The Odisha State Sentence Review Board has recommended his release from jail on ground of “good behaviour.” On July 14, 2026, a bench comprising of Justices Manoj Misra and Vijay Bishnoi of the Supreme Court through its order had asked the Odisha Government to take a decision on the premature release of Singh by August 19. Reportedly, the bench also made an oral observation that, “You take a decision by August 15. Let him also celebrate Independence Day by then.” Reported the Hindustan Times.

Singh, who is said to be associated with the Bharatiya Janata Party and the Bajrang Dal, is serving life imprisonment not only for the murder of Australian missionary Graham Staines and his two sons, but also for the 1999 murder of Catholic priest Arul Das, who was shot with an arrow while fleeing a building that had been set on fire. Reported the new Indian Express. He was also convicted for the murder of Shaikh Rahman, a Muslim garment merchant, who was brutally assaulted, had his hands severed, and whose body and garment stall were set ablaze.

In July 2024, the Supreme Court had sought the Odisha government’s response on a plea filed through advocate Vishnu Shankar Jain seeking Singh’s remission of sentence and release, asserting that he met the state government’s criteria for granting remission (i.e. 25 years). The reformative theory of Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer was invoked and reliance was placed on the Court’s 2022 judgment permitting the premature release of the convict in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case.

The current remission, therefore reflects a broader pattern in India of state governments ruled by the incumbent-BJP granting remission to those convicted in cases of gross communal violence. One such earlier instance was the release of the convicts in the 2002 Bilkis Bano gang rape and family murder case, a decision that remained in force until it was struck down by the Supreme Court.

It is worth noting that prior to this; Singh’s plea for remission has been evaluated on five separate occasions, and has been turned down each time, with the most recent rejection occurring in February 2024.

How the Remission Was Filed and Processed

Singh’s possible release has drawn political attention in the past. During a campaign for his release in 2022, when the BJD government was in power, Sudarshan TV editor-in-chief Suresh Chavhanke attempted to meet him in prison but was denied permission. Mohan Charan Majhi, (now the Chief Minister of Odisha), had also joined a protest outside the jail demanding Singh’s release. However, the Board’s consideration of Singh’s case was based on the prescribed remission process and the reports submitted by the relevant authorities. This clearly establishes that organised political demand for Singh’s release predates, by a considerable margin, the administrative process that has now produced it.

At its September 2025 meeting, the Board considered 107 cases. It recommended the release of 18 life convicts, rejected 75 applications, and deferred 14, including Singh’s. Singh’s case remained pending because the Board required a fresh report from his home district.

According to The Hindu, the State Sentence Review Board met in the first week of July 2026 to consider the premature release of eligible life convicts. Among the cases reviewed was that of Dara Singh. In his petition before the Supreme Court, he stated that he deeply regretted the offences committed over two decades earlier and sought an opportunity to “give back to society” through service-oriented work.  He also claimed that he bore no personal animosity towards the victims and described his actions as the result of “youthful rage.” Singh was 37 years old at the time of his arrest!

Under Odisha’s 2022 premature-release guidelines, a convict whose sentence has been commuted from death to life becomes eligible for remission consideration after 25 years in custody, subject to a recommendation from the State Sentence Review Board (SSRB) and government approval. Five out of six members of the SSRB belong to the executive branch of government. The presence of ruling-party legislators, when the CM has supported Singh’s release, on the deciding panel raises questions whether the government will independently apply its mind.

Comparison with the Bilkis Bano Case

Setting the two cases side by side is useful because they involve a similar factual pattern. In both instances, persons convicted of life imprisonment in communal hate-crime cases were considered for or granted premature release.

The release in Bano’s case followed a plea filed by one convict, Radheshyam Bhagwandas Shah, who argued he had already served over 15 years and sought early release. Shah had first tried this route in Gujarat, where the Gujarat High Court itself had indicated that Maharashtra, the state where his trial was actually conducted after the Supreme Court moved it there on Bano’s plea, was the appropriate government to decide his remission, not Gujarat. On May 13, 2022, Supreme Court order directed Gujarat (rather than Maharashtra) to decide the remission question. Acting on the Court’s direction, the Gujarat government formed a committee, which went on to recommend that the sentences of all 11 convicts in the case be remitted. The panel that granted remission included BJP legislators, the same party that governed Gujarat at the time of the riots. One of those legislators publicly defended the convicts by remarking that some of them were “Brahmins” with good values. Reported NDTV.

Several activists, along with Bilkis Bano herself petitioned the Court in November 2022. On January 8, 2024, Justices B.V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan quashed the remission, holding that Gujarat was never the appropriate government and that the May 2022 order directing Gujarat to decide had itself been obtained by concealing material facts. The convicts were ordered back to prison within two weeks.

In Bano’s case, when the Gujarat government had released eleven convicts on August 15, 2022, they were welcomed with sweets and had their feet touched by supporters. Singh has for years been celebrated by sections of the Hindu right. Organisations such as the Dharmarakhyak Sri Dara Singh Bachao Samiti and Dara Sena have publicly campaigned for his release and portrayed him as a defender of Hinduism.

Given this, especially when the incumbent Odisha Chief Minister has also, before assuming office, expressed support for Singh’s release, there is a significant possibility that Singh’s release too will receive a public welcome similar to that accorded to the Bano’s convicts. The repeated public glorification of individuals convicted in cases of communal violence by organisations affiliated with or aligned to the BJP-RSS ecosystem raises serious concerns about the social and political messaging such releases convey.

While concealment of material facts was the decisive ground in Bano’s case, the Court also separately described Gujarat’s orders as stereotyped and passed without application of mind. Odisha’s Sentence Review Board considered Singh’s file within a batch of dozens of prisoners in a single sitting arguably meets the same structural vulnerability.

Five factors were decided in Laxman Naskar v. Union of India (2000), to decide on pre-mature release of convicts, namely:

i) Whether the offence is an individual act of crime without affecting the society at large?

ii) Whether there is any chance of future recurrence of committing crime?

iii) Whether the convict has lost his potentiality in committing crime?

iv) Whether there is any fruitful purpose of confining this convict any more?

v) Socio-economic condition of the convict’s family.

The first factor alone arguably requires reckoning with the fact that his is not a single offence but three separate convictions, spanning roughly a year, each targeting a different religious minority.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this judgement primer has been worked on by Tanishka Shah)

Related:

Remembering the Graham Staines Murder

Bilkis Bano gets Justice: Supreme Court strikes down remission

De-coding the historic Bilkis Bano verdict

The post Dara Singh, convicted in string of 1999 communal killings, likely set for release by August 15 appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Background of the case and procedural history

 The appellants, Mayadhar Nayak and Baina Nayak, were daily wagers belonging to the Scheduled Castes, who served the Government Treasury Branch of SBI in Bhubaneswar as cleaners and sweepers for approximately three decades, starting in 1994 and 1995, respectively.

The appellants had previously approached the Court in 1999 regarding non-regularisation of service and denial of pay on par with temporary employees. This produced an interim protective order on October 28, 1999 where the Court said, “If there is work for the Petitioners, they may not be retrenched.” The Court had directed the Bank to pay them remuneration under the Minimum Wages Act and be allowed to continue working as long as work was available, without being substituted by new hands. The Court also asked the bank to consider their cases for regularisation if any vacancies arose.

In 2007, the appellants again approached the Court claiming that the Bank was seeking to fill up the posts of Sweepers and other menial staff without considering their claim for appointment. This time too, the Court asked the bank to consider their cases for regularisation if any vacancies arose, keeping in view the length of their engagement and the services.

In terms of the above order, Appellants were paid on September 17, 2021 the arrears of minimum wages quantified at Rs.1, 61,619/- , each, for the period between April, 2017 & June, 2021.

Around five years later, in 2012, the appellants filed another petition for their recognition as temporary employees, pay parity under the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’, release of bonus for the financial year 2011–12, and extension of all temporary service benefits as granted to similarly situated employees of the Bank.

In 2020, the appellants another petition seeking regularisation of their services, contending that the Bank had regularised the services of a similarly situated employee engaged as a ‘Liftman’ at the time, the appellants were receiving a consolidated monthly remuneration of Rs.16,406/- while other temporary employees of the Bank were receiving Rs.27,443/-.

