The cases — Sanidul Sheikh v. Union of India and Reijya Khatun v. Union of India — were filed after both men, who had been released under Supreme Court-mandated COVID bail in 2021, were suddenly picked up again in May 2025 despite consistent compliance with all bail conditions. They have since been lodged in the Kokrajhar Holding Centre. CJP has been providing legal aid in both these cases.

State’s New Claim: “They were once sent back”

At the hearing, the FT counsel, appearing for the State, told the Bench that “the government is ready to deport them,” but added that “a stay order by this Court” prevented immediate action. The counsel went on to state that “the factual position is that they were once sent back. They came back. Now they are kept in the Kokrajhar Holding Centre.”

This was the first time such a claim had ever been made in the proceedings — no previous affidavit, submission, or oral statement had suggested that the two men had been “sent back” to Bangladesh before.

Appearing for the petitioners, Advocate Mrinmoy Dutta immediately objected: “This is being said for the first time, My Lords. It was never mentioned before.”

Petitioners demand proof of verification

Dutta pressed that before any talk of deportation, the government must first demonstrate factual and documentary verification of nationality, and clarify through which process and destination country deportation is being contemplated:

“Let them show the Court that they have completed the verification. If they have been able to verify, that is different. But they need to show where they will deport and how they will deport. Otherwise, my submission is that the detention is illegal.”

The argument underscored a crucial point — verification of nationality is a precondition to deportation, not a justification for continued detention. Yet, despite repeated demands for such evidence since June, the State has produced no records of nationality confirmation or communication from Bangladesh.

Bench Avoids Two Key Questions: Deportation claim and verification process

Despite the gravity of the new claim, the Bench did not press the State for supporting documentation or clarification on when and how the alleged earlier deportation occurred, or through which process. Nor did it examine the petitioner’s long-standing demand for production of verification records confirming nationality — a prerequisite under both domestic and international law before any lawful deportation can occur.

Instead, the Court recorded that submissions had been heard from both sides and directed that orders will be delivered on October 24, 2025.

By not engaging with either issue — the alleged “previous sending back” or the requirement of verification — the Bench left unresolved the two fundamental questions that have defined this case since its inception:

1. Can persons released on Supreme Court-granted bail be re-detained without bail cancellation, solely on the State’s readiness to deport?
2. Can deportation be initiated without verification or proof of nationality — or, as now alleged, after an unexplained earlier “sending back”?

Legal and factual uncertainty deepens

The State’s assertion that both men had once been “sent back” — without any affidavit or documentary trail — now sits uneasily alongside its claim that they are being held “pending deportation.” The petitioners have maintained throughout that the detention is illegal, since both men were released under valid judicial bail orders, and no court has recalled or varied those directions.

The Bench’s decision to step back from addressing either the alleged prior deportation or the absence of verification records leaves a grey area — a vacuum between State assertion and judicial scrutiny, where neither legality nor process is yet established.

Background: From bail to re-detention

Abdul Sheikh and Majibur Rehman were declared foreigners by Foreigners Tribunals in 2018 and 2019. After over two years in detention, both were released on bail under the Supreme Court’s April 2020 order in Suo Motu WP(C) No. 1 of 2020, which allowed long-term detainees to be freed under conditions of weekly reporting. For nearly two years, both complied — signing attendance registers at Kajolgaon and Goalpara Police Stations every week — until their sudden re-detention in May 2025.

Their families’ petitions have challenged these arrests as unconstitutional, arguing that bail orders remain valid until recalled and that “verification” cannot justify re-incarceration. The State has since argued that deportation efforts, halted during the pandemic, have now resumed — though it has yet to produce any official verification or communication with Bangladesh confirming nationality.

Their petitions, filed by their relatives, argued that detention without recall of bail orders is unconstitutional, and that any “verification” could be undertaken without custody. The State, however, has maintained that it is reinitiating deportations and that detention in holding centres is lawful pending such deportation.

Previous detailed reports may be read here.

Related:

Calcutta High Court strikes down arbitrary deportations of West Bengal residents, orders return from Bangladesh

Bangladeshi Court declares deported Bengal families as Indians, orders their return

Gauhati HC defers final hearing in Majibur Rehman and Abdul Sheikh petitions; Questions state on justification for continued detention

Assam BJP’s AI video a manufactured dystopia, Congress files complaint, myths exposed

CJP scores big win! Citizenship restored to Mazirun Bewa, a widowed daily wage worker from Assam

Victory in Dhubri FT: Jarina Bibi declared Indian after years of ordeal

Assam’s New SOP Hands Citizenship Decisions to Bureaucrats: Executive overreach or legal necessity?

The post “They were once sent back”: Court refrains from probing State’s claim as Assam seeks to justify continued detention appeared first on SabrangIndia.

This brief assesses this decision of the Gujarat High Court, which ruled that individuals alleged to be “victims” of wrongful religious conversion could be charged with instigation or abetting, irrespective of any lawful (or not) religious conversion under the Gujarat Freedom of Religion Act, 2003. It also reviews the legal landscape for the law, the history of the interim order issued by the Division Bench in 2021, to the Supreme Court, and contemplates the indications of the recent decision for individual autonomy and minority rights in the Constitution.

The Gujarat Freedom of Religion Act was first enacted in 2003 and was reportedly intended to restrict conversions obtained through force, allurement, or fraud. To do this, the Act attempted to restrict conversion by defining the two relevant concepts. “Allurement” is defined broadly to include the providing of material benefit, gifts, or any other means of temptation, while “force” includes not just physical coercion, but social coercion or spiritual coercion. The Act also included certain procedural safeguards and a call for transparency, requiring advance consent from the district magistrate prior to any conversion taking place, and a notice to the district magistrate, after the religious conversion had occurred, regarding the conversion of individuals.

In 2021, the Act was significantly amended, considerably broadening its application. Of particular note was a provision that prohibited conversion engaged in “by marriage,” which meant that any interfaith marriage could potentially be an unlawful conversion and could see criminal consequences. The revised sections (sections 3, 4, 5, 6) elaborated the definitions of unlawful conversion and expanded the consequences, such as longer periods of imprisonment and increased fines, particularly for mass conversions or conversion of vulnerable targets which are minors and Scheduled Castes or Tribes we were physically disadvantaged. Penalizing schemes have also been extended to group converts and not just converts.

Section 3 prohibits conversions through the use of force, allurement, fraud, or marriage, creating a broad ban of both direct actions and indirect inducements involving religious conversion. The later sections 4, 4A, 4B, and 4C, then create specific punishments, voiding any marriage conducted or executed for the purpose of conversion, as well as additional punishments for mass conversion events.

Section 5 establishes punishments for violations, whereas Section 6 establishes a prohibition that prosecutions cannot be made without prior sanction from the district magistrate, ostensibly for frivolous or political motives. Section 6A subsequently reverses the burden of proof, requiring the accused to prove that there was no force or allurement linked to the conversion, effectively reversing one of the cornerstones for criminal law and default criminal procedures.

The impact of these provisions, and most notably for interfaith marriages the criminalizing of conversion by marriage and the reversing the burden of proof, come together to place serious consequences on an interfaith marriage by potentially invalidating the display of an otherwise legitimate marriage if conversion is alleged against either spouse. All of these areas cluster legal implications for individuals, regulating personal choice, religious choice, and marital choice under scrutiny of the State and criminal offenses, thereby restricting voluntary acts of an interfaith marriage and ratcheting-up legal risks.

In conclusion, the legal framework set out by the Gujarat Freedom of Religion Act (sections 3 to 6A) constitutes a restrictive legal environment regulating conversions of religion, particularly where the conversions relate to interfaith marriages, through the expansive definitions of conversion that are illegal, strict procedural controls, and broad criminal liability, with important consequences for both individual freedoms and the rights of religious minorities.

In response to the amendments being contested, the state court in Gujarat issued an interim stay on the most controversial provisions of the amendments for cases involving voluntary interfaith couples in August 2021. The court ruled that criminalizing marriages and cohabitation between consenting adults would infringe on the protected constitutional right to marry and choose a partner contained in Article 21. However, the court’s stay injunction on the operation of the amendment provisions was limited to consensual marriages, permitting enforcement of the amendments in circumstances where force, deceit, or allurement were alleged. A different but related process in the Supreme Court of India is considering the larger constitutionality of the intermediaries of religious domination and sexuality with related petitions filed from several states.

The current Gujarat High Court ruling does not negate or contradict the previous stay issued in 2021, but rather limits the scope and application of that ruling. The 2021 stay was issued by a division bench and expressly protected voluntary interfaith marriages from being the subject of criminal proceedings under the Gujarat Freedom of Religion Act, in instances where there has been no allegation of force, fraud, or allurement. The current ruling deals with a vastly different set of facts and law: in the current case, individuals have been converted (allegedly by inducement or coercion) to a different religion and are implicated in converting others to that religion through means of influencing, coercing, or allurement, often by way of material incentives or social pressure.

The High Court distinctly affirmed that such individuals were not “victims” but instead that they were offenders. The Court explained that even if they were initially converted by force or some allurement and were thus victims, if they engaged in further abetting others either indirectly or directly, then they would be committing a new and separate offence under the Act. The judgement explains that “had those persons, after getting converted, not engaged in any activity of further converting other persons, they could have been said to be victims of conversion. However, on account of their act of influencing and pressuring and alluring other persons to convert… a prima facie offence is made out against them.” In essence, the Court is laying down a clear principle that victimhood does not confer immunity if the individual chooses to act as a direct participant in further conversions.

This line of thinking undermines the conventional legal and moral separation between victims and offenders. Practically, it means any person who may have been coerced (through any means) or manipulated (regardless of the instrument of coercion) into converting can be potentially prosecuted, if they are (even in a minor way) later found to have converted others themselves—even due to social coercion. The risk of this reasoning is that it could potentially spread the net of criminality too wide-reaching, especially with respect to group conversions in closely connected or marginalized communities, where social ties or economic ties or familial ties may have led individuals to join in the group conversion.

From a constitutional standpoint, this raises profound challenges stemming from Article 25 (freedom of religion), and Article 21 (right to autonomy and to marry). The law’s broad definitions and the reversal of the burden of proof (Section 6A) put accused persons, who are often poor or socially vulnerable, at a disadvantage in defending themselves. It is also likely to deter proper practices of religious expression or voluntary religious association. The Supreme Court – as it reviews the constitutional validity of anti-conversion laws in general – will ultimately need to address whether this expansion of liability is proper and consistent with fundamental rights or, alternatively, provides space for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement against minorities and interfaith couples.

From a constitutional perspective this raises many challenges stemming from Article 21 to Article 25. The law’s reversal of the burden of proof in Section 6A as well puts accused persons who are often socially and financially vulnerable at a great disadvantage in defending themselves which makes it more likely to deter proper practice of religious expressions.

In conclusion, the ruling of the Gujarat High Court in 2025 ventures into uncertain new ground with respect to India’s law regarding conversion by making even so-called “victims” prosecutable if they subsequently aid someone’s conversion. While distinguishing, and not overruling, the prior stay for voluntary interfaith couples, the Court’s decision expands the law’s reach and increases the stakes for individual rights, particularly among minorities and the entire category of vulnerable people. As the Supreme Court now considers and reviews these statutes, it is possible that the ultimate fate of religious freedom in India, as well as the fate of personal autonomy and procedural fairness, rests in the balance.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Urvi Kehri)

Sources: 

1. https://sabrangindia.in/sc-issues-notice-guj-govt-plea-against-hc-stay-anti-conversion-law/
2. https://sabrangindia.in/guj-hc-refuses-remove-stay-sec-5-anti-conversion-law/
3. https://sabrangindia.in/anti-conversion-law-will-not-apply-inter-faith-marriages-unless-there-force-fraud/
4. https://www.opindia.com/2025/10/gujarat-hc-rejects-argument-that-converted-muslims-cant-be-accused-of-forcing-others-to-convert/
5. https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/ahmedabad/victims-of-religious-conversion-can-be-booked-for-offence-if-they-induce-others-to-convert-gujarat-hc-10295684/
6. https://www.barandbench.com/news/forced-religious-conversions-converts-can-be-booked-if-they-lure-others-to-change-religion-says-gujarat-hc
7. https://lawtrend.in/gujarat-hc-victims-of-religious-conversion-can-also-face-prosecution-if-they-later-convert-others/
8. https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/ahmedabad/victims-of-religious-conversion-can-be-booked-for-offence-if-they-induce-others-to-convert-gujarat-hc-10295684/

Related:

“Anti-conversion laws being weaponised”: CJP seeks interim relief against misuse of anti-conversion laws

SC issues notice to 5 states in CJP’s renewed challenge to anti-conversion laws

CJP plea against anti-conversion laws: SC seeks to know status of cases challenging ‘anti conversion’ laws in HCs

CJP, other rights groups challenge Maharashtra Govt GR setting up a Committee to “monitor inter-faith marriages”

The post From Victim to Accused: High Court of Gujarat’s 2025 Ruling on Religious Conversion appeared first on SabrangIndia.

