For Ajabha and her family, her release marked the end of an agonising wait. For CJP’s Assam team, it was a deeply significant milestone in 2026. But the relief was accompanied by a painful reminder of the many people who remain trapped in detention, separated from their families, their health deteriorating and their futures uncertain. Her freedom is also a reminder of what timely legal assistance can mean to someone who has been left without the resources to fight alone.

From a forgotten case to a sustained legal fight

On September 2, 2024, twenty-eight Bengali-speaking Muslims from Barpeta district were taken into custody and placed in a detention camp. When the CJP team met their families, it learnt that Ajabha’s family had not approached the Gauhati High Court on her behalf. The family was extremely marginalised and lacked the means to pursue the legal remedies available to her. At the family’s request, CJP took up Ajabha’s case, providing legal and paralegal assistance and helping bring her plight before the Gauhati High Court.

Detailed story may be read here.

On March 3, 2025, the Gauhati High Court stayed her deportation and sought the Foreigners Tribunal records to review the order declaring her a foreigner. The legal challenge, however, remained pending, and Ajabha continued to be held at Matia.

Detailed piece may be read here.

The High Court proceedings were crucial, but the immediate reality remained stark: an unwell woman was still confined in a detention camp, separated from her family, with no certainty about when she would return home. Without timely legal intervention, Ajabha could have remained without effective recourse to challenge her situation, while the threat of deportation continued to hang over her.

CJP’s work did not end with bringing her case before the Court. The team continued to stand by Ajabha and her family, pursuing every available avenue to secure her release while her substantive legal battle remained unresolved.

Two years in detention. A new effort to bring her home.

On September 1, 2026, Ajabha completed two years in the Matia Transit Camp. Her illness and prolonged confinement made the urgency of securing her release all the more pressing. Although her case was still pending before the Gauhati High Court, CJP’s Assam team began exploring additional avenues for her release on the grounds of her two years in detention and her deteriorating health. The effort drew upon the Supreme Court’s and Gauhati High Court’s suo-motu proceedings concerning detention during and around the COVID-19 period.

From August onwards, the team intensified its efforts. Alongside its continuing legal work, it counselled family members, visited the detention camp, documented her circumstances and initiated the administrative process required to secure her release. CJP Assam State In-charge Nanda Ghosh and legal team member Abhijeet Choudhury contacted the relevant authorities and submitted an application through Ajabha’s son. The work that followed was painstaking and often bureaucratic: identifying suitable bailors, verifying their documents and preparing the necessary applications, affidavits and supporting papers for submission to the District Border Police Office.

By October, Ajabha had spent more than two years and one month in detention. After the documents were submitted to the District Border Branch, officials informed the team that they would be forwarded to Guwahati and that the remaining process would depend on a favourable response. A few days later, the team received word that the processing in Guwahati had been completed and that the next steps could begin.

The team continued to follow up with the authorities through the following week. On October 11, the process was finalised for Ajabha’s release on conditional bail. On October 12, the Border Branch informally indicated that transportation difficulties could delay her release, but that an alternative arrangement might make it possible for her to leave the following day. CJP immediately coordinated with the Border Police and Ajabha’s family to ensure that the arrangements could be made. After more than two years of waiting, October 13 would finally bring her home.

October 13: The long journey back to freedom

CJP Team Assam with Ajabha Khatun after being released

The day began before dawn. At 3:40 a.m., Nanda Ghosh, on behalf of CJP’s Assam team, and office driver Ashikul Hussain set out for Barpeta. The journey involved multiple stops: the Border Branch police quarters, the local police station and Ajabha’s home, where family members had to be brought together with the police for the journey to the Matia Transit Camp in Goalpara. They reached Matia at around 9:30 a.m. After completing the required formalities, the team accompanied Ajabha out of the camp and began the return journey to Barpeta.

By around 1:30 p.m., after hours on the road without food, Ajabha, the CJP team and the three police personnel accompanying them stopped to eat. It was a small, ordinary moment, but one that underscored how much had gone into making this day possible. The journey continued to the Barpeta District Border Branch at the Superintendent of Police’s office, where Abhijeet Choudhury had already begun the necessary work. CJP’s Barpeta District DVM, Jafar Ali, and the two bailors were also present.

Once the team arrived, the remaining formalities involving Ajabha and the bailors were completed, and the Border Police handed her over to the bailors. There was one more official requirement. The team accompanied Ajabha, the two bailors and a family member to Barpeta Sadar Police Station, where she is required to report once a week under the conditions of her release. Only after all these formalities were completed could the team finally take Ajabha home.

“The suffering there is indescribable. Only those who have been there know that pain.”

As soon as Ajabha got into the car, the weight of her long ordeal began to surface. Overcome with emotion, she struggled to find words to express her gratitude to the CJP team. “Baba, may God bless you all!” she said.

Then, speaking about her time in detention, she described the suffering she had endured. “What can I say about the suffering in that detention camp? It is a hell. The suffering there is indescribable. Only those who have been there know that pain!”

But even in that moment of relief, Ajabha was thinking of someone she had left behind. She told the team about Sehera, a visually impaired woman from Barpeta district who remains in the detention camp. Ajabha had cared for her during their time together, bringing her food, washing her clothes and plate, and making her bed.

“Baba, there is a blind woman there who cannot see. She suffers a lot. I used to bring her food, wash her clothes, wash her plate and make her bed. Her name is Sehera. She is from Barpeta district itself, but I don’t know exactly where. I only know her name. Can you please get her released, Baba?”

Ajabha recalled that as she was leaving, Sehera had hugged her and wept. She had asked Ajabha to appeal to the people who had helped secure her release to do the same for her. When I was leaving, she hugged me and cried a lot. She told me to request those who got me released to get her released too. Please get her out of that detention camp just like me. Allah will surely bless you,” Ajabha pleaded.

The request was heartbreaking. After 772 days of confinement, after enduring illness, separation and the uncertainty of her own future, Ajabha’s first concern was for another woman still inside. The CJP team knew Sehera only by name. They assured Ajabha that they would make every effort to trace her and explore the legal avenues available to help secure her release, while acknowledging that they could not guarantee the outcome. Ajabha had finally found her way out. Yet, even as she returned to freedom, she carried with her the anguish of someone who had not.

A village waits. A family welcomes her home.

 

As the sun began to set, the CJP team reached Koetkuchi village with Ajabha. Word of her return had drawn almost the entire village to her home. The moment the car arrived, people rushed forward. Tears, cries and overwhelming emotion filled the scene. After such a long separation, the sight of Ajabha returning home proved almost too much to bear. She fainted several times amid the emotional upheaval.

The team finally handed her over to her family, urging them to take particular care of her physical and mental well-being over the coming days after her prolonged confinement and the strain of the journey. Ajabha’s son, Buddu, works as a migrant labourer in the coal mines of Meghalaya. Unable to be present throughout the release process, he called the team by telephone and expressed his heartfelt gratitude to CJP for helping bring his mother home.

For a family that had spent months grappling with uncertainty and helplessness, her return offered a moment of immense relief. Yet Ajabha knows that her release is conditional and that her case before the Gauhati High Court remains unresolved. Before the team departed, she folded her hands and made one final plea. “I pray that my case ends permanently, Baba, as soon as possible, so that I never have to go to the camp again!”She prayed to Allah for the CJP team.

It was around 9 p.m. when the team finally began its journey home. The day had been long, physically exhausting and emotionally overwhelming. For months, the distress of Ajabha’s family had weighed heavily on the team as it worked to find a way to bring her home. That night, there was finally some relief.

It was not the end of the legal battle. It was not yet the permanent resolution Ajabha desperately wants. But it was a moment when sustained legal work, careful documentation, administrative follow-up and the determination to stand by a marginalised family had helped make a tangible difference.

The fight is not over

Ajabha Khatun’s release is an important milestone for CJP’s Assam team in 2026. It demonstrates the importance of legal assistance that does not stop at filing a petition, but continues through the practical, often exhausting work required to secure relief for a person who may otherwise struggle to navigate the system alone.

Her case also brings into focus the human consequences of prolonged detention for people declared foreigners, particularly those who are ill, economically marginalised and separated from their families while legal proceedings remain pending.

For Ajabha, freedom has meant returning to her village, embracing her family and sleeping once again under the open sky. But her relief remains shadowed by the knowledge that Sehera and others continue to endure detention.

As CJP’s team celebrates Ajabha’s return, it also carries forward the responsibility her plea has placed before it: to try to trace Sehera, explore the available legal remedies and continue working towards relief for those still confined.

After 772 days, Ajabha is home. Her legal case must still reach its conclusion, and the conditions of her release must be respected. For now, a family has its mother back, a village has welcomed one of its own, and a woman who endured the suffering of detention has found the strength to speak for someone still inside. Her freedom is a milestone. Her plea for Sehera is a reminder of the work that remains.

Related:

CJP Win! Gauhati HC stays deportation of Ajabha Khatun, will address bail demand on April 4

Ajabha Khatun, among the 63 facing detention in Assam, seeks Supreme Court intervention, emphasis on pending legal remedies

From Detention to Deportation: The mass deportations and detention crisis at Assam’s Matia centre

How the Rajubala case in the Supreme Court, its genesis and context has now become the ground for ‘state expulsion”

Declared Foreigner, buried Indian: The tragic death of Abdul Matleb in Assam’s detention camp

The post After 772 Days in Detention, Ajabha Khatun Returns Home: CJP helps secure her release appeared first on SabrangIndia.

According to a report by The Indian Express, Ansari was arrested in connection with a case registered under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act. He was allegedly being taken to Sahodra police station when he sustained serious head injuries.

The suspended personnel have been identified as sub-inspectors Ravi Shankar Kumar and Arun Kumar, and constables Saudagar Kumar Yadav, Raj Kumar Rishi, Kundan Kumar and Suman Kumar. All six were posted at Sahodra police station and have been suspended with immediate effect, police said.

In a statement issued on Monday, Bettiah Police said Ansari had jumped from a moving police vehicle while being taken into custody, resulting in grievous injuries. He was taken to a subdivisional hospital in Narkatiaganj and subsequently referred to the Government Medical College and Hospital (GMCH) in Bettiah, where doctors declared him dead on arrival.

Ansari’s family has rejected the police version of events and alleged that he was assaulted in custody.

Following the death of Dilshad Ansari in police custody in #Bettiah, #Bihar, six policemen including the Station House Officer have been suspended. The family alleges that Dilshad was beaten and his death occurred due to a head injury.
The Bihar Police should conduct a fair investigation into the matter.

— Siraj Noorani (@sirajnoorani) October 12, 2026

दिलशाद अंसारी की मौत पर कई गंभीर सवाल हैं। आखिर उस रात क्या हुआ? @Bettiah_Police से माँग है कि CCTV फुटेज, पोस्टमार्टम रिपोर्ट और सभी साक्ष्यों के आधार पर निष्पक्ष जाँच हो। सच्चाई सामने आए, पीड़ित परिवार को इंसाफ मिले! @bihar_police

#JusticeForDilshadAnsari https://t.co/beZXydymQg

— Sartaj Alam Champarni سرتاج (@YouthSartajAlam) October 12, 2026

Family disputes police account

Speaking to the media, his wife, Nagma Khatoon, said a police team took him from their home at around 2 am on October 12. She alleged that the officers assured the family he would be released by morning after questioning. The family later received a call from Banuchhapar police station asking them to reach GMCH in Bettiah, reportedly on the grounds that Ansari had fallen ill. They found him dead on arrival at the hospital, she said. Ansari’s father, Akhbar Ansari, alleged that police personnel had struck his son hard on the head and called for a thorough inquiry into his death. 

Ansari, a resident of Badhayi Tola in Auraiya, under the Banuchhapar police station area, was named as an accused in NDPS case number 65/25, registered on August 8, 2025. Ansari leaves behind his wife and their six-month-old daughter. His family is seeking a high-level investigation into the death.

Calls for accountability

The incident has also drawn criticism from former Rajya Sabha MP Ali Anwar, who heads the All India Pasmanda Muslim Mahaz. In a statement, reported India Today, Anwar urged Bihar Chief Minister Samrat Choudhary to take action against the police personnel allegedly responsible for Ansari’s death.

Citing accounts from social activists in West Champaran, Anwar questioned the claim that Ansari had jumped from a moving vehicle, arguing that the reported absence of injuries to his arms and legs warranted further scrutiny. He also urged the National Human Rights Commission to intervene and called for ex gratia compensation for Ansari’s family.

Related:

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The post Bihar custodial death: Six suspended after Dilshad Ansari’s death in custody; family demands high-level probe appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Organised by People’s First, Citizens for Justice & Peace (CJP) and Vote for Democracy (VFD), the consultation examined the growing concerns surrounding electoral-roll revision, the exclusion of eligible voters, transparency and accountability within the Election Commission of India, and the legal and democratic consequences of conducting elections on disputed or procedurally defective electoral rolls.

Among the prominent voices at the consultation were MG Devasahayam, soldier, economist, administrator and public servant and an expert on India’s electoral system; Dr Pyarelal Garg, former Dean and Professor of Surgery and an expert with VFD; Professor Harish Karnick, formerly of IIT Kanpur; senior RTI activist Venkatesh Nayak; former Union Home Secretary Gopal Krishna Pillai; former Union Finance Secretary EAS Sarma; former bureaucrat Amitabha Pande of the Constitutional Conduct Group; actor Prakash Raj; human rights activist Usha Ramanathan; Thomas Franco, former General Secretary of the All India Bank Officers Confederation; Tara Rao and Noor Sridhar of Wake Up Karnataka; and academic Ashoke Chatterjee.

The consultation reflected the breadth of concern over the SIR process, with participation from Assam, Manipur, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Gujarat, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Delhi, Uttar Pradesh and Jharkhand, among other States. Independent journalists Prashant Tandon of DB Live and Indra Kumar Theradi from Tamil Nadu also participated.

The strong representation from Assam was particularly significant. In a State where citizens have for decades faced the enormous burden of establishing their citizenship through documentary records, Dr Ghyansham Nath, senior academic; Nanda Ghosh of CJP; advocates Mrinmoy Dutta, Abhijeet Chowdhury, Abdur Rahim and Jamal Uddin; Harkumar Goswami; Dr Rituraj Kalita of the Forum for Social Harmony; and Professor Taijuddin Ahmed brought the experience of Assam’s citizenship and electoral processes into the national discussion. The consultation was conducted by Teesta Setalvad, Secretary of CJP.

The diversity of those participating was itself a reflection of the seriousness with which the question of SIR is being viewed. Electoral-roll revision is not merely an administrative exercise. It determines who is recognised as an elector and therefore who is able to exercise one of the most fundamental forms of democratic participation: the right to vote.

The consultation consequently resolved to bring together public mobilisation, systematic documentation, social audits, legal intervention and institutional accountability around a single overarching demand: SIR must be scrapped and the electoral rights of every eligible citizen must be restored and protected.

Demands for the Public Campaigns/ Protests

1. CEC GYANESH KUMAR MUST RESIGN: Resignation/ removal Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) (Impeachment is the legal provision for this process if there is no resignation)

2. SIR MUST BE SCRAPPED: Completely reverse SIR. All future elections to be based on 2024 rolls + any revisions made as per law and past practice for addition/deletion for the past 2 years.

3. ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA MUST BE DISBANDED

4. 2023 ACT THAT GRANTS IMMUNITY TO ECI ETC FROM PROSECUTION & NON-TRANSPARENT APPOINTMENT OF COMMISSIONERS BE REPEALED: Repeal 2023 law giving commissioners immunity for decisions taken.
5. RE-ENACT A LAW FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF ALL ELECTION COMMISSIONERS: This new law should ensure that the Appointment Committee and procedure is broad-based, diverse and ensures some accountability: Appointment by/through a broad based committee of 8-10 people containing two government nominees, two opposition nominees, two past election commissioners (not holding any position given by govt.), two representatives of the higher judiciary (retired judges of high/supreme court not holding any position). The Final Selection should be by two-third majority.
6. ANNUL AND RE-DO ELECTIONS CONDUCTED AFTER THE SIR 2025 PROCESS: Elections to be conducted based on Electoral rolls verified and transparent after annual Summary Revision of 2025 and 2026 as the case may be.
7. TRANSPRENCY & ACCOUNTABILITY IN ECI FUNCTIONING: Complete transparency and public access to all data in machine readable form as soon as it is available to the EC both during elections and during normal times. In particular all electoral rolls, all forms filled by presiding officers during elections, counting related data.
8. MAKE SOURCE CODES(S) PUBLIC: Source code of EVM software, ECInet/EROnet software and any other s/w used for any sanity checks of the electoral roll (e.g. logical discrepancy) should be in the public domain.

Electoral transparency is a constitutional necessity

The Assembly has called for complete transparency in the functioning of the ECI, including public access to electoral data in machine-readable form, electoral rolls, relevant forms filled by election officials and counting-related information. It has also called for the source codes of EVM software, ECINet, ERONet and other software used for electoral-roll verification and discrepancy detection to be placed in the public domain. These demands arise from a fundamental democratic principle. Citizens cannot effectively challenge an electoral decision if the processes producing that decision remain inaccessible or impossible to independently scrutinise. Digitalisation cannot become a substitute for accountability.

If an elector’s name is deleted, the citizen must be able to know why. If a deletion application has been filed, the grounds and source of that application must be capable of scrutiny. If a claim for inclusion is rejected, the elector must have access to the reasons. If an appeal is pending, its status must be ascertainable. If software contributes to identifying a discrepancy or exclusion, there must be an auditable record of how that decision was generated and reviewed. A constitutional election process cannot be allowed to operate as a black box.

Legal intervention must be narrow, rigorous and evidence-based

The Assembly has resolved to assist in exploring appropriate legal remedies concerning the SIR and electoral processes conducted on the basis of disputed or procedurally defective rolls. The legal strategy must begin with evidence. It must document patterns of exclusion, bulk deletion applications, Forms 6 and 7, software-related exclusions, unresolved appeals, failures of restoration and instances where citizens were denied meaningful opportunities for verification or hearing.

This approach is especially important after the Supreme Court’s May 2026 judgment concerning Bihar. The appropriate constitutional question now is not simply whether the ECI possesses the power to undertake an intensive revision, but whether particular exercises of that power comply with the statutory framework and constitutional safeguards.

Where elections have already been conducted on rolls shown to have been seriously compromised, remedies must be examined through the statutory framework governing election challenges and on the basis of constituency-specific evidence. The Assembly has specifically identified the large number of pending appeals and limited restoration of voters in West Bengal as matters requiring close examination before any conclusions are drawn about the validity of elections conducted on the revised rolls.

Give every excluded voter a name and a face

The Assembly has therefore called for a nationwide Public Social Audit of electoral rolls across SIR-affected States. Civil-society organisations, community groups, youth organisations and citizens are being encouraged to undertake participatory verification at the booth, ward and Gram Sabha levels, with the involvement of the concerned Booth Level Officer and Electoral Registration Officer wherever possible.

Such exercises have already been undertaken in parts of Delhi and across approximately 100 booths in Karnataka. The Assembly seeks to expand these efforts into a systematic national campaign documenting exclusions, pending claims and objections, Forms 6 and 7, deletion notices, bulk applications and procedural violations.

This public process will include comparing the SIR-driven deletions and additions with a comparison of earlier electoral records, including the 2002-03 rolls where relevant, with the 2025-26 SIR rolls is intended to establish what happened to individual voters rather than allowing their exclusion to disappear into administrative statistics.

The campaign is intended to give a face and name to the 13.60 crore Indians so tragically and shamefully excluded. That too by a constitutional authority like the Election Commission of India. The conduct of this Campaign for a Public Social Audit is crucial to drum up and sustain the demand for a Scrapping of the 2025-2026 SIR.

Every proposed deletion and addition must be publicly disclosed, with the voter given a meaningful opportunity to contest the deletion and have their name restored where wrongly excluded. The process must ensure transparency regarding who sought a deletion, on what grounds, whose name is proposed to be deleted and what verification was undertaken. No electoral-roll change should be affected without public notice, verification and an effective opportunity to object.

Independent inquiry must strengthen public accountability

The Assembly has welcomed the Independent Commission of Former Supreme Court and High Court Judges constituted by the Lawyers Association for Constitution (LAFC) to examine the constitutional and statutory validity, methodology and impact of the SIR. The five-member Commission, chaired by former Supreme Court judge Justice Madan B. Lokur, includes former Supreme Court judge Justice A.K. Patnaik and former judges of the Jammu & Kashmir, Delhi and Patna High Courts. It proposes to conduct public hearings, collect testimony from affected citizens and analyse electoral-roll data, with a report expected by December 2026.

The Assembly will assist this process by placing before the Commission relevant data, documentation and evidence emerging from public campaigns, independent investigations and social audits. Such an inquiry must complement, not replace, judicial and statutory remedies. Its importance lies in bringing together evidence that is otherwise dispersed among individual voters, election officials, civil-society groups and independent investigations.

Electoral democracy cannot survive exclusion without accountability

The controversy surrounding SIR has brought together questions that cannot be treated separately: the integrity of electoral rolls, the right to vote, institutional independence, and transparency, collective decision-making and judicial accountability. The integrity of an election begins long before polling day. It begins with the electoral roll.

If an eligible citizen is removed without adequate notice, verification or an effective remedy, the democratic injury occurs before that citizen ever reaches the polling station. The October 3 Assembly has therefore resolved to combine public mobilisation, social audits, evidence-building, legal intervention and institutional accountability around one central demand.

Every eligible citizen must have the right to remain on the electoral roll, to know why any deletion is proposed, to challenge it effectively and to have a wrongful exclusion corrected.

Scrap SIR and restore electoral rolls

The Assembly has called for the SIR process to be completely reversed and for future elections to be conducted on the basis of the 2024 electoral rolls, subject to additions and deletions carried out through the ordinary statutory processes and established safeguards. The demand comes against the backdrop of the Supreme Court’s May 2026 judgment upholding the constitutional validity of the Bihar SIR. That judgment, however, cannot be read as placing every subsequent decision or implementation of SIR beyond judicial scrutiny. The present controversy concerns not merely the existence of a power to revise electoral rolls, but the manner in which that power is exercised, the safeguards accompanying it and the legality of particular decisions taken during the process.

The distinction is crucial. A constitutional power must still be exercised in accordance with the Constitution, the Representation of the People Acts, the Registration of Electors Rules, applicable directions and the principles of procedural fairness. The Assembly therefore proposes an evidence-based legal strategy focused on specific violations, documented exclusions, defective procedures and departures from statutory safeguards rather than relying on broad assertions about the SIR in the abstract.

The Election Commission cannot function without accountability

The Assembly has demanded the resignation of CEC Gyanesh Kumar and has also called for a fundamental restructuring of the institutional framework governing the Election Commission. These demands have acquired renewed significance following the Supreme Court’s October 5 proceedings concerning allegations that important decisions connected with the SIR were taken unilaterally by the CEC despite objections from the other two Election Commissioners.

Reports based on an investigation by The Indian Express have stated that Election Commissioners Sukhbir Singh Sandhu and Vivek Joshi recorded objections on at least 14 occasions over ten months concerning decisions and orders connected with the SIR, with some objections alleging that decisions were taken without their knowledge or contrary to their recommendations. The Supreme Court has now sought responses and records from the concerned authorities. The Court declined, at this stage, to suspend the CEC, but made clear that the legality of the alleged unilateral decisions remains open for examination. It also indicated that decisions of the Commission must comply with the legally prescribed mechanism of collective decision-making.

The controversy over Form 6 makes the issue particularly serious. During the October 5 hearing, Chief Justice of India Surya Kant clarified that the Supreme Court had not approved modifications allegedly made to Form 6 and indicated that the Court would examine who authorised those changes.

Form 6 is a form distinctly and procedurally meant for enrolment of first-time new voters. The ECI, by using this process meant for a limited and specific purpose, for the re-enrolment of wrongfully deducted previous voters is itself committing a flawed illegality and asking citizens to do the same. Making matters worse, the amended Form 6 includes a declaration on oath by an older voter to the effect that ‘she or he has not voted before’, making matters worse.

The question before the country is consequently larger than whether one particular administrative decision was correct. It is whether a constitutional body exercising enormous power over the democratic franchise is functioning collectively, transparently and within the limits imposed by law.

The complete resolution may be read below:

Related:

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From Statelessness to Citizenship: CJP helps Adori Bibi reclaim her Indian identity

Who had access to 3,404 SIR forms? CJP, VFD and BCS seeks statewide audit after Kharghar breach

The language of the lathi

Another CJP Victory: Barpeta Tribunal declares Alam Khan ‘not a foreigner’

The post Scrap SIR, Restore Electoral Integrity: A national call to defend the right to vote appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The incidents documented this month of September range from demands linked to the Mathura temple-mosque dispute and provocative religious sloganeering outside a mosque to warnings against alleged “infiltrators”, claims of Hindu demographic decline and repeated exhortations to acquire weapons. While the speakers and settings differ, the rhetoric follows recognisable patterns of exclusion and otherisation.

From a place of worship to a demand for its “liberation”

Location: Basti, Uttar Pradesh

Date: September 4

On the occasion of Krishna Janmashtami, Vishva Hindu Mahasangh leader Akhilesh Singh asserted that if those celebrating Janmashtami had taken an oath to celebrate it only after demolishing the mosque in Mathura, similar to the Babri Masjid, and “freeing” the temple, it would have been “freed” long ago. He claimed that Krishna had been imprisoned in a jail and that the temple had been occupied. He also announced a march for “Krishna Janmabhoomi” in October.

https://t.me/hindutvawatchin/5188

On September 4 in Basti, Uttar Pradesh, Vishva Hindu Mahasangh leader Akhilesh Singh used the occasion of Krishna Janmashtami to invoke the Mathura mosque-temple dispute. He said that if those celebrating Janmashtami had taken an oath to celebrate it only after demolishing the mosque in Mathura, “like the Babri Masjid”, and “freeing” the temple, it would have been “freed” long ago. He also announced a march for “Krishna Janmabhoomi” in October.

The significance of this rhetoric lies in the transformation of a contested place of worship into a religious obligation. The mosque is not presented simply as a structure involved in an ongoing legal and political dispute. Its presence is rhetorically framed as an obstacle to the fulfilment of a Hindu religious claim.

The invocation of the Babri Masjid demolition is particularly concerning. A constitutional and legal dispute over a place of worship is thereby connected to a historical episode in which a mosque was demolished by a extremist mobilisation. The language of “liberation” further recasts the removal of a Muslim religious site as an act of religious restoration. This is one of the recurring mechanisms through which religious difference becomes exclusionary: a particular religious community is represented as occupying space that rightfully belongs to another.

When religious practice becomes a public assertion against Muslims

Location: Achalpur, Amravati, Maharashtra

Date: September 8

During a grand Kanwar Yatra organised by Jableshwar Baba Mitra Mandal, participants recited the Hanuman Chalisa and raised “Jai Shri Ram” slogans outside a mosque, with former MP Navneet Rana seen reciting the Hanuman Chalisa. The religious recitation and slogan-shouting reportedly led to brief communal tension, following which security was tightened in the area.

https://t.me/hindutvawatchin/5194

A similar dynamic appeared in Achalpur, Amravati, on September 8, where participants in a Kanwar Yatra organised by Jableshwar Baba Mitra Mandal recited the Hanuman Chalisa and raised “Jai Shri Ram” slogans outside a mosque. Former MP Navneet Rana was seen participating in the recitation. The incident reportedly generated brief communal tension, after which security was increased.

When religious activity is deliberately performed outside another community’s place of worship and accompanied by slogans that have acquired a powerful political resonance, religion can cease to function merely as an expression of personal faith. It can become a public demonstration of dominance, particularly where the immediate setting is already communally sensitive. The issue, therefore, is not the Hanuman Chalisa itself. It is the use of religious symbolism in a setting where the identity of another religious community becomes part of the spectacle.

Constructing the Muslim as the outsider

Location: Howrah, West Bengal

Date: September 11

A Hindu nationalist speaker, defending religious preacher Dhirendra Shastri’s comment about banning non-vegetarian food from Durga Puja, warned that anyone who insulted a saint again would be “beaten so badly” that they would be unable to get up. He targeted those he termed “Bangladeshi infiltrators”, accusing them of disrespecting Bengali culture and vandalising Durga Puja pandals, breaking Saraswati idols, and setting fire to pandals. He named Muslim leaders from opposition parties and alleged that such people had “become Bengalis” and accused “intellectuals” of abusing Hindus who worship Durga and Saraswati. He claimed that efforts had begun in Bengal to get rid of this “drug” from their minds.

https://t.me/hindutvawatchin/5258

In Howrah, West Bengal, on September 11, a Hindu nationalist speaker defending religious preacher Dhirendra Shastri’s remarks on non-vegetarian food during Durga Puja threatened that anyone who insulted a saint again would be “beaten so badly” that they would be unable to get up. The speech then moved from defending a religious figure to identifying an alleged enemy.

The speaker referred to people he described as “Bangladeshi infiltrators” and accused them of disrespecting Bengali culture, vandalising Durga Puja pandals, breaking Saraswati idols and setting fire to pandals. Muslim political leaders were named, while “intellectuals” were accused of abusing Hindus who worship Durga and Saraswati. This is a familiar form of otherisation: disparate questions of nationality, religion, culture, political affiliation and alleged criminality are collapsed into a single hostile category.

The label “Bangladeshi infiltrator” is particularly potent in this construction. It does not merely describe an alleged immigration status. In the speech, it becomes attached to a broader image of the Muslim as someone who does not belong to Bengal, does not respect its culture and is therefore positioned outside the legitimate social body. The result is a rhetorical equation in which defending Hindu religious culture is presented as requiring resistance to an allegedly Muslim threat.

From demographic anxiety to militarisation

Location: Rasdhan, Kanpur Dehat, Uttar Pradesh

Date: September 14

During a Ganesh Utsav program, far-right monk Madhuram Sharan Shiva, leader of the armed monks’ group Shiva Shakti Akhada, invoked Partition to claim that Hindus were again facing a similar “tragedy” because they were “weapon less.” He claimed that 10 lakh Hindus were killed during Partition and suggested that a similar number of “Miya” could have been killed had Hindus been armed. He contrasted Hindus’ worship of Ram with his killing of demons and urged Hindus to take up weapons to protect their religion. He also alleged that Hindus were converting to Christianity and Islam because they lacked knowledge of Hindu deities and religious teachings. He urged organisers to establish classes in temples to teach children aged 6–14 about Hindu deities, arguing that merely installing Ganesh idols was not enough to establish dharma.

