A documentary about Khalid scheduled to be screened at the National Law School of India University (NLSIU) on September 14, was suddenly postponed. The Law & Society Committee, which had organised the event, said it had taken the decision because of “logistical and security considerations” and insisted that it was not backing down because of pressure. The documentary, Prisoner No. 626710 is Present, directed by Lalit Vachani, was to be shown to mark Political Prisoners’ Day and six years since Khalid’s arrest.

However, developments around the screening tell a different story. The postponement came after opposition from the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP), which had demanded that the screening be cancelled and subsequently claimed credit for its postponement. The News Minute reported that the organisation affiliated to the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) had formally complained to the NLSIU administration about the screening. The Quint likewise reported that the organisers maintained that their decision was not a response to external pressure. Significantly, the NLSIU episode was not an isolated incident.

Just weeks earlier, Jawaharlal Nehru University had formally cancelled the booking of an auditorium for a discussion around Khalid’s book, Fractured Communities: Adivasi Histories and the Politics of Power. While the university cited the organisers’ alleged “non-disclosure of the full facts” of the programme, this was contested by the organisers and as reported in The New Indian Express and Sabrangindia, the programme went ahead with retired professors addressing the gathering just outsider the School of Social Sciences-II building. A report on this may be read here.[1]

There is an unmistakable irony to these episodes.

While universities debate whether his work can be discussed, the much larger question remains unresolved: how long can a person remain imprisoned before the criminal justice system is required to put its case to trial?

Umar Khalid was arrested in September 2020 under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) in connection with the alleged larger conspiracy behind the February 2020 North-East Delhi riots. Six years later, the trial has still not begun. That fact is no longer a footnote to the case. It is the case. Two thousand, one hundred and ninety days as an under-trial prisoner.

Six years, and still waiting for a trial

Khalid has now spent six years in custody as an under trial. The prosecution case against him is “extensive” yet key allegations have not been buffeted by adequate evidence. The Delhi Police filed a charge sheet running into 11 volumes and more than 17,000 pages in September 2020. The larger conspiracy case involves many accused and, according to an August 2026 open letter signed by more than 100 public figures, the prosecution has listed around 900 witnesses. Yet the trial has not begun.

This creates a constitutional problem that cannot simply be answered by pointing to the seriousness of the allegations. Article 21 protects the right to life and personal liberty and has long been interpreted by the Supreme Court to include the right to a speedy trial. In Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court specifically recognised that prolonged incarceration can, in appropriate circumstances, justify bail even where stringent statutory restrictions apply.

The tension between that constitutional principle and the UAPA’s stringent bail regime now sits at the centre of Khalid’s case. Six years of imprisonment without trial means that the punishment of incarceration is being experienced before guilt has been adjudicated. That distinction matters.

Khalid has not been convicted of the allegations against him. The charges remain allegations. His guilt or innocence is ultimately for a trial court to determine after evidence is tested. But the trial has not begun.

The arrest came after years of being a public dissenter

Khalid’s current incarceration cannot be understood without the political and legal history that preceded it. A former JNU student leader and research scholar, Khalid emerged as a prominent public voice on questions of communalism, citizenship, minority rights and state power.

His name first became nationally prominent during the 2016 JNU controversy. In February that year, he was arrested in connection with an event held at JNU protesting the execution of Parliament attack convicts Afzal Guru and Maqbool Bhat. He and others were accused under provisions including sedition and criminal conspiracy. The case itself became emblematic of the criminalisation of political expression on university campuses. Then, SabrangIndia had interviewed Umar Khalid, and the two-part conversation can be viewed here and here.

In January 2019, the Delhi Police filed a charge sheet against Khalid and former JNU student leader Kanhaiya Kumar in the sedition case. Then came the political upheaval surrounding the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA 2019) and the proposed National Register of Citizens (NRC). Khalid was among those who participated in and addressed protests against the CAA-NRC framework in 2019 and 2020.

On February 17, 2020, Umar Khalid spoke about peaceful protest and invoked Gandhian methods. A portion of his remarks was subsequently circulated widely on social media after BJP IT-cell head Amit Malviya posted an edited interpretation of his comments. Worse, just ahead of the 2020 Delhi Assembly elections, Kapil Mishra of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) had stated on Twitter, “Delhi mein chote chote Pakistan bane (Delhi will become mini-Pakistan)” and “Shaheen Bagh mein Pak ki entry (Shaheen Bagh will serve as entry for Pakistan) as reported by The New Indian Express and The Hindu.” Mishra was even subsequently booked under Section 125 of the Representation of People Act, 1951 (RP Act), for promoting enmity between classes to gain an advantage during the elections and thereafter in June June 2024, Mishra was summoned by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. At the time in 2020, the Delhi High Court made the Delhi Police watch four videos in court establishing hate speeches that had been made by politicians but not acted on by the police. Kapil Mishra was one of the four videos. Justice Murlidhar who came down on the police sharply for inaction was summarily transferred to the Punjab and Haryana High Court. Despite the fact that the case dwindled to naught later, there have been sharp critiques on how justice has been selectively delivered. Not just Mishra but Anurag Thakur, were recorded delivering provocative and incendiary hate speeches at election rallies in February 2020. The courts, including the Supreme Court of India were eventually lenient with them (2026) as compared to the young Muslim student leadership at the helm of the anti-CAA/NRC protests. At an election rally, Anurag Thakur, an elected official of the BJP, was heard leading a chant of “Desh ke gaddaron ko…”, to which the crowd responded, “Goli maaron saalon ko.” The slogan went viral and drew widespread criticism. Just weeks later, Delhi witnessed large-scale communal violence that claimed 53 lives, with allegations raised that such speeches contributed to the charged atmosphere. Yet it was Umar and 17 others who bore the brunt of the blame for the violence.[2]

Days later, North-East Delhi descended into brute and targeted communal violence. Fifty-three people were killed and hundreds were injured. Ignoring the deliberate provocations by elected officials of the ruling BJP, the Delhi Police chose to target on the previous, vibrant and widespread anti-CAA/NRC protest leadership, developed a theory of a “larger conspiracy”, alleging that the anti-CAA protest movement had been used to plan and orchestrate the violence. Khalid became one of the principal accused in that case. Incidentally, while the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) was in power at the time and returned to power after the state elections, the Delhi police are controlled directly by the central/union ministry for home affairs.

September 2020: The beginning of six years behind bars

Khalid was arrested on September 13, 2020, under the UAPA. The prosecution alleged that he played a central role in the conspiracy behind the riots. The case was not merely an ordinary prosecution arising from individual acts of violence. The police’s case was that Khalid, and others were part of a broader conspiracy connected to the anti-CAA protests and that the protests themselves were used as part of a plan culminating in the violence.

The prosecution has repeatedly described Khalid as one of the alleged “masterminds” of the conspiracy. Khalid has consistently denied the allegations. What followed was a prolonged battle over bail and liberty.

2021: The first long bail battle

In April 2021, a Delhi trial court granted Khalid bail in a separate IPC case relating to the Delhi riots, observing that the material against him was sketchy and that he could not be incarcerated indefinitely on such material. That did not result in his release. His UAPA case continued.

By September 2021, his lawyers were back before the court seeking bail in the larger conspiracy case. The arguments went to the heart of the prosecution’s theory. Khalid’s lawyers argued that participation in protests, membership of WhatsApp groups and advocacy of a chakka jam could not, by themselves, constitute a terrorist conspiracy.

The defence also argued that the prosecution was attempting to paint a large number of individuals with the same brush and that the charge sheet presented a narrative rather than evidence establishing Khalid’s criminal role. The prosecution disputed this and argued that the protests had been systematically organised and synchronised. The bail hearings continued for months. In March 2022, the trial court rejected Khalid’s bail application. The court found a prima facie case against him under the UAPA. Khalid remained behind bars.

2023–24: The Supreme Court route and repeated adjournments

Khalid approached the Supreme Court. Notice was issued in May 2023. What followed was another prolonged sequence of hearings and adjournments. The matter was repeatedly listed before different benches. There were adjournments because of the unavailability of counsel, constitutional bench proceedings, changes in bench composition and the recusal of a judge.

On August 9, 2023, the matter came before Justices A.S. Bopanna and Prashant Kumar Mishra. Justice Bopanna indicated that the matter would come before another bench after Justice Mishra’s recusal. On September 12, the Supreme Court admitted the bail plea but indicated that the documentary material would have to be examined in detail. The hearings continued into October and November. In January 2024, the matter was again repeatedly adjourned. There were 44 deferrals of the matter before the apex court.

Finally, on February 14, 2024, Khalid withdrew the Supreme Court petition, with his counsel telling the court that he would pursue the matter before the trial court on account of a “change in circumstances”. That change did not result in liberty.

2024: Back to the trial court

In July 2024, Khalid moved the Karkardooma court for bail. The proceedings again became protracted. On May 28, 2024, the Karkardooma court rejected his bail plea. The prosecution argued, among other things, that Khalid had amplified what it described as a “false narrative” through social media. The defence rejected the allegations and continued to challenge the evidentiary basis of the prosecution case. The central problem, however, remained unchanged. Khalid was still in prison. And there was still no trial.

2025: Another rejection, another year in custody

On September 2, 2025, the Delhi High Court rejected Khalid’s bail plea. The court accepted the prosecution’s contention that the Delhi riots were the result of a “premeditated, well-orchestrated conspiracy” rather than a spontaneous eruption of violence. The court also held that delay in trial, by itself, could not justify bail given the gravity of the allegations.

Khalid challenged the decision before the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, the years continued to accumulate. In December 2025, a Delhi court granted him interim bail for 14 days so that he could attend his sister’s wedding. It was a brief departure from a pattern otherwise defined by continued incarceration. He returned to prison.

January 5, 2026: the Supreme Court’s crucial order

The most consequential development came on January 5, 2026. The Supreme Court, in Gulfisha Fatima v. State (NCT of Delhi), granted bail to five accused in the Delhi riots larger conspiracy case: Gulfisha Fatima, Meeran Haider, Shifa-ur-Rehman, Mohammad Saleem Khan and Shadab Ahmed. But it denied bail to Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam. The distinction drawn by the court became critical (and most contested).

The bench of Justices Aravind Kumar and N.V. Anjaria said that the prosecution material prima facie disclosed what it described as a “central and formative role” for Khalid and Imam, involving planning, mobilisation and strategic direction beyond “episodic and localised acts”. The court held that the threshold under Section 43D (5) of the UAPA was attracted. It also said that the accused could renew their bail applications after the examination of the protected witnesses or after one year from the judgment, whichever was earlier. At the same time, the court directed the trial court to expedite the proceedings.

April 2026: Review rejected

Khalid sought review of the January judgment. On April 20, 2026, the Supreme Court dismissed the review petition, finding no sufficient ground to review its January 5 judgment. The door to immediate reconsideration appeared closed.

May 2026: A Supreme Court bench questions the January approach

On May 18, 2026, a separate Supreme Court bench comprising Justices B.V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan delivered the judgment in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi v. National Investigation Agency. The bench emphasised the constitutional significance of liberty and the principle that bail is ordinarily the rule and imprisonment the exception. More significantly, the bench expressed reservations about the January Gulfisha Fatima judgment’s treatment of the Supreme Court’s earlier three-judge decision in K.A. Najeeb.

The judges held that judicial discipline required the two-judge bench deciding Gulfisha to follow the binding precedent laid down by the three-judge bench in Najeeb. The issue was subsequently referred to a larger bench after another Supreme Court bench identified a “perceived conflict” in the approaches taken by different benches. That development was seized upon by Khalid and Imam in their renewed bail proceedings.

And then came the latest bail battle

Khalid and Imam approached the Delhi High Court challenging the rejection of their third bail applications. The Delhi Police has now argued that they should not even be heard at this stage. In its response before the High Court, the police described the fresh bail proceedings as “illegal”, “misconceived” and an attempt to “mislead” the court.

The Supreme Court’s January 5 order, the police says, gave Khalid and Imam liberty to renew their bail applications only after one of two events occurred: the examination of protected witnesses or the expiry of one year from the judgment. According to the prosecution, neither event had occurred when the fresh pleas were filed.

Therefore, the police say, the applications are premature. Scroll.in, reporting on August 27, quoted the prosecution’s position that the May judgment in Andrabi, arising from another case, could not override the specific directions issued in Gulfisha. The police have also relied on the Supreme Court’s May 22 order in Tasleem Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi), which acknowledged the divergence between the Gulfisha and Andrabi approaches and referred the issue to a larger bench.

The State’s position is that until the larger bench settles the question, the January judgment continues to bind the High Court.

When does pre-trial detention become punishment?

The prosecution’s argument is this: the allegations are grave, Section 43D(5) applies, the Supreme Court has already assessed the material and Khalid’s alleged role is different from that of the accused who were granted bail. But there is another side to the equation. Khalid has spent six years in prison without trial. The prosecution has reportedly listed around 900 witnesses and there is no sign of the trial beginning any time soon.

The case involves thousands of pages of evidence and many accused. The more complicated the prosecution case becomes, the longer it can take to bring it to trial. But that cannot mean that the complexity of the prosecution’s own case becomes a reason for indefinite pre-trial incarceration. This is precisely why K.A. Najeeb matters. The Supreme Court’s three-judge bench in that case recognised that statutory restrictions on bail cannot be interpreted in a manner that makes constitutional rights meaningless. Where incarceration becomes excessively prolonged and there is no reasonable prospect of the trial being completed within a meaningful timeframe, Article 21 can acquire decisive significance. Detailed pieces may be read here, here and here.

A six-year incarceration has become a public question

On August 15, more than 100 writers, academics, activists, filmmakers, journalists and public figures wrote to Chief Justice of India Surya Kant urging intervention in the continued incarceration of Khalid and Sharjeel Imam. As reported by The Wire, the signatories invoked K.A. Najeeb and argued that nearly six years of detention without the commencement of trial demands constitutional scrutiny. Their intervention reflects a broader anxiety about what prolonged pre-trial incarceration does to the meaning of liberty itself.

Six years is a long time to spend behind bars without a verdict. Umar Khalid has not been convicted of the charges against him, yet six years of pre-trial incarceration have already become a defining fact of his case. His bail battles continue, the prosecution and defence remain locked in arguments over the scope of the UAPA, and the larger question of how long a person can remain imprisoned while awaiting trial remains unresolved.

The courts will ultimately decide the charges against Khalid. But six years of incarceration without that determination cannot be reduced to another date in a long procedural timeline. It is a measure of the extraordinary cost of prolonged pre-trial detention. For Khalid, the wait for trial is no longer simply a stage in the criminal process. It has itself become the story.

Detailed pieces may be read here, here, here and here.

A profile on Umar Khalid may be viewed here.

[1] Professor Avinash Kumar, who had submitted the requisition for the auditorium, was particularly categorical. “The stated reason for the cancellation of the booking of the SSS auditorium is false,” he said, according to Hindustan Times report. Kumar maintained that the Dean had been fully informed that the event was going to discuss Khalid’s book and that the requisition had been prepared in the format suggested by the Dean himself.

His question was simple: if the university did not know what the event was about, why was the auditorium booking approved in the first place?

[2] In 2020, prior to the Delhi riots, Parvesh Verma was a Member of Parliament (MP) in the Lok Sabha, representing the West Delhi constituency. He belonged to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

During the February 2020 Delhi Assembly elections, Kapil Mishra was a BJP candidate from the Karawal Nagar constituency (which he lost). He did not hold a formal government or party organizational position during the February 2020 riots. In early 2020, prior to the Delhi riots in February, Anurag Thakur held the designation of Union Minister of State (MoS) for Finance and Corporate Affairs in the Government of India. Simultaneously, he was a serving Member of Parliament (MP) in the Lok Sabha representing the Hamirpur constituency of Himachal Pradesh.

Related:

The Conspiracy of Silence: HC denies bail to Delhi riots accused

How free are all Indians to exercise their right to peacefully protest under Article 19?

UAPA: Delhi HC denies bail, Umar Khalid’s Incarceration to Continue

4 years onward, activist Gulfisha Fatima remains behind bars

Order denying bail to Dr. Umar Khalid, a mockery of judicial system?

Dastardly attempt to assassinate Umar Khalid

Witch hunt against Umar Khalid and Kanhaiya Kumar continues

The post Six Years Behind Bars, Still No Trial: Umar Khalid’s long wait for justice appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The complaints concern BJP MLA Gopichand Padalkar, Dr. Dhavalsinh Mohite-Patil, MLA Sangram Jagtap, Shri Ram Sangh President Sagar Baig, Sangram Bapu and public speaker & RSS member Pushpendra Kulshreshtha. Each complaint identifies the date and location of the event, sets out CJP’s objections to particular statements and urges police authorities to take action under the relevant provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

CJP is dedicated to finding and bringing to light instances of Hate Speech, so that the persons propagating these venomous ideas can be unmasked and brought to justice. To learn more about our campaign against hate speech, please become a member. To support our initiatives, please donate now!

1.  Complaint against BJP MLA Gopichand Padalkar and Dr. Dhavalsinh Mohite-Patil

The complaint dated July 31, 2026, concerned speeches delivered at a public gathering in Georai, Beed district, Maharashtra, on June 19, 2026.

The complaint named BJP MLA Gopichand Padalkar and Dr. Dhavalsinh Mohite-Patil and stated that the speeches were delivered before a public gathering.

Statements attributed to Gopichand Padalkar

According to the transcript reproduced in the complaint, Padalkar spoke about alleged encroachments and religious structures, stating that “When we visited that village, we found total encroachment. That mosque was built right on the road. Our request and challenge to the police administration is this: if any place of worship has been built on government land, it must first be demolished, and a bulldozer must be run over it!”

He further referred to alleged temple and religious lands and questioned the revenue and police administration over action.

Padalkar also spoke about village names associated with Mughal rulers, stating:

“And that is why I want to request you all. Why am I telling you this? Because in Beed district, there are villages that bear the signs of Mughal rule—Imampur, Aurangpur Kukda… Ah, even after Aurangzeb has passed, why is there still an Aurangpur Kukda here? Shahjahanpur, Umrad Khurd, Dari Shahjahanpur, Sultanpur…

Wipe out these names now! Find out what their original names were.”

The speech then referred to various expressions involving the word “Jihad”. Padalkar stated:

“Land Jihad, Love Jihad, Juice Jihad—you see all of this in the media—Corporate Jihad. Our educated daughters working in big companies are also being targeted. People might think this is just random talk, but it is not. This is a matter that goes beyond politics. Understand this clearly, Hindus!”

He also referred to demographic and religious changes in Jammu and Kashmir, the North-East, Kerala and Tamil Nadu and made allegations concerning Bangladeshis and states governed by political parties.

Statements attributed to Dr. Dhavalsinh Mohite-Patil

The complaint recorded Dr. Mohite-Patil using derogatory language while referring to Muslims and political leaders.

He urged Hindu mobilisation and stated:

“If Hindus stand united, then the Hindu community will stand by you. Because it is written in our religion: ‘Dharmo Rakshati Rakshitah’ (He who protects Dharma is protected by Dharma).”

The most significant portion reproduced in the complaint stated that the highest place belongs to our mother and father. After that, if anyone looks at our motherland or our religion with an evil eye in the future, we will gouge their eyes out first, and only then will we look at the Constitution!

He continued while stating that “Because if these people do not respect our Constitution… if these people do not respect our Constitution, then it becomes very difficult to get justice through the medium of the Constitution and that is why staying united is the need of the hour today. Gathering together and building the strength of Hindus is the need of the hour today.”

What CJP alleged in the complaint

CJP stated that Padalkar’s speech repeatedly portrayed Muslims as unlawful encroachers and invoked theories including “Land Jihad”, “Love Jihad”, “Juice Jihad” and “Corporate Jihad”.

The complaint stated that the demand for bulldozer action specifically directed attention towards mosques and Muslim religious sites and that the speech sought the removal of names associated with Muslim rulers.

Regarding Dr. Mohite-Patil, CJP specifically highlighted the use of derogatory language and the statement that people would “gouge their eyes out first, and only then” look at the Constitution. The complaint described this as advocacy of violence and rejection of constitutional processes.

CJP urged authorities to immediately investigate the remarks under the relevant provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. It requested action against speech promoting enmity and incitement to hatred and referred to the need to protect dignity and communal harmony.