While the speech originated as a local executive response to the Bareilly protest, its propagation and amplification were largely mediated through national and regional media, especially Hindi television channels like Times Now Navbharat, Zee News Hindi, and News18 Hindi, which paired the CM’s words with dramatic visuals of protests, police action, and property demolitions. Short-form clips circulated widely on social media, creating a feedback loop that magnified both the rhetoric and the state response.

This media-driven amplification transformed a local law-and-order issue into a nationally visible spectacle of punitive governance, normalising coercive enforcement and targeting of a religious community. The timing and scale of dissemination may also have significant political resonance, particularly with the upcoming Bihar elections, as the Hindi-language media networks ensured that the CM’s rhetoric reached a broad, politically significant audience.

Within days the state response in Bareilly intensified: large-scale arrests, property-sealing and demolition actions, 48-hour internet suspensions, criminal FIRs (running into hundreds or thousands in some counts), and administrative notices against aides of the cleric who called the Bareilly protest. That sequence of ‘protest → CM rhetoric → heavy-handed enforcement’ raises three connected questions the rest of this piece examines in depth:

• Did the CM’s speech cross legal lines such as incitement or unlawful discrimination?
• Did the state response follow due process and the Supreme Court’s own safeguards (including the duty to investigate hate speech suo moto)?
• What are the measurable social, legal and media consequences of that political rhetoric?

What happened — a timeline

The trigger (September 4–9, 2025): The flashpoint began on September 4 when an illuminated board/banners reading “I Love Muhammad” appeared during an Eid-e-Milad-un-Nabi procession in parts of Kanpur (Syed Nagar/Rawatpur). Local objections, framed by some Hindu groups as a “deviation from tradition”, led the police to register an FIR on September 9 against 24 persons (9 named, 15 unknown) for allegedly disturbing communal harmony. The complaint, according to the report of India Today, centred on shifting tents/banners into a location on a public road near a gate used by Ram Navami processions. That apparently small ritual alteration escalated as news and social media spread the story to other districts.

Escalation and the Bareilly protest (September 26–27, 2025): On September 26, a public gathering in Bareilly — called in sympathy with the “I Love Muhammad” campaign and associated with cleric Tauqeer Raza Khan — clashed with police after Friday prayers; police used lathi-charge and reported stone-pelting and injuries to officers. According to a report of Times of India, authorities say the protest had been called without permission; police also said the gathering showed signs of pre-planning through social media groups. Multiple FIRs and detentions followed. Local reporting states dozens detained with FIRs filed against hundreds — and some outlets report FIR counts running into the thousands across multiple stations. Shortly after the clashes, the cleric and several aides were arrested.

The Chief Minister’s response (September 28, 2025): Speaking at a public ‘Viksit UP’ event, CM Yogi Adityanath warned that those who “vandalise in the name of faith… attack the police… we won’t let you go… chedhoge to chodenge nahi aur chodenge nahi toh fir chootoge bhi nahi.” He used phrases such as “denting and painting must be done” and framed the response as necessary to protect festivals and public safety. These comments were widely reported and repeated across national news outlets the same day and the day after.

The contentious speeches delivered by CM Adityanath are:

अगर बेटी की सुरक्षा पर हाथ डालने का प्रयास किया,
व्यापारी के प्रतिष्ठान में आग लगाने का प्रयास किया,
उत्सव में अराजकता पैदा करने प्रयास किया तो,

यह रास्ता सीधे नर्क में जाने का होगा… pic.twitter.com/gUV9vkYnRX

— Yogi Adityanath (@myogiadityanath) September 28, 2025

‘गजवा-ए-हिंद’ हिन्दुस्तान की धरती पर नहीं होगा,

अगर किसी को जहन्नुम में जाना हो तो ‘गजवा-ए-हिंद’ के नाम पर अराजकता पैदा करने का कुत्सित प्रयास करे…

देर-सबेर ‘छांगुर’ जैसे हाल तो उनके भी होने ही हैं… pic.twitter.com/8V6MXvZbgm

— Yogi Adityanath (@myogiadityanath) September 28, 2025

छोटे-छोटे बच्चों को जिनके हाथों में कलम होनी चाहिए, जिनके हाथों में नोटबुक होनी चाहिए, विज्ञान और गणित की पुस्तकें होनी चाहिए, उनके हाथों में I Love Muhammad का पोस्टर…

…इनको यह भी नहीं मालूम कि उनकी जिंदगी तो बर्बाद है ही लेकिन इन बच्चों की भी जिंदगी ये लोग बर्बाद करने पर… pic.twitter.com/rhCBIxoh71

— Yogi Adityanath (@myogiadityanath) September 28, 2025

याद रखना!

जब भी दुस्साहस करोगे, ऐसे ही पिटोगे जैसे बरेली के अंदर पीटे गए हो… pic.twitter.com/AZWOU4m495

— Yogi Adityanath (@myogiadityanath) September 28, 2025

लव-जिहाद, धर्मांतरण और गो-तस्करी जैसी राष्ट्र विरोधी गतिविधियों के प्रति हमें सतर्क रहना होगा,

अगर कहीं कोई भूल से भी इस प्रकार की गतिविधियों में लिप्त है, उसकी सूचना ससमय पुलिस और प्रशासन को उपलब्ध करवाइए,

उपचार की व्यवस्था हम स्वयं कर लेंगे… pic.twitter.com/wLTyTcChgD

— Yogi Adityanath (@myogiadityanath) September 28, 2025

2025): After the violence and speeches, the district administration moved decisively: large-scale arrests and FIRs were filed, properties linked to accused persons were sealed or demolished by the local authority demolished including a banquet hall and other structures allegedly used by those arrested, administrative notices, for example, power-theft notices, were issued against associates of the cleric, and internet and SMS services in Bareilly district were suspended for 48 hours citing maintenance of public order, as per The Economic Times. Several human-rights and legal activists have already filed petitions and complaints alleging lack of prior notice for demolition and possible collective punishment. Political parties and civil-society delegations have begun to visit the city; opposition leaders are demanding investigations.

The problem with the speech itself

1. Targeting + personal reference. The CM specifically attacked a cleric’s actions, namely Tauqeer Raza Khan, and conduct in public, saying that the “Maulana forgot who is in power” and promising retribution that would be remembered by “future generations.” Targeting an identifiable leader and associating him and his followers with violence elevates the rhetoric beyond abstract law-and-order language.
2. Punitive metaphors taken literally. The repeated use of “denting and painting” and explicit references to the “bulldozer” rhetorical universe, and actual demolitions in other recent UP campaigns, is not merely figurative; in the current UP context it has an institutional history as a public performance of punishment — a state spectacle with material consequences. The phrase therefore reads as both a policy cue and a public warning.
3. Promise of force / deterrence directed at a community act. Even if the immediate trigger was violence, the CM’s formula — “If you trouble us, we will not spare you” — was framed to deter a specific form of expressive action, such as displaying I Love Muhammad posters, that political actors and some civil-society figures had defended as speech. The combination of delegitimisation, portraying the slogan as manipulation of children or anarchy, plus promise of collective discipline is consequential.

Those three features — naming, punitive metaphor, and generalised deterrence — are the elements that make legal and normative analysis urgent.

Media: Who amplified, and how amplification changed the story

The media ecosystem played a decisive role in transforming Yogi Adityanath’s remarks from a local political reaction into a nationally mediated performance of power. Within hours of his speech, both television and print outlets had front-paged his most aggressive lines — “chedhoge to chodenge nahi” and “denting and painting must be done” — turning threats of retribution into viral catchphrases.

National and regional broadcasters, including Times Now Navbharat, Zee News Hindi, and News18 Hindi, ran segments that paired these quotes with dramatic visuals of protests, lathicharges, and property demolitions. The YouTube thumbnails and on-screen tickers themselves became an extension of the state’s messaging — text overlays like “Maulana bhool gaya kaun sarkar mein hai” or “Bareilly mein danga, sarkar ki kathor karwai” visually encoded the CM’s warning as spectacle and slogan.

This media choreography had a dual effect. First, it nationalised the CM’s rhetoric, ensuring that what began as a local communal disturbance was recast as a state-wide law-and-order triumph. Second, the widespread replaying of his lines — often stripped of context and accompanied by enforcement footage — normalised the language of punishment and deterrence. Even platforms that did not editorially endorse the speech contributed to its amplification through repetition and aestheticisation.

Some outlets, such as The Wire and The Indian Express, offered a countervailing frame: detailed timelines, verification of police claims about “online toolkits,” and critical analysis of the administration’s disproportionate use of force. But these were exceptions within an overwhelming current of performative law-and-order coverage. The split in framing — between law-and-order narratives and civil-liberties scrutiny — reveals how editorial positioning directly shapes the moral valence of communal incidents.

Short-form videos from these channels, extracted as YouTube shorts and Twitter/X reels, circulated widely on social media. These clips — the CM’s warning juxtaposed with scenes of violence and police deployment — fed a feedback loop: the more viral the visual, the stronger the administrative justification for subsequent measures like internet suspension and mass arrests. In effect, the media ecology and the state’s coercive apparatus became mutually reinforcing.

This convergence also raises a constitutional question about mediated governance. When executive speech, journalistic amplification, and administrative coercion operate in sync, the boundary between state messaging and independent reportage collapses. The outcome is not merely the spread of information, but the construction of a “performance of control”, where the appearance of decisive governance substitutes for adherence to due process.

Attached is a collection of YouTube thumbnails from Times Now Navbharat, Zee News Hindi, and News18 Hindi demonstrates this vividly — a montage of headlines that blur the line between news coverage and narrative reinforcement, framing punitive action as political virtue.

Legal frame: what the law says and where courts have drawn the line

Three interlocking legal rules matter here:

• The statutory toolbox for “hate” / public-order speech: India’s criminal law criminalises speech that promotes enmity or hatred between groups (e.g., IPC Section 153A/Section 198 BNS), imputations prejudicial to national integration (IPC Section 153B/Section 197 BNS), deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings (IPC Section 295A/Section 298 BNS), and statements likely to create terror or public alarm (IPC Section 505/Section 356 BNS). These are the provisions courts and police typically invoke in communal-speech cases. The Supreme Court has emphasised that lawful restrictions must be precisely applied and proportionate
• The Supreme Court’s duty-to-act on hate speech: Shaheen Abdulla and follow-up orders: In Shaheen Abdulla v. Union of India (2022), the Supreme Court highlighted the “growing climate of hate” and directed police chiefs to take suo motu action in hate-speech incidents — specifically instructing registration and investigation under IPC sections such as 153A, 295A and 505 without waiting for a private complaint. These directions were later extended to all States/UTs; the court took the view that proactive policing is essential to preserve the secular fabric envisaged by the Preamble. That jurisprudence puts an onus on state police: if a public utterance plausibly constitutes hate speech, police must investigate it on their own motion.
• The constitutional limit: incitement and proximity to violence: Indian courts have insisted on a context-sensitive test. The classic guide is Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar (1962), where the Supreme Court upheld sedition law only for words that have the “tendency or intention of creating public disorder” or inciting violence; mere abusive or critical expression cannot be criminalised. Modern caselaw returns to the same principle: to punish speech the state must show an intention or proximate tendency to produce imminent lawless action — not merely dislikeable or provocative words. This high threshold matters because it keeps robust political speech protected while allowing punishment where speech is truly dangerous.

Apply the law to the facts: Did the UP CM cross the line?

This is the crucial, uncomfortable question. Courts usually apply a two-part analysis to political speech by powerful actors:

• Does the speech itself contain elements of the statutory offences?

The Chief Minister’s speech went beyond mere governance rhetoric. It singled out a specific cleric and his supporters, implicitly ascribing collective culpability to a religious community. The language of punishment and humiliation—phrases such as “denting and painting” or “beaten as in Bareilly”—was not random metaphor; it invoked a visual and historical grammar of state-sanctioned coercion. These expressions are deeply loaded in Uttar Pradesh’s recent political lexicon, symbolising demolition drives, police beatings, and targeted action that disproportionately affect Muslim localities.

