misuse of power but also from administrative indifference. Police accountability includes the obligation to assist the administration of justice with diligence and efficiency. By imposing costs of ₹50,000 on the State for avoidable delay in deciding a bail application, directing payment to the applicants, permitting recovery from erring officers after departmental enquiry, and ordering an inquiry into the lapses, the Court converts bureaucratic negligence into a matter of constitutional accountability. Administrative omissions that unnecessarily prolong deprivation of liberty are treated as inconsistent with Article 21 no less than affirmative executive misconduct.

Collectively, these judgments also demonstrate the evolving role of constitutional courts. Rather than merely correcting completed legal wrongs, the High Courts increasingly function as institutional supervisors, issuing directions aimed at improving governance, strengthening internal accountability mechanisms and embedding constitutional discipline within police administration. Whether by denying statutory protection to officers accused of custodial violence, directing police authorities to institutionalise compliance with arrest safeguards, or imposing financial consequences for administrative negligence, the courts are moving beyond dispute resolution towards structural constitutional oversight.

Equally significant is the continuity they establish despite the transition to India’s new criminal laws. Although the BNSS has replaced the Code of Criminal Procedure, these decisions affirm that legislative reform cannot dilute constitutional guarantees. The Constitution—and particularly Articles 21 and 22—continues to provide the normative framework within which every police power must be exercised.

Taken together, the three judgments articulate an emerging constitutional ethic of policing founded upon three interconnected propositions:

• Police powers cannot be exercised through violence or coercion that falls outside lawful investigation.
• Every exercise of coercive authority must comply with constitutional and statutory procedural safeguards protecting personal liberty.
• Police institutions bear a continuing obligation to function diligently, transparently and responsibly in aid of the administration of justice.

The cumulative message is both simple and profound. Constitutional policing is measured not merely by the absence of abuse, but by affirmative fidelity to the rule of law at every stage of the criminal justice process. In reaffirming that principle, the Bombay, Madhya Pradesh and Allahabad High Courts have collectively advanced an important and evolving doctrine of institutional constitutionalism—one in which police legitimacy derives not from the breadth of statutory power, but from disciplined adherence to constitutional values.

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When uniformed personnel stand accused India’s highest courts have spoken boldly yet acted narrowly

The post Three High Courts, One Message: Police power has constitutional limits appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In support of this claim, Shrivastava has relied on a purported account attributed to former British Prime Minister Clement Attlee, who was not in office during the Quit India Movement, to argue that it was the Indian National Army, and not the Quit India Movement, that ultimately compelled Britain to leave India.

“The leaders, be it Maulana Azad, Jawaharlal Nehru, J Prakash Narayan, or Aruna Asaf Ali, all of them accepted that the movement was a flop,” said Shrivastava. These statements were met with loud applause from members of the audience in the video.

It certainly would be an oversimplification to attribute India’s independence solely to the Quit India Movement of 1942, and would overlook several other significant developments that shaped the British decision to leave India. The role of the Indian National Army, the Royal Indian Navy mutiny, growing labour unrest, and Britain’s severe economic exhaustion after the Second World War were all undeniably important factors in hastening the end of colonial rule.

Yet acknowledging these factors does not diminish the importance of the Quit India Movement which profoundly altered the political landscape, a fact reflected in reports and British correspondence, including those sent to the then Prime Minister Winston Churchill. This will be examined in greater detail below but to dismiss the significance of the 1942 Movement altogether is not a serious and independent reading of history as claimed by Shrivastava.

For decades, a recurring theme in Hindutva discourse has been to downplay the significance of the 1942 Movement and recast India’s freedom struggle as a contest between competing movements. It serves a broader political purpose. This framing, first, diminishes the mass, cross-community, non-violent, anti-imperialist, and secular civil disobedience popularly associated with Gandhi and Nehru, and second, undermines the idea of a secular, democratic republic that emerged from it- a constitutional vision that is at odds with the ideological project of the RSS, and affiliated Hindutva organisations.

The push to diminish 1942 today comes from the political tradition that did not participate in and in some documented instances actively counselled against that very Movement.

What was the Quit India Movement?

In protest against the British decision to involve India in World War- II, without consulting Indian political leaders, the Congress ministries in the provinces resigned from office. By contrast, V.D. Savarkar, then president of the Hindu Mahasabha, had met Viceroy Linlithgow in October 1939 and called for Hindu-British cooperation. The Hindu Mahasabha, Savarkar even went on to say, “favoured an unambiguous undertaking of dominion status at the end of the war.” He also offered that the Hindu Mahasabha would replace the Congress in provincial governments if the Congress ministries resigned. Reported in the National Herald.

The failure of the Cripps Mission in 1942 had intensified public discontent with British rule. Until then, Gandhi had largely followed a policy of avoiding actions that would hinder the British war effort. Following the collapse of the Cripps negotiations, however, he called for an open non-violent revolution. On July 14, 1942, the Congress Working Committee adopted a resolution declaring that the immediate end of British rule was essential not only for India’s freedom but also for the success of the Allied cause. The Quit India Resolution generated widespread enthusiasm across the country.

Meanwhile, RSS speakers had urged members to stay away from the Congress-led agitation, and these instructions, according to the British Home Department, were duly followed. Syama Prasad Mookerjee, a Hindu Mahasabha leader and minister in the undivided Bengal government, went a step further when in July 1942, he wrote to the British Governor of Bengal advising on measures to suppress the Quit India Movement in the province while arguing that Indians should continue to place their trust in the British for the region’s defence.

Gandhi was entrusted with leading the movement. Addressing a gathering, he said “There is a mantra, a short one, that I give you. You imprint it on your heart and let every breath of yours give an expression to it. The mantra is ‘do or die’. We shall either be free or die in the attempt …. Every one of you from this moment consider himself a free man or woman and even act as if you are free and no longer under the heel of this imperialism.”

The Congress urged people to undertake ten forms of non-violent resistance which included refraining from any commercial transactions with the British or the colonial government, displaying the tricolour on every home and window, boycotting cinema halls on the ground that the proceeds benefited the colonial administration, avoiding the courts, refusing to purchase foreign goods, withdrawing money from government banks, socially boycotting those who served the British government, avoiding any transactions that required recourse to colonial courts, leaving cities for villages, and ensuring that grain and other produce remained with the peasantry.

Subhas Chandra Bose, broadcasting from Azad Hind Radio on August 17, 1942, himself did not dismiss it and called it “non-violent guerrilla warfare,” and told listeners the “administrative machinery can be brought to a standstill” if the campaign continued. Bose, whom Shrivastva implicitly elevates over Gandhi, was on record treating 1942 as a serious and continuing front in the freedom struggle, not a failure to be measured against Congress.

What was the impact of the Quit India Movement?

Over 60,000 people were arrested by the end of 1943 alone, mass fines were levied, and demonstrators were subjected to public flogging. Official casualty figures stood at 1,028 dead while Nehru’s own estimate put the toll closer to 10,000. Many national leaders went underground and continued their struggle by broadcasting messages over the clandestine radio stations, distributing pamphlets and establishing parallel governments. The underground Congress Radio run by Usha Mehta during Quit India recorded messages from Gandhi and other leaders, moving location to location to dodge authorities. It reported on events from every nook and corner of the country and was the first to inform the nation about the Chittagong raid, the atrocities in Ashti and Chimur, and the strike in Jamshedpur. It operated for nearly three months before their arrest in November 1942. When the police arrived, the programme was coming to an end with Vande Mataram playing. Upon being asked to stop the record, Mehta reportedly commanded the police to stand at attention for the national song. The film Ae Watan Mere Watan directed by Kannan Iyer was a fictionalised tribute to Mehta and the historic Congress Radio that kept the Quit India flame alive against overwhelming odds.

Fifty-seven battalions of the British Army, alongside the entire police force, were deployed to suppress the movement. The sabotage of communications was so extensive that ground forces often could not reach certain areas, leading the Viceroy Linlithgow to suggest machine-gunning mobs from the air to regain control.

While the revolt was underway, Viceroy wrote a telegram to Churchill, the then Prime Minister:

“I am engaged here in meeting by far the most serious rebellion since that of 1857, the gravity and extent of which we have so far concealed from the world for reasons of military security. Mob violence remains rampant over large tracts of the countryside and I am by no means confident that we may not see in September a formidable attempt to renew this widespread sabotage of our war effort. The lives of Europeans in outlying places are in jeopardy.”

Contrary to his public pronouncements, Churchill gloomily disclosed to King George VI at one of their Tuesday luncheons in July 1942 that “the idea of the transfer of power in India had become an admitted inevitability in the minds of the British Party leaders.”

The movement’s structure, once its leadership was arrested within 24 hours, became spontaneous and largely leaderless. Parallel governments were established and functioned for extended periods.  In Ballia, UP, protestors overthrew the district administration and freed prisoners; it took the British weeks to reassert control. Railway lines, telegraph wires, and government buildings across the country were targeted to paralyse the war effort. The British kept a battleship on standby, reportedly to remove Gandhi and Congress leaders from India entirely, a step they ultimately judged too risky to take.

Exposing the Distortion: Why Attlee?

Like Shrivastava, many have relied on a purported statement by former British Prime Minister Clement Attlee to downplay the significance of the Quit India Movement. The claim originates from a second-hand account written in 1976 by P.V. Chakraborty, former Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court, who recounted a conversation he claimed to have had with Attlee during the latter’s visit to India in 1956. According to Chakraborty, Attlee identified the activities of the Indian National Army and the Royal Indian Navy Mutiny as the principal reasons for Britain’s withdrawal. “When asked about the extent to which the British decision to quit India was influenced by Mahatma Gandhi’s 1942 movement, Attlee’s lips widened in a smile of disdain and he uttered, slowly, ‘Minimal’.”

But why Attlee? This is the question that is never asked, and it deserves scrutiny.

Attlee was the British Labour Prime Minister from 1945 to 1951 the man who, as head of the postwar British government, oversaw and ultimately signed off on India’s independence in 1947. He was not the incumbent prime minister when Quit India Movement took place and therefore, his assessment of the movement’s impact is questionable. The argument asks one to accept a private, unverifiable, retrospective opinion as the authoritative verdict on which Indian freedom movement “really” mattered while dismissing Linlithgow’s real-time telegram, Churchill’s statement to the King, Bose’s real-time broadcasts, and the testimony of Indians who lived through the movement, as insufficient.

In fact, according to Churchill, the Attlee government was from the outset keen to leave India as soon as possible, regardless of the political situation. On December 12, 1946 he deplored “the ruthless logic to quit India regardless of what may happen there.”

But a moot question here should or ought to be, should we as Indians living in an India free of colonial yoke rely on colonial documentation and sources? Or seek independent assessments and verifications of how India and Indians achieved freedom from centuries of exploitative British rule?

No serious historian claims 1942 alone delivered independence in isolation. The Indian National Army trials, the Royal Indian Navy Mutiny, and Britain’s post-war financial exhaustion were all real and significant pressures, arguably the more immediate triggers of the 1947 transfer of power. That is a defensible historical position. But there is a wide gap between ‘1942 was not the sole cause’ and ‘1942 was a flop with no contribution’ According to Bipan Chandra, the INA’s public sympathy and the 1946 mutiny did not emerge in a vacuum and were given ‘fillip’ by the anti-imperialist sentiment and mass mobilisation that 1942 had already built. The movements were links in a chain, not rivals competing for sole credit. “After Quit India there cou1d be no retreat. Any future negotiations with the British Government could only be on the manner of the transfer of power. Independence was no longer a matter of bargain. And this became amply clear after the War,” Chandra wrote.

As for Aruna Asaf Ali, a figure Shrivastava names as having accepted the movement was a flop, is remembered specifically as the movement’s defining figure for hoisting the flag at Gowalia Tank.

Why This Matters

Reducing India’s freedom struggle to delegitimise the mass, cross-community, non-violent civil disobedience associated with Gandhi and the Congress follows a broader pattern in which organisations that have documented, historically-recorded records of aloofness from or active opposition to the 1942 movement now seek to rewrite it as inconsequential, while elevating alternative narratives more compatible with their own political lineage.

Acharya Kriplani (who was INC President in 1946-47) said, ‘It is my opinion that India could not have achieved its independence, but for the accession of strength which the nation received by the successive struggles started by Gandhiji. A nation which could throw a challenge to the Empire at a time when the armies of all the Allies were on Indian soil could no more be held in thraldom.’  Reported in Janata Weekly.

RS Sharma, Romila Thapar, Irfan Habib, Ramchandra Guha, and such historians Shrivastava has moved to discredit and insult without engaging their actual, published arguments, have also been separately accused in the current political establishment of distorting history through the education system.

But as Shrivastava claims, “All the letters of the leaders, all the books of the leaders, all the newspapers, reporters, the diaries of the British officers, the letters of the British officers, everything is in the National Archives. Take a look at it, the truth will be revealed.”