The copy of complaint dated July 31, 2026 can be accessed here

2. Complaint concerning speeches by Sangram Jagtap and Sagar Baig at Shevgaon

On August 11, 2026, CJP filed a complaint with Ahilyanagar Police authorities. The complaint concerned speeches delivered during a Hindu Janakrosh Morcha at Shevgaon in Ahilyanagar district, Maharashtra, on June 17, 2026. The speakers named in the complaint included MLA Sangram Jagtap and Shri Ram Sangh President Sagar Baig. The gathering followed a case involving the death of a Hindu woman and allegations concerning a Muslim man.

Statements attributed to Sangram Jagtap

According to the complaint, Jagtap addressed the gathering and spoke about the family of the accused person. He stated that “Tomorrow, after today’s meeting concludes, the responsibility lies with you all to ensure that his family does not continue to live in this area. You must take this responsibility upon yourselves.”

He further stated:

“The names of the family members listed on his ration card… no person associated with that ration card should remain here.”

The speech continued while stating that “A life of one of our children has been lost. Our child’s life is gone. His family must not stay here. Even after his death, they should not be allowed to bury him in this soil.”

Jagtap also stated:

“These people come and detonate bombs among us, and after they are sentenced or hanged, they are buried in our soil.”

He then called for collective action:

“Not a single person listed on that ration card should remain within the surroundings of this Shevgaon.”

The complaint further recorded Jagtap stating that if authorities considered the family’s presence a possible law-and-order issue, “If a law-and-order situation is going to arise because of them, then the Hindu community must create a law-and-order situation here.” He also said that “Only then… only then, in the times ahead, will anyone think twice before acting. No one will dare to cast an evil eye on our daughters. I tell you, they must learn a lesson from our actions.”

Statements attributed to Sagar Baig

The complaint recorded Sagar Baig speaking about possible criminal cases against persons participating in Hindutva-related activities. He stated:

“If anyone thinks that by filing cases against these boys or arresting them, the work will stop, then clear that misunderstanding from your mind. The work can never be stopped.”

He further said:

“Whichever case is filed during the work for Hindutva, do not be afraid; we are with you. If anyone requires assistance with legal expenses or lawyer fees, we are with you as the Rashtriya Shriram Sangh and the entire Hindu community.”

What CJP alleged in the complaint

CJP stated that the speeches called for the collective expulsion of a Muslim family from Shevgaon and went beyond criticism of an accused individual by targeting family members associated with him. The complaint specifically highlighted the statements concerning preventing the family from living in the locality and denying burial in the soil of the area.

CJP also raised objections to the statement suggesting that the Hindu community should create a law-and-order situation and to assurances that criminal cases should not deter participants.

The complaint urged police authorities to examine the speeches and take action under applicable criminal provisions. It also sought action consistent with judicial directions requiring law-enforcement agencies to act against hate speech and incitement.

The copy of complaint dated August 11, 2026 can be read here

3. Complaint concerning Sangram Jagtap and Sangram Bapu at Jalna

On July 31, 2026, CJP filed a complaint with the Jalna Police authorities. The complaint concerned a Hindu Jan Akrosh Morcha held at Partur in Jalna district, Maharashtra, on June 24, 2026. The complaint identified MLA Sangram Jagtap and Sangram Bapu as speakers.

Statements attributed to Sangram Jagtap

Jagtap spoke about Muslim children and alleged that they were taught violence. According to the complaint, he said that “And what are they taught? What is the first thing they are taught? ‘Sar Tan Se Juda’! What kind of ‘Sar Tan Se Juda’ is this?”

He contrasted this with scientific achievements and stated that children should be taught about Chandrayaan and the possibility of building a “Suryayaan”. He then stated:

“Their only teaching is that Sharia law must be implemented across the world. And if they want Sharia law, they should immediately leave this land of India and go wherever they want—be it Dubai or Pakistan, they should go to their Arab countries.”

The speech also contained a threat of physical violence:

“Eat eggs, eat chicken, eat mutton—but do not cross the line. If you go beyond that, then just like Afzal Khan’s entrails were ripped out, your entrails will be pulled out! Keep that in mind.”

Statements attributed to Sangram Bapu

According to the complaint, Sangram Bapu addressed the gathering and referred to Hindu strength.

He stated that “If they think that the youths of Ahmednagar will get scared, put their tails between their legs, and sit quietly at home… these Hindus possess the strength to cut down whatever remains of yours!”

He also called upon participants to monitor their respective localities that “Everyone must keep a strict vigil on their respective areas!” The complaint further recorded the slogan that “Uthao dande, bhagao lande.”

What CJP alleged in the complaint

CJP stated that the speeches collectively portrayed Muslims as supporters of violence and Sharia-based governance and called upon them to leave India. The complaint highlighted the threat referring to Afzal Khan’s entrails and the statement attributed to Sangram Bapu concerning the ability of Hindus to “cut down whatever remains”.

CJP also objected to the slogan recorded at the gathering, describing it as a call for collective mobilisation using a derogatory expression directed at Muslims. CJP sought investigation and appropriate criminal action against the speakers and organisers under the relevant provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, and urged authorities to act in accordance with judicial directions concerning hate speech and public order.

The copy of complaint dated July 31, 2026 can be accessed here

4. Complaint against Pushpendra Kulshreshtha over speech at Virat Hindu Sammelan, Mumbai

On July 28, 2026, CJP filed complaint and concerned a speech delivered by Pushpendra Kulshreshtha at the “Virat Hindu Sammelan” in Mumbai, Maharashtra, on June 27, 2026. The complaint stated that the speech included statements concerning Muslims, equal rights, secularism, the Gyanvapi dispute, Sanatan religion and public punishment.

Statements recorded in the complaint

Kulshreshtha questioned the proposition that India belonged equally to Hindus and Muslims, stating that “As much as the land of Bharat belongs to Hindus, it equally belongs to Muslims’—was this remembered in 2026? Before this, was it not remembered?”

He also criticised secularism and the concept of equality among religions, stating that “India is secular’—from morning till evening, those who define secularism, those who do the drama of ‘all religions are equal’—they neither define religion nor anything else; they just create their own rote definition and promote it.”

Referring to the Gyanvapi dispute, he stated “On the very first page… inside Banaras, the place which some people till recently, some supreme fools used to call the ‘Gyanvapi Mosque’… ‘Gyan’ and ‘Vyapi’—neither of these words has any relation to a mosque!”

He subsequently declared that there was only one religion, there is only one religion, and there will only be one religion—its name is Sanatan.

While discussing alleged financial irregularities concerning temple funds, Kulshreshtha stated:

“Stand them at every crossroads and whoever has stolen even ₹1 to ₹200 crore from the Ram Temple should be shot dead publicly!”

What CJP alleged in the complaint

CJP stated that the speech attacked the constitutional principle of equal rights and ridiculed secularism and the concept of all religions being equal. The complaint also objected to the statements concerning the Gyanvapi Mosque, stating that they were made in the context of a sensitive religious dispute. CJP specifically highlighted the declaration that only one religion existed and would exist—Sanatan—as a statement denying equal standing to other religions.

The complaint also identified the call for persons accused of theft to be publicly shot as inflammatory language encouraging violence and lawlessness.

CJP urged Maharashtra police authorities to investigate the speech under the relevant provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, and take action against speech promoting communal hostility and violence.

The complaint also referred to Supreme Court directions concerning suo motu action against hate speech and Maharashtra Police circulars requiring preventive measures and immediate action where speeches create law-and-order concerns.

The copy of complaint dated July 28, 2026 can be accessed here

Common demands made by CJP across the complaints

Across the four complaints, CJP repeatedly urged the police and other authorities to examine the speeches and take action under the relevant provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

The complaints referred to Supreme Court decisions and directions concerning hate speech, including the requirement that law-enforcement authorities take appropriate action where speeches attract criminal offences, even where a formal complaint is not forthcoming.

CJP also referred to the need for police authorities to preserve peace and communal harmony, record public gatherings and speeches, identify persons responsible for unlawful statements and take preventive and legal action where required.

The complaints repeatedly stressed that the speeches were delivered before public audiences and had also circulated through videos and social media platforms, extending their reach beyond those physically present at the events.

Related:

Why Justice Still Eludes Dalits | Inside India’s Anti-Atrocities Law

In Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand and Haryana, India’s anti-atrocities law is failing Dalits

Ritual Bans to Targeted Killings: Rising anti-Dalit hate and crime across states

The post CJP files four complaints over hate speeches at gatherings across Maharashtra appeared first on SabrangIndia.

A Division Bench of Justices Atul Sreedharan and Achal Sachdev quashed the NSA detention order passed against Chaudhary, holding that her continued incarceration under the Act violated Article 21 of the Constitution. The Court found that the grounds of detention were unsupported by material, repetitive and speculative, and that the District Magistrate had passed the order without proper application of mind.

The judgment is significant not merely, because it sets aside an NSA detention order. The Court closely reconstructed the chronology relied upon by the State, examined the WhatsApp conversations and videos forming the evidentiary basis of the detention, scrutinised the circumstances of Chaudhary’s arrest, and then questioned the District Magistrate’s failure to independently assess whether the extraordinary power of preventive detention was warranted at all.

Its conclusion was unequivocal: the State had failed to establish the evidentiary foundation necessary to deprive Chaudhary of her liberty under the NSA.

The Court also went considerably further. Holding that the State had exercised its authority in a “casual and cavalier” manner, it awarded Chaudhary ₹5 lakh compensation and directed that the amount be recovered from the salaries of the District Magistrate, Gautam Buddha Nagar, and other officers found responsible, “right down to the SHO” who had prepared the initial report supporting the detention.

The chronology that undermined the State’s case

The case arose out of labour agitation in Gautam Buddha Nagar in April 2026. Thousands of workers had taken to the streets over low wages, the absence of salary increases for several years and working conditions involving shifts of up to twelve hours. The State alleged that the protests subsequently descended into vandalism and arson, and portrayed Chaudhary as an “agent provocateur” responsible for provoking the violence.

Chaudhary, a history graduate who had completed her M.A. in History and was pursuing her first year of law at Delhi University, had no previous criminal antecedents—a fact expressly admitted by the State. The fundamental difficulty with the State’s case was chronological.

The State’s own position was that Chaudhary was taken into custody on April 12. At the same time, it was undisputed that the violence began only on April 13. The State nevertheless sought to attribute the subsequent violence to Chaudhary by alleging that she and her associates had entered into a conspiracy before her arrest and that the violence was the eventual consequence of that conspiracy. The Court examined that proposition against the actual material placed before it. It did not find the necessary link.

The High Court repeatedly asked the State to identify the specific WhatsApp message or video in which Chaudhary had incited people to engage in rioting, arson or destruction of public or private property. The State was unable to identify even a single such communication. That finding goes to the core of the detention order. The State was not merely required to establish that violence had occurred. It had to demonstrate why Chaudhary’s detention under the NSA was necessary to prevent its recurrence or continuation. The material, according to the Court, did not establish that connection.

“This Court repeatedly asked the learned counsel for the State to point out from the WhatsApp chats and the video recordings as to which one of them incited people or disclosed a conspiracy inciting people to indulge in acts of rioting, arson and destruction of public and private property? The learned counsel for the State has not been able to show a single message from the WhatsApp chats between the Petitioner and her associates or any video clip which would reveal any incitement from the Petitioner, either evidently or by necessary implication, which would disclose that it was the involvement of the Petitioner and the conspiracy hatched by her that resulted in the violence which erupted from 13.04.2026, much after the Petitioner was taken into custody by the State on 11.04.2026 (as held by this Court). Even otherwise, the undisputed case of the State is also that the violence erupted after the Petitioner was taken to custody by the police.” (Para 20)

A call for mobilisation was not an incitement to violence

One of the principal pieces of material relied upon by the State was a WhatsApp exchange in which Chaudhary allegedly called upon people to gather in support of workers and to oppose what she described as unlawful police action. The Court’s treatment of this communication is constitutionally significant. Even if the communication were accepted in its entirety, the Bench held that it did not constitute an exhortation to violence. At most, it called upon people to assemble in solidarity with labourers and to oppose excessive or unlawful exercise of police authority.

The Court also examined the videos relied upon by the State. The footage showed a large gathering of men and women, including persons in rural attire, with one individual apparently addressing the gathering. The Court found nothing in the footage indicating that the crowd was armed or engaged in violence. Instead, the material appeared to show people exercising their right to speak and agitate for higher wages and humane working hours.

“The video images relied upon by the State show a large number of people having gathered, which include men and women in traditional rural clothing, all standing near a lamp posts and one video image of a person who seems to be addressing the public. None of these videos disclose that the crowd is agitated or armed with lathi, stones or any such articles, which may be used in an act of violence, but appear to be exercising their constitutional right and freedom of speech and agitating their demands for higher pay and humane working hours.” (Para 21)

The judgment thus refuses an important form of executive overreach: the retrospective attribution of violence to an entire protest movement, or to an individual associated with it, without evidence establishing individual culpability or incitement.

Preventive detention cannot become a substitute for ordinary criminal law

The Court’s clearest legal proposition is that the NSA is an exceptional power. Preventive detention, it held, “is an exception”. It cannot be used as a substitute for ordinary criminal law merely to ensure that a person remains incarcerated because she might otherwise obtain bail in a criminal case.

The State had correctly pointed out that preventive detention does not necessarily require a person to have been convicted, or even to have been involved in several criminal cases. The statutory power can operate on the basis of a genuine apprehension concerning public order or national security. But that does not mean that the detaining authority’s satisfaction is beyond evidentiary scrutiny. The High Court expressly rejected the proposition that “subjective satisfaction” permits detention based upon bare allegations. The subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority must emerge from relevant material capable of supporting the inference drawn.

In the present case, the Court found the grounds of detention to be “repetitive, speculative and … only opinion based”, without material capable of sustaining those opinions.

The Court therefore laid down a simple but important constitutional proposition: an extraordinary power that directly results in the deprivation of liberty under Article 21 cannot be exercised on “surmises, biases, conjectures and opinions”. The material must cross the threshold from allegation to evidence; otherwise, the detention becomes arbitrary.

“Any detention under the NSA is an exception. It is not a substitute to ensure that a person who may receive bail on account of merits of his case, is still detained in custody under a concocted reasoning by the State. The elaborate grounds of detention of the District Magistrate are repetitive, speculative and are only opinion based without referring to a shred of evidence / material in support of sustaining those opinions. The grounds of detention must traverse beyond mere allegations and opinion. Allegations which raise a subjective opinion in the mind of the District Magistrate must be supported with reference to material for the formation of such opinion, else the same would be arbitrary. It must be understood that the exercise of such a discretion which directly violates a person’s rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, cannot be exercised lightly on the basis of surmises, biases, conjectures and opinions. It is the exercise of an extraordinary authority which results in the summary incarceration of a citizen merely on the opinion of the detaining authority which must be such that where a constitution court examining the grounds of detention is also satisfied that the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the District Magistrate, crosses the threshold of mere surmises and conjectures and was justly based upon the material on record and not detaining the detenue under the stringent provisions of the NSA would in all probability than not, result in the public order being disturbed or would result in an act by the detenue which is deleterious to national security. The absence of such material would render the grounds of detention and the order of detention unjustified, deserving to be set aside.” (Para 22)

The arrest record raised a more serious procedural concern

The judgment becomes particularly significant when it turns from the substantive allegations to the legality of the arrest process itself. Chaudhary’s case was that she had been taken into custody at approximately 5:30 p.m. on April 11 from Botanical Garden Metro Station. The State maintained that her arrest took place only on April 12. The Court tested these competing versions against the WhatsApp material produced by the State itself.

Messages sent to Chaudhary by an associate beginning at 5:56 p.m. on April 11 went unanswered. Several further messages and a missed call also received no response. The Court contrasted this with an earlier exchange that afternoon in which Chaudhary had been actively communicating with the same associate.

The material, the Court held, rendered Chaudhary’s claim that she was already in State custody from the evening of April 11 probable and undermined the State’s contention that she remained free until her formal arrest on April 12. But it was the Section 130 BNSS notice that caused the Court greater concern.

The State relied upon the notice to establish that Chaudhary had been proceeded against for failing to furnish a bond for good behaviour. Yet the notice contained General Diary Entry No. 37—the very entry on the basis of which the State claimed she had been arrested. The Court noted that the GD entry had been generated at 10:20 a.m. on April 12. The notice, however, did not mention the time at which it was issued.

Justice Achal Sachdev pointed out that if the notice had genuinely preceded the arrest, the GD number could not logically have appeared on it in the manner in which it did. Justice Sreedharan agreed, holding that the notice appeared to have been prepared after the arrest, describing the procedure as “ex post facto” and “nothing more than a sham”. The State was unable to answer what the Court described as “visible fabrication in the record”. This finding is particularly consequential in a preventive-detention case.

“My learned brother on the bench Justice Achal Sachdev, pointed out that the General Diary Entry No. 37 was generated at 10.20 am on 12.04.2026 and the mention of the G.D number in the notice under Section 130 goes to reveal that the notice was prepared after the arrest of the petitioner for, had the same been prepared before the arrest of the Petitioner, the G.D. number would not have been mentioned on the notice u/s. 130 BNSS. Mentioning the G.D. number in the notice under Section 130 of the BNSS reveals that the Petitioner was already arrested and the procedure of giving a notice under Section 130 of the BNSS was ex post facto the arrest and nothing more than a sham. I agree with the view of brother Justice Achal Sachdev that the notice u/s. 130 of the BNSS was prepared after the arrest of the Petitioner and that is the reason why the time of issuance is not mentioned in the notice and its omission is deliberate. Answer was sought from the Ld. Counsel for the state with regard to visible fabrication in the record for which no answer is forthcoming from the Ld. Counsel for the State.” (Para 17)

The Court’s scrutiny therefore went beyond whether the NSA order contained adequate reasons. It questioned the integrity of the very process through which the State sought to justify its exercise of coercive power.

The District Magistrate was required to exercise independent judgment

The Court’s criticism of the District Magistrate, Medha Roopam, is equally significant. The detention grounds ran into several pages. But the Court made clear that the length of a detention order cannot establish that the authority has applied its mind. The District Magistrate was required to examine the police dossier “threadbare”, particularly when the police report consisted largely of allegations unsupported by credible material.

The circumstances demanded greater scrutiny: Chaudhary was a young student activist, had no previous criminal record, was agitating in support of labourers, and the material before the authority did not demonstrate that she had incited violence. Instead, the Court found that the circumstances suggested that the District Magistrate had sought to “set an example” out of Chaudhary and deter others from exercising their right to freedom of speech and expression in public spaces in support of labourers.

The finding is devastating for the legality of the detention order because the District Magistrate’s statutory role is not to mechanically endorse the police version. Preventive detention requires an independent satisfaction on the part of the detaining authority. Where the underlying police material is itself weak, contradictory or unsupported, the District Magistrate has an even greater obligation to interrogate it before authorising incarceration under an exceptional statute. The Court concluded that this obligation had not been discharged.

“In this case, the conduct of the District Magistrate Gautam Buddha Nagar who passed the impugned order, is worthy of derision. In a case where the police report against the Petitioner were only allegations without there being any credible material against her, the District Magistrate was expected to be vigilant and examine the record threadbare to determine if there was any material in support of the allegations and even thereafter, assess whether the oppressive provisions of the NSA were warranted against the Petitioner and how the general law of the land was inadequate against a female student activist without any previous criminal record, agitating for the rights of labourers and where the material on record did not disclose that she had in any way incited violence, reveals that the District Magistrate desired to set an example out of the Petitioner and deter others from exercising their right to freedom of speech and expression in public spaces in support of the labourers. The District Magistrate Gautam Buddha Nagar is guilty of violating her oath of allegiance, making this a fit case for the imposition of compensation to the petitioner.” (Para 31)

The Court draws a constitutional line around protest

The judgment also makes an important statement about the constitutional status of public protest. The High Court held that freedom of speech and expression extends beyond speech in the abstract. It includes the right to come onto the streets, gather peacefully and agitate for one’s rights. The State cannot prevent public gatherings merely because it assumes that they may result in a breach of peace.