Further, the assertion that “future generations” would be taught a lesson carries the unmistakable tone of collective retribution, extending the threat from present offenders to an entire community across time. Such language constructs Muslims not as citizens subject to law, but as an enduring adversarial category — a perpetual “other” against whom exemplary force is justified.

Under Sections 153A (now Section 196 of BNS) and 295A (now Section 298 of BNS)  of the Indian Penal Code, the test for criminality hinges not merely on overt incitement but also on whether the speech promotes enmity, targets a community, or is likely to disturb public tranquillity. Read against the backdrop of recent police actions in UP—demolition of Muslim-owned properties, custodial violence, and selective FIRs—the Chief Minister’s words may reasonably be understood as an endorsement and encouragement of discriminatory state practices.

Moreover, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in cases such as Amish Devgan v. Union of India (2020) clarifies that when influential figures make statements capable of mobilising real-world hostility, the likelihood of incitement must be assessed contextually, not in isolation. From that perspective, Yogi Adityanath’s remarks arguably cross the boundary from administrative assertion into speech that legitimises and incites discrimination.

In sum, while the speech may not contain an explicit call to violence, it performs a dog-whistle function: normalising state-backed hostility and signalling permissibility for coercive action against a targeted religious group. In legal terms, that makes it a fit case for prima facie examination under Sections 153A, 295A, and 505(2) IPC, especially given the speaker’s constitutional position and the demonstrable pattern of violence that followed.

• What changed after the speech? (state action and proportionality)

The true constitutional stakes emerge not merely from what was said, but from what followed. When a Chief Minister’s public rhetoric is swiftly mirrored by administrative action—bulldozers rolling in, FIRs multiplying overnight, and digital blackouts silencing affected districts—the question is no longer one of abstract speech, but of state power animated by speech.

In the immediate aftermath of Yogi Adityanath’s address, municipal and police authorities in multiple UP districts launched coordinated operations: mass detentions of Muslim youth, property demolitions framed as “encroachments,” and sweeping suspension of internet services. These were not isolated law-and-order responses but a choreographed display of retribution, executed without adequate notice, hearing, or judicial oversight.

Courts have repeatedly emphasised that executive spectacle cannot substitute due process. In its observations concerning “bulldozer justice,” the Supreme Court has held that demolitions carried out as instantaneous punishment for alleged offences are unconstitutional unless preceded by notice, opportunity to respond, and adherence to municipal laws (Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind v. North Delhi Municipal Corporation, 2022). The law draws a bright line: urban planning cannot be weaponised as penal theatre. Yet, in Uttar Pradesh, the chain of events—fiery speech followed by visible coercive measures—suggests a punitive motive masquerading as law enforcement.

Equally significant is the Shaheen Abdulla v. Union of India (2022) principle, which imposes a positive duty on the police: they must initiate suo-moto FIRs against hate speech, irrespective of the speaker’s political stature. The judgment underscored that inaction is complicity, and selective enforcement deepens discrimination. In this case, law enforcement pursued alleged protestors with urgency but failed to act on the Chief Minister’s inflammatory remarks, despite clear statutory grounds under Sections 153A, 295A, and 505(2) IPC.

The constitutional doctrine of proportionality also comes into play. Administrative actions must bear a rational nexus to legitimate aims, employ the least restrictive means, and avoid discriminatory impact. Yet the scale and selectivity of post-speech measures—demolitions confined largely to Muslim-majority neighbourhoods, police raids on specific youth groups, and the near-complete absence of accountability for vigilante actors—suggest a pattern of collective punishment rather than targeted, proportionate law enforcement.

As many have noted, when executive speech operates as a signal and the bureaucratic apparatus responds with coercive overreach, the boundary between political rhetoric and state sanction collapses. The state ceases to act as a neutral arbiter and instead becomes a performer in its own moral spectacle, projecting deterrence through fear.

In sum, while Yogi Adityanath’s speech might be defensible as political expression if viewed in isolation, the temporal and causal sequence of events—immediate arrests, sweeping FIRs, and punitive demolitions—creates a compelling case that state power was deployed not for justice but for signalling. Such a pattern raises grave constitutional concerns under Articles 14, 19, and 21, even if establishing direct criminal culpability for the speech remains legally complex.

The ground reality: Evidence of disproportionate enforcement and social fallout

The aftermath of the Bareilly clashes reveals a pattern that extends far beyond a conventional law-and-order response. It reflects a multi-tiered exercise of coercive state power, activated in the wake of the Chief Minister’s speech and sustained through both formal and informal mechanisms of punishment.

• Mass arrests and sweeping FIRs: In the immediate aftermath, police operations intensified across Bareilly and adjoining districts. Reports cited dozens of detentions within hours, and FIRs naming hundreds—sometimes even thousands—of individuals. According to The Times of India, nearly 2,000 people were named across multiple police stations, though the exact number varied by outlet. The breadth of these FIRs—often containing generalised allegations—raises serious questions about collective culpability and the use of preventive detention as a form of intimidation rather than targeted investigation.
• Property sealing and demolitions: Municipal and development authorities undertook swift demolition and sealing drives against properties allegedly linked to the accused—among them a banquet hall and other commercial structures. Families reported that no prior notice or opportunity to be heard was provided, prompting complaints to the Uttar Pradesh Human Rights Commission. As The Times of India noted, these measures echo the state’s recent pattern of bulldozer-led punitive actions, widely criticised by rights groups as performative retribution designed to convey dominance rather than ensure compliance with planning laws. The recurrence of such demolitions immediately after communal incidents suggests a deliberate conflation of criminal liability with property ownership and community identity.
• Administrative and regulatory reprisals: Alongside police action, the administration issued a series of “ancillary punishments”—including power-theft notices, income recovery claims, and regulatory sanctions against persons associated with the cleric at the centre of the protests. These quasi-civil penalties compounded the economic and psychological burden on affected families. The simultaneity of these measures—each lawful in isolation but collectively disproportionate—points to a pattern of cumulative punishment through bureaucratic instruments.
• Communications blackouts: Authorities imposed a 48-hour suspension of mobile internet, broadband, and SMS services across Bareilly district, citing the need to curb rumours and prevent mobilisation. The Economic Times reported that this was one of several recent instances where internet shutdowns have become the default administrative reflex during communal tensions. Such measures, while framed as precautionary, raise acute proportionality and necessity concerns under the Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of Indiav (2020) standard, which requires narrowly tailored, time-bound restrictions and periodic review.
• Societal reverberations and exclusionary practices: The social aftershocks were equally significant. Civil-society observers and media, such as LiveMint documented a perceptible tightening of social boundaries in the weeks following the incident. Muslims reportedly faced pressure to abstain from participating in garba celebrations and other public festivities, and instances were noted where Hindutva groups sought to monitor or exclude Muslim presence at cultural events. Though less quantifiable, these developments illustrate how executive rhetoric and coercive enforcement combine to legitimise exclusion at the community level, embedding state-endorsed bias within everyday social interactions.

Taken together, these events depict not an isolated breakdown of order but a coordinated sequence: rhetoric, repression, and social sanction. The cycle of speech, enforcement, spectacle, and exclusion forms a distinctive template of governance—where administrative action doubles as political performance, and punishment itself becomes a form of public messaging.

The Political Economy of Hard-line Rhetoric: How speech translates into power

Whether by deliberate strategy or downstream effect, hard-line public rhetoric by state leaders like Yogi Adityanath yields three tangible advantages for majoritarian or vigilante actors operating at the political margins. It converts language into action, rhetoric into legitimacy, and coercion into spectacle.

1. Implicit legitimisation of vigilante policing: When a head of government publicly vows “uncompromising action” and uses metaphors of retribution—such as “denting and painting” or “we will not spare you”—the message travels well beyond the bureaucracy. It functions as a symbolic green light for local affiliates, vigilante groups, and ideological sympathisers. These actors interpret the rhetoric as moral endorsement for “citizen policing” or social intimidation campaigns under the guise of defending faith or nationalism. Civil-society reports document a consistent pattern: Hindutva outfits intensify surveillance of Muslim participation in cultural events—such as garba celebrations or processions—soon after high-profile communal statements. In practice, this rhetoric lowers the cost of vigilantism, creating a permissive environment where harassment appears state-sanctioned.
2. Narrative control and inversion: Strongman rhetoric also reshapes the moral sequence of events. By branding expressive or devotional acts—such as the “I Love Muhammad” posters—as “provocations,” the state repositions itself as the neutral guarantor of order, while protestors are recast as disruptors. This narrative inversion turns a community’s assertion of faith into a law-and-order problem, allowing the administration to deploy coercion with minimal public pushback.
   As The Wire and other critical outlets observed, media framing plays a decisive role: channels that foreground “riots” and “discipline” amplify the executive’s preferred storyline, while those that question due process or disproportionality are marginalised as “soft on disorder.” The result is a feedback loop where political rhetoric and editorial selection co-produce legitimacy.
3. Electoral signalling and mobilisation gains: Beyond its immediate administrative use, hard-line speech operates as a performative display of strength aimed at a political constituency. The imagery of bulldozers, swift arrests, and collective punishment serves as a spectacle of decisive governance, projecting control and dominance. Scholars of South Asian populism have noted that such performances of punishment—what The Loop terms “punitive populism”—transform the machinery of justice into an instrument of emotional reassurance for the majority. Each demolition or crackdown becomes not just an act of enforcement but a ritual reaffirmation of political identity, blurring the lines between public order and electoral theatre.

Taken together, these three dynamics show how rhetoric, media, and enforcement converge into a single ecosystem of majoritarian power. In this model, punishment is not merely administered—it is performed, televised, and voted upon.

Accountability gaps and legal remedies

The aftermath of the Bareilly episode demands more than commentary — it demands accountability. When executive speech, administrative action, and media amplification intersect to produce coercive outcomes, the constitutional order must provide correctives. The following lines of legal and institutional response arise directly from existing Supreme Court jurisprudence and human-rights practice:

1. Suo moto inquiry into the Chief Minister’s speech under the Shaheen Abdulla directions: The Supreme Court has made it unequivocally clear that police are under a continuing duty to register suo moto FIRs in cases of hate speech, regardless of the speaker’s political position. Inaction in the face of potentially inflammatory statements by high public officials amounts to contempt of the Court’s directions. A representation to the High Court or Supreme Court seeking compliance would therefore be legally tenable if no inquiry has yet been initiated.
2. Judicial review of demolitions and sealing drives for arbitrariness and disproportionality: The Supreme Court’s November 2024 observations on “bulldozer justice” caution that demolitions used as instant punishment violate due process. Every affected person is entitled to prior notice, an opportunity to be heard, and independent adjudication before property action. Where municipal or development authorities acted immediately after communal incidents, those demolitions merit judicial scrutiny as punitive theatre rather than lawful urban regulation.
3. Human-rights complaints and public-interest petitions documenting the full sequence: The timeline itself — from the Kanpur FIRs to the Bareilly clashes, the CM’s speeches, and the administrative crackdown — forms crucial evidence of state overreach and selective enforcement. Complaints to the NHRC, the State Human Rights Commission, or the jurisdictional High Court can seek independent inquiry, victim compensation, and publication of findings. Precedents show that such petitions have successfully compelled state responses and stayed coercive action.
4. Media accountability and transparency demands: Given the central role of television and digital platforms in magnifying punitive rhetoric, transparency measures are essential. Broadcasters and social media intermediaries should be required to preserve all footage, thumbnails, and metadata for future scrutiny. Outlets that used sensational promos can be asked to issue contextual clarifications or corrections through the NBDSA process. Simultaneously, police and civic authorities must disclose the legal basis for mass FIRs, demolition orders, and internet suspensions. Public disclosure often becomes the first step toward halting unchecked executive excess.

Conclusions — legal risk, democratic cost

The Bareilly “I Love Muhammad” row and its aftermath sit at a critical intersection of power and speech in contemporary India. What began as an expressive act — a slogan, a banner, a theological or identity affirmation — was transformed rapidly under political and administrative force into a narrative of provocation, then into a sequence of punitive state interventions.

Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath’s rhetoric did more than warn: it arguably furnished the legal and moral scaffolding for escalated state action — actions that, according to credible reportage, stretched procedural norms, threatened minority rights, chilled speech, and disrupted daily life for many. Legal redress is challenging but not impossible: the constitutional framework, statutory provisions, and Supreme Court precedents exist to push back against such overreach.