Sources that are interesting to examine also are:

Several American journalists famously covered Mahatma Gandhi, most notably United Press correspondent Webb Miller, who provided worldwide eyewitness accounts of the 1930 Salt Satyagraha. Other prominent figures include Louis Fischer, who spent a week at Gandhi’s ashram in 1942, and Chicago Tribune reporter William L. Shirer

The definitive account of the Congress Underground Radio was documented by historian and academic Dr. Usha Thakkar in her book, Congress Radio: Usha Mehta and the Underground Radio Station of 1942, published by Penguin Random House India. [1, 2]

National Archives of India (NAI): Located in New Delhi, the NAI holds the Home Political Department files that contain intercepted correspondence, censorship reports, and data on the suppression of the “Secret Congress Radio” spearheaded by Usha Mehta. [1, 2, 3]

The film based on the historic Congress Radio is Ae Watan Mere Watan. Directed by Kannan Iyer, the 2024 Hindi-language historical thriller stars Sara Ali Khan as Usha Mehta, a 22-year-old college student in Mumbai who operated an underground, anti-British radio station during the Quit India movement of 1942  For many in Assam, citizenship isn’t a birthright taken for granted—it’s a legal battle fought after decades of living in the only home they’ve ever known.

Remembering the courageous Aruna Asaf Ali today. Her historic act of hoisting the Indian flag at Gowalia Tank during the Quit India Movement remains a powerful symbol of defiance.

Readers encountering this argument should ask questions: What is the primary source? Is it contemporaneous or retrospective? And who benefits from the comparison being drawn?

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Tanishka Shah)

Related:

How Hindutva forces colluded with both the British & Jinnah against the historic ‘Quit India’ movement: Archives

Past and Prejudice

The post Debunking the ‘Quit India Was Useless’ Myth appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Viewed narrowly, the judgment settles a local and specific legal controversy. Viewed more broadly, however, it speaks to an increasingly recurring constitutional question: what happens when the State’s power of eminent domain intersects with historic places of worship located within politically and religiously contested urban spaces especially when these culturally and religiously are those of the religious minorities? That question cannot be answered by reading the judgment in isolation.

The litigation arose from the continuing expansion of the Shri Kashi Vishwanath Dham Corridor, a project that has dramatically transformed the Varanasi urban landscape surrounding one of Hinduism’s oldest temples. The political patronage by a  specific expansionist, militarist interpretation of the faith (RSS-BJP-VHP combine) is not irrelevant. Hindusim in its purest practiced form has been over the centuries not linear or semitic, by vesting authenticity of faith on three north-Indian shrines –Ayodhya, Mathura and Kashi Viswanath—lies a structured and political effort to semitise the faith that was once localised and eclectic and control power, finance and practice.[1]

Unsurprisingly therefore, with the contours of the Indian state altering since the early 1990s and more sharply and substantively since 2014, the building of shrines at these three sites has drawn political, financial and state support. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) came to power with the steely organisational support of the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (RSS) and its more vocal/rabid wings (Bajrang Dal-BD and Vishwa Hindu Parishad-VHP) in the state of Uttar Pradesh in 2017.[2] Even three years prior to this, after the regime change at the Centre (2014), pressure was brought on the Varanasi district administration regarding the Kashi Viswanath shrine.[3]

Since its announcement, the Corridor has been presented by the Uttar Pradesh Government as an exercise in heritage conservation, pilgrimage facilitation and urban renewal. At the same time, it has generated sustained criticism from residents, traders, historians, architects, conservationists and civil society organisations, who have questioned the scale of demolition, displacement and the irreversible alteration of one of India’s oldest living cities.

Consequently, the Allahabad High Court’s interpretation of the Places of Worship Act (POW), 1991 is not simply a technical pronouncement on statutory construction. It is a judicial intervention in a redevelopment project that has, for several years, borne a clear majoritarian stamp: an intersection of constitutional law, heritage conservation, minority rights, urban planning and contemporary politics.

The Kashi Corridor is more than an infrastructure project

Few redevelopment projects in independent India have altered the physical and symbolic landscape of a historic city as dramatically as the Kashi Vishwanath Corridor. Conceived as an ambitious project connecting the Kashi Vishwanath Temple directly to the ghats of the Ganga, the redevelopment sought to replace the centuries-old maze of narrow lanes surrounding the temple with wide pedestrian corridors, plazas and public spaces capable of accommodating millions of pilgrims. The State justified the project as necessary to improve accessibility, crowd management, disaster preparedness and civic infrastructure around one of India’s most visited pilgrimage centres. Yet the area selected for redevelopment was not an empty tract awaiting urban renewal.

The neighbourhood surrounding the Kashi Vishwanath Temple represents one of the oldest continuously inhabited urban settlements in South Asia. For centuries, the sacred geography of Kashi evolved organically through a dense network of ancient and historic local temples of prime religious and cultural significance, shrines, mosques, markets, residences, dharamshalas, akharas, courtyards and interconnected gullies. Its heritage lay not merely in monumental religious structures but equally in the lived urban fabric that connected them. Historians have long described the city as a layered civilisational landscape in which Hindu, Muslim and other communities inhabited overlapping social and religious spaces, creating an urban ecology unlike that of most planned cities.

This evocative report on the issue reflects the majoritarian make-over of the Kashi-Viswanath Dham Corridor, not just in terms of a brute and uni-directional take-over of culture, art, faith and individual rights, but also as a clear-cut political design to re-shape the understanding and practice of the Hindu faith. “The ruling (BJP) government and Modi, who represents Varanasi in the Lok Sabha, Dharma Vyaparis (religion traders) instead of Dharma Adhikaris (religion upholders).” The report may be read here. The Indian Express had then quoted Rajendra Tiwari, the former Mahant of the same Kashi Viswanath temple here:  “Every part of the country is represented across these Ganga ghats. Where we are sitting is Lahori Tola, where people from Lahore came and settled. Then there are areas where the Bengalis settled, the South Indians, the Marathis.” They are changing the “vaastu” of the place, he says. “Yeh dharam adhikari nahin, dharam vypari hein (They don’t serve religion, they trade in religion).”

It is in this question that the recent judgement of the Allahabad High Court that clinically ignores. Adopting an approach that is jurisprudentially analysed by scholars as legal formalism (or mechanically applied jurisprudence), such an approach only narrowly protects the rule of law while turning a judicial ostrich like approach away from sociological jurisprudence and legal realism.

By completely ignoring the context of this aggressive and politically intentioned Corridor development and land acquisition, the Allahabad High Court a constitutional court has tragically obliterated the socio-political-administrative background to these demolitions and acquisitions. In leveraging the POW Act of 1991 to do so, the Court has also subtly but surely diluted the content and “Aims and Objectives” of the law.

It is in this overall context that the Dham Corridor “re=development” needs to be understood. Through the period that it took place, the redevelopment therefore triggered concerns extending beyond ordinary questions of land acquisition. Reports documenting the implementation of the project described the acquisition and demolition of hundreds of residential and commercial properties around the temple precinct. Local residents spoke of the disappearance of neighbourhoods that had existed for generations. Conservationists questioned whether the pursuit of monumental redevelopment had come at the cost of preserving Varanasi’s historic urban morphology. Architects debated whether the widening of lanes and creation of expansive public plazas fundamentally altered the cultural identity of a city historically defined by its intimate and densely layered built environment.

The project also generated controversy over the treatment of numerous smaller shrines, temples and archaeological remains reportedly discovered during demolition. While the temple administration maintained that significant structures had been carefully preserved wherever possible, it has been argued that redevelopment had prioritised visual grandeur over conservation of the city’s accumulated architectural heritage. The debate reflected competing visions of heritage itself: whether it should be understood principally through monumental architecture or through the preservation of living neighbourhoods that had evolved over centuries.

Redevelopment within a politically contested landscape

The constitutional significance of the Corridor cannot be understood without recognising another reality. The redevelopment has unfolded alongside continuing legal and political contestation surrounding the Gyanvapi Mosque, situated immediately adjacent to the Kashi Vishwanath Temple. In recent years, the mosque has become the subject of multiple civil suits, archaeological surveys and “competing” historical claims concerning the existence of a pre-existing temple beneath the present structure. Those proceedings, in turn, form part of a broader national debate concerning historical religious sites and the continued relevance of the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991, whose constitutional validity is presently under challenge before the Supreme Court.

Detailed reports on Gyanvapi Mosque, its history and the case may be read here, here, here, here and here.

Detailed reports on the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991 may be read here, here, here and here.

Detailed report on “contested” Mosques and Places of Worship Act may be read here, here and here.

The present litigation did not concern ownership of the Gyanvapi Mosque, nor did it involve competing historical claims regarding religious identity. Nevertheless, it emerged within this broader environment of heightened contestation, where disputes concerning places of worship are rarely perceived as isolated property disputes. Instead, they frequently engage larger constitutional questions concerning secularism, equality, historical memory and the relationship between religion and State power.

It is precisely because of this context that the Allahabad High Court’s interpretation of the Places of Worship Act assumes significance beyond the immediate facts before it. A judgment concerning six mosques in Dalmandi inevitably contributes to the evolving jurisprudence governing one of the Constitution’s most sensitive areas. As said before, it slants and limits the scope of application of a law enacted in 1991 for precisely this purpose: containment of aggressive politico-majoriatrian claims arounds places of worship.

Why the Places of Worship Act matters

To appreciate the importance of the Court’s ruling, it is necessary to revisit the constitutional purpose behind the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991. The legislation was enacted at a moment of extraordinary communal tension. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, disputes concerning historical places of worship increasingly became instruments of political mobilisation, culminating in the movement surrounding the Babri Masjid at Ayodhya. Parliament responded by enacting the Places of Worship Act to ensure that, with the sole exception of the Ayodhya dispute, the religious character of every place of worship as it existed on August 15, 1947 would remain unchanged.

The statute represented more than an ordinary property law. It was a legislative affirmation that independent India would not permit historical grievances to become the basis for contemporary contests over religious identity. By freezing the religious status of places of worship at the moment of Independence, Parliament sought to preserve communal harmony and reinforce the constitutional commitment to secularism embodied in the Preamble and the guarantees of equality and religious freedom.

Nearly three decades later, in the Babri Masjid demolition-Ayodhya judgment (2019), the Supreme Court described the Act as a legislative intervention that safeguards the secular character of the Republic by preventing historical wrongs, whether real or perceived, from being reopened through present-day litigation. The Court characterised the legislation as imposing a constitutional obligation of non-retrogression, ensuring that independent India’s future would not be continually reshaped by unresolved disputes from its past. It is against that constitutional backdrop that the Dalmandi dispute reached the Allahabad High Court.

Detailed reports on Babri Masjid demolition-Ayodhya judgment may be read here, here, here and here.

The question before the Court was not whether a mosque could be converted into a temple. The statute answers that unequivocally. Rather, it was whether Parliament intended the protection afforded by the Act to extend further, shielding places of worship from compulsory acquisition itself, or whether acquisition for a genuine public purpose remained outside the Act’s reach.

That seemingly narrow distinction lies at the heart of one of the most consequential interpretations of the Places of Worship Act delivered by any constitutional court since the legislation came into force.

The Dalmandi redevelopment project

The controversy before the Allahabad High Court arose from the Uttar Pradesh Government’s proposal to widen and beautify Dalmandi, one of Varanasi’s oldest commercial neighbourhoods situated approximately 800 metres from the Kashi Vishwanath Temple. As part of the continuing expansion of the Kashi Vishwanath Corridor, the State proposed to acquire numerous residential and commercial properties along the route to facilitate smoother movement of pilgrims and improve connectivity between the temple precinct and adjoining areas.

Unlike the earlier phases of the Corridor project, which had already witnessed extensive demolition of residential and commercial structures surrounding the temple, the proposed redevelopment of Dalmandi raised an additional legal question. The proposed alignment included six centuries-old mosques: Anjuman Intezamia Masjid, Masjid Rangile Shah, Masjid Ali Raza Khan, Masjid Karimullah Baig, Masjid Nisaran and Masjid Sangamarmar. According to the petitioners, these mosques were likely to be acquired and demolished as part of the road-widening exercise.

While urban redevelopment frequently involves difficult choices between public infrastructure and private property, the inclusion of functioning places of worship transformed what might otherwise have been an ordinary land acquisition dispute into a constitutional controversy. It raised a question that courts had not previously addressed in any substantial detail: does the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991 merely prohibit changes in the religious identity of places of worship, or does it also prevent the State from acquiring them altogether?

That question assumed particular significance because the litigation unfolded against the backdrop of continuing constitutional debates over the meaning and future of the Places of Worship Act itself. Several petitions challenging the validity of the legislation, or seeking a narrower interpretation of its provisions, are presently pending before the Supreme Court. Although the Allahabad High Court was not called upon to determine the constitutional validity of the statute, its interpretation of the Act inevitably contributes to the developing jurisprudence on one of India’s most consequential secularism laws.

