The complaint brings together incidents from diverse regions to highlight a recurring pattern rather than isolated excesses. CJP has emphasised that these acts, frequently recorded and circulated on social media, operate as public demonstrations of intimidation that erode constitutional guarantees of equality, dignity, and religious freedom.

Vigilantism and physical violence

One major cluster of incidents documented in the complaint concerns vigilante violence carried out in the name of cow protection, moral policing, or religious assertion. These include assaults on cattle transporters, attacks on vendors selling non-vegetarian food, and instances where individuals were beaten or publicly humiliated while being forced to chant religious slogans. In several cases, the violence was carried out in public spaces and filmed by the perpetrators themselves. Despite the visibility of these acts, information regarding prompt police action against those responsible was often unavailable or unclear at the time of reporting.

Economic intimidation and livelihood disruption

The complaint also highlights repeated instances of economic harassment targeting minority livelihoods. Muslim shopkeepers, street vendors, and contractors were confronted at their places of work, accused of religious or ideological wrongdoing, and pressured to shut down businesses or comply with identity-based demands. Such actions, undertaken without any lawful authority, effectively imposed informal economic boycotts and restrictions on the right to carry on trade, raising concerns about the unequal access to public spaces and livelihoods.

Raids on prayer meetings and religious disruption

Another set of incidents detailed in the complaint involves the disruption of Christian prayer meetings held in private homes and community spaces. Organised groups entered prayer gatherings alleging unlawful religious conversions, leading to intimidation, physical violence, and the destruction of religious texts. In some cases, police action followed complaints made by these groups, resulting in questioning or detention of worshippers rather than action against those who initiated the disruption. CJP has pointed out that such incidents reflect a pattern of interference with the peaceful practice of religion, accompanied by selective enforcement of law.

Identity policing and forced compliance

The complaint further records incidents of coercive identity policing, including demands for documentation, accusations of being “illegal” or “foreign,” and the forced chanting of religious slogans. Elderly individuals, clerics, migrant workers, and vendors were stopped in public spaces and subjected to threats or humiliation when they refused to comply. CJP has noted that these acts function as mechanisms of public intimidation, reinforcing exclusion and fear among targeted communities.

Evictions, demolitions, and state-led actions

In addition to vigilante actions by private actors, the complaint draws attention to large-scale eviction and demolition drives carried out by state authorities that disproportionately affected Muslim communities. While these actions were officially justified on grounds such as encroachment or administrative necessity, the scale of displacement, the manner of execution, and the absence of adequate rehabilitation measures raise serious concerns regarding due process, proportionality, and the protection of vulnerable populations.

What the complaint underscores

In the complaint submitted to the NCM, CJP has underscored that the situation reflected in these incidents is neither episodic nor accidental. As the complaint states:

“The incidents documented herein, when viewed cumulatively, disclose a disturbing and recurring pattern in which private individuals and organised groups assume the role of self-appointed enforcers of law, identity, and morality. These actions, ranging from physical violence and public humiliation to economic coercion, religious disruption, and large-scale displacement, have frequently unfolded in the absence of timely or impartial state intervention. Such patterns risk normalising vigilantism, eroding constitutional guarantees, and fostering an environment of fear and exclusion for minority communities.”

CJP has further pointed out that in several instances, police action appeared to follow pressure or complaints from vigilante groups, while unlawful acts by private actors went unaddressed. This, the complaint argues, not only emboldens vigilante behaviour but also undermines public confidence in the impartial application of law.

What CJP has urged the NCM to do

Through its complaint, CJP has urged the National Commission for Minorities to take cognisance of the pattern emerging from these incidents and to exercise its statutory mandate to seek accountability from state authorities. The complaint calls for the Commission to seek detailed action-taken reports from concerned state governments and district administrations, particularly with regard to the registration of FIRs, investigations conducted, and steps taken to prevent further incidents.

CJP has also urged the Commission to emphasise the obligation of states to ensure impartial enforcement of criminal law, so that victims are not criminalised following vigilante complaints while perpetrators evade accountability. The complaint seeks directions to prevent economic intimidation, protect the right to peaceful religious practice, and ensure that eviction and demolition drives comply with due process and provide adequate rehabilitation.

Reiterating that the complaint is not directed against any religion or community, CJP has stated that its concern lies with the misuse of public platforms, private coercion, and state inaction that threaten constitutional values, communal harmony, and the rule of law. The organisation has urged the NCM to intervene to prevent further normalisation of such conduct and to safeguard the rights of minority communities across the country.

The complaint may be read here:

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Risha Fathima)

Related:

CJP complaints to NCM over alarming surge in hate speech against Bengali-origin Muslims

CJP calls for action by NCM against hate speeches at Dharam Sansad and Trishul Deekha events, files 2 complaints

CJP moves NCM against arms training camps, weapon distribution events in Assam and Rajasthan

CJP complains to NCM over Uttarakhand Muslim exodus; seeks urgent action

CJP moves NCM against Shiladitya Dev for targeting the ‘Miya Muslim’ community of Assam

The post CJP moves National Commission for Minorities over vigilante violence, identity policing, and targeted evictions across states appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The judgment did not come out of thin air. It followed months if not years of ‘instant justice’ enabled by bulldozers, in well-publicized incidents as far back as 2021 in Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Delhi, and Haryana, almost always following communal incidents or protests. Many, most obviously in the named jurisdictions, were occurring at night, without rehabilitation, and impacted Muslim, Dalit, and migrant communities disproportionately.

A year has passed. The question to ask is whether these guidelines changed state practice, or whether bulldozers continued to operate in ways that undermined the rule of law – often ways that reinforced reports that we, at CJP and Sabrang India have already documented.

The Judgment that Promised a Reversal

When it rendered its decision in November 2024, the Supreme Court intended to firmly ground demolition practices within constitutional limits. The Bench reiterated that demolitions cannot occur without a statutory basis and must abide by the basic tenets of due process: individuals should be given a notice tailored specifically to them, an opportunity to respond promptly to the notice, a hearing at which to be heard in a meaningful way, and a speaking order evidencing the administrative rationale.

It also spoke to the absurdity of dealing with rehabilitation as an afterthought, especially when it involves vulnerable communities. While some of these principles had stalked Indian law before the decision, the judgment unified them all in one framework during a time when bulldozer-led punitive state action was becoming more commonplace. It indicated we would be seeing efforts to recalibrate the conduct of state institutions in the following year, while signalling to us that we should expect greater adherence to procedural safeguards.

A Year on the Ground: Patterns of Demolition Post the Gavai-Viswanathan verdict

Although in November 2024, the Supreme Court reiterated that demolition cannot take place without notice, a hearing, or rehabilitation, the next twelve months were characterised by a number of drives across states which showed a decidedly different reality on the ground: Demolitions were limited by varying degrees in reliance of this judgement and occurred in urban renewal, and post-arson and riot punitive acts, as reflected in CJP’s and Sabrang India’s reporting, the list below illustrates how state practice was inconsistent, replicating the very failure of procedures the Court had attempted to rectify.

• March 2025

Prayagraj, Uttar Pradesh

A key legal development in the aftermath of the judgment occurred in Prayagraj when the Supreme Court awarded ₹10 lakh in compensation each to six residents whose homes were demolished without due process. As reported by Sabrang India in “Supreme Court slams Prayagraj demolitions…”, the Supreme Court found that the Prayagraj Development Authority did not adhere to the statutory due process when demolishing the homes, thus confirming the long-held position of the demolished families. While the Supreme Court’s intervention was valuable, it occurred years after the demolitions happened, indicating a trend where judicial relief is only provided after the damage has already been done.

• May 2025

Madrasi Camp, Delhi

In Delhi, the demolition of Madrasi Camp in Jangpura has once again raised questions about whether the municipality is conforming to the Supreme Court’s guidelines. As Sabrang India’s article, “Madrasi Camp demolition: CPIM Delhi demands halt…” states, residents asserted that they did not receive a substantial notice and were neither promised nor consulted about rehabilitation. The demolition was carried out with a significant police force present, raising apprehensions that evictions continued in the capital even after the verdict, without full compliance with procedural requirements.

• April – May 2025 

Chandola Lake, Ahmedabad

Ahmedabad’s anti-encroachment drive around Chandola Lake was one of the biggest demolitions in the post-judgment year. In Sabrang India’s coverage of the same event (“Gujarat HC refuses stay…”), it noted that the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation was clearing structures that were predominantly occupied by Muslim residents, under the Gujarat High Court judgment, as it pertained to reclaiming the lake. Though the recourse to the Gujarat High Court challenged the practice, it did not specifically cease the demolition of the houses, nor addressed the rehabilitation of families or just a simple notice.

• March – April 2025 

Nagpur, Maharashtra

The destruction of Fahim Khan’s home in Nagpur highlighted anxieties over punitive administrative action; residents of Nagpur argued that the short notice period of 24 hours did not provide adequate due process. Sabrang India’s report, “Demolition of Fahim Khan’s home…” noted the demolition was significant in the local political climate and raised even more questions over the motive and process in a post-judgement political landscape.

• January 2025 

Dwarka District Islands, Gujarat

In the Dwarka district, clearance operations ordered by the administration after floods impacted fishing communities and places of religious worship. As Sabrang India reported, houses, community shelters, and several mazars and a dargah were demolished. Residents reported that all notices received came too late to counter the action adequately, which instead made it one of the most significant coastal demolitions this year.

• November 2025 

Gurugram, Haryana

In Haryana, the demolition of a longstanding Dalit settlement located on Old Delhi Road exemplified how marginalized communities are still subjected to abrupt unilateral administrative action after the Supreme Court’s ruling. Residents argued that they had not been given the promises regarding rehabilitation, and that they were not given sufficient opportunity to contest the eviction.

• May 2025 

Ujjain, Madhya Pradesh

In Ujjain, the Ujjain Development Authority initiated a demolition campaign along Mahakal Road. Despite official claims that a notice had been issued months ahead of time, residents affected by the demolition vehemently disputed the timing and sufficiency of the notice. Although the High Court had engaged in surveillance of certain aspects of the proceedings, details of the operation also highlighted the disparity of attention to due process in these matters throughout the state.

• Other States Across 2025 

In addition to these key events, there were many additional demolitions, albeit smaller in scale, that further complicated the patterns of uneven compliance with the judgement safeguards. In Delhi, several slum clusters in Mangolpuri, Seemapuri, and near the Yamuna floodplains were partially demolished from June to September 2025. Residents in these areas contended that municipalities referenced notes in affidavits that had never been served individually to residents. Additionally, in UP, families were told that demolitions after flooding in Prayagraj and Varanasi were justified as “emergency measures.” Families maintained that, especially in Prayagraj, there appeared to be selective enforcement and confusion about categorizing the land as within the floodplain or “vacant.” In Kashmir, demolitions after counter-insurgency operations in the Pulwama region. Although families claimed there were no formal charges against them, the demolitions left families without a home, which drew civil liberties objections. Finally, in Punjab, demolitions associated with NDPS-related investigations were conducted, which resulted in a troubling blurring of the lines between crime-control and punitive administrative action. This suggests that bulldozer governance had begun to arrive in new legal categories, disjointed from purely communal-based incidents.

Cumulatively, these expanded incidents along this timeline show that although some agencies claimed procedural compliance, the reality in most cases still demonstrated the same post-incident demolitions, disputed notices, crude procedure, and inadequate rehabilitation, all features that were squarely inconsistent with the principles reaffirmed in the judgment.