On June 20 2025, a single judge bench Justice S.K. Panigrahi which was hearing both the petitions together dismissed the appellants’ writ petitions finding all their claims unsustainable. The judgment read:

“While this Court does not disregard the long and uninterrupted service rendered by the petitioners, it is well-settled that mere length of service does not by itself confer a right to regularisation. The consistent position in law is that engagement on a daily wage or casual basis, however prolonged, cannot mature into a claim for regular appointment in the absence of sanctioned posts and adherence to a lawful selection process.” (Para 18).

In 2022, the Bank had sought permission to retrench the Appellants as being surplus workers.

On July 19, 2025, the appellants were retrenched by the bank as surplus workers under Section 25F of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and were paid roughly Rs. 3.31 lakh each as statutory compensation and payment due to a policy shift toward outsourcing driven by IT developments in banking.

The division bench presently hearing the case, had to decide whether

• the appellants, after nearly 30 years of service were entitled to regularisation and consequential monetary benefits,
• the previous court orders, which only directed the payment of minimum wages and conditional consideration for vacancies, barred the appellants’ current claims for regularisation, and
• what constitutes fair ‘remediable and reparative justice’ for manual labourers in an era of outsourcing and AI, when regularisation might impose an excessive financial burden on the employer.

High Court’s intervention

 The Division Bench partially allowed the appeals and set aside the order of the Single Judge through an order on May 18, 2026. In that it said:

“There appears to be a prima facie case for granting relief to the Appellants herein, who admittedly have put in service as Sweepers, first Appellant from 1994, and the second from 1995. The law, as it now stands in the June of its life, tilts in favour of the Appellant’s herein, inasmuch as, arguably, the impugned order of the learned Single Judge has missed the march”

• Declined Regularisation

The Court declined to order regularisation. Reliance was placed on Supreme Court’s rulings in Jaggo v. Union of India (2024), and Shripal v. Nagar Nigam (2025) but the Court noted it would cause the Bank to bear the brunt of losing huge money and that the appellants’ prior cases only resulted in a direction for minimum wages. At the same time, the Court observed that the appellants’ earlier rounds of litigation had not secured them much real benefit, since those orders only directed payment of minimum wages, which SBI had already paid. Because of this, the Bench held that the regularisation claim in the present appeals was, to an extent, barred by the principle of res judicata.

The Court then referred to a coordinate Bench’s order in Secretary, Berhampur Cooperative Central Bank Ltd. v. Bhaba Sundar Dalai (2026), where Rs 10 lakh had been awarded as compensation in lieu of regularisation. However, the Bench distinguished that case as there was no res judicata bar in it, and the employees’ service was comparatively shorter.

The Court took note of two mitigating factors specific to the present appellants, that they had roughly ten years left before superannuation, and that both belonged to Scheduled Castes, as relevant considerations in shaping the final relief.

• Justification for the Compensation Amount

In the May order, the Court had suggested both the sides to negotiate a settlement with fairness and justice. The SBI proposed to pay a lump sum compensation of Rs. 5 lakh to each of the appellants to settle the dispute. However, the appellants rejected the bank’s offer and during a personal interaction with the Court, they stated they would settle for Rs. 25 lakh each

The Court evaluated both proposals and described the Bank’s Rs. 5 lakh offer inadequate. It said:

“Rupees 5 lakh offer made by the Bank as compensation is too frugal to be mentioned, when bread is costlier than blood, Rupee value now-a-days dwindling down. The Appellants, who have given their sweat & blood, cannot seek gainful employment elsewhere at their present declining age. They were working only as sweepers with not much education nor with due social status.” (Para 7.3.2)

Instead, the Court awarded a lump sum compensation of Rs. 20, 00,000 (Twenty Lakh) to each appellant in lieu of regularisation and continued service.

While deciding the compensation amount, it remarked:

“In the AI era, we are not sure that they would be able to eke out their livelihood, having spent prime of their life blood in the menial job all these years. Even Rs.10 lakh compensation awarded by the Coordinate Bench to the workmen of a Cooperative Bank would not constitute a solid yardstick for determining what should be paid to these poor persons. Should Appellants be regularized in service, it would incur more expenditure than otherwise.” (Para 7.3.2)

The Bank was ordered to pay the total Rs. 40 lakh within eight weeks. Any delay would trigger an interest penalty (1% for the first month and 2% thereafter), which the Court directed should be recovered personally from the erring bank officials.

The full judgment may be read here:

Why Regularisation Never Came

 The Fifth Schedule to the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, that designates certain practices as unfair labour practices includes:

 “10. To employ workmen as “badlis”, casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for years, with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen.”

 For thirty years, and over 240 days annually, the appellants discharged their duty in continuity. For context, the Government Treasury Branch of the Bank occupies more than 11,000 square feet, spread over three levels comprising the upper basement, ground floor, and first floor. The premises include eight toilets and six urinals. The Appellants had been performing cleaning duties in the said premises along with outsourced employees.

The denial of regularisation and long-term benefits to contractual or temporary workers is a heavily litigated issue in India, and not unique to the present case. In Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (2006) the Court clarified that temporary, daily wage, or contractual employees do not possess a legal or fundamental right to be made permanent. It held that a court cannot issue a writ of mandamus to make a worker permanent because the worker has no enforceable legal right to such a status, and the State has no legal duty to provide it outside of established rules. However, the Court also provided a narrow exception as a one-time measure for workers who have completed at least 10 years of service. Regularisation, it held, may be permitted where the appointment was irregular (meaning it suffered from a procedural flaw) but not illegal.

In Jaggo v. Union of India (2024), the Supreme Court said that the appellants’ long and uninterrupted service, for periods extending well beyond ten years, cannot be brushed aside merely by labelling their initial appointments as part-time or contractual. The essence of their employment must be considered in the light of their sustained contribution, the integral nature of their work, and the fact that no evidence suggests their entry was through any illegal or surreptitious route. The judgment read:

“The claim by the respondents that these were not regular posts lacks merit, as the nature of the work performed by the appellants was perennial and fundamental to the functioning of the offices. The recurring nature of these duties necessitates their classification as regular posts, irrespective of how their initial engagements were labelled. It is also noteworthy that subsequent outsourcing of these same tasks to private agencies after the appellants’ termination demonstrates the inherent need for these services. This act of outsourcing, which effectively replaced one set of workers with another, further underscores that the work in question was neither temporary nor occasional.” (Para 13)

In Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. vs Brajrajnagar Coal Mines Workers Union (2024), the Court held that workers engaged to perform work of regular and perennial nature cannot be treated as contract labour.

Similarly, last year, in Shripal vs Nagar Nigam (2025), the Supreme Court while acknowledging the precedence in Umadevi, emphasised that workers performing duties that are integral, ongoing, and perennial to an institution’s functions should not be relegated to perpetual daily-wage status. The judgment authored by Justice Vikram Nath said:

“While the judgment in Uma Devi (supra) sought to curtail the practice of backdoor entries and ensure appointments adhered to constitutional principles, it is regrettable that its principles are often misinterpreted or misapplied to deny legitimate claims of long-serving employees. This judgment aimed to distinguish between “illegal” and “irregular” appointments. It categorically held that employees in irregular appointments, who were engaged in duly sanctioned posts and had served continuously for more than ten years, should be considered for regularization as a one-time measure. However, the laudable intent of the judgment is being subverted when institutions rely on its dicta to indiscriminately reject the claims of employees, even in cases where their appointments are not illegal, but merely lack adherence to procedural formalities.” (Para 26).

“Indian labour law strongly disfavours perpetual daily-wage or contractual engagements in circumstances where the work is permanent in nature. Morally and legally, workers who fulfil ongoing municipal requirements year after year cannot be dismissed summarily as dispensable, particularly in the absence of a genuine contractor agreement.” (Para 15).

To continue extracting regular labour for decades while pleading a lack of sanctioned strength is a position the Court found legally and morally unsustainable in Dharam Singh vs State of UP (2025).

In January this year, in Bhola Nath vs The State Of Jharkhand (2026), the Court while finding the State’s refusal to regularise the workers who had served for over a decade to be a clear derogation of equality principles, directed the State to forthwith regularise the appellants against the sanctioned posts they were initially appointed to, granting them all consequential service benefits

Hence, while long service alone does not guarantee automatic regularisation, the Supreme Court has ruled that continuing workers in identical, perpetual roles on temporary wages while denying them benefits can be considered arbitrary and discriminatory.