Bareilly is therefore not just a local incident. It’s a test case. If the judicial system, civil society, and media fail to rigorously examine speech + enforcement, the precedent is troubling: political speech that combines identity, faith, punitive promise and spectacle becomes a license to marginalise. For democracy to survive in such moments, the invisible boundary between “law-and-order” and state overreach must be policed with the same seriousness with which we monitor overt dissent.

References:

https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/take-suo-motu-action-against-hate-speech-crimes-without-waiting-for-complaint-supreme-court-212282

https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/what-is-i-love-muhammad-row-and-why-it-sparked-protests-across-india-barawafat-procession-kanpur-nagpur-hyderabad-owaisi-full-story-2791497-2025-09-22

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/meerut/bareilly-cleric-among-8-held-2000-booked-31-detained/articleshow/124185812.cms

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/lucknow/i-love-muhammad-row-up-cm-yogi-adityanath-warns-habitual-law-breakers-after-bareilly-protest-says-denting-painting-must-be-done/articleshow/124189795.cms

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/internet-suspended-in-bareilly-for-48-hours-after-i-love-muhammad-row/articleshow/124273149.cms

https://www.livemint.com/news/india/yogi-adityanath-warns-i-love-mohammad-protesters-chedhoge-to-fir-chodhenge-nahi-11758975758381.html

https://thepolisproject.com/research/sc-verdict-demolitions-statecraft/

https://thewire.in/politics/i-love-muhammad-banner-controversy-how-routine-decoration-in-kanpur-sparked-nationwide-protests-and-crackdowns

https://www.scobserver.in/journal/bulldozer-demolitions-remind-of-a-lawless-ruthless-state-of-affairs-declares-supreme-court-as-it-issues-pan-india-guidelines

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/meerut/i-love-muhammad-row-plea-filed-in-human-rights-body-on-demolition-ofproperties-in-bareilly-affected-families-say-no-prior-notice-sent/articleshow/124345491.cms

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/bareilly/i-love-muhammad-row-rs-1-crore-power-theft-notice-to-tauqeer-razas-aides/articleshow/124324197.cms

https://theloop.ecpr.eu/bulldozer-justice-punitive-populism-in-india/

https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/lucknow/i-love-muhammad-row-cleric-tauqeer-raza-detained-protest-10274731

https://theprint.in/politics/cleric-who-once-said-modi-should-learn-from-yogi-whos-tauqeer-khan-in-eye-of-i-love-muhammad-storm

https://kmsnews.org/kms/2025/09/20/muslims-protest-across-india-against-registration-of-case-for-writing-i-love-muhammad-saw.html

https://sabrangindia.in/register-prosecute-hate-speech-offences-promptly-uphold-rule-law-sci-all-states

https://sabrangindia.in/hate-crime-hate-speech-scs-scrutiny-continue

https://sabrangindia.in/free-speech-even-in-bad-taste-is-protected-if-no-incitement-to-violence-hp-hc

https://www.toaep.org/pbs-pdf/138-lokur-damojipurapu

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/tension-in-bareilly-drones-are-up-ahead-of-friday-prayer-internet-shut-down/articleshow/124280351.cms

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/one-can-say-i-love-modi-but-not-i-love-mohammad-owaisi-amid-bareilly-unrest-condemns-violence/articleshow/124284809.cms

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/i-love-mohammad-march-violence-after-stone-pelting-in-bareilly-cops-resort-to-lathicharge/articleshow/124157113.cms

https://cjp.org.in/bns-2023-does-nothing-to-bring-in-a-nuanced-effective-understanding-of-hate-speech-making-its-prosecution-even-more-difficult

https://cjp.org.in/cjp-files-complaints-against-the-hate-speeches-delivered-in-uttar-pradesh

https://cjp.org.in/the-sentinel-and-the-shift-free-speech-in-the-supreme-court

https://thelogicalindian.com/chedhoge-to-chodhenge-nahi-yogi-adityanaths-warning-after-i-love-mohammad-protest-turns-violent-in-up

https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/internet-cut-for-48-hours-in-ups-bareilly-amid-i-love-muhammad-posters-row-9384013

https://article-14.com/post/govt-whataboutery-inaction-why-hate-speech-persists-despite-the-supreme-court-wanting-to-stop-it-64c3372224505

The post From Words to Bulldozers: How a Chief Minister’s rhetoric triggered and normalised punitive policing in Bareilly appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The NCRB’s data functions like gospel in courtrooms, reports, and media outlets. And yet, the authority of its findings relies on the assumption that the act of counting is not itself an act of power. Counting crime, however, is a political act masked in the bureaucratic detachment of its tables, graphs, and other representations of data. The political project is quiet but to present to the national imagination of justice the act of determining which crime, and more importantly, who’s suffering, is worth preserving in the record.

The Politics of Delay

The NCRB’s (National Crime Records Bureau) report of 2023, which detailed crime across the nation of India, including its 28 states and 8 Union Territories, was released in September 2025. The prior report (Crime in India 2021) took an entire 14 months to come out; this 2023 report has taken nearly 2 years. The Ministry of Home Affairs explanation for the delay, “data consolidation and verification”, is a common and routine bureaucratic response.

However, the timing matters. Delays distort accountability. By the time the data is in the public domain, it is no longer a measurement of the political moment it originally described. When hate crimes flare, when trends of custodial violence rise, when protests become suppressed – those realities have become lost within time. The NCRB’s silence is neither neutral nor impartial; instead, it is strategic.

The delay in the publication of ‘data’ in moments of political sensitivity turns ‘public data’ into a curated and managed narrative. That the 2023 report arrives late, after two national elections have already occurred, and several rounds of communal violence, is no coincidence; it is very evidently institutionalized amnesia.

Selective Vision: What the Numbers Hide

The most immediate observation for a careful reader is what is not recorded. Jammu & Kashmir, according to the NCRB, reported zero sedition cases in 2023 and zero cases of communal or religious violence. This is a region where expression is restricted, people have been detained en masse under the Public Safety Act, and the internet is repeatedly shut down. The data suggests order and harmony; however, lived experience reveals pervasive control.

Maharashtra, not to be outdone by Jammu and Kashmir, has also had well-publicized prosecutions under UAPA and sedition laws; it thus recorded only one case of indirect UAPA prosecution and one sedition FIR in the same year. For reference, independent observers track FIRs, and the media covered at least a dozen UAPA/sedition FIRs that occurred in that year.

The issue isn’t just about statistical erasure and representation; it’s how classification is used as a tool of governance. A sedition FIR can be reclassified as “public mischief,” or a hate-crime FIR as simply “rioting.” The very fabric of normalcy can be maintained by the State. With the examples from criminal law enforcement, the NCRB’s annual report provides further quantification and narrative control.

The Erasure of Hate

One of the most obvious gaps is still the absence of any hate-crime and lynching data. After the widespread of mob lynchings in 2017, which led to huge public outrage, the NCRB created a new category for “hate crime,” “honour killings” and “mob violence.” After a year, those categories dropped out of the tables. The government told Parliament that states were giving them “unreliable data.” In the years since, there has not been a single official record of hate crimes in India.

This bureaucratic erasure is particularly striking when independent monitoring shows supportive evidence of hate crimes. The India Hate Lab found in its 2025 Report that Uttar Pradesh and Maharashtra together accounted for more than 50% of hate-speech incidents across India observed. Yet in looking at the NCRB 2023 tables of incidents of crime, it covers records of “rioting” and “offences against the state,” without any named hate.

As such, violence with a communal motive is folded into a generic “group clashes,” “public disorder,” or “arson.” The political becomes the statistical. The intentional becomes the invisible. By not naming hate, the state avoids evidence of their own complicity in enabling hate.

When ‘Marginal’ Means Massive

According to the NCRB report of 2023, crimes against women increased by 0.7% and crimes against children increased by 9.2%. All of the media accounts repeated news stories featuring the language: “Crimes up marginally.” But the word “marginal” itself conceals more than it reveals.

Domestic cruelty, the largest category of crime against women, remains at a staggering 31.4%, as assault and sexual harassment follow back-to-back. For children, sexual offences under POCSO comprise over 80% of all crimes documented. The adverse statistics of conviction rates leave much to be desired, with higher than 30% in many of the states, while pendency rates approach or exceed 90% in court systems.

The distortion lies in the flatness of the data itself. The data are counting incidents and not silences. Underreporting, arising from stigma, police refusal, or fear of retaliation, is widely accepted to be pervasive. When NCRB states that violence has levelled and/or stabilized, it is the institutional response that has levelled and not the violence itself.

Even in the absence of intersectionality in crime, intersectionality gets omitted in collectives. If a Dalit woman is raped by an upper caste person, the report lists the event as “crime against women,” not “crime against SC.” In addition, if a queer or disabled survivor is the victim, they have no collective statistical identity at all. The “blindness” of the system prevents the recognition of compounded vulnerability and fails to acknowledge the visibility of the crimes, which makes them least able to seek justice and experience the most victimization.

Free Speech without a Trace

The discrepancy between what is experienced on the ground and what is officially reported is perhaps most pronounced in cases involving freedom of speech. While the judiciary has made it clear, on numerous occasions, that dissent is a right in a democracy, the NCRB’s data from 2023 tells an entirely different story, one of perhaps complete calm—as if India has no crisis of free speech whatsoever.

A key event occurred in Kunal Kamra v. Union of India, which was decided by the Bombay High Court on August 22, 2024. The case challenged a provision of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Amendment Rules, 2023, namely Rule 3(1)(b)(v), which allowed a “fact-checking unit” that the government had notified to declare internet content “fake or false or misleading” about the business of the Central Government. Once identified, social media intermediaries would be required to remove or disable the content.

Kamra asserted that this provision amounted to the government being the sole truth authority, a prior restraint that violated Article 19(1)(a), and went beyond the limits of “reasonable restrictions” in Article 19(2).

Article 19(1)(a): (1) All citizens shall have the right— 

• to freedom of speech and expression; 

Article 19(2): (2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence.

The Bombay High Court agreed and struck down the rule on constitutional terms. In strong words, Justices G.S. Patel and Neela Gokhale said the rule imposed a “chilling effect” on speech and “flipped the democratic relationship between citizen and State.” The judgment affirmed that free expression is not a privilege given by the government, but a freedom that constrains government authority itself.

Nevertheless, the NCRB’s section on “Offences Against the State” gives no trace of this struggle. There is no recognition of hundreds of FIRs against journalists, stand-up artists, and students, filed under vaguely stated sections of the IPC and the IT Act. The report indicates only 107 sedition cases and 361 UAPA cases, numbers that are significantly lower than independent counts. What results from this is a fictional statistic: on paper, dissent hardly exists, but in practice, dissent is policed every day.

The Illusion of Order: Data without Democracy

The NCRB’s credibility is cracking even in seemingly neutral categories. While the report indicates a drop in cybercrime cases of 11.7 in Mumbai, RTI data shows that only 2% of the complaints made through the National Cyber Crime Portal are even registered as FIRs. As an expert told The Times of India, this decline is “a statistical illusion”; the progressive appearance of reducing cases masked police reluctance to register cases. Fewer FIRs are better numbers; better numbers are better for political comfort.

The illusion is deepened inside India’s prisons. The Prison Statistics 2023 report states that there is a total population of 5.8 lakh, of which 77.9% are undertrials, people who have not committed any offence. Among undertrials, Dalits comprise 22%, Adivasis 13%, and Muslims 16%, all incredibly disproportionate to their representation in the population. The report also mentions 1,800 plus custodial deaths last year, but does not provide much detail about this, including state or cause. Women, approximately 4% of all inmates, still do not have access to basic sanitary and maternal care. The overall impression is that presenting data without any context turns structural injustice into bureaucratic routine.

In the meantime, the government has been pleased to note a 26% drop in “Offences against the State”, down from 7,128 in 2019 to only 5,272 cases in 2023. During this time, we are expected to assume, show that the nation remains stable. In this regard, the “decline” is merely a reclassification, not a reform, as the state is only quieter because it has erased dissent from the ledger, while journalists, activists, and students are now experiencing surveillance or detention.

In the end, what the NCRB provides is not an understanding but control of the narrative. Its lack of transparency converts governance into ideology; a system where what is not counted is overlooked and what is overlooked is, by design, absent.

Towards Data Justice

If recognition is the first step to justice, then the crime data of India requires a constitutional reboot.