Due Process and Rule of Law: What the Year Revealed

The demolitions conducted across states during the year following the judgment demonstrate how the gap between constitutional protections and public administration remains intact. The Supreme Court upheld the paramount importance of notice, hearing, and rehabilitation, yet in most reported drives the involuntary responses relied on notices that were either insufficiently raised, or disputed, sometimes delivered to affected households on the night before demolition or after machinery had arrived.

Hearings were virtually absent, and affected families were united in reporting that they were not afforded any opportunity to present a defence to an allegation of encroachment or illegality. Rehabilitation – outlined specifically by the Court for vulnerable groups – was rarely planned, and never actualized. The judicial responses, when they occurred, were often post-facto rather than pro-facto: the most direct orders, such as the imposition of the Supreme Court’s admonition of the Prayagraj demolitions, and the Orissa High Court ruling on the Cuttack community centre, came months, if not years, after the demolition. The High Court made efforts to call for affidavits or provide interim stays on demolitions, but without a method of enforcement, these steps amounted to little more than symbolic acknowledgment of demolition abuses. The judiciary did not have a mechanism for monitoring the demolitions or following up on the assurances to protect vulnerable families. In the absence of enforcement and in the absence of a court interceding pro-facto, routine use of bulldozing remains an option for administrative attention.

All of the incidents throughout the year show that while the courts have provided clarity of law, process continues to be treated by executive branch actors as a process of ritual and not of constitutional obligation that depends on and can range from excesses of the political or administrative context of where a demolition occurs to focusing on the time and nature of the demolition process, such as while in progress, an act undertaken to restore public order through law enforcement, through ordinary adjustments, including diminished due process for the loved ones of the deceased.

Judicial vs Executive Approaches: A Deepening Divide

In the year following Gavai, we saw an increasingly divergent distance between judicial statements of due-process standards and the executive branches’ practices of adhering to those standards. Courts certainly exhibited, especially in a few notable cases, a willingness to hold state actors accountable: Justice Abhay Oka’s Supreme Court Bench, for example, not only condemned Prayagraj’s unlawful demolitions, but also awarded damages and called for an inquiry to hold the officials accountable. Further still, the Orissa High Court ordered to recovery from the former officer in the Cuttack community-centre case. What emerged among a few courts was the express judicial acknowledgment that demolitions without notice and hearing were not simply “administrative” violations, but constitutional violations. Courts, however, did go so far as to issue contempt notices, such as was seen in the proceedings following the demolitions of the Goalpara community centre, in Maharashtra, and in Delhi, indicating that litigants and judges were considering the guidelines proposed in the judgement, as enforceable obligations. Exceptionally, of course, given how rarely an executive agency is sanctioned for non-adherence to due-process protections.

For most of the demolitions and drives in Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, and parts of Delhi and Uttar Pradesh, no disciplinary investigations, prosecutions, or public censures were found. In a few cases, officers were transferred soon after a disputed demolition, but these were simply transferred and not punitive. Even when courts demanded accounts from officials or demanded affidavits, the lapses began to fade into the mass of administrative inertia without consistency or follow-up. The unpredictable but frequent comparisons between the court’s occasional harsh language and the executive branch’s nearly total impunity show the central tension of the post-Gavai year: the words could be said and stated clearly from the Bench, but they could easily be replaced by immediate political, policing, or developmental goals on the ground without a structural mechanism to enforce them.

Constitutional Lens: Articles 14, 21, and 300A

The demolitions conducted across states in the post-judgement timeframe repeatedly placed strain on the constitutional protections outlined in Articles 14, 21, and 300A. Article 14 had more visible effects, where enforcement patterns appeared uneven with bulldozers appearing fastest in Muslim-majority bastis, Dalit settlements, migrant clusters, and other communities with precarious housing. The patterns of the law, particularly the selective invocation of laws regarding encroachment, often within hours of community violence, politicians, and other events, suggested that the police powers were used in a discriminatory manner, informed less by planning considerations and more by the social makeup of neighbourhoods.

Article 21, which underpins the right to life and dignity, is equally undermined. Eviction of temporary structures without any notice does more than involve the destruction of premises; it obliterates the social architecture of family life—livelihoods, safety, and considerations of community. Reporting in The Indian Express of demolitions in Nagpur, Ujjain, Prayagraj, and Delhi were made in consideration of families rendered homeless overnight, with a complete lack of accommodation, with implications for precarious living conditions and a vulnerability to other harms, and dispossession, especially without provision for hearing or rehabilitation in cases of demolition, implicitly indicates a constitutional injury.

Article 300A of the Gavai judgment was arguably the most consistently breached. While state authorities cited legislative authority for demolition, the lack of a fair process, advance notice, and transparent decision-making weakened the “authority of law” mandated by the Constitution. The year’s data suggest that, notwithstanding a robust judicial restatement, the constitutional principles that seek to constrain state authority remain tenuous in the face of administrative urgency or political pressure.

When Landmark Judgments Remain Symbolic

The post-judgement reality reflects a larger trend in a defraying Indian constitutionalism, where even the most impactful judgments risk being reduced to mere symbols. The doctrine implemented in D.K. Basu did not stop custodial torture; Tehseen Poonawalla did not stop lynching; Shreya Singhal did not stop the ongoing usage of Section 66A years after its invalidation. Likewise, the decision, which celebrated the re-centering of due process in demolition practice, has not transformed the habitual behaviour of entrenched administratively.

One reason for this is structural: Indian courts, as a general rule, only intervene when something is brought before them, typically well after demolitions have occurred. As a number of petitions noted by LiveLaw in 2025 highlight, families only arrive in court because their homes are gone – effectively turning the judiciary into an after-the-fact remedial body instead of a preventative one. High Courts occasionally interject with some stern words, but even orders with some public interest stay orders only deal with the facts and circumstances of the individual case.

The political context is also important. In electoral and police discourse, bulldozers have gained a symbolic meaning, viewed as a form of “decisive/aggressive governance” against a select section, India’s marginalized, especially Dalits, Adivasis and the Muslim minority. This symbolism lessens the normative weight of judicial reasoning, giving officers the belief that constitutions are secondary to political mobility. In this context, even a decisive and pathbreaking judgment is susceptible to becoming a citation rather than a restraint.

What Will It Take to Replace the Rule of Bulldozer with the Rule of Law?

A significant transition from bulldozer-led governance to rule-of-law-based governance necessitates more than occasional judicial reprimands. It requires institutional mechanisms that facilitate the provision of procedural safeguards before building demolitions occurring, not after the fact. Mandatory reporting protocols, both before demolitions and immediately following demolitions, that include documentation of public notices, hearings, and rehabilitation plans would create a minimal record of accountability. The reports could be subject to audits by judicially appointed committees or independent agencies.

Courts may also be able to use some form of structured monitoring (as exists in certain environmental and prison-reform litigation) of the state parties in future cases. The state government could make periodic affidavits of compliance, with the threat of civil contempt for systemic non-compliance, and the high courts do registry tracking of demolition cases and violations of the judgement framework by the agency.

Furthermore, executive accountability should reach beyond symbolic shifts of power to committees that was entirely outside of the executive altogether; the state approximate automatic inquiries into demolitions that lack documented due process, the recorded public findings, along with other penalties, serve as deterrents. States may also want to consider codifying the norms in Statutes or regulations, or using agency policies, making these administrative actions defined offences for non-compliance. It is also necessary that rehabilitation be planned and adequately funded. Due process will only be administratively seen as part of the professional duty when officers are routinely and predictably held accountable for the compliant or non-compliant forms of their practice.

A Strong Judgment met With Structural Impunity

The judgment in November 2024 reiterated the core constitutional guarantees: no demolition without prior notice, an opportunity for a hearing and a fair process. It was a principled and timely expression of limits on the powers of the state, especially in the moment when bulldozers had been commonly adopted as some form of immediate administrative response. Yet the following year will demonstrate how even strong jurisprudence may wither away in a context of systemic impunity.

Policies of demolition continued across the states, with at times uneven practices or minimal respect for due process. In a great number of cases, the courts provided relief only after homes had been demolished or schools were turned into rubble. What usually accompanied these rulings were strong observations from the Supreme Court and some High Courts, and an order of compensation, but those decisions were usually either limited in nature or retrospective. State agencies suffered virtually no immediate consequences for their actions, and without institutions capable of monitoring enforcement, the guidelines remained aspirational.

The judgement also highlights the growing disconnect between constitutional principles and everyday executive decision-making. Without continued monitoring, transparent accountability, and meaningful legislative frameworks, a robust ruling cannot control entrenched bureaucratic practices. The promise we have enshrined in the Constitution is hanging in doubt so long as the bulldozer can demolish traditional patterns of adherence to due process.

The judgment may be read below –

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Preksha Bothara)

Related: 

Encroachment or erasure? India’s demolition wave and the law

‘An eye for an eye’- new law of the land for the Muslim minorities in India?

Muslims in the new India: How one week showcases their escalating persecution

Bulldozer Justice: How Unlawful Demolitions are Targeting India’s Marginalised Communities

The post When the Rule of the Bulldozer Outpaces the Rule of Law: One year after this landmark judgment appeared first on SabrangIndia.

According to the latest available data, in 2024 alone, a comprehensive survey by India Hate Lab (IHL) documented 1,165 in-person hate-speech events targeting religious minorities across India, marking a 74.4 percent rise from the 668 incidents recorded in 2023. A significant number of these incidents occurred in states governed by the ruling coalition, underlining the geographic and political concentration of communal hate mobilisation. Many of these hate-speech events including rallies, processions, public speeches, and nationalist gatherings were accompanied by social-media amplification, transforming offline aggression into widely visible and shared public spectacle. At the same time, India is entering a high-stakes electoral cycle in 2025–2026, with state assembly elections scheduled in key states such as Delhi, Bihar, Assam, Kerala, West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, and Puducherry. This convergence of rising hate speech, online amplification and election-era mobilisation has created a volatile environment in which ordinary citizens increasingly act as self-appointed enforcers of identity and morality, often targeting religious minorities under the guise of vigilante zeal. Reported NDTV.

These dynamics now play out not only through speeches or online rhetoric, but through direct interference in everyday life. Across markets, highways, neighbourhoods, schools and private homes, civilians have increasingly taken on roles that mimic policing functions. They stop individuals from demanding proof of citizenship or religious identity, supervise what businesses may sell or display, disrupt prayer gatherings inside homes or churches, compel public chanting of religious slogans, and enforce boycotts against minority traders. In several cases, these acts escalate into physical violence, public humiliation, or forced displacement. The presence of cameras and mobile phones has added another layer to the intimidation; confrontations are recorded and circulated as proof of ideological performance, converting harassment into spectacle. Police responses frequently blur the line between enforcement and endorsement, with officers either standing by during mob action, detaining victims after vigilante complaints, or acting only once public pressure mounts. Within this landscape, the distinction between civilian vigilantism and state authority weakens, leaving targets without clear avenues of protection while aggressors operate with growing confidence that their actions fall within tolerated political behaviour.

The incidents documented across states fall broadly into six categories: vigilante violence; economic harassment and boycott; raids on prayer meetings; identity policing and forced slogans; evictions and demolitions; and patterns of state response and police complicity.