The petition: More than a challenge to acquisition

The writ petition was filed by six tenants and shopkeepers carrying on business in Dalmandi. Their immediate concern was practical and personal: the proposed acquisition threatened the closure of their establishments and the loss of their livelihoods. Yet the petition deliberately framed the dispute as extending beyond commercial interests. It argued that the redevelopment would simultaneously extinguish historic places of worship that had existed long before Independence and therefore enjoyed statutory protection under the Places of Worship Act.

The petitioners contended that the six mosques proposed to be acquired had retained their religious character continuously since before August 15, 1947, bringing them squarely within the protective ambit of the 1991 legislation. Parliament, they argued, had enacted the Act to preserve precisely such sites from future interference. If pre-Independence places of worship could nevertheless be acquired and demolished in the name of redevelopment, the central objective of the legislation would stand substantially diluted.

Their challenge therefore rested on a purposive understanding of the statute. According to the petitioners, the Act could not be reduced to a prohibition against physically converting a mosque into a temple or vice versa. Such a narrow reading, they argued, ignored the broader legislative purpose of preserving religious sites from becoming casualties of contemporary political or administrative decisions. A mosque that had been acquired and demolished might not have been converted into another religious structure, but its existence as a functioning place of worship would nevertheless come to an end. From that perspective, acquisition could undermine the statutory protection just as effectively as formal conversion.

The petition also invoked broader constitutional guarantees. The petitioners argued that the proposed acquisition violated Articles 14, 21 and 25 of the Constitution by threatening both their right to livelihood and the community’s right to continue worship at long-standing mosques. They further questioned whether the project genuinely satisfied the requirement of public purpose, asserting that alternative alignments were available which could improve access to the temple without requiring demolition of existing neighbourhoods and religious structures.

Another important strand of the petition concerned the social consequences of redevelopment. Dalmandi is not merely a cluster of buildings; it is a living commercial locality whose economy has evolved over generations. The petitioners argued that the project would displace traders, workers and families whose livelihoods depended upon businesses established in the locality over several decades. While acknowledging the importance of improving civic infrastructure, they contended that the State had failed to adequately balance developmental objectives with constitutional guarantees protecting livelihood, religious practice and equality before the law.

The petition further alleged that the proposed alignment disproportionately affected one community and was therefore arbitrary. The High Court later described these assertions as “odd pleadings”, indicating that it found the allegations insufficiently substantiated by specific material placed on record. Nevertheless, the broader concern articulated by the petition—that redevelopment in religiously sensitive spaces demands heightened constitutional scrutiny—continued to inform the legal arguments advanced before the Court.

The State’s response: Eminent domain cannot be displaced by implication

The Uttar Pradesh Government fundamentally disagreed with the petitioners’ interpretation of the 1991 Act. According to the State, the legislation was enacted for a specific and limited purpose: to prohibit the conversion of places of worship from one religion or denomination to another. It was never intended to extinguish the State’s sovereign authority to compulsorily acquire land for public purposes. Reading such an exemption into the statute, the State argued, would effectively place every temple, mosque, church, gurudwara and shrine permanently beyond the reach of land acquisition laws, regardless of compelling public necessity. Parliament, it submitted, had expressed no such intention.

The State therefore relied upon the doctrine of eminent domain, the well-established constitutional principle recognising the State’s authority to acquire private property for a public purpose subject to payment of compensation and compliance with statutory safeguards. That power today is principally regulated by the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (RFCTLARR Act), which replaced the colonial Land Acquisition Act of 1894 with a framework emphasising social impact assessment, rehabilitation, transparency and fair compensation.

Crucially, the State argued that the RFCTLARR Act does not create a blanket exemption for religious properties. Instead, it prescribes the conditions under which acquisition may occur while balancing developmental needs with the rights of affected persons. If Parliament had intended places of worship to enjoy absolute immunity from acquisition, it could have expressly provided so. The absence of such an exemption, according to the State, was itself significant.

The Government also relied upon provisions of the Waqf Act, 1995, which contemplate acquisition of Waqf properties under certain circumstances while requiring adherence to statutory safeguards and compensation mechanisms. These provisions, the State argued, demonstrated that Parliament recognised acquisition of religious endowments as legally permissible, subject to due process, rather than absolutely prohibited. At a deeper level, the dispute reflected two competing constitutional visions.

For the petitioners, the Places of Worship Act represented a broad constitutional guarantee preserving the continued existence of historic places of worship against contemporary State action. For the State, the Act performed a narrower but equally important function: preventing religious conversion of sites while leaving intact the ordinary operation of land acquisition law. Resolving that conflict required the High Court to answer not merely what the statute says, but what Parliament intended the Act to protect. That inquiry would lead the Bench to adopt one of the narrowest judicial readings of the Places of Worship Act since its enactment in 1991.

The Court’s reasoning: Locus standi, statutory interpretation and the doctrine of eminent domain

The Allahabad High Court’s judgment proceeds in two distinct stages. The first concerns maintainability—whether the petitioners possessed the legal standing to challenge the acquisition. The second addresses the larger constitutional issue of whether the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991 limits the State’s power to compulsorily acquire places of worship. While the Court ultimately dismissed the petition on grounds of locus standi, it nevertheless chose to examine the substantive legal issue. In doing so, it delivered one of the most detailed judicial interpretations of the Places of Worship Act since its enactment.

A threshold question: Who can challenge the acquisition?

The Bench first noted that the petitioners were tenants and shopkeepers, not the owners of the properties proposed to be acquired. Although they undoubtedly stood to lose their businesses and livelihoods, the Court held that the legal challenge to acquisition primarily belongs to those whose proprietary rights are directly affected.

Under the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, it is ordinarily the title holder who possesses the right to object to acquisition, negotiate compensation or challenge the legality of the State’s exercise of eminent domain. Since none of the property owners had approached the Court, the Bench found it difficult to sustain a challenge instituted solely by tenants.

“We would think that the petitioners are more or less here, in order to protect their business and source of livelihood, rather than proprietary rights,” the Court remarked, reported LiveLaw. This observation should not be misunderstood as dismissing the hardships that acquisition may cause tenants. Rather, it reflects a long-established principle of land acquisition law: economic injury does not necessarily confer the same legal standing as proprietary ownership. Yet, the conclusion also reveals one of the limitations of the judgment.

The Court did not meaningfully engage with the evolving constitutional jurisprudence surrounding Article 21, where livelihood has increasingly been recognised as an integral component of the right to life. Decisions such as Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation have acknowledged that displacement and deprivation of livelihood engage constitutional protections beyond conventional property rights. While Olga Tellis arose in a different factual context, the judgment nevertheless illustrates that constitutional standing cannot always be viewed exclusively through the lens of ownership.

The Bench’s approach therefore reflects a relatively traditional understanding of locus standi in acquisition proceedings, even as constitutional jurisprudence has gradually expanded recognition of those indirectly affected by State action.

Can ordinary worshippers defend a mosque?

The Court adopted a similar approach regarding the six mosques proposed to be acquired. The petitioners argued that, as members of the Muslim community, they were entitled to seek judicial protection for places of worship that had existed for centuries. The Court disagreed.

Each of the six mosques, it observed, was a registered Waqf administered by its own Mutawalli. Under the statutory framework governing Waqf properties, it is primarily the Mutawalli and the State Waqf Board that are entrusted with protecting Waqf assets and representing them before courts.

The Bench therefore held:

“The mosques are admittedly registered Waqf, with their own Mutawalli in each case. No doubt, members of the Muslim community may come forward in certain cases, but essentially it is the Mutawalli and the Waqf Board, who have to protect such properties. We have, nevertheless, heard the petitioners on this issue as well. If we hear the petitioners on this issue and pass judgment, it might prejudice the rights of the Mutawalli and the Waqf Board, who might have something to say in the matter, and their locus is pre-eminent, and not of the petitioners”. (Para 36)

Importantly, the Court did not hold that the mosques themselves lacked legal protection. Instead, it concluded that these particular petitioners were not the appropriate parties to assert those rights. This distinction assumes significance because the judgment expressly leaves open the possibility of future litigation by the Waqf Board or the respective Mutawallis. In other words, the Court’s dismissal of the petition cannot be read as foreclosing all future challenges to the acquisition of the mosques.

Interpreting the Places of Worship Act: Conversion is not acquisition

The central legal question before the Bench was whether the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991 prevents the State from acquiring a place of worship that existed before August 15, 1947.

The petitioners relied primarily upon Sections 3 and 4 of the Act. Section 3 prohibits the conversion of any place of worship belonging to one religious denomination into a place of worship of another denomination or another section of the same religion. Section 4 declares that the religious character of every place of worship existing on 15 August 1947 shall continue to remain the same. According to the petitioners, these provisions effectively insulated pre-Independence places of worship from acquisition or demolition because any such action would inevitably alter their religious character.

The High Court rejected this interpretation. The Bench cautioned against reading Section 4 in isolation. If viewed independently, Section 4 might appear to suggest that every place of worship existing on 15 August 1947 must physically remain untouched forever. However, the Court held that such a reading would misconstrue the statute and disregard the legislative context in which it was enacted.

Instead, the Court adopted what it described as a harmonious construction of Sections 3 and 4. Read together, these provisions reveal Parliament’s true objective—to prevent one religious community or denomination from converting a place of worship belonging to another community after Independence. Thus, a temple existing on 15 August 1947 cannot subsequently become a mosque or church; equally, a mosque cannot be converted into a temple or any other place of worship. That, according to the Court, is the extent of the statutory prohibition.

The judgment stressed that Parliament enacted the Places of Worship Act in the aftermath of escalating communal disputes over religious sites to preserve communal harmony and maintain the religious status quo existing at the time of Independence. Nothing in the language of the Act, however, indicates an intention to withdraw the State’s traditional power to acquire land for public purposes.

“Now, Sections 3 and 4 of the Act of 1991 have to be harmoniously construed, in particular, sub-Section (1) of Section 4. Read in isolation, sub-Section (1) of Section 4 might seem to declare that the religious character of a place of worship existing on the 15th day of August, 1947 is immutable, to wit, if it was a temple, it will remain a temple, if a church, it would remain that, and if a mosque, it would continue to be so. But reading it this way, would be a misconstruction of the scope of the Statute. When Section 4(1) of the Act of 1991 is read together with Section 3, it is evident that there is a prohibition imposed by Section 3 upon any person converting any place of worship of any religious denomination or a sect thereof into a place of worship of a different sect of the same denomination or to that of a different religious denomination. Sections 3 and 4 of the Act of 1991, when harmoniously construed, prevent the religious character of a place of worship belonging to a religious denomination from being changed into a place of worship of another religious denomination, from whatever it was on the 15th day of August, 1947. In short, a temple on 15th August, 1947 cannot be converted to a church or a mosque, and likewise, a mosque or a church to a temple.” (Para 42)

According to the Court, interpreting the 1991 Act as creating absolute immunity from acquisition would place every religious property beyond the reach of public infrastructure projects, regardless of necessity or public interest. Such an interpretation, the Bench held, finds no support either in the statutory language or in the legislative purpose underlying the Act.

The Court therefore concluded that the Places of Worship Act protects religious identity, not ownership. It prevents the alteration of the religious character of places of worship but does not prohibit their acquisition for roads, public infrastructure or other secular public purposes carried out in accordance with law and accompanied by payment of compensation.

The Bench also found support for this interpretation in the amended provisions of the Waqf Act, 1995. Section 51 expressly recognises that Waqf properties may be acquired for public purposes under the RFCTLARR Act or other land acquisition laws, provided the acquisition is undertaken in consultation with the Waqf Board and subject to statutory safeguards, including that it should not contravene the Places of Worship Act, be for an undisputed public purpose, and provide appropriate compensation or suitable alternative land where required. Far from prohibiting acquisition, the Waqf Act, the Court held, prescribes the conditions under which such acquisition may lawfully take place.

“Section 51 of the Waqf Act, 1995 (as amended by Act No. 14 of 2025) provides, by virtue of the second proviso to sub-Section (1A) of Section 51 that nothing contained in this sub-Section, that is to say, the prohibition on sale, gift, exchange, mortgage or transfer of Waqf property being void, shall affect any acquisition of Waqf properties for a public purpose, under the Act of 2013, or any other law relating to acquisition of land, if such acquisition is made in consultation with the Board. The Board, of course, means the Waqf Board. The third proviso says that the acquisition shall not be in contravention of the Act of 1991, the provision upon which learned Counsel for the petitioner has much harped.” (Para 44)

The Court’s understanding of eminent domain

The judgment is equally significant for its reaffirmation of the constitutional doctrine of eminent domain. The Bench held that nothing in the Places of Worship Act suggests Parliament intended to curtail the State’s sovereign authority to acquire land for public purposes. Such a conclusion, it reasoned, would create an extraordinary category of property permanently insulated from acquisition—something Parliament neither expressly stated nor necessarily intended.