During the litigation, the appellants in present case- Mayadhar Nayak supported his wife, two children, and a father aged about 80 years. On the other hand, Baina Nayak was the sole caretaker of a mentally and physically disabled child and another son, all of whom dependent on his meagre income of about Rs 16,000.

On paper, the Nayaks had reason to expect a better outcome. They approached the High Court as early as 1999 where a coordinate bench even secured them protection against retrenchment in 1999, and in 2007 the Court directed SBI to consider them if sweeper vacancies were filled. Yet each of these interventions never fruitioned into regularisation.

When two vacancies did arise after the 2007/2008 orders, SBI chose to outsource the cleaning function rather than fill the posts departmentally citing a policy shift attributed to changes in banking operations. Because this outsourcing decision was never independently challenged, it stood, and it extinguished the very condition on which the appellants’ continued engagement depended. Rather than terminating long-serving casual workers outright, the restructuring of the underlying work itself dissolved the employee’s along with the post. By the time the Division Bench heard the 2025 appeals, it held that the earlier 2007/2008 orders had already adjudicated.

Compensation and Delayed Justice

 Regularisation would have given the appellants a pension, medical benefits, promotional prospects, and crucially continued income until superannuation. A one-time payment, however large, is a terminal substitute.

 None of this is to say compensation is worthless. Rs20 lakh each is a materially significant, life-altering sum, and the Court’s insistence on interest for delay and personal liability of erring officials for that interest is a genuinely useful enforcement mechanism. But as a systemic remedy for decades of institutionalised casualisation, compensation calculated case-by-case, in peculiar facts and circumstances, explicitly disclaiming precedential value, plausibly should not substitute for either a binding regularisation scheme or statutory reform that removes employers’ incentive to keep essential, perennial work permanently temporary! While salary or lump-sum compensation prevents destitution, it does not cure systemic exploitation. Compensation is at best a consolation, and workers deserve justice, not just money. Compensation does little to restore lost career opportunities, dignity and security.

 “The Appellants have been fighting the legal battles since about three decades, complete justice eluding for one or the other reason,” acknowledged the Orissa High Court in the present case.

This is not unusual. Delay is a common feature of our judicial system. Labour disputes in India typically take somewhere between seven to ten years to reach a final judgment. Pendency of labour disputes in general for long period of time leads to frustration among workers.

The Delhi High Court recently flagged this delay directly, describing the backlog of pending labour matters before constitutional courts as a “sorry state of affairs” in the constitutional courts where the “poor labourers are forced to fight tooth and nail to get justice for themselves”. Reported the Indian Express.

Labour Law in the AI-era

 Tucked into the judgment’s compensation calculus, the Bench doubted the appellants could “eke out their livelihood… in the AI era,” having spent their working lives in menial labour with little education. This, on one level, was an acknowledgment that older, low-skilled workers pushed out of long-term employment have genuinely diminished prospects of re-entering the labour market. But it is worth reading as part of a broader, nascent judicial awareness that automation and technological change will compound the harm of insecure employment for low-skill, manual roles.

A public employer that outsources or automates a function bears a one-time restructuring cost but the displaced worker bears a lifetime cost, often without the education or capital to pivot into new work. The Court’s remark implicitly recognises this asymmetry, even if it does not translate it into a legal standard.

“Perennial nature of work” as a legal test may itself be eroding. Much of the jurisprudence on regularisation and contract labour assumes that if work is genuinely permanent, it should attract permanent labour protections. But work that was perennial for thirty years can be redefined as time-limited or eliminable through outsourcing plus technology, without ever being tested against the perennial nature standard in a contested proceeding.

Indian courts have long tied the right to livelihood, and by extension dignity, to Article 21. It would perhaps be an overreach to describe this as an emerging AI-era jurisprudence. But future litigants representing displaced casual workers in automating sectors like banking, toll collection, municipal sanitation may well cite this observation as an early judicial acknowledgment that technological displacement deserves distinct legal weight. The judges however have made it clear that this order is based on the facts of this case and they do not intend to make it a binding precedent or a Rule of Parity.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this judgement primer has been worked on by Tanishka Shah)

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The post The Orissa High Court awards them Rs 20 lakh each to two SBI Sweepers appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The four, Danish Sheikh, Sweety Bibi and her two sons, re-entered India through the Mahadipur border in West Bengal’s Malda district after spending months stranded in Bangladesh following their deportation in June 2025. This was the period (May-June 2025) when huge such undocumented “push out” efforts were carried out by the authorities under some instructions issued by the union government at the centre. Their return comes months after Sunali Khatun, who was pregnant at the time of her deportation, and her young son Sabir were allowed to return to India on humanitarian grounds. Together, the cases have become emblematic of the risks posed by administrative errors in citizenship determination and the constitutional imperative of ensuring that no individual is deprived of liberty without due process.

Detailed piece on Khatun’s deportation may be read here.

According to Scroll, residents of Paikar village in West Bengal’s Birbhum district confirmed that Danish Sheikh, Sweety Bibi and her two sons returned to the state after the Union Government complied with judicial directions requiring their repatriation. The families have consistently maintained that they are Indian citizens from Birbhum and had been living and working in Delhi when they were detained during an identity-verification exercise.

The deportations formed part of a wider crackdown that followed the April 2025 terror attack in Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir. In the weeks that followed, police in several Bharatiya Janata Party-ruled states reportedly detained large numbers of Bengali-speaking persons, predominantly Muslims, and demanded documentary proof of Indian citizenship. Several individuals who allegedly failed to immediately establish their nationality were deported to Bangladesh. Subsequent investigations and court proceedings revealed that, in multiple cases, Indian citizens had been caught in the sweep.

Detailed report may be read here.

Few cases illustrate the devastating consequences of such errors more starkly than that of Sunali Khatun and her family. As reported by BBC News, Khatun, her husband Danish Sheikh and their young son were detained in Delhi after officials suspected that they were undocumented migrants. The family maintained throughout that they were Indian citizens from West Bengal. According to Khatun’s account, authorities failed to adequately verify the family’s claims or examine available evidence before initiating deportation proceedings.

The family was transported across the border into Bangladesh, where Bangladeshi authorities treated them as undocumented entrants and detained them. Instead of returning to the country of which they claimed to be citizens, they found themselves imprisoned in a foreign nation, separated from relatives and stripped of the protections ordinarily available under Indian law. What began as an administrative decision soon evolved into a humanitarian crisis.

The case exposed the extraordinary consequences of mistaken deportation. Unlike routine immigration enforcement, an erroneous determination of citizenship can sever families, deprive individuals of their nationality in practice, expose them to detention in another country and leave them without any effective legal protection. For those wrongfully deported, the consequences extend far beyond the loss of physical liberty—they amount to the denial of identity, dignity and constitutional safeguards.

The legality of these deportations soon came under judicial scrutiny. In September 2025, the Calcutta High Court, while deciding Bhodu Sekh v. Union of India & Ors. and the connected matter Amir Khan v. Union of India & Ors., delivered a strongly worded judgment directing the Union Government to bring back the deported families within four weeks.

The Division Bench of Justices Tapabrata Chakraborty and Reetobroto Kumar Mitra held that the authorities had acted in “hot haste” and failed to comply with basic procedural safeguards before deporting individuals who had asserted Indian citizenship. The Court found that the actions of the Delhi Police and the Foreigners Regional Registration Office (FRRO) raised serious concerns under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution and underscored that executive action, even in matters concerning illegal migration, must remain subject to constitutional limitations.

The Court directed the Union Government, through the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Indian High Commission in Dhaka, to facilitate the return of Sunali Khatun, Danish Sheikh and their son Sabir, along with Sweety Bibi and her two sons. In doing so, it reaffirmed that constitutional guarantees cannot be displaced by administrative expediency.

Detailed report may be read here.

The facts before the High Court painted a disturbing picture. According to the petitions, Sunali Khatun’s family was picked up by Delhi Police on June 24, 2025, during an identity-verification drive. Within forty-eight hours—and without any meaningful inquiry into their citizenship claims—they were deported to Bangladesh under orders issued by the FRRO under the Foreigners Act, 1946.