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The speeches by far-right monk Madhuram Sharan Shiva across Uttar Pradesh in September took this logic further. At a Ganesh Utsav programme in Rasdhan, Kanpur Dehat, on September 14, Shiva invoked Partition to claim that Hindus were again facing a similar “tragedy” because they were “weapon less”. He referred to the deaths of Hindus during Partition and suggested that a comparable number of “Miya” could have been killed had Hindus been armed. He invoked Ram’s killing of demons and urged Hindus to take up weapons to protect their religion.

Location: Kanpur Nagar, Uttar Pradesh

Date: September 15

During a Ganesh Utsav program, far-right monk Madhuram Sharan Shiva, leader of the armed monks’ group Shiva Shakti Akhada, questioned why the Ganesh idol does not carry weapons and alleged that Hindus were gradually declining across the world because they had abandoned weapons. He claimed that religious scriptures are torn and places of worship destroyed when Hindus do not practise weapons training, asserting that “if there is knowledge of dharma and shaastra (religious scriptures), that knowledge is incomplete without weapons.”

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The following day, at another Ganesh Utsav programme in Kanpur Nagar, he questioned why the Ganesh idol did not carry weapons and argued that religious knowledge was incomplete without weapons.

Location: Makhi, Unnao, Uttar Pradesh

Date: September 16

During a Ganesh Utsav program, far-right monk Madhuram Sharan Shiva, leader of the armed monks’ group Shiva Shakti Akhada, fearmongered about the decline of the Hindu population, citing Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh and alleging that Hindu populations in nine states had fallen from around 90% to as low as 5–10%, leaving Hindus unable to organise religious events. He claimed that religious scriptures are torn and places of worship destroyed when Hindus do not practise weapons training, alleging that more than 500,000 temples were destroyed over 500 years. He questioned why “no god” came to protect temples when the Ram temple and Somnath temple were destroyed, arguing that Hindu religious teachings require Hindus to protect their own faith and that “without weapons, protection is impossible.” He urged Hindus to study their religious scriptures and become “dharma yoddhas,” declaring that those who carry weapons become “veers” (brave warriors).

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On September 16 in Makhi, Unnao, the rhetoric centred on alleged Hindu demographic decline. Shiva invoked Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh and made claims about the Hindu population having fallen dramatically in several Indian states. He also alleged that hundreds of thousands of temples had been destroyed over centuries and asked why Hindu gods had not protected temples such as the Ram temple and Somnath. His conclusion was that Hindus themselves must become “dharma yoddhas” and that protection of the faith was impossible without weapons.

The argument begins with fear. Hindus are portrayed as a community in demographic decline, surrounded by hostile forces and historically dispossessed of temples. That fear is then connected to a solution: Hindu unity, physical preparedness and weapons. Religion thus becomes not simply an identity but a justification for militarisation.

The invocation of Hindu gods and religious texts plays an important role in this process. Religious figures are selectively interpreted through the vocabulary of battle, while the distinction between spiritual instruction and physical confrontation is deliberately narrowed. The implied message is that to be a sufficiently committed Hindu, one must be prepared to defend the community against an identified adversary.

The making of an internal enemy

The rhetoric also repeatedly moves beyond an abstract “threat” to identify Muslims as the people against whom Hindu unity must be consolidated. That distinction matters. A speech about preserving one’s religion does not automatically constitute hate speech. But when religious preservation is constructed through the identification of another religious community as dangerous, disloyal, invasive or responsible for historical and contemporary grievances, religious identity becomes a mechanism of exclusion.

The September speeches repeatedly follow this trajectory. Muslims are represented variously as occupants of Hindu sacred spaces, cultural outsiders, demographic threats, political enemies or people against whom Hindus must physically organise. The vocabulary changes, but the underlying structure remains strikingly similar.

From “Hindu culture” to political ownership

Location: Dongri, Mumbai, Maharashtra

Date: September 23

During a Ganesh celebration, BJP MLA Nitesh Rane declared that India was a Hindu Rashtra and said that in Dongri he wanted to hear “Har Har Mahadev” and not “I Love Mohammed”, while describing the government as one based on Hindutva ideology. He also referred to Muslims as “green snakes” and said he would always stand with Hindus in disputes with Muslims.

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The September 23 incident in Mumbai brought this directly into electoral and political language. During a Ganesh celebration in Dongri, BJP MLA Nitesh Rane declared that India was a Hindu Rashtra and said that he wanted to hear “Har Har Mahadev” rather than “I Love Mohammed” in Dongri. He described the government as one based on Hindutva ideology, referred to Muslims as “green snakes” and said he would stand with Hindus in disputes involving Muslims. Here, religious identity is explicitly linked to political authority and territorial belonging.

Dongri is not merely a neighbourhood in this formulation. It becomes a symbolic site in which one religious expression is presented as belonging and another as something that should not be heard. The contrast between “Har Har Mahadev” and “I Love Mohammed” is particularly revealing. It converts religious expression into a test of communal ownership: one slogan is presented as appropriate to the space, while the other is implicitly marked as alien. The reference to Muslims as “green snakes” goes a step further by reducing an entire religious community to a dehumanising metaphor.

A recurring grammar of exclusion

Read individually, these incidents come from different contexts. Taken together, however, they reveal a recurring rhetorical grammar.

First step: Sacred injury- A mosque is presented as occupying a Hindu sacred site. A temple is described as having been destroyed. A religious figure is portrayed as having been insulted. Hindu festivals are presented as being under threat.

Second step: Collective identification- The alleged perpetrator is no longer an individual. “Muslims”, “Miya”, “Bangladeshi infiltrators” or an undefined Muslim political establishment become collective categories.

Third step: Invoke fear- The community is portrayed as demographically declining, culturally threatened, historically victimised or physically vulnerable.

Final step: Mobilisation- The proposed response ranges from marches and public religious assertions to demands for religious unity and, in the most extreme speeches, weapons training and physical confrontation.

This progression is important because hate speech does not always begin with an explicit call for violence. It can begin by changing how a community is imagined. A mosque becomes an encroachment. A Muslim becomes an outsider. A demographic change becomes an existential threat. A historical grievance becomes a present danger. Religious self-defence becomes a justification for arming. And eventually, violence or confrontation can be presented as the logical consequence of protecting the community.

Religion as an instrument of otherisation

The central issue running through these September incidents is therefore not religious belief itself. It is the political use of religious identity to divide the population into those who supposedly belong and those who supposedly threaten that belonging. Hindu festivals provide the setting. Temples and mosques provide the symbols. Religious figures provide moral authority. Historical episodes provide grievance. Demographic claims provide fear. Political slogans provide mobilisation. Muslims are repeatedly positioned at the other end of this construction.

This matters because constitutional secularism does not require citizens to abandon their religions. It requires the State and public institutions to recognise citizens as equal members of the political community regardless of religion. The danger in this rhetoric lies precisely in the opposite proposition: that religious identity determines who has a stronger claim to public space, cultural legitimacy or political belonging.

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The Kanwar Yatra: Between devotion and domination

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Hate Watch: Jihad rhetoric, forced sloganeering mark UP-Uttarakhand week

Clashes, Slogans, Stone-Pelting: How Eid Milad processions turned tense across India

The post ‘Free the Temple’, ‘Protect the Faith’, ‘Take Up Weapons’: How September’s festivals became stages for anti-Muslim hate appeared first on SabrangIndia.

A documentary about Khalid scheduled to be screened at the National Law School of India University (NLSIU) on September 14, was suddenly postponed. The Law & Society Committee, which had organised the event, said it had taken the decision because of “logistical and security considerations” and insisted that it was not backing down because of pressure. The documentary, Prisoner No. 626710 is Present, directed by Lalit Vachani, was to be shown to mark Political Prisoners’ Day and six years since Khalid’s arrest.

However, developments around the screening tell a different story. The postponement came after opposition from the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP), which had demanded that the screening be cancelled and subsequently claimed credit for its postponement. The News Minute reported that the organisation affiliated to the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) had formally complained to the NLSIU administration about the screening. The Quint likewise reported that the organisers maintained that their decision was not a response to external pressure. Significantly, the NLSIU episode was not an isolated incident.

Just weeks earlier, Jawaharlal Nehru University had formally cancelled the booking of an auditorium for a discussion around Khalid’s book, Fractured Communities: Adivasi Histories and the Politics of Power. While the university cited the organisers’ alleged “non-disclosure of the full facts” of the programme, this was contested by the organisers and as reported in The New Indian Express and Sabrangindia, the programme went ahead with retired professors addressing the gathering just outsider the School of Social Sciences-II building. A report on this may be read here.[1]

There is an unmistakable irony to these episodes.

While universities debate whether his work can be discussed, the much larger question remains unresolved: how long can a person remain imprisoned before the criminal justice system is required to put its case to trial?

Umar Khalid was arrested in September 2020 under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) in connection with the alleged larger conspiracy behind the February 2020 North-East Delhi riots. Six years later, the trial has still not begun. That fact is no longer a footnote to the case. It is the case. Two thousand, one hundred and ninety days as an under-trial prisoner.

Six years, and still waiting for a trial

Khalid has now spent six years in custody as an under trial. The prosecution case against him is “extensive” yet key allegations have not been buffeted by adequate evidence. The Delhi Police filed a charge sheet running into 11 volumes and more than 17,000 pages in September 2020. The larger conspiracy case involves many accused and, according to an August 2026 open letter signed by more than 100 public figures, the prosecution has listed around 900 witnesses. Yet the trial has not begun.

This creates a constitutional problem that cannot simply be answered by pointing to the seriousness of the allegations. Article 21 protects the right to life and personal liberty and has long been interpreted by the Supreme Court to include the right to a speedy trial. In Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court specifically recognised that prolonged incarceration can, in appropriate circumstances, justify bail even where stringent statutory restrictions apply.

The tension between that constitutional principle and the UAPA’s stringent bail regime now sits at the centre of Khalid’s case. Six years of imprisonment without trial means that the punishment of incarceration is being experienced before guilt has been adjudicated. That distinction matters.

Khalid has not been convicted of the allegations against him. The charges remain allegations. His guilt or innocence is ultimately for a trial court to determine after evidence is tested. But the trial has not begun.

The arrest came after years of being a public dissenter

Khalid’s current incarceration cannot be understood without the political and legal history that preceded it. A former JNU student leader and research scholar, Khalid emerged as a prominent public voice on questions of communalism, citizenship, minority rights and state power.

His name first became nationally prominent during the 2016 JNU controversy. In February that year, he was arrested in connection with an event held at JNU protesting the execution of Parliament attack convicts Afzal Guru and Maqbool Bhat. He and others were accused under provisions including sedition and criminal conspiracy. The case itself became emblematic of the criminalisation of political expression on university campuses. Then, SabrangIndia had interviewed Umar Khalid, and the two-part conversation can be viewed here and here.

In January 2019, the Delhi Police filed a charge sheet against Khalid and former JNU student leader Kanhaiya Kumar in the sedition case. Then came the political upheaval surrounding the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA 2019) and the proposed National Register of Citizens (NRC). Khalid was among those who participated in and addressed protests against the CAA-NRC framework in 2019 and 2020.

On February 17, 2020, Umar Khalid spoke about peaceful protest and invoked Gandhian methods. A portion of his remarks was subsequently circulated widely on social media after BJP IT-cell head Amit Malviya posted an edited interpretation of his comments. Worse, just ahead of the 2020 Delhi Assembly elections, Kapil Mishra of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) had stated on Twitter, “Delhi mein chote chote Pakistan bane (Delhi will become mini-Pakistan)” and “Shaheen Bagh mein Pak ki entry (Shaheen Bagh will serve as entry for Pakistan) as reported by The New Indian Express and The Hindu.” Mishra was even subsequently booked under Section 125 of the Representation of People Act, 1951 (RP Act), for promoting enmity between classes to gain an advantage during the elections and thereafter in June June 2024, Mishra was summoned by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. At the time in 2020, the Delhi High Court made the Delhi Police watch four videos in court establishing hate speeches that had been made by politicians but not acted on by the police. Kapil Mishra was one of the four videos. Justice Murlidhar who came down on the police sharply for inaction was summarily transferred to the Punjab and Haryana High Court. Despite the fact that the case dwindled to naught later, there have been sharp critiques on how justice has been selectively delivered. Not just Mishra but Anurag Thakur, were recorded delivering provocative and incendiary hate speeches at election rallies in February 2020. The courts, including the Supreme Court of India were eventually lenient with them (2026) as compared to the young Muslim student leadership at the helm of the anti-CAA/NRC protests. At an election rally, Anurag Thakur, an elected official of the BJP, was heard leading a chant of “Desh ke gaddaron ko…”, to which the crowd responded, “Goli maaron saalon ko.” The slogan went viral and drew widespread criticism. Just weeks later, Delhi witnessed large-scale communal violence that claimed 53 lives, with allegations raised that such speeches contributed to the charged atmosphere. Yet it was Umar and 17 others who bore the brunt of the blame for the violence.[2]

Days later, North-East Delhi descended into brute and targeted communal violence. Fifty-three people were killed and hundreds were injured. Ignoring the deliberate provocations by elected officials of the ruling BJP, the Delhi Police chose to target on the previous, vibrant and widespread anti-CAA/NRC protest leadership, developed a theory of a “larger conspiracy”, alleging that the anti-CAA protest movement had been used to plan and orchestrate the violence. Khalid became one of the principal accused in that case. Incidentally, while the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) was in power at the time and returned to power after the state elections, the Delhi police are controlled directly by the central/union ministry for home affairs.

September 2020: The beginning of six years behind bars

Khalid was arrested on September 13, 2020, under the UAPA. The prosecution alleged that he played a central role in the conspiracy behind the riots. The case was not merely an ordinary prosecution arising from individual acts of violence. The police’s case was that Khalid, and others were part of a broader conspiracy connected to the anti-CAA protests and that the protests themselves were used as part of a plan culminating in the violence.

The prosecution has repeatedly described Khalid as one of the alleged “masterminds” of the conspiracy. Khalid has consistently denied the allegations. What followed was a prolonged battle over bail and liberty.

2021: The first long bail battle

In April 2021, a Delhi trial court granted Khalid bail in a separate IPC case relating to the Delhi riots, observing that the material against him was sketchy and that he could not be incarcerated indefinitely on such material. That did not result in his release. His UAPA case continued.

By September 2021, his lawyers were back before the court seeking bail in the larger conspiracy case. The arguments went to the heart of the prosecution’s theory. Khalid’s lawyers argued that participation in protests, membership of WhatsApp groups and advocacy of a chakka jam could not, by themselves, constitute a terrorist conspiracy.

The defence also argued that the prosecution was attempting to paint a large number of individuals with the same brush and that the charge sheet presented a narrative rather than evidence establishing Khalid’s criminal role. The prosecution disputed this and argued that the protests had been systematically organised and synchronised. The bail hearings continued for months. In March 2022, the trial court rejected Khalid’s bail application. The court found a prima facie case against him under the UAPA. Khalid remained behind bars.

2023–24: The Supreme Court route and repeated adjournments

Khalid approached the Supreme Court. Notice was issued in May 2023. What followed was another prolonged sequence of hearings and adjournments. The matter was repeatedly listed before different benches. There were adjournments because of the unavailability of counsel, constitutional bench proceedings, changes in bench composition and the recusal of a judge.