The Court explained:

“The purport of the Act of 1991 is not to place beyond the pale of authority of the State’s right as the owner paramount of all lands in the territory of India and to acquire and use it for any public purpose, subject, of course, to the owner’s right to receive just and fair compensation. That is what the doctrine of eminent domain, after all, means. The Act of 1991 is not meant to derogate from that right of the State.” (Para 42)

The reasoning reflects a limited ,classical understanding of eminent domain: private rights yield to public necessity, subject to legality, due process and compensation. However, the judgment also illustrates a recurring feature of Indian constitutional adjudication. The Court devotes considerable attention to affirming the State’s acquisition powers but relatively little to examining the quality of judicial review that should accompany their exercise—particularly where acquisition affects centuries-old religious institutions. The distinction is important.

Recognising that the State possesses the power to acquire land does not automatically answer whether a particular acquisition satisfies constitutional standards of fairness, proportionality or necessity.

Reliance on Ismail Faruqui

To reinforce its interpretation, the Bench relied upon the Constitution Bench decision in Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India (1994). That decision, delivered in the aftermath of the acquisition of land around the disputed Ayodhya site, held that acquisition of a mosque is not constitutionally prohibited merely because it is a place of worship. The Constitution Bench observed that offering namaz is not necessarily confined to a mosque, and consequently a mosque does not enjoy absolute immunity from acquisition.

The Allahabad High Court relied upon these observations to conclude that acquisition of religious property remains constitutionally permissible where undertaken for a legitimate public purpose. The reliance is doctrinally understandable because Ismail Faruqui continues to remain binding precedent on land acquisition. Yet it also revives one of the most debated aspects of Indian constitutional law.

The observations concerning the essentiality of mosques to Islamic practice have been criticised by constitutional lawyers for venturing into theological questions that were arguably unnecessary for deciding the acquisition dispute before the Court. Indeed, in M. Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das (Ayodhya, 2019), the Supreme Court clarified that Ismail Faruqui should be understood in the limited context of acquisition and should not be read as a broader pronouncement on Islamic doctrine.

The Allahabad High Court follows precisely that limited approach. It relies on Ismail Faruqui not to determine the importance of mosques within Islam, but to reaffirm the narrower proposition that religious properties are not constitutionally immune from compulsory acquisition. Yet that conclusion, while legally defensible, does not exhaust the constitutional questions raised by the case. The more difficult issue is not whether acquisition is legally permissible.

It is how courts should scrutinise the exercise of that power when acquisition affects historic places of worship situated within politically contested landscapes. That question, significantly, remains largely unanswered by the judgment.

A narrow reading of a law enacted to preserve constitutional secularism

The Allahabad High Court’s judgment is likely to become an important precedent in future disputes involving religious properties and public infrastructure. Its central holding—that the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991 does not prohibit the State from acquiring places of worship for secular public purposes—is likely to be cited in litigation involving roads, railways, metro projects, heritage redevelopment and urban renewal schemes across the country. Yet, while the judgment provides a coherent textual interpretation of the statute, it also leaves several constitutional questions unanswered. These unanswered questions are important because they go to the heart of the constitutional balance between State power, religious freedom and secularism.

The High Court proceeds on the premise that Parliament intended the Places of Worship Act to prevent only one mischief—the conversion of a place of worship from one religion to another. There is textual support for this conclusion. Sections 3 and 4 repeatedly refer to “conversion” and “religious character.” Read literally, they do not expressly prohibit acquisition. However, constitutional interpretation rarely ends with the literal text. Every statute must also be understood in light of the constitutional purpose it seeks to achieve.

The Places of Worship Act was enacted in September 1991 during one of independent India’s most volatile communal moments. The Ram Janmabhoomi movement had transformed disputes over historical religious sites into instruments of mass political mobilisation. Parliament responded by freezing the religious character of every place of worship as it existed on August 15, 1947, making a conscious constitutional choice that independent India would not continually reopen disputes rooted in medieval history. In Ayodhya jugdment, the Supreme Court recognised precisely this objective.

The Court described the Places of Worship Act as a legislative instrument that protects the secular foundations of the Constitution by preventing history from becoming a source of recurring communal conflict. It called the Act a statutory reflection of India’s constitutional commitment to equality, fraternity and secularism, observing that the law imposes a principle of constitutional non-retrogression—the Republic would move forward from the moment of Independence rather than repeatedly litigate the past. Against that backdrop, an important question arises.

If Parliament intended to preserve communal harmony by protecting historic places of worship, does that protection concern only their religious identity, or also their continued existence? The Allahabad High Court answers only the first question. It does not meaningfully engage with the second. That omission does not necessarily render the judgment incorrect. But it does illustrate the limits of a purely textual approach when interpreting legislation enacted to serve a larger constitutional purpose.

Conversion and acquisition: A distinction that invites further debate

The judgment rests upon a clear distinction between conversion and acquisition. According to the Court, acquisition changes ownership; conversion changes religious identity. Legally, the distinction is logical. Constitutionally, however, it is more complicated. A mosque acquired for a road project has not become a temple; a church acquired for a metro line has not become a gurudwara; yet neither continues to function as a place of worship. This raises an important constitutional question that the judgment leaves unanswered.

Can the religious character of a place meaningfully survive once the place itself has ceased to exist? The answer is not obvious. One could argue, as the Court does, that Parliament deliberately chose only to prohibit conversion and not acquisition. Equally, one could argue that the continued existence of historic places of worship forms part of the very constitutional settlement the Act sought to preserve after Independence. Neither interpretation is implausible. The issue is likely to acquire greater significance if future redevelopment projects affect historic temples, mosques, churches or gurudwaras elsewhere in the country.

The meaning of “public purpose”

Perhaps the most important constitutional issue left largely unexplored by the judgment concerns the idea of public purpose. Throughout the decision, the Court accepts road widening, urban infrastructure and improved pilgrimage access as legitimate public purposes. Ordinarily, that proposition is uncontroversial. Courts have long recognised roads, railways, public transport and civic infrastructure as classic examples of public purpose. However, constitutional adjudication ordinarily does not stop there.

Where fundamental rights are affected, courts frequently ask additional questions.

• Is the objective legitimate?
• Was due fair and reasonable process followed in the actions of acquisition of ancient temples and mosques: dialogues, engagements, adjudication?
• Is the chosen measure necessary?
• Could the same objective have been achieved through less restrictive means?
• Has the State adequately balanced competing constitutional interests?

Those questions receive relatively limited attention in the present judgment. This is partly explained by the Court’s finding that the petition itself suffered from lack of locus standi. Once the Court concluded that the petitioners were not the appropriate parties to challenge the acquisition, it understandably refrained from undertaking a detailed proportionality analysis. Nevertheless, the broader constitutional issue remains. Redevelopment projects affecting centuries-old places of worship occupy a category distinct from ordinary land acquisition disputes. Such projects implicate not merely property rights but also religious freedom, cultural heritage, community identity and constitutional secularism. Future litigation instituted by title holders, Mutawallis or Waqf Boards may therefore require courts to scrutinise more closely whether the asserted public purpose justifies the particular acquisition in question.

The heritage dimension

Another notable feature of the judgment is what it does not discuss. The decision treats the dispute primarily as one concerning statutory interpretation and land acquisition. It says relatively little about heritage. Yet heritage formed an important part of the wider public debate surrounding the Kashi Vishwanath Corridor.

For several years, historians, architects, urban planners and conservationists have debated whether redevelopment of the temple precinct should be understood merely as infrastructure expansion or also as a profound transformation of one of India’s oldest living cities. The issue extends beyond individual buildings. Varanasi’s historic significance lies not only in monumental structures such as the Kashi Vishwanath Temple or the Gyanvapi Mosque but equally in the intricate network of neighbourhoods, shrines, markets and narrow lanes that evolved over centuries.

Urban heritage increasingly recognises that cities possess value not merely because of isolated monuments but because of the relationships between monuments, communities and everyday life. Indian constitutional law itself reflects this concern. Article 49 places an obligation upon the State to protect monuments of national importance, and Article 51A(f) recognises a fundamental duty to value and preserve the country’s composite culture. Neither provision directly governed the dispute before the Allahabad High Court. Yet both remind us that redevelopment of historically significant urban spaces inevitably raises constitutional questions extending beyond land acquisition alone.

What the judgment leaves open

It is equally important to understand what the Court did not decide. The judgment does not hold that every acquisition of a religious property is automatically valid. Nor does it approve every aspect of the Dalmandi redevelopment project. The Court does not examine whether the acquisition satisfies every procedural safeguard under the RFCTLARR Act; it does not determine whether consultation requirements under the Waqf Act were fully complied with; and it does not decide whether compensation is adequate. Nor does it adjudicate upon the independent rights of the Waqf Board or the Mutawallis, expressly leaving those questions open for future proceedings. Accordingly, the judgment should not be read more broadly than its ratio permits.

Its central proposition is narrower: the Places of Worship Act, by itself, does not prohibit acquisition of places of worship for a lawful public purpose. Whether a particular acquisition satisfies constitutional and statutory safeguards remains a separate inquiry.

Conclusion: Development, secularism and the future of the Places of Worship Act

The Allahabad High Court’s decision arrives at a moment when the constitutional future of the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991 itself remains under scrutiny before the Supreme Court. In that sense, the judgment is likely to influence debates extending far beyond the immediate dispute in Dalmandi. Its importance lies not because it diminishes the constitutional value of secularism, the Court expressly accepts the continuing force of the 1991 Act, but because it narrows the statute’s operational field. By distinguishing conversion from acquisition, the Court shifts future disputes involving redevelopment away from the Places of Worship Act and towards the law of eminent domain, land acquisition, proportionality and procedural fairness. Whether that shift ultimately strengthens constitutional governance or weakens one of Parliament’s most significant secular safeguards remains an open question.

If accepted more broadly, the judgment means that the principal legal battleground in future cases may no longer be whether the Places of Worship Act bars State action, but whether the exercise of eminent domain itself satisfies constitutional standards of fairness, necessity, proportionality and non-discrimination. That is a significant doctrinal shift. It also reflects a larger constitutional reality.

As Indian cities continue to redevelop historic religious precincts, whether in Varanasi, Mathura, Ujjain, Ayodhya or elsewhere, courts will increasingly be called upon to reconcile competing constitutional values: development and conservation, public infrastructure and religious freedom, State power and minority rights, heritage and modernisation. The Dalmandi judgment does not resolve those tensions. It marks the beginning of a new chapter in that conversation.

The complete judgment may be read below:

[1] Announced with much fanfare in March 2019, when prime minister Modi laid the foundation stone, it was formally inaugurated in 2021; https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2122058&reg=48&lang=2

[2] https://www.thehinducentre.com/the-arena/current-issues/advani-to-modi-to-yogi-a-hindutva-story-foretold/article64931577.ece; https://frontline.thehindu.com/cover-story/article25545271.ece

[3] Babri Masjid Demolition: Point of Departure, and of Arrival, Teesta Setalvad, Social Scientist; https://www.jstor.org/stable/27249507

Related:

When the Supreme Court directed protection for the Gyan Vapi Mosque, upheld the Places of Worship Act, 1991 (1994, 1995, 1997)

UP: After Gyanvapi, Mathura Court Orders Shahi Idgah Survey; ‘Violation’ of Places of Worship Act, Say Activists

The Challenge to Places of Worship Special Provisions Act, 1991 is Misconceived

Article 32 cannot be invoked to enforce all disputes relating to the Places of Worship Act: SC

When and How Ram Vilas Paswan made a strong pitch for the Places of Worship Act, 1991

Understanding the Supreme Court’s Interim Intervention in the Waqf Amendments, 2025

‘Reforms’: Sachar Committee, the 2013 Amendments and the motive behind the proposed changes in the Waqf Regime

Amendments to the Waqf Law were needed, but the grab-and-control Waqf Amendment Act, 2025 is not the answer

The post Public Purpose and Places of Worship: Allahabad HC’s Dalmandi verdict appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Against this backdrop, the Gauhati High Court’s decision in Aminul Hoque v. Union of India & Ors, delivered on June 30, 2026, dismissing the petitioner’s challenge to the opinion of Foreigners Tribunal No. 4, Kamrup (Metro), once again reiterates the settled principles governing proceedings under the Foreigners Act, 1946. In this June 30 judgement, the Court reaffirmed that the burden under Section 9 of the Act rests squarely upon the proceedee; that documentary evidence, rather than oral assertions, must establish citizenship; that writ courts exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot function as appellate authorities over findings of Foreigners Tribunals; and that discrepancies in documentary evidence may legitimately defeat a citizenship claim where linkage with pre-1971 ancestors remains unproved.