The Court warned that such an approach would amount to “throwing the baby out of the bath water” and could ultimately result in the cessation of collective expression in public spaces. Importantly, the Court did not ignore the State’s obligation to maintain public order. It expressly recognised that peaceful demonstrations may be infiltrated by persons interested in creating violence and that the violent acts of such persons may subsequently be attributed unjustly to an entire gathering. But its answer was not to suppress the gathering itself.

The State, the Court said, possesses a strong police force and must train it to manage large gatherings while preserving accountability through measures such as videography. The principle is therefore not that every protest is constitutionally immune from regulation. It is that the State must distinguish between peaceful dissent and actual threats to public order rather than treating the possibility of disorder as proof of disorder.

“In this case, this Court has seen from the material on record that at the petitioner has called for citizens in support of the labourers and to agitate for their rights. There is no material to reflect that such agitation will have to be violent or challenging the authority of the State. The freedom of speech and expression extends to coming out on the streets and agitating a cause, and gathering peacefully without arms or without threat to the public order. However, the State must also realize that a peaceful agitation where people collect without arms or ammunitions, can still be scuttled by mischievous elements, who may be sent by parties, who are interested in ensuring that such an agitation is broken and also where such elements may indulge in acts of violence, which thereafter gets attributed to the entire group which is patently unjust. Preventing people from gathering in public spaces or agitating their rights on the grounds of assumed breach of peace, would be throwing the baby out of the bath water. If such a view is taken by the State and approved of by the Courts, it would lead to a cessation of the collective expression of opinion in public spaces. The Constitution protects such a right and the same cannot be trifled with merely on the subjective opinion of the State. The State must also realize that it has a strong and powerful police force, which must be trained in ensuring public order in such large gatherings and also resort to videography of the gathering and the manner in which it is conducted, so that accountability may be affixed, in the event of an outbreak of violence.” (Para 23)

“The loyalty is towards the Constitution and not the political executive”

The Court’s observations on the bureaucracy take the judgment beyond the immediate facts of Chaudhary’s detention. In considering compensation, the Bench turned to the constitutional responsibilities attached to the powers exercised by the IAS and IPS.

It reminded public officials that the immense powers conferred upon them exist alongside an equally serious responsibility to protect the constitutional rights, dignity and welfare of citizens. Most significantly, the Court observed that their loyalty is to the Constitution and not to the political executive, and that they are servants of the people in a democracy. The Court then issued an extraordinary warning.

When bureaucrats and police officers disregard their constitutional oath and exercise power in a manner that violates civil liberties, citizens may begin to regard them as an “oppressive vestige of the British Empire”. Such conduct, the Court warned, can generate distrust, anger and civil unrest. It concluded with the striking observation that unless such conduct is checked, “it shan’t be long before the errant in the bureaucracy reduce the State of Uttar Pradesh to an Orwellian Dystopia.”

“It goes without saying that those in the bureaucracy and the police, when they act in a manner which is harmonious with their oath of allegiance, the thankful citizens of this State shall elevate them, and very rightly so, to a position which would be envied by the Gods themselves. However, every time they ignore that solemn oath and act contrary to it, the people of the State of Uttar Pradesh would view them as an oppressive vestige of the British Empire arousing angst and hatred towards them creating an environment of civil unrest and this Court, while correcting their excesses and/or illegalities, especially those that impinge upon the civil liberties of the citizens without adequate cause or due process (inhering in the procedure established by law), may pass harsh orders to compensate the citizen so wronged, besides recording their despotic conduct. Else, it shan’t be long before the errant in the bureaucracy reduce the State of Uttar Pradesh to an Orwellian Dystopia.” (Para 30)

Personal financial consequences for the officers

The Court’s response to the State’s conduct was not confined to declaratory relief. Chaudhary had sought ₹50 lakh in compensation. The State argued that quashing the NSA order would not result in any substantial release from custody because Chaudhary remained in judicial custody in the underlying criminal cases, where her bail applications had been rejected. The Court accepted that the period of NSA detention had merged with her judicial custody and therefore declined to award the full amount claimed.

It nevertheless found that the State’s “casual and cavalier exercise of authority” had violated her constitutional rights and awarded ₹5 lakh as compensation. More significantly, the Court did not direct the compensation to be borne merely by the public exchequer. It ordered recovery from the salary of the District Magistrate and all other officers who were responsible, “right down to the SHO” who had prepared the initial report supporting the NSA detention.

The Court further directed that its displeasure against the District Magistrate and police officers involved in preparing the dossier be recorded in their service records. This is perhaps the judgment’s strongest institutional message.

“Undoubtedly, even if the order in this particular case is quashed, the petitioner would still remain in jail as an under trial till she secures bail in all the criminal cases registered against her. As the period of detention merges with the period of judicial custody, the amount as prayed for by the petitioner, need not be considered in its entirety. However, on account of the casual and cavalier exercise of authority by the State through the District Magistrate Gautam Buddha Nagar, which has violated the constitutional rights of the petitioner, this Court considers it sufficient to grant ₹5 lakhs as compensation to the petitioner. This Court also directs that the said amount must be recovered from the salary of the District Magistrate Gautam Buddha Nagar, who has passed this order of detention without application of mind and from all such other officers who may have been responsible, right down to the SHO of the Police Station, who had prepared the initial report warranting the detention of the petitioner under the provisions of the NSA. The displeasure of this Court against the conduct of the District Magistrate concerned and all such other officers of the police who were involved in preparing the dossier against the petition, be noted in their service records.” (Para 33)

The Court has effectively rejected the proposition that an unconstitutional exercise of State power should have no personal consequences for those who exercise it. Where individual officials are found responsible for an arbitrary deprivation of liberty, accountability may follow the chain of decision-making down to the officer who initiated the process.

The judgment is ultimately about the limits of preventive State power

The Allahabad High Court’s decision is not a declaration that Chaudhary is innocent of the criminal allegations against her. The Court expressly recorded that the chargesheet in the underlying case had been filed, cognizance had been taken and her bail application had been rejected. She would consequently remain in judicial custody even after the NSA detention was quashed, unless released in the other criminal cases.

The High Court was not deciding whether Chaudhary committed the offences alleged against her. It was deciding whether the executive had lawfully established the extraordinary conditions necessary to deprive her of liberty under the NSA. On that question, the Court found the State’s case fundamentally deficient.

Preventive detention may be exceptional by design. But precisely because it authorises incarceration without the safeguards of an ordinary criminal trial, the material supporting its exercise must meet a correspondingly serious standard of scrutiny. The Allahabad High Court’s judgment insists on that standard. And in doing so, it makes a broader point about the rule of law: Article 21 is not merely a protection against unlawful imprisonment after the event. It is a constitutional command that every exercise of coercive State power affecting liberty must remain tethered to law, evidence, reason and institutional responsibility.

The complete judgment may be read below:

Related:

Allahabad HC quashes NSA detention of Aakriti Chaudhary, questions ‘concocted’ State narrative in Noida workers’ protest case

Satya Niketan Collapse: When students and neighbours had to rescue students from a system that had failed them

Vande Mataram and the 2026 Amendment: From voluntary honour to penal coercion

Declared ‘Foreigner’, denied a hearing, pushed across the border: Gauhati HC pulls up Assam

The Normalisation of Suicide at IITs: Institutional blindness and failure

Six Days On, Still No FIR: What happened to Shaheen and Nafisa Khan at Saket Police Station?

The post ‘Subjective Satisfaction’ Cannot Be Built On Conjecture: Allahabad HC quashes NSA detention of Akriti Chaudhary appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In its memorandum dated September 2, the organisations have collectively argued that the incident cannot be dismissed as an isolated administrative lapse. The memorandum has called for a comprehensive investigation into how thousands of original election documents came to be outside official custody, why they were being reproduced at a commercial establishment and whether the breach points to wider vulnerabilities in the handling of voter information during the SIR exercise.

The Kharghar incident assumes added significance because of the scale of the ongoing revision process. According to figures cited by the Chief Electoral Officer, around 2.07 crore Enumeration Forms have been classified as uncollectable in Maharashtra at the draft stage. While the Election Commission has clarified that being classified as uncollectable does not automatically mean that an elector has been permanently excluded from the electoral roll, CJP has argued that the sheer magnitude of the figure makes the integrity of every stage of the verification process a matter of exceptional public importance.

3,404 original forms found at private photocopying centre

The controversy emerged on August 27, when election-related forms were reportedly found at a photocopying centre in Sector 19, Kharghar. According to reports cited in the memorandum, the recovered documents were original SIR Enumeration Forms relating to multiple polling stations under the 188-Panvel Assembly Constituency. A revenue team subsequently examined the documents, and election authorities reportedly confirmed that they were genuine election forms. Reports have stated that the forms related to 11 polling stations.

The incident reportedly came to light following a complaint concerning the photocopying of the forms. A person identified in media reports as Suraj Patil, described as a BJP functionary, was allegedly found handling the forms. The police subsequently seized the documents and an FIR was registered. Five Booth Level Officers associated with the forms were also suspended, with a departmental inquiry initiated into how the documents reached the private premises.

In the memorandum, the groups state that culpability must be established through an impartial investigation. At the same time, the memorandum argues that the reported political connection makes it particularly important for the State Election Commission to establish whether access to the forms was authorised and, if not, how such access was facilitated. The central question, according to CJP, is therefore not simply who was found with the forms, but how the forms travelled from the official election machinery to a private establishment in the first place.

Where did the documents leave the official chain of custody?

The memorandum places particular emphasis on the chain of custody (chain of command in law) of the Enumeration Forms. SIR forms are part of an official electoral exercise and contain voter-related information. Their handling therefore requires safeguards that ensure that the documents remain accessible only to persons authorised to use them for election-related purposes.

The discovery of thousands of original forms at a commercial photocopying centre raises questions about every stage of their movement. CJP and others has therefore called for the reconstruction of the entire chain of custody, beginning with the collection of the forms from electors and continuing through their storage, transportation, access and eventual recovery.

The organisation has also stressed that the inquiry should not automatically end with the suspension of the five BLOs. If the evidence points towards supervisory, administrative or other responsibility, those aspects too must be investigated. The issue is particularly significant because of the sheer number of documents involved. The presence of 3,404 forms cannot be explained simply as an isolated document inadvertently carried outside an office. The authorities must establish who had access to them, who authorised their movement and why they were taken to a private photocopying facility.

A voter-data security concern, not merely a paperwork lapse

The memorandum has also raised concerns about what may have happened to the information contained in the forms. The organisation has urged the authorities to determine whether the documents were merely photocopied or whether they were also scanned, photographed, digitally stored, transmitted or reproduced in any other manner.

This is an important distinction. Physical recovery of the original forms does not necessarily establish that no copies remain elsewhere. CJP, VFD and BCS have therefore called for relevant CCTV footage, electronic records and equipment used in the photocopying process to be preserved and examined as part of the investigation.

The memorandum argues that once voter-level information leaves the controlled environment of the election machinery, the potential risk extends beyond the physical documents. Copies could potentially be retained or disseminated without the knowledge of election authorities.

For CJP, VFD and BCS, citizens who provide information to the State as part of the electoral process are entitled to an assurance that such information will be used only for legitimate electoral purposes and handled through secure procedures.

The 2.07 crore figure makes the breach more consequential

The memorandum has linked the Kharghar incident to the wider concerns surrounding the SIR exercise in Maharashtra. The Chief Electoral Officer has stated that approximately 2.07 crore Enumeration Forms have been classified as uncollectable, comprising categories including voters who were absent or not found, those who had permanently shifted, deceased persons, duplicates or persons already enrolled elsewhere.

The Election Commission has emphasised that these classifications are provisional and that the draft electoral roll is not the final roll. Eligible voters whose names are missing can participate in the claims and objections process and seek inclusion or correction. The memorandum has acknowledged this position but has argued that the availability of a remedy does not, by itself, eliminate concerns arising from the scale of exclusion. An elector who does not know that their name has disappeared from the draft roll may not necessarily approach the authorities. Similarly, an elector incorrectly classified as shifted, deceased, duplicated or absent may face a significant administrative burden in establishing that they remain eligible.

In this context, the Kharghar incident raises a broader question: can the public have confidence in the accuracy of the electoral roll if the documents on which that roll is being prepared are not demonstrably secure? For CJP, this is why the Kharghar episode cannot be treated merely as a local dispute.

CJP and others seeks statewide audit

The organisation has called for the Kharghar incident to trigger a statewide audit of the custody and handling of SIR Enumeration Forms. Such an audit, CJP argues, should establish whether similar instances of unauthorised possession, removal, reproduction or mishandling have occurred elsewhere in Maharashtra.

The memorandum also calls for the Election Commission to strengthen and publicly disclose uniform safeguards governing the custody, movement, reproduction, storage and disposal of SIR documents. This, CJP says, is necessary not only to identify wrongdoing after it occurs but to prevent vulnerabilities in the system from being repeated.

Transparency is essential to restoring public confidence

The memorandum has also called for the findings of the Kharghar inquiry to be made public, subject to legitimate restrictions relating to personal information or an ongoing criminal investigation. The organisation argues that the public should not be left to choose between competing political claims about what happened. The State Election Commission, as the institution responsible for the electoral process, must establish the facts and communicate them transparently. For CJP, the issue ultimately extends beyond the Kharghar photocopying centre.

An electoral roll determines who is recognised by the State as entitled to participate in an election. Its preparation therefore forms part of the foundation of the democratic process itself. The discovery of thousands of original SIR forms outside the expected chain of custody, followed by the suspension of five BLOs and the registration of an FIR, has already exposed a serious administrative vulnerability. When viewed alongside the 2.07 crore forms classified as uncollectable, that vulnerability assumes greater significance.

The memorandum therefore calls upon the Election Commission to treat the episode as an institutional matter rather than merely an isolated breach. Its demand is ultimately for something fundamental to any electoral exercise: that every eligible citizen’s place on the electoral roll be determined through a process that is secure, transparent, impartial and capable of independent scrutiny.

The credibility of an election does not begin on polling day. It begins with the integrity of the electoral roll—and with public confidence that the machinery preparing that roll is not vulnerable to unauthorised access, administrative failures or partisan interference.

The complete memorandum may be on the CJP website here.

Related:

Maharashtra’s schools are struggling to survive as students protest, infrastructure crumbles and Marathi-medium institutions disappear

Maharashtra SIR: 2.08 crore (20.8 million) voter forms “uncollected” hence may not be listed in August 24 draft electoral roll

Maharashtra SIR extension keeps teachers away from classrooms as unit tests face delays

SIR Maharashtra: CEO details schedules for publication & verification of draft and final electoral rolls

SIR and the Making of a Stateless Citizen? | R. Rajagopal Speaks Out | Teesta Setalvad

The post 3,404 SIR Forms Found at Kharghar Xerox Shop: CJP, VFD and BCS demands answers from Maharashtra SEC appeared first on SabrangIndia.

At one level, the case concerned two women who said that they had voluntarily embraced Islam and were subsequently confined by their father. But the legal question before the Court was considerably broader: can the alleged illegality of a person’s religious conversion justify the continued physical confinement of that person when she is an adult, competent, and unequivocally asserts that the choice was voluntary?

The Court answered in the negative. More importantly, it refused to allow the criminal investigation into the alleged conversion to collapse the distinction between two separate questions: whether the conversion was lawful, and whether the women could lawfully be detained.

“The present case discloses an exceptionally grave and egregious violation of constitutional rights. The corpus, despite being major, educated and legally competent women, were deprived of their liberty for a prolonged period commencing from the year 2021, solely because they exercised their constitutionally protected freedom of conscience and chose to profess a religion different from that professed by their family. Such prolonged and coercive confinement strikes at the very foundation of constitutional democracy, which recognises the autonomy of every adult individual as sacrosanct and beyond the reach of parental or societal control. The constitutional guarantee of personal liberty cannot be permitted to yield to familial disapproval, social orthodoxy or executive apathy.” (Para 65)

“Before parting, this Court deems it necessary to reiterate that the Constitution does not confer upon parents a licence to incarcerate their major children merely because they disapprove of their faith, beliefs or personal choices. Constitutional rights cannot be eclipsed by parental authority, social morality or majoritarian sentiment. The liberty of an adult individual is inviolable, and any attempt to suppress that liberty by force or coercion invites the constitutional scrutiny of this Court and attracts appropriate public law consequences, including the award of monetary compensation for the infringement of fundamental rights.” (Para 66)

The former, the Court held, could be examined by the competent authority or court. The latter was squarely before the High Court in habeas corpus jurisdiction. The judgment consequently becomes a strong reaffirmation of decisional autonomy, freedom of conscience, the limits of parental authority, the scope of habeas corpus against private detention, and the State’s public-law liability when its machinery permits an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty to continue.

Two adult women before the constitutional court

The petition concerned Anshu Bhatia @ Amina Anshu Bhatia, aged about 35 years, and Diya Bhatia @ Zoya Diya Bhatia, aged about 20 years. By an order dated July 30, 2026, the State was directed to produce both women before the High Court. They were subsequently produced before Justice Sandeep Jain by police officials from the Cyber Crime Police Station, Agra.

The Court then did something crucial for a habeas corpus proceeding involving allegations of coercion: it interacted with the women directly. Anshu told the Court that she had voluntarily embraced Islam in 2020, describing the decision as a conscious and independent choice motivated by mental peace, spiritual fulfilment and inner solace. She stated that the decision was not the result of inducement, influence, coercion, undue persuasion or any extraneous consideration. She further stated that her father strongly opposed the decision and subsequently confined her within the parental home. According to her, physical restraint, intimidation and sustained mental harassment were used to compel her to renounce the faith she had chosen and return to Hinduism.

Diya, who had completed her education up to the Intermediate level, similarly told the Court that she had voluntarily embraced Islam in 2021, motivated by personal faith, conscience, mental peace and spiritual solace. She too denied force, fraud, coercion, undue influence or allurement.

Both women consistently maintained before the Court that their decisions were voluntary and conscious and arose from their own individual faith and freedom of conscience. They also denied that their conversion was motivated by an extraneous, unlawful or pecuniary consideration or intended to advance the interests of any individual or organisation. The dispute therefore came before the High Court in a very specific constitutional form: Were these adult women unlawfully confined by their father against their own wishes?

The State’s case: This was not merely a family dispute

The State strongly opposed the habeas corpus petition. The father had lodged Case Crime No. 228 of 2025 at Police Station Sadar Bazar, District Agra, alleging that the women had been subjected to forcible and deceitful conversion from Hinduism to Islam. The FIR was initially registered under Section 87 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

During investigation, the investigating agency subsequently added:

• Sections 61(2), 111(3), 111(4) and 152 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023; and
• Sections 3/5(1) and 5(2) of the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021.

The State argued that the addition of these provisions demonstrated that the allegations of voluntary conversion could not simply be accepted at face value. But the State went considerably further. Its case was that the alleged conversion was part of a larger and organised conspiracy with ramifications for the sovereignty, integrity and unity of the nation.

It claimed that the investigation had uncovered material indicating the involvement of organised persons pursuing a coordinated design to disturb the social fabric through unlawful religious conversions.

The State also referred to alleged involvement of foreign entities and external influences, arguing that the investigation was continuing and that releasing the women could prejudice the proceedings. It further contended that the women had been projected as victims in the criminal case and that allowing them to reside with persons allegedly connected to the investigation could influence witnesses, prejudice the prosecution and frustrate the administration of criminal justice. The State therefore attempted to place the case within a much larger framework of public order, national interest and security.

The High Court was not persuaded.

Findings of the Court

• What is the scope of habeas corpus?

Before determining whether the detention was illegal, Justice Sandeep Jain examined the nature of the writ itself. The Court relied upon the Supreme Court’s judgment in Home Secretary (Prison) v. H. Nilofer Nisha, where the Supreme Court explained that habeas corpus is available wherever a person is deprived of personal liberty unlawfully or without justification.

Importantly, the Supreme Court authority recognises that habeas corpus is not confined to State detention. It can also be invoked against private detention. The Allahabad High Court quoted the principle that the writ is available for release from detention not only by the State but also from private detention. This becomes central to the case as the father was not a State official exercising a statutory power of detention. The alleged confinement was taking place inside the parental home. But that did not take the matter outside Article 226. The constitutional inquiry was simple: Was there lawful authority for the restraint?