Vigilante violence

Across states, groups identifying themselves as cow-protection or majoritarian outfits have moved from episodic intimidation to repeated physical enforcement on public roads, markets and transit routes. These actions take several common forms. Perpetrators intercept transporters and vendors, they detain and humiliate people on the spot, they physically assault those who resist, and they record and circulate the confrontation to amplify the act. The incidents collected here show that such attacks are not isolated. They recur in different states, follow similar scripts, and often end with victims being punished while perpetrators face little immediate consequence.

In Maharashtra on September 24, 2025, two cattle transporters – one Hindu and one Muslim – were intercepted and assaulted; a later video shows the victims forced to apologise as their cattle were taken away. In Sambhajinagar on November 10, 2025, a vigilante named Shobhraj Patil is recorded slapping and kicking a Muslim cattle transporter and verbally abusing others who were made to sit on the ground; other Bajrang Dal members restrained Patil only after the violence escalated. On November 12, 2025, In Balikuda, Jagatsinghpur, members of the Bajrang Dal and Hindu Sena entered a Muslim neighbourhood armed with sticks and, following their complaint, police confiscated meat for “investigation”; there is no contemporaneous record of action against the groups that forced entry.

Vigilante attacks also target traders. On November 2, 2025 in Ludhiana, Gau Raksha Dal members raided a biryani shop on beef allegations, detained the owner and handed him to police. In Hisar on November 4, 2025, a Bajrang Dal activist identified by local reporting assaulted a meat vendor for opening on a Tuesday and forced the vendor to chant “Jai Shri Ram,” an episode that was filmed and circulated – The Tribune reported. In Indore on November 10, 2025, Members of the Bajrang Dal assaulted a Muslim gym trainer after seeing him driving with a Hindu woman, accusing him of “luring” Hindu women. Despite the woman defending him and no formal complaint being lodged by her, the police allegedly transferred the case between police stations citing jurisdiction issues and ultimately sent the gym trainer to jail under restrictive legal sections. No reported police action against the vigilante attackers was available at the time of documentation.

The interplay between vigilante coercion and state action is evident in Damoh, Madhya Pradesh. On November 2, 2025, following pressure from far-right groups and cow vigilantes, police publicly paraded nine Muslim men accused of cow slaughter, despite statements from local butchers that the animal involved was a buffalo. In the local butcher market, vigilantes allegedly attacked with sticks while accusing traders of cow slaughter, leading to clashes. Police action was taken only against the Muslim men, who were jailed under provisions of the Animal Cruelty Act, even as officials later described the slaughtered animal as a buffalo calf. No action against the vigilante attackers was reported at the time of documentation. That sequence shows how vigilante pressure can shape law enforcement responses and how public parading becomes a tool of humiliation rather than a neutral investigatory procedure.

Legally these incidents implicate offences such as assault, criminal intimidation, trespass and unlawful assembly. These attacks also raise serious constitutional concerns about arbitrary deprivation of liberty when arrests follow vigilante complaints rather than independent police inquiry. The recorded habit of filming and broadcasting confrontations converts private violence into public spectacle, and that publicity frequently insulates perpetrators by forcing rapid public narratives that favour the aggressors. Across the documented cases, police responses range from delayed intervention to actions that appear to prioritise complaints lodged by vigilante groups rather than protecting those they have attacked. That pattern underlines why vigilante violence in the present period cannot be treated as random crime. It must be understood as a coordinated set of practices that enforce ideological norms through force, humiliation and selective use of formal law enforcement.

Harassment, Economic Intimidation and Boycott

Across multiple states, economic life has become a stage for enforcing majoritarian identity rules. Markets, roadside stalls and ordinary workplaces have turned into sites where Hindutva groups and sympathisers dictate who may trade, which foods may be sold, what symbols may be displayed and how Muslim vendors must present themselves in order to remain in business. These interventions do not involve claims of law and order. They operate through intimidation, accusations of deception and appeals to communal purity, all of which seek to restrict the economic presence of Muslims in public spaces. The incidents recorded here show that harassment often comes first, followed by pressure on police or local authorities to legitimise the exclusion.

In Ludhiana on November 2 2025, members of the Gau Raksha Dal stormed a biryani shop, accused the shopkeeper of selling beef and detained him before handing him to police. The manner of the raid reflects a broader trend in which Hindutva groups conduct their own inspections and arrests, treating Muslim-run establishments as inherently suspect while assuming the authority to punish on the spot. Police treatment of the incident focused on the allegation of beef sale rather than the unlawful detention and intimidation carried out by the vigilantes.

Economic policing is even more overt in Dehradun, where on November 14 2025, Kali Sena leaders publicly confronted a Muslim contractor who managed a dry-fruit stall. The men accused him of engaging in what they termed “mungfali jihad,” claiming that Hindu vendors and a calendar displaying a Hindu deity were being used to deceive customers. The language deployed in the confrontation draws directly from Hindutva propaganda that imagines Muslim economic activity as a covert threat. No action was taken on the leaders who staged the intimidation, although the harassment was filmed and circulated.

In Mapusa, Goa, on  October 3, 2025 far-right men harassed a Muslim shopkeeper and his staff, insisting that they present themselves as visibly Muslim by adopting green colour, changing their names and refraining from touching the picture of a Hindu deity displayed in the shop. That episode shows how Hindutva surveillance extends into everyday bodily behaviour and demands that Muslims perform identity as perceived by majoritarian norms. The threats were issued in the presence of staff and customers, yet there is no record of police intervention.

In Delhi’s Gokulpuri area on November 27, 2025, Hindu nationalist supporters forcibly shut down meat shops on the grounds that a temple was nearby. The idea that Muslim vendors should not operate in proximity to Hindu religious sites has become a recurring argument in Hindutva campaigns that seek to push Muslims out of mixed localities. The forced closures left vendors without income for the day and reinforced the message that their right to livelihood is conditional on the whims of majoritarian groups rather than equal protection under law.

These incidents illustrate a pattern in which economic activity becomes an arena for enforcing communal boundaries. They reflect a deliberate strategy within Hindutva politics to curtail Muslim economic visibility and participation. The absence of police action against harassers and the willingness of authorities to act on vigilante complaints further institutionalise these informal boycotts. Through repeated intimidation and public humiliation, these groups attempt to reshape markets into spaces that mirror and reinforce majoritarian social control.

Raids on Prayer Meetings and the Criminalisation of Christian Worship

Across several states, Christian prayer gatherings have become one of the most visible targets of Hindutva surveillance, reflecting a climate in which routine worship is increasingly cast as suspicious activity. Civil society reports show that the portrayal of Christians as agents of coercive conversion has become a central plank of Hindutva mobilisation, creating an atmosphere where even small home-based gatherings are vulnerable to intrusion and violence. This narrative has normalised vigilante entry into private spaces and produced situations where state institutions appear more responsive to the allegations of disruptors than to the rights of Christians who are attacked.

The incidents documented here show three recurring elements. Hindutva groups repeatedly enter private houses to disrupt worship, often accompanied by assault or the burning of religious books, as seen in Rohtak where, November 9, 2025 Christian participants were beaten and their Bibles burnt. These forced entries are justified through claims of “illegal conversion,” a narrative that has gained wide circulation in political speeches and local mobilisation campaigns, reinforcing the idea that Christian worship should be monitored rather than protected. The allegations themselves become tools that shift suspicion onto victims, making the act of prayer appear as evidence of wrongdoing.

A second pattern emerges through state response. In Rohtak, police allegedly questioned the victims rather than the perpetrators and later monitored their calls, reflecting a deeper institutional assumption that those who pray are the ones who require investigation rather than protection. This inversion of victim and accused also appears in Uttar Pradesh, where on November 16, 2025 members of the Bajrang Dal raided a Christian prayer meeting, alleging that illegal religious conversions were taking place. They claimed that poor Hindu women were being offered money to convert to Christianity. Following their complaint, police reached the location and arrested three individuals on charges related to unlawful religious conversion. No action against the vigilante group was reported. Similar patterns have been documented nationally wherever anti-conversion rhetoric is deployed to justify interference in Christian worship.

A third pattern concerns how the state frames these incidents. When on November 8, 2025 Hindu nationalist groups confronted a Christian gathering in Korba, Chhattisgarh, the disruption escalated into clashes after outsiders entered the residence and accused attendees of conversion. Official accounts framed the situation as a two-sided confrontation, obscuring the fact that the meeting was peaceful until disrupted. This framing aligns with rhetorical strategies that recast minority communities as sources of instability, even when they are the ones targeted.

In Agra, on November 23, 2025 members of the VHP–Bajrang Dal raided a private Christian prayer meeting and filed complaints alleging inducement to convert. Police detained a man and several women for questioning but did not act against the raiding group, entrenching the perception that majoritarian actors can intrude upon religious spaces with impunity. This is consistent with research showing that police often absorb the assumptions of vigilantes, reinforcing structural bias in how minority religious practice is policed.

Taken together, these episodes reveal a pattern in which prayer is treated as potential evidence, faith is framed as a threat and Christian worship becomes subject to the approval of hostile majoritarian actors. Hindutva groups position themselves as regulators of religious life, while police responses often validate their claims through investigation of the victims and neglect of the perpetrators. The result is a message that Christian communities can neither rely on privacy in their own homes nor on equal protection from the state.

Forced Slogans and Identity Policing

A striking feature of the current wave of communal hostility is the policing of Muslim identity in everyday spaces. These incidents do not involve allegations of crime or conversion. They revolve around humiliation, coercion and the demand that Muslims publicly affirm majoritarian slogans as proof of loyalty. National reports show that such practices have increased alongside online hate campaigns that dehumanise Muslims and frame them as permanent outsiders requiring discipline. The pattern is not incidental. It reflects a deliberate cultural project in which asserting Hindu nationalist symbols becomes a test of citizenship.

The confrontation of a Muslim fruit vendor on October 25, 2025 in Doimukh, Arunachal Pradesh, where locals accused him of being Bangladeshi and demanded NRC documentation, illustrates how identity policing collapses into racial profiling and suspicion of illegality. Research shows that “Bangladeshi” rhetoric has frequently been used to target Bengali-speaking Muslims, turning documentation status into a tool of exclusion . The vendor was forced to close his stall despite no official verification, demonstrating how communal assumptions override legal process.

Forced sloganeering further reveals the psychological dimension of this violence. In Uttarakhand, a Muslim cleric was stopped on the road and threatened when he refused to chant “Jai Shri Ram,” a moment intended to remind him of his vulnerability in public space. India Today reported that in UP, on November 25, 2025 an elderly Muslim cab driver, Mohammad Rais, was harassed near the Taj Mahal parking area by a group of young men who demanded that he chant “Jai Shri Ram.” When he initially refused, the men threatened him. The incident was filmed and later circulated on social media. Local police at Tajganj Police Station registered an FIR and said they are investigating the video evidence, though no arrests had been made at the time of the report.

Identity policing functions as a low-threshold form of violence. It does not require large groups or organised campaigns. It relies on the everyday assertion of dominance, the demand for symbolic compliance and the threat of punishment for refusal. These incidents demonstrate how Hindu nationalist mobilisation penetrates ordinary life. The pressure to chant slogans, produce documents or justify one’s presence signals a shift in which Muslim identity is treated as suspicious unless actively performed in ways that satisfy majoritarian expectations.

Evictions and Demolitions as Instruments of Displacement.

The most far-reaching form of exclusion documented in this period appears in state-led eviction and demolition drives. These actions are carried out through legal and administrative mechanisms, yet their impact falls overwhelmingly on Muslim communities, raising questions about selective enforcement and the absence of safeguards. Research on eviction patterns in Assam and Gujarat has shown that state narratives of encroachment often overlap with political rhetoric that casts certain communities as illegitimate occupants.