The NCRB (National Crime Records Bureau) ought to be thought of as a public accountability office, and not just a bureaucratic appendage for record-keeping. Its processes should be opened to audit, its categories, a reflection of social reality rather than bureaucratic convenience. Independent auditing, by the National Human Rights Commission, specific Parliamentary Committees, or civil society organizations, should be made part of its function. Existing independent databases or projects documenting hate crimes should also be recognized as proper and legitimate data sources, existing in context that can fill official silences.

To put it more bluntly, police or peripheral agencies can also create invisibility and silence of their own. In the end, crime statistics are not just numbers; they are moral narratives. In particular, the NCRB report for 2023 speaks less about the status of crime and even more about the status of The State itself. In short, it reminds us that numbers can be used as a way to practice power- invisibility is engineered and silence is measurable.

As long as data is not democratized, justice will not be served.

The petition filed by Kunal Kamra can be read here:

The entire judgment in Kunal Kamra v. Union of India can be read here:

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Preksha Bothara)

Related:

NCRB’s Prison Statistics Report 2019 paints a bleak picture

Inexplicable delay in release of NCRB figures

India Hate Lab Report 2024: Unveiling the rise of hate speech and communal rhetoric

Holding power to account: CJP’s efforts to combat hate and polarisation

Free Speech Upheld: Bombay HC strikes down IT (Amendment) Rules, 2023 as unconstitutional

The post Crimes Uncounted: When Data Becomes the State’s Defence appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Social media posts suggested there was “forced conversion” or “religious mixing” happening, resulting in vigilante groups mobilising and police quickly intervening — not against the aggressors, but against individuals accused of converting others. In several districts, including Alwar, Dungarpur, and Jaipur, the people abusing Christians worked with police and other authorities, a relationship that demonstrated their collusion. The accounts below follow this trajectory — from Alwar and Dungarpur’s early raids to the violence reported in Jaipur’s Pratap Nagar — and how an entire month was essentially practice for institutionalised religious surveillance and social exclusion.

This complaint and supporting documentation derive from validated field reports and a comprehensive timeline of events built by the Coordination Committee for Protection of Freedom of Religion and Human Rights in Rajasthan — a network of civil society organisations that has been following closely incidents of harassment and hate crimes against Christians within the state. The Coordination Committee includes People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL), People’s Union for Human Rights (PUHR), All India People’s Forum (AIPF), Janwadi Mahila Samiti (JMS), Rajasthan Christian Fellowship (RCF), National Alliance of People’s Movements (NAPM), Adivasi Adhikar Abhiyan (AAA), and Bhil Pradesh Mukti Morcha (BPMM), among others. Their Joint Press Statement of September 25, 2025, chronicled targeted attack incidents, police harassment, and coercive raids in the wake of the Rajasthan Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Bill, 2025. CJP’s submission relies on that data to further triangulate it with independent media reports, HindutvaWatch documentation, and on-ground interviews to provide a detailed record of an organized campaign of intimidation conducted under the cover of “anti-conversion vigilance.”

Gelota, Alwar (MIA Thana, Alwar district)

Police conducted a raid on September 3 on a hostel for children that allegedly housed approximately 25 poor children run by a missionary in Galota (Udyog Nagar locality). The police action followed a complaint filed by a VHP activist alleged that a “conversion” was underway. The police reportedly confiscated literature, a FIR was filed; the police arrested two hostel staffers—listed in the log as Amrit (a teacher) and Sonu Rai (press reports also identify her as Sonu Singh/Garasia)—and detained them in judicial custody. Reports indicate that local Sangh affiliate groups (VHP/Bajrang Dal) coerced the authorities into arresting. Media reporting addresses the arrest and the police case; civil society groups who monitor the case remark that it is the first in a spate of incidents after the anti-conversion bill was introduced.

Khetolai Village (Bhabru Thana), Kotputli-Behror District

On September 9, less than an hour after the anti-conversion legislation was introduced in the Assembly, officers arrived on the property of a house in the family of brothers Vikram and Rajendra Kanav, who host their own satsang/prayer meetings. The brothers state they were told, rather explicitly, not to hold prayer sessions with outsiders, then were brought to the police station and interrogated, finally being coerced into signing a form, or written undertaking, indicating they would not hold their satsangs and would not “invite outsiders” to their home. The brothers’ account of the incident follows a trend being run in the community by local Sangh activists (identified in the log as Shri Ram Samiti), who have consistently threatened this family in various ways. Complaints were made, in writing, not only to the SP but also to other organizations such as the PUCL.

Paota (Pragpura Thana), Kotputli-Behror district

A similar incident took place in Paota on September 9. Believer Gajanand Kuldeep stated that the next morning after the Bill passed, the SHO summoned him, stating that if he hosted prayers, meals, or called people outside again, he would be arrested. He testified that he was forced to sign a document that indicated he would stop doing this activity. Like the Khetolai incident, PUCL passed his application on to the SP, and was kept on the record as an example of coercive policing as part of wider harassment following the Bill introduction.

Jhelana, Bichiwada, Dungarpur District

Local Hindu sangathans and a Sant Samaj group protested outside a minority-run school and its church ahead of the scheduled prayer service on September 10, claiming the school was a site for the conversion of Adivasi students and parents. Police arrived in significant numbers; the school maintained that it is a minority-run educational institution and denied that there had been any conversion activity. The incident intensified tensions, but no FIR was filed in relation to the protest. The account refers to this as an incident as an event of communal mobilization involving pressure from authorities on students and staff in the school community.

In a separate case in Durgapur on the same date, an Adivasi organiser with a local mazdoor sangathan said she was stopped on the road and verbally threatened by VHP/Bajrang Dal activists who accused her organisation of “converting Adivasis.” Also, the landlord of the office supposedly threatened to evict them. The organiser described it as demoralising and reported that a formal complaint was being prepared, and civil society groups mentioned that this harassment was part of the broader campaign.

St Paul’s Hostel School, Patela, Dungarpur City

On September 11, after investigation and complaints, including a health inspection in early 2023, the district authorities responded to complaints (made by the ABVP and others) by issuing an order to close the hostel/school for alleged record-keeping and sanitation infractions. The Child Welfare Committee, in collaboration with district education and administration personnel, whisked away 230 children to their families; the authorities issued show-cause notices and initiated proceedings under the JJ Act against the school authorities. The staff contends that the closure is a result of pressure from right-wing student groups and has displaced the school kids and staff; reports are that the school is seeking legal remedies to restore the school to operation.

Chak-6P hostel school (Anupgarh, Sri Ganganagar district)

On September 16, an incident log entry reported a nocturnal attack on a hostel school for orphans: students and adult supervisors were said to be frightened by an enterprising attack on the site in the middle of the night. The log entry does not provide many public details but lists the incident as one of a multitude of attacks aimed at Christian institutions in the district. Similarly, civil society narratives identify hostel attacks as part of a continuation of incidents.

Ward No. 14, Anupgarh Thana (District: Sri Ganganagar)

A local citizen complained on September 17, stating that a person who lived in the area (whom we cannot identify in the log) had been “converted” as per missionary activity; the Vishwa Hindu Parishad filed a police complaint in support of this local citizen. The officer of the law arrested two persons, associated with a missionary prayer group, by the names of Polus Barjao and Aryan, and began an investigation to ascertain the degree of conversion processes. It was reported that a third person (the landlord) was in hiding from police arrest. The two arrested were later remanded and put into judicial custody; the case file states the Indian police were undertaking active investigations into conversion processes, as per the FIR filed by the VHP.

Pratap Nagar (Sector 08/82/625), Jaipur (Rajasthan)

On September 21, approximately 40–50 Bajrang Dal activists allegedly entered a private residence where Pastor Bobas Daniel was conducting a prayer meeting of about 15–26 people. According to local sources, the Bajrang Dal group locked the doors, broke items, and physically assaulted congregants. Neighbors, including a pregnant woman and the landlady, attempted to intervene to protect the victims, but allegedly were beaten themselves. Victims state that eight were injured; the police filed the FIR only after lengthy protests and community pressure for accountability. Locals expressed concerns over delayed police responses, no prompt documentation from medical professionals, and failure to arrest persons who assaulted congregants, despite eyewitness evidence provided by victims. Media accounts confirmed both the attack and the delay of police response.

On September 23, 2025 — Hindustan Bible Institute (HBI), Pratap Nagar, Jaipur (Rajasthan)

Almost 50 Bajrang Dal activists surrounded the campus of HBI after a visit from two visiting staff members from the head office of HBI. The protesters were targeting HBI due to accusations of “forced conversions” of members of a local church. Police officers escorted the visitors from out of state to the police station after probable cause occurred from the protests. The mobile devices, Aadhaar cards, and property documents were confiscated from visitors and some local staff, and the property of the institute was detained. Guests left the facility for the night but were there after civil society intervened, although some devices and property papers were withheld. Civil society groups described the detainment as broad and the lack of property restoration as violations of their freedom of movement and association, and also demanded the immediate restoration of property and arrest of the perpetrators. National and international news services reported on the incident; civil society organized delegations to meet with senior officers and issued joint statements condemning the attacks.

Engineered Vigilantism and the Mechanics of Fear

In September 2025, an evident and purposeful pattern of inciting violence against Christians was followed. Most incidents started with rumours of “forced conversions”, often transmitted via WhatsApp groups or VHP, Bajrang Dal, or ABVP local units, targeting schools and hostels run by Christians or prayer gatherings. These allegations served as incitement to coordinated raids, mob assemblies, and police involvement, all as a rubric of vigilance. Many of the same incidents occurred across Alwar, Dungarpur, Anupgarh, and Jaipur. Pastors in Alwar and Kotputli-Behror were summoned and pressured into signing undertakings not to pray. Groups on the right stormed educational and welfare institutions for Adivasi and Dalit children in Dungarpur and Anupgarh, accusing them of “conversion through education”. The apex of these events occurred in Jaipur’s Pratap Nagar, where a mob assaulted those attending prayer, kicked several women, and destroyed public and private property while police sat by or arrived late.

Such violence was rarely spontaneous. The same three steps were followed: rumour being spread, mob assembly, and state validation of the violence through a raid or a politically motivated delay in filing an FIR. Even if the violence ended quickly, the intimidation and coercion continued – everything from pastors suspended from conducting worship, to schools sealed, to social workers leaving in fear.

While Rajasthan represented the focal point, the scenario reflected a national agenda. When combining repeat attacks by Hindutva affiliates with the targeting of marginalized groups, this wasn’t simply random aggression, but a more comprehensive policy of surveillance and social exclusion acted along with administrative acquiescence and ideological consensus.

The Rhetoric of Conversion and Cultural Purity

At the core of these campaigns rests a control ideology – an ideology that sees religious diversity as a danger, and that views women, Dalits, and Adivasis as “vulnerable bodies” who need to be protected from conversion. The rhetoric here is reminiscent of the more familiar tropes of Hindutva propaganda: the notion that Christian charity disguises “mass conversions,” that western forces undermine Indian culture, and that Hindu identity must be “defended” under the watchful gaze of vigilantism. The word “conversion” operates much like “love jihad” in anti-Muslim rhetoric – shorthand for cultural invasion and the fear of demographic change. However, the terms of conversion are also intended to implicate Christian schools and welfare Institutions in “Westernising” India’s poor through education and through care, thus recasting social uplift as social subversion. With the most recent incidents in September as one instance, foreign and local pastors were referred to as “agents.” New believers became “traitors,” and Christian education was labelled as “mental colonisation.” Such language comes out of Far-Right narratives and foretells danger while dehumanizing the minority population. Such language, too, perversely renders violence a moral obligation.

These narratives are meant to reinforce (and reproduce) caste hierarchies, wherein Dalit and Adivasi populations are painted as “vulnerable to corruption,” while maintaining caste(s) boundaries of purity-pollution under the guise of religion. The institutional forces of religion, caste, and nationalism become a single ideological and controlling matrix, which is central to Hindutva mobilisation.

In the end, it is political, not religious. As elections approach, “conversion panic” tells the story of a group working to unite the base and distract from the failures of governance. By presenting Christians as controlling the marginalized and suspicious, those invoking conversion panic can generate both moral panic and political capital, repurposing faith-based fear into electoral gold.

Silence, Complicity, and the Erosion of Protection

If there is a pattern that is as troubling as the violence itself, it is the silence—or worse, complicity—of the machinery of the state itself. All over Rajasthan, police responded to violence against Christians with bias, siding with aggressors over victims. In Alwar and Ktputli-Behror, officers pressured Christian pastoralists to sign undertakings prohibiting worship rather than offering protective services. In Dungarpur, Christian schools and hostels were invaded by police, who conducted raids without warrants, sometimes only after complaints from VHP or Bajrang Dal workers. In Pratap Nagar, Jaipur, women were assaulted and prayer halls were vandalised without the police filing any FIRs against the perpetrators. Instead, those praying were questioned as to their “conversion motives,” effectively treating them as suspects in their own community.