• A parental home is not a legal prison—but it cannot become one

The judgment’s treatment of private detention is especially significant. The women were allegedly confined in their parental home. That fact could easily have been used to characterise the dispute as a family matter. Thankfully, the Court refused to do so. Habeas corpus exists precisely because the law is concerned with the fact of unlawful restraint, not merely the formal label attached to the person exercising it. The relevant question was not whether the father believed he was acting in the interests of his daughters. The question was whether he had legal authority to restrain two adult women. The Court ultimately found that he did not.

• Majority marks the constitutional end of parental custody

The Court relied on a line of constitutional jurisprudence concerning the autonomy of adult women. One of the authorities discussed was the Supreme Court’s decision in Soni Gerry v. Gerry Douglas. There, the Supreme Court held that once an individual attains majority, she is entitled to make her own choices and that courts should not assume the role of a super-guardian merely because a parent disapproves of that choice.

The Allahabad High Court also considered the Kerala High Court’s decision in Rajamohan MS v. State of Kerala, which dealt specifically with parental attempts to restrain an adult woman. That decision recognised that parental authority may extend to advice, counselling and guidance, but not to confinement or detention against the wishes of an adult daughter.

The Allahabad High Court reproduced the proposition that an adult major woman cannot be treated as a “chattel” and that parental authority does not give a parent the right to keep her under restraint against her will. This jurisprudence supplies the conceptual foundation for the present ruling. Once adulthood is attained, the parent-child relationship does not disappear. But its legal character changes.

• The Court rejects the idea that parents know what is “best” for adult women

The reliance on Rajamohan MS case is particularly important because it confronts a deeply embedded paternalistic assumption: that parents should be permitted to control adult women’s decisions because they believe those decisions are wrong, imprudent or harmful. The jurisprudence cited by the High Court rejects that logic.

An adult’s decision does not lose constitutional protection simply because the decision might later prove to be unwise. The Kerala High Court authority, quoted in the judgment, makes the point that courts cannot permit the concepts of parents about what is “right and good” for their adult daughters to override the daughters’ own assessment of what is right for them. This principle is particularly relevant in the present case.

The women’s choice concerned religion—a matter inherently connected to conscience and identity. The Constitution cannot recognise individual autonomy while simultaneously allowing family members to exercise a veto over the individual’s conscience.

• Reliance on Shafin Jahan to hold that constitutional courts are not super-guardians

The judgment also invokes Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M., one of the Supreme Court’s most crucial decisions on individual autonomy. The High Court notes the Supreme Court’s recognition that constitutional courts may exercise parens patriae jurisdiction for persons who are incapable of exercising free will, such as minors or persons of unsound mind. But that principle cannot be extended to competent adults simply because their choices are controversial or disapproved of by others.

The Supreme Court in Shafin Jahan emphasised that decisions concerning intimate and personal matters belong to the individuals concerned and that neither State nor society can intrude into that domain merely because they disapprove of the choice. The Allahabad High Court uses that jurisprudence to reinforce a fundamental distinction: A constitutional court protects an adult’s autonomy; it does not replace it.

The Court therefore did not ask whether it believed the women’s religious choice was sensible. It asked whether the women themselves had made the choice freely. Once the answer was yes, the constitutional duty was to protect that choice from unlawful restraint.

• The Court personally tests voluntariness

This is where the Court’s interaction with the women becomes legally decisive. Justice Sandeep Jain recorded that the responses of both women were: “spontaneous, coherent and unequivocal.”

Nothing emerged during the interaction to suggest that they were acting under coercion, fear, inducement or undue influence. On the contrary, both consistently asserted that they had voluntarily embraced Islam as a matter of personal faith and conscience. The Court therefore did not simply accept the women’s claims because they were petitioners. It independently interacted with them. This matters because the State’s central argument was that their assertion of voluntariness was false and that they had been made instruments of an organised conversion network. The Court found no material before it sufficient to draw that inference.

• Article 25: “Freedom of conscience” includes the freedom to change faith

The Court then turned to Article 25. It held that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of conscience necessarily encompasses the right of a competent adult to adopt a faith, renounce a faith, or change her faith according to her own free will, belief and conviction. The Court did not conceptualise Article 25 merely as protecting the practice of an inherited religion. It recognised conscience as a matter of individual choice.

The Court held that such a decision is an essential facet of: individual autonomy, dignity and personal liberty. It is therefore protected not only under Article 25, but also under Article 21. If freedom of conscience means anything constitutionally, it cannot mean merely the freedom to remain within the religious identity assigned by one’s family. It must include the freedom to arrive at one’s own conviction. And where an adult voluntarily changes her faith, that choice cannot ordinarily be dictated by either the family or the State except within constitutionally permissible restrictions and the authority of law.

• The Uttar Pradesh Conversion Act does not answer the detention question

The State relied heavily on the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021. The Court acknowledged that the Act provides the statutory framework governing unlawful religious conversions and prescribes procedures concerning conversions. But the Court made an important jurisdictional observation: The vires of the 2021 Act had not been challenged before it. Nor was the legality or validity of the alleged conversion itself the subject matter of the habeas corpus proceedings. Any question concerning compliance or non-compliance with the Act was therefore left to the competent authority or court. The Court then reached the central distinction: “The legality of the conversion and the legality of their detention constitute two distinct and independent issues.” This distinction is the backbone of the judgment.

The Court went further. It said that even assuming, for the sake of argument,  that the conversion had not been carried out strictly according to the procedure prescribed under the 2021 Act, that assumption would not itself authorise the father to continue confining the women. This is a crucial rule-of-law proposition. An alleged violation of one law does not automatically create a power under another law to deprive a person of liberty. If the conversion was unlawful, the State could investigate it. If an offence was established, the criminal law could operate.

But the father could not become the custodian of the women merely because he believed their religious conversion was illegal. The State could not use the pendency of that investigation to permit the confinement to continue. Thus, the Court separates regulation from detention. The State may regulate conduct through law; however, it cannot manufacture a detention power that the law does not confer.

• National security cannot rest on assertion alone

The State’s invocation of sovereignty, integrity and national security was also examined closely. The Court found that, apart from broad assertions based on the FIR and the pendency of investigation, no material had been placed before it demonstrating that the voluntary exercise of religious choice by these women, by itself, constituted a threat to the sovereignty, integrity or security of the country. The Court therefore refused to accept the argument.

The court held that mere apprehensions, however serious they may appear, cannot substitute legally admissible material while adjudicating upon the fundamental rights of citizens. This is not a finding that national-security considerations can never justify restrictions on liberty. Rather, it is a rejection of conjecture as constitutional evidence. The seriousness of the allegation does not eliminate the need for material. A court deciding whether a fundamental right has been infringed cannot treat the language of “national security” as a substitute for proof.

• The Court refuses to infer an “oblique motive”

The Court also rejected the suggestion that the women were merely instruments in a larger unlawful design. After interacting with them, the Court said it could not discern material warranting an inference that they had acted with an oblique motive or had been reduced to instruments in the hands of an individual or organisation pursuing an unlawful agenda.

Such an inference, the Court held, could not legitimately be drawn from conjectures, surmises or allegations that remained to be tested before the competent criminal court. This distinction is significant as the Court did not adjudicate the criminal allegations, rather it simply refused to allow untested allegations to determine the constitutional status of the women before it. The criminal investigation was therefore left intact. But it was not allowed to become a basis for continuing their detention.

The investigation arising from Case Crime No. 228 of 2025 would continue strictly in accordance with law. But, the court held that mere pendency of a criminal investigation cannot, by itself, furnish a lawful justification for curtailing the liberty of adult citizens, particularly where they are not subject to any judicial or other lawful order of detention.

This is one of the judgment’s most important safeguards. A criminal investigation is a process for determining whether an offence has been committed. It is not, by itself, a source of custody. The existence of an FIR cannot turn a private residence into a lawful detention centre. Nor can the seriousness of the allegations eliminate the requirement that any deprivation of liberty have legal authority.

Parental authority yields to constitutional liberty: Compensation and directions

Having found the detention to be wholly illegal, the Court did not confine the remedy to a declaration that the women were free. It recognised that where a serious and prolonged violation of fundamental rights has already occurred, an order of release alone may not provide an adequate constitutional remedy. The Court therefore invoked the established jurisprudence on constitutional compensation, particularly Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar and Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa. These decisions establish that constitutional courts exercising jurisdiction under Articles 32 and 226 can award monetary compensation for egregious violations of fundamental rights as a public-law remedy. Such compensation is distinct from ordinary private-law damages and is intended to provide meaningful redress for the breach of a public duty to protect fundamental rights.

Applying this principle, the Court found the present case to involve an “exceptionally grave and egregious violation of constitutional rights.” It took into account the fact that the women were adults and legally competent, the prolonged nature of their deprivation of liberty, the circumstances in which the confinement allegedly followed their exercise of freedom of conscience, and the mental and psychological consequences of the restraint. The Court also considered the failure of the State machinery to discharge its constitutional obligation to protect their liberty. It described the conduct as a “flagrant affront to the Rule of Law” and found that the State, rather than securing their release, had allowed the detention to continue under the ostensible cover of criminal proceedings. The award of compensation was therefore not presented as punitive damages or an ex gratia payment, but as a constitutional remedy flowing from the gravity of the fundamental-rights violation.

The Court consequently held the father and the State of Uttar Pradesh jointly and severally liable to pay ₹25 lakh, with the amount to be equally divided between the two women. The judgment also incorporated an important mechanism for individual accountability within the State machinery. After satisfying the compensation award, the State was permitted, subject to due process and an opportunity of hearing, to recover the stipulated share from the father and from any delinquent public servant whose acts or omissions contributed to the unconstitutional deprivation of liberty. This aspect of the order is significant because it moves beyond merely compensating the victims and raises the question of institutional responsibility for allowing an unlawful deprivation of liberty to persist.

The Court’s directions were also designed to restore the women’s practical autonomy, rather than merely declare their freedom in abstract terms. It directed that they were free to reside at any place and with any person of their choice and restrained the father from interfering with their personal liberty, movement, residence, profession or religious choices. The State authorities were directed to ensure that no interference was caused to their peaceful life and liberty and to provide protection if required. These directions recognise that liberty can be undermined even without formal physical detention. If a person is denied access to her documents, finances, educational records or other personal belongings, her ability to independently exercise her constitutional choices may remain substantially constrained.

Accordingly, the Court directed the father to hand over the women’s passports, educational certificates, identity documents, bank passbooks, cheque books, conversion-related documents and other personal belongings within seven days, with the State authorities directed to ensure compliance where necessary. At the same time, the Court carefully limited the scope of its intervention: it did not determine whether the alleged conversion was legally valid, whether the criminal allegations would ultimately be established, or whether any offence had been committed. The investigation was permitted to continue strictly in accordance with law. The significance of the judgment therefore lies in the balance it draws between investigative power and individual liberty: the State remains free to investigate an alleged offence, but neither an investigation nor parental disapproval can become a substitute for lawful authority to deprive an adult of her liberty.

The complete judgment may be read here.

Related:

Two FIRs, Four Days In: Pune sees first use of Maharashtra’s controversial anti-conversion law

After NEET protests ended, the battle moved online: Women protesters face threats, doxing and criminalisation

One Death Every Few Days, Zero Accountability: Sanitation workers protest at Jantar Mantar

From Civil Registration to Identity Control: Parliament tightens India’s birth certificate regime without debate

‘Deportation Cannot Begin without Nationality Verification’: Union’s Rajubala affidavit clarifies legal limits on executive power

Brij Bhushan Acquittal: The system vs the wrestlers

The post When Family Becomes Custody: Allahabad HC holds adult women’s faith, residence and liberty cannot be placed under parental control appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Uttar Pradesh & Uttarakhand, June 28 – July 5, 2026

Chronology of Incidents

June 28- Ilaichipur, Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh

BJP MLA for Loni, Nandkishore Gurjar at the inauguration of local development projects is seen addressing a large crowd stating that 99 percent of Indian Muslims were originally Hindus. He added that those who were “weak” converted while those who were “strong” fought “demons” rather than convert.

This was not an isolated incident during the reporting period. Gurjar was also implicated in another hate speech delivered on July 3, which will be listed down in the chronology. (See incident number 6)

CJP is dedicated to finding and bringing to light instances of Hate Speech, so that the bigots propagating these venomous ideas can be unmasked and brought to justice. To learn more about our campaign against hate speech, please become a member. To support our initiatives, please donate now!

Incidentally, two hate speeches in 2025 according to IHL’s report traces directly to Gurjar. On March 17,  2025 in Loni, Uttar Pradesh, Gurjar referred to Muslims as “demons” and “beasts” while glorifying the demolition of Babri mosque. On April 26, he administered an oath to protest attendees, urging them to identify and expel all those who “support Pakistan,” referring to them as “topiwallas,” “jihadis,” and “Rohingya Bangladeshis.”

In addition to this documented history of communal speeches, Association for Democratic Reforms records show that Gurjar has multiple criminal cases in which charges have been framed, including:

• IPC Section 295: Injuring or defiling a place of worship with intent to insult the religion of any class.
• IPC Section 436: Mischief by fire or explosive substance with intent to destroy a house or other property.
• IPC Section 332: Voluntarily causing hurt to deter a public servant from the discharge of duty.
• IPC Section 506: Criminal intimidation.
• Three charges under IPC Section 147: Rioting.
• Two charges under IPC Section 148: Rioting while armed with a deadly weapon.
• Two charges under IPC Section 353: Assault or criminal force to deter a public servant from the discharge of duty.
• IPC Section 427: Mischief causing damage.
• IPC Section 504: Intentional insult with intent to provoke a breach of the peace.

All of this taken together indicates a recurring pattern of inflammatory public statements—often a precursor to targeted violence- alongside a long-standing record of criminal proceedings.

June 29– Champawat, Uttarakhand

Chief Minister of Uttarakhand, Pushkar Singh Dhami, at a Mukhya Sevak Samvad outreach event, Dhami credited his government with implementing the state’s amended anti-conversion law, running Operation Kalnemi, and “freeing” over 12,000 acres of government land from what he called “land jihad.” He also invoked “love jihad,” “thook jihad” (spit jihad) and “mazar jihad” (shrine jihad), calling them anti-social and anti-national. He further accused the political opposition of appeasement politics for opposing action against “illegal” encroachments and mazars (Muslim shrines).

https://www.facebook.com/hindutvawatchIn/videos/location-champawat-uttarakhanddate-june-29at-the-mukhya-sevak-samvad-program-chi/1751173735881458/

This rhetoric is a verbatim repetition of Dhami’s script which he has used in at least half a dozen recorded speeches since 2024 in Haridwar, Dehradun, Chamoli and Sagar. Reported by The Quint and Deccan Herald.

According to IHL, Dhami has “emerged as the most prolific hates speech actor in 2025, with 71 speeches.”

“CM Dhami and his colleagues frequently invoked the anti-Muslim conspiracies of “love jihad,” “land jihad,” and “spit jihad” alongside fear-mongering about demographic change,” the report states.

June 30– Dehradun, Uttarakhand

A Vishwa Hindu Parshad-Bajrang Dal leader Vikas Verma, at a weekly Hanuman Chalisa gathering cited an unverified case of Hindu students allegedly forced to remove their tilak, kalava and janeu at school. He accused Christianity and Islam of long targeting Sanatan Dharma and welcomed Uttarakhand’s dissolution of the Madrasa Board as he alleged madrasas teach students that non-Muslims are “kafirs” who should be beheaded. He also claimed that those who choose to educate from madrasas will not hesitate to practise terrorism.

Verma has delivered near-identical claims about mosques, madrasas and “anarchists” at the same weekly event before. Im May this year, he also led a right-wing group to a prominent footwear showroom in Dehradhun and a clip was circulated where they were purportedly seen selectively confronting Muslim staff and even snatching their name tags and writing “jihadi” on it.

An investigation published by The Wire found Dehradun Bajrang Dal members running dedicated social-media pages built around similar content.

June 30– Loni, Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh

Hindu Raksha Dal leader Sunny Bajrangi, at a Hanuman Chalisa event called “love jihad” a “termite” eating away at Hindu society. He alleged “jihadis” hide their identity to trap Hindu women, and warned that demographic change would become unstoppable within 20 years unless Hindus unite.

July 1- Domariaganj, Siddharthnagar, Uttar Pradesh

Former BJP MLA Raghvendra Pratap Singh at an event marking Shyama Prasad Mukherjee’s birth anniversary said “love jihad” was rising rapidly and cited an unverified ‘kidnapping’ allegation of a Hindu woman against a “Mulla.” Singh urged BJP workers to watch for “vidharmi” (heretic/anti-faith) and “kukarmi” (evildoer) elements. He also called for scrutiny of Christian missionary activity.

https://www.instagram.com/reel/DaavObxMIgW/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link&igsh=NTc4MTIwNjQ2YQ==

In February 2022, a report by Citizens for Justice and Peace documented two FIRs for hate speech against Singh. CJP quoted far more extreme past remarks, including threats to “get their blood tested” against Hindus who did not vote for him. Read the report here.

July 3- Loni, Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh

The incident again implicates Nandkishore Gurjar, the BJP MLA for Loni who was also the perpetrator in the current reported incident 1. At the inauguration of a road-widening project, Gurjar called Muslims “pigs” and a “disease.” He praised a village for barring any “jihadi” from settling there, and said hospitals now stood where   these “pigs” once roamed. He warned residents against renting warehouses to “Bangladeshis” and vowed to drive them out.

https://www.instagram.com/reel/Dad_ttrsEyL/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link&igsh=NTc4MTIwNjQ2YQ==

Ten months earlier, in September 2025, Gurjar was filmed at a yoga event in Baghpat saying, “Swines and Bangladeshi Rohingyas are being settled here, and they will ruin the country.”

July 4- Barabanki, Uttar Pradesh

Vimlesh Sharma of the Shri Ram Sanatan Seva Samiti and the Gau Raksha Dal along with a group of 15-20 men confronted a Muslim man over alleged remarks about a cow. In the video, they are seen repeatedly slapping and hurling abuses at him as he tries to offer an explanation. The group dragged him to a shed, and forced him to kneel and touch a calf’s legs and later chants “Jai Shri Ram.” Sources also document that he was forced to drink cow urine.

Location:Barabanki, Uttar Pradesh, India ,
According to reports, Vimlesh Sharma, State President of the Shri Ram Sanatan Seva Samiti, along with members of the Gau Raksha Dal, allegedly assaulted a Muslim man after accusing him of making objectionable remarks about a cow.

The… pic.twitter.com/BFPrrT5Ik1

— Rising Falcon (@TheRFTeam) July 5, 2026

The Siasat Daily also reports that the Hindutva group’s own Instagram post accused the man of threatening a violent, blood-soaked Holi.

In a video posted on X, Vimlesh Sharma justified the assault by alleging that the victim had abused their mothers and sisters and mocked their dietary practices, stating that these actions prompted the group to respond as they did.

Location: Barabanki, Uttar Pradesh

Vimalesh Sharma, the state president of Shri Ram Sanatan Seva Samiti, released a video in which he said that he beat a Muslim man accused of making offensive remarks about cows and forcibly made him drink cow urine. https://t.co/K8zCAB2L17 pic.twitter.com/eYt8ux4M8Q

— The Muslim (@TheMuslim786) July 7, 2026

According to media reports, the Public Relations Officer (PRO) of the Barabanki Superintendent of Police stated that the police were unaware of the incident.

Congress MP Syed Naseer Hussain has condemned such acts of forced religious worship and described it as “deeply disturbing.”

The assault and humiliation of a Muslim man in Barabanki, including forcing him to perform religious acts against his will, is deeply disturbing. Such acts are not expressions of faith but crimes that violate human dignity and the Constitution.

When vigilante groups believe they… pic.twitter.com/jq7Hlgb0Ki

— Dr Syed Naseer Hussain, M P (@NasirHussainINC) July 4, 2026

July 5- Kaintholi, Tehri Garhwal, Uttarakhand

One, Amit Thapliyal along with a few associates stopped a Christian Sunday prayer meeting, asserting that Hinduism is the village’s only permitted religion. Thapiyal accused attendees of attending for payment, and told them to surrender their Scheduled Caste (SC) reservation benefits if they wished to practice Christianity.