“Thus, though the petitioner had exhibited 15 (fifteen) documents as exhibits, the same does not appear to help the petitioner to establish that he has been able to discharge his burden as required under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1964 to prove that he is not a foreigner but an Indian Citizen.” (Para 27)

The judgment may sound as if it is entirely consistent with recent jurisprudence developed by the Gauhati High Court. However as the 2013 judgement of the same Court in Moslem Mandal shows, this is not how this particular court has ruled, always. Conflicting verdicts make access for substantive justice an even greater challenge for individual, impoverished victims of citizenship. The Aminul Hoque verdict relies upon familiar propositions regarding the burden of proof, admissibility of electronic records, evidentiary value of electoral rolls, proof of linkage documents and the narrow contours of certiorari jurisdiction. While the Court appears to meticulously examine each document produced by the petitioner, its treatment and evaluation especially given everyday realities behind “spelling differences” and “date differentials” in official documents discards their value. The entire verdict runs in to 21 pages.

Hence, the judgment raises larger constitutional questions about the evolving nature of citizenship adjudication in India. The decision reflects what may be described as a burden-centric approach, where the primary inquiry revolves around whether the proceedee has satisfactorily established lineage through admissible documentary evidence. Questions relating to procedural fairness, the practical realities of maintaining documentary continuity over several decades, and the heightened constitutional consequences flowing from a declaration of foreigner status receive comparatively limited engagement.

These concerns assume particular significance in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Sabitri Dey @ Swasthi Dey v. Union of India, where a Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta substantially reiterated formerly established jurisprudence governing Foreigners Tribunal proceedings. While affirming that Section 9 continues to place the burden upon the individual to establish Indian citizenship, the Supreme Court simultaneously clarified that this burden “operates within a legal process” and cannot replace the Tribunal’s obligation to conduct a fair, lawful and reasoned adjudication. The Court further held that citizenship proceedings remain subject to Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, emphasising that procedural fairness extends to “any person”, irrespective of whether they ultimately succeed in proving citizenship.

Detailed report on the judgement may be read here.

Although Aminul Hoque predates that decision, it provides an important lens through which the Supreme Court’s subsequent intervention may be understood. Substantially varying interpretations –even by constitutional courts –on the rigour of evidentiary procedures before Foreigners Tribunals have only obfuscated a life-and-death issue further. The present judgment reflects the evidentiary challenges routinely encountered in Assam’s Foreigners Tribunal regime: fragmented documentary records, changing spellings of names, migration across villages due to erosion and displacement, inconsistencies in electoral rolls, reliance upon legacy data, and the perennial difficulty of establishing genealogical continuity spanning several decades.

Rather than merely determining the fate of one individual, the judgment illustrates the structural tensions embedded within citizenship adjudication itself—between subjective evaluations of the statutory burden and constitutional fairness, documentary precision and lived realities, judicial restraint and meaningful scrutiny, and ultimately between sovereign power and individual liberty.

Facts giving rise to the dispute

The proceedings arose from an opinion dated February 28, 2019 passed by the Member, Foreigners Tribunal No. 4, Kamrup (Metro), Guwahati in FT Case No. FT(KM)-4/1077/2017. Acting upon a reference made by the competent authorities, the Tribunal declared the petitioner, Aminul Hoque, to be a foreigner who had entered India after March 25, 1971, thereby attracting the consequences contemplated under the Foreigners Act, 1946. Challenging this opinion, the petitioner invoked the writ jurisdiction of the Gauhati High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Before the Tribunal, the petitioner asserted that he was an Indian citizen by birth and traced his lineage through his father Mohiruddin Sheikh (also described in different documents as Mahruddin Sheikh, Mohiruddin and Mohir Uddin) and his grandfather Pasan Ali (also appearing as Pashan Sheikh/Pachan Ali in different records). According to the defence, the family originally resided at village Dhobakura, later shifted to Ghugudoba owing to erosion caused by the Brahmaputra, and subsequently settled at Hashdoba following family partition and migration over the years. The petitioner contended that these successive movements explained the appearance of his family in electoral rolls relating to different villages across different years.

To establish this lineage, the petitioner produced an extensive documentary record comprising fifteen exhibits. These included extracts from the 1951 NRC, certified electoral rolls of 1966, 1970, 1979, 1985, 1989, 1997, 2005, 2013, 2015 and 2017, a registered sale deed executed in favour of his projected grandfather in 1973, his PAN Card, EPIC, and a school certificate issued by the Headmaster of Hashdoba Anchalik High School. He also examined himself as DW-1 and produced his projected father as DW-2 in an attempt to establish the necessary family linkage between the pre-1971 ancestors and himself.

Clearly, the documentary record appeared substantial. Unlike several Foreigners Tribunal cases where the proceedee herein relies upon only a handful of documents, and the petitioner sought to construct a continuous genealogical chain spanning over five decades. The central question before both the Tribunal and the High Court, therefore, was not the absence of documentary material but whether the documents, read together, successfully established an uninterrupted legal link connecting the petitioner with ancestors whose presence in India prior to March 25, 1971 stood established.

It is in answering that question that the judgment assumes wider significance, for the High Court’s analysis demonstrates the exceptionally narrow –and even bureaucratically rigid–evidentiary scrutiny presently employed in citizenship adjudication. Rather than treating the documents cumulatively, the Court subjected each exhibit to independent examination before testing whether the entire chain remained internally consistent. Any unexplained discrepancy—whether relating to age, spelling, relationship, village, family composition or documentary proof—was treated as capable of weakening the overall linkage claim.

The resulting analysis reveals a judicial methodology that prioritises documentary perfection above all else, raising broader questions about the practical ability of rural citizens (or any citizens from the marginalised sections) to satisfy evidentiary standards in proceedings carrying the gravest of civil consequences.

Another detailed report on an earlier judicial treatment of documentary discrepancies may be read here.

The Court’s evidentiary analysis: Why every document failed to establish citizenship

The Gauhati High Court’s judgment is disturbing not only because it rejects the petitioner’s claim outright, but because of the meticulous manner in which it appears to scrutinise every document relied upon to establish citizenship. Rather than approaching the petitioner’s evidence cumulatively –and with an application of reasoning and logic– the Court examined each document individually, testing its admissibility, authenticity, evidentiary value and ability to establish the crucial element of linkage. Ultimately, the Court concluded that while some documents may have demonstrated the existence of particular individuals at different points in time, none successfully established the “connections” of the petitioner to an ancestor whose presence in India prior to March 25, 1971 stood legally established.

The judgment therefore illustrates a recurring feature of Foreigners Tribunal litigation in Assam: possession of numerous documents does not necessarily translate into proof of citizenship. What the law requires is an unbroken documentary chain demonstrating lineage, identity and continuity across generations.

• The 1951 NRC extract: A foundational document rejected

Among the most significant documents relied upon by the petitioner was a computer-generated extract of the 1951 National Register of Citizens (NRC), purportedly showing the name of his projected grandfather, Pasan Ali. Since the 1951 NRC predates the statutory cut-off date of March 25, 1971, such a document, if accepted, could have provided a crucial starting point for establishing ancestral presence in India.

The High Court, however, refused to attach evidentiary value to the document. The Court observed that the extract produced before the Tribunal was not the original NRC register but a computer-generated copy downloaded from the NRC database. As such, it constituted an electronic record within the meaning of the Indian Evidence Act. Since no certificate satisfying the mandatory requirements of Section 65B accompanied the document, the Court held that it was inadmissible in evidence. Consequently, the Tribunal was justified in excluding it from consideration. Arguably this is a hyper-technical rejection of an otherwise accepted document. Put differently, the state could have been called upon by the Court to produce its own digital record of the same roll for re-verification.

The Court relied upon settled jurisprudence governing electronic evidence to conclude that compliance with Section 65B is not merely procedural but mandatory when electronic records are sought to be proved.

This aspect of the judgment is particularly significant because many citizenship claims in Assam increasingly rely upon digitised legacy data generated during the NRC exercise. By insisting upon strict compliance with Section 65B, the Court effectively raises the evidentiary threshold for proving legacy records that are now maintained and accessed electronically.

From a doctrinal standpoint, the reasoning is consistent with the law governing electronic evidence. Yet it also raises practical concerns. Legacy data made available by government authorities for NRC verification is frequently accessed through official digital repositories rather than physical registers. Requiring every proceedee before a Foreigners Tribunal to procure a formal Section 65B certificate may impose an additional procedural hurdle upon individuals who have little control over the manner in which such historical records are digitised or maintained. The judgment does not engage with this practical difficulty, instead applying the evidentiary rule in a strictly formal manner.

• Electoral rolls: Presence is not enough; linkage must also be proved

The petitioner also relied extensively upon electoral rolls spanning several decades. He produced voter lists of 1966 and 1970 showing the names of Pasan Ali and Mohiruddin Sheikh, voter lists of subsequent years reflecting changes in residence, and later electoral rolls containing his own name.

Ordinarily, electoral rolls prepared before the cut-off date constitute important evidence in citizenship proceedings because they establish that a particular individual was recognised as an elector in India before March 25, 1971.

However, the High Court reiterated another “settled” principle: pre-1971 electoral records establish only the existence of the recorded individual—not the citizenship of every person claiming descent from that individual. The crucial question always remains whether the proceedee has successfully proved the family linkage connecting himself to the projected ancestor.

Examining the electoral records closely, the Court noticed several inconsistencies. The names of the projected ancestors appeared across different villages—Dhobakura, Ghugudoba and Hashdoba. The petitioner explained these changes by referring to river erosion, displacement and subsequent settlement elsewhere, a phenomenon not uncommon in Assam’s flood-prone districts.

The Court did not reject this explanation outright. Instead, it held that the explanation itself required independent documentary corroboration. Merely asserting that a family migrated because of erosion could not bridge the evidentiary gap unless supported by continuous documentary material establishing that the individuals appearing in different electoral rolls were indeed the same persons. The question that begs attention here is what document if at all –across India and applicable to any or all displaced by natural disasters individuals or groups—could ever establish such “continuous documentary material.” Again, by adhering to a narrow manifestation of “established procedure” the Gauhati HC, a constitutional court, ignored the vast (and bitter reality) that hundreds of thousands of displaced Assamese face—the absence of these “legally convincing documents.”

The Court also examined the ages recorded in different voter lists and observed discrepancies which, in its view, weakened the reliability of the projected genealogy. These inconsistencies, though individually minor, assumed greater significance because the petitioner’s entire citizenship claim depended upon establishing an uninterrupted documentary chain extending across several decades.

Accordingly, the Court concluded that while the electoral rolls undoubtedly demonstrated the presence of persons bearing similar names, they did not satisfactorily establish that the petitioner was their lawful descendant.

• The registered sale deed: Ownership cannot establish lineage

Another important document relied upon by the petitioner was a registered sale deed executed in 1973 in favour of the projected grandfather. The petitioner argued that ownership of immovable property further corroborated the family’s long-standing residence in Assam.

The High Court accepted that the sale deed was a genuine registered document but observed that its evidentiary value remained limited.

A sale deed may establish ownership of land by the recorded purchaser. It does not, however, establish the identity of descendants claiming through that purchaser unless independent evidence proves the genealogical relationship between them.

Since the Court had already found the linkage evidence deficient, the sale deed could not independently prove the petitioner’s citizenship.

The judgment simply reiterates another practice followed by Foreigners Tribunal that do not often follow the rules of logic and reasoning of the Indian Evidence Act: documents proving property ownership cannot substitute proof of lineage. They merely establish that a particular person owned land; they do not establish that every claimant tracing ancestry to that person has successfully proved the relationship.

• PAN Card and EPIC: Identity documents are not proof of citizenship

The petitioner also relied upon his Permanent Account Number (PAN) Card and Electoral Photo Identity Card (EPIC). The High Court attached virtually no evidentiary weight to either document. Referring to earlier precedents, the Court reiterated that neither a PAN Card nor an EPIC constitutes proof of Indian citizenship. These documents primarily establish identity for administrative purposes and cannot override the statutory inquiry contemplated under the Foreigners Act.

The Court observed that issuance of such documents proceeds upon administrative verification and does not amount to a judicial determination of citizenship. Consequently, possession of these documents cannot discharge the burden imposed under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act.

The judgment once again reflects the narrow philosophy that often –though not always –governs citizenship litigation.

School certificate and oral evidence: Insufficient to bridge the evidentiary gap

Perhaps the most revealing aspect of the judgment concerns the treatment of the petitioner’s school certificate and oral testimony. The petitioner relied upon a certificate issued by the Headmaster of Hashdoba Anchalik High School to establish his parentage and educational history.