The petitioner’s case was that the family had longstanding roots in West Bengal. They possessed family members, land records and other documentary evidence linking them to Birbhum district. Significantly, Sunali’s Aadhaar and Permanent Account Number (PAN) records reflected her year of birth as 2000, directly contradicting the authorities’ assertion that she had entered India illegally in 1998—a claim that was factually impossible if the official records were accurate.

The petitioners further argued that the authorities had ignored the Ministry of Home Affairs’ own guidelines dated May 2, 2025, which required verification from the individual’s home State before deportation. They contended that no meaningful opportunity of hearing had been provided and that the deportations violated both statutory procedure and the constitutional guarantee of fairness.

The Union Government defended its actions by relying on Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946, arguing that the burden of proving Indian citizenship rested upon the individuals concerned. It claimed that the detainees had failed to produce sufficient documents establishing their nationality and asserted that statements recorded during interrogation indicated that they were Bangladeshi nationals who had entered India illegally. The High Court, however, found that such disputed claims required proper verification and could not justify immediate deportation without following the prescribed legal process.

Supreme Court intervention and the government’s assurance

The Union Government challenged the Calcutta High Court’s directions before the Supreme Court, questioning both the High Court’s jurisdiction and its order directing the return of the deported individuals. However, the proceedings before the apex court marked a significant shift in the Centre’s position.

On May 22, 2026, the Union Government informed the Supreme Court that it would facilitate the return of the deported individuals to India and conduct a proper inquiry into their citizenship claims before taking any further action. Appearing before a Bench comprising Chief Justice Surya Kant and Justices Joymalya Bagchi and Vipul Pancholi, Solicitor General Tushar Mehta submitted that, “keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case,” the Government had decided to bring the individuals back and verify their citizenship status in accordance with law.

Detailed report may be read here.

Senior Advocate Sanjay Hegde, appearing for the affected families, requested that the Government’s assurance be formally recorded. Accepting the submission, the Supreme Court directed that the deported individuals be brought back to India and clarified that their continued stay would depend upon the outcome of a lawful inquiry into their citizenship claims. At the same time, the Court recorded the Government’s submission that the undertaking was being made in the peculiar facts of the case and should not be treated as a precedent for future deportation disputes.

The Centre informed the Court that the process of bringing the individuals back from Bangladesh would take approximately eight to ten days. The undertaking marked a notable departure from its earlier stand, under which it had defended the deportations as lawful exercises of executive power under the Foreigners Act.

The Supreme Court had, in fact, intervened even earlier in December 2025 in respect of Sunali Khatun. At the time, she was in an advanced stage of pregnancy and remained stranded in Bangladesh along with her young son. Considering the humanitarian dimensions of the case, the Court permitted their return to India while the dispute regarding citizenship remained pending. During those proceedings, the Bench observed that certain situations required “law to bend to humanity”—a remark that underscored the Court’s attempt to reconcile immigration enforcement with constitutional compassion.

Detailed report may be read here.

Constitutional questions beyond individual cases

The litigation has raised issues that extend far beyond the fate of a handful of families. At its core lies a fundamental constitutional question: can the State deport a person claiming Indian citizenship without first conducting a fair, thorough and lawful determination of that claim?

The Calcutta High Court answered this question emphatically in the negative. The Court observed that documentary material placed before it, including electoral records relating to members of the deportees’ families, prima facie indicated Indian lineage and warranted a detailed inquiry before any coercive action could be taken. Instead, the authorities acted with what the Court described as “hot haste”, deporting individuals within days of detention and without adhering to procedural safeguards contained in the Ministry of Home Affairs’ own guidelines.

The proceedings also highlighted the constitutional significance of Articles 14 and 21. Even where the State suspects an individual to be a foreign national, executive action must satisfy the requirements of fairness, reasonableness and due process. Citizenship disputes cannot be resolved through hurried administrative action that disregards evidence or deprives individuals of an effective opportunity to establish their identity.

The Government relied heavily on Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946, which places the burden of proving citizenship upon the person concerned. However, the High Court made it clear that the statutory burden cannot justify dispensing with procedural fairness. Where credible evidence exists supporting an individual’s claim to Indian citizenship, authorities are required to conduct a meaningful verification before resorting to the irreversible step of deportation.

The cases have also revived discussion around the principle of non-refoulement—the international law norm prohibiting the forcible return of individuals to territories where they may face persecution, arbitrary detention or other serious harm. Although India is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, Indian courts have repeatedly read elements of this principle into Article 21’s guarantee of life and personal liberty. The petitioners argued that deporting individuals without adequately determining their nationality violated these constitutional protections.

It is crucial to note that in the month of October 2025, a Bangladesh court had ruled that these six individuals were forcibly deported from Delhi as “illegal Bangladeshis”, and are in fact Indian citizens citing their Aadhaar and home addresses. Even pursuant to this, the Union government challenged the Calcutta HC order in the Supreme Court

Detailed report may be read here and here.

A reminder of the cost of administrative error

The legal battle reached an important milestone when Danish Sheikh, Sweety Bibi and her two sons finally returned to West Bengal through the Mahadipur border crossing in Malda district. Their return followed months of litigation and judicial scrutiny that ultimately compelled the Union Government to revisit its position.

Political and legal advocacy around the issue was not confined to the courtroom. Even before the present litigation reached the Supreme Court, the Trinamool Congress (TMC) had repeatedly raised concerns over the treatment of Bengali-speaking migrant workers and alleged instances of wrongful detention and deportation. In May 2025, Rajya Sabha MP Samirul Islam wrote to Union Home Minister Amit Shah seeking immediate intervention against the reported harassment, detention and violence faced by Bengali-speaking workers in BJP-ruled states. Around the same time, Berhampore MP Yusuf Pathan also expressed concern over reports that migrant labourers from his constituency were being systematically targeted in Odisha, calling for measures to ensure their safety and protection.

The issue soon reached the Supreme Court in a broader constitutional challenge. In August 2025, the Court sought responses from the Union Government and nine States on a petition filed by the West Bengal Migrant Welfare Board alleging that migrant labourers from West Bengal were being detained on unverified allegations of being illegal Bangladeshi immigrants. As reported by The Hindu, a Bench of Justices Surya Kant and Joymalya Bagchi acknowledged the State’s legitimate concern over illegal infiltration but observed that there must be a mechanism to identify and protect “bona fide workers.” The petition challenged the implementation of the Ministry of Home Affairs’ May 2, 2025 circular, contending that inter-state verification drives had resulted in arbitrary detention of genuine Indian citizens.

The party also remained actively involved after the deportations of the Birbhum families. In September 2025, TMC Rajya Sabha MP Samirul Islam visited the families of Sunali Khatun and Sweety Bibi in Murarai, Birbhum, after the two women and their children were allegedly pushed into Bangladesh despite claiming Indian citizenship. In a post on X, Islam described them as “bona fide Indian citizens” whose families had lived in Birbhum for generations and said the party, under Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee, was pursuing the matter before both the Calcutta High Court and the Supreme Court. He assured the families that every possible legal and institutional assistance would be extended, including enrolment in the State government’s Shramshree welfare scheme once the women returned to India.

Speaking to Scroll, Trinamool Congress MP Samirul Islam remarked that it was “only because of the judiciary’s intervention” that the Government ultimately brought back what he described as “poor Indian citizens.” While affirming that genuine foreign nationals could lawfully be deported, he questioned why Indian citizens should be subjected to harassment, detention and expulsion before their citizenship was properly verified.

For the affected families, the return to India represents only partial relief. Their citizenship claims are yet to be conclusively determined, and the litigation continues. Nevertheless, their repatriation serves as an acknowledgement that irreversible executive action cannot precede a lawful determination of nationality.

The episode also carries wider implications for citizenship verification exercises across the country. Since the Pahalgam terror attack, numerous reports by SabrangIndia and Citizens for Justice and Peace have documented allegations of Bengali-speaking Muslims being detained, questioned and, in some cases, deported without adequate verification. The present litigation demonstrates the serious constitutional consequences of such practices and reinforces the judiciary’s role as a safeguard against arbitrary executive action.

Detailed reports may be read here, here, here and here.