Assessment

No reports of any FIR or case registered has emerged against any of these incidents. Most, in fact, were not found reported in mainstream media at the time of writing. This unfortunately is evidence if such were needed of the cavalier and casual manner in which legacy and mainstream media treats such hate speech; avoidance of which allows for a continued prevalence of a culture of impunity. However, the videos show a pattern of anti-minority mobilisation that is consistent with established scholarship on communal politics, majoritarian nationalism, and hate speech in India. They demonstrate how political rhetoric, vigilante action, and symbolic performances of dominance reinforce one another to construct religious minorities, particularly Muslims and Christians, as threats to the nation, culture, and social order.

The incidents are examples of moral panic and conspiracy framing in which minority communities are portrayed as engaging in coordinated efforts to undermine the demographic, territorial, or cultural integrity of the Hindu majority. This assessment is not to paint any one community as total saints and another as perpetrators. However, such rhizomatic organisation and hate speech by creating an atmosphere of perceived threat only legitimises exceptional state action and public hostility.  They create an imagined internal enemy whose existence justifies exclusionary politics.

The repeated and exhausting invocation of various forms of ‘jihad,’ portrayal of Muslims as ‘Bangladeshis,’ or ‘swines,’ disruption of Christian prayer meetings, and performative humiliation by asking someone to forcefully chant a religious slogan suggest diffusion of a shared ideological repertoire of how political authority and vigilante mobilisation reinforce one another.

Importantly, 3 out of 8 incidents have been attributed to a sitting Chief Minister and an MLA. This convergence of official political speech and vigilante action is a significant feature of democratic backsliding and ethno nationalism. Uttarakhand held municipal elections on June 9, 2026, and Uttar Pradesh has delayed its three-tier panchayat elections, with voter-list work underway through the summer of 2026 across nearly 58,000 gram panchayats

But a similar language appearing across chief ministerial speeches, local political leaders, and organisations such as the Bajrang Dal, Hindu Raksha Dal, and cow-protection groups suggests the diffusion of a shared ideological repertoire. One that is unconstitutional. However, such language has frequently been used, even at a national level, including from the head of government.

The trajectory of hate speech leading up to the 2024 General Elections has been documented by India Hate Speech Monitor. It can be accessed here.

Several of these incidents cannot be separated from a broader, well-documented campaign. Since May 2025, Indian authorities have detained and, in many cases, summarily expelled thousands of people to Bangladesh, a substantial number of them Bengali-speaking Indian Muslims with valid citizenship documents. UP has seen its own share of wrongful detentions of West Bengal migrant workers holding valid Aadhaar and voter identification.

In Uttrakhand, disruption of prayer meetings is documented. In July 2024, an 11-person FIR followed a mob attack on a Dehradun prayer meeting that vandalised a crucifix.

Uttarakhand: Hindutva mob attacks Christian prayer meet in Dehradun. A group of Hindutva ‘activists’ barged into the house and assaulted people including women present inside, Forcefully entered inside the house and vandalised a Christian cross, prayer room and bedroom, made… pic.twitter.com/BLD7vbXp2Y

— Mohammed Zubair (@zoo_bear) July 16, 2024

Similarly, in May 2022 in Purola,Uttarakhand a prayer meeting was stormed by an armed group. The coercive demand to renounce SC reservation status is a recognisable feature of this genre nationally. However, the groups are also apprehensive of forced-conversion practices.

Sections 196 and 299 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 penalises promoting disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill will. This is the only remedy for hate speech between religious, racial, linguistic or regional groups. The maximum sentence is three years, rising to five if the act occurs at a place of worship or religious ceremony.

However, the structural problem, independent of any single case, is enforcement and conviction rates. In May this year, the Supreme Court said that separate guidelines for heat speech were unnecessary. This climb-down by the apex court to its own earlier interventionist directions and orders around such mobilisations is also a sign of institutional disregard to a culture of growing anti-minority public rhetoric. A detailed analysis on the Supreme Court’s final judgement on the issue may be read here and here.

According to IHL, documented 1,318 hate speech events nationally in 2025, roughly four events a day, with 98 percent targeting Muslims either alone or alongside Christians.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Tanishka Shah)

Related:

Targeted as ‘Bangladeshis’: The hate speech fuelling deportations

A Targeted Campaign: The orchestrated crackdown on Bengali Migrants and the rising pushback from courts, Bengal government, and civil society

India Hate Lab Report 2025: How Hate Speech has been normalised in the public sphere

The post A week of anti-minority hate that grips UP-Uttarakhand appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Jakira Bibi and Naseruddin Sheikh

For Naseruddin Sheikh and Jakira Bibi, an elderly couple from Shernagar village under Agomani Police Station in Dhubri district, that question arrived in the form of notices from the Foreigners Tribunal. The notices did not merely initiate legal proceedings; they brought an extraordinary degree of fear into the ordinary life of a family that had spent generations rooted in Assam.

The allegation against them was that they had entered India illegally from Bangladesh on or after March 25, 1971. The consequence of such an allegation is immense. For a person of limited means, an appearance before a Foreigners Tribunal can mean confronting a legal system that demands historical documents, family linkage, oral evidence and a coherent explanation of one’s identity and residence, often going back decades. The burden is particularly heavy for those who are elderly, poor, uneducated or physically unwell.

Naseruddin was an ageing handcart puller whose life had been spent in physical labour. Jakira was an elderly woman suffering from several health problems who had spent her life caring for her family. Neither possessed the resources to comfortably navigate a prolonged legal battle.

The couple therefore faced something far larger than two legal cases. They faced the possibility that the country in which they been born and lived, could question their allegiance and their lives could suddenly become a question mark.

Their story, however, is also a story of legal intervention, documentary evidence and persistence. With the assistance of the intrepid para-legal and legal team of the Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP), the couple was able to place their evidence before the Foreigners Tribunal. After examining the materials and testimony presented in the respective proceedings, the Tribunals ultimately declared both Naseruddin Sheikh and Jakira Bibi “Not Foreigner.”

The two orders are significant not only because they brought relief to an elderly couple but also because they demonstrate how citizenship-related proceedings can turn on the careful reconstruction of family history, legacy linkage and documentary continuity—and how access to quality and sensitive legal assistance can be critical when ordinary citizens are required to defend themselves against allegations that challenge their very belonging. The final order in Naseruddin’s case is dated May 8, 2025, while the order in Jakira’s case was pronounced on November 1, 2025. It took the Assam team of Citizens for Justice and Peace, that provided this quality legal aid, eight months in accessing the order of the Foreigners Tribunal.

Foreigners Tribunal Court, Dhurbi

Naseruddin Sheikh: A man who spent his life pulling a handcart, now forced to defend his Indian identity

Naseruddin Sheikh is now close to 76 years old. His life has been shaped by hard work rather than privilege. Born on January 12, 1950, he belongs to Bidyadabri village in the Dhubri region and is the son of late Basaruddin Sheikh and grandson of Sukur Ali @ Khasar.

He never received an education and, from a young age, had to depend on physical labour for survival. For nearly three decades, he worked as a handcart puller in Agomani market, transporting vegetables, rice and other goods. At different times, he also worked as a daily wage labourer, taking whatever work was available to support his family.

His life was not one of comfort, but it was a life firmly rooted in the place he knew as home. Together with his wife, Jakira, he raised six children—three sons and three daughters. While he worked outside, she managed the household and cared for the family.

Today, Naseruddin’s body bears the consequences of decades of physical labour. Yet, even at an advanced age, he sometimes continues to pull his handcart because the economic circumstances of his family leave little room for retirement. It was against this background that the Foreigners Tribunal proceedings began.

The case against Naseruddin was registered as FT-9/113/GKJ/2019. The reference originated from the Superintendent of Police (Border), Dhubri, following a citizenship verification process and raised the question of whether Naseruddin was an illegal migrant or foreigner of the post-1971 stream or any other relevant stream. The Tribunal’s order records that Naseruddin appeared in response to notice, filed a written statement, produced documents and contested the allegation that he was a foreigner.

For Naseruddin, the proceedings were frightening not simply because of their legal implications but because of the practical reality of defending himself. A man whose daily existence depended upon manual labour was suddenly required to reconstruct his family history through documents and testimony. The cost of legal representation, travel to court and the loss of working days could have placed an unbearable burden upon him.

The legal system, however, required him to answer the allegation with evidence. That is where the intervention of CJP became crucial.

CJP Team Assam along with Jakira Bibi and Naseruddin Sheikh

When the CJP team came to his door: After receiving the notice, Naseruddin did not know where to turn. He was confronted with a legal proceeding whose consequences he could not fully understand and whose financial demands he could not easily meet. It was at this point that he came into contact with CJP Community Volunteer Ilias Sarkar, who connected him with the wider CJP team. State In-Charge Nanda Ghosh, Advocate Iskandar Azad and Community Volunteer Habibul Bepari became involved in assisting the couple.

The team visited Naseruddin’s home, examined the available records and began working to understand the documentary history of his family. This intervention was important because citizenship proceedings of this nature often require something that is not easy for ordinary people to provide on their own: the ability to transform scattered documents from different periods into a legally coherent narrative.

A voter list from decades ago may establish the presence of an ancestor. A later electoral roll may establish continuity. A land deed may support residence or possession of property. A witness may explain the relationship between generations. None of these pieces necessarily tells the whole story in isolation. Their significance emerges when they are connected into a credible chain of evidence.

For Naseruddin, the legal task was therefore not simply to produce an Aadhaar card or an EPIC card. The more fundamental challenge was to demonstrate the historical continuity of his identity and his connection to his family and to India.

CJP took responsibility for assisting him in the proceedings, and Advocate Iskandar Azad represented him before the Tribunal. The support gave Naseruddin something that he had been missing since the notice arrived: the confidence that he would not have to face the legal process alone.

As Naseruddin later recalled, “After getting the notice we did not understand where to go. Even with papers, people become foreigners here. So the fear remains, but after you came we got courage.”

His words capture the psychological reality behind the legal case. The presence of legal assistance did not merely provide representation; it restored a measure of confidence to a man who had suddenly been made to question his own security in the country where he had spent his entire life.

The legal strategy: The central challenge in Naseruddin’s case was to establish his connection with his family lineage and demonstrate the continuity of his presence in India. The evidence presented before the Tribunal therefore went back across generations.

One of the important pieces of evidence was a 1966 electoral roll of Bhamandanga Part-II, in which the name of Gerpu Sheikh, son of Sukur Ali, was recorded. Naseruddin identified Gerpu Sheikh as his paternal uncle and Sukur Ali as his grandfather. The Tribunal also considered a 1966 electoral roll from Jaldhoya, where the name of Naseruddin’s father, Basiruddin, was recorded.

The importance of these records lay in their historical character. They were not documents created for the purpose of the present litigation; rather, they were old electoral records that predated the proceedings by several decades. Their evidentiary value, therefore, arose from the fact that they could potentially connect Naseruddin’s present identity to members of his family who were recorded as voters in the relevant period.

The case was further supported by electoral rolls from 1994, 1997, 2005, 2015 and 2022, reflecting the names of Naseruddin and his wife in successive electoral records. The Tribunal’s order records these documents as part of the 13 exhibits produced by Naseruddin in support of his claim.

The defence also relied upon Registered Deed No. 473 dated 24 January 1976, together with Naseruddin’s EPIC, PAN and Aadhaar documents. A licence issued by the Agomani Gaon Panchayat for operating a push cart and certificates issued by the relevant Gram Panchayat were also placed on record.

The evidence was not confined to documents. Naseruddin himself appeared as DW-1 and gave evidence regarding his birth, his father and grandfather, the family’s movements between Assam and West Bengal, his father’s death, his subsequent residence and his own connection with the places in which he lived. His relative Yashomuddin Munshi was also examined as a defence witness.

The Tribunal therefore had before it a combination of historical electoral records, later electoral continuity, land documentation, identity records and oral testimony. Legally, the importance of this combination lies in the way the evidence was intended to work together. The case was not based upon the proposition that any single document, by itself, conclusively established citizenship. Rather, the defence sought to establish a consistent narrative of family lineage and residence through multiple sources of evidence spanning different periods. That approach was central to the Tribunal’s assessment.

Why the evidence was found sufficient in Naseruddin’s case: The Tribunal’s reasoning is particularly important from a legal perspective because it did not simply list the documents and declare the case proved. It examined the documentary record alongside the oral evidence.

The Tribunal scrutinised the 1966 electoral roll of Bhamandanga Part-II and the corresponding electoral evidence from West Bengal. It considered the oral evidence concerning Gerpu Sheikh and Basiruddin, whom Naseruddin identified as members of his paternal family. The Tribunal also noted that Naseruddin’s own testimony supported his existence in India from his birth in 1950.

The Tribunal also considered Naseruddin’s account of his father’s movements between Assam and West Bengal. His evidence was that his father had moved to Jaldhoya in Cooch Behar in the mid-1950s, remained there for a period and had cast his vote in the West Bengal electoral roll, before returning to Assam and subsequently residing in the Bhamandanga area. Naseruddin further described the circumstances following his father’s death and his own later residence in Shernagar.

This is legally significant because the Tribunal was required to assess not only whether individual documents existed but whether the overall evidence formed a credible and consistent account. The Tribunal ultimately found that the historical electoral evidence, together with the oral testimony, supported the existence of Naseruddin in India from birth and established the parental linkage relied upon by him. The evidence of his defence witness was also considered in support of his version.

The significance of the decision, therefore, lies in the Tribunal’s acceptance of a cumulative evidentiary approach. Historical voter records, family linkage, oral testimony and subsequent documentary continuity were considered together rather than in isolation.

The final conclusion was unequivocal: Naseruddin did not appear to be a foreigner of the post-1971 stream or of any other stream, and the reference against him was answered in the negative. In practical terms, Naseruddin Sheikh was declared “Not Foreigner.”

For a man who had spent his entire life working with his hands, the order represented the end of an extraordinary legal ordeal. It meant that the elderly handcart puller who had always said, “I was born here, my father was born here, my grandfather was also born here,” had succeeded in placing before the Tribunal the evidence necessary to support that claim.

The complete order may be read below:

Jakira Bibi: When an ailing elderly woman had to defend the home she had always known

While Naseruddin fought his legal battle, his wife, Jakira Bibi, was facing a Foreigners Tribunal proceeding of her own. Jakira is above 60 years old and suffers from several health problems. Her life, like her husband’s, has been one of family responsibilities and modest means. She was born on July 12, 1964 in Shernagar village, the same region where her family had long been rooted.

Her father was Bataullah Sheikh, also referred to in the proceedings as Batasulla Sheikh, and her mother was Jelmoti Bibi. Her family history, as presented before the Tribunal, extended through historical electoral records and NRC legacy data.

Jakira’s case was registered as FT-9/112/GKJ/2019. The reference alleged that she had entered India illegally from Bangladesh on or after March 25, 1971. The order records that the reference originated from the Superintendent of Police (Border), Dhubri, and that Jakira contested the allegation, asserting that she was an Indian citizen by birth and that her parents and family were rooted in Assam.

For Jakira, the proceedings came with a particularly heavy physical burden. She was an elderly woman living with health problems, while her husband was himself an ageing daily wage worker. The prospect of travelling, collecting documents and participating in litigation was therefore not merely inconvenient—it was a serious hardship. But the evidence in her case was substantial.

Her defence sought to establish her identity through her parents, her family lineage and her own long history of residence and participation in the electoral process.

The evidence in Jakira’s case: The legal case presented on behalf of Jakira was built around a combination of historical electoral records, family linkage, land documentation and oral evidence. The Tribunal considered a 1958 electoral roll of Shernagar in which the names of Jakira’s parents, Batasullah Sheikh and Jelmoti Bibi, were recorded. The defence also relied upon a 1966 electoral roll, which reflected the name of her mother along with her stepfather, Goher Ali. Later electoral records from 1985, 1994, 1997, 2005, 2015 and 2022 were produced to demonstrate continuity of the family’s presence and Jakira’s own electoral history.

The defence further relied upon 1951 NRC legacy data, which was cited in support of the family linkage, as well as Registered Sale Deed No. 456 dated 20 January 1983, relating to ancestral land. Jakira’s own EPIC, PAN and Aadhaar documents were also placed on record. Importantly, the case did not rest solely upon documentary evidence. Jakira herself appeared as DW-1, while her elder brother Jahir Ali appeared as DW-2 to support the family linkage and her account of the family’s presence in India.

The Tribunal’s order records that Jakira produced as many as 16 exhibits in support of her claim, including historical and subsequent electoral rolls, the 1983 registered deed, identity documents and the identity documents of her brother. The evidentiary structure of the case is important.

The older electoral records were relevant to establishing the presence of Jakira’s parents and family in the earlier period. The later electoral records helped demonstrate continuity. The land deed supported the family’s connection to property in the area. Her own testimony and that of her brother addressed the relationship between the generations. Thus, as in Naseruddin’s case, the legal significance lay in the cumulative effect of the evidence.

The legal significance of Jakira’s victory: The Tribunal’s order makes an explicit reference to Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946, observing that the burden was upon the proceedee to prove her nationality and that, accordingly, the liability of the prosecution was dispensed with.

In a Foreigners Tribunal proceeding, the legal question is not merely whether a person possesses contemporary identity documents. The person proceeded against must establish the case put forward regarding their nationality and status in accordance with the applicable legal framework. That makes historical evidence especially important when the allegation concerns illegal entry after the March 25, 1971 cut-off.

Jakira’s case therefore required her to establish more than her present-day identity. Her evidence sought to demonstrate her familial and historical connection to Assam, beginning with the electoral presence of her parents and continuing through her own life and electoral records.

The Tribunal examined the historical voter lists and the oral evidence of Jakira and her brother. It noted that her father and mother had cast votes in Assam and that the relevant electoral records supported the defence version. The Tribunal also considered the subsequent electoral rolls in which Jakira and her husband were recorded as voters.

The Tribunal further noted that the Election Office, Dhubri, had confirmed the authenticity of the exhibited electoral rolls. This was an important corroborative element because it strengthened the evidentiary reliability of the historical electoral records relied upon by the defence.

The Tribunal also considered the oral evidence of Jakira’s brother, Jahir Ali, regarding her paternal linkage. His testimony was treated as corroborating Jakira’s own evidence, and the Tribunal found that the parental linkage with Batasullah Sheikh had been established adequately.

The legal significance of this reasoning lies in the Tribunal’s reliance on multiple mutually supporting forms of evidence. The historical electoral records established the presence of the family; the later rolls demonstrated continuity; the land record supported the family’s connection to the area; and the oral evidence provided the relational bridge linking Jakira to her parents.

The Tribunal ultimately found that Jakira was a descendant of genuine Indian parents and that she had successfully discharged the burden placed upon her. She was declared “Not Foreigner.”

The complete order may be read below:

What triggered the proceedings against them?

The question of how a person first comes to be referred to a Foreigners Tribunal is an important part of every citizenship case. The legal battle before the Tribunal is only one stage of the process. Before that, there must be a basis for the initial reference and the decision to question the person’s nationality.

In the case of Jakira Bibi, the reference was originally forwarded by the Superintendent of Police (B), Dhubri, through SP (Border) I(M)DT Case No. 2389/98. The order records that the reference was made on the basis of a doubt regarding her nationality, with the purpose of determining whether she was or was not an illegal migrant. The matter was subsequently re-numbered before Foreigners Tribunal No. 2, Dhubri as F.T. Case No. 3494/GKJ/2011, under the provisions of the Foreigners Act, 1946, read with the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964.

In Naseruddin Sheikh’s case, the order provides a somewhat more specific description of the origin of the reference. It states that the case was originally forwarded by the Superintendent of Police (B), Dhubri, Assam, vide IM(D)T Case No. 2388/1998, on the basis of a report made by the Local Verification Officer for determination of his citizenship. The case was initially registered before the Foreigners Tribunal No. 2, Dhubri and was later transferred to the present Tribunal following the constitution of additional Tribunals.

The order further records that, upon consideration, the Tribunal found “sufficient grounds to proceed” and accordingly issued notice to Naseruddin, providing him an opportunity to show cause in respect of the matter. These details are significant because they bring the question of the “first cause of action” into focus.

In Naseruddin’s case, the order specifically refers to a Local Verification Officer’s report as the basis for the original reference for determination of his citizenship. In Jakira’s case, the order states that the reference arose from a doubt regarding her nationality. The documents, however, as quoted above, do not themselves set out the substantive contents of the Local Verification Officer’s report in Naseruddin’s case or explain in detail what specific material gave rise to the doubt regarding Jakira’s nationality.