The Court declined to rely upon the certificate because the Headmaster who issued it was not examined before the Tribunal and the original admission register from which the certificate was prepared was never produced. In the absence of foundational evidence proving how the entries were made, the Court held that the certificate possessed little evidentiary value. A more pro-active approach could have resulted in a constitutional court questioning the Foreigner Tribunal proceedings for this “lapse” rather than rejecting the proceedee’s claim altogether.

Similarly, although the petitioner’s projected father entered the witness box and attempted to establish the family relationship through oral testimony, the Court held that such evidence could not compensate for deficiencies in documentary proof.

The High Court also observed that oral assertions regarding lineage, however sincere, cannot by themselves discharge the burden imposed under Section 9 where documentary evidence capable of establishing family linkage is either absent or inconsistent.

In effect, questionably, the Court treated documentary evidence as the primary mode of proving citizenship, while oral testimony assumed only a corroborative role. Where the documentary chain itself remained incomplete, oral evidence was considered insufficient to cure the defect.

This approach reflects some –not all—of the the prevailing judicial emphasis on documentary certainty in citizenship adjudication. However, it simultaneously raises an important question: whether proceedings determining a person’s legal status should demand documentary continuity of a standard that vast numbers of Indians, rural citizens, particularly those displaced by erosion, migration or historical administrative deficiencies, may find exceptionally difficult to satisfy.

Judicial restraint and the limits of Article 226: Deference to the Foreigners Tribunal

Having concluded that the petitioner failed to “establish a satisfactory documentary chain linking him to his projected ancestors,” the Gauhati High Court turned to what ultimately became the decisive legal question: whether the High Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, could re-appreciate the evidence and arrive at a different factual conclusion from that reached by the Foreigners Tribunal. The Court answered this question firmly in the negative.

Relying upon a long line of precedents, the Bench reiterated that a writ court exercising certiorari jurisdiction does not function as an appellate forum over the findings of a Foreigners Tribunal. Its role is confined to examining whether the Tribunal acted within its jurisdiction, followed the prescribed procedure, observed principles of natural justice and arrived at findings that are not perverse or unsupported by any evidence. Mere disagreement with the appreciation of evidence does not justify interference under Article 226.

To reinforce this proposition, the Court referred to the Constitution Bench decision in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, which continues to govern the scope of certiorari jurisdiction. The Court also relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences v. Bikartan Das, reiterating that writ courts cannot substitute their own factual conclusions merely because another view of the evidence may be possible.

Applying these principles, the High Court concluded that the Tribunal had examined every document placed before it, evaluated the oral testimony of both witnesses and assigned reasons for rejecting the petitioner’s claim. Unfortunately even though some oral testimonies –notably that of the Headmaster of the school were not recorded—the HC still came to this conclusion.

Whether those conclusions were ultimately correct on facts was, according to the Court, not a question that could ordinarily be reopened in writ proceedings. The judgment therefore reflects a pronounced judicial deference to the specialised role assigned to Foreigners Tribunals under the Foreigners Act and the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order.

“In this case in hand, the petitioner has not been able to establish that the learned Tribunal had committed any patent error in appreciating the pleadings and evidence on record, or that it considered extraneous materials or that the decision was based on ignorance of law or in disregard to the provisions of law.” (Para 30)

“In the light of the discussions made hereinbefore, the Court finds no material to hold that the opinion assailed in this writ petition is bad on facts or in law. The learned counsel for the petitioner could not show that the said opinion was perverse on any count whatsoever. Therefore, this challenge fails and consequently, this writ petition is dismissed.” (Para 31)

A burden-centric model of citizenship adjudication

Read holistically, the judgment reveals a judicial philosophy that has shaped Assam’s citizenship jurisprudence intermittently over the past two decades. The Court repeatedly returns to one statutory principle: Section 9 of the Foreigners Act places the burden of proving citizenship upon the proceedee. Everything else in the judgment flows from that premise.

The Court examines every document not to determine whether it raises a reasonable probability of Indian citizenship but to ascertain whether it conclusively discharges the burden imposed by Section 9. Where inconsistencies emerge, the benefit does not accrue to the proceedee. Instead, the deficiencies are treated as failures to satisfy the statutory burden. This approach may be described as burden-centric adjudication.

Under this model:

• the reference made by the State initiates the proceedings;
• the proceedee must affirmatively establish Indian citizenship;
• documentary evidence assumes primacy over oral testimony;
• every link in the genealogical chain must be independently proved;
• unexplained discrepancies weaken the entire claim; and
• failure to establish linkage results in the statutory burden remaining undischarged.

Doctrinally, this reasoning finds some support in earlier Supreme Court decisions, particularly Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India, which upheld the reverse burden contained in Section 9 on the ground that questions relating to nationality, birth and ancestry lie especially within the knowledge of the individual concerned. Interestingly while Sonowal has been cited on this aspect –upholding burden of proof—the same judgement of the SC has been ignored when it comes to the crucial and material issue of material grounds for issuance of notice by the Assam Border Police in the first place.

The Gauhati High Court’s judgment faithfully applies that doctrine. However, the decision also exposes the practical implications of a jurisprudence that places overwhelming emphasis upon documentary precision in a region where historical documentation has often been fragmented by displacement, erosion, illiteracy and administrative inconsistency.

Does the judgment impose an unrealistic evidentiary standard?

Perhaps the most significant question emerging from the judgment is not whether the Court correctly applied existing law, but whether the evidentiary standard demanded by that law adequately reflects the realities of citizenship documentation in Assam. The petitioner produced fifteen documents spanning nearly seven decades. These included pre-1971 electoral rolls, a 1951 NRC extract, land records, a registered sale deed, multiple voter lists, school records, PAN and EPIC, along with oral evidence from his projected father. Yet none proved sufficient.

Individually, many documents were rejected because they did not establish linkage. Others were discounted because of technical deficiencies in admissibility. Some suffered from discrepancies in names, ages or villages. Oral testimony was treated as incapable of curing documentary gaps. From a purely evidentiary standpoint, each conclusion may appear legally sustainable. Viewed collectively, however, the judgment raises a broader concern.

Citizenship proceedings frequently involve families whose records extend back fifty or seventy years. Variations in spelling, transliteration between Assamese, Bengali and English, inconsistent recording of ages, migration due to annual flooding, subdivision of villages and changing administrative boundaries are hardly exceptional features of rural documentation in Assam—they are endemic realities. The judgment gives relatively little consideration to these structural realities. Instead, it proceeds upon an implicit assumption that documentary continuity should ordinarily be capable of precise reconstruction. Whether such an expectation is realistic is a question that remains largely unexplored.

The treatment of linkage evidence

Another notable aspect of the judgment is its treatment of linkage. The Court correctly observes that proving the existence of an ancestor in India before March 25, 1971 is only the first step. The decisive issue is whether the proceedee has successfully demonstrated that he is indeed the descendant of that ancestor. This requirement has become the cornerstone of Assam’s Foreigners Tribunal jurisprudence. Yet the present judgment illustrates how linkage has gradually evolved from a factual inquiry into an exceptionally demanding documentary exercise. Each missing document, each discrepancy in age, each variation in spelling and each unexplained shift in residence becomes capable of weakening the entire genealogical chain.

The consequence is that citizenship litigation often turns less upon the existence of ancestral residence than upon the ability to reconstruct documentary history with remarkable precision across multiple decades. Whether this reflects the legislative intention underlying Section 9 or has developed incrementally through judicial practice is itself worthy of closer examination.

The Supreme Court’s intervention: A shift from burden to process

It is against this background that the Supreme Court’s recent judgment in Sabitri Dey @ Swasthi Dey v. Union of India assumes profound significance. Although the Supreme Court did not dilute the statutory burden under Section 9, it fundamentally altered the constitutional framework within which that burden must operate. The Court categorically held that the burden on the proceedee does not replace the legal process itself.

Section 9, according to the Bench, authorises neither automatic declarations nor mechanical acceptance of police references. Instead, the burden functions within a fair adjudicatory process that requires meaningful notice, disclosure of the “main grounds”, objective consideration of the State’s evidence and a reasoned determination by the Tribunal.

Most crucially, this recent 21 page judgement in Aminol Haque delivered by the GHC is silent on the whether or not the Foreigners Tribunal had examined the basis of the “notice” issued by the Assam Border Police to the proceedee, whether the notice itself disclosed material grounds for justifying the proceedings around adjudication of a person’s citizenship etc. Did the Court in Aminol Haque examine whether the initiation of proceedings were wholly without jurisdiction, non est, and void ab initio? The verdict is silent on this.[1]

Most importantly, the Supreme Court held that proceedings before Foreigners Tribunals remain subject to Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution because both provisions protect “any person”, irrespective of citizenship. This marks a subtle but significant constitutional shift.

The focus moves beyond the question “Has the proceedee discharged the burden?”

It also asks:

• Was the adjudication fair?
• Was the notice meaningful?
• Were the grounds adequately disclosed?
• Did the Tribunal independently evaluate the evidence?
• Were reasons properly recorded?
• Was the conclusion reached through a lawful and reasoned process?

These questions receive comparatively limited attention in Aminul Hoque, where the primary emphasis remains upon whether the petitioner successfully proved his case.

The Supreme Court’s judgment does not invalidate this evidentiary inquiry. Rather, it insists that evidentiary assessment itself must occur within a procedurally robust constitutional framework. Consequently, Sabitri Dey represents not a rejection of Section 9 but a recalibration of its operation. The burden continues to rest upon the proceedee. But the legitimacy of the outcome now depends equally upon the fairness of the process through which that burden is evaluated. It is precisely this constitutional dimension that may shape the future trajectory of citizenship jurisprudence in Assam.

Beyond one case: What Aminul Hoque tells us about the future of citizenship adjudication

The Gauhati High Court’s decision ultimately dismissed the writ petition, affirmed the opinion of the Foreigners Tribunal and upheld the declaration of the petitioner as a post March 25, 1971 foreigner. In doing so, the Court concluded that there was no jurisdictional error, perversity or violation of natural justice warranting interference under Article 226. The Tribunal had, in the Court’s view, appreciated the documentary and oral evidence in accordance with law, and the petitioner’s failure to establish linkage meant that the statutory burden under Section 9 remained undischarged.

From a strictly doctrinal perspective, the judgment is difficult to fault. It faithfully follows established precedents of both the Gauhati High Court and the Supreme Court regarding the burden of proof, the evidentiary value of public documents, the admissibility of electronic records, and the limited scope of judicial review under Article 226. It neither creates new legal principles nor departs from settled jurisprudence. Rather, it is emblematic of the legal framework that has governed Foreigners Tribunal litigation in Assam for nearly two decades. Yet, legal correctness is not the only lens through which judgments involving citizenship should be examined.

Citizenship occupies a unique constitutional position. Unlike most adjudicatory disputes, proceedings before a Foreigners Tribunal determine whether an individual belongs to the constitutional community itself. A declaration of foreigner status is not merely an adverse civil finding—it fundamentally alters the individual’s relationship with the State. It may lead to detention in transit camps, deportation, disenfranchisement, separation from family members who remain Indian citizens, and, in some cases, prolonged uncertainty regarding nationality. These are consequences of exceptional gravity, making citizenship litigation qualitatively different from ordinary civil or administrative proceedings.

It is precisely because of these consequences that the Supreme Court, in Sabitri Dey @ Swasthi Dey, described citizenship and foreigner determination as matters of “high constitutional and legal significance.” The Court recognised that while Parliament may legitimately prescribe a reverse burden under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, that burden cannot eclipse the constitutional guarantees of fairness, reasonableness and non-arbitrariness embodied in Articles 14 and 21.

A jurisprudence in transition

Viewed together, Aminul Hoque and Sabitri Dey reveal that citizenship jurisprudence in India is undergoing a turbulent transition. The Gauhati High Court’s judgment represents what may be a clinical and narrow view on Foreigners Tribunal jurisprudence. The principal questions are:

• Has the proceedee produced admissible documents?
• Has family linkage been proved?
• Are the electoral rolls internally consistent?
• Have documentary discrepancies been satisfactorily explained?
• Has the burden under Section 9 been discharged?

However by leaping to look at evidence from a narrow, even bureaucratically top-heavy perspective, this judgement and others of its ilk fail to scrutinise the merit or applicability of the “notice” issued. As a wide range of international and national studies including those conducted by Citizens for Justice and Peace  have shown, the act and process of issuing such notices has been proven to be ad hoc, manifestly arbitrary and even selective. No rigour in enquiry by the authorities prior to such issuance neither takes place nor is examined by the Foreigner Tribunal.

The recent Supreme Court judgment by underlining a basic flaw in this approach reiterates a constitutional process model.

Under this approach, the inquiry expands beyond abstract and even subjective assessments of “documentary sufficiency” to include procedural legitimacy. The Court asks not only whether the proceedee proved citizenship, but also whether the adjudication itself satisfied constitutional standards. Accordingly, the focus shifts towards questions such as:

• Were the “main grounds” of the allegation properly disclosed?
• Was notice effectively served?
• Did the Tribunal independently evaluate the State’s evidence?
• Were the findings supported by reasons?
• Was the opportunity to defend meaningful rather than merely formal?
• Did the adjudication satisfy the requirements of Articles 14 and 21?