CJP has also been providing legal aid in cases of forced and illegal deportations. Details may be read here.

Ultimately, the case is not merely about immigration enforcement or citizenship documentation. It is about the constitutional obligation of the State to exercise its powers fairly, cautiously and in accordance with due process. A mistaken deportation is not a routine administrative error—it can separate families, expose individuals to imprisonment in a foreign country and effectively deprive them of their nationality. The return of these families, secured through persistent judicial intervention, stands as a reminder that constitutional guarantees acquire their greatest significance precisely when the State exercises its most coercive powers.

Related:

The Battle of Belonging: Why India’s Passport Controversy Matters

IR 2025-2026: A backdoor exercise to bring in the NRC?

SIR 2025-26: Dismantling the very Idea of India?

“They were once sent back”: Court refrains from probing State’s claim as Assam seeks to justify continued detention

The Uneasy Calm in Assam: The Limits of Control of a Nervous Government

The post The cost of a wrongful deportation appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Read the judgment primer by CJP here.

“Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely,” wrote the historian Lord Acton. Critics argue that legal protections governing the prosecution of offences by uniformed personnel have fostered a culture of impunity by making accountability more difficult. Over the years, members of India’s armed, paramilitary and police forces have been implicated in a range of serious offences against civilians, including rape, extrajudicial killings, staged encounters, culpable homicide, enforced disappearances, illegal detention, and custodial torture.

The 1991 in the villages of Kunan and Poshpora in Kashmir, the army personnel allegedly raped over 23 women in Kashmir (Human Rights Watch assessed the number of survivors at up to 100). It is gut wrenching but it is by no means the only one. In 2004, a 32-year old activist Thangjam Manorama was allegedly raped and murdered by the Indian paramilitary unit 17th Assam Rifles in Manipur. Following this, around twelve elderly women staged a naked protest outside the Assam Rifles headquarters. Their banner read: ‘Indian Army Rape Us.’

CREDIT: BBC News

In 2009, two women from Shopian in Kashmir were allegedly abducted, repeatedly gang-raped by soldiers, and murdered. Their bodies were recovered from a river.

In 2010, a 16-year-old Zahid Farooq Sheikh was shot and killed by BSF personnel as he was walking home from playing cricket with friends in Srinagar.

In 2015 and 2016, a National Commission for Scheduled Tribes (NCST) fact-finding report documented three instances of mass sexual violence including gang-rapes, physical assault, and looting by police and paramilitary personnel deployed on anti-Maoist operations in Chhattisgarh. The victims were Adivasi women, subsistence farmers. The report concluded that there had been a breakdown of discipline among the forces concerned.

In 2021, soldiers from the 21 Para Special Forces army unit shot and killed six coal miners in Nagaland’s Mon district, for mistaking the miners for militants.

These are only a few cases that reached the media. The structure of the law and the barriers to FIR registration in conflict areas means that for every case that surfaces, an unknown number do not.

In 2018, over 350 army personnel filed a petition in the Supreme Court to protect the AFSPA from being diluted. Its defenders argue that soldiers operating in counter-insurgency environments face split-second, life-or-death decisions. They are trained not to open fire unless they are fired upon, attacked, or have reasonable grounds to believe an attack is imminent. AFSPA was enacted in 1958 to enable the deployment of the armed forces in areas where the civil administration had failed to maintain law and order.  The legal protection under AFSPA is therefore justified, they contend, because actions taken during combat cannot be judged with the benefit of hindsight.

The criticism, however, is not that soldiers acting in good faith during genuine combat operations should be prosecuted. It is that the shield of prior sanction has repeatedly been invoked to protect those accused of abusing that power.

For instance, in Manorama’s case mentioned before, the post-mortem revealed injuries consistent with torture, including bullet wounds on her vagina. Most significantly, the Central Forensic Science Laboratory detected human semen on her clothing, suggesting that she had been sexually assaulted before her death. Yet the Assam Rifles invoked Section 6 of AFSPA to argue that no legal proceedings could continue without prior sanction from the Central Government. Manorama’s family questioned how acts such as rape, torture and the killing of an unarmed woman could ever be considered actions taken ‘in aid of civil power’ or in the exercise of official duty.

The full Human Rights Watch report can be accessed here.

Put very simply, there is no operational rationale for extending immunity to those who have abused the power, and specifically in the offence of rape. Unlike the use of force during an armed encounter, rape can never be characterised as a split-second military judgment or an act committed in good faith in the discharge of official duties. It is an intentional criminal act. The law offers no convincing explanation for why allegations of rape should be subject to the same procedural immunity as decisions taken during armed engagement.

According to Margot Walstrom, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, “[Sexual violence] is a way of demonstrating power and control. It inflicts fear on the whole community. And it is unfortunately a very effective, cheap and silent weapon with a long lasting effect on every society.”

A 2019 paper titled ‘Violence against women by the army personnel’ reads, “Many in Mizoram do not even talk about those days when such trauma was so prominent as to bring gushes of trauma to them. Those instances have been simply called “troubles” and no discussion takes place, such is the trauma that has been inflicted on people.”

In India’s conflict zones, sexual violence has long been dismissed as ‘collateral damage.’ As an unfortunate but inevitable cost of maintaining order in disturbed areas. However, it arguably is a documented, recurring pattern of abuse that is shielded by law and enabled by institutional silence.

The severity and persistence of the reports surrounding rapes by uniformed personnel compelled the Justice Verma Committee constituted in the wake of the 2012 Nirbhaya gang-rape to specifically examine the position of women in conflict areas and recommend a review of the AFSPA. The committee explicitly said that women in conflict areas are entitled to all the security and dignity that is afforded to citizens in any other part of our country.

That was over fifteen years ago.

In the intervening period, India has overhauled its criminal law framework wholesale, replacing the Indian Penal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Evidence Act with new statutes  expressly on the ground that the old laws were colonial relics. But the provisions of AFSPA, the Border Security Forces (‘BSF’) Act, the Army Act 1950, and the Disturbed Areas Act 1992 that shield uniformed personnel from prosecution for crimes committed against civilians remain untouched.

The Legal Architecture

Several statutory provisions form the backbone of security force immunity in India.

Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now Section 218 of the Bhartiya Nyaya Suraksha Sanhita ) requires government sanction before a court can prosecute judges and public servants, including armed forces and police officials, for offenses committed while discharging official duties unless the Central Government first grants sanction for prosecution. The Ministry of Home Affairs is vested with the authority to grant sanction for prosecution of public servants.

Section 47 of the BSF Act provides that BSF personnel accused of serious civil offences including  murder, culpable homicide not amounting to murder, or rape against civilians cannot ordinarily be tried by an internal Security Force Court, unless the offence was committed on active duty, outside India, or at a location specifically notified by the Central Government. Read alongside the sanction requirement, this provision can operate as a gap between two forums where civilian courts are barred without sanction and military courts barred by the section itself.

Similarly, Section 70 of the Army Act, 1950 specifies when military personnel cannot be tried by a court-martial for certain serious crimes against civilians.

According to section 6 of the AFSPA no prosecution, suit, or legal proceeding may be brought against any person acting under AFSPA without the prior sanction of the Central Government. This provision has operated in parts of the Northeast since 1958 and in Jammu and Kashmir since 1990.

How have the Courts acted?

In Sebastian Hongray v. Union of India (1984), the petitioner, a student from the Naga community contended that two men were unlawfully detained by the 21st Sikh Regiment during a combing operation in Huining village of Manipur. The Army could not produce or account for two men taken into custody and asserted that the men had left the army camp alive and that an extensive search, including a CBI enquiry, had failed to locate them in Manipur. The Court applied habeas corpus directly against the Union of India and later imposed exemplary costs. The Court said:

“As we are inclined to direct registration of an offence and an investigation, we express no opinion as to what fate has befallen to Shri C. Daniel and Shri C. Paul, the missing two persons in respect of whom the writ of habeas corpus was issued save and except saying that they have not met their tragic end in an encounter as is usually claimed and the only possible inference that can be drawn from circumstance already discussed is that both of them must have met an unnatural death. Prima facie, it would be an offence of murder. 

….