In Goalpara, Assam, more than 580 Bengali-origin Muslim families were displaced during a large-scale eviction operation in the Dahikata Reserve Forest on 9 November (Incident 17). Officials stated that the drive was aimed at addressing human-elephant conflict and was conducted pursuant to Gauhati High Court directions, and notices were reportedly issued fifteen days earlier. Heavy machinery entered the area under substantial police presence and demolished remaining structures. No immediate rehabilitation or resettlement measures were announced, leaving hundreds without shelter. Protests were minimal and swiftly contained, with some residents detained. Reporting from the region CNN has noted that eviction drives disproportionately affect Bengali-origin Muslim settlements and often lack clear post-eviction planning.

The Wire reported that in Gujarat’s Gir Somnath district, demolitions on 10 November focused on Muslim-owned homes, shops and a dargah (Incident 18). While several structures were removed without resistance, the attempt to demolish the dargah triggered confrontation. Residents opposed the demolition, leading to clashes with police who used crowd-control measures to disperse them. No rehabilitation measures were reported for those who lost homes or commercial property. Coverage from previous years shows a sustained pattern of demolitions in the region that disproportionately target Muslim religious structures.

A second demolition sequence that same day saw tensions escalate further when locals attempted to prevent the removal of another dargah near the Somnath Temple area. Police responded with lathi charges and tear gas and arrested thirteen people who were later paraded publicly (Incident 19). Authorities described all demolished structures as illegal constructions on government land. Details of any resettlement process were absent.

These cases demonstrate how eviction functions not only as an administrative measure but also as a tool of dispossession when applied without safeguards or rehabilitation. The selective concentration of demolition activity in Muslim neighbourhoods reinforces perceptions that state power is being deployed unevenly.

State Complicity and Biased Policing

CNN reported that across multiple states, the line between vigilante activity and state response becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish. The incidents documented here show repeated patterns in which police act on the allegations of vigilante groups while neglecting the rights of the victims. Human rights analyses have noted that policing in communal situations often reflects underlying majoritarian assumptions, leading to disproportionate scrutiny of minorities and minimal accountability for aggressors. This dynamic is visible in cases involving Christians, Muslims and those accused of violating religious norms.

In Rohtak, Haryana, on November 9, 2025 police reportedly interrogated Christian victims after an Arya Samaj group assaulted them, burnt their Bibles and injured a pastor during a prayer meeting. Rather than treating the attack as a criminal intrusion into a private residence, officers shifted attention onto the victims and monitored their phones. This reflects a broader pattern identified by rights organisations, where anti-conversion rhetoric shapes police behaviour and legitimises scrutiny of Christian gatherings.

In Uttar Pradesh, on November 23, 2025 police acted on the complaint of Bajrang Dal members who raided a Christian prayer meeting and alleged inducement to convert, arresting three attendees while declining to take action against the vigilantes. The same reversal appears in Agra, on November 20, 2025 where VHP and Bajrang Dal members entered a private home to disrupt another Christian meeting. Police detained a man and several women for questioning, again treating the accused vigilantes as complainants rather than aggressors.

In Madhya Pradesh, state complicity took a more punitive form. In Damoh, on November 2, 2025 police publicly paraded nine Muslim men after allegations of cow slaughter, even though local butchers stated that the animal was a buffalo and not a cow. No action was taken against the vigilantes who attacked the butcher market. In Indore, on November 10, 2025 a Muslim gym trainer assaulted by Bajrang Dal members was jailed despite the Hindu woman involved not filing any complaint, while no action was initiated against the attackers.

These incidents show how policing becomes aligned with vigilante narratives. When state institutions absorb the assumptions of majoritarian groups, minority communities lose access to impartial protection. The result is not simply inadequate investigation but a structural failure in which victims are recast as suspects and unlawful violence becomes socially sanctioned through official inaction.

Legal Framework: Constitutional Protections, Criminal Law and Supreme Court Guidelines

The incidents documented in this report engage multiple areas of Indian law, including constitutional guarantees, criminal prohibitions under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), procedural obligations under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) and binding Supreme Court directives on mob vigilantism. At their core, these cases reflect violations of the rights to equality, non-discrimination, personal liberty and religious freedom under Articles 14, 15, 19, 21 and 25 of the Constitution. Article 25 protects the right to freely profess and practice one’s faith, which extends to prayer meetings held in private homes or neighbourhood spaces. Evictions and demolitions without rehabilitation trigger concerns under Article 21 and the prohibition against arbitrary state action.

As per a report in the LiveLaw Under the new BNS, many of the acts witnessed here constitute clear criminal offences. Assault and causing hurt are covered under Sections 124 and 125, which penalise physical injury regardless of motive. Criminal intimidation is defined under Section 351, which applies to threats used to instil fear or force compliance. Forced entry into homes, including raids on Christian prayer meetings, falls within the definition of criminal trespass under Sections 329 and 330. The public parading of detainees undermines the constitutional guarantee of dignity and violates custodial safeguards linked to Article 21, which has been repeatedly upheld in Supreme Court jurisprudence.

Communal incitement and hate speech are addressed under Section 194 of the BNS, which criminalises acts that promote enmity between groups or deliberately provoke violence on grounds such as religion or race. This provision is directly relevant to forced slogans, threats and the circulation of humiliating videos, which mirror the trends identified in recent national analyses of hate speech escalation.

Procedurally, the BNSS continues to require prompt registration of FIRs, impartial investigation and accountability for dereliction of duty by law enforcement. These duties operate alongside the Supreme Court’s directives in Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India (2018), which remain binding. The Court mandated state responsibility to prevent mob violence, protect targeted communities, arrest perpetrators and discipline officers who fail to act. The recurring inaction or reversal of attention onto victims in the incidents documented here reflects clear non-compliance with these obligations.

Targeted demolitions and evictions further implicate constitutional protections. The Supreme Court in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation held that the right to life includes the right to shelter and that demolitions carried out without due process violate Article 21. The lack of rehabilitation reported in Assam and Gujarat contradicts these principles. Rights groups have noted that demolition and eviction in these regions disproportionately affect Muslim communities and often mirror political narratives of encroachment or demographic threat.

Taken together, the constitutional framework, the BNS and BNSS, and Supreme Court jurisprudence make clear that the acts described here violate established protections and statutory duties. The failure to act against vigilantes, the criminalisation of victims and the use of demolition powers without due process point not to isolated lapses but to structural disregard for the rule of law.

Conclusion

Taken together, the incidents documented across these states reveal a common pattern in which ordinary citizens, vigilante networks and state institutions participate in the policing of minority identity and belonging. What appears on the surface as scattered episodes of harassment, forced slogans, raids on prayer meetings or localised demolition drives becomes, in aggregate, a system of pressure that constrains the everyday freedoms of Muslims and Christians. National analyses of hate speech and communal mobilisation show that this pattern is not accidental but reflects a wider political environment in which minorities are cast as security risks, demographic threats or ideological adversaries. This environment encourages vigilantism by signalling that such conduct aligns with majoritarian expectations.

The unevenness of state response reinforces these pressures. Police often act on the allegations of vigilante groups while questioning, detaining or monitoring the victims. Eviction drives in Assam and demolition actions in Gujarat further illustrate how administrative power, when exercised without safeguards, produces large-scale dispossession that disproportionately affects Muslim communities. These practices undermine constitutional principles of equal protection and due process and violate the standards set by the Supreme Court in Tehseen Poonawalla, which requires proactive prevention of mob violence and accountability for official inaction.

As per a report in CNBC TV 18 a potential institutional response has emerged through Karnataka’s Hate Speech and Hate Crimes (Prevention) Bill, 2025, which for the first time proposes a clear statutory framework for defining hate speech and penalising organised intimidation. The Bill prescribes penalties of one to seven years for initial convictions, up to ten years for aggravated offences and empowers authorities to direct digital platforms to remove hate content. While some view this as a needed attempt to address escalating violence, its effectiveness will depend on impartial enforcement. Without structural reforms that ensure equal protection for minority victims, even progressive legal tools risk becoming instruments of selective repression.

The incidents in this report therefore point not only to unlawful actions by private actors but to a weakening of constitutional guarantees in everyday life. Restoring trust in the rule of law requires consistent action against vigilantism, accountability for discriminatory policing and a commitment to protecting the right of every community to live, worship and work without fear.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Risha Fathima)

Related:

Faith Under Fire: Coordinated Harassment of Christians After the Rajasthan Bill

Targeted as ‘Bangladeshis’: The Hate Speech Fuelling Deportations

The Architecture of Polarisation: A Structural Analysis of Communal Hate Speech as a Core Electoral Strategy in India (2024–2025)

Sanatan Ekta Padyatra: Unmasking the March of Majoritarianism

The post Documenting a national pattern of vigilantism & targeted action against minorities appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The Government presents the Codes as a modernisation that eases compliance, simplifies regulatory processes and boosts investment. From an industry perspective, consolidation reduces administrative burden and litigation risk, enhancing flexibility. However, labour unions and many policy analysts contend that these reforms prioritise employer interests, weaken worker protections, and ignore the realities of India’s heavily informal workforce. This paper critically examines the Code on Wages, Industrial Relations Code, Code on Social Security, and Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions Code, analysing their likely impact on workers, employers, unions, and labour rights. All the codes have been embedded at the end of this analysis for easy reference.

Understanding the Four Labour Codes

• The Code on Wages, 2019

The Code on Wages replaces four earlier laws — Minimum Wages Act, 1948, Payment of Wages Act, 1936, Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 and the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976 — into a unified wage framework. At first glance, this rationalisation is welcome: it removes the peculiar fragmentation wherein only certain “scheduled employments” were entitled to minimum wage protection, leaving vast sectors uncovered.

Its most noted provision is the establishment of a National Floor Wage, below which no state can fix minimum wages. In theory, this should reduce inter-state disparities. However, the Code does not mandate that states must revise their minimum wages upward if their current rates slightly exceed the national floor. Many states already have minimum wages far higher than earlier floor-level recommendations; thus, unless the national floor is set ambitiously, something economists have long urged, it will have little meaning.

The Code also introduces a uniform definition of “wages”, attempting to address the inconsistencies across earlier laws. Critically, this definition includes basic pay and dearness allowance but excludes a list of allowances. If exclusions exceed 50% of total remuneration, the excess counts back into wages. While this aims to prevent employers from artificially restructuring wages to avoid statutory contributions, it remains complex in practice and will likely generate future litigation.

Moreover, enforcement has been significantly weakened. Earlier, workers could approach labour courts directly for wage-related grievances. The new system shifts much of the enforcement to inspectors-cum-facilitators and administrative mechanisms, reducing avenues for judicial redress. In a country where workers face stigma, fear, and lack of access to representation, administrative barriers often function as substantive barriers.

• Industrial Relations Code, 2020

The Industrial Relations (IR) Code arguably represents the most transformative and contentious reform. It combines the Trade Unions Act 1926, Industrial Disputes Act 1947, and Standing Orders Act 1946, governing everything from unionisation and dispute resolution to layoffs and closures.

The most controversial shift is the increase in the threshold for layoffs and closures from 100 to 300 workers. Units employing fewer than 300 workers no longer need prior government permission to terminate or retrench employees. This is not a minor change; it effectively removes a layer of job security for workers in medium-sized establishments, a sector which accounts for a large share of India’s organised workforce.