This pattern demonstrates not only bureaucratic indifference but collusion between law enforcement and vigilante groups. Normative lines of state duty have blurred with the mood of majoritarian sentiments in ways that create a situation of fear, putting Christians in the position of suspicion. By repeating the language of “conversion vigilance,” police and district officials not only create confusion around maintaining civic responsibility, but they also license mob violence in the name of duty.

The overall consequence is that constitutional protection is slowly torn asunder. Article 25 protects freedom of religion; Article 21 protects dignity and freedom. But the rights are now conditional – subject to majority privilege. The events of September 2025 show that when the state becomes a mechanism of ideological enforcement rather than neutrality and fairness in justice, citizenship itself becomes stratified based on faith. Unless there is accountability and equal protection can be guaranteed under the law, the glamorized promise of secular democracy will be meaningless but abiding, while hate will continue to loom under the guise of law and order.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Preksha Bothara)

Related:

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The Anti-Conversion Law of Rajasthan: A threat to individual liberty and religious freedom

“Anti-conversion laws being weaponised”: CJP seeks interim relief against misuse of anti-conversion laws

Everyday Atrocity: Mapping the normalisation of violence against Dalits and Adivasis in 2025

Anti-Christians Widespread hate events on the eve of X’mas, Punjab, UP, Kerala, Rajasthan

The post September of Fear: Targeted Violence against Christians in Rajasthan exposes pattern of harassment after Anti-Conversion Bill appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The complaint, addressed to the DGP and copied to the Maharashtra Home Department and the National Human Rights Commission, argues that such conduct represents a gross violation of the oath of office, the Maharashtra Police Conduct Rules, and the constitutional principle of neutrality that underpins policing in a secular democracy.

CJP has urged immediate suspension of the concerned officers, transfer of the Suleman Pathan investigation to an independent agency, and a state-wide directive reaffirming police impartiality in communal and hate-crime cases.

The Crime: A lynching born of hate

On August 11, 2025, 20-year-old Suleman Khan Pathan, a resident of Betawad Khurd in Jalgaon’s Jamner taluka, was brutally lynched by a mob for being seen in a café with a Hindu girl. The café stands barely a minute’s walk from the local police station.

According to reports by Scroll.in, The Wire, Article 14, and NDTV, the mob dragged Suleman out, kidnapped and assaulted him for hours across multiple locations, and finally beat him to death in front of his family. His father, mother, and sister were also attacked when they tried to intervene.

The FIR, filed promptly under Sections 103(1) and 103(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (the mob-lynching provisions), named eight accused, four of whom — Aaditya Devre, Krushna Teli, Sojwal Teli, and Rishikesh Teli — were later confirmed to be active members of Shiv Pratisthan Hindustan, a Hindutva outfit led by Sambhaji Bhide, known for his anti-Muslim rhetoric and open rejection of India’s tricolour in favour of a saffron flag.

The accused were part of a local network that frequently mobilised against what they called “love jihad,” a discredited conspiracy theory used to demonise interfaith relationships.

The outfit and its ideology

Founded by Sambhaji Bhide in 1984, Shiv Pratisthan Hindustan has over the years built a reputation for hyper-nationalist, anti-constitutional, and communal rhetoric. Bhide’s speeches — including public calls to “chop down Muslim men” and to replace the tricolour with the saffron flag — have repeatedly drawn complaints under hate-speech provisions, though he has rarely faced legal consequences.

Investigations by Scroll.in and The Wire reveal that the outfit has actively expanded its base in northern Maharashtra, with hundreds of local youth being mobilised through cultural runs, martial displays, and social media campaigns steeped in communal imagery. Its members have glorified Suleman’s killers online, labelling the victim a “jihadi” and defending the lynching as “protection of Hindu women.”

The Procession: Police and accused ideologues march together

On Dussehra (October 2025), while the investigation into Suleman’s lynching was still ongoing, Jamner witnessed the Durga Mata Maha Daud — a massive public procession organised by Shiv Pratisthan Hindustan to mark the culmination of Navratri.

Thousands marched in saffron turbans, waving tridents, swords, and lathis, chanting incendiary slogans such as: “Durga ban, tu Kali ban, kabhi na burkhe wali ban” (Become Durga or Kali, but never a woman in a burkha.)

Among them were uniformed police officers, including Inspector Murlidhar Kasar, the original investigating officer in the Suleman lynching case. Videos published on social media show Kasar leading the procession, carrying the outfit’s saffron flag, and welcoming participants with tilaks and flower petals. The flag itself bore a plaque declaring it to be India’s “true national flag”, displaying a saffron map of “Akhand Bharat” that symbolically erases India’s constitutional tricolour. At that moment, the distinction between law enforcers and ideological actors collapsed entirely.

The video may be viewed here:

A betrayal of the police oath and constitutional duty

CJP’s complaint highlights that this conduct is a direct violation of the oath of office sworn by every Maharashtra Police officer — to “bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India” and to perform duties “without fear or favour, affection or ill-will.”

It also breaches the Maharashtra Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1979, particularly:

• Rule 3(1): Every government servant shall at all times maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty, and do nothing unbecoming of a government servant.
• Rule 5(1): No Government servant shall be a member of or be otherwise associated with, any political party or any organization which takes part in politics, nor shall he take part in, or subscribe in aid of, or assist in any other manner, any political movement or activity.
• Rule 24: No Government servant shall, by writing, speech or deed, or otherwise indulge in any activity which is likely to incite and create feelings of hatred or ill-will between different communities in India or religious, racial, regional, communal or other grounds.

By marching in uniform under a communal organisation’s banner, these officers have forfeited the appearance and substance of neutrality. As the complaint notes, “No investigation can be credible when the investigator marches beside those under investigation.” The police oath, the Constitution, and the spirit of secular law enforcement stand violated.

A compromised investigation

For the Pathan family, the participation of these officers has deepened their sense of betrayal.
They had earlier complained of intimidation, deliberate omissions in the FIR, and the police’s refusal to act on their statements naming key assailants. Now, with the same officers seen celebrating alongside members of the accused’s organisation, the family’s fears of bias have turned into certainty. They have indicated their intent to seek judicial monitoring of the case to ensure impartiality.

The legal and ethical context

The Supreme Court of India in Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India (2018) laid down a binding framework to combat mob lynching, directing that all investigations must be impartial, supervised, and shielded from communal influence. It further stated that any police officer found negligent or biased in such cases would face departmental and penal action.

CJP’s complaint invokes these guidelines, arguing that the conduct of the Jamner officers is in contempt of the Supreme Court’s directives and warrants immediate disciplinary inquiry.
It also references the National Police Commission’s Code of Ethics, which demands impartial behaviour and expressly forbids allowing personal or ideological beliefs to influence official actions.

CJP’s demands

In its submission to the DGP, CJP has sought the following immediate measures:

1. Suspension and departmental inquiry against all officers who participated in the Shiv Pratisthan rally, including Inspector Murlidhar Kasar;
2. Transfer of the Suleman Pathan lynching investigation to an independent agency such as the CID;
3. Public clarification from the Maharashtra Police regarding its position on the officers’ participation;
4. Statewide circular reaffirming that police personnel are prohibited from taking part in political, communal, or sectarian processions; and
5. Protection for Suleman’s family and witnesses, who have expressed fear and loss of faith in the current probe.

The Larger Issue: Policing and prejudice

Beyond the specifics of the Suleman case, the incident reflects a larger institutional drift where sections of the police appear to blur the line between law enforcement and ideological alignment. Maharashtra has, in recent years, witnessed a sharp rise in hate speech and communal offences — second only to Uttar Pradesh, according to India Hate Lab’s 2025 report.

In this environment, the neutrality of the police is not just desirable; it is existential.
A single image of an investigating officer carrying a saffron flag can undo decades of trust built between citizens and the state.

The complete complaint may be read here.

Image Courtesy: twitter.com

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The post CJP files complaint to Maharashtra DGP, SP Jalgaon over police participation in communal rally amid Suleman Pathan lynching probe appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Busted! The Delhi High Court strongly questioned the lack of empirical evidence for these claims, pointing out that the government’s decision to bury them inside was a sensitive law-and-order call that could not be challenged over a decade later on mere “personal views.”

Background

On September 24, 2025, the Delhi High Court heard a PIL seeking the removal of the graves of two Kashmiri separatist leaders: Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) founder Mohammad Maqbool Bhatt and Parliament attack convict Mohammad Afzal Guru. Both were sentenced to death and executed in Tihar Jail – Guru in February 2013 and Bhatt in February 1984. They were both buried in the jail premises after performing the last rites according to the Islamic principles, a sensitive decision taken by the government to prevent law-and-order disturbances that may have arisen from public burials.

The petition, filed by Hindu right-wing organisation ‘Vishwa Vedic Sanatan Sangh’ argued that Bhatt and Guru, acting under the influence of “extremist Jihadi ideology,” orchestrated acts of terrorism that gravely threatened India’s sovereignty. The Sangh President, Jitendra Singh Vishen, had previously written to President Droupadi Murmu, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Union Home Minister Amit Shah and Delhi Chief Minister Rekha Gupta, urging them to shift the graves “to the depths of the Atlantic Ocean or to a secret place in the jungles of Amazon” in order to curb “Jihadi mentality” and free the “holy land of India” from the graves, dargahs, and mausoleums of terrorists.

Their plea sought directions to the authorities to remove the graves from Tihar or, as an alternative, to relocate the mortal remains to a secret location to prevent “glorification of terrorism.”

What is the Vishwa Vedic Sanatan Sangh? What purpose does its petition serve? And what larger narrative does it seek to construct? The answers begin to emerge once we look closely at the claims made in their plea.

Claim #1:

The presence of these graves, the petition stated, has turned Tihar jail into a site of “radical pilgrimage” where extremist elements gather to pay homage and venerate convicted terrorists.

Busted – a wild claim without evidence!

In the aforementioned letter, Vishen wrote that the two convicts have become “heroes of the society with a jihadi mindset” and are worshipped as religious leaders by young men who bow before their graves. “People of Jihadi society make fun of the law and order of the country by doing criminal activities day in and day out to offer prayers at the graves of the above two terrorists, and are also popularizing Central Jail Tihar as the graveyard/mausoleum/dargah of the above two terrorists,” the letter claims.

The Delhi High Court pressed the petitioner to produce data showing that people visit the graves to pay homage. Observing that no material had been produced to support the claim aside from stray social media posts, the Court asked, “Where is the empirical data? We cannot act on news clippings.”

Claim #2:

The construction and continued existence of the graves inside a state-controlled prison, counsel for the petitioner argued, was a ‘health hazard’ and a ‘nuisance’ as people are committing crimes to go to the jail and pay homage. 

Busted – legally and factually wanting! 

The Court rejected the argument that there was a ‘nuisance’ within the meaning of Section 398 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act (1957). Chief Justice DK Upadhyaya said, “This provision is made for any kind of nuisance to be removed. Not for the removal of a grave if that grave has been put in with the consent of the authority which owns the land. Jail is not a public place. Jail is a place owned by the State established for a specific purpose of incarceration.”

The Court further emphasised that the government’s action to bury the bodies within the prison was based on a sensitive political and law-and-order situation. The Court could not overturn a policy decision made by the State in an area of its specific and sensitive competence, especially not 12 years later and on unsubstantiated grounds.

Claim #3:

 The graves are unlawful and violate Delhi Prisons Rules 2018, which states that the remains of executed prisoners must be disposed of in a manner that prevents glorification and maintains prison discipline, argued the petition.

Busted – no law prohibits cremation or burial inside the jail!

The Bench corrected the misinterpretation of Rules 895 to 897, remarking that, “if a body has to be transported outside the prison, it has to be done with all solemnity. It doesn’t say that each body has to be taken outside prison.”

Claim #4:

The existence of the graves not only “undermines national security and public order,” but also “sanctifies terrorism in direct contravention of the principles of secularism and rule of law under the Constitution of India,” the petition states.

Busted – no constitutional rights or fundamental rights infringed!