These questions do not replace Section 9; they contextualise it within constitutional guarantees.

The challenge of documentary perfection

One of the most striking features of Aminul Hoque is the extraordinarily high premium placed on documentary continuity. The judgment expects a seamless genealogical chain extending across multiple decades, villages and administrative records. Every link in that chain must withstand judicial scrutiny. Variations in names, inconsistencies in ages, changes in residence, absence of foundational records and deficiencies in proving public documents all become capable of defeating the claim.

Citizenship cannot be determined on speculation or conjecture. While some aspects of documentary proof may be needed as a reliable means of establishing lineage, ground circumstances, the sensitive issue of citizenship adjudication in Assam presents a unique factual context. Large sections of the population have experienced repeated displacement due to river erosion. Entire villages have disappeared and re-emerged elsewhere. Administrative boundaries have changed. Large sections of the local population migrate intra-state. Names have been transliterated between Assamese, Bengali and English with varying spellings. Ages have often been recorded approximately rather than precisely. Legacy records from the 1950s and 1960s were not created with future citizenship litigation in mind. These realities do not excuse deficiencies in evidence. But they do underscore the importance of evaluating documentary inconsistencies in context rather than in isolation.

The High Court’s judgment gives comparatively limited consideration to these structural realities, preferring instead to apply conventional evidentiary principles with considerable rigour. Whether that approach adequately accommodates the lived realities of documentation in Assam remains an open constitutional question.

Fairness as a constitutional imperative

Perhaps the most enduring contribution of the Supreme Court’s judgment is that it reframes citizenship adjudication as a constitutional exercise rather than merely a statutory one. By holding that Articles 14 and 21 protect “any person”, the Court has made clear that procedural fairness does not depend upon citizenship. The very purpose of the adjudication is to determine citizenship; fairness cannot therefore be withheld until citizenship is first established. This principle has implications extending well beyond ex-parte proceedings.

It informs the manner in which notices are drafted, evidence is appreciated, reasons are recorded, and proceedings are conducted. It reinforces the quasi-judicial character of Foreigners Tribunals and emphasises that their role is not merely to verify police references but to independently determine one of the most consequential legal questions an individual can face.

Conclusion

The Gauhati High Court’s decision in Aminul Hoque reinforces the reverse burden under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, demands strict proof of genealogical linkage, accords limited evidentiary value to identity documents such as PAN and EPIC, insists upon compliance with Section 65B for electronic records, and reiterates the narrow scope of judicial review under Article 226. The judgement is marked by a huge lacunae in not examining the grounds or methods employed in issuance of the “notice” in the first place. Hence, the judgment also illustrates the limitations of a jurisprudence centred almost exclusively upon documentary proof and evidentiary precision. Citizenship is unlike any other legal status. The consequences of an erroneous declaration extend beyond the courtroom, affecting liberty, family life, identity and belonging. Such consequences demand not only accurate fact-finding but also procedures that command constitutional legitimacy.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Sabitri Dey on the other hand provides an essential constitutional complement to them. By reaffirming that the burden under Section 9 operates within a framework of fairness, reasoned adjudication and meaningful procedural safeguards, the Supreme Court has signalled that the legitimacy of citizenship determination depends as much upon the integrity of the process as upon the correctness of the final outcome. The Gauhati High Court’s adjudication remains limiting and burden-centric. The Supreme Court, crucially, introduces a more process-oriented constitutional framework.

The complete judgement may be read below:

[1] It is well settled inter alia by the judgments of the Honourable Supreme Court in Sarbananda Sonowal (II) v. Union of India, (2007) 1 SCC 174 (paras 42, 55 and 60),  and Md. Rahim Ali, @ Abdur Rahim v. State of Assam (paras 35-41), as also by a Full Bench of the Hon’ble Gauhati High Court in State of Assam v. Moslem Mondal, (2013) 1 GLT 809, that the Foreigners Tribunal is required to independently apply its mind to the grounds and materials produced before it by the State and come to a conclusion that there are sufficient grounds to initiate proceedings against any person who is alleged to be a foreigner.  It is further well settled that in the absence of grounds supported by objective materials which justify proceeding against a person, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to issue a notice calling upon him to appear and show cause why he should not be declared a foreigner.  It is further well settled that if the notice issued by the Tribunal does not contain the main grounds on the basis of which the Tribunal is satisfied that it is a fit case to proceed, then the entire proceedings are void ab initio and the reverse burden of proof under Section 9 of the Act does not get cast upon the proceedee, and any opinion rendered by the Tribunal is void and non est and has to be struck down on this ground alone.

Related:

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Abdul Sheikh Citizenship Case: Gauhati High Court issues notice, continues protection against deportation

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Defending Citizenship, On the Ground | CJP Assam 2025

From Despair to Dignity: How CJP helped Elachan Bibi win back her identity, prove her citizenship

The post Documentary Burden beyond proof: Gauhati HC upholds foreigner declaration appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The Odisha State Sentence Review Board has recommended his release from jail on ground of “good behaviour.” On July 14, 2026, a bench comprising of Justices Manoj Misra and Vijay Bishnoi of the Supreme Court through its order had asked the Odisha Government to take a decision on the premature release of Singh by August 19. Reportedly, the bench also made an oral observation that, “You take a decision by August 15. Let him also celebrate Independence Day by then.” Reported the Hindustan Times.

Singh, who is said to be associated with the Bharatiya Janata Party and the Bajrang Dal, is serving life imprisonment not only for the murder of Australian missionary Graham Staines and his two sons, but also for the 1999 murder of Catholic priest Arul Das, who was shot with an arrow while fleeing a building that had been set on fire. Reported the new Indian Express. He was also convicted for the murder of Shaikh Rahman, a Muslim garment merchant, who was brutally assaulted, had his hands severed, and whose body and garment stall were set ablaze.

In July 2024, the Supreme Court had sought the Odisha government’s response on a plea filed through advocate Vishnu Shankar Jain seeking Singh’s remission of sentence and release, asserting that he met the state government’s criteria for granting remission (i.e. 25 years). The reformative theory of Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer was invoked and reliance was placed on the Court’s 2022 judgment permitting the premature release of the convict in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case.

The current remission, therefore reflects a broader pattern in India of state governments ruled by the incumbent-BJP granting remission to those convicted in cases of gross communal violence. One such earlier instance was the release of the convicts in the 2002 Bilkis Bano gang rape and family murder case, a decision that remained in force until it was struck down by the Supreme Court.

It is worth noting that prior to this; Singh’s plea for remission has been evaluated on five separate occasions, and has been turned down each time, with the most recent rejection occurring in February 2024.

How the Remission Was Filed and Processed

Singh’s possible release has drawn political attention in the past. During a campaign for his release in 2022, when the BJD government was in power, Sudarshan TV editor-in-chief Suresh Chavhanke attempted to meet him in prison but was denied permission. Mohan Charan Majhi, (now the Chief Minister of Odisha), had also joined a protest outside the jail demanding Singh’s release. However, the Board’s consideration of Singh’s case was based on the prescribed remission process and the reports submitted by the relevant authorities. This clearly establishes that organised political demand for Singh’s release predates, by a considerable margin, the administrative process that has now produced it.

At its September 2025 meeting, the Board considered 107 cases. It recommended the release of 18 life convicts, rejected 75 applications, and deferred 14, including Singh’s. Singh’s case remained pending because the Board required a fresh report from his home district.

According to The Hindu, the State Sentence Review Board met in the first week of July 2026 to consider the premature release of eligible life convicts. Among the cases reviewed was that of Dara Singh. In his petition before the Supreme Court, he stated that he deeply regretted the offences committed over two decades earlier and sought an opportunity to “give back to society” through service-oriented work.  He also claimed that he bore no personal animosity towards the victims and described his actions as the result of “youthful rage.” Singh was 37 years old at the time of his arrest!

Under Odisha’s 2022 premature-release guidelines, a convict whose sentence has been commuted from death to life becomes eligible for remission consideration after 25 years in custody, subject to a recommendation from the State Sentence Review Board (SSRB) and government approval. Five out of six members of the SSRB belong to the executive branch of government. The presence of ruling-party legislators, when the CM has supported Singh’s release, on the deciding panel raises questions whether the government will independently apply its mind.

Comparison with the Bilkis Bano Case

Setting the two cases side by side is useful because they involve a similar factual pattern. In both instances, persons convicted of life imprisonment in communal hate-crime cases were considered for or granted premature release.

The release in Bano’s case followed a plea filed by one convict, Radheshyam Bhagwandas Shah, who argued he had already served over 15 years and sought early release. Shah had first tried this route in Gujarat, where the Gujarat High Court itself had indicated that Maharashtra, the state where his trial was actually conducted after the Supreme Court moved it there on Bano’s plea, was the appropriate government to decide his remission, not Gujarat. On May 13, 2022, Supreme Court order directed Gujarat (rather than Maharashtra) to decide the remission question. Acting on the Court’s direction, the Gujarat government formed a committee, which went on to recommend that the sentences of all 11 convicts in the case be remitted. The panel that granted remission included BJP legislators, the same party that governed Gujarat at the time of the riots. One of those legislators publicly defended the convicts by remarking that some of them were “Brahmins” with good values. Reported NDTV.

Several activists, along with Bilkis Bano herself petitioned the Court in November 2022. On January 8, 2024, Justices B.V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan quashed the remission, holding that Gujarat was never the appropriate government and that the May 2022 order directing Gujarat to decide had itself been obtained by concealing material facts. The convicts were ordered back to prison within two weeks.

In Bano’s case, when the Gujarat government had released eleven convicts on August 15, 2022, they were welcomed with sweets and had their feet touched by supporters. Singh has for years been celebrated by sections of the Hindu right. Organisations such as the Dharmarakhyak Sri Dara Singh Bachao Samiti and Dara Sena have publicly campaigned for his release and portrayed him as a defender of Hinduism.

Given this, especially when the incumbent Odisha Chief Minister has also, before assuming office, expressed support for Singh’s release, there is a significant possibility that Singh’s release too will receive a public welcome similar to that accorded to the Bano’s convicts. The repeated public glorification of individuals convicted in cases of communal violence by organisations affiliated with or aligned to the BJP-RSS ecosystem raises serious concerns about the social and political messaging such releases convey.

While concealment of material facts was the decisive ground in Bano’s case, the Court also separately described Gujarat’s orders as stereotyped and passed without application of mind. Odisha’s Sentence Review Board considered Singh’s file within a batch of dozens of prisoners in a single sitting arguably meets the same structural vulnerability.

Five factors were decided in Laxman Naskar v. Union of India (2000), to decide on pre-mature release of convicts, namely:

i) Whether the offence is an individual act of crime without affecting the society at large?

ii) Whether there is any chance of future recurrence of committing crime?

iii) Whether the convict has lost his potentiality in committing crime?

iv) Whether there is any fruitful purpose of confining this convict any more?

v) Socio-economic condition of the convict’s family.

The first factor alone arguably requires reckoning with the fact that his is not a single offence but three separate convictions, spanning roughly a year, each targeting a different religious minority.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this judgement primer has been worked on by Tanishka Shah)

Related:

Remembering the Graham Staines Murder

Bilkis Bano gets Justice: Supreme Court strikes down remission

De-coding the historic Bilkis Bano verdict

The post Dara Singh, convicted in string of 1999 communal killings, likely set for release by August 15 appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Background of the case and procedural history

 The appellants, Mayadhar Nayak and Baina Nayak, were daily wagers belonging to the Scheduled Castes, who served the Government Treasury Branch of SBI in Bhubaneswar as cleaners and sweepers for approximately three decades, starting in 1994 and 1995, respectively.

The appellants had previously approached the Court in 1999 regarding non-regularisation of service and denial of pay on par with temporary employees. This produced an interim protective order on October 28, 1999 where the Court said, “If there is work for the Petitioners, they may not be retrenched.” The Court had directed the Bank to pay them remuneration under the Minimum Wages Act and be allowed to continue working as long as work was available, without being substituted by new hands. The Court also asked the bank to consider their cases for regularisation if any vacancies arose.

In 2007, the appellants again approached the Court claiming that the Bank was seeking to fill up the posts of Sweepers and other menial staff without considering their claim for appointment. This time too, the Court asked the bank to consider their cases for regularisation if any vacancies arose, keeping in view the length of their engagement and the services.

In terms of the above order, Appellants were paid on September 17, 2021 the arrears of minimum wages quantified at Rs.1, 61,619/- , each, for the period between April, 2017 & June, 2021.