On August 9, 2023, the matter came before Justices A.S. Bopanna and Prashant Kumar Mishra. Justice Bopanna indicated that the matter would come before another bench after Justice Mishra’s recusal. On September 12, the Supreme Court admitted the bail plea but indicated that the documentary material would have to be examined in detail. The hearings continued into October and November. In January 2024, the matter was again repeatedly adjourned. There were 44 deferrals of the matter before the apex court.

Finally, on February 14, 2024, Khalid withdrew the Supreme Court petition, with his counsel telling the court that he would pursue the matter before the trial court on account of a “change in circumstances”. That change did not result in liberty.

2024: Back to the trial court

In July 2024, Khalid moved the Karkardooma court for bail. The proceedings again became protracted. On May 28, 2024, the Karkardooma court rejected his bail plea. The prosecution argued, among other things, that Khalid had amplified what it described as a “false narrative” through social media. The defence rejected the allegations and continued to challenge the evidentiary basis of the prosecution case. The central problem, however, remained unchanged. Khalid was still in prison. And there was still no trial.

2025: Another rejection, another year in custody

On September 2, 2025, the Delhi High Court rejected Khalid’s bail plea. The court accepted the prosecution’s contention that the Delhi riots were the result of a “premeditated, well-orchestrated conspiracy” rather than a spontaneous eruption of violence. The court also held that delay in trial, by itself, could not justify bail given the gravity of the allegations.

Khalid challenged the decision before the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, the years continued to accumulate. In December 2025, a Delhi court granted him interim bail for 14 days so that he could attend his sister’s wedding. It was a brief departure from a pattern otherwise defined by continued incarceration. He returned to prison.

January 5, 2026: the Supreme Court’s crucial order

The most consequential development came on January 5, 2026. The Supreme Court, in Gulfisha Fatima v. State (NCT of Delhi), granted bail to five accused in the Delhi riots larger conspiracy case: Gulfisha Fatima, Meeran Haider, Shifa-ur-Rehman, Mohammad Saleem Khan and Shadab Ahmed. But it denied bail to Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam. The distinction drawn by the court became critical (and most contested).

The bench of Justices Aravind Kumar and N.V. Anjaria said that the prosecution material prima facie disclosed what it described as a “central and formative role” for Khalid and Imam, involving planning, mobilisation and strategic direction beyond “episodic and localised acts”. The court held that the threshold under Section 43D (5) of the UAPA was attracted. It also said that the accused could renew their bail applications after the examination of the protected witnesses or after one year from the judgment, whichever was earlier. At the same time, the court directed the trial court to expedite the proceedings.

April 2026: Review rejected

Khalid sought review of the January judgment. On April 20, 2026, the Supreme Court dismissed the review petition, finding no sufficient ground to review its January 5 judgment. The door to immediate reconsideration appeared closed.

May 2026: A Supreme Court bench questions the January approach

On May 18, 2026, a separate Supreme Court bench comprising Justices B.V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan delivered the judgment in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi v. National Investigation Agency. The bench emphasised the constitutional significance of liberty and the principle that bail is ordinarily the rule and imprisonment the exception. More significantly, the bench expressed reservations about the January Gulfisha Fatima judgment’s treatment of the Supreme Court’s earlier three-judge decision in K.A. Najeeb.

The judges held that judicial discipline required the two-judge bench deciding Gulfisha to follow the binding precedent laid down by the three-judge bench in Najeeb. The issue was subsequently referred to a larger bench after another Supreme Court bench identified a “perceived conflict” in the approaches taken by different benches. That development was seized upon by Khalid and Imam in their renewed bail proceedings.

And then came the latest bail battle

Khalid and Imam approached the Delhi High Court challenging the rejection of their third bail applications. The Delhi Police has now argued that they should not even be heard at this stage. In its response before the High Court, the police described the fresh bail proceedings as “illegal”, “misconceived” and an attempt to “mislead” the court.

The Supreme Court’s January 5 order, the police says, gave Khalid and Imam liberty to renew their bail applications only after one of two events occurred: the examination of protected witnesses or the expiry of one year from the judgment. According to the prosecution, neither event had occurred when the fresh pleas were filed.

Therefore, the police say, the applications are premature. Scroll.in, reporting on August 27, quoted the prosecution’s position that the May judgment in Andrabi, arising from another case, could not override the specific directions issued in Gulfisha. The police have also relied on the Supreme Court’s May 22 order in Tasleem Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi), which acknowledged the divergence between the Gulfisha and Andrabi approaches and referred the issue to a larger bench.

The State’s position is that until the larger bench settles the question, the January judgment continues to bind the High Court.

When does pre-trial detention become punishment?

The prosecution’s argument is this: the allegations are grave, Section 43D(5) applies, the Supreme Court has already assessed the material and Khalid’s alleged role is different from that of the accused who were granted bail. But there is another side to the equation. Khalid has spent six years in prison without trial. The prosecution has reportedly listed around 900 witnesses and there is no sign of the trial beginning any time soon.

The case involves thousands of pages of evidence and many accused. The more complicated the prosecution case becomes, the longer it can take to bring it to trial. But that cannot mean that the complexity of the prosecution’s own case becomes a reason for indefinite pre-trial incarceration. This is precisely why K.A. Najeeb matters. The Supreme Court’s three-judge bench in that case recognised that statutory restrictions on bail cannot be interpreted in a manner that makes constitutional rights meaningless. Where incarceration becomes excessively prolonged and there is no reasonable prospect of the trial being completed within a meaningful timeframe, Article 21 can acquire decisive significance. Detailed pieces may be read here, here and here.

A six-year incarceration has become a public question

On August 15, more than 100 writers, academics, activists, filmmakers, journalists and public figures wrote to Chief Justice of India Surya Kant urging intervention in the continued incarceration of Khalid and Sharjeel Imam. As reported by The Wire, the signatories invoked K.A. Najeeb and argued that nearly six years of detention without the commencement of trial demands constitutional scrutiny. Their intervention reflects a broader anxiety about what prolonged pre-trial incarceration does to the meaning of liberty itself.

Six years is a long time to spend behind bars without a verdict. Umar Khalid has not been convicted of the charges against him, yet six years of pre-trial incarceration have already become a defining fact of his case. His bail battles continue, the prosecution and defence remain locked in arguments over the scope of the UAPA, and the larger question of how long a person can remain imprisoned while awaiting trial remains unresolved.

The courts will ultimately decide the charges against Khalid. But six years of incarceration without that determination cannot be reduced to another date in a long procedural timeline. It is a measure of the extraordinary cost of prolonged pre-trial detention. For Khalid, the wait for trial is no longer simply a stage in the criminal process. It has itself become the story.

Detailed pieces may be read here, here, here and here.

A profile on Umar Khalid may be viewed here.

[1] Professor Avinash Kumar, who had submitted the requisition for the auditorium, was particularly categorical. “The stated reason for the cancellation of the booking of the SSS auditorium is false,” he said, according to Hindustan Times report. Kumar maintained that the Dean had been fully informed that the event was going to discuss Khalid’s book and that the requisition had been prepared in the format suggested by the Dean himself.

His question was simple: if the university did not know what the event was about, why was the auditorium booking approved in the first place?

[2] In 2020, prior to the Delhi riots, Parvesh Verma was a Member of Parliament (MP) in the Lok Sabha, representing the West Delhi constituency. He belonged to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

During the February 2020 Delhi Assembly elections, Kapil Mishra was a BJP candidate from the Karawal Nagar constituency (which he lost). He did not hold a formal government or party organizational position during the February 2020 riots. In early 2020, prior to the Delhi riots in February, Anurag Thakur held the designation of Union Minister of State (MoS) for Finance and Corporate Affairs in the Government of India. Simultaneously, he was a serving Member of Parliament (MP) in the Lok Sabha representing the Hamirpur constituency of Himachal Pradesh.

Related:

The Conspiracy of Silence: HC denies bail to Delhi riots accused

How free are all Indians to exercise their right to peacefully protest under Article 19?

UAPA: Delhi HC denies bail, Umar Khalid’s Incarceration to Continue

4 years onward, activist Gulfisha Fatima remains behind bars

Order denying bail to Dr. Umar Khalid, a mockery of judicial system?

Dastardly attempt to assassinate Umar Khalid

Witch hunt against Umar Khalid and Kanhaiya Kumar continues

The post Six Years Behind Bars, Still No Trial: Umar Khalid’s long wait for justice appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The complaints concern BJP MLA Gopichand Padalkar, Dr. Dhavalsinh Mohite-Patil, MLA Sangram Jagtap, Shri Ram Sangh President Sagar Baig, Sangram Bapu and public speaker & RSS member Pushpendra Kulshreshtha. Each complaint identifies the date and location of the event, sets out CJP’s objections to particular statements and urges police authorities to take action under the relevant provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

CJP is dedicated to finding and bringing to light instances of Hate Speech, so that the persons propagating these venomous ideas can be unmasked and brought to justice. To learn more about our campaign against hate speech, please become a member. To support our initiatives, please donate now!

1.  Complaint against BJP MLA Gopichand Padalkar and Dr. Dhavalsinh Mohite-Patil

The complaint dated July 31, 2026, concerned speeches delivered at a public gathering in Georai, Beed district, Maharashtra, on June 19, 2026.

The complaint named BJP MLA Gopichand Padalkar and Dr. Dhavalsinh Mohite-Patil and stated that the speeches were delivered before a public gathering.

Statements attributed to Gopichand Padalkar

According to the transcript reproduced in the complaint, Padalkar spoke about alleged encroachments and religious structures, stating that “When we visited that village, we found total encroachment. That mosque was built right on the road. Our request and challenge to the police administration is this: if any place of worship has been built on government land, it must first be demolished, and a bulldozer must be run over it!”

He further referred to alleged temple and religious lands and questioned the revenue and police administration over action.

Padalkar also spoke about village names associated with Mughal rulers, stating:

“And that is why I want to request you all. Why am I telling you this? Because in Beed district, there are villages that bear the signs of Mughal rule—Imampur, Aurangpur Kukda… Ah, even after Aurangzeb has passed, why is there still an Aurangpur Kukda here? Shahjahanpur, Umrad Khurd, Dari Shahjahanpur, Sultanpur…

Wipe out these names now! Find out what their original names were.”

The speech then referred to various expressions involving the word “Jihad”. Padalkar stated:

“Land Jihad, Love Jihad, Juice Jihad—you see all of this in the media—Corporate Jihad. Our educated daughters working in big companies are also being targeted. People might think this is just random talk, but it is not. This is a matter that goes beyond politics. Understand this clearly, Hindus!”

He also referred to demographic and religious changes in Jammu and Kashmir, the North-East, Kerala and Tamil Nadu and made allegations concerning Bangladeshis and states governed by political parties.

Statements attributed to Dr. Dhavalsinh Mohite-Patil

The complaint recorded Dr. Mohite-Patil using derogatory language while referring to Muslims and political leaders.

He urged Hindu mobilisation and stated:

“If Hindus stand united, then the Hindu community will stand by you. Because it is written in our religion: ‘Dharmo Rakshati Rakshitah’ (He who protects Dharma is protected by Dharma).”

The most significant portion reproduced in the complaint stated that the highest place belongs to our mother and father. After that, if anyone looks at our motherland or our religion with an evil eye in the future, we will gouge their eyes out first, and only then will we look at the Constitution!

He continued while stating that “Because if these people do not respect our Constitution… if these people do not respect our Constitution, then it becomes very difficult to get justice through the medium of the Constitution and that is why staying united is the need of the hour today. Gathering together and building the strength of Hindus is the need of the hour today.”

What CJP alleged in the complaint

CJP stated that Padalkar’s speech repeatedly portrayed Muslims as unlawful encroachers and invoked theories including “Land Jihad”, “Love Jihad”, “Juice Jihad” and “Corporate Jihad”.

The complaint stated that the demand for bulldozer action specifically directed attention towards mosques and Muslim religious sites and that the speech sought the removal of names associated with Muslim rulers.

Regarding Dr. Mohite-Patil, CJP specifically highlighted the use of derogatory language and the statement that people would “gouge their eyes out first, and only then” look at the Constitution. The complaint described this as advocacy of violence and rejection of constitutional processes.

CJP urged authorities to immediately investigate the remarks under the relevant provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. It requested action against speech promoting enmity and incitement to hatred and referred to the need to protect dignity and communal harmony.

The copy of complaint dated July 31, 2026 can be accessed here

2. Complaint concerning speeches by Sangram Jagtap and Sagar Baig at Shevgaon

On August 11, 2026, CJP filed a complaint with Ahilyanagar Police authorities. The complaint concerned speeches delivered during a Hindu Janakrosh Morcha at Shevgaon in Ahilyanagar district, Maharashtra, on June 17, 2026. The speakers named in the complaint included MLA Sangram Jagtap and Shri Ram Sangh President Sagar Baig. The gathering followed a case involving the death of a Hindu woman and allegations concerning a Muslim man.

Statements attributed to Sangram Jagtap

According to the complaint, Jagtap addressed the gathering and spoke about the family of the accused person. He stated that “Tomorrow, after today’s meeting concludes, the responsibility lies with you all to ensure that his family does not continue to live in this area. You must take this responsibility upon yourselves.”

He further stated:

“The names of the family members listed on his ration card… no person associated with that ration card should remain here.”

The speech continued while stating that “A life of one of our children has been lost. Our child’s life is gone. His family must not stay here. Even after his death, they should not be allowed to bury him in this soil.”

Jagtap also stated:

“These people come and detonate bombs among us, and after they are sentenced or hanged, they are buried in our soil.”

He then called for collective action:

“Not a single person listed on that ration card should remain within the surroundings of this Shevgaon.”

The complaint further recorded Jagtap stating that if authorities considered the family’s presence a possible law-and-order issue, “If a law-and-order situation is going to arise because of them, then the Hindu community must create a law-and-order situation here.” He also said that “Only then… only then, in the times ahead, will anyone think twice before acting. No one will dare to cast an evil eye on our daughters. I tell you, they must learn a lesson from our actions.”

Statements attributed to Sagar Baig

The complaint recorded Sagar Baig speaking about possible criminal cases against persons participating in Hindutva-related activities. He stated:

“If anyone thinks that by filing cases against these boys or arresting them, the work will stop, then clear that misunderstanding from your mind. The work can never be stopped.”

He further said:

“Whichever case is filed during the work for Hindutva, do not be afraid; we are with you. If anyone requires assistance with legal expenses or lawyer fees, we are with you as the Rashtriya Shriram Sangh and the entire Hindu community.”

What CJP alleged in the complaint

CJP stated that the speeches called for the collective expulsion of a Muslim family from Shevgaon and went beyond criticism of an accused individual by targeting family members associated with him. The complaint specifically highlighted the statements concerning preventing the family from living in the locality and denying burial in the soil of the area.

CJP also raised objections to the statement suggesting that the Hindu community should create a law-and-order situation and to assurances that criminal cases should not deter participants.

The complaint urged police authorities to examine the speeches and take action under applicable criminal provisions. It also sought action consistent with judicial directions requiring law-enforcement agencies to act against hate speech and incitement.

The copy of complaint dated August 11, 2026 can be read here

3. Complaint concerning Sangram Jagtap and Sangram Bapu at Jalna

On July 31, 2026, CJP filed a complaint with the Jalna Police authorities. The complaint concerned a Hindu Jan Akrosh Morcha held at Partur in Jalna district, Maharashtra, on June 24, 2026. The complaint identified MLA Sangram Jagtap and Sangram Bapu as speakers.