The Court dismissed such a broad constitutional claim. “Tell us which law has been infringed and which fundamental rights of yours have been infringed by this. Something you wish cannot become the subject matter of a PIL,” the Court said, underscoring that the judiciary’s role is to address rights and statutes, not to legislate on personal views. “I like this, you like something else. These are not matters to be taken in courts.”

The High Court further maintained that such policy decisions lay with the government, not the judiciary. “Government decided to have the burial in jail keeping these issues in mind. Can we challenge that 12 years later?” the Bench asked.

“Somebody’s last rites are to be respected.”

Pattern of Post-Mortem Erasure

The petition frames its demand for grave removal as a continuation of an “established state practice,” asking the court to treat the graves of Afzal Guru and Maqbool Bhatt the same way as those of Ajmal Kasab and Yakub Memon, “where every precaution was taken to prevent glorification.”

However, these earlier episodes do not add up to a clear, uniform practice, but a patchwork of administrative choices driven less by due process and more by political spectacle. Administrative powers, court orders and enforcement measures are deployed unevenly, creating a de facto policy that singles out sites linked to Muslim history for agitation, removal, demolition or public shaming.

The petition’s insistence the state follows an “established practice” is undercut by its own example. In September 2022, BJP MLA Ram Kadam shared photos showing marble slabs and LED lighting “adorning” the grave of 1993 Mumbai blasts convict Yakub Memon. A political row erupted: the BJP accused the erstwhile Maha Vikas Aghadi coalition and Shiv Sena leadership of having “beautified” the grave and warned it could become a ‘mazar;’ Shiv Sena leaders countered that the cemetery was privately managed and charged the BJP with trying to divert attention and inflame communal tensions ahead of civic polls. The episode illustrates how these disputes are rarely about procedure, law, or even history – rather, they are exercises in narrative-building and political opportunism.

The same year, a few months later, the spotlight shifted from Mumbai to Satara where the administration demolished structures around the 17th-century tomb of Afzal Khan, the Adil Shahi general slain by Chhatrapati Shivaji. Officially, the drive was framed as the removal of “unauthorised constructions,” with Hindu nationalist groups alleging that the Hazarat Mohammad Afzal Khan Memorial Society was expanding the tomb and glorifying an “enemy of Swaraj” in “Shivaji’s own land.” The demolition was carried out on the 363rd anniversary of Khan’s death and was seen as a major “win” for the Hindutva groups. The Supreme Court later sought reports on whether due process had been followed, but by then the demolition was over. Again, we see how the graves, memory, and history of Indian Muslims are but props in electoral theatre.

In March 2025, following the release of Bollywood film Chhava, a far-right campaign demanded the demolition of Mughal emperor Aurangzeb’s tomb in Chhatrapati Sambhajinagar with VHP-Bajrang Dal warning of a “Babri-like” repeat if the tomb was not removed. The agitation set off communal riots in Nagpur, leaving over 30 injured and 40-year-old welder Irfan Ansari dead.

Is it possible to tell history as the story of one side, while erasing the other? What happens when stories are pared down to black and white, heroes and villains, holy and savage, us and them? Do they still hold memory, or do they begin to serve a purpose beyond remembering? When history is stripped of its layers, nuance, and its many voices, when what remains is defaced textbooks and demolished tombs, are we left with memory — or with propaganda?

Conclusion

The Vishwa Vedic Sanatan Sangh has been party to over 170 cases linked to Hindu majoritarian causes across the country, including the Gyanvapi mosque dispute. Its litigation is driven by an ideology of historical revisionism – recasting India’s past as a story of continuous “foreign aggression” by Muslims and Christians, against the “native” Hindus (a claim categorically debunked by the Indo-Aryan Migration Theory). The purpose is to erase every trace of “foreign” (“enemy”) religious groups in order to establish the Hindu Rashtra.

In the end, demands for post-mortem erasure are not grounded in law, empirical evidence, or constitutional principle. They are acts of disinformation and political theatre, designed to delegitimise the cultural and historical existence of India’s largest religious minority. The campaign to target graves of Indian Muslims – rulers or convicts (or, most frequently, of ordinary citizens and local communities) – is a campaign to deny dignity even in death, and to eternally remember the deceased, and by extension their entire community, as the “perpetual other.”

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this Hate Buster has been worked on by Raaz)

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The post The Politics of Memory: Controversy over graves of Afzal Guru and Maqbool Bhatt appeared first on SabrangIndia.

This is not only a vindication of CJP’s relentless media watchdog efforts but also an institutional acknowledgment that prime-time news debates can fuel communal hatred when stripped of neutrality and balance.

The Spark: Bahraich Violence and its media afterlife

The case traces back to events of October 13, 2024, when communal violence erupted in Bahraich’s Maharajganj area during a Durga Puja immersion procession. Loud music played near a mosque led to clashes, gunfire, and the death of 22-year-old Ram Gopal Mishra, sparking retaliatory violence across the area. Shops, homes, hospitals, and vehicles were vandalised or set ablaze.

Just two days later, India TV aired Coffee Par Kurukshetra, ostensibly to discuss the incident. But instead of sober reportage, the show sensationalised the tragedy, demonised Muslims, and presented the violence as part of a larger “civil war” allegedly being prepared by Muslims against Hindus.

The episode was hosted by Sourav Sharma, with panellists including Professor Sangeet Ragi, Pradeep Singh, and Shantanu Gupta — all of whom used the platform to make sweeping, inflammatory claims against Muslims.

The complete complaint may be read here.

The Complaint

On October 21, 2024, CJP filed a complaint, later escalated on November 6, 2024, underlining the show’s dangerous narrative and violation of broadcasting standards.

CJP pointed to several troubling aspects:

• Loaded language and visuals: The anchor introduced the show with terms like “stone-pelter army”, “extremist Muslims”, “civil war” and “conspiracy”. Aggressive visuals and background music heightened the fear-driven narrative.
• Vilification of Muslims: The broadcast portrayed Muslims as perpetual aggressors and “outsiders,” even invoking Partition to argue Hindus had historically suffered because of Muslims.
• Misuse of religious practices: The Azaan was singled out as disruptive; panellists questioned why Hindus should tolerate it. Muslim festivals were painted as threats to Hindu ways of life.
• Distortions of historical figures: Gandhi and Ambedkar’s words were misquoted or wrenched out of context to argue that they too had warned against Muslims.
• No counter-voices: No Muslim speakers or neutral voices were invited. The discussion was entirely one-sided, with the host tacitly endorsing the communal tone.
• Dangerous calls to action: Guests openly suggested Hindus should “come out with sticks” to defend themselves, with rhetoric escalating to cosmic metaphors of “gods versus demons.”

CJP stressed that airing such a programme without any verified police investigation or neutral reporting amounted to spreading disinformation, promoting hostility, and abandoning journalistic neutrality.

The Broadcaster’s Defence: Freedom of press or abdication of duty?

India TV, in its reply dated November 5, 2024, defended the programme by arguing:

• The show was live, unscripted, and based on free debate; responsibility lay with guests, not the broadcaster.
• The channel did not endorse guest views, which were “diverse perspectives.”
• Freedom of the press under Article 19(1)(a) protected the airing of controversial opinions.
• CJP’s complaint had “selectively quoted” panellists and distorted context.

India TV insisted the host had asked probing questions — such as whether Ram Gopal’s removal of a flag justified his killing — and claimed that presenting historical parallels and references to riots was legitimate.

The Hearing: CJP vs. India TV

The matter was heard by NBDSA on May 29, 2025. CJP reiterated that the show, aired at a time when no official police findings were available, had irresponsibly created an “us vs. them” dichotomy, depicted Muslims as violent conspirators, and stripped the broadcast of neutrality.

The broadcaster doubled down, arguing that controversial views cannot be censored in a democracy, and the complainant had failed to show factual misquotations.

NBDSA’s Findings: A one-sided, communal narrative

After reviewing the broadcast and submissions, NBDSA made several critical findings:

1. Deliberate theme and panel selection

• • The broadcaster had pre-selected a divisive theme and only invited speakers supporting that narrative.
  • No dissenting or balancing voices were included, making the debate fundamentally biased.

The order noted “The Authority found that a particular theme was chosen and thereafter only those persons who have strong views in support of that theme were invited to express their views.”

2. Violation of neutrality

• • Anchors are obliged to moderate and prevent communal provocation.

The order noted “The broadcaster did not include the speakers who could express other side of the picture, and thus the discussion was not balanced and was one-sided. This is clear violation of principle of neutrality under the Code of Conduct. The broadcaster is advised to have such discussions in the programmes keeping in mind the principles of neutrality.”

The Order: Strong directions against India TV

NBDSA’s order issued the following directions:

• Content removal: India TV must delete the impugned broadcast from its website, YouTube channel, and all online links. Written confirmation of compliance must be submitted within 7 days.
• Institutional circulation: The order will be circulated among all NBDA members, Editors, and Legal Heads.
• Public record: The order will be hosted on NBDSA’s website, included in its Annual Report, and released to the media.

The Authority clarified that while its findings apply to broadcasting standards, they do not determine civil or criminal liability — keeping the scope strictly within media regulation.

The order noted that “NBDSA further also directed the broadcaster to remove the videos of the impugned broadcasts, if still available from the website of the channel, or YouTube, and remove all hyperlinks, including access, which should be confirmed to NBDSA in writing within 7 days of the Order.

NBDSA decided to close the complaint with the above observations and inform the complainant and the broadcaster accordingly.

NBDSA directs NBDA to send:

• A copy of this Order to the complainant and the broadcaster;

• Circulate this Order to all Members, Editors & Legal Heads of NBDA;

• Host this Order on its website and include it in its next Annual Report and

• Release the Order to media.”

Why this is a victory

The importance of this order lies in:

• Explicit recognition of one-sided narratives: The order highlights how “debates” can be structured to push communal agendas by excluding balancing voices.
• Anchor accountability: By holding the host responsible for failing to intervene, the NBDSA sets a precedent that anchors cannot hide behind guest opinions.
• Content removal, not just warning: The directive to remove all online traces of the show is stronger than usual, signalling zero tolerance for such broadcasts.
• Validation of civil society monitoring: CJP’s meticulous monitoring, complaint drafting, and legal follow-through stand vindicated, showcasing the role of civil society in holding powerful broadcasters to account.

Conclusion

The NBDSA’s decision reaffirms that freedom of the press cannot be a licence to vilify minorities or erode communal harmony.

For CJP, this win represents the power of consistent vigilance, evidence-based complaints, and commitment to secular values. At a time when hate speech in mainstream media is often normalised, this order proves that institutions can still deliver accountability when pushed with precision and persistence.

This is, without doubt, a small but vital step towards reclaiming media as a forum for truth, balance, and harmony — not hate.

The complete order may be read here.

Image Courtesy: jiotv.com

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The post NBDSA pulls up India TV for communal, one-sided broadcast; upholds CJP complaint against broadcast appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The complaint, addressed to NCM Chairperson Iqbal Singh Lalpura, seeks urgent intervention under Section 9(1)(d) of the National Commission for Minorities Act, 1992, requesting a full inquiry, registration of FIRs against hate speech offenders, and preventive directions to curb vigilante activity and incitement.

Background: The hate campaign after “Operation Sindoor”

According to the complaint, the rise in hate speech is not random but follows a pattern of political and administrative hostility that began after the launch of Operation Sindoor in April 2025. CJP states that post the said operation, arbitrary action officially framed as a crackdown on illegal immigration has increased, degenerating into a campaign of ethnic profiling and arbitrary expulsions, resulting in over 1,500 people being “pushed out” into Bangladesh between May and July 2025 without legal verification by Foreigners Tribunals or access to legal aid.

CJP warns that these actions have created a climate of fear among Bengali-speaking Muslims, especially migrant workers in cities like Mumbai, Delhi, and Ahmedabad, who now face harassment, eviction, and assault under the guise of “protecting the state from infiltrators.”

Scope of incidents documented

The complaint meticulously catalogues over two dozen hate speech incidents between June and September 2025, with supporting links from mainstream and independent media as well as verified social media posts.

• Assam: The epicentre of anti-Muslim rhetoric

CJP identifies Assam as the focal point of the hate campaign. Under the banner of the “Miya Kheda Andolon” (“Expel the Miyas Movement”), local organisations and political figures have launched public drives to evict Bengali-speaking Muslims, often with violent undertones.
Among those named are:

• Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma, who made inflammatory remarks alleging that “newly arrived Muslims” weaponise beef consumption and have built mosques near Satras “to drive out Hindus.”
• Situ Barua of Jatiya Sangrami Sena and Milan Buragohain of All Tai Ahom Students’ Union, both accused of stopping buses and threatening Muslim labourers to “vacate Upper Assam.”
• Bir Lachit Sen, whose followers reportedly conducted door-to-door “document checks” and forced evictions.