Proponents argue that rigid labour laws have suppressed the growth of labour-intensive industries, forcing firms to remain small to avoid crossing the regulatory threshold. They insist that increased flexibility will encourage larger hiring. But India’s own experience, and that of countries like Bangladesh and Vietnam, suggests that labour protections alone do not determine employment growth; infrastructure, productivity, skill development, and stable markets play a far more decisive role.

The IR Code also tightens procedures around strikes. The new rules require workers to provide extended notice in all industrial establishments, and prohibit strikes during conciliation proceedings and arbitration. Taken together, this significantly curtails the traditional bargaining power of unions. With union density already low in the private sector, critics argue that the Code further shifts the power imbalance in favour of employers.

The introduction of fixed-term employment — contracts with a defined duration but parity in benefits — adds another layer of flexibility. While it technically ensures equal benefits, the ability to not renew a contract provides employers a way to bypass protections against arbitrary dismissals. Without strong union presence or dispute-resolution mechanisms, many workers may experience heightened precarity.

• Code on Social Security, 2020

The Social Security Code replaces nine statutes, such as the Employees’ State Insurance Act, Provident Funds Act, Maternity Benefit Act and the Unorganised Workers’ Social Security Act, into one framework intended to extend welfare benefits across India’s vast workforce — including organised, unorganised, gig and platform workers.

The Code on Social Security puts in place suitable welfare arrangements for unorganised workers, like health and maternity benefits, education, etc. [Section 109(1)] as well as provident fund, gratuity, housing, old-age homes, funeral assistance, etc [Section 109 (2)]. However, it makes the registration of such unorganised workers, including gig workers, compulsory. Such registration is also subject to submission of the Aadhaar details of the workers under Section 113 (2)(1)-

shall make an application for registration in such form along with such documents including Aadhaar number as may be prescribed by the Central Government and such worker shall be assigned a distinguishable number to his application

Yet, recognition alone does not guarantee actual coverage. Registration under the Code requires Aadhaar-based identification, which has been criticised for excluding those without stable documentation, particularly migrant workers and those on the margins of the digital ecosystem. Several constitutional arguments have been raised against making Aadhaar a mandatory precondition for accessing statutory benefits, but the Code nevertheless embeds this requirement.

Moreover, the Code leaves most of the substantive welfare provisions to be framed through future schemes. This skeletal drafting has drawn criticism for shifting the real decision-making power from Parliament to the executive. Funding responsibilities between states and the Centre are vaguely articulated, leaving scope for jurisdictional friction and uneven implementation. Another issue arises for the gig workers. While the gig workers are a part of a larger subset of unorganised workers, the SSC 2020 lays down separate provisions for the gig workers, making the provisions applying to such workers confusing. Gig workers, in particular, are recognised as a category but remain non-employees in the eyes of the law.

• Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions Code, 2020

The OSH Code merges 13 different laws on factories, mines, construction, contract labour, inter-state migrant workers and more, aiming for uniform workplace safety standards. It increases formalisation by allowing a single registration for establishments working across sectors, and in principle extends certain safety and welfare protections to gig/platform workers as well. However, as with the Social Security Code, most operational details are delegated to subordinate rule-making.

One notable change is the relaxation of restrictions on women working at night. While framed as a progressive step toward gender equality, the Code requires that states ensure adequate safety conditions. Critics point out that without strong monitoring mechanisms, this provision could expose women to vulnerabilities in poorly regulated industries such as hospitality, manufacturing, and gig-based delivery. Moreover, the Occupational Safety and Health Code, 2020, while bringing together various labour laws, fails to incorporate specific measures to safeguard women from violence and harassment comprehensively.

The OSH Code also does not adequately address India’s longstanding compliance problems. The earlier Factories Act mandated facilities like crèches and sanitation, but enforcement remained abysmally weak. Merely codifying these rights in a consolidated law does not guarantee their realisation without institutional strengthening.

Do the New Labour Codes Strengthen Labour Rights?

The central claim of the Government is that legal consolidation promotes clarity, reduces duplication and enhances compliance. But the deeper question is whether this simplification translates into strengthened labour rights or whether it functions as an understated pathway to employer-centred deregulation. Across the Codes, several concerns persist:

Weakening of Unions and Collective Bargaining: The expanded notice requirements for strikes, and the constraints placed on union recognition and dispute resolution, have raised alarms about the shrinking space for collective bargaining. In a labour market already skewed in favour of employers, these restrictions deepen the imbalance.

Ease of Retrenchment: Raising the threshold for retrenchment permission to 300 workers enables employers to terminate workers more easily. Economic studies show that greater job insecurity often pushes workers into informal or precarious employment, undermining long-term industrial stability.

Ambiguous Social Security for Gig Workers: Recognition without rights creates a misleading sense of inclusion. Gig workers remain outside traditional employer-employee frameworks, and the Code does not mandate contributions that would secure pensions, provident funds or health insurance for them.

Dilution of Safety Standards: By shifting critical provisions to future rules, the OSH Code risks weakening existing protections — especially in sectors with historically high accident rates such as construction and mining.

Skeletal Legislative Frameworks:  All four Codes defer substantial amounts of lawmaking to delegated legislation. This centralises power in the executive and sidelines parliamentary oversight. Critics argue that this makes workers’ rights contingent on administrative discretion rather than statutory guarantees.

Constitutional Concerns: Questions arise under: Article 14 (differential treatment of workers based on establishment size, potentially arbitrary), Article 16 (fairness in employment procedures), Article 19(1) (c) (restrictions on forming associations and unions) and Article 21 (dignity and security of livelihood). While not necessarily unconstitutional, the Codes open space for litigation and judicial scrutiny.

Overlapping and Confusing Jurisdictions

The Delhi High Court on December 11, 2025, noted that The Industrial Relations Code, 2020, was brought in without repealing the previous 3 laws- Trade Unions Act, 1926, Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the Industrial Employment (Standing Order) Act, 1946. As reported in Bar and Bench.

There has also been a great deal of opposition from the labour unions with regard to the judicial recourse available to the working class. All cases pending in the Labour Courts and Industrial tribunals under the Industrial Disputes Act,1947 have now been transferred to special tribunals under the new code. These tribunals have, however, not yet been put in place. This raises much doubts on the effectiveness of these tribunals.

In terms of the jurisdiction, there is an overlap between the Centre and the State Governments. While the boundaries are clearly demarcated between the central and the state governments under Section 109(1) and Section 109(2) of the OSH Code, what it does not specify is the implementation authority. Another point of contention is that of the fund allocation between the states. Till the time these issues are clarified and sorted out, no progress of any sort could be made.

Challenges in Implementation

Even the best-designed labour laws fail without effective implementation — and here, the Codes face formidable challenges. One bigger question that comes is up:  how well the government has resources and infrastructure for the electronic registration of unorganised workers, gig workers, and platform employees.?  A report by Mehrotra and Sarkar in EPW also point out that the current OSH Code does not take into account the high proportion of unregistered establishments (67.7 percent) in the unorganised sector, instead stating that ‘every establishment to which the code applies’ must be registered.

A major concern is the transition from labour inspectors to “Inspector-cum-Facilitators”, which shifts the enforcement philosophy from deterrence to self-certification and advisory compliance. Critics argue that replacing surprise inspections with web-based randomised checks significantly dilutes state oversight, especially in sectors notorious for exploitation such as construction, textiles, and mining. This new framework assumes that employers will voluntarily comply with safety and welfare norms; an assumption that may not hold in an economy where informalisation is widespread and labour violations are systemic.

Migrant workers, who make up a large share of India’s workforce, face particular vulnerabilities under the new regime. While the Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions Code promises better registration and portability of benefits, the on-ground mechanisms required to operationalise these guarantees remain weak. The experience of the pandemic, when millions of migrant workers were left without income, shelter, or social protection, demonstrates the fragility of India’s labour governance system and raises serious questions about whether the Codes can be meaningfully enforced without substantial administrative strengthening.

Ultimately, the effectiveness of the Codes will depend not only on legislative intent but on the capacity of state labour departments, the willingness of employers to comply, and the ability of workers, especially those in informal and precarious sectors, to access grievance redressal mechanisms. Without significant investment in personnel, digital infrastructure, and awareness-building, the promise of simplification may translate into weaker protections and heightened precarity for millions of Indian workers.

Conclusion

The consolidation of labour laws into four comprehensive Codes was an enormous legislative undertaking, long recommended by commissions and economic advisors. Again, like the much-opposed erstwhile Farm laws (that were subsequently withdrawn because of intense agitation by India’s famer organisations (2020-2021), the Labour Codes have been brought in near unilaterally without effective debate, deliberations and discussions either with sake holder Worker’s Unions or Parliament. On paper, simplification seems beneficial. But simplification that simultaneously erodes substantive rights, weakens collective bargaining, and defers essential protections to executive rule-making demands scrutiny.

India’s economy does need labour reform. It needs modernisation, expanded social security, and flexible frameworks that encourage job creation. But reform must not come at the cost of workers’ security, dignity and constitutional rights.

Central to any step forward must remain the rights, welfare and accountability due to India’s marginalised workforce. While the Labour Codes attempt to position themselves as a new social contract for India’s workforce, several provisions remain vague. Most concerning is the push-back on a rights-based approach with constitutional provisions of judicial review to restricting redressal to tribunals etc. Finally, whether they become meaningful instruments of empowerment, or mechanisms that accelerate employer-centred deregulation, will depend on how the rules are drafted, how states implement them, and whether the opinions, concerns and voices of workers and unions are meaningfully included in shaping the next phase of India’s labour landscape.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Shyamli Pengoriya)

Code on Wages may be read here:

Industrial Relations Code may be read here:

Code on Social Security may be read here:

Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions Code may be read here:

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Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP), along with women’s rights groups, constitutional lawyers, and minority rights organisations, has repeatedly cautioned that such laws—already operational in several BJP-ruled states—have functioned less as safeguards against coercion and more as tools for communal profiling, moral policing, and the criminalisation of adult consensual relationships. Maharashtra is now being pushed to replicate a model that is not only deeply abusive in practice but also under active constitutional challenge before the Supreme Court of India.

It is essential to note that previously, the Maharashtra Government had issued a Government resolution on December 13, 2022, following the gruesome murder of Shraddha Walkar in Delhi allegedly by her inter-faith live-in partner, forming a committee to provide a platform to ‘counsel, communicate and resolve’ issues between couples and families. According to the GR, the committee can seek information of both registered and unregistered marriages. Furthermore, the committee can intervene at the behest of any person, which the plea alleges is a breach of the couple’s privacy “especially when two consenting adults are married to each other”. A challenge against the same, filed by CJP, remains pending in the Bombay High Court. Details of the petition may be read here.

A state-wide, synchronized campaign- Event by event

The scale and coordination of the recent mobilisations are striking. On November 27, in Jalgaon, the Hindu Janajagruti Samiti organised an ‘Anti–Love Jihad’ protest where speakers openly demanded that the Maharashtra Chief Minister ensure the passage of an anti-conversion law in the upcoming winter session of the Assembly. The demand was framed as a matter of urgency and inevitability. Organisers claimed support from over 35 organisations, cited more than 300 citizen statements, and referenced a petition purportedly carrying 15,000 signatures—figures repeatedly invoked to manufacture the impression of overwhelming public consensus.