Statements attributed to Sangram Jagtap

Jagtap spoke about Muslim children and alleged that they were taught violence. According to the complaint, he said that “And what are they taught? What is the first thing they are taught? ‘Sar Tan Se Juda’! What kind of ‘Sar Tan Se Juda’ is this?”

He contrasted this with scientific achievements and stated that children should be taught about Chandrayaan and the possibility of building a “Suryayaan”. He then stated:

“Their only teaching is that Sharia law must be implemented across the world. And if they want Sharia law, they should immediately leave this land of India and go wherever they want—be it Dubai or Pakistan, they should go to their Arab countries.”

The speech also contained a threat of physical violence:

“Eat eggs, eat chicken, eat mutton—but do not cross the line. If you go beyond that, then just like Afzal Khan’s entrails were ripped out, your entrails will be pulled out! Keep that in mind.”

Statements attributed to Sangram Bapu

According to the complaint, Sangram Bapu addressed the gathering and referred to Hindu strength.

He stated that “If they think that the youths of Ahmednagar will get scared, put their tails between their legs, and sit quietly at home… these Hindus possess the strength to cut down whatever remains of yours!”

He also called upon participants to monitor their respective localities that “Everyone must keep a strict vigil on their respective areas!” The complaint further recorded the slogan that “Uthao dande, bhagao lande.”

What CJP alleged in the complaint

CJP stated that the speeches collectively portrayed Muslims as supporters of violence and Sharia-based governance and called upon them to leave India. The complaint highlighted the threat referring to Afzal Khan’s entrails and the statement attributed to Sangram Bapu concerning the ability of Hindus to “cut down whatever remains”.

CJP also objected to the slogan recorded at the gathering, describing it as a call for collective mobilisation using a derogatory expression directed at Muslims. CJP sought investigation and appropriate criminal action against the speakers and organisers under the relevant provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, and urged authorities to act in accordance with judicial directions concerning hate speech and public order.

The copy of complaint dated July 31, 2026 can be accessed here

4. Complaint against Pushpendra Kulshreshtha over speech at Virat Hindu Sammelan, Mumbai

On July 28, 2026, CJP filed complaint and concerned a speech delivered by Pushpendra Kulshreshtha at the “Virat Hindu Sammelan” in Mumbai, Maharashtra, on June 27, 2026. The complaint stated that the speech included statements concerning Muslims, equal rights, secularism, the Gyanvapi dispute, Sanatan religion and public punishment.

Statements recorded in the complaint

Kulshreshtha questioned the proposition that India belonged equally to Hindus and Muslims, stating that “As much as the land of Bharat belongs to Hindus, it equally belongs to Muslims’—was this remembered in 2026? Before this, was it not remembered?”

He also criticised secularism and the concept of equality among religions, stating that “India is secular’—from morning till evening, those who define secularism, those who do the drama of ‘all religions are equal’—they neither define religion nor anything else; they just create their own rote definition and promote it.”

Referring to the Gyanvapi dispute, he stated “On the very first page… inside Banaras, the place which some people till recently, some supreme fools used to call the ‘Gyanvapi Mosque’… ‘Gyan’ and ‘Vyapi’—neither of these words has any relation to a mosque!”

He subsequently declared that there was only one religion, there is only one religion, and there will only be one religion—its name is Sanatan.

While discussing alleged financial irregularities concerning temple funds, Kulshreshtha stated:

“Stand them at every crossroads and whoever has stolen even ₹1 to ₹200 crore from the Ram Temple should be shot dead publicly!”

What CJP alleged in the complaint

CJP stated that the speech attacked the constitutional principle of equal rights and ridiculed secularism and the concept of all religions being equal. The complaint also objected to the statements concerning the Gyanvapi Mosque, stating that they were made in the context of a sensitive religious dispute. CJP specifically highlighted the declaration that only one religion existed and would exist—Sanatan—as a statement denying equal standing to other religions.

The complaint also identified the call for persons accused of theft to be publicly shot as inflammatory language encouraging violence and lawlessness.

CJP urged Maharashtra police authorities to investigate the speech under the relevant provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, and take action against speech promoting communal hostility and violence.

The complaint also referred to Supreme Court directions concerning suo motu action against hate speech and Maharashtra Police circulars requiring preventive measures and immediate action where speeches create law-and-order concerns.

The copy of complaint dated July 28, 2026 can be accessed here

Common demands made by CJP across the complaints

Across the four complaints, CJP repeatedly urged the police and other authorities to examine the speeches and take action under the relevant provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

The complaints referred to Supreme Court decisions and directions concerning hate speech, including the requirement that law-enforcement authorities take appropriate action where speeches attract criminal offences, even where a formal complaint is not forthcoming.

CJP also referred to the need for police authorities to preserve peace and communal harmony, record public gatherings and speeches, identify persons responsible for unlawful statements and take preventive and legal action where required.

The complaints repeatedly stressed that the speeches were delivered before public audiences and had also circulated through videos and social media platforms, extending their reach beyond those physically present at the events.

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The post CJP files four complaints over hate speeches at gatherings across Maharashtra appeared first on SabrangIndia.

A Division Bench of Justices Atul Sreedharan and Achal Sachdev quashed the NSA detention order passed against Chaudhary, holding that her continued incarceration under the Act violated Article 21 of the Constitution. The Court found that the grounds of detention were unsupported by material, repetitive and speculative, and that the District Magistrate had passed the order without proper application of mind.

The judgment is significant not merely, because it sets aside an NSA detention order. The Court closely reconstructed the chronology relied upon by the State, examined the WhatsApp conversations and videos forming the evidentiary basis of the detention, scrutinised the circumstances of Chaudhary’s arrest, and then questioned the District Magistrate’s failure to independently assess whether the extraordinary power of preventive detention was warranted at all.

Its conclusion was unequivocal: the State had failed to establish the evidentiary foundation necessary to deprive Chaudhary of her liberty under the NSA.

The Court also went considerably further. Holding that the State had exercised its authority in a “casual and cavalier” manner, it awarded Chaudhary ₹5 lakh compensation and directed that the amount be recovered from the salaries of the District Magistrate, Gautam Buddha Nagar, and other officers found responsible, “right down to the SHO” who had prepared the initial report supporting the detention.

The chronology that undermined the State’s case

The case arose out of labour agitation in Gautam Buddha Nagar in April 2026. Thousands of workers had taken to the streets over low wages, the absence of salary increases for several years and working conditions involving shifts of up to twelve hours. The State alleged that the protests subsequently descended into vandalism and arson, and portrayed Chaudhary as an “agent provocateur” responsible for provoking the violence.

Chaudhary, a history graduate who had completed her M.A. in History and was pursuing her first year of law at Delhi University, had no previous criminal antecedents—a fact expressly admitted by the State. The fundamental difficulty with the State’s case was chronological.

The State’s own position was that Chaudhary was taken into custody on April 12. At the same time, it was undisputed that the violence began only on April 13. The State nevertheless sought to attribute the subsequent violence to Chaudhary by alleging that she and her associates had entered into a conspiracy before her arrest and that the violence was the eventual consequence of that conspiracy. The Court examined that proposition against the actual material placed before it. It did not find the necessary link.

The High Court repeatedly asked the State to identify the specific WhatsApp message or video in which Chaudhary had incited people to engage in rioting, arson or destruction of public or private property. The State was unable to identify even a single such communication. That finding goes to the core of the detention order. The State was not merely required to establish that violence had occurred. It had to demonstrate why Chaudhary’s detention under the NSA was necessary to prevent its recurrence or continuation. The material, according to the Court, did not establish that connection.

“This Court repeatedly asked the learned counsel for the State to point out from the WhatsApp chats and the video recordings as to which one of them incited people or disclosed a conspiracy inciting people to indulge in acts of rioting, arson and destruction of public and private property? The learned counsel for the State has not been able to show a single message from the WhatsApp chats between the Petitioner and her associates or any video clip which would reveal any incitement from the Petitioner, either evidently or by necessary implication, which would disclose that it was the involvement of the Petitioner and the conspiracy hatched by her that resulted in the violence which erupted from 13.04.2026, much after the Petitioner was taken into custody by the State on 11.04.2026 (as held by this Court). Even otherwise, the undisputed case of the State is also that the violence erupted after the Petitioner was taken to custody by the police.” (Para 20)

A call for mobilisation was not an incitement to violence

One of the principal pieces of material relied upon by the State was a WhatsApp exchange in which Chaudhary allegedly called upon people to gather in support of workers and to oppose what she described as unlawful police action. The Court’s treatment of this communication is constitutionally significant. Even if the communication were accepted in its entirety, the Bench held that it did not constitute an exhortation to violence. At most, it called upon people to assemble in solidarity with labourers and to oppose excessive or unlawful exercise of police authority.

The Court also examined the videos relied upon by the State. The footage showed a large gathering of men and women, including persons in rural attire, with one individual apparently addressing the gathering. The Court found nothing in the footage indicating that the crowd was armed or engaged in violence. Instead, the material appeared to show people exercising their right to speak and agitate for higher wages and humane working hours.

“The video images relied upon by the State show a large number of people having gathered, which include men and women in traditional rural clothing, all standing near a lamp posts and one video image of a person who seems to be addressing the public. None of these videos disclose that the crowd is agitated or armed with lathi, stones or any such articles, which may be used in an act of violence, but appear to be exercising their constitutional right and freedom of speech and agitating their demands for higher pay and humane working hours.” (Para 21)

The judgment thus refuses an important form of executive overreach: the retrospective attribution of violence to an entire protest movement, or to an individual associated with it, without evidence establishing individual culpability or incitement.

Preventive detention cannot become a substitute for ordinary criminal law

The Court’s clearest legal proposition is that the NSA is an exceptional power. Preventive detention, it held, “is an exception”. It cannot be used as a substitute for ordinary criminal law merely to ensure that a person remains incarcerated because she might otherwise obtain bail in a criminal case.

The State had correctly pointed out that preventive detention does not necessarily require a person to have been convicted, or even to have been involved in several criminal cases. The statutory power can operate on the basis of a genuine apprehension concerning public order or national security. But that does not mean that the detaining authority’s satisfaction is beyond evidentiary scrutiny. The High Court expressly rejected the proposition that “subjective satisfaction” permits detention based upon bare allegations. The subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority must emerge from relevant material capable of supporting the inference drawn.

In the present case, the Court found the grounds of detention to be “repetitive, speculative and … only opinion based”, without material capable of sustaining those opinions.

The Court therefore laid down a simple but important constitutional proposition: an extraordinary power that directly results in the deprivation of liberty under Article 21 cannot be exercised on “surmises, biases, conjectures and opinions”. The material must cross the threshold from allegation to evidence; otherwise, the detention becomes arbitrary.

“Any detention under the NSA is an exception. It is not a substitute to ensure that a person who may receive bail on account of merits of his case, is still detained in custody under a concocted reasoning by the State. The elaborate grounds of detention of the District Magistrate are repetitive, speculative and are only opinion based without referring to a shred of evidence / material in support of sustaining those opinions. The grounds of detention must traverse beyond mere allegations and opinion. Allegations which raise a subjective opinion in the mind of the District Magistrate must be supported with reference to material for the formation of such opinion, else the same would be arbitrary. It must be understood that the exercise of such a discretion which directly violates a person’s rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, cannot be exercised lightly on the basis of surmises, biases, conjectures and opinions. It is the exercise of an extraordinary authority which results in the summary incarceration of a citizen merely on the opinion of the detaining authority which must be such that where a constitution court examining the grounds of detention is also satisfied that the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the District Magistrate, crosses the threshold of mere surmises and conjectures and was justly based upon the material on record and not detaining the detenue under the stringent provisions of the NSA would in all probability than not, result in the public order being disturbed or would result in an act by the detenue which is deleterious to national security. The absence of such material would render the grounds of detention and the order of detention unjustified, deserving to be set aside.” (Para 22)

The arrest record raised a more serious procedural concern

The judgment becomes particularly significant when it turns from the substantive allegations to the legality of the arrest process itself. Chaudhary’s case was that she had been taken into custody at approximately 5:30 p.m. on April 11 from Botanical Garden Metro Station. The State maintained that her arrest took place only on April 12. The Court tested these competing versions against the WhatsApp material produced by the State itself.

Messages sent to Chaudhary by an associate beginning at 5:56 p.m. on April 11 went unanswered. Several further messages and a missed call also received no response. The Court contrasted this with an earlier exchange that afternoon in which Chaudhary had been actively communicating with the same associate.

The material, the Court held, rendered Chaudhary’s claim that she was already in State custody from the evening of April 11 probable and undermined the State’s contention that she remained free until her formal arrest on April 12. But it was the Section 130 BNSS notice that caused the Court greater concern.

The State relied upon the notice to establish that Chaudhary had been proceeded against for failing to furnish a bond for good behaviour. Yet the notice contained General Diary Entry No. 37—the very entry on the basis of which the State claimed she had been arrested. The Court noted that the GD entry had been generated at 10:20 a.m. on April 12. The notice, however, did not mention the time at which it was issued.

Justice Achal Sachdev pointed out that if the notice had genuinely preceded the arrest, the GD number could not logically have appeared on it in the manner in which it did. Justice Sreedharan agreed, holding that the notice appeared to have been prepared after the arrest, describing the procedure as “ex post facto” and “nothing more than a sham”. The State was unable to answer what the Court described as “visible fabrication in the record”. This finding is particularly consequential in a preventive-detention case.

“My learned brother on the bench Justice Achal Sachdev, pointed out that the General Diary Entry No. 37 was generated at 10.20 am on 12.04.2026 and the mention of the G.D number in the notice under Section 130 goes to reveal that the notice was prepared after the arrest of the petitioner for, had the same been prepared before the arrest of the Petitioner, the G.D. number would not have been mentioned on the notice u/s. 130 BNSS. Mentioning the G.D. number in the notice under Section 130 of the BNSS reveals that the Petitioner was already arrested and the procedure of giving a notice under Section 130 of the BNSS was ex post facto the arrest and nothing more than a sham. I agree with the view of brother Justice Achal Sachdev that the notice u/s. 130 of the BNSS was prepared after the arrest of the Petitioner and that is the reason why the time of issuance is not mentioned in the notice and its omission is deliberate. Answer was sought from the Ld. Counsel for the state with regard to visible fabrication in the record for which no answer is forthcoming from the Ld. Counsel for the State.” (Para 17)

The Court’s scrutiny therefore went beyond whether the NSA order contained adequate reasons. It questioned the integrity of the very process through which the State sought to justify its exercise of coercive power.

The District Magistrate was required to exercise independent judgment

The Court’s criticism of the District Magistrate, Medha Roopam, is equally significant. The detention grounds ran into several pages. But the Court made clear that the length of a detention order cannot establish that the authority has applied its mind. The District Magistrate was required to examine the police dossier “threadbare”, particularly when the police report consisted largely of allegations unsupported by credible material.

The circumstances demanded greater scrutiny: Chaudhary was a young student activist, had no previous criminal record, was agitating in support of labourers, and the material before the authority did not demonstrate that she had incited violence. Instead, the Court found that the circumstances suggested that the District Magistrate had sought to “set an example” out of Chaudhary and deter others from exercising their right to freedom of speech and expression in public spaces in support of labourers.