 It is not necessary to start casting a doubt on anyone or any particular person. But prima facie there is material on record to reach an affirmative conclusion that both Shri C. Daniel and Shri C. Paul are not alive and have met an unnatural death. And the Union of India cannot disown the responsibility in this behalf.”

A decade later, in Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa (1993), the Supreme Court confronted the death of a man after arrest by the police. With characteristic directness, the Court held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity used to shield the State from civil liability has no place in proceedings for the enforcement of fundamental rights and that:

“There is a great responsibility on the police or prison authorities to ensure that the citizen in its custody is not deprived of his right to life. His liberty is in the very nature of things circumscribed by the very fact of his confinement and therefore his interest in the limited liberty left to him is rather precious. The duty of care on the part of the State is strict and admits of no exceptions.”

“A reading of the morning newspapers almost everyday carrying reports of dehumanising torture, assault, rape and death in custody of police or other governmental agencies is indeed depressing,” was the Court’s observation in D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1996) in which it issued a comprehensive set of binding guidelines governing arrest, documentation, medical examination, and notification of family members, and held that violation of these guidelines would render police officers personally liable for contempt of court. The Court reiterated that defence of sovereign immunity is not available to the State for the tortious act of the public servants and for the established violation of the rights guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

In Naga People’s Movement of Human Rights v. Union of India (1997), the Supreme Court constitutionally upheld the validity of AFSPA. It also curated a list of ‘Do’s and Don’ts,’ in which the use of excessive force or retaliatory force by the Manipur Police or the armed forces of the Union was not permissible.

However, the provision that ASPA’s protection was not absolute and that it did not grant a ‘licence to kill indiscriminately’ remained a judicial aspiration rather than an enforceable limit.

Significantly in 2012, a division bench of Justices BS Chauhan and Swatenter Kumar while hearing the Pathribal case at the Supreme Court orally remarked that AFSPA gave very limited protection confined to action in discharge of duty and that rape and murder committed by its personnel should be considered a normal crime. The Court said that there is no question of sanction from the government before prosecution of offenders in such cases. Reported The Indian Express.

“You go to a place in exercise of AFSPA, you commit rape, you commit murder, then where is the question of sanction? It is a normal crime which needs to be prosecuted, and that is our stand,” the bench said.  However, ultimately the Court held that where AFSPA’s protection applies, prior sanction from the Central Government is required before the criminal court can take cognizance of the offence but if the competent Army authority opts for trial by court-martial, no such sanction is needed.

In 2013, the Supreme Court affirmed that the power of the armed forces to seek trial before a General Security Force Court is not unlimited. In the case concerning the killing of a teenager by BSF personnel, a Bench of Justices Chandramauli Prasad and Ibrahim Kalifulla set aside a Jammu and Kashmir High Court order that had transferred the trial to a General Security Force Court under the BSF Act, 1968. The Court described the allegations against the accused as “very distressing” and held that merely because the personnel were on active duty in a disturbed area did not automatically entitle the BSF to claim jurisdiction. The Court also held that the commanding officer’s discretion to seek trial before a security force court was not absolute and had been exercised without considering the statutory restrictions requiring such a course to be necessary in the interest of discipline.

In Extra-Judicial Execution Victim Families Association (EEVFAM) v. Union of India (2016), the Court examined 1,528 alleged encounter killings by police and armed forces in Manipur between 1979 and 2012. A court-appointed Justice Hegde Commission investigated six cases and concluded that none were genuine encounters and that the security forces had exceeded their powers.

While hearing the case, a bench of Justices Madan B Lokur and U U Lalit rapped the Army for silence over the allegations and questioned the state government for not proceeding with these cases against them. “Don’t you want to inquire even if somebody makes such allegations against your people (Army personnel)? Are you saying whatever was done was legitimate,” the bench asked. “The reports clearly suggest that the girl was subjected to rape. You are creating a stonewall and you do not want to break that stonewall. You have not tried anything. You have not asked the Army to handover the custody of the alleged culprits,” the Court added.

In its 2017 judgment, the Supreme Court held that even in a disturbed area under AFSPA excessive or retaliatory force is prohibited and ordered every death caused by the armed forces or police to be thoroughly enquired into.

“It does not matter whether the victim was a common person or a militant or a terrorist, nor does it matter whether the aggressor was a common person or the State. The law is the same for both and is equally applicable to both,” the order read.

The EEVFAM litigation remains alive as a continuing mandamus.

Still, it is relatively uncommon for allegations of rape against armed forces personnel to culminate in prosecution before ordinary civilian criminal courts. Instead, cases have often been dealt with through the military courts, if dealt at all. When convictions have resulted from court-martial proceedings, civilian High Courts have generally examined them in the exercise of judicial review rather than hearing the criminal case at first instance.

In Captain Vinod Kumar vs State of J&K (2012), the Jammu and Kashmir High Court heard the case of two members of the 8th Battalion JAKLI who allegedly broke into a residential house in Poonch and repeatedly raped two women, aged 18 and 24, in front of the victims’ young children. The Army’s Commanding Officer initially opted in 1999 for the accused to be tried by a civil criminal court rather than a Court-martial. However, the petitioners challenged this. The Court ruled that the trial should not be abandoned and rejected the idea that army personnel should go ‘Scott free’ due to procedural errors. It famously noted that “Crime does not die in this manner” and emphasized that the seriousness of a rape charge outweighs technical procedural wrangles.

In 2014, a division bench of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court upheld the sentence by the Summary General Court Martial which found four army personnel guilty of rape and sentenced them to ten years of rigorous imprisonment and dismissal from service. The Court ruled that Court Martial proceedings can only be invalidated if there is a breach of fundamental procedural rules that renders the trial illegal. The Court emphasized that there cannot be “any compromise with the standards and maintenance of discipline in the army. They are not only the sentinels of the frontiers of the country but are also sacred guards of the rights of the people. Any invasion of the rights of the people by this kind of force cannot be tolerated.”

Where the Courts have deferred.

Despite this increasingly robust jurisprudential framework limiting blanket immunity under AFSPA, accountability has remained elusive. More than three decades after the alleged mass rapes in Kunan and Poshpora, judicial and investigative orders have been repeatedly challenged, stayed, or left unresolved. In 2015, the Jammu and Kashmir High Court stayed the Magistrate’s order directing further investigation after objections by the Army. Separately, the State challenged the recommendation of the Jammu and Kashmir State Human Rights Commission awarding compensation to the survivors before the Supreme Court. In its report, the Commission observed that the Director General of Police had attempted to “push the collective crime committed by the army personnel under the carpet” and that the medical evidence pointed towards gang rape. Following the abrogation of Article 370, the State Human Rights Commission itself ceased to exist, while the compensation proceedings remain pending before the Supreme Court and the criminal proceedings continue to languish without final adjudication. Reporter The Outlook.

The litigation in Extra Judicial Execution Victim Families Association (EEVFAM) continues as a court-monitored process nearly a decade after the Supreme Court’s landmark rulings. Thangjam Manorama Devi’s case, despite forensic evidence suggestive of sexual assault and repeated judicial scrutiny, has similarly failed to result in criminal prosecution. In these cases justice has been deferred through prolonged litigation, jurisdictional objections, repeated appeals, and institutional inaction. The consequence is much the same that is the promise of accountability remains suspended indefinitely.

According to Rishika Arora and Iyina Grover, there is a requirement for a new protocol for protecting the women in an armed conflict. Women’s participation in the drafting of future laws and their appointment as judicial officers in army tribunals are essential steps. The concept of the court martial must be women-oriented.

The Justice Verma Committee recommendations are as follows:

1.  Sexual violence against women by members of the armed forces or uniformed personnel must be brought under the purview of ordinary criminal law;
2. Special care must also be taken to ensure the safety of women who are complainants and witnesses in cases of sexual assault by armed personnel;
3. There should be special commissioners – who are either judicially or legislatively appointed – for women’s safety and security in all areas of conflict in the country. These commissioners must be chosen from those who have experience with women’s issues, preferably in conflict areas. In addition, such commissioners must be vested with adequate powers to monitor and initiate action for redress and criminal prosecution in all cases of sexual violence against women by armed personnel;
4. Care must be taken to ensure the safety and security of women detainees in police stations, and women at army or paramilitary check points, and this should be a subject under the regular monitoring of the special commissioners mentioned earlier;
5. The general law relating to detention of women during specified hours of the day must be strictly followed;
6. Training and monitoring of armed personnel must be reoriented to include and emphasize strict observance by the armed personnel of all orders issued in this behalf;
7. There is an imminent need to review the continuance of AFSPA and AFSPA-like legal protocols in internal conflict areas as soon as possible. This is necessary for determining the propriety of resorting to this legislation in the area(s) concerned; and
8. Jurisdictional issues must be resolved immediately and simple procedural protocols put in place to avoid situations where police refuse or refrain from registering cases against paramilitary personnel.