As the Assembly session approached, the campaign intensified. On December 5, in Amravati, far-right organisations led by the Hindu Janajagruti Samiti submitted a memorandum to the District Collector, addressed to the Chief Minister and Deputy Chief Minister, demanding a ‘strict’ law against the alleged conspiracy of ‘love jihad’. A signature campaign claiming the support of over 3,000 citizens accompanied the submission, making explicit that the objective was legislative pressure during the session rather than redressal of any specific grievance.

On December 7, protests were held across multiple districts. In Dapoli, Ratnagiri, far-right groups once again alleged a systematic conspiracy of ‘love jihad’ and demanded immediate legislative action. The framing was uniform: inter-faith relationships were projected as demographic warfare, and state inaction was portrayed as civilisational betrayal.

The same day, in Akola, the campaign descended into overt communal abuse. At an anti–‘love jihad’ protest, a Hindu Janajagruti Samiti member used derogatory slurs against Muslims—calling them “cowards who used to be Hindus” and “jalli-topiwallas”—and invoked the trope of ‘gaddar Hindus’. Such speech is not incidental; it reveals the communal animus that animates the demand for criminal legislation and signals how such laws are likely to be enforced on the ground.

Also on December 7, in Kothrud, Pune, at a Vishwa Hindu Parishad–Bajrang Dal ‘Shaurya Diwas’ event, speakers claimed that only organisations like the Bajrang Dal could stop ‘love jihad’, religious conversions, and cow slaughter. This assertion effectively erased the boundary between state authority and vigilante power, suggesting that the proposed law is intended to legitimise extra-legal social control.

On December 8, the campaign expanded simultaneously into administrative offices and mainstream political platforms. In Chhatrapati Sambhaji Nagar, delegations led by the Hindu Janajagruti Samiti, alongside BJP leader Kamlesh Katariya, submitted requests at District Magistrate offices across Maharashtra, uniformly urging enactment of a ‘strict’ anti–love jihad law.

The same day, at Hotel Center Point, Nagpur, during a ‘Majha Maharashtra’ event organised by Anand Bazaar Patrika, BJP MLA Nitesh Rane amplified these conspiracies from a mainstream political stage. He invoked ‘love jihad’, ‘land jihad’, and ‘halal jihad’, and further referenced ‘ghazwa-e-Hind’, explicitly linking these ideas to terrorism. Such rhetoric performs a crucial legitimising function: it converts fringe paranoia into a perceived security threat, thereby manufacturing public consent for exceptional criminal law.

Core Criticisms of Anti-Conversion Laws: Why civil liberties groups oppose them

CJP and other civil liberties organisations, women’s rights groups, and constitutional scholars have consistently raised serious objections to anti-conversion laws across states—objections that apply with equal, if not greater, force to the proposed Maharashtra legislation.

1. Criminalisation of consent and autonomy: These laws operate on the presumption that adult women—particularly Hindu women—are incapable of making informed choices about relationships and faith. By treating consent as inherently suspect, the laws directly contradict Supreme Court jurisprudence recognising decisional autonomy, bodily integrity, and the right to choose one’s partner.
2. Vague and overbroad offences: Terms such as ‘allurement’, ‘undue influence’, and ‘fraud’ are undefined or expansively defined, allowing ordinary acts—companionship, emotional support, marriage, or assistance—to be reinterpreted as criminal inducement. This violates the principle that criminal offences must be narrowly and clearly defined.
3. Burden-shifting and presumption of guilt: Many anti-conversion laws invert the foundational criminal law principle of presumption of innocence by shifting the burden onto the accused to prove that no coercion occurred. This is constitutionally suspect and procedurally unjust.
4. Third-party complaints and vigilante policing: By allowing relatives—or even unrelated persons—to file complaints, these laws institutionalise vigilante interference in intimate relationships. In practice, police action is often triggered not by the alleged convert but by ideological organisations or hostile family members.
5. Discriminatory enforcement: Empirical evidence from other states demonstrates that enforcement disproportionately targets Muslim men and inter-faith couples, entrenching communal profiling and selective policing.
6. Chilling Effect on Religious Freedom: Mandatory prior notice requirements and intrusive inquiries deter individuals from exercising their freedom of conscience, effectively converting a fundamental right into a regulated privilege.

CJP has repeatedly warned that these laws do not prevent coercion; they prevent choice.

Pending Petitions Before the Supreme Court: Laws under constitutional cloud

Importantly, CJP’s challenge to anti-conversion laws in several states—including Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Uttarakhand, and Gujarat—is currently pending before the Supreme Court of India. Multiple petitions contend that these statutes violate core constitutional guarantees under Articles 14, 15, 19, 21, and 25.

Detailed report may be read here.

Petitioners have argued that the laws:

• Undermine the right to privacy and decisional autonomy recognised in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India
• Criminalise adult consensual relationships, contrary to Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M. and Lata Singh v. State of UP
• Treat women as lacking agency, in violation of equality and dignity
• Enable arbitrary, discriminatory, and communalised policing
• Invert the presumption of innocence by shifting the burden of proof

The Supreme Court has been urged to examine whether the state can subject personal faith, marriage, and belief to prior scrutiny and criminal sanction in the absence of demonstrable harm. These challenges remain pending, rendering the legal framework that Maharashtra is being urged to adopt constitutionally unstable.

Manufacturing panic, normalising surveillance, reshaping criminal law

The Maharashtra campaign exemplifies a broader shift in law making: from evidence-based policy to ideology-driven criminalisation. There is no credible data demonstrating widespread forced conversions through marriage in Maharashtra. Existing criminal law already addresses coercion, cheating, kidnapping, trafficking, and sexual exploitation. The demand for a new law is therefore not remedial but symbolic—designed to signal dominance, discipline intimacy, and legitimise social surveillance.

By framing adult women as perpetual victims, these campaigns rein scribe patriarchal control. By singling out Muslims as conspirators, they normalise collective suspicion. By demanding preventive criminalisation, they erode the basic premise that criminal law punishes acts, not identities or intentions.

What is at stake for Maharashtra

If enacted, an anti-conversion law in Maharashtra will not remain a neutral legal instrument. It will embolden vigilante groups, legitimise moral policing, and place police machinery at the service of ideological enforcement. For inter-faith couples, religious minorities, and women asserting autonomy, the consequences are likely to be immediate and severe: arrests, harassment, prolonged incarceration, and social ostracisation.

As CJP has consistently argued, the real question is not whether forced conversions should be prevented—existing law already does so—but whether the state can be permitted to criminalise choice itself. Maharashtra today stands at a constitutional crossroads: between safeguarding liberty and importing a legal regime already notorious for abuse and under active constitutional scrutiny. The street pressure is loud. The constitutional warning signs are louder still.

Related:

Gujarat High Court Widened Anti-Conversion Law: ‘Victims’ can be prosecuted as offenders

K’taka HC: Ruling on state’s ‘anti-conversion’ law, lays down precedent against potential weaponisation by third-party vigilantes

Supreme Court seeks states’ replies on pleas for stay of anti-conversion laws, to decide on interim stay after six weeks

“Anti-conversion laws being weaponised”: CJP seeks interim relief against misuse of anti-conversion laws

The post Street Pressure, State Power, and the Criminalisation of Choice: How Hindutva groups are pushing Maharashtra’s anti-conversion law appeared first on SabrangIndia.

December 13, 2025 also marks two decades (twenty years) of the passage of this historic law that was enacted after nearly a decade or more campaign by forest rights’ and Adivasi groups across the country. On this occasion of the 20th Anniversary of the Forest Rights Act, national campaign coordination organisations (like NRCCJ) have extended extend our heartfelt appreciation to all those, including, parliamentarians, intellectuals, and organisations whose collective efforts made this landmark legislation possible. The Act stands as a historic step to redress past injustices and to democratize forest governance and management, ensuring dignity, rights, and justice for forest-dwelling communities.

The FRA 2006 formally came into force on December 31, 2007, but initially excluded Jammu & Kashmir. Following the abrogation of Article 370, the Act was extended to the Union Territory on October 31, 2019 through the J&K Reorganisation Act, 2019. Formal implementation began in September 2021, and the State Forest Department was designated as the nodal agency. While the extension of the Act was welcomed by local groups and intellectuals, concerns were raised about entrusting implementation to the Forest Department, given its questionable historical role in restricting customary and traditional rights of forest dwellers.

Union of India’s contradictory stances over two decades

To recall these contradictory pulls, when the Government of India was drafting legislation to recognise tribal forest rights, the Ministry of Environment, Forests and Climate Change made several attempts to be the nodal ministry. However, the Campaign for Survival and Dignity—a coalition of tribal groups and intellectuals—strongly opposed this, arguing that a ministry associated with past injustices should not oversee the Act. Their advocacy led to the Ministry of Tribal Affairs (MoTA) being designated as the nodal ministry in 2006, through amendments to the Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961.

Despite this, in many states and UTs, Forest Departments continued to act as shadow nodal agencies. The consequences have been stark:

• Out of 4.79 million Individual Forest Rights (IFR) claims, 1.47 million were rejected.
• For Community Forest Rights (CFR), the rejection rate stands at 9.56%, with states like Uttarakhand and West Bengal recording rejection rates above 90%.
• In states/UTs including Jammu & Kashmir, Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Rajasthan, Karnataka, Bihar, and Madhya Pradesh, more than 50% of IFR claims have been rejected.

These figures highlight how the lack of awareness has enabled Forest Departments to dismiss or dilute claims, undermining the spirit of the Act.

In this context on the twenty years anniversary of this historic law, these steps by administration’s like Jammu and Kashmir (J and K) remain significant.

The Notification by the J and K administration may be read here

Letter dated December 3, 2025 by AIUWFP to District Magistrate Ms.Indu Kanwal Chib, District Bandipora J&K regarding the Implementation of Forest Rights Act in District Bandipora J&K may be read here. (https://dipr.jk.gov.in/Prnv?n=21737)

Related:

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Struggle for Forest Rights in India stretches from East to West

The post 20 years of FRA 2006, J and K appoints Tribal Ministry as Nodal agency appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In an almost routine manner, clearly meant to harass citizens, especially those from marginalised communities who may exercise their personal choices in faith practice or in relationships, the sections applied by the Sri Hemant Yadav, Sub Inspector, Jethwara Police station, district Pratapgarh in the First Information Report dated April 26, 2025 (registered as Case Crime No. 0081 of 2025) was under Sections 5 (1), 8 (2) & 8 (6) of the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021.

Sub-Inspector Hemant Yadav, the complainant in the FIR alleged that the petitioner was involved in unlawful religious conversion. In a significant Order by a Constitutional Court, not only did the Judges quash the Order but, after getting to the root of the matter –which clearly appeared to be that a false and motivated FIR had been lodged by the instant Sub-Inspector– the Court held the Principal Secretary (Home), Uttar Pradesh to account directly him to explain this conduct through filing of a personal affidavit!  What cleared the matters for the Court, was the affidavit in counter filed by private respondents denying the allegations made in the FIR of any coercive conversions etc.