The finding is devastating for the legality of the detention order because the District Magistrate’s statutory role is not to mechanically endorse the police version. Preventive detention requires an independent satisfaction on the part of the detaining authority. Where the underlying police material is itself weak, contradictory or unsupported, the District Magistrate has an even greater obligation to interrogate it before authorising incarceration under an exceptional statute. The Court concluded that this obligation had not been discharged.

“In this case, the conduct of the District Magistrate Gautam Buddha Nagar who passed the impugned order, is worthy of derision. In a case where the police report against the Petitioner were only allegations without there being any credible material against her, the District Magistrate was expected to be vigilant and examine the record threadbare to determine if there was any material in support of the allegations and even thereafter, assess whether the oppressive provisions of the NSA were warranted against the Petitioner and how the general law of the land was inadequate against a female student activist without any previous criminal record, agitating for the rights of labourers and where the material on record did not disclose that she had in any way incited violence, reveals that the District Magistrate desired to set an example out of the Petitioner and deter others from exercising their right to freedom of speech and expression in public spaces in support of the labourers. The District Magistrate Gautam Buddha Nagar is guilty of violating her oath of allegiance, making this a fit case for the imposition of compensation to the petitioner.” (Para 31)

The Court draws a constitutional line around protest

The judgment also makes an important statement about the constitutional status of public protest. The High Court held that freedom of speech and expression extends beyond speech in the abstract. It includes the right to come onto the streets, gather peacefully and agitate for one’s rights. The State cannot prevent public gatherings merely because it assumes that they may result in a breach of peace.

The Court warned that such an approach would amount to “throwing the baby out of the bath water” and could ultimately result in the cessation of collective expression in public spaces. Importantly, the Court did not ignore the State’s obligation to maintain public order. It expressly recognised that peaceful demonstrations may be infiltrated by persons interested in creating violence and that the violent acts of such persons may subsequently be attributed unjustly to an entire gathering. But its answer was not to suppress the gathering itself.

The State, the Court said, possesses a strong police force and must train it to manage large gatherings while preserving accountability through measures such as videography. The principle is therefore not that every protest is constitutionally immune from regulation. It is that the State must distinguish between peaceful dissent and actual threats to public order rather than treating the possibility of disorder as proof of disorder.

“In this case, this Court has seen from the material on record that at the petitioner has called for citizens in support of the labourers and to agitate for their rights. There is no material to reflect that such agitation will have to be violent or challenging the authority of the State. The freedom of speech and expression extends to coming out on the streets and agitating a cause, and gathering peacefully without arms or without threat to the public order. However, the State must also realize that a peaceful agitation where people collect without arms or ammunitions, can still be scuttled by mischievous elements, who may be sent by parties, who are interested in ensuring that such an agitation is broken and also where such elements may indulge in acts of violence, which thereafter gets attributed to the entire group which is patently unjust. Preventing people from gathering in public spaces or agitating their rights on the grounds of assumed breach of peace, would be throwing the baby out of the bath water. If such a view is taken by the State and approved of by the Courts, it would lead to a cessation of the collective expression of opinion in public spaces. The Constitution protects such a right and the same cannot be trifled with merely on the subjective opinion of the State. The State must also realize that it has a strong and powerful police force, which must be trained in ensuring public order in such large gatherings and also resort to videography of the gathering and the manner in which it is conducted, so that accountability may be affixed, in the event of an outbreak of violence.” (Para 23)

“The loyalty is towards the Constitution and not the political executive”

The Court’s observations on the bureaucracy take the judgment beyond the immediate facts of Chaudhary’s detention. In considering compensation, the Bench turned to the constitutional responsibilities attached to the powers exercised by the IAS and IPS.

It reminded public officials that the immense powers conferred upon them exist alongside an equally serious responsibility to protect the constitutional rights, dignity and welfare of citizens. Most significantly, the Court observed that their loyalty is to the Constitution and not to the political executive, and that they are servants of the people in a democracy. The Court then issued an extraordinary warning.

When bureaucrats and police officers disregard their constitutional oath and exercise power in a manner that violates civil liberties, citizens may begin to regard them as an “oppressive vestige of the British Empire”. Such conduct, the Court warned, can generate distrust, anger and civil unrest. It concluded with the striking observation that unless such conduct is checked, “it shan’t be long before the errant in the bureaucracy reduce the State of Uttar Pradesh to an Orwellian Dystopia.”

“It goes without saying that those in the bureaucracy and the police, when they act in a manner which is harmonious with their oath of allegiance, the thankful citizens of this State shall elevate them, and very rightly so, to a position which would be envied by the Gods themselves. However, every time they ignore that solemn oath and act contrary to it, the people of the State of Uttar Pradesh would view them as an oppressive vestige of the British Empire arousing angst and hatred towards them creating an environment of civil unrest and this Court, while correcting their excesses and/or illegalities, especially those that impinge upon the civil liberties of the citizens without adequate cause or due process (inhering in the procedure established by law), may pass harsh orders to compensate the citizen so wronged, besides recording their despotic conduct. Else, it shan’t be long before the errant in the bureaucracy reduce the State of Uttar Pradesh to an Orwellian Dystopia.” (Para 30)

Personal financial consequences for the officers

The Court’s response to the State’s conduct was not confined to declaratory relief. Chaudhary had sought ₹50 lakh in compensation. The State argued that quashing the NSA order would not result in any substantial release from custody because Chaudhary remained in judicial custody in the underlying criminal cases, where her bail applications had been rejected. The Court accepted that the period of NSA detention had merged with her judicial custody and therefore declined to award the full amount claimed.

It nevertheless found that the State’s “casual and cavalier exercise of authority” had violated her constitutional rights and awarded ₹5 lakh as compensation. More significantly, the Court did not direct the compensation to be borne merely by the public exchequer. It ordered recovery from the salary of the District Magistrate and all other officers who were responsible, “right down to the SHO” who had prepared the initial report supporting the NSA detention.

The Court further directed that its displeasure against the District Magistrate and police officers involved in preparing the dossier be recorded in their service records. This is perhaps the judgment’s strongest institutional message.

“Undoubtedly, even if the order in this particular case is quashed, the petitioner would still remain in jail as an under trial till she secures bail in all the criminal cases registered against her. As the period of detention merges with the period of judicial custody, the amount as prayed for by the petitioner, need not be considered in its entirety. However, on account of the casual and cavalier exercise of authority by the State through the District Magistrate Gautam Buddha Nagar, which has violated the constitutional rights of the petitioner, this Court considers it sufficient to grant ₹5 lakhs as compensation to the petitioner. This Court also directs that the said amount must be recovered from the salary of the District Magistrate Gautam Buddha Nagar, who has passed this order of detention without application of mind and from all such other officers who may have been responsible, right down to the SHO of the Police Station, who had prepared the initial report warranting the detention of the petitioner under the provisions of the NSA. The displeasure of this Court against the conduct of the District Magistrate concerned and all such other officers of the police who were involved in preparing the dossier against the petition, be noted in their service records.” (Para 33)

The Court has effectively rejected the proposition that an unconstitutional exercise of State power should have no personal consequences for those who exercise it. Where individual officials are found responsible for an arbitrary deprivation of liberty, accountability may follow the chain of decision-making down to the officer who initiated the process.

The judgment is ultimately about the limits of preventive State power

The Allahabad High Court’s decision is not a declaration that Chaudhary is innocent of the criminal allegations against her. The Court expressly recorded that the chargesheet in the underlying case had been filed, cognizance had been taken and her bail application had been rejected. She would consequently remain in judicial custody even after the NSA detention was quashed, unless released in the other criminal cases.

The High Court was not deciding whether Chaudhary committed the offences alleged against her. It was deciding whether the executive had lawfully established the extraordinary conditions necessary to deprive her of liberty under the NSA. On that question, the Court found the State’s case fundamentally deficient.

Preventive detention may be exceptional by design. But precisely because it authorises incarceration without the safeguards of an ordinary criminal trial, the material supporting its exercise must meet a correspondingly serious standard of scrutiny. The Allahabad High Court’s judgment insists on that standard. And in doing so, it makes a broader point about the rule of law: Article 21 is not merely a protection against unlawful imprisonment after the event. It is a constitutional command that every exercise of coercive State power affecting liberty must remain tethered to law, evidence, reason and institutional responsibility.

The complete judgment may be read below:

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The post ‘Subjective Satisfaction’ Cannot Be Built On Conjecture: Allahabad HC quashes NSA detention of Akriti Chaudhary appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In its memorandum dated September 2, the organisations have collectively argued that the incident cannot be dismissed as an isolated administrative lapse. The memorandum has called for a comprehensive investigation into how thousands of original election documents came to be outside official custody, why they were being reproduced at a commercial establishment and whether the breach points to wider vulnerabilities in the handling of voter information during the SIR exercise.

The Kharghar incident assumes added significance because of the scale of the ongoing revision process. According to figures cited by the Chief Electoral Officer, around 2.07 crore Enumeration Forms have been classified as uncollectable in Maharashtra at the draft stage. While the Election Commission has clarified that being classified as uncollectable does not automatically mean that an elector has been permanently excluded from the electoral roll, CJP has argued that the sheer magnitude of the figure makes the integrity of every stage of the verification process a matter of exceptional public importance.

3,404 original forms found at private photocopying centre

The controversy emerged on August 27, when election-related forms were reportedly found at a photocopying centre in Sector 19, Kharghar. According to reports cited in the memorandum, the recovered documents were original SIR Enumeration Forms relating to multiple polling stations under the 188-Panvel Assembly Constituency. A revenue team subsequently examined the documents, and election authorities reportedly confirmed that they were genuine election forms. Reports have stated that the forms related to 11 polling stations.

The incident reportedly came to light following a complaint concerning the photocopying of the forms. A person identified in media reports as Suraj Patil, described as a BJP functionary, was allegedly found handling the forms. The police subsequently seized the documents and an FIR was registered. Five Booth Level Officers associated with the forms were also suspended, with a departmental inquiry initiated into how the documents reached the private premises.

In the memorandum, the groups state that culpability must be established through an impartial investigation. At the same time, the memorandum argues that the reported political connection makes it particularly important for the State Election Commission to establish whether access to the forms was authorised and, if not, how such access was facilitated. The central question, according to CJP, is therefore not simply who was found with the forms, but how the forms travelled from the official election machinery to a private establishment in the first place.

Where did the documents leave the official chain of custody?

The memorandum places particular emphasis on the chain of custody (chain of command in law) of the Enumeration Forms. SIR forms are part of an official electoral exercise and contain voter-related information. Their handling therefore requires safeguards that ensure that the documents remain accessible only to persons authorised to use them for election-related purposes.

The discovery of thousands of original forms at a commercial photocopying centre raises questions about every stage of their movement. CJP and others has therefore called for the reconstruction of the entire chain of custody, beginning with the collection of the forms from electors and continuing through their storage, transportation, access and eventual recovery.

The organisation has also stressed that the inquiry should not automatically end with the suspension of the five BLOs. If the evidence points towards supervisory, administrative or other responsibility, those aspects too must be investigated. The issue is particularly significant because of the sheer number of documents involved. The presence of 3,404 forms cannot be explained simply as an isolated document inadvertently carried outside an office. The authorities must establish who had access to them, who authorised their movement and why they were taken to a private photocopying facility.

A voter-data security concern, not merely a paperwork lapse

The memorandum has also raised concerns about what may have happened to the information contained in the forms. The organisation has urged the authorities to determine whether the documents were merely photocopied or whether they were also scanned, photographed, digitally stored, transmitted or reproduced in any other manner.

This is an important distinction. Physical recovery of the original forms does not necessarily establish that no copies remain elsewhere. CJP, VFD and BCS have therefore called for relevant CCTV footage, electronic records and equipment used in the photocopying process to be preserved and examined as part of the investigation.

The memorandum argues that once voter-level information leaves the controlled environment of the election machinery, the potential risk extends beyond the physical documents. Copies could potentially be retained or disseminated without the knowledge of election authorities.

For CJP, VFD and BCS, citizens who provide information to the State as part of the electoral process are entitled to an assurance that such information will be used only for legitimate electoral purposes and handled through secure procedures.

The 2.07 crore figure makes the breach more consequential

The memorandum has linked the Kharghar incident to the wider concerns surrounding the SIR exercise in Maharashtra. The Chief Electoral Officer has stated that approximately 2.07 crore Enumeration Forms have been classified as uncollectable, comprising categories including voters who were absent or not found, those who had permanently shifted, deceased persons, duplicates or persons already enrolled elsewhere.

The Election Commission has emphasised that these classifications are provisional and that the draft electoral roll is not the final roll. Eligible voters whose names are missing can participate in the claims and objections process and seek inclusion or correction. The memorandum has acknowledged this position but has argued that the availability of a remedy does not, by itself, eliminate concerns arising from the scale of exclusion. An elector who does not know that their name has disappeared from the draft roll may not necessarily approach the authorities. Similarly, an elector incorrectly classified as shifted, deceased, duplicated or absent may face a significant administrative burden in establishing that they remain eligible.

In this context, the Kharghar incident raises a broader question: can the public have confidence in the accuracy of the electoral roll if the documents on which that roll is being prepared are not demonstrably secure? For CJP, this is why the Kharghar episode cannot be treated merely as a local dispute.

CJP and others seeks statewide audit

The organisation has called for the Kharghar incident to trigger a statewide audit of the custody and handling of SIR Enumeration Forms. Such an audit, CJP argues, should establish whether similar instances of unauthorised possession, removal, reproduction or mishandling have occurred elsewhere in Maharashtra.

The memorandum also calls for the Election Commission to strengthen and publicly disclose uniform safeguards governing the custody, movement, reproduction, storage and disposal of SIR documents. This, CJP says, is necessary not only to identify wrongdoing after it occurs but to prevent vulnerabilities in the system from being repeated.

Transparency is essential to restoring public confidence

The memorandum has also called for the findings of the Kharghar inquiry to be made public, subject to legitimate restrictions relating to personal information or an ongoing criminal investigation. The organisation argues that the public should not be left to choose between competing political claims about what happened. The State Election Commission, as the institution responsible for the electoral process, must establish the facts and communicate them transparently. For CJP, the issue ultimately extends beyond the Kharghar photocopying centre.

An electoral roll determines who is recognised by the State as entitled to participate in an election. Its preparation therefore forms part of the foundation of the democratic process itself. The discovery of thousands of original SIR forms outside the expected chain of custody, followed by the suspension of five BLOs and the registration of an FIR, has already exposed a serious administrative vulnerability. When viewed alongside the 2.07 crore forms classified as uncollectable, that vulnerability assumes greater significance.

The memorandum therefore calls upon the Election Commission to treat the episode as an institutional matter rather than merely an isolated breach. Its demand is ultimately for something fundamental to any electoral exercise: that every eligible citizen’s place on the electoral roll be determined through a process that is secure, transparent, impartial and capable of independent scrutiny.

The credibility of an election does not begin on polling day. It begins with the integrity of the electoral roll—and with public confidence that the machinery preparing that roll is not vulnerable to unauthorised access, administrative failures or partisan interference.

The complete memorandum may be on the CJP website here.