Those recommendations remain unimplemented.

The Supreme Court has already suggested that AFSPA’s protection is limited to acts conducted in the line of duty, and that offences such as rape and murder are ordinary crimes that do not require special courts. The incorporation of these suggestions remains awaited because the nation will not fully deliver on its constitutional promise until its laws place all citizens, including those in its border areas and conflict zones, on an equal footing before justice.

“The primary task of the armed forces of the Union is to defend the country in the event of war or when it is face with external aggression. Their training and orientation defeat the hostile forces. A situation of internal disturbance involving the local population requires a different approach. Involvement of armed forces is handling such a situation brings them in confrontation with their countrymen. Prolonged or too frequent deployment of armed forces for handling such situations is likely to generate a feeling of alienation among the people against the armed forces who by their sacrifices in the defence of their country have earned a place in the hearts of the people,” said the Court in  Naga People’s Movement of Human Rights in 1997.

Nearly three decades later, that warning remains as relevant as ever.  The Mizoram conviction in the 2017 case is still, in this landscape, a welcome anomaly even though it took the Court nine years to reach a decision because it shows what the system is capable of.  The guarantee that every woman in a conflict area who files a complaint will have her case heard by a court that is independent of the institution she is accusing is perhaps the minimum that the Constitution already promises and what the Mizoram court, in its judgment of June 2026, briefly delivered.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this judgement primer has been worked on by Tanishka Shah)

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The story I never got to tell – of rape and torture by the Indian army

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Will Army Court Martial Captain who allegedly took money to stage Shopian ‘encounter’?

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The post Promising Principles Poor Outcomes: What the judicial record on security force accountability actually shows appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Released by the Washington D.C.-based Centre for the Study of Organized Hate (CSOH), the report, Profiting from Hate Music, examines what researchers describe as the rapidly expanding ecosystem of Hindutva pop music, or “H-Pop”—a genre that combines devotional, nationalist and popular musical styles with rhetoric targeting Muslims and Christians. According to the report, this music is no longer confined to fringe corners of the internet. Instead, it is thriving across some of the world’s largest technology platforms, generating millions of views, streams and shares while simultaneously producing revenue for creators and, indirectly, the platforms themselves.

Authored by journalist Kunal Purohit, whose book H-Pop: The Secretive World of Hindutva Pop Stars further documented the rise of the genre, along with CSOH researchers Tavishi and Hamaad Meer, the report presents itself as the first comprehensive effort to map the scale, reach and monetisation of hate music in India. Supported through a grant from the Human Rights Foundation, the study argues that major technology companies are not merely hosting such content but are enabling its amplification and profitability despite maintaining public policies against hate speech and incitement.

At the heart of the report lies a stark claim: online platforms have become critical infrastructure for the production, dissemination and monetisation of music that allegedly promotes hatred, dehumanisation and violence against religious minorities.

Over a year before Kunal Purohit’s H-Pop… was released on November 22, 2023, on October 10, 2022 Citizens for Justice and Peace was among the first to conduct its own investigation into YouTube and other platform’s promotion of hate lyrics. Hate through music, lyrics and visuals: Hindutva pop. CJP’s The online eco-system hosts a plethora of videos peddling hate may be read here. Four months before that, in June 2022, Caravan had also done its own investigation into Hindutva’s hate music: Hindu Rashtra OST authored by Samriddhi Sakuniya that can be read here. The CSOH’s recent report is then a logical, research driven extension to earlier work done that exposed this further capture of ‘culture’ by the majoritarian far right.

From white supremacist rock to Hindutva pop

The report situates Hindutva hate music within a broader global history of extremist music cultures. Researchers trace parallels with white power music in Europe and the United States, particularly the rise of white supremacist bands in the 1980s that used music as a vehicle for recruitment, radicalisation and political mobilisation. Similar patterns, the report notes, have emerged in other contexts, including Rwanda and Myanmar, where music was used to reinforce ethnic and religious hostility before or during periods of violence.

According to the authors, Hindutva pop has evolved into a distinctly Indian manifestation of this phenomenon. Unlike conventional devotional music, these songs frequently depict Muslims and Christians as enemies, invaders, traitors or existential threats. The report argues that many songs go beyond ideological messaging and explicitly advocate discrimination, exclusion, boycotts or violence.

The researchers further link the growth of the genre to broader political and social developments in India, including increasing incidents of anti-minority hate speech and communal polarisation. Citing data from India Hate Lab, the report notes that hate speech incidents documented in India increased dramatically in recent years, providing a social and political backdrop against which Hindutva music has flourished.

Importantly, the report does not portray these songs as isolated cultural products. Rather, it argues that they form part of a larger ecosystem in which music is used during religious processions, political gatherings, social media campaigns and community mobilisation efforts. Several incidents of communal tension and violence, the report notes, have involved processions playing songs containing anti-Muslim themes or violent rhetoric.

Building a database of hate music

One of the report’s most significant contributions is methodological. Rather than relying on anecdotal examples, the researchers spent a year building what they describe as a comprehensive database of Hindutva hate music across multiple platforms.

The study examined four major platforms: YouTube, Spotify, Apple Music and Meta’s Music Library, which powers audio used in Instagram Reels. Before identifying songs, researchers first analysed each platform’s published policies governing hate speech, incitement to violence and discriminatory content. These policies then became the framework through which songs were assessed.

Data collection occurred between January 2025 and January 2026 and involved multiple research techniques. Researchers conducted keyword searches in English and Hindi, monitored social media accounts of prominent Hindutva influencers, reviewed footage of religious processions and tracked channels and creators repeatedly associated with such music. Songs identified through one platform were subsequently traced across others to determine their broader distribution.

The resulting database contains 523 songs that researchers concluded violated the content policies of at least one platform. These songs were then categorised according to the type of violation involved, including direct incitement to violence, dehumanisation, promotion of supremacist beliefs and other forms of hateful content.

The researchers also tested platform accountability by reporting a sample of songs and tracking platform responses over several months. In addition, they investigated how creators and platforms monetised such content through advertising, subscriptions, and fan funding and other revenue streams.

A vast digital ecosystem

The report’s findings suggest that hate music is not confined to a few isolated uploads but forms a substantial and highly visible digital ecosystem. Across the four platforms studied, researchers identified 523 songs that they argue violate platform policies. Of these, 210 were found on YouTube, 109 on Spotify, 103 within Meta’s Music Library, and 101 on Apple Music.

The scale of engagement documented in the report is striking. The YouTube songs alone accumulated more than 198 million views, while songs available through Meta’s Music Library were used in over 5.9 million Instagram Reels. Researchers argue that the actual audience exposure is likely far greater because each Reel can be viewed, shared and recommended repeatedly through Instagram’s algorithmic systems.

Perhaps most significantly, the report concludes that roughly half of all identified songs contain explicit calls for violence. Researchers found that 263 of the 523 songs directly threatened, encouraged or glorified violence against religious minorities, while the remaining songs primarily relied on dehumanisation, conspiracy theories, derogatory stereotypes and other forms of hateful rhetoric.

According to the report, Muslims were overwhelmingly the primary targets. Many songs promoted familiar Hindu nationalist narratives, including allegations of “love jihad,” demographic replacement theories, claims that Muslims pose an existential threat to Hindu society, and demands that India be transformed into an explicitly Hindu nation.

The researchers argue that these narratives do not merely express political opinions but function as tools of radicalisation. By repeatedly portraying minorities as enemies, traitors or invaders, the music allegedly normalises hostility and creates conditions in which discrimination and violence become easier to justify.

YouTube: The largest hub

Among all platforms studied, YouTube emerged as the most significant repository of Hindutva hate music. The report identified 210 allegedly violative songs uploaded across 100 channels with a combined subscriber base exceeding 76 million. Researchers found that nearly half of these songs contained direct threats or calls for violence against Muslims.