Interim Order of November 20, 2025

The first protective steps taken on November 20, 2025 in which interim Order the Court also stated that failure to file such affidavit before the next date, December 2, 2025 would require the Principal Secretary (Home) to appear in person, with all records of the case, before the Court. While doing so, the Court Observed that such urgent and stringent steps were required to hold the state administration at the highest level to account, as the contents of the FIR “are patently false” and aggrieved persons (citizens) are required to spend precious resources on seeking relief in patently false and motivated prosecutions. The Interim Order also protected the respondent private respondents from any harassment in any manner by the police or administration, warning of strict action were that to happen. (Para 18 of Interim Order)

Para 14 of the Interim Order dated November 20, 2025

Para 14. This Court requires the personal affidavit of the Principal Secretary (Home), Lucknow inasmuch as the Court is already deluged with the other matters which are coming before the Court and once the First Information Report is being filed by an officer of the State which prima facie appears to be false as such, this is a fit case in which the highest officer should file his affidavit indicating as to why the aforesaid First Information Report has been lodged by an officer of the State although the allegations levelled in the said First Information Report are prima facie patently false. However, the aggrieved persons are constrained to approach this Court for the redressal of their grievances whereby spending their valuable money and time and at the same time, the precious judicial time of the Court is also wasted in dealing with such cases which could have been nipped in the bud by the State itself. As such, personal affidavit would also indicate that in case such frivolous cases continue to come to the highest Court of the State as to why exemplary cost should not be imposed against the authorities who have not applied their mind while lodging the First Information Reports under the Act, 2021.

What was especially noteworthy about this case is that private respondents, alleged victims (Respondents No. 5 to 8) appeared before the High Court and filed a short counter affidavit in which they categorically stated that the allegations in the FIR were “absolutely false, concocted, baseless and without any substance“. They submitted, on record, that no incident of inducement, allurement or coercion had taken place and that they were following their religion “as per their own free will”. Details of this counter-affidavit have been recorded by the Allahabad HC in its interim order in the case dated November 20, 2025 (Paras 7 and 8), also reproduced in part in the final order in the matter dated December 2, 2025.

Paras 7 and 8 of the Interim Order of the Allahabad High Court in the Sabir Ali Case:

Para 7. Taking note of the same, in its earlier detailed order [dated N7. On the other hand, Sri Alok Pandey, Advocate who has filed a short counter affidavit today in Court on behalf of the respondents no. 5 to 8 states on the basis of averments contained in the short counter affidavit that the allegations as made in the impugned First Information Report are absolutely false, concocted, baseless and without any su any substance and no incident of religious conversion, inducement, allurement, pressure or coercion has ever taken place with the petitioner or with any of the other alleged victims.

Para 8. It is further submitted that all the private respondents have already been following their religion, social custom and traditions as per their own free will, independently and without interference or pressure from any corner. At no point of time has any of them adopted any other religion as alleged in the impugned First Information Report nor has any such step ever been undertaken or considered by them.

On that date, November 20, 2025, the Court had also expressed strong displeasure over the facts of the case. It also made a prima facie observation that the FIR lodged by the State officer appeared “patently false”. The Bench had then observed that it was ‘deluged’ with such matters and questioned why citizens should be constrained to approach the Court, spending money and time, for cases that “could have been nipped in the bud by the State itself“.

Final Order Quashing the FIR

Finally on December 2, 2025, 14 days ago, the Division Bench recorded in Para 3 that the personal affidavit of the Principal Secretary (Home), Government of UP had been filed. Significantly, the Court observed that, in Para 4 of the Final Order, that, the State of UP conceived that the FIR may be quashed!

Para 4. Even before the averments contained in the said personal affidavit could be considered by the Court, Dr. V.K. Singh, learned Government Advocate, states that the FIR itself may be quashed by this Court.

Considering the aforesaid statement made by Dr. V.K. Singh, the Court quashed the motivated FIR and observed, in a strong observation in Para 7 of the final order dated December 2, 2025, the Allahabad High Court observed:

“However, considering the detailed order of this Court dated 20.11.2025 a note of caution is issued to the State authorities that being the special Act and having it’s stringent provisions the authorities should have to be more cautious in future while registering the FIRs in mimeographic style under the provisions of the Act, 2021”.

(Para 7)

Counsel for the petitioners are/were Akhand Kumar Pandey, Abhishek Singh

Citizens for Justice and Peace (cjp.org.in, CJP) is the lead petitioner in the draconian ‘anti-conversion laws’ passed by those state ruled by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Today, December 16, 2025 the hearing in this matter (WP Criminal Nos 428/2020 and Nos 14/2023) is expected to address the prayer for interim stay on the most egregious provisions. In the 2025 hearings, first on April 16, 2025, and thereafter in September 2025, hearing on the main prayer of the writ petition for declaring the laws passed unconstitutional (early hearing on cases pending since December 2020) and another application filed by CJP, seeking interim relief. After first challenging the 2020-2021 amended laws of Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Madhya Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh, the CJP had, in 2023, amended their plea to include similar laws passed in Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Haryana, Jharkhand, and Karnataka. CJP is the lead petitioner in this matter.

The Interim Order of the Allahabad HC dated November 20, 2025 may be read here

The Final Order of the Allahabad HC dated December 2, 2025 may be read here.

[1] Mimeographic refers to “photo-copy” type documents, or documents from a duplicating machine which produces copies from a stencil, now a photo-copier!

Related:

“Anti-conversion laws being weaponised”: CJP seeks interim relief against misuse of anti-conversion laws

United Christian Forum petitions UP Governor Anandiben Patel, express concerns over recent amendment to UP anti-conversion law

Anti-Conversion Laws: Are forced conversions a myth or reality?

The post Allahabad HC: Quashes FIR under draconian UP ‘Anti-Conversion Act’, warns state authorities against lodging ‘Mimeographic Style’ FIRs appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The video—which has been widely circulated on social media and reported by The Wire—shows Tasing telling voters unequivocally:

“Government schemes will not go to those panchayat segments where the BJP is defeated… I do what I say.”

He reiterates the same statement moments later: “The panchayat segments where the BJP candidates lose will not get any scheme. As the panchayati raj minister, I mean what I say.”

The complaint argues that this constitutes a direct threat of withdrawal of welfare benefits, amounting to undue influence, coercion, and misuse of official position under the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (Sections 123(2) and 123(8)), as well as a serious breach of the Model Code of Conduct (MCC), which prohibits ministers from using their office to influence electors or making promises or threats linked to government schemes.

CJP, through its complaint, stresses that Tasing’s statement is not merely a political appeal, but an assertion made in his capacity as a sitting minister, explicitly invoking ministerial authority to condition access to State welfare on political loyalty. According to the complaint, this “strikes at the core of the principle of free electoral choice” and undermines the constitutional guarantee that public welfare funds belong to citizens, not to political parties or individual ministers.

It has also been noted that the Congress party in Arunachal Pradesh has already filed a separate petition with the State Election Commission, calling the remark “unlawful” and demanding Tasing’s resignation. The SEC has reportedly sought a factual report from the district administration.

CJP contextualises the issue within broader constitutional norms, stating that the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasised that elections must be insulated from state-backed inducement or intimidation, and that public schemes cannot be used as instruments for conditioning votes. It references the MCC guidelines for ministers as well as the RPA’s prohibition on “threats of injury” to voters.

The complaint seeks:

• Immediate cognisance by the ECI;
• Proceedings under Sections 123(2), 123(8), and 171C IPC/Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita equivalents;
• A direction to the State Election Commission to file an FIR;
• Public censure of the minister;
• And consideration of his temporary removal from campaign responsibilities until the inquiry is completed.

It further argues that allowing such statements to go unaddressed risks setting a precedent where ministers feel free to link welfare access to political compliance, weakening public trust in the neutrality of governance.

While BJP state leaders have distanced themselves from the remark—calling it Tasing’s “personal opinion”—the complaint states that the issue is not personal expression, but the misuse of ministerial authority during an active election period, a matter squarely within the jurisdiction of the Election Commission.

The complaint may be read here.

Image Courtesy: nenow.in

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The post Complaint filed by CJP against Arunachal Minister Ojing Tasing for threatening denial of welfare schemes appeared first on SabrangIndia.

NBDSA’s review of the broadcast revealed that the anchor relied on stereotypes about Bengali-speaking Muslims—particularly the Miya community—misrepresented demographic and political data, and even connected the protest song to an entirely unrelated rape case with no causal link. The Authority noted that this narrative expansion could not be justified as news reporting; rather, it demonstrated that the anchor “had a particular agenda in mind.” By weaving isolated incidents into a communal narrative and introducing ideas like a “Jihadi syndicate” or a conspiracy to undermine Hindu traditions, the programme violated the NBDSA’s Code of Ethics and Specific Guidelines for Anchors, which bar generalisation, sensationalism, and the vilification of any community.

In its direction, the Authority has ordered Times Now Navbharat to remove all “offending portions” from the programme and submit a modified version within seven days. It also instructed that the order be circulated to all member broadcasters and uploaded on the NBDA website and in the next Annual Report. For CJP, the decision marks a significant regulatory affirmation of its consistent efforts to challenge communalised media narratives. For the wider media landscape, the order serves as a critical reminder that the authority to question and critique cannot be exercised through distortion, stereotype, or the manufacturing of communal fear.

The Complaint: CJP flags communal narrative, distortion, and fear-mongering

CJP’s complaint dated September 9, 2024 focused on a Times Now Navbharat programme titled: “Desh Ka Mood Meter: सनातन संस्कृति…कट्टरपंथियों के लिए सॉफ्ट टारगेट? | CM Himanta Biswa Sarma News” that aired on 2 September 2024. The show revolved around the arrest of Altaf Hussain, a Bengali-speaking Muslim singer from Assam, who had released a protest song highlighting discrimination against the Miya community. Following his arrest, the Chief Minister og Assam made a Facebook Live appearance calling the song “an attack” and alleging an attempt to “change Bihu into Miya Bihu”.

The Times Now Navbharat broadcast then used these remarks to spin a sweeping communal narrative.

CJP pointed out that the anchor:

• Presented the incident as part of a nationwide conspiracy against Hindu culture—linking Assam, Kerala, and Kashmir in a manufactured war-like narrative.
• Used dangerous phrases such as “Jihadi syndicate”, communal conspiracy, and “invasion”.
• Equated the term ‘Miya’ with illegal Bangladeshi immigrants, misrepresenting an entire community.
• Suggested that Muslims controlled 30 Vidhan Sabha seats and posed a demographic threat.
• Linked an isolated rape case to an entire community to insinuate collective criminality.
• Wove these disparate incidents into an overarching narrative that Hindus were under “attack”.

CJP also highlighted how the broadcast manipulated imagery, language, and tone to sharply polarise viewers and turn a cultural controversy into a nationwide Hindu-Muslim conflict.

The complete report may be read here.

Broadcaster’s Defence: ‘We only reported facts’

Times Now Navbharat denied all allegations:

• It claimed the show was only reporting the arrest and the Chief Minister’s views.
• It argued that it had differentiated between “Miya” Muslims and indigenous Assamese Muslims.
• It insisted that the depiction of demographics and electoral influence was factual.
• It refuted claims of fear-mongering, stating that the anchor was merely posing uncomfortable questions in the national interest.
• It accused the complainant of “selectively quoting snippets”.

Hearing Before NBDSA: CJP demonstrates how the anchor crafted a false national conspiracy

At the hearing held on February 22, 2025, CJP meticulously demonstrated that:

• The anchor’s opening monologue itself framed the entire show as an attack on Hindu festivals “from Assam to Kerala”.
• This was not reportage but a deliberate, pre-set narrative.
• The anchor bundled unrelated issues—the singer’s arrest, a rape case, Onam interpretations, and alleged temple name changes—to craft a false story of Hindus under siege.
• The rhetoric used was not factual journalism but fear-inducing, divisive, and ethically unsound.