Two Cases, One Common Lesson: Citizenship proceedings are often about reconstructing a life through evidence

The cases of Naseruddin Sheikh and Jakira Bibi are legally distinct proceedings, but their evidentiary journeys reveal a common pattern. In both cases, the defence had to reconstruct a family history that stretched back decades. In both, historical electoral rolls played an important role, electoral records helped demonstrate continuity, and oral testimony was used to establish family relationships and explain the documentary record. And in both, the evidence was considered not as isolated pieces but as part of a larger narrative of identity, ancestry and residence.

In citizenship proceedings, the strength of a case may lie not in one document but in the consistency between several independent sources of evidence. A historical electoral roll may establish the presence of a parent or grandparent. A later electoral roll may demonstrate continuity. A land document may reinforce residence and family connection. A witness may explain the relationship between individuals appearing in different records.

The value of legal representation, therefore, is not limited to arguing before the Tribunal. It also lies in identifying which documents matter, tracing family linkage, locating historical records and presenting them in a manner that allows the Tribunal to assess the evidence as a coherent whole. For Naseruddin and Jakira, the CJP team’s intervention helped transform a collection of old documents and family memories into a structured legal defence. That is where access to justice becomes particularly important.

The human cost behind the case numbers

Behind FT-9/113/GKJ/2019 and FT-9/112/GKJ/2019 were not merely two case files. There was an elderly man who had spent his life pulling a handcart to feed his family. There was an elderly woman who was already battling illness. There were six children whose parents were suddenly living under the shadow of a citizenship proceeding.

There was a family that had to search through decades of records to prove a history that had always been part of their everyday lives. The legal proceedings also reveal the disproportionate impact that such litigation can have on people living in poverty.

For Naseruddin, appearing in court could mean losing the day’s earnings. For Jakira, the physical strain of participating in proceedings was compounded by her health problems. For both, the financial cost of engaging a lawyer could have been beyond their means. This is why legal aid in citizenship proceedings is not simply a matter of convenience. It can determine whether a vulnerable person is able to meaningfully participate in the legal process.

A person may possess relevant documents but not know which ones are legally significant. They may have a family connection but lack the ability to explain it in the form required by a legal proceeding. They may have old electoral records but not understand how those records can establish a historical linkage. Legal assistance can bridge that gap. In Naseruddin and Jakira’s cases, that bridge ultimately helped them present their evidence before the Tribunal.

The day the order came home

On July 18, the CJP team visited the couple’s home to deliver copies of the order. The team included Advocate Iskandar Azad, Office Driver Asikul Hussain, Community Volunteers Ilias Sarkar (Rabbi), Habibul Bepari, Deep Ghosh and Ilias Rahman, along with State In-Charge Nanda Ghosh. This time, they did not arrive with another notice; they came carrying the order.

For the couple, the moment represented the end of months of uncertainty and fear.  Naseruddin had feared that the proceedings might eventually lead to detention. Jakira had endured the physical and emotional burden of litigation despite her health problems. Together, they had lived through the uncertainty of not knowing whether the country they had always called home would continue to recognise them as belonging to it. When the order were placed in their hands, the relief was overwhelming.

Naseruddin recalled the terror he had experienced when the notice first arrived and how the support of CJP had given him the courage to continue. Jakira expressed her gratitude through tears, remembering how the team had come to their home, helped organise their documents and ensured that they had legal representation. Their words reveal something that legal orders alone cannot capture.

A favourable order may end a proceeding, but it cannot immediately erase the fear created by the proceeding itself. The couple had won, but the memory of having been forced to defend their belonging would remain.

Beyond Two Victories: The larger citizenship question

The legal victory of Naseruddin and Jakira is deeply significant to them and their family. But their cases also raise broader questions about how citizenship proceedings affect ordinary people, particularly those who live on the margins of society.

A person may have lived in a village for decades and still be required to reconstruct their family history through records that may be more than half a century old. Historical documents may contain variations in names or spellings. Families may have moved between districts or across state boundaries. Electoral records may exist in different places. Land may have been acquired, sold or requisitioned. All of these factors can make the process of establishing continuity complex.

The two cases demonstrate why citizenship proceedings cannot be viewed purely as administrative exercises. They involve questions of identity, family history, dignity and belonging. They also raise crucial questions of maintainability, accountability and mala fide by authorities, unused to being questioned on these foundational aspects.

The legal orders also demonstrate the importance of the evidentiary process. In both cases, the Tribunals considered the documentary record alongside oral evidence and assessed whether the evidence, taken as a whole, was sufficient to discharge the applicable burden.

In Naseruddin’s case, the Tribunal accepted the evidentiary chain connecting him to his paternal family and his presence in India. In Jakira’s case, the Tribunal accepted the evidence establishing her parental linkage and the family’s historical presence in Assam.

The outcomes therefore underline the importance of access to legal assistance, preservation of historical records and the careful presentation of evidence. At the same time, the emotional experiences of the couple remind us that the human consequences of citizenship proceedings extend far beyond the courtroom. For the poor and elderly, the process itself can become a source of profound anxiety. The question, therefore, is not only whether justice can ultimately be obtained. It is also whether vulnerable people have the support necessary to reach justice in the first place.

From Fear to Dignity: The meaning of “not foreigner”

For Naseruddin Sheikh and Jakira Bibi, being declared “Not Foreigner” means more than winning a legal case. It means that the fear and uncertainty they lived with after receiving the notices have finally come to an end.

The judgments have brought them relief and restored their sense of security. The evidence they collected, the family records they preserved and the testimony they gave were accepted by the Tribunals.

Naseruddin is still the elderly man who spent decades pulling a handcart in Agomani market. Jakira is still the woman who devoted her life to caring for her family. But now, they can return to their home without the fear that once followed them. Their story is about belonging, but it is also about the importance of having the chance to be heard and to present one’s evidence before the law. For both, the journey began with fear. It continued through old electoral rolls, land records, family documents and witness testimony, supported by legal assistance and the determination to prove their history. And it ended with two words that brought them immense relief: “Not Foreigner.”

or CJP, the victory of Naseruddin Sheikh and Jakira Bibi is not the end of the struggle, but a reminder of why access to justice and legal support remain so important for Assam’s poor and marginalised communities. The CJP team says it will continue to stand with those whose citizenship and dignity are challenged, with the hope that no Indian will ever have to face the fear of proving that they belong to their own country.

Today, Naseruddin and Jakira can finally smile without the shadow of the notices hanging over them. After a long journey of fear, uncertainty and legal struggle, they can return to their home with renewed confidence and say what they have always believed: “We are Indian.”

 Related:

Another CJP Victory: Barpeta Tribunal declares Alam Khan ‘not a foreigner’

When a narrow reading of documents decide citizenship: GHC in Aminul Hoque

‘Fairness & reason ‘: SC rules that due process is a must for citizenship determination

Gauhati High Court upholds foreigner declaration, rejects mental illness plea

When a Spelling Error Can Cost Citizenship: Supreme Court stays deportation of five Assam women

The post The country they called home, the identity they had to defend appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Alam Khan outside his home in Barpeta

In an order delivered on January 6, 2026, the Foreigners Tribunal No. 1, Barpeta, presided over by Member Ms. Anurupa Dey, declared that Alam Khan is not a foreigner, concluding that he had successfully established his Indian citizenship through reliable documentary evidence, credible oral testimony and a consistent chain of records demonstrating that his family had been residing in Assam prior to the statutory cut-off date of March 25, 1971.

The decision represents another important legal victory for Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP), which provided legal assistance to Alam Khan throughout the proceedings. The matter was argued by Advocate Abhijeet Choudhury, whose legal strategy addressed complex questions of lineage, documentary continuity and evidentiary burden arising under the Foreigners Act, 1946.

Alam Khan along with CJP Team Assam, outside his home

However, the significance of this decision extends beyond one individual’s relief. The Tribunal’s order is noteworthy for its careful appreciation of evidence, its refusal to allow administrative lapses to prejudice the proceedee, and its recognition that family circumstances such as divorce and remarriage cannot, by themselves, undermine a genuine claim to Indian citizenship.

A citizenship dispute dating back more than two decades

Alam Khan’s case originated as IM(D)T Reference Case No. 1371 of 2000, when the Superintendent of Police (Border), Barpeta, referred him as a suspected foreigner. Following the Supreme Court’s order striking down the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act in Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India, pending references under the IM(D)T regime stood transferred to Foreigners Tribunals for adjudication under the Foreigners Act, 1946 and the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964. Alam Khan’s case was one such transferred proceeding.

Although the reference itself was over two decades old, Alam Khan received a fresh notice from the Tribunal only in October 2024, compelling him once again to defend his citizenship. For a daily wage labourer with limited financial means, this meant returning to prolonged litigation, collecting decades-old documents, tracing family records and proving facts that ordinarily no citizen is ever expected to establish.

The proceedings eventually culminated in January 2026, though the certified copy of the order reached Alam Khan only several months later. On July 16, 2026, CJP’s legal team, represented by Advocate Abhijeet Choudhury and Assam State In-charge Nanda Ghosh, formally handed over the order copy to him, marking the end of a legal battle spanning almost twenty-six years.

A case made difficult by family history rather than law

Unlike many Foreigners Tribunal proceedings where documentary continuity alone becomes the principal issue, Alam Khan’s case presented an additional layer of complexity arising from his family’s personal history. Alam Khan was born to Late Abdul Hakim Khan and Joytan Nessa. During his childhood, however, his parents divorced. Following the separation, his mother returned to her parental home, while Alam Khan continued residing with his father. Subsequently, his father remarried, and his stepmother, Jahura Khatun, became part of the family. These personal circumstances later translated into significant documentary complications.

By the time Alam Khan’s own name began appearing in electoral rolls, his father had already passed away. Consequently, subsequent voter lists reflected his residence alongside his stepmother rather than his biological mother. Since he did not possess a birth certificate, establishing the identity of his biological mother, and distinguishing her from his stepmother, became one of the most difficult factual questions before the Tribunal.

Ordinarily, such inconsistencies are capable of creating serious doubts in citizenship proceedings, particularly because the burden of proof under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act rests upon the proceedee. Had these inconsistencies remained unexplained, they could easily have undermined Alam Khan’s defence despite his genuine claim to citizenship. It was this challenge that shaped CJP’s legal strategy before the Tribunal.

CJP’s Legal Strategy: Addressing documentary gaps through credible evidence

Recognising that the case hinged not merely on producing documents but on explaining the circumstances behind apparent inconsistencies, CJP adopted a legal strategy that combined documentary evidence with carefully structured oral testimony. Representing Alam Khan, Advocate Abhijeet Choudhury sought to establish an unbroken narrative of lineage, residence and citizenship, while simultaneously demonstrating that the deficiencies in the documentary record arose from circumstances entirely beyond the proceedee’s control. The defence first addressed the most fundamental issue in the case—Alam Khan’s parentage.

To resolve the confusion arising from the divorce of his parents and his subsequent residence with his father and stepmother, CJP produced Joytan Nessa, Alam Khan’s biological mother, as Defence Witness No. 2 (DW-2). Through her sworn affidavit and oral testimony, she confirmed that Alam Khan was indeed her son and explained the family’s history, including her separation from Abdul Hakim and her return to her parental home. The Tribunal found that her evidence fully corroborated Alam Khan’s own testimony and expressly recorded that it found no reason to disbelieve her evidence.

This was a crucial intervention. In Foreigners Tribunal proceedings, discrepancies concerning parentage or family relationships often become decisive, particularly where birth certificates or other foundational documents are unavailable. By placing the biological mother in the witness box and allowing her testimony to withstand cross-examination, the defence transformed what appeared to be a documentary weakness into a coherent and credible explanation supported by oral evidence.

Equally significant was CJP’s response to another obstacle that had nothing to do with Alam Khan himself—the absence of certified electoral rolls for 1985 and 1989. The relevant Election Commission office was unable to produce certified copies of these electoral rolls because they had not been preserved. This was an institutional failure entirely attributable to the authorities. During the proceedings, Advocate Abhijeet Choudhury argued that a citizen cannot be expected to suffer adverse consequences because the State failed to preserve public records that were legally required to be maintained. The inability to produce those electoral rolls, therefore, could not be treated as evidence against the proceedee.

Instead of insisting upon documents that no longer existed, the defence invited the Tribunal to examine the continuity of evidence through earlier and subsequent electoral records, legacy documents and witness testimony. The Tribunal accepted this broader evidentiary approach, demonstrating that the absence of a particular document does not necessarily break the chain of proof where surrounding evidence establishes continuity.

Documentary evidence establishing citizenship

To discharge the burden imposed under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946, the defence produced an extensive body of documentary evidence tracing Alam Khan’s family across multiple decades. The foundation of the case lay in the 1951 National Register of Citizens (NRC). The Tribunal noted that Alam Khan’s grandfather’s name appeared in the 1951 NRC Legacy Data under Legacy Data Code No. 120-0041-8547, establishing that the family was residing in village Katla, Mouza Bhawanipur, long before the citizenship cut-off date prescribed under the Assam Accord. The documentary chain was then strengthened through certified electoral rolls spanning more than five decades.

The 1965 and 1970 voter lists contained the names of Alam Khan’s father, Abdul Hakim Khan, and his mother, Joytan Nessa. The 1970 electoral roll also reflected the presence of his stepmother following his father’s remarriage, a circumstance that aligned with the factual explanation advanced before the Tribunal. Alam Khan’s own name subsequently appeared in the electoral records from 1997 onwards, demonstrating continuity of residence in the same village. Certified copies of the voter list for 1997, 2005, 2010, 2019 and 2021 were produced before the Tribunal.

The defence also produced Alam Khan’s Voter Identity Card, land records (Khatian) and a certificate issued by the Gaonburah of Katla village. Significantly, the Gaonburah himself appeared before the Tribunal and proved the certificate, explaining that it had been issued after verification of the 1965 electoral records relating to Alam Khan’s father. This substantially enhanced the evidentiary value of the certificate, which was no longer merely a supporting document but one whose authenticity stood established through oral testimony.

An equally important aspect of the proceedings was the State’s own conduct. While Alam Khan examined three witnesses, including himself, and produced extensive documentary evidence, the State did not lead any evidence whatsoever to substantiate the allegation that he was a foreigner. The Tribunal specifically recorded that no witness appeared on behalf of the State to adduce evidence.

Tribunal rejects a mechanical approach to citizenship determination

The order is particularly significant because it rejects a narrow or mechanical assessment of documentary evidence in favour of a holistic evaluation of the entire factual record. Foreigners Tribunal proceedings are frequently characterised by intense scrutiny of documentary inconsistencies. Minor discrepancies in names, ages, family relationships or electoral records have often proved fatal to citizenship claims. In Alam Khan’s case, however, the Tribunal recognised that documentary records must be assessed in light of the social realities that produce them.

Rather than treating the absence of a birth certificate or the appearance of a stepmother’s name in later electoral rolls as circumstances adverse to the proceedee, the Tribunal examined whether those circumstances had been satisfactorily explained through credible evidence. Finding that they had, it accepted the explanation offered by the defence.

This approach reflects an important principle in citizenship adjudication: documentary evidence does not exist in isolation. Electoral rolls, family records and legacy documents must be read together with oral testimony and surrounding circumstances. Where the evidence collectively establishes a coherent and credible narrative, isolated inconsistencies cannot automatically justify declaring an individual a foreigner. That reasoning is one of the most significant aspects of the order and reinforces the principle that citizenship determinations must rest on a comprehensive appreciation of evidence rather than on rigid technicalities.

Tribunal finds Alam Khan successfully discharged the burden under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act

One of the most important aspects of the decision lies in the Tribunal’s application of Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946, which places the burden of proving Indian citizenship upon the proceedee once a reference is made against them. While the statutory burden remained upon Alam Khan, the Tribunal emphasised that this burden had to be assessed on the basis of the quality, credibility and cumulative effect of the evidence rather than through a piecemeal examination of individual documents.

After considering the oral testimony and documentary record together, the Tribunal held that Alam Khan had successfully discharged this burden. It observed that the evidence placed on record was trustworthy, internally consistent and sufficiently established that he was born to Indian parents who had been residing in Assam prior to March 25, 1971.

This finding is significant because it reiterates an important evidentiary principle governing Foreigners Tribunal proceeding. Although Section 9 reverses the ordinary burden of proof, it does not authorise a mechanical rejection of citizenship claims merely because every conceivable document is unavailable. Instead, what is required is a credible evidentiary chain capable of establishing ancestry and residence. The Tribunal found that Alam Khan had done precisely that.

Oral evidence receives equal evidentiary weight

The order is equally noteworthy for the importance it accords to oral testimony. Citizenship cases before Foreigners Tribunals often become document-centric, with oral evidence receiving comparatively little attention. In Alam Khan’s case, however, the Tribunal carefully evaluated the testimony of both the proceedee and his witnesses instead of confining itself to documentary records alone.

The evidence of Joytan Nessa (DW-2) proved particularly decisive. Her testimony not only established that she was Alam Khan’s biological mother but also explained the family’s circumstances following her divorce from Abdul Hakim. The Tribunal categorically recorded that her affidavit corroborated Alam Khan’s own evidence and that there was no reason to disbelieve her testimony.

Similarly, the Gaonburah of Katla village, who had issued the hereditary certificate relied upon by the defence, appeared before the Tribunal and proved its contents. The Tribunal specifically noted that the certificate had been issued after verification of the 1965 electoral records relating to Alam Khan’s father, thereby enhancing both its authenticity and evidentiary value.

Together, these witnesses bridged the documentary gaps that arose because of divorce, remarriage and the absence of a birth certificate. Rather than treating oral evidence as secondary, the Tribunal relied upon it to contextualise and reinforce the documentary record.

Administrative negligence cannot defeat citizenship

The proceedings also exposed a troubling administrative lapse. During the course of the case, certified copies of the 1985 and 1989 electoral rolls could not be produced because the Election Commission had failed to preserve those records. This was not a case where Alam Khan had failed to produce documents in his possession; rather, the relevant public authority itself was unable to furnish records that ought to have been maintained.

Recognising the implications of this failure, CJP argued that a citizen cannot be deprived of his legal rights because of omissions committed by the State. The absence of public records attributable to administrative negligence cannot be converted into evidence against the very citizen who seeks to rely upon them.

Although the Tribunal’s written opinion ultimately rested on the strength of the remaining documentary and oral evidence, its acceptance of the defence case effectively recognised that missing public records, when unavailable due to official lapses, cannot by themselves negate an otherwise credible claim of citizenship. The decision therefore reflects a fair and pragmatic approach to evidentiary evaluation in citizenship proceedings.

This aspect of the case is likely to assume wider significance. Across Assam, numerous citizenship proceedings have been complicated by missing electoral rolls, damaged records and administrative deficiencies that are entirely beyond the control of the persons facing proceedings. The reasoning adopted in Alam Khan’s case reinforces the principle that such institutional failures should not become instruments for denying citizenship.

A holistic appreciation of evidence

In this order, rather than isolating each document and asking whether it independently established citizenship, the Tribunal examined the evidence as a connected chain extending across several decades. It considered the 1951 NRC legacy data, the certified electoral rolls from 1965, 1970, 1997, 2005, 2010, 2019 and 2021, the voter identity cards, the land records, the Gaonburah’s certificate and the oral testimony of the proceedee and his witnesses. None of these documents, viewed in isolation, answered every question raised in the proceedings. Taken together, however, they established a consistent narrative regarding Alam Khan’s ancestry, family history and continuous residence in Assam.

The Tribunal expressly recorded that the evidence relied upon by Alam Khan appeared trustworthy, that there was nothing on record to disbelieve his version, and that the documents produced were admissible and duly proved. On that basis, it concluded that he had been born and brought up through genuine Indian parents and, being their descendant, could not be termed a foreigner.

“The evidence of Proceedee, coupled with the above-mentioned documents relied upon by him appears to be trustworthy and there is nothing on record to disbelieve him. I find sufficient proof on record to come to a definite conclusion that the Proceedee was born and brought up through genuine Indian Parents and as such, he being the descendent of his Indian Parents cannot be termed as a foreigner as alleged in the above-mentioned case.” (Para 8)

In doing so, the Tribunal reaffirmed an important legal principle: citizenship adjudication is ultimately an exercise in evaluating the totality of evidence. The law does not require perfection in documentation; it requires credible proof. Where multiple independent pieces of evidence corroborate one another and collectively establish the proceedee’s claim, isolated inconsistencies or documentary gaps cannot outweigh the cumulative force of the record. That is precisely the approach adopted in Alam Khan’s case, making the decision an important example of reasoned and evidence-based adjudication under the Foreigners Act.