CJP documents 18 rallies and nine incidents of targeted violence across 14 districts of Assam in just three weeks (July 9–30, 2025), pointing to a coordinated effort to normalise vigilantism against Bengali-origin Muslims.

• Bihar: Hate speech for electoral gain

As the Bihar Assembly elections approach, CJP notes a strategic deployment of hate speech to polarise voters. Union Home Minister Amit Shah, Union Minister Giriraj Singh, and several BJP leaders including Jagannath Sarka and Samik Bhattacharya are cited for using communal rhetoric in public rallies. CJP highlights a disturbing pattern — speeches describing Bengali-origin Muslims as “demons,” “Rohingya infiltrators,” and “threats to Hindu women” — all couched in the language of demographic panic and cultural invasion.

The complaint underscores that no voter deletions have occurred on the basis of foreign nationality in Bihar’s updated electoral rolls, exposing the falsehood behind the “infiltrator” narrative. Instead, the rhetoric has dehumanised entire groups of internal migrant workers.

• Hate speech spreading nationwide

The complaint lists similar hate-laced incidents across Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Delhi, and Maharashtra, including:

• Kapil Mishra’s speech at Delhi’s PGDAV College claiming a “Rohingya and Bangladeshi settlement conspiracy.”
• Nitesh Rane’s rally in Navi Mumbai urging Hindus to avoid “goltopis and dadiwallas.”
• Mahadev Baba’s hate-filled tirade in Lucknow describing Muslims as “cannibalistic infiltrators.”
• A mob attack at the Constitution Club of India that disrupted a civil society event on Assam’s detention and eviction crisis with chants of “Desh ke gaddaron ko, goli maaro saalon ko.”

Legal and constitutional analysis

CJP’s complaint goes beyond documenting hate speech — it situates these acts within the framework of criminal and constitutional law, citing the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Sections 196, 197, 352, 353) and Section 125 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
The organisation argues that these offences are cognisable and non-bailable, and must invite suo motu action by police in compliance with the Supreme Court’s directives in Shaheen Abdulla v. Union of India (2023).

The complaint draws on key judicial precedents:

• Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan (2014) – defining hate speech as an act of marginalisation and de-legitimisation of vulnerable groups.
• Tehseen Poonawalla (2018) – directing states to curb vigilante violence and appoint nodal officers to monitor hate crimes.
• Amish Devgan (2020) – establishing a higher standard of responsibility for influential figures in public life.

CJP contends that the repeated participation of ministers and legislators in inflammatory campaigns represents a violation of constitutional morality and betrays the secular fabric of the Indian state protected under Articles 14, 15, 19, 21, and 25–30 of the Constitution.

CJP’s key demands to the NCM

The complaint calls upon the Commission to:

1. Take legal cognisance under the NCM Act and initiate an inquiry.
2. Direct registration of FIRs against individuals and organisations spreading hate.
3. Curb vigilante activity by outfits like Bir Lachit Sen and All Tai Ahom Students’ Union.
4. Ensure police compliance with Supreme Court orders on suo motu action.
5. Enforce preventive measures, such as videographing rallies and banning repeat hate offenders.
6. Urge social media platforms to remove hateful content.
7. Launch a fact-finding mission on the profiling, harassment, and eviction of Bengali-origin Muslims nationwide.

Conclusion

CJP’s complaint represents one of the most exhaustive compilations of hate speech documentation in recent months, combining legal precision with humanitarian concern.
It frames the current climate not as a communal clash but as a “systematic campaign of hate speech that slurs, stigmatises, and instigates violence against lawful citizens.”

By appealing to the National Commission for Minorities, CJP has sought to reclaim the constitutional promise of equality and secularism, urging that the language of hate not become the language of governance.

The complete complaint may be read below:

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The post CJP urges NCM action against hate speech campaign vilifying Bengali Muslims as ‘Infiltrators’ appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Recent activity on X (previously Twitter), once again, showcases this mode of policing. Accounts such as Team Falcon and Muslim IT Cell have employed shaming and ridicule to condemn Muslim women for entering temples, forming friendships with men outside their faith, or celebrating their autonomy. Hindu supremacist organizations have found ways of employing the same tactics to marginalize a woman’s choice to marry a man outside of their faith or community, or choose clothing outside the boundaries of permissible attire. Despite presenting opposing principles, the toolbox is strikingly similar to “police” online, to “publicly shame”, and to socially “humiliate” someone into submission and compliance. Be it ‘love jihad’ or ‘bhagwa jihad’ the perpetrators mind-set is strikingly similar.

Common ground: Shaming, justification, surveillance

What is notable about these campaigns is their use of public shaming. Women are marked and shamed for exercising personal agency.

An example: a post by Team Falcon post showed a photo of Muslim women at a temple, with the caption sneering this as “shameful conduct of Muslim women.” Another post demonstrated how a woman was shamed for holding arms with her Hindu friends—that is to say, ordinary social situations were framed as shameful. By publicising women’s names, images, and voicing their social interactions, these accounts have made private behaviour into a public spectacle of communal shaming.

One post shared a photo of two Muslim women, who reportedly were turned away from a Garba event organised at a local mosque. Instead of holding the organisers accountable, the post went after the women specifically, trying to accuse them morally for attending, despite their faith.

Shaming is almost always accompanied by an explanation that the conduct is ideologically wrong. In fact, the rhetoric goes beyond objection of personal conduct to suggesting that women’s choices are a threat to the community. In one post, visiting a temple was framed as evidence of “Bhagwa Jihad,” a term meant to suggest that religious fluidity is part of a conspiracy to transform the community.

Another example stated that Muslim women were “diluting our culture by mixing with Hindus,” which reduces friendship or interfaith marriage to a ‘betrayal of the community’.  This discursive leap from personal agency to community traitor inspires politicized agency and turns it into a conflict of identity.

These stories are preserved by a social surveillance system that invites followers and supporters to act as its enforcers, magnifying and prolonging the policing effect. For example, a Muslim IT Cell post asked supporters to “expose Muslim women who befriend Hindus and betray their deen.”

Such posts act as crowdsourced surveillance, where every choice – what to wear, who to be with – may be subject to scrutiny in the public domain. The result is a constant sense of being watched – an online panopticon in which women are made to second-guess their choices.

Taken together, these practices represent informal yet deeply felt regulations of women’s lives. The coercion is not just in the explicit threats, but also in the fear they produce. Women who are targeted suffer reputational damage, harassment, and ostracism; women who are not targeted come to feel the threat, and, ultimately, censor themselves and withdraw from public life. Hashtags like “Bhagwa Jihad” and posts calling women’s autonomy “disgraceful” function in this same way as a means of ideological control based on obedience brought about from fearing discovery and humiliation.

Constitutional protections undermined

Monitoring women’s decisions online fundamentally contradicts the guarantees in the Constitution of India. These posts constitute a breach of Articles 14, 15, and 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. Article 14 guarantees equality before the law, yet what does it matter when a post describes a woman’s behaviour as “shameful conduct of Muslim women,” only to post another opinion claiming disloyalty for visiting a temple? Article 15 prohibits discrimination on grounds of sex and religion, yet these online campaigns are based on precisely these grounds. Article 19(1) (a) guarantees us freedom of expression, which is broadly interpreted in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence to encompass choices of dress, associations, and beliefs.

At the heart of all these violations lies Article 21. It guards against any violation of the right to life and personal liberty, which has been gradually expanded in case law to include dignity, privacy, and autonomy. Yet, the monitoring and invading of a woman’s private behaviors essentially negates these liberties. When a public social interaction or a photograph can be subclassed or reframed into a documentation of “immorality” or “betrayal,” any assurances of dignity and private space, as contemplated by Article 21, disappear.

When women are demeaned for either entering a temple or upholding interfaith friendships/relationships by being vilified with derogatory and vile terms like “Bhagwa Jihad,” their rights guaranteed in the Constitution become hollowed-out rights. Public degradation dissuades them from expressing themselves, chilling their speech and removing their agency. These case studies expose the inconsistency: constitutional guarantees and judicial pronouncements declare autonomy, dignity, and equality, but the social narrative and digital age conflict with these values every day. Women are free in principle, but the fact-checking hashtags like “Bhagwa Jihad” and public campaigns or calls to “expose” them erode the rights guaranteed to them in the Constitution.

From online narratives to real-world consequences

Online shaming is not limited to timelines or hashtags; it invades women’s daily lives. Women are often shamed through posts and subjected to abuse, harassment, trolling, and stalking. Comments online like, “shameful behaviour of Muslim women,” go beyond disapproval and serve as a way to justify policing women on the street, at school, or at work. On top of this, the damage extends to reputational damage. “Bhagwa Jihad,” and “betrayal of faith” are screen-shotted, shared in WhatsApp groups, and saved, creating a digital footprint that follows women around. Whether true or not, the stigma sticks to women — impacting lives, jobs, education, and relationships.

Furthermore, shaming online leads to community ostracisation. Families often pressure women to leave friendships, jobs, and in some cases, marriages, due to a fear of social stigma. This has deep psychological harm, resulting in self-censorship, withdrawal from public spaces, and anxiety for what could happen if they exercise their autonomy.

Narratives of extremism, whether Muslim or Hindu, utilize the same logic of patriarchal control. In some Muslim extremist narratives, having a friendship with an interfaith person or visiting their place of worship may be viewed as a “betrayal of the deen” — an expectation that women should always carry the burden of safeguarding religious purity. Similarly, Hindu supremacist narratives present a threat of “love jihad” in interfaith marriage, while insisting that women should employ prescribed dress codes to preserve “cultural purity.” The terms may differ, but the strategy is the same: reduce women to instruments of ideological reproduction and limit women’s freedoms to protect the imagined community.

The counter voices as an act of resistance

In the current context of online shaming and moral policing, we have begun to see, from both public figures and ordinary users, a push back against the misogyny present both in Hindu and Muslim extremist narratives. Historian Ruchika Sharma has been particularly vocal, using her X account to explicitly call out Muslim men for hypocritically excluding women from public and religious spaces, while also criticising Hindu supremacy for their almost violent moral policing of women’s dress, marriage, and friendships.

By not allowing either side the luxury of moral high ground, Sharma demonstrates how patriarchy traverses ideological boundaries. These interventions are far from simply rhetorical and create important counter-spaces of resistance, wherein women’s choices become reframed as matters of constitutional rights, rather than communal loyalty. The assertion by Sharma that women’s freedom cannot be bartered away because of any anxieties concerning faith or culture reflects the guarantees embedded in Articles 14 (equality), 19 (freedom of association), and 21 (the right to dignity). Her voice, in fact, shows how social media, notoriously a tool of harassment against women and gender non-conforming persons, can be reclaimed as a space for accountability and counter-narrative.

These instances of resistance signal to us that the digital space is not only a realm of control but also a site of struggle. Resistance voices undermine the legitimacy of an extremist tongue, and in doing so, disrupt the cycle of shaming and surveillance, and offer women and allies a shared vocabulary of solidarity.

In a similar vein, feminist groups, journalists, and student activists condemn moral policing on the internet, provide targeted women with legal and psychological support, and educate the public on constitutional protections. These alternative voices reclaim social media as a public space of accountability and solidarity, demonstrating that resistance is indeed possible and effective.

Women’s autonomy as first casualty

Patterns traced across ideological lines reveal an unsettling truth: women are the first and primary victims of extremist strategies because controlling women constitutes an effective means of enforcement and compliance with extremism. Public shaming, ideological justification, and social surveillance follow women from digital spaces into families, workplaces, and communities, exposing women to reputational, psychological, and social harms.

These practices violate Articles 14, 15, 19, and 21, undermine the aspirations of Vishaka and Shafin Jahan, and erode dignity, freedoms, and the equality of living. Social media and public discourse are vehicles of cultural policing that further amplify exposure to threats and surveillance.

Women’s autonomy is not a negotiable cultural or religious project; it is foundational to democratic society. Maintaining women’s autonomy is non-negotiable and requires platform accountability, legal protections, institutional fortitude, and proactive counter-speech, all stemming from an understanding that gender is to be the first fault line along which extremist ideologies seek to exert control.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this community resource has been worked on by Preksha Bothara)

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The post Misogyny & Faith: Extreme narratives curtailing the autonomy of women appeared first on SabrangIndia.