NBDSA’s Findings: “Anchor had an agenda in mind”

• Reporting the arrest itself was legitimate—but the anchor went far beyond facts

The Authority noted that reporting the arrest and discussing the Chief Minister’s criticism of the song was well within the channel’s rights. But the problem was everything that followed.

• “The narrative built by the anchor went much beyond that”

NBDSA found that:

• The anchor introduced communal stereotypes, generalisations, and insinuations against a specific community.
• He linked the singer’s song to an unrelated rape case, despite “no causal connection”.
• He used the incident as an opportunity to push an agenda-driven narrative.

• “The anchor had a particular agenda in mind”

This is one of the strongest observations NBDSA has made in recent orders. The Authority stated that the anchor appeared to seize the incident as a chance to craft a pre-decided, communal storyline.

“In the process, the anchor brings a stereotype in respect of a particular community which could clearly have been avoided. The anchor also connects the song with an incident of rape, though there was no causal connection and the two things arc altogether separate and distinct. It seems the anchor had a particular agenda in mind and got this opportunity to build his narrative, bearing in mind the said agenda. It is this generalisation which falls foul of the BDSA’s Code of Ethics and Broadcasting Standards as well as the Specific Guidelines for Anchors conducting Programmes including Debates.”

• This violates the Code of Ethics and the Specific Guidelines for Anchors

NBDSA held that the broadcast breached:

• requirements of impartiality,
• fairness,
• neutrality,
• and the mandates for non-sensational, non-communal reporting.

The Direction: Remove offending content, re-publish edited version

NBDSA issued a clear directive:

• Times Now Navbharat must modulate the programme by removing all offending portions.
• The broadcaster must submit the edited link to NBDSA within 7 days.
• The order will be circulated internally to all NBDA member channels, editors, and legal heads.
• It will be hosted publicly on NBDA’s website and included in the Authority’s Annual Report.

Why this order matters

For CJP: It validates months of rigorous, evidence-driven media accountability work and strengthens future interventions against hate speech and communal propaganda.

For media regulation: The order sets a clear precedent that anchors cannot camouflage communal narratives under the guise of “uncomfortable questions”.

For newsroom ethics: The order draws a sharp line between reporting and communal agenda-setting, holding anchors accountable—not just for factual accuracy but for narrative construction.

For public discourse: It recognises how dangerous and corrosive it is when mainstream news links isolated crimes to entire communities or constructs conspiracies around minorities.

The complete order may be read here.

Image Courtesy: Youtube.com

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The post NBDSA Raps Times Now Navbharat for communal, agenda-driven broadcast; orders removal of inflammatory segments appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The Court’s perspective on this issue brings to bear a number of important constitutional issues that need to be addressed immediately. Firstly, having access to content related to “obscenity” linked to the Aadhaar number will also mean that all online anonymity will cease to be protected and, in effect, this will increase the amount of control given to the government regarding what individuals are allowed to view and/or post online. Secondly, since the meaning of “obscenity” has always been subject to personal opinion and moral bias, if the Court continues to follow a technological enforcement of this concept, it will result in an enormous increase in the amount of government control over online spaces such as YouTube and other OTT platforms and, ultimately, over independent creators.

From the Ranveer Allahabadia Matter to Systemic Control

The Court’s changing view can be traced back to a case involving Ranveer Allahabadia, a YouTuber accused of producing “obscene” and “immoral” video content. This case raised the question of whether the legal rules and regulations currently in effect were sufficient to govern such content. As stated in the Supreme Court Observer respectfully, it appeared as though the Court was more concerned with the potential risks posed by unregulated digital content than with determining whether the petitioner was harmed by the defendant’s content. A similar finding was reported in the Global Freedom of Expression case report from Columbia University, which stated that the petitioner did not present evidence of legal harm, but instead framed the issues through the lens of moral panic.

Following this, the positions taken by the Supreme Court became increasingly broad, culminating in a March 2025 request by the Court to the Union government to think about enacting a law creating a national standard for “online obscenity”. In doing so, the Court transitioned from addressing the content grievance in a singular context to calling for a systematic legislative approach to achieve the same. The Court stated that India lacked a neutral, independent regulatory authority to oversee online content.

In late 2025, the ongoing confusion within the legal framework surrounding Aadhaar culminated in the formulation of a very specific concept regarding how Aadhaar should be used as the basis for age verification for the purposes of preventing minors from accessing pornographic materials. This was not simply a passing comment or procedural matter but was rather a comprehensive strategy of linking an individual’s access to online material directly to an individual’s biometric identity through Aadhaar’s use as an age verification mechanism.

The March 2025 Direction and the Government’s Parallel Initiatives

The Supreme Court’s March 2025 directive to the Executive branch of the Union Government came at a time when the Executive branch had been assessing the types of control that it might use to regulate digital content. Witnesses described that the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting was looking into creating regulations that would provide new rules for the regulation of “perverse user-generated content,” which was echoed by Solicitor General Tushar Mehta, who had testified to the Supreme Court.

At the same time, there was an effort on behalf of the Central Government to push out an Influencer Code, resulting in concern over the lack of public consultation. The Internet Freedom Foundation recorded those concerns in its report and called for a consultation on the matter. The report can be read here.

Many parties were warning that the Supreme Court’s strong push for new legislative enactments could have a chilling effect on legitimate online speech, with reports in The Hindu explaining this matter and how it combined with the earlier actions by the Executive branch indicating an increasing amount of judicial interest in the regulation of social media, and the ability of the Supreme Court to regulate online speech.

Therefore, what once appeared to be one case of litigation has been seen to be braided into a more significant regulatory push. The Supreme Court and the Executive branch are seen to mutually reinforce each other’s concerns regarding digital content.

Obscenity as a Legal Category: Colonial Morality in Digital Form

India’s obscenity doctrine has its origins in the pre-constitutional era. The Interpretation of Section 292 in the IPC has been based on the moral standards of Victorian England, in how sexual expression was viewed as corruptive. Although the Supreme Court has attempted to modernize the definition of “obscene” in Aveek Sarkar v. State of West Bengal by moving from the Hicklin test to current community standards, the concept of obscenity remains the most unclear and controversial definition in Indian Law.

Traditionally, the word “obscene” has been a means to censor the expression of LGBTQ+ individuals, feminists, those providing information about reproductive health, those who produce artistic works and literature, and people who provide sex education. By using the same definition of obscenity to create and regulate content within the digital space, these definitions will encompass many types of legitimate speech, i.e., queer content, experimental art, sex education content being made on YouTube, and narratives of survivors.

Because spaces for digital creators, i.e., YouTube and OTT platforms, are some of the only ways that individuals can currently communicate with large audiences that are not already censored within the media through either governmental control or the NBDSA, independent creators possess the unique ability to produce their content on these platforms without any type of government interference. By establishing obscenity regulations, the autonomy that independent creators currently possess would be lessened, allowing the government to indirectly suppress dissent, satire, and criticisms of the established cultural/ethical norms of society, under the guise of “protecting” minors.

Aadhaar-Based Age Verification: The Constitutional Faultlines

The Court’s finding that the Aadhaar system could be used as an age gate for virtual media raises significant constitutional issues.

Article 19 (1) (a) grants individuals a right to receive information as well as to express themselves. Using Aadhaar to authenticate access to digital content destroys the ability to remain anonymous and connects people’s viewing patterns with their biometric identity. Because of this linkage, individuals may feel deterred from viewing and/or interacting with material that is sensitive in nature, including material related to political criticism, mental health, LGBTQ resource issues, and sexual education.

Article 21 requires that any encroachment upon an individual’s right to privacy must meet the proportionality tests outlined in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India. Aadhaar-based verification of an individual’s age does not meet these criteria as it is neither required nor proportionate. Alternative methods of age verification that do not require individuals to disclose their identities, such as anti-fraud age verification or token-based confirmation of age, may serve as less invasive methods.

Article 14 addresses the issue of classification. Because obscenity is a subjective classification and is inconsistently applied across jurisdictions, an identity-linked filtering system allows arbitrary and disparate restriction of content. Thus, material labelled as “immoral” or “perverse” can disproportionately affect marginalized producers of content, as well as LGBTQ related materials, political satire, or criticisms of majority morality.

Globally, similar types of legislation have been challenged and have been ruled unconstitutional in court. In the U.S., age-verification laws in Utah, Arkansas, and Texas were found to violate an individual’s right to privacy by imposing a chill on lawful speech. Additionally, the Digital Economy Act in the U.K. abandoned the use of age verification due to privacy concerns and the difficulty of implementing that scheme. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) of the EU presumes large-scale identity verification in order to access content as a violation of existing privacy law. Finally, Aadhaar-based filtering is significantly more intrusive than any other methodology described above and places India outside the realm of established international norms based on rights.

Who Classifies Obscenity?

In what is likely the most important question raised by the Court’s recent remarks, the issue of determining what constitutes obscenity remains unresolved. While the Court has suggested that a neutral and independent body should make this determination, the historical patterns of regulatory bodies in India indicate that there will be an ongoing struggle for executive supremacy over regulatory bodies. Even self-regulatory agencies are often placed under significant amounts of state pressure, as evidenced by SCObserver’s analysis of takedown jurisprudence found in Wikimedia Foundation v. ANI and pointing to the inherent risk that any regime to classify material as obscene will be manipulated by the political elite in a country where the lines between nationalism and morality have become increasingly unclear. Therefore, it is highly probable that any form of content that has been deemed ‘anti-national’, ‘anti-authority’, or ‘anti-Indian’ will likely be categorized with what is generally regarded as immoral.

The Political and Practical Risks: Can Balance Exist?

Although it is almost impossible to find a balanced approach to controlling minors from unlawful exposure to cyberspace content while at the same time protecting individuals’ right to free speech, the current regulatory developments within India indicate that finding a true balance is aspirational at best. Increasing pressure from the governing body and the continual expansion of the IT Rules, as well as significant interest in ensuring traceability of cyber content, lack of information regarding reasons for user information withdrawal, and draft regulations for influencer(s) will only serve to establish an overwhelming level of executive control over the speech and behaviour of individuals within cyberspace.

In this context, obscene content provides an excellent opportunity for state intervention by way of protecting children but ultimately provides an opening for vague state regulation of all forms of expression. Such an increase in state authority will rarely decrease, as has been pointed out by many authorities in constitutional law who cautioned against the expansion of state power.

Safeguards against a Moral-Political Regime

The Supreme Court’s development of a new anti-obscenity regime should include critical safeguards, including:

1. a transition from ‘moral’ definitions to ‘harm’ based definitions;
2. an independent and accountable regulatory authority not influenced or dominated by the Executive;
3. a requirement for all regulations to be developed with transparency and public consultations;
4. a strong commitment to continuing judicial review over takedown requests; and
5. a prohibition on access to content via Aadhar-based identity links.

If these safeguards are not implemented, India risks creating a system where the use of morality as a justification for censorship, identity as a currency for realizing one’s right to access information, and a re-definition of digital public spaces under the control of State powers occur.

The judgment in Aveek Sarkar v. State of West Bengal can be read here:

The judgment in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India can be read here:

The judgment in Wikimedia Foundation v. ANI can be read here:

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Preksha Bothara)

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The post When Morality Meets Surveillance: The court’s push toward state-regulated digital content appeared first on SabrangIndia.