The Final Verdict: Tribunal declares Alam Khan ‘not a foreigner’

Having examined the oral testimony, documentary evidence and the submissions advanced by both sides, the Foreigners Tribunal unequivocally held that the allegations made against Alam Khan could not be sustained. The Tribunal observed that the proceedee’s testimony, read together with the evidence of his biological mother and the documentary record produced before it, constituted a credible and reliable chain of evidence. It found no material on record that cast doubt upon the authenticity of the documents or the veracity of the witnesses. On the contrary, the Tribunal held that the evidence consistently established that Alam Khan belonged to a family that had been residing in Assam long before the statutory cut-off date and that he was the descendant of genuine Indian citizens.

Accordingly, by its order dated January 6, 2026, the Tribunal answered the reference in the negative, holding that Md. Alam Khan, son of Late Abdul Hakim Khan of village Katla, Barpeta, is not a foreigner within the meaning of the Foreigners Act, 1946.

The decision finally brought an end to a proceeding that had remained unresolved for over two decades, restoring to Alam Khan what should never have been placed in doubt—his recognition as an Indian citizen.

Alam Khan holds up the Foreigners’ Tribunal Order

Why this order matters

While the order grants relief to one individual, its importance lies in the principles it reinforces for citizenship adjudication before Foreigners Tribunals. First, the order demonstrates that family complexities cannot be viewed in isolation from social realities. Divorce, remarriage and blended family structures are lived realities across society. The absence of a birth certificate or the appearance of a step-parent’s name in electoral records cannot automatically negate a person’s citizenship. By accepting oral evidence that satisfactorily explained these circumstances, the Tribunal adopted an approach rooted in evidentiary fairness rather than technical formalism.

Secondly, the case highlights the consequences of administrative negligence. The inability to produce certain electoral records did not arise because Alam Khan had failed to preserve them; rather, the relevant public authority itself had failed to maintain those records. Had the Tribunal adopted an inflexible documentary standard, Alam Khan could have been penalised for omissions committed entirely by the State. Instead, the Tribunal assessed the available evidence in its entirety and declined to allow institutional lapses to determine the outcome of the proceedings.

Thirdly, the decision reiterates that the burden under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act is discharged through credible and cumulative evidence, not through the production of any one document in isolation. Legacy data, electoral rolls spanning several decades, land records, voter identity documents, certificates issued by local authorities and reliable witness testimony together formed an unbroken chain that satisfied the Tribunal. The order therefore reinforces the settled principle that citizenship claims must be evaluated on the basis of the totality of evidence rather than isolated discrepancies.

Finally, the order underscores the importance of effective legal representation in Foreigners Tribunal proceedings. Citizenship litigation often turns upon nuanced questions of evidence, lineage and documentary continuity. Alam Khan’s case demonstrates how careful legal strategy, supported by thorough documentation and credible witness testimony, can overcome seemingly insurmountable evidentiary hurdles.

A victory beyond the courtroom

For Alam Khan, the order marks far more than the conclusion of litigation. For years, the proceedings imposed severe emotional, social and financial burdens on a man whose livelihood depended on daily labour, farming and fishing. Living on the banks of the Dhumarkur River, Alam Khan has long battled forces beyond his control. Every monsoon, floodwaters enter his home, eroding both land and livelihood. Yet, for over two decades, nature was not his only adversary. As he poignantly puts it, “On one side, the floods threaten to wash away my home. On the other, the government sought to take away my citizenship.” His victory before the Foreigners Tribunal has ended one of those battles, even as the other returns with every monsoon.

Like countless individuals facing citizenship proceedings in Assam, he lived with the uncertainty that accompanies every notice, every hearing and every adjournment. The prolonged litigation affected not only his legal status but also his ability to live with dignity and security.

Upon learning of the Tribunal’s decision, Alam Khan broke down in tears. Describing the years of mental distress and financial hardship that accompanied the proceedings, he acknowledged that without the legal support extended by Citizens for Justice and Peace, it would have been extremely difficult for him to establish his citizenship and secure justice.

On July 26 2026, Advocate Abhijeet Choudhury and CJP Assam State In-charge Nanda Ghosh formally handed over the certified copy of the order to Alam Khan, symbolising the end of a legal struggle that had lasted almost twenty-six years.

CJP’s continuing commitment

Alam Khan’s case is another reminder of the indispensable role that sustained legal aid plays in protecting the rights of vulnerable communities facing citizenship proceedings in Assam. Over the years, Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP) has represented hundreds of economically and socially marginalised individuals before Foreigners Tribunals, assisting them in tracing legacy documents, reconstructing family histories, producing witnesses and navigating a complex legal process that is often inaccessible to those with limited means.

The organisation’s intervention in Alam Khan’s case illustrates that citizenship litigation is not merely about producing documents; it is about reconstructing lives, explaining family histories, addressing administrative failures and ensuring that constitutional guarantees are not defeated by poverty, illiteracy or bureaucratic lapses.

With this order, another individual has been spared the devastating consequences of an erroneous declaration of foreigner status. Yet the case also serves as a broader reminder that citizenship adjudication must remain anchored in fairness, careful appreciation of evidence and the rule of law.

The complete order may be read below:

Related:

When a narrow reading of documents decide citizenship: GHC in Aminul Hoque

‘Fairness & reason ‘: SC rules that due process is a must for citizenship determination

Gauhati High Court upholds foreigner declaration, rejects mental illness plea

When a Spelling Error Can Cost Citizenship: Supreme Court stays deportation of five Assam women

The post 26-Year Citizenship Battle Ends: Barpeta Tribunal rules Alam Khan is Indian appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Recent decisions of three different High Courts, the Bombay High Court, the Madhya Pradesh High Court and the Allahabad High Court, although arising from entirely different factual situations, reveal a remarkably consistent judicial approach towards police accountability. Each case concerns a distinct stage of the criminal process. The Bombay High Court examined the legality of custodial violence committed during investigation and the extent to which statutory protection under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure could shield police officers accused of assaulting a suspect. The Madhya Pradesh High Court dealt with compliance with the newly enacted Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita and the constitutional requirement that every arrested person be informed, in writing, of the grounds of arrest. The Allahabad High Court, on the other hand, addressed what appeared at first glance to be a routine bail application but eventually transformed it into an inquiry into police negligence that had delayed adjudication of the applicants’ liberty.

Viewed independently, each judgment addresses a different procedural or substantive question. One concerns custodial violence, another concerns arrest procedure, and the third concerns administrative negligence in criminal proceedings. Yet, when read together, these decisions reveal an emerging constitutional narrative that extends well beyond their immediate facts. Collectively, they reject the notion that police accountability is confined to instances of spectacular misconduct such as torture or illegal detention. Instead, they emphasise that accountability permeates every stage of criminal administration—from the manner in which investigations are conducted, to the procedural safeguards accompanying arrest, to the institutional obligation of police authorities to cooperate with courts in the timely administration of justice.

Significantly, none of these judgments merely reiterates settled legal principles. Each court fashions remedies that seek to strengthen institutional compliance. The Bombay High Court refuses to allow police officers to invoke statutory immunity where allegations concern custodial assault to extract a confession, thereby reaffirming that violence cannot be characterised as an act performed in discharge of official duty. The Madhya Pradesh High Court, while declining to invalidate the arrest on the peculiar facts before it, nevertheless directs the Director General of Police to issue fresh circulars, warns that future violations of constitutional safeguards may invite departmental action, and treats repeated non-compliance with binding precedent as a matter of grave institutional concern. The Allahabad High Court goes a step further by imposing monetary costs on the State for police negligence that delayed adjudication of a bail application and permitting recovery of those costs from the erring officials after departmental enquiry.

What unites these judgments is not merely judicial criticism of the police. Courts have, on numerous occasions, criticised investigative lapses, custodial violence and administrative inefficiency. The significance of these three decisions lies in the manner in which the High Courts conceptualise police accountability. Rather than treating constitutional guarantees as abstract ideals, they recognise that the rule of law depends upon everyday institutional compliance. A police officer who assaults a suspect during investigation, an investigating officer who disregards mandatory constitutional safeguards while effecting an arrest, and officials whose negligence prolongs a person’s incarceration each undermine the administration of criminal justice, albeit in different ways. The constitutional injury is not confined to physical violence or illegal detention; it also extends to procedural disregard and bureaucratic indifference that compromise personal liberty and erode public confidence in the justice system.

Equally noteworthy is the evolving understanding of judicial supervision reflected in these decisions. Traditionally, courts have confined themselves to determining the legality of individual executive actions. These judgments demonstrate a willingness to move beyond adjudication of individual disputes towards ensuring institutional compliance. Directions to police headquarters, recommendations for departmental action, warnings of disciplinary proceedings, recovery of costs from erring officers, and rejection of statutory immunities collectively indicate that High Courts are increasingly employing their constitutional jurisdiction not merely to remedy individual violations but also to improve systemic functioning of law enforcement agencies. In doing so, they reaffirm the constitutional proposition that executive discretion remains subordinate to judicially enforceable standards of legality.

Another common feature is the courts’ refusal to permit procedural or statutory provisions to become instruments of impunity. In the Bombay case, Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, intended to protect honest public servants from vexatious litigation, is interpreted in a manner that prevents its misuse as a shield against allegations of custodial torture. In the Madhya Pradesh case, Section 47 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita is read in harmony with Article 22(1) and Supreme Court precedent, emphasising that communication of grounds of arrest is not a technical formality but a substantive constitutional guarantee. In the Allahabad case, the Court treats delays caused by police negligence not as mere administrative lapses but as failures that directly affect the timely adjudication of liberty.

These developments assume particular importance in the context of India’s ongoing transition from the Code of Criminal Procedure to the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita. While legislative reform has altered statutory language and introduced procedural modifications, these judgments underscore that the constitutional foundations governing criminal procedure remain unchanged. Police powers continue to derive their legitimacy from constitutional limitations rather than statutory discretion alone. Neither investigative convenience, administrative inefficiency nor claims of official duty can dilute the guarantees embedded in Articles 14, 21 and 22.

Against this backdrop, the three decisions merit close examination—not merely as isolated judicial pronouncements, but as markers of an emerging jurisprudence that insists upon constitutional discipline at every stage of policing. Each judgment contributes a distinct dimension to that jurisprudence. Read together, they illuminate how High Courts are increasingly deploying constitutional principles to strengthen police accountability, reinforce procedural safeguards, and preserve the rule of law in everyday criminal administration.

Custodial Violence Is Never ‘Official Duty’: Bombay High Court

The first judgment in this piece comes from the Bombay High Court, which reaffirmed a fundamental constitutional principle: the authority to investigate crime does not include the authority to use violence. In Sanjay Bapuso Dalvi & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, the Court held that assaulting a suspect to extract a confession can never constitute an act performed in the discharge of official duty, thereby denying police officers the protection of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Facts and the question before the court: The case arose from allegations that a man summoned to the Shivaji Nagar Police Station in Ichalkaranji during a murder investigation in November 2008 was detained overnight, assaulted and forced to confess. Following medical evidence and the complainant’s allegations, the Magistrate issued process against the police officers for offences including voluntarily causing hurt, wrongful confinement and criminal intimidation. The Sessions Court refused to discharge them.

Before the High Court, the officers argued that the alleged acts occurred during investigation of a cognisable offence and therefore attracted the protection of Section 197 CrPC, which bars prosecution of public servants for acts committed while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duty without prior governmental sanction.

The central issue was whether custodial assault allegedly committed to extract a confession could be regarded as an act connected with official duty.

Section 197 protects official functions, not abuse of power: Justice Sandesh Patil answered the question in the negative. The Court reiterated the settled principle that Section 197 is intended to protect honest public servants from vexatious litigation arising out of acts reasonably connected with their official responsibilities. It is not a substantive immunity from prosecution but a procedural safeguard available only where the impugned act bears a reasonable nexus with official duty.

Drawing upon the Constitution Bench decision in Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari and subsequent rulings including Ganesh Chandra Jew v. State of Orissa, Om Prakash v. State of Jharkhand and Devinder Singh v. State of Punjab, the Court reaffirmed that even acts committed in excess of authority may require sanction if they remain connected to lawful official functions. However, criminal conduct wholly divorced from those functions cannot claim statutory protection merely because it occurred during official employment.

The distinction was decisive in the present case. Investigation of offences is undoubtedly an official function. Assaulting a suspect to secure a confession is not. The Court therefore rejected the argument that every act committed during an investigation automatically becomes an official act. The setting of the misconduct cannot determine its legal character.

Drawing a constitutional boundary: The Court emphasised that the police possess statutory authority to interrogate suspects, collect evidence and investigate offences, but no law authorises “third-degree” methods or custodial violence. Such conduct is not an excess committed while performing official duty; it is conduct wholly outside the scope of lawful police functions.

Justice Patil accordingly held that assaulting a suspect for a confessional statement “would never be said to be an act in discharge of official duty.” Accepting the prosecution case at face value—as required at the stage of issuance of process—the requirement of prior sanction under Section 197 had no application.

Importantly, the Court confined itself to the legal issue before it. It did not determine the guilt of the accused officers but only whether the prosecution could proceed without governmental sanction. Questions relating to the truth of the allegations were left to trial.

Constitutional significance: Although framed as a dispute over Section 197 CrPC, the judgment is rooted in the broader constitutional prohibition against custodial violence. It aligns with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa and Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani, all of which recognise that coercive interrogation is incompatible with Articles 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution.

The decision also reinforces the evidentiary policy underlying the law governing confessions. Indian criminal law has long treated police-obtained confessions with suspicion, recognising the dangers of coercive investigation. By refusing to extend statutory protection to allegations of custodial assault, the Bombay High Court ensures that Section 197 cannot become a procedural shield against accountability for torture.

More broadly, the judgment restores Section 197 to its intended purpose. The provision exists to protect bona fide exercise of public functions, not to immunise criminal misconduct. Had the Court accepted the petitioners’ argument, virtually every allegation of custodial violence could have been insulated behind the requirement of prior sanction simply because it occurred during an investigation.

Instead, the Court reaffirmed a fundamental constitutional proposition: official authority ends where illegality begins. Police powers derive legitimacy from law, and once those powers are exercised through violence or coercion, they cease to be protected as official acts. In doing so, the Bombay High Court laid down the first principle that runs through all three judgments—constitutional policing begins with recognising that the State’s coercive powers are always subject to constitutional limits.

The complete judgment may be read below:

Procedural Safeguards Are Constitutional Guarantees: Madhya Pradesh High Court

If the Bombay High Court’s decision placed substantive limits on police power, the Madhya Pradesh High Court focused on how that power must be exercised. In Dharmendra Lodhi v. State of Madhya Pradesh, the Court examined the constitutional requirement that an arrested person be informed of the grounds of arrest in writing under Section 47 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), while issuing far-reaching directions to ensure institutional compliance by the police.

Facts and the legal issue: The petitioner challenged his brother’s arrest under the NDPS Act through a habeas corpus petition, contending that the arrest was illegal because the investigating agency had failed to communicate the grounds of arrest in writing, as mandated by Section 47 BNSS and the Supreme Court’s decisions in Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra and Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana.

The State argued that although no separate written memorandum of grounds of arrest had been served, the accused had received a written notice under Section 50 of the NDPS Act, the seizure memo recording recovery of 86.85 kilograms of ganja, and information regarding the arrest had been conveyed to his family. The question before the Court, therefore, was whether these documents constituted sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.

Section 47 BNSS gives statutory effect to Article 22: The Division Bench of Justices G.S. Ahluwalia and Anuradha Shukla treated Section 47 BNSS not as a mere procedural provision but as a statutory expression of Article 22(1) of the Constitution, which guarantees every arrested person the right to be informed of the grounds of arrest.

Relying on Pankaj Bansal, Mihir Rajesh Shah and Vihaan Kumar, the Court observed that the requirement of written communication is intended to eliminate disputes over whether the grounds of arrest were actually conveyed. Written communication enables an arrested person to effectively challenge detention, seek legal representation, oppose remand and apply for bail, thereby making Article 22 a meaningful safeguard rather than an empty formality.

Substantial compliance, but a strong institutional warning: On the facts, however, the Court declined to invalidate the arrest. It held that the Section 50 NDPS notice, the seizure memo signed by the accused and the communication made to his brother sufficiently informed him of the reasons for his arrest. Although no independent document titled “grounds of arrest” had been furnished, the constitutional objective underlying Section 47 BNSS stood substantially fulfilled.

The significance of the judgment, however, lies less in this conclusion than in what followed. The Bench expressed serious concern that investigating officers continued to violate binding constitutional requirements despite repeated Supreme Court decisions, earlier High Court rulings and even a circular issued by the Madhya Pradesh Police Headquarters directing strict compliance. Such repeated lapses, the Court observed, pointed either to negligence or deliberate disregard of constitutional safeguards—both of which it described as “alarming”.

In one of its strongest observations, the Court remarked that if investigating officers routinely ignored mandatory procedures, the police department had to introspect whether it was inadvertently helping offenders secure release through illegal arrests rather than effectively prosecuting them. Procedural safeguards, the Bench emphasised, strengthen criminal investigations; they do not weaken them.

From individual relief to institutional accountability: Recognising that constitutional rights cannot depend solely upon post facto judicial intervention, the Court issued prospective directions to the Director General of Police to circulate fresh instructions requiring strict compliance with Section 47 BNSS and the Supreme Court’s decisions. It further directed that where investigating officers violated these requirements, the department should ordinarily presume deliberate non-compliance, initiate departmental proceedings and consider suspension and major penalties.

These directions mark an important shift from correcting individual violations to addressing institutional deficiencies. Rather than treating procedural lapses as isolated mistakes, the Court sought to embed constitutional compliance within police administration itself.

Significance of the decision: The judgment expands the understanding of police accountability beyond cases of excessive force or illegal detention. It recognises that constitutional policing also demands faithful adherence to procedural safeguards governing arrest. By reading Section 47 BNSS as a statutory embodiment of Article 22, the Court reaffirmed that procedural requirements are not technicalities but constitutional guarantees protecting personal liberty.

Although the Court upheld the arrest on the peculiar facts of the case, it left no ambiguity about the law going forward. Police powers remain legitimate only when exercised in accordance with constitutional procedure. Compliance with written grounds of arrest is therefore not a matter of administrative convenience but an indispensable component of due process.

In doing so, the Madhya Pradesh High Court adds a second dimension to the emerging jurisprudence on police accountability. While the Bombay High Court held that custodial violence can never be protected as official duty, the Madhya Pradesh High Court emphasised that even lawful police powers lose constitutional legitimacy when exercised without scrupulous adherence to mandatory procedural safeguards.

The complete judgment may be read below:

Administrative Negligence as a Constitutional Wrong: Allahabad High Court

If the Bombay High Court’s decision drew a constitutional boundary around the misuse of police power, and the Madhya Pradesh High Court underscored that lawful policing is inseparable from procedural fairness, the Allahabad High Court’s decision introduces a third, and equally significant, dimension to constitutional policing. It recognises that the rule of law may be undermined not only through abuse of authority or violation of procedural safeguards, but also through institutional indifference, bureaucratic inertia and administrative negligence.

Unlike the previous two cases, the controversy before the Court did not concern custodial violence, illegal arrest or investigative excesses. It arose from what appeared to be an ordinary bail application. Yet, in deciding that application, Justice Arun Kumar Singh Deshwal transformed a routine criminal proceeding into a broader examination of how police inaction can obstruct judicial administration and unnecessarily prolong deprivation of personal liberty.

The judgment is important because it expands the constitutional understanding of police accountability beyond the exercise of coercive powers. It reminds that the constitutional obligations of investigating agencies do not end with lawful arrest or fair investigation. They equally encompass timely cooperation with judicial proceedings. Where police negligence delays adjudication of liberty, the constitutional injury is no less significant merely because it results from omission rather than affirmative abuse of power.