Related:

Maharashtra’s schools are struggling to survive as students protest, infrastructure crumbles and Marathi-medium institutions disappear

Maharashtra SIR: 2.08 crore (20.8 million) voter forms “uncollected” hence may not be listed in August 24 draft electoral roll

Maharashtra SIR extension keeps teachers away from classrooms as unit tests face delays

SIR Maharashtra: CEO details schedules for publication & verification of draft and final electoral rolls

SIR and the Making of a Stateless Citizen? | R. Rajagopal Speaks Out | Teesta Setalvad

The post 3,404 SIR Forms Found at Kharghar Xerox Shop: CJP, VFD and BCS demands answers from Maharashtra SEC appeared first on SabrangIndia.

At one level, the case concerned two women who said that they had voluntarily embraced Islam and were subsequently confined by their father. But the legal question before the Court was considerably broader: can the alleged illegality of a person’s religious conversion justify the continued physical confinement of that person when she is an adult, competent, and unequivocally asserts that the choice was voluntary?

The Court answered in the negative. More importantly, it refused to allow the criminal investigation into the alleged conversion to collapse the distinction between two separate questions: whether the conversion was lawful, and whether the women could lawfully be detained.

“The present case discloses an exceptionally grave and egregious violation of constitutional rights. The corpus, despite being major, educated and legally competent women, were deprived of their liberty for a prolonged period commencing from the year 2021, solely because they exercised their constitutionally protected freedom of conscience and chose to profess a religion different from that professed by their family. Such prolonged and coercive confinement strikes at the very foundation of constitutional democracy, which recognises the autonomy of every adult individual as sacrosanct and beyond the reach of parental or societal control. The constitutional guarantee of personal liberty cannot be permitted to yield to familial disapproval, social orthodoxy or executive apathy.” (Para 65)

“Before parting, this Court deems it necessary to reiterate that the Constitution does not confer upon parents a licence to incarcerate their major children merely because they disapprove of their faith, beliefs or personal choices. Constitutional rights cannot be eclipsed by parental authority, social morality or majoritarian sentiment. The liberty of an adult individual is inviolable, and any attempt to suppress that liberty by force or coercion invites the constitutional scrutiny of this Court and attracts appropriate public law consequences, including the award of monetary compensation for the infringement of fundamental rights.” (Para 66)

The former, the Court held, could be examined by the competent authority or court. The latter was squarely before the High Court in habeas corpus jurisdiction. The judgment consequently becomes a strong reaffirmation of decisional autonomy, freedom of conscience, the limits of parental authority, the scope of habeas corpus against private detention, and the State’s public-law liability when its machinery permits an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty to continue.

Two adult women before the constitutional court

The petition concerned Anshu Bhatia @ Amina Anshu Bhatia, aged about 35 years, and Diya Bhatia @ Zoya Diya Bhatia, aged about 20 years. By an order dated July 30, 2026, the State was directed to produce both women before the High Court. They were subsequently produced before Justice Sandeep Jain by police officials from the Cyber Crime Police Station, Agra.

The Court then did something crucial for a habeas corpus proceeding involving allegations of coercion: it interacted with the women directly. Anshu told the Court that she had voluntarily embraced Islam in 2020, describing the decision as a conscious and independent choice motivated by mental peace, spiritual fulfilment and inner solace. She stated that the decision was not the result of inducement, influence, coercion, undue persuasion or any extraneous consideration. She further stated that her father strongly opposed the decision and subsequently confined her within the parental home. According to her, physical restraint, intimidation and sustained mental harassment were used to compel her to renounce the faith she had chosen and return to Hinduism.

Diya, who had completed her education up to the Intermediate level, similarly told the Court that she had voluntarily embraced Islam in 2021, motivated by personal faith, conscience, mental peace and spiritual solace. She too denied force, fraud, coercion, undue influence or allurement.

Both women consistently maintained before the Court that their decisions were voluntary and conscious and arose from their own individual faith and freedom of conscience. They also denied that their conversion was motivated by an extraneous, unlawful or pecuniary consideration or intended to advance the interests of any individual or organisation. The dispute therefore came before the High Court in a very specific constitutional form: Were these adult women unlawfully confined by their father against their own wishes?

The State’s case: This was not merely a family dispute

The State strongly opposed the habeas corpus petition. The father had lodged Case Crime No. 228 of 2025 at Police Station Sadar Bazar, District Agra, alleging that the women had been subjected to forcible and deceitful conversion from Hinduism to Islam. The FIR was initially registered under Section 87 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

During investigation, the investigating agency subsequently added:

• Sections 61(2), 111(3), 111(4) and 152 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023; and
• Sections 3/5(1) and 5(2) of the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021.

The State argued that the addition of these provisions demonstrated that the allegations of voluntary conversion could not simply be accepted at face value. But the State went considerably further. Its case was that the alleged conversion was part of a larger and organised conspiracy with ramifications for the sovereignty, integrity and unity of the nation.

It claimed that the investigation had uncovered material indicating the involvement of organised persons pursuing a coordinated design to disturb the social fabric through unlawful religious conversions.

The State also referred to alleged involvement of foreign entities and external influences, arguing that the investigation was continuing and that releasing the women could prejudice the proceedings. It further contended that the women had been projected as victims in the criminal case and that allowing them to reside with persons allegedly connected to the investigation could influence witnesses, prejudice the prosecution and frustrate the administration of criminal justice. The State therefore attempted to place the case within a much larger framework of public order, national interest and security.

The High Court was not persuaded.

Findings of the Court

• What is the scope of habeas corpus?

Before determining whether the detention was illegal, Justice Sandeep Jain examined the nature of the writ itself. The Court relied upon the Supreme Court’s judgment in Home Secretary (Prison) v. H. Nilofer Nisha, where the Supreme Court explained that habeas corpus is available wherever a person is deprived of personal liberty unlawfully or without justification.

Importantly, the Supreme Court authority recognises that habeas corpus is not confined to State detention. It can also be invoked against private detention. The Allahabad High Court quoted the principle that the writ is available for release from detention not only by the State but also from private detention. This becomes central to the case as the father was not a State official exercising a statutory power of detention. The alleged confinement was taking place inside the parental home. But that did not take the matter outside Article 226. The constitutional inquiry was simple: Was there lawful authority for the restraint?

• A parental home is not a legal prison—but it cannot become one

The judgment’s treatment of private detention is especially significant. The women were allegedly confined in their parental home. That fact could easily have been used to characterise the dispute as a family matter. Thankfully, the Court refused to do so. Habeas corpus exists precisely because the law is concerned with the fact of unlawful restraint, not merely the formal label attached to the person exercising it. The relevant question was not whether the father believed he was acting in the interests of his daughters. The question was whether he had legal authority to restrain two adult women. The Court ultimately found that he did not.

• Majority marks the constitutional end of parental custody

The Court relied on a line of constitutional jurisprudence concerning the autonomy of adult women. One of the authorities discussed was the Supreme Court’s decision in Soni Gerry v. Gerry Douglas. There, the Supreme Court held that once an individual attains majority, she is entitled to make her own choices and that courts should not assume the role of a super-guardian merely because a parent disapproves of that choice.

The Allahabad High Court also considered the Kerala High Court’s decision in Rajamohan MS v. State of Kerala, which dealt specifically with parental attempts to restrain an adult woman. That decision recognised that parental authority may extend to advice, counselling and guidance, but not to confinement or detention against the wishes of an adult daughter.

The Allahabad High Court reproduced the proposition that an adult major woman cannot be treated as a “chattel” and that parental authority does not give a parent the right to keep her under restraint against her will. This jurisprudence supplies the conceptual foundation for the present ruling. Once adulthood is attained, the parent-child relationship does not disappear. But its legal character changes.

• The Court rejects the idea that parents know what is “best” for adult women

The reliance on Rajamohan MS case is particularly important because it confronts a deeply embedded paternalistic assumption: that parents should be permitted to control adult women’s decisions because they believe those decisions are wrong, imprudent or harmful. The jurisprudence cited by the High Court rejects that logic.

An adult’s decision does not lose constitutional protection simply because the decision might later prove to be unwise. The Kerala High Court authority, quoted in the judgment, makes the point that courts cannot permit the concepts of parents about what is “right and good” for their adult daughters to override the daughters’ own assessment of what is right for them. This principle is particularly relevant in the present case.

The women’s choice concerned religion—a matter inherently connected to conscience and identity. The Constitution cannot recognise individual autonomy while simultaneously allowing family members to exercise a veto over the individual’s conscience.

• Reliance on Shafin Jahan to hold that constitutional courts are not super-guardians

The judgment also invokes Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M., one of the Supreme Court’s most crucial decisions on individual autonomy. The High Court notes the Supreme Court’s recognition that constitutional courts may exercise parens patriae jurisdiction for persons who are incapable of exercising free will, such as minors or persons of unsound mind. But that principle cannot be extended to competent adults simply because their choices are controversial or disapproved of by others.

The Supreme Court in Shafin Jahan emphasised that decisions concerning intimate and personal matters belong to the individuals concerned and that neither State nor society can intrude into that domain merely because they disapprove of the choice. The Allahabad High Court uses that jurisprudence to reinforce a fundamental distinction: A constitutional court protects an adult’s autonomy; it does not replace it.

The Court therefore did not ask whether it believed the women’s religious choice was sensible. It asked whether the women themselves had made the choice freely. Once the answer was yes, the constitutional duty was to protect that choice from unlawful restraint.

• The Court personally tests voluntariness

This is where the Court’s interaction with the women becomes legally decisive. Justice Sandeep Jain recorded that the responses of both women were: “spontaneous, coherent and unequivocal.”

Nothing emerged during the interaction to suggest that they were acting under coercion, fear, inducement or undue influence. On the contrary, both consistently asserted that they had voluntarily embraced Islam as a matter of personal faith and conscience. The Court therefore did not simply accept the women’s claims because they were petitioners. It independently interacted with them. This matters because the State’s central argument was that their assertion of voluntariness was false and that they had been made instruments of an organised conversion network. The Court found no material before it sufficient to draw that inference.

• Article 25: “Freedom of conscience” includes the freedom to change faith

The Court then turned to Article 25. It held that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of conscience necessarily encompasses the right of a competent adult to adopt a faith, renounce a faith, or change her faith according to her own free will, belief and conviction. The Court did not conceptualise Article 25 merely as protecting the practice of an inherited religion. It recognised conscience as a matter of individual choice.

The Court held that such a decision is an essential facet of: individual autonomy, dignity and personal liberty. It is therefore protected not only under Article 25, but also under Article 21. If freedom of conscience means anything constitutionally, it cannot mean merely the freedom to remain within the religious identity assigned by one’s family. It must include the freedom to arrive at one’s own conviction. And where an adult voluntarily changes her faith, that choice cannot ordinarily be dictated by either the family or the State except within constitutionally permissible restrictions and the authority of law.

• The Uttar Pradesh Conversion Act does not answer the detention question

The State relied heavily on the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021. The Court acknowledged that the Act provides the statutory framework governing unlawful religious conversions and prescribes procedures concerning conversions. But the Court made an important jurisdictional observation: The vires of the 2021 Act had not been challenged before it. Nor was the legality or validity of the alleged conversion itself the subject matter of the habeas corpus proceedings. Any question concerning compliance or non-compliance with the Act was therefore left to the competent authority or court. The Court then reached the central distinction: “The legality of the conversion and the legality of their detention constitute two distinct and independent issues.” This distinction is the backbone of the judgment.

The Court went further. It said that even assuming, for the sake of argument,  that the conversion had not been carried out strictly according to the procedure prescribed under the 2021 Act, that assumption would not itself authorise the father to continue confining the women. This is a crucial rule-of-law proposition. An alleged violation of one law does not automatically create a power under another law to deprive a person of liberty. If the conversion was unlawful, the State could investigate it. If an offence was established, the criminal law could operate.

But the father could not become the custodian of the women merely because he believed their religious conversion was illegal. The State could not use the pendency of that investigation to permit the confinement to continue. Thus, the Court separates regulation from detention. The State may regulate conduct through law; however, it cannot manufacture a detention power that the law does not confer.

• National security cannot rest on assertion alone

The State’s invocation of sovereignty, integrity and national security was also examined closely. The Court found that, apart from broad assertions based on the FIR and the pendency of investigation, no material had been placed before it demonstrating that the voluntary exercise of religious choice by these women, by itself, constituted a threat to the sovereignty, integrity or security of the country. The Court therefore refused to accept the argument.

The court held that mere apprehensions, however serious they may appear, cannot substitute legally admissible material while adjudicating upon the fundamental rights of citizens. This is not a finding that national-security considerations can never justify restrictions on liberty. Rather, it is a rejection of conjecture as constitutional evidence. The seriousness of the allegation does not eliminate the need for material. A court deciding whether a fundamental right has been infringed cannot treat the language of “national security” as a substitute for proof.

• The Court refuses to infer an “oblique motive”

The Court also rejected the suggestion that the women were merely instruments in a larger unlawful design. After interacting with them, the Court said it could not discern material warranting an inference that they had acted with an oblique motive or had been reduced to instruments in the hands of an individual or organisation pursuing an unlawful agenda.

Such an inference, the Court held, could not legitimately be drawn from conjectures, surmises or allegations that remained to be tested before the competent criminal court. This distinction is significant as the Court did not adjudicate the criminal allegations, rather it simply refused to allow untested allegations to determine the constitutional status of the women before it. The criminal investigation was therefore left intact. But it was not allowed to become a basis for continuing their detention.

The investigation arising from Case Crime No. 228 of 2025 would continue strictly in accordance with law. But, the court held that mere pendency of a criminal investigation cannot, by itself, furnish a lawful justification for curtailing the liberty of adult citizens, particularly where they are not subject to any judicial or other lawful order of detention.

This is one of the judgment’s most important safeguards. A criminal investigation is a process for determining whether an offence has been committed. It is not, by itself, a source of custody. The existence of an FIR cannot turn a private residence into a lawful detention centre. Nor can the seriousness of the allegations eliminate the requirement that any deprivation of liberty have legal authority.

Parental authority yields to constitutional liberty: Compensation and directions

Having found the detention to be wholly illegal, the Court did not confine the remedy to a declaration that the women were free. It recognised that where a serious and prolonged violation of fundamental rights has already occurred, an order of release alone may not provide an adequate constitutional remedy. The Court therefore invoked the established jurisprudence on constitutional compensation, particularly Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar and Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa. These decisions establish that constitutional courts exercising jurisdiction under Articles 32 and 226 can award monetary compensation for egregious violations of fundamental rights as a public-law remedy. Such compensation is distinct from ordinary private-law damages and is intended to provide meaningful redress for the breach of a public duty to protect fundamental rights.

Applying this principle, the Court found the present case to involve an “exceptionally grave and egregious violation of constitutional rights.” It took into account the fact that the women were adults and legally competent, the prolonged nature of their deprivation of liberty, the circumstances in which the confinement allegedly followed their exercise of freedom of conscience, and the mental and psychological consequences of the restraint. The Court also considered the failure of the State machinery to discharge its constitutional obligation to protect their liberty. It described the conduct as a “flagrant affront to the Rule of Law” and found that the State, rather than securing their release, had allowed the detention to continue under the ostensible cover of criminal proceedings. The award of compensation was therefore not presented as punitive damages or an ex gratia payment, but as a constitutional remedy flowing from the gravity of the fundamental-rights violation.