Around five years later, in 2012, the appellants filed another petition for their recognition as temporary employees, pay parity under the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’, release of bonus for the financial year 2011–12, and extension of all temporary service benefits as granted to similarly situated employees of the Bank.

In 2020, the appellants another petition seeking regularisation of their services, contending that the Bank had regularised the services of a similarly situated employee engaged as a ‘Liftman’ at the time, the appellants were receiving a consolidated monthly remuneration of Rs.16,406/- while other temporary employees of the Bank were receiving Rs.27,443/-.

On June 20 2025, a single judge bench Justice S.K. Panigrahi which was hearing both the petitions together dismissed the appellants’ writ petitions finding all their claims unsustainable. The judgment read:

“While this Court does not disregard the long and uninterrupted service rendered by the petitioners, it is well-settled that mere length of service does not by itself confer a right to regularisation. The consistent position in law is that engagement on a daily wage or casual basis, however prolonged, cannot mature into a claim for regular appointment in the absence of sanctioned posts and adherence to a lawful selection process.” (Para 18).

In 2022, the Bank had sought permission to retrench the Appellants as being surplus workers.

On July 19, 2025, the appellants were retrenched by the bank as surplus workers under Section 25F of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and were paid roughly Rs. 3.31 lakh each as statutory compensation and payment due to a policy shift toward outsourcing driven by IT developments in banking.

The division bench presently hearing the case, had to decide whether

• the appellants, after nearly 30 years of service were entitled to regularisation and consequential monetary benefits,
• the previous court orders, which only directed the payment of minimum wages and conditional consideration for vacancies, barred the appellants’ current claims for regularisation, and
• what constitutes fair ‘remediable and reparative justice’ for manual labourers in an era of outsourcing and AI, when regularisation might impose an excessive financial burden on the employer.

High Court’s intervention

 The Division Bench partially allowed the appeals and set aside the order of the Single Judge through an order on May 18, 2026. In that it said:

“There appears to be a prima facie case for granting relief to the Appellants herein, who admittedly have put in service as Sweepers, first Appellant from 1994, and the second from 1995. The law, as it now stands in the June of its life, tilts in favour of the Appellant’s herein, inasmuch as, arguably, the impugned order of the learned Single Judge has missed the march”

• Declined Regularisation

The Court declined to order regularisation. Reliance was placed on Supreme Court’s rulings in Jaggo v. Union of India (2024), and Shripal v. Nagar Nigam (2025) but the Court noted it would cause the Bank to bear the brunt of losing huge money and that the appellants’ prior cases only resulted in a direction for minimum wages. At the same time, the Court observed that the appellants’ earlier rounds of litigation had not secured them much real benefit, since those orders only directed payment of minimum wages, which SBI had already paid. Because of this, the Bench held that the regularisation claim in the present appeals was, to an extent, barred by the principle of res judicata.

The Court then referred to a coordinate Bench’s order in Secretary, Berhampur Cooperative Central Bank Ltd. v. Bhaba Sundar Dalai (2026), where Rs 10 lakh had been awarded as compensation in lieu of regularisation. However, the Bench distinguished that case as there was no res judicata bar in it, and the employees’ service was comparatively shorter.

The Court took note of two mitigating factors specific to the present appellants, that they had roughly ten years left before superannuation, and that both belonged to Scheduled Castes, as relevant considerations in shaping the final relief.

• Justification for the Compensation Amount

In the May order, the Court had suggested both the sides to negotiate a settlement with fairness and justice. The SBI proposed to pay a lump sum compensation of Rs. 5 lakh to each of the appellants to settle the dispute. However, the appellants rejected the bank’s offer and during a personal interaction with the Court, they stated they would settle for Rs. 25 lakh each

The Court evaluated both proposals and described the Bank’s Rs. 5 lakh offer inadequate. It said:

“Rupees 5 lakh offer made by the Bank as compensation is too frugal to be mentioned, when bread is costlier than blood, Rupee value now-a-days dwindling down. The Appellants, who have given their sweat & blood, cannot seek gainful employment elsewhere at their present declining age. They were working only as sweepers with not much education nor with due social status.” (Para 7.3.2)

Instead, the Court awarded a lump sum compensation of Rs. 20, 00,000 (Twenty Lakh) to each appellant in lieu of regularisation and continued service.

While deciding the compensation amount, it remarked:

“In the AI era, we are not sure that they would be able to eke out their livelihood, having spent prime of their life blood in the menial job all these years. Even Rs.10 lakh compensation awarded by the Coordinate Bench to the workmen of a Cooperative Bank would not constitute a solid yardstick for determining what should be paid to these poor persons. Should Appellants be regularized in service, it would incur more expenditure than otherwise.” (Para 7.3.2)

The Bank was ordered to pay the total Rs. 40 lakh within eight weeks. Any delay would trigger an interest penalty (1% for the first month and 2% thereafter), which the Court directed should be recovered personally from the erring bank officials.

The full judgment may be read here:

Why Regularisation Never Came

 The Fifth Schedule to the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, that designates certain practices as unfair labour practices includes:

 “10. To employ workmen as “badlis”, casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for years, with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen.”

 For thirty years, and over 240 days annually, the appellants discharged their duty in continuity. For context, the Government Treasury Branch of the Bank occupies more than 11,000 square feet, spread over three levels comprising the upper basement, ground floor, and first floor. The premises include eight toilets and six urinals. The Appellants had been performing cleaning duties in the said premises along with outsourced employees.

The denial of regularisation and long-term benefits to contractual or temporary workers is a heavily litigated issue in India, and not unique to the present case. In Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (2006) the Court clarified that temporary, daily wage, or contractual employees do not possess a legal or fundamental right to be made permanent. It held that a court cannot issue a writ of mandamus to make a worker permanent because the worker has no enforceable legal right to such a status, and the State has no legal duty to provide it outside of established rules. However, the Court also provided a narrow exception as a one-time measure for workers who have completed at least 10 years of service. Regularisation, it held, may be permitted where the appointment was irregular (meaning it suffered from a procedural flaw) but not illegal.

In Jaggo v. Union of India (2024), the Supreme Court said that the appellants’ long and uninterrupted service, for periods extending well beyond ten years, cannot be brushed aside merely by labelling their initial appointments as part-time or contractual. The essence of their employment must be considered in the light of their sustained contribution, the integral nature of their work, and the fact that no evidence suggests their entry was through any illegal or surreptitious route. The judgment read:

“The claim by the respondents that these were not regular posts lacks merit, as the nature of the work performed by the appellants was perennial and fundamental to the functioning of the offices. The recurring nature of these duties necessitates their classification as regular posts, irrespective of how their initial engagements were labelled. It is also noteworthy that subsequent outsourcing of these same tasks to private agencies after the appellants’ termination demonstrates the inherent need for these services. This act of outsourcing, which effectively replaced one set of workers with another, further underscores that the work in question was neither temporary nor occasional.” (Para 13)

In Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. vs Brajrajnagar Coal Mines Workers Union (2024), the Court held that workers engaged to perform work of regular and perennial nature cannot be treated as contract labour.

Similarly, last year, in Shripal vs Nagar Nigam (2025), the Supreme Court while acknowledging the precedence in Umadevi, emphasised that workers performing duties that are integral, ongoing, and perennial to an institution’s functions should not be relegated to perpetual daily-wage status. The judgment authored by Justice Vikram Nath said:

“While the judgment in Uma Devi (supra) sought to curtail the practice of backdoor entries and ensure appointments adhered to constitutional principles, it is regrettable that its principles are often misinterpreted or misapplied to deny legitimate claims of long-serving employees. This judgment aimed to distinguish between “illegal” and “irregular” appointments. It categorically held that employees in irregular appointments, who were engaged in duly sanctioned posts and had served continuously for more than ten years, should be considered for regularization as a one-time measure. However, the laudable intent of the judgment is being subverted when institutions rely on its dicta to indiscriminately reject the claims of employees, even in cases where their appointments are not illegal, but merely lack adherence to procedural formalities.” (Para 26).

“Indian labour law strongly disfavours perpetual daily-wage or contractual engagements in circumstances where the work is permanent in nature. Morally and legally, workers who fulfil ongoing municipal requirements year after year cannot be dismissed summarily as dispensable, particularly in the absence of a genuine contractor agreement.” (Para 15).

To continue extracting regular labour for decades while pleading a lack of sanctioned strength is a position the Court found legally and morally unsustainable in Dharam Singh vs State of UP (2025).

In January this year, in Bhola Nath vs The State Of Jharkhand (2026), the Court while finding the State’s refusal to regularise the workers who had served for over a decade to be a clear derogation of equality principles, directed the State to forthwith regularise the appellants against the sanctioned posts they were initially appointed to, granting them all consequential service benefits

Hence, while long service alone does not guarantee automatic regularisation, the Supreme Court has ruled that continuing workers in identical, perpetual roles on temporary wages while denying them benefits can be considered arbitrary and discriminatory.

During the litigation, the appellants in present case- Mayadhar Nayak supported his wife, two children, and a father aged about 80 years. On the other hand, Baina Nayak was the sole caretaker of a mentally and physically disabled child and another son, all of whom dependent on his meagre income of about Rs 16,000.

On paper, the Nayaks had reason to expect a better outcome. They approached the High Court as early as 1999 where a coordinate bench even secured them protection against retrenchment in 1999, and in 2007 the Court directed SBI to consider them if sweeper vacancies were filled. Yet each of these interventions never fruitioned into regularisation.

When two vacancies did arise after the 2007/2008 orders, SBI chose to outsource the cleaning function rather than fill the posts departmentally citing a policy shift attributed to changes in banking operations. Because this outsourcing decision was never independently challenged, it stood, and it extinguished the very condition on which the appellants’ continued engagement depended. Rather than terminating long-serving casual workers outright, the restructuring of the underlying work itself dissolved the employee’s along with the post. By the time the Division Bench heard the 2025 appeals, it held that the earlier 2007/2008 orders had already adjudicated.

Compensation and Delayed Justice

 Regularisation would have given the appellants a pension, medical benefits, promotional prospects, and crucially continued income until superannuation. A one-time payment, however large, is a terminal substitute.

 None of this is to say compensation is worthless. Rs20 lakh each is a materially significant, life-altering sum, and the Court’s insistence on interest for delay and personal liability of erring officials for that interest is a genuinely useful enforcement mechanism. But as a systemic remedy for decades of institutionalised casualisation, compensation calculated case-by-case, in peculiar facts and circumstances, explicitly disclaiming precedential value, plausibly should not substitute for either a binding regularisation scheme or statutory reform that removes employers’ incentive to keep essential, perennial work permanently temporary! While salary or lump-sum compensation prevents destitution, it does not cure systemic exploitation. Compensation is at best a consolation, and workers deserve justice, not just money. Compensation does little to restore lost career opportunities, dignity and security.

 “The Appellants have been fighting the legal battles since about three decades, complete justice eluding for one or the other reason,” acknowledged the Orissa High Court in the present case.

This is not unusual. Delay is a common feature of our judicial system. Labour disputes in India typically take somewhere between seven to ten years to reach a final judgment. Pendency of labour disputes in general for long period of time leads to frustration among workers.

The Delhi High Court recently flagged this delay directly, describing the backlog of pending labour matters before constitutional courts as a “sorry state of affairs” in the constitutional courts where the “poor labourers are forced to fight tooth and nail to get justice for themselves”. Reported the Indian Express.

Labour Law in the AI-era

 Tucked into the judgment’s compensation calculus, the Bench doubted the appellants could “eke out their livelihood… in the AI era,” having spent their working lives in menial labour with little education. This, on one level, was an acknowledgment that older, low-skilled workers pushed out of long-term employment have genuinely diminished prospects of re-entering the labour market. But it is worth reading as part of a broader, nascent judicial awareness that automation and technological change will compound the harm of insecure employment for low-skill, manual roles.

A public employer that outsources or automates a function bears a one-time restructuring cost but the displaced worker bears a lifetime cost, often without the education or capital to pivot into new work. The Court’s remark implicitly recognises this asymmetry, even if it does not translate it into a legal standard.

“Perennial nature of work” as a legal test may itself be eroding. Much of the jurisprudence on regularisation and contract labour assumes that if work is genuinely permanent, it should attract permanent labour protections. But work that was perennial for thirty years can be redefined as time-limited or eliminable through outsourcing plus technology, without ever being tested against the perennial nature standard in a contested proceeding.

Indian courts have long tied the right to livelihood, and by extension dignity, to Article 21. It would perhaps be an overreach to describe this as an emerging AI-era jurisprudence. But future litigants representing displaced casual workers in automating sectors like banking, toll collection, municipal sanitation may well cite this observation as an early judicial acknowledgment that technological displacement deserves distinct legal weight. The judges however have made it clear that this order is based on the facts of this case and they do not intend to make it a binding precedent or a Rule of Parity.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this judgement primer has been worked on by Tanishka Shah)

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