Facts and background: The proceedings arose from a bail application filed by the parents-in-law of a deceased woman, who were accused of offences under Sections 80(2) and 85 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita read with Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

Upon examining the material on record, the Court found no sufficient evidence indicating that the applicants had subjected the deceased to cruelty or harassment for dowry soon before her death. The statements of independent witnesses pointed instead to ordinary matrimonial discord between the husband and wife. Finding no material to sustain the allegations against the parents-in-law, the Court concluded that they were entitled to bail.

Ordinarily, the matter would have ended there. Instead, before disposing of the application, the Court turned to an entirely different question—why a bail application that could have been decided much earlier had remained pending for more than ten additional days.

The answer, according to the Court, lay not in judicial delay or legal complexity, but in the repeated failure of the investigating agency to furnish the necessary instructions and case diary despite repeated communications from the High Court. It was this administrative lapse, rather than the merits of the bail application itself, that became the central focus of the judgment.

The institutional failure that prompted judicial intervention: The chronology recorded by the Court revealed a sustained pattern of administrative indifference rather than an isolated procedural lapse.

The Office of the Joint Director (Prosecution), attached to the Allahabad High Court, supplied a copy of the bail application to the police pairokar on June 17, 2026. This was followed by an alert to the Superintendent of Police on June 19 and a reminder on June 29. Despite these repeated communications, the investigating agency failed to furnish the necessary instructions to enable the Government Advocate to assist the Court.

Even when the matter was taken up on 3 July 2026, the Court attempted to facilitate compliance by directing the prosecution to obtain the case diary electronically through the Crime and Criminal Tracking Network and Systems (CCTNS), thereby eliminating any practical difficulty in transmitting records.

Yet even this direction went unheeded. Instead of producing the case diary, the police supplied only the criminal antecedents of the accused, leaving the Court without the material necessary to decide the bail application. The sequence demonstrated that the delay was not the consequence of unavoidable administrative constraints. The High Court had repeatedly reminded the investigating agency, suggested alternative methods of compliance and afforded ample opportunity to furnish the requisite records. Nevertheless, the necessary instructions remained unavailable, preventing timely adjudication of a matter directly affecting personal liberty.

Translating judicial censure into institutional accountability: Having concluded that the delay in deciding the bail application was attributable solely to police negligence, the Court declined to treat the lapse as a matter warranting only administrative criticism. Instead, it imposed costs of ₹50,000 upon the State Government, directing that the amount be paid to the applicants. Simultaneously, it granted the State liberty to recover the amount from the erring officials after conducting an appropriate departmental enquiry.

This direction is perhaps the most significant aspect of the judgment. Indian courts have frequently expressed dissatisfaction with administrative inefficiency or investigative lapses, but far fewer decisions translate such criticism into enforceable consequences. By imposing monetary costs, the Court recognised that bureaucratic negligence is not a victimless administrative failure. Where executive inaction delays adjudication of liberty, the prejudice is suffered by litigants whose incarceration continues solely because the State failed to discharge its institutional obligations.

Equally significant is the Court’s refusal to allow the burden of that negligence to remain permanently upon the public exchequer. By permitting recovery from the responsible officials after due enquiry, the judgment carefully distinguishes between institutional liability and individual accountability. The State remains constitutionally answerable for the functioning of its agencies, but the financial consequences of proven negligence need not ultimately be borne by taxpayers. In doing so, the Court fashioned a remedy that simultaneously compensates those affected, reinforces governmental responsibility and preserves personal accountability within the police hierarchy.

More importantly, the order signals that constitutional accountability is not exhausted by declarations of illegality. Administrative indifference that obstructs judicial proceedings may itself attract tangible consequences. The judgment therefore moves beyond symbolic judicial disapproval and adopts a remedial approach aimed at improving institutional discipline within the criminal justice system.

The complete judgment may be read below:

Police Accountability: From individual misconduct to institutional constitutionalism

At first glance, the three High Court decisions appear to address entirely different questions. The Bombay High Court considered whether police officers accused of custodial assault could invoke the protection of Section 197 CrPC. The Madhya Pradesh High Court examined whether the constitutional requirement of communicating the grounds of arrest in writing under Article 22 and Section 47 BNSS had been complied with. The Allahabad High Court dealt with police negligence that delayed adjudication of a bail application.

Read individually, each judgment resolves a distinct procedural issue. Read together, however, they articulate a broader constitutional doctrine on police accountability. The common thread running through all three decisions is that the legitimacy of policing does not flow merely from statutory powers but from faithful adherence to constitutional limitations. Police accountability is no longer confined to punishing overt abuse such as custodial violence or illegal detention. It now extends to every stage of the criminal justice process—from investigation and arrest to procedural fairness, administrative diligence and cooperation with judicial institutions.

The Bombay High Court establishes the first principle: official duty cannot be used as a shield for unconstitutional conduct. Custodial assault and coercive violence are fundamentally incompatible with lawful policing and therefore fall outside the protection of Section 197 CrPC. The decision reinforces that statutory immunity exists to protect bona fide public functions, not acts that violate Article 21.

The Madhya Pradesh High Court adds a second dimension by treating procedural safeguards as constitutional guarantees rather than technical formalities. Reading Section 47 BNSS through Article 22 and the Supreme Court’s decisions in Pankaj Bansal, Mihir Rajesh Shah and Vihaan Kumar, the Court holds that informing an arrested person of the grounds of arrest in writing is integral to constitutional fairness. More importantly, it moves beyond the individual case to address systemic police non-compliance, directing institutional reforms and departmental accountability so that constitutional safeguards become part of everyday policing rather than case-specific judicial corrections.

The Allahabad High Court completes the trilogy by recognising that constitutional injury may arise not only from misuse of power but also from administrative indifference. Police accountability includes the obligation to assist the administration of justice with diligence and efficiency. By imposing costs of ₹50,000 on the State for avoidable delay in deciding a bail application, directing payment to the applicants, permitting recovery from erring officers after departmental enquiry, and ordering an inquiry into the lapses, the Court converts bureaucratic negligence into a matter of constitutional accountability. Administrative omissions that unnecessarily prolong deprivation of liberty are treated as inconsistent with Article 21 no less than affirmative executive misconduct.

Collectively, these judgments also demonstrate the evolving role of constitutional courts. Rather than merely correcting completed legal wrongs, the High Courts increasingly function as institutional supervisors, issuing directions aimed at improving governance, strengthening internal accountability mechanisms and embedding constitutional discipline within police administration. Whether by denying statutory protection to officers accused of custodial violence, directing police authorities to institutionalise compliance with arrest safeguards, or imposing financial consequences for administrative negligence, the courts are moving beyond dispute resolution towards structural constitutional oversight.

Equally significant is the continuity they establish despite the transition to India’s new criminal laws. Although the BNSS has replaced the Code of Criminal Procedure, these decisions affirm that legislative reform cannot dilute constitutional guarantees. The Constitution—and particularly Articles 21 and 22—continues to provide the normative framework within which every police power must be exercised.

Taken together, the three judgments articulate an emerging constitutional ethic of policing founded upon three interconnected propositions:

• Police powers cannot be exercised through violence or coercion that falls outside lawful investigation.
• Every exercise of coercive authority must comply with constitutional and statutory procedural safeguards protecting personal liberty.
• Police institutions bear a continuing obligation to function diligently, transparently and responsibly in aid of the administration of justice.

The cumulative message is both simple and profound. Constitutional policing is measured not merely by the absence of abuse, but by affirmative fidelity to the rule of law at every stage of the criminal justice process. In reaffirming that principle, the Bombay, Madhya Pradesh and Allahabad High Courts have collectively advanced an important and evolving doctrine of institutional constitutionalism—one in which police legitimacy derives not from the breadth of statutory power, but from disciplined adherence to constitutional values.

Related:

The Dalmandi Judgment: Allahabad HC clears way for religious site acquisition

‘Fairness & reason ‘: SC rules that due process is a must for citizenship determination

After 30 years, Orissa high court orders SBI to pay for Rs. 40 lakh to two bank sweepers

When uniformed personnel stand accused India’s highest courts have spoken boldly yet acted narrowly

The post Three High Courts, One Message: Police power has constitutional limits appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In support of this claim, Shrivastava has relied on a purported account attributed to former British Prime Minister Clement Attlee, who was not in office during the Quit India Movement, to argue that it was the Indian National Army, and not the Quit India Movement, that ultimately compelled Britain to leave India.

“The leaders, be it Maulana Azad, Jawaharlal Nehru, J Prakash Narayan, or Aruna Asaf Ali, all of them accepted that the movement was a flop,” said Shrivastava. These statements were met with loud applause from members of the audience in the video.

It certainly would be an oversimplification to attribute India’s independence solely to the Quit India Movement of 1942, and would overlook several other significant developments that shaped the British decision to leave India. The role of the Indian National Army, the Royal Indian Navy mutiny, growing labour unrest, and Britain’s severe economic exhaustion after the Second World War were all undeniably important factors in hastening the end of colonial rule.

Yet acknowledging these factors does not diminish the importance of the Quit India Movement which profoundly altered the political landscape, a fact reflected in reports and British correspondence, including those sent to the then Prime Minister Winston Churchill. This will be examined in greater detail below but to dismiss the significance of the 1942 Movement altogether is not a serious and independent reading of history as claimed by Shrivastava.

For decades, a recurring theme in Hindutva discourse has been to downplay the significance of the 1942 Movement and recast India’s freedom struggle as a contest between competing movements. It serves a broader political purpose. This framing, first, diminishes the mass, cross-community, non-violent, anti-imperialist, and secular civil disobedience popularly associated with Gandhi and Nehru, and second, undermines the idea of a secular, democratic republic that emerged from it- a constitutional vision that is at odds with the ideological project of the RSS, and affiliated Hindutva organisations.

The push to diminish 1942 today comes from the political tradition that did not participate in and in some documented instances actively counselled against that very Movement.

What was the Quit India Movement?

In protest against the British decision to involve India in World War- II, without consulting Indian political leaders, the Congress ministries in the provinces resigned from office. By contrast, V.D. Savarkar, then president of the Hindu Mahasabha, had met Viceroy Linlithgow in October 1939 and called for Hindu-British cooperation. The Hindu Mahasabha, Savarkar even went on to say, “favoured an unambiguous undertaking of dominion status at the end of the war.” He also offered that the Hindu Mahasabha would replace the Congress in provincial governments if the Congress ministries resigned. Reported in the National Herald.

The failure of the Cripps Mission in 1942 had intensified public discontent with British rule. Until then, Gandhi had largely followed a policy of avoiding actions that would hinder the British war effort. Following the collapse of the Cripps negotiations, however, he called for an open non-violent revolution. On July 14, 1942, the Congress Working Committee adopted a resolution declaring that the immediate end of British rule was essential not only for India’s freedom but also for the success of the Allied cause. The Quit India Resolution generated widespread enthusiasm across the country.

Meanwhile, RSS speakers had urged members to stay away from the Congress-led agitation, and these instructions, according to the British Home Department, were duly followed. Syama Prasad Mookerjee, a Hindu Mahasabha leader and minister in the undivided Bengal government, went a step further when in July 1942, he wrote to the British Governor of Bengal advising on measures to suppress the Quit India Movement in the province while arguing that Indians should continue to place their trust in the British for the region’s defence.

Gandhi was entrusted with leading the movement. Addressing a gathering, he said “There is a mantra, a short one, that I give you. You imprint it on your heart and let every breath of yours give an expression to it. The mantra is ‘do or die’. We shall either be free or die in the attempt …. Every one of you from this moment consider himself a free man or woman and even act as if you are free and no longer under the heel of this imperialism.”

The Congress urged people to undertake ten forms of non-violent resistance which included refraining from any commercial transactions with the British or the colonial government, displaying the tricolour on every home and window, boycotting cinema halls on the ground that the proceeds benefited the colonial administration, avoiding the courts, refusing to purchase foreign goods, withdrawing money from government banks, socially boycotting those who served the British government, avoiding any transactions that required recourse to colonial courts, leaving cities for villages, and ensuring that grain and other produce remained with the peasantry.

Subhas Chandra Bose, broadcasting from Azad Hind Radio on August 17, 1942, himself did not dismiss it and called it “non-violent guerrilla warfare,” and told listeners the “administrative machinery can be brought to a standstill” if the campaign continued. Bose, whom Shrivastva implicitly elevates over Gandhi, was on record treating 1942 as a serious and continuing front in the freedom struggle, not a failure to be measured against Congress.

What was the impact of the Quit India Movement?

Over 60,000 people were arrested by the end of 1943 alone, mass fines were levied, and demonstrators were subjected to public flogging. Official casualty figures stood at 1,028 dead while Nehru’s own estimate put the toll closer to 10,000. Many national leaders went underground and continued their struggle by broadcasting messages over the clandestine radio stations, distributing pamphlets and establishing parallel governments. The underground Congress Radio run by Usha Mehta during Quit India recorded messages from Gandhi and other leaders, moving location to location to dodge authorities. It reported on events from every nook and corner of the country and was the first to inform the nation about the Chittagong raid, the atrocities in Ashti and Chimur, and the strike in Jamshedpur. It operated for nearly three months before their arrest in November 1942. When the police arrived, the programme was coming to an end with Vande Mataram playing. Upon being asked to stop the record, Mehta reportedly commanded the police to stand at attention for the national song. The film Ae Watan Mere Watan directed by Kannan Iyer was a fictionalised tribute to Mehta and the historic Congress Radio that kept the Quit India flame alive against overwhelming odds.

Fifty-seven battalions of the British Army, alongside the entire police force, were deployed to suppress the movement. The sabotage of communications was so extensive that ground forces often could not reach certain areas, leading the Viceroy Linlithgow to suggest machine-gunning mobs from the air to regain control.

While the revolt was underway, Viceroy wrote a telegram to Churchill, the then Prime Minister:

“I am engaged here in meeting by far the most serious rebellion since that of 1857, the gravity and extent of which we have so far concealed from the world for reasons of military security. Mob violence remains rampant over large tracts of the countryside and I am by no means confident that we may not see in September a formidable attempt to renew this widespread sabotage of our war effort. The lives of Europeans in outlying places are in jeopardy.”

Contrary to his public pronouncements, Churchill gloomily disclosed to King George VI at one of their Tuesday luncheons in July 1942 that “the idea of the transfer of power in India had become an admitted inevitability in the minds of the British Party leaders.”

The movement’s structure, once its leadership was arrested within 24 hours, became spontaneous and largely leaderless. Parallel governments were established and functioned for extended periods.  In Ballia, UP, protestors overthrew the district administration and freed prisoners; it took the British weeks to reassert control. Railway lines, telegraph wires, and government buildings across the country were targeted to paralyse the war effort. The British kept a battleship on standby, reportedly to remove Gandhi and Congress leaders from India entirely, a step they ultimately judged too risky to take.

Exposing the Distortion: Why Attlee?

Like Shrivastava, many have relied on a purported statement by former British Prime Minister Clement Attlee to downplay the significance of the Quit India Movement. The claim originates from a second-hand account written in 1976 by P.V. Chakraborty, former Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court, who recounted a conversation he claimed to have had with Attlee during the latter’s visit to India in 1956. According to Chakraborty, Attlee identified the activities of the Indian National Army and the Royal Indian Navy Mutiny as the principal reasons for Britain’s withdrawal. “When asked about the extent to which the British decision to quit India was influenced by Mahatma Gandhi’s 1942 movement, Attlee’s lips widened in a smile of disdain and he uttered, slowly, ‘Minimal’.”

But why Attlee? This is the question that is never asked, and it deserves scrutiny.

Attlee was the British Labour Prime Minister from 1945 to 1951 the man who, as head of the postwar British government, oversaw and ultimately signed off on India’s independence in 1947. He was not the incumbent prime minister when Quit India Movement took place and therefore, his assessment of the movement’s impact is questionable. The argument asks one to accept a private, unverifiable, retrospective opinion as the authoritative verdict on which Indian freedom movement “really” mattered while dismissing Linlithgow’s real-time telegram, Churchill’s statement to the King, Bose’s real-time broadcasts, and the testimony of Indians who lived through the movement, as insufficient.

In fact, according to Churchill, the Attlee government was from the outset keen to leave India as soon as possible, regardless of the political situation. On December 12, 1946 he deplored “the ruthless logic to quit India regardless of what may happen there.”

But a moot question here should or ought to be, should we as Indians living in an India free of colonial yoke rely on colonial documentation and sources? Or seek independent assessments and verifications of how India and Indians achieved freedom from centuries of exploitative British rule?

No serious historian claims 1942 alone delivered independence in isolation. The Indian National Army trials, the Royal Indian Navy Mutiny, and Britain’s post-war financial exhaustion were all real and significant pressures, arguably the more immediate triggers of the 1947 transfer of power. That is a defensible historical position. But there is a wide gap between ‘1942 was not the sole cause’ and ‘1942 was a flop with no contribution’ According to Bipan Chandra, the INA’s public sympathy and the 1946 mutiny did not emerge in a vacuum and were given ‘fillip’ by the anti-imperialist sentiment and mass mobilisation that 1942 had already built. The movements were links in a chain, not rivals competing for sole credit. “After Quit India there cou1d be no retreat. Any future negotiations with the British Government could only be on the manner of the transfer of power. Independence was no longer a matter of bargain. And this became amply clear after the War,” Chandra wrote.

As for Aruna Asaf Ali, a figure Shrivastava names as having accepted the movement was a flop, is remembered specifically as the movement’s defining figure for hoisting the flag at Gowalia Tank.

Why This Matters

Reducing India’s freedom struggle to delegitimise the mass, cross-community, non-violent civil disobedience associated with Gandhi and the Congress follows a broader pattern in which organisations that have documented, historically-recorded records of aloofness from or active opposition to the 1942 movement now seek to rewrite it as inconsequential, while elevating alternative narratives more compatible with their own political lineage.

Acharya Kriplani (who was INC President in 1946-47) said, ‘It is my opinion that India could not have achieved its independence, but for the accession of strength which the nation received by the successive struggles started by Gandhiji. A nation which could throw a challenge to the Empire at a time when the armies of all the Allies were on Indian soil could no more be held in thraldom.’  Reported in Janata Weekly.

RS Sharma, Romila Thapar, Irfan Habib, Ramchandra Guha, and such historians Shrivastava has moved to discredit and insult without engaging their actual, published arguments, have also been separately accused in the current political establishment of distorting history through the education system.

But as Shrivastava claims, “All the letters of the leaders, all the books of the leaders, all the newspapers, reporters, the diaries of the British officers, the letters of the British officers, everything is in the National Archives. Take a look at it, the truth will be revealed.”

Sources that are interesting to examine also are:

Several American journalists famously covered Mahatma Gandhi, most notably United Press correspondent Webb Miller, who provided worldwide eyewitness accounts of the 1930 Salt Satyagraha. Other prominent figures include Louis Fischer, who spent a week at Gandhi’s ashram in 1942, and Chicago Tribune reporter William L. Shirer

The definitive account of the Congress Underground Radio was documented by historian and academic Dr. Usha Thakkar in her book, Congress Radio: Usha Mehta and the Underground Radio Station of 1942, published by Penguin Random House India. [1, 2]

National Archives of India (NAI): Located in New Delhi, the NAI holds the Home Political Department files that contain intercepted correspondence, censorship reports, and data on the suppression of the “Secret Congress Radio” spearheaded by Usha Mehta. [1, 2, 3]

The film based on the historic Congress Radio is Ae Watan Mere Watan. Directed by Kannan Iyer, the 2024 Hindi-language historical thriller stars Sara Ali Khan as Usha Mehta, a 22-year-old college student in Mumbai who operated an underground, anti-British radio station during the Quit India movement of 1942  For many in Assam, citizenship isn’t a birthright taken for granted—it’s a legal battle fought after decades of living in the only home they’ve ever known.

Remembering the courageous Aruna Asaf Ali today. Her historic act of hoisting the Indian flag at Gowalia Tank during the Quit India Movement remains a powerful symbol of defiance.

Readers encountering this argument should ask questions: What is the primary source? Is it contemporaneous or retrospective? And who benefits from the comparison being drawn?

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Tanishka Shah)

Related:

How Hindutva forces colluded with both the British & Jinnah against the historic ‘Quit India’ movement: Archives

Past and Prejudice

The post Debunking the ‘Quit India Was Useless’ Myth appeared first on SabrangIndia.