The Court consequently held the father and the State of Uttar Pradesh jointly and severally liable to pay ₹25 lakh, with the amount to be equally divided between the two women. The judgment also incorporated an important mechanism for individual accountability within the State machinery. After satisfying the compensation award, the State was permitted, subject to due process and an opportunity of hearing, to recover the stipulated share from the father and from any delinquent public servant whose acts or omissions contributed to the unconstitutional deprivation of liberty. This aspect of the order is significant because it moves beyond merely compensating the victims and raises the question of institutional responsibility for allowing an unlawful deprivation of liberty to persist.

The Court’s directions were also designed to restore the women’s practical autonomy, rather than merely declare their freedom in abstract terms. It directed that they were free to reside at any place and with any person of their choice and restrained the father from interfering with their personal liberty, movement, residence, profession or religious choices. The State authorities were directed to ensure that no interference was caused to their peaceful life and liberty and to provide protection if required. These directions recognise that liberty can be undermined even without formal physical detention. If a person is denied access to her documents, finances, educational records or other personal belongings, her ability to independently exercise her constitutional choices may remain substantially constrained.

Accordingly, the Court directed the father to hand over the women’s passports, educational certificates, identity documents, bank passbooks, cheque books, conversion-related documents and other personal belongings within seven days, with the State authorities directed to ensure compliance where necessary. At the same time, the Court carefully limited the scope of its intervention: it did not determine whether the alleged conversion was legally valid, whether the criminal allegations would ultimately be established, or whether any offence had been committed. The investigation was permitted to continue strictly in accordance with law. The significance of the judgment therefore lies in the balance it draws between investigative power and individual liberty: the State remains free to investigate an alleged offence, but neither an investigation nor parental disapproval can become a substitute for lawful authority to deprive an adult of her liberty.

The complete judgment may be read here.

Related:

Two FIRs, Four Days In: Pune sees first use of Maharashtra’s controversial anti-conversion law

After NEET protests ended, the battle moved online: Women protesters face threats, doxing and criminalisation

One Death Every Few Days, Zero Accountability: Sanitation workers protest at Jantar Mantar

From Civil Registration to Identity Control: Parliament tightens India’s birth certificate regime without debate

‘Deportation Cannot Begin without Nationality Verification’: Union’s Rajubala affidavit clarifies legal limits on executive power

Brij Bhushan Acquittal: The system vs the wrestlers

The post When Family Becomes Custody: Allahabad HC holds adult women’s faith, residence and liberty cannot be placed under parental control appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Uttar Pradesh & Uttarakhand, June 28 – July 5, 2026

Chronology of Incidents

June 28- Ilaichipur, Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh

BJP MLA for Loni, Nandkishore Gurjar at the inauguration of local development projects is seen addressing a large crowd stating that 99 percent of Indian Muslims were originally Hindus. He added that those who were “weak” converted while those who were “strong” fought “demons” rather than convert.

This was not an isolated incident during the reporting period. Gurjar was also implicated in another hate speech delivered on July 3, which will be listed down in the chronology. (See incident number 6)

CJP is dedicated to finding and bringing to light instances of Hate Speech, so that the bigots propagating these venomous ideas can be unmasked and brought to justice. To learn more about our campaign against hate speech, please become a member. To support our initiatives, please donate now!

Incidentally, two hate speeches in 2025 according to IHL’s report traces directly to Gurjar. On March 17,  2025 in Loni, Uttar Pradesh, Gurjar referred to Muslims as “demons” and “beasts” while glorifying the demolition of Babri mosque. On April 26, he administered an oath to protest attendees, urging them to identify and expel all those who “support Pakistan,” referring to them as “topiwallas,” “jihadis,” and “Rohingya Bangladeshis.”

In addition to this documented history of communal speeches, Association for Democratic Reforms records show that Gurjar has multiple criminal cases in which charges have been framed, including:

• IPC Section 295: Injuring or defiling a place of worship with intent to insult the religion of any class.
• IPC Section 436: Mischief by fire or explosive substance with intent to destroy a house or other property.
• IPC Section 332: Voluntarily causing hurt to deter a public servant from the discharge of duty.
• IPC Section 506: Criminal intimidation.
• Three charges under IPC Section 147: Rioting.
• Two charges under IPC Section 148: Rioting while armed with a deadly weapon.
• Two charges under IPC Section 353: Assault or criminal force to deter a public servant from the discharge of duty.
• IPC Section 427: Mischief causing damage.
• IPC Section 504: Intentional insult with intent to provoke a breach of the peace.

All of this taken together indicates a recurring pattern of inflammatory public statements—often a precursor to targeted violence- alongside a long-standing record of criminal proceedings.

June 29– Champawat, Uttarakhand

Chief Minister of Uttarakhand, Pushkar Singh Dhami, at a Mukhya Sevak Samvad outreach event, Dhami credited his government with implementing the state’s amended anti-conversion law, running Operation Kalnemi, and “freeing” over 12,000 acres of government land from what he called “land jihad.” He also invoked “love jihad,” “thook jihad” (spit jihad) and “mazar jihad” (shrine jihad), calling them anti-social and anti-national. He further accused the political opposition of appeasement politics for opposing action against “illegal” encroachments and mazars (Muslim shrines).

https://www.facebook.com/hindutvawatchIn/videos/location-champawat-uttarakhanddate-june-29at-the-mukhya-sevak-samvad-program-chi/1751173735881458/

This rhetoric is a verbatim repetition of Dhami’s script which he has used in at least half a dozen recorded speeches since 2024 in Haridwar, Dehradun, Chamoli and Sagar. Reported by The Quint and Deccan Herald.

According to IHL, Dhami has “emerged as the most prolific hates speech actor in 2025, with 71 speeches.”

“CM Dhami and his colleagues frequently invoked the anti-Muslim conspiracies of “love jihad,” “land jihad,” and “spit jihad” alongside fear-mongering about demographic change,” the report states.

June 30– Dehradun, Uttarakhand

A Vishwa Hindu Parshad-Bajrang Dal leader Vikas Verma, at a weekly Hanuman Chalisa gathering cited an unverified case of Hindu students allegedly forced to remove their tilak, kalava and janeu at school. He accused Christianity and Islam of long targeting Sanatan Dharma and welcomed Uttarakhand’s dissolution of the Madrasa Board as he alleged madrasas teach students that non-Muslims are “kafirs” who should be beheaded. He also claimed that those who choose to educate from madrasas will not hesitate to practise terrorism.

Verma has delivered near-identical claims about mosques, madrasas and “anarchists” at the same weekly event before. Im May this year, he also led a right-wing group to a prominent footwear showroom in Dehradhun and a clip was circulated where they were purportedly seen selectively confronting Muslim staff and even snatching their name tags and writing “jihadi” on it.

An investigation published by The Wire found Dehradun Bajrang Dal members running dedicated social-media pages built around similar content.

June 30– Loni, Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh

Hindu Raksha Dal leader Sunny Bajrangi, at a Hanuman Chalisa event called “love jihad” a “termite” eating away at Hindu society. He alleged “jihadis” hide their identity to trap Hindu women, and warned that demographic change would become unstoppable within 20 years unless Hindus unite.

July 1- Domariaganj, Siddharthnagar, Uttar Pradesh

Former BJP MLA Raghvendra Pratap Singh at an event marking Shyama Prasad Mukherjee’s birth anniversary said “love jihad” was rising rapidly and cited an unverified ‘kidnapping’ allegation of a Hindu woman against a “Mulla.” Singh urged BJP workers to watch for “vidharmi” (heretic/anti-faith) and “kukarmi” (evildoer) elements. He also called for scrutiny of Christian missionary activity.

https://www.instagram.com/reel/DaavObxMIgW/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link&igsh=NTc4MTIwNjQ2YQ==

In February 2022, a report by Citizens for Justice and Peace documented two FIRs for hate speech against Singh. CJP quoted far more extreme past remarks, including threats to “get their blood tested” against Hindus who did not vote for him. Read the report here.

July 3- Loni, Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh

The incident again implicates Nandkishore Gurjar, the BJP MLA for Loni who was also the perpetrator in the current reported incident 1. At the inauguration of a road-widening project, Gurjar called Muslims “pigs” and a “disease.” He praised a village for barring any “jihadi” from settling there, and said hospitals now stood where   these “pigs” once roamed. He warned residents against renting warehouses to “Bangladeshis” and vowed to drive them out.

https://www.instagram.com/reel/Dad_ttrsEyL/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link&igsh=NTc4MTIwNjQ2YQ==

Ten months earlier, in September 2025, Gurjar was filmed at a yoga event in Baghpat saying, “Swines and Bangladeshi Rohingyas are being settled here, and they will ruin the country.”

July 4- Barabanki, Uttar Pradesh

Vimlesh Sharma of the Shri Ram Sanatan Seva Samiti and the Gau Raksha Dal along with a group of 15-20 men confronted a Muslim man over alleged remarks about a cow. In the video, they are seen repeatedly slapping and hurling abuses at him as he tries to offer an explanation. The group dragged him to a shed, and forced him to kneel and touch a calf’s legs and later chants “Jai Shri Ram.” Sources also document that he was forced to drink cow urine.

Location:Barabanki, Uttar Pradesh, India ,
According to reports, Vimlesh Sharma, State President of the Shri Ram Sanatan Seva Samiti, along with members of the Gau Raksha Dal, allegedly assaulted a Muslim man after accusing him of making objectionable remarks about a cow.

The… pic.twitter.com/BFPrrT5Ik1

— Rising Falcon (@TheRFTeam) July 5, 2026

The Siasat Daily also reports that the Hindutva group’s own Instagram post accused the man of threatening a violent, blood-soaked Holi.

In a video posted on X, Vimlesh Sharma justified the assault by alleging that the victim had abused their mothers and sisters and mocked their dietary practices, stating that these actions prompted the group to respond as they did.

Location: Barabanki, Uttar Pradesh

Vimalesh Sharma, the state president of Shri Ram Sanatan Seva Samiti, released a video in which he said that he beat a Muslim man accused of making offensive remarks about cows and forcibly made him drink cow urine. https://t.co/K8zCAB2L17 pic.twitter.com/eYt8ux4M8Q

— The Muslim (@TheMuslim786) July 7, 2026

According to media reports, the Public Relations Officer (PRO) of the Barabanki Superintendent of Police stated that the police were unaware of the incident.

Congress MP Syed Naseer Hussain has condemned such acts of forced religious worship and described it as “deeply disturbing.”

The assault and humiliation of a Muslim man in Barabanki, including forcing him to perform religious acts against his will, is deeply disturbing. Such acts are not expressions of faith but crimes that violate human dignity and the Constitution.

When vigilante groups believe they… pic.twitter.com/jq7Hlgb0Ki

— Dr Syed Naseer Hussain, M P (@NasirHussainINC) July 4, 2026

July 5- Kaintholi, Tehri Garhwal, Uttarakhand

One, Amit Thapliyal along with a few associates stopped a Christian Sunday prayer meeting, asserting that Hinduism is the village’s only permitted religion. Thapiyal accused attendees of attending for payment, and told them to surrender their Scheduled Caste (SC) reservation benefits if they wished to practice Christianity.

Assessment

No reports of any FIR or case registered has emerged against any of these incidents. Most, in fact, were not found reported in mainstream media at the time of writing. This unfortunately is evidence if such were needed of the cavalier and casual manner in which legacy and mainstream media treats such hate speech; avoidance of which allows for a continued prevalence of a culture of impunity. However, the videos show a pattern of anti-minority mobilisation that is consistent with established scholarship on communal politics, majoritarian nationalism, and hate speech in India. They demonstrate how political rhetoric, vigilante action, and symbolic performances of dominance reinforce one another to construct religious minorities, particularly Muslims and Christians, as threats to the nation, culture, and social order.

The incidents are examples of moral panic and conspiracy framing in which minority communities are portrayed as engaging in coordinated efforts to undermine the demographic, territorial, or cultural integrity of the Hindu majority. This assessment is not to paint any one community as total saints and another as perpetrators. However, such rhizomatic organisation and hate speech by creating an atmosphere of perceived threat only legitimises exceptional state action and public hostility.  They create an imagined internal enemy whose existence justifies exclusionary politics.

The repeated and exhausting invocation of various forms of ‘jihad,’ portrayal of Muslims as ‘Bangladeshis,’ or ‘swines,’ disruption of Christian prayer meetings, and performative humiliation by asking someone to forcefully chant a religious slogan suggest diffusion of a shared ideological repertoire of how political authority and vigilante mobilisation reinforce one another.

Importantly, 3 out of 8 incidents have been attributed to a sitting Chief Minister and an MLA. This convergence of official political speech and vigilante action is a significant feature of democratic backsliding and ethno nationalism. Uttarakhand held municipal elections on June 9, 2026, and Uttar Pradesh has delayed its three-tier panchayat elections, with voter-list work underway through the summer of 2026 across nearly 58,000 gram panchayats

But a similar language appearing across chief ministerial speeches, local political leaders, and organisations such as the Bajrang Dal, Hindu Raksha Dal, and cow-protection groups suggests the diffusion of a shared ideological repertoire. One that is unconstitutional. However, such language has frequently been used, even at a national level, including from the head of government.

The trajectory of hate speech leading up to the 2024 General Elections has been documented by India Hate Speech Monitor. It can be accessed here.

Several of these incidents cannot be separated from a broader, well-documented campaign. Since May 2025, Indian authorities have detained and, in many cases, summarily expelled thousands of people to Bangladesh, a substantial number of them Bengali-speaking Indian Muslims with valid citizenship documents. UP has seen its own share of wrongful detentions of West Bengal migrant workers holding valid Aadhaar and voter identification.

In Uttrakhand, disruption of prayer meetings is documented. In July 2024, an 11-person FIR followed a mob attack on a Dehradun prayer meeting that vandalised a crucifix.

Uttarakhand: Hindutva mob attacks Christian prayer meet in Dehradun. A group of Hindutva ‘activists’ barged into the house and assaulted people including women present inside, Forcefully entered inside the house and vandalised a Christian cross, prayer room and bedroom, made… pic.twitter.com/BLD7vbXp2Y

— Mohammed Zubair (@zoo_bear) July 16, 2024

Similarly, in May 2022 in Purola,Uttarakhand a prayer meeting was stormed by an armed group. The coercive demand to renounce SC reservation status is a recognisable feature of this genre nationally. However, the groups are also apprehensive of forced-conversion practices.

Sections 196 and 299 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 penalises promoting disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill will. This is the only remedy for hate speech between religious, racial, linguistic or regional groups. The maximum sentence is three years, rising to five if the act occurs at a place of worship or religious ceremony.

However, the structural problem, independent of any single case, is enforcement and conviction rates. In May this year, the Supreme Court said that separate guidelines for heat speech were unnecessary. This climb-down by the apex court to its own earlier interventionist directions and orders around such mobilisations is also a sign of institutional disregard to a culture of growing anti-minority public rhetoric. A detailed analysis on the Supreme Court’s final judgement on the issue may be read here and here.

According to IHL, documented 1,318 hate speech events nationally in 2025, roughly four events a day, with 98 percent targeting Muslims either alone or alongside Christians.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Tanishka Shah)

Related:

Targeted as ‘Bangladeshis’: The hate speech fuelling deportations

A Targeted Campaign: The orchestrated crackdown on Bengali Migrants and the rising pushback from courts, Bengal government, and civil society

India Hate Lab Report 2025: How Hate Speech has been normalised in the public sphere

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