Particularly notable was the concentration of content among a relatively small number of channels. According to the report, three channels alone accounted for more than 40 percent of the identified songs. Despite repeatedly hosting content that researchers argue violates YouTube’s own hate speech policies, these channels allegedly remained active, verified and monetised.

The report further argues that YouTube’s own systems may be helping such content spread. Researchers note that the platform automatically generates videos for music tracks even when creators do not upload visual content, thereby ensuring additional visibility for songs distributed through music services.

Spotify, Meta and Apple: A pattern across platforms

While YouTube accounted for the largest number of allegedly violative songs, the report argues that the problem extends well beyond video-sharing platforms. Researchers found what they describe as a consistent pattern across Spotify, Meta’s Music Library and Apple Music, with songs containing anti-Muslim hate speech, conspiracy theories and incitement to violence remaining available despite each platform maintaining policies that prohibit such content.

The report argues that this demonstrates a systemic moderation failure rather than isolated lapses in enforcement. Although each platform adopts different approaches to content moderation and community standards, the researchers contend that all four companies continue to host content that appears to violate their own published rules.

Spotify: Hate music available beside mainstream artists

Spotify, the world’s largest music streaming platform, hosts 109 songs that the report argues violate its Platform Rules. Researchers found that 51 of these songs explicitly praise or encourage violence against Muslims, while 44 others promote hatred, dehumanisation or harmful stereotypes directed at the community.

According to the report, Spotify’s own rules prohibit content that promotes hatred or violence against protected groups based on characteristics including religion. Yet researchers argue that songs encouraging violence against Muslims, promoting the “love jihad” conspiracy theory, or portraying religious minorities as enemies of the nation remained easily accessible through ordinary searches.

The report also highlights Spotify’s recommendation architecture. Unlike traditional music stores where users actively purchase specific tracks, streaming services recommend songs, playlists and artists based on listening behaviour. Researchers argue that this recommendation system can inadvertently increase the reach of extremist content once a listener engages with similar material.

Another concern identified is the coexistence of such songs alongside mainstream music. The report argues that users do not encounter these tracks in isolated corners of the platform; instead, they exist within the same searchable ecosystem as Bollywood music, devotional songs and popular commercial artists, making discovery significantly easier.

Instagram Reels and Meta’s Music Library: Turning hate into viral content

Perhaps the report’s most striking findings concern Meta’s Music Library, the catalogue of licensed music available to users creating Instagram Reels. Researchers identified 103 songs within Meta’s music catalogue that they argue violate the company’s Hate Speech Community Standard. Of these, 46 songs actively encourage or incite violence against Muslims, while another 57 use abusive language, slurs or dehumanising rhetoric targeting the community.

What makes Meta’s ecosystem particularly significant, the report argues, is the extraordinary scale of amplification. Rather than simply existing as songs available for listening, these tracks have been incorporated into more than 5.9 million Instagram Reels, transforming music into a reusable soundtrack for millions of user-generated videos.

Researchers contend that every Reel using a hate song effectively creates another distribution channel for the underlying message. Since Instagram’s recommendation algorithm actively promotes short-form videos beyond a creator’s followers, songs embedded in viral Reels can rapidly reach audiences far larger than those who might deliberately search for the original track.

The report provides numerous examples illustrating this phenomenon. One of the most widely circulated songs documented is “Bharat Ka Bacha Bacha Jai Shri Ram Bolega.” According to the report, the song had already been used in over 730,000 Instagram Reels. Researchers note that some individual Reels featuring the song accumulated millions of views, vastly exceeding the reach of the original audio itself. One Reel showing a DJ performing the song before a large public audience reportedly received over 5.7 million views and hundreds of thousands of likes.

Similarly, the song “Gau Mata“, which the report says contains anti-Muslim slurs and threats of violence, had been used in more than 40,000 Instagram Reels. Researchers observed that many of these videos were posted by self-described cow vigilante groups or supporters, often depicting vehicle chases, confrontations or assaults involving alleged cattle transporters while the song played in the background.

Another frequently used track, “Bhagwa Se Dar Lagta Hai Toh Bharat Chod Do,” had reportedly been used in over 104,000 Reels by May 2026. The report documents examples where the song accompanied videos of Ram Navami processions, saffron flag displays and other communal imagery, with individual Reels reaching hundreds of thousands of viewers.

The report argues that Meta’s music catalogue effectively allows hateful audio to be endlessly repurposed, giving songs an afterlife far beyond their original release.

Apple Music: Minimal hate speech standards

Among the four platforms examined, researchers identify Apple Music as having the least detailed public standards specifically addressing hate speech. Unlike YouTube, Meta and Spotify, Apple does not publish an extensive standalone hate speech policy governing music content. Instead, the company requires artists to comply with local laws, cultural sensitivities and general standards of appropriateness.

Applying Indian legal standards as well as the report’s analytical framework, researchers identified 101 songs on Apple Music that they argue should not remain available. Several songs promote the discredited conspiracy theory of “love jihad,” alleging that Muslim men systematically target Hindu women for religious conversion. The report notes that the Government of India itself informed Parliament in 2020 that the term has no legal basis, yet multiple songs continue to invoke it as an established fact while encouraging hostility against Muslims.

Researchers also criticise Apple’s moderation of album artwork. According to the report, several songs employ imagery that reinforces anti-Muslim narratives, including depictions of veiled Muslim women intended to portray interfaith relationships or Islamic identity as inherently threatening.

The report argues that visual imagery, combined with inflammatory lyrics, contributes to a broader ecosystem of communal propaganda rather than functioning merely as artistic expression.

Violence is not an exception—it is a central theme

One of the report’s most significant conclusion concerns the nature of the content itself. Researchers argue that violent rhetoric is not confined to a handful of fringe songs but constitutes one of the defining characteristics of the Hindutva pop ecosystem.

Across platforms, they found:

• 104 YouTube songs containing explicit violent themes targeting minorities;
• 51 Spotify songs praising or encouraging violence;
• 46 Meta Music Library tracks directly calling for violence;
• 67 Apple Music songs encouraging or glorifying violence against minorities.

Beyond explicit threats, the report identifies recurring themes that appear repeatedly across hundreds of songs. These include portraying Muslims as traitors or foreign invaders; invoking historical grievances involving Mughal rulers; calling for the demolition of mosques and construction of temples in their place; depicting demographic change as an existential threat; promoting conspiracy theories such as “love jihad” and “Ghazwa-e-Hind”; glorifying cow vigilantism; and encouraging Hindus to prepare for what songs describe as an inevitable religious conflict.

According to the researchers, these recurring narratives collectively create a worldview in which violence against minorities is portrayed not as criminal conduct but as a legitimate form of self-defence or historical justice.

The report therefore argues that the danger lies not only in individual songs but in the cumulative effect of hundreds of tracks repeating similar messages across multiple platforms, reinforcing one another through algorithms, recommendations and user-generated content.

Profiting From Hate: How platforms monetise extremist music

One of the report’s most serious allegations is that technology companies are not merely failing to remove hateful content—they are also profiting from it. The report argues that while companies publicly maintain zero-tolerance policies towards hate speech, many of the creators producing anti-Muslim songs continue to benefit from platform monetisation tools, while the platforms themselves earn advertising and subscription revenue generated by user engagement with this content.

Researchers contend that this creates what they describe as a perverse incentive structure. The more popular a hate song becomes, the more advertisements it attracts, the more revenue it generates for both the creator and the platform, and the more likely platform algorithms are to recommend it to additional users. According to the report, this commercial ecosystem transforms communal hatred into profitable digital content.

YouTube’s monetisation ecosystem

The report identifies YouTube as the platform where monetisation is most visible. Researchers found that many channels repeatedly uploading songs that allegedly violate YouTube’s hate speech policies remain eligible for monetisation through the YouTube Partner Program. This allows creators to earn money from advertisements shown before or during videos, while also accessing features such as Super Thanks, Super Chats, Channel Memberships and paid subscriptions.

The report notes that the 210 songs identified on YouTube had collectively amassed approximately 198 million views, generating substantial audience engagement through more than 3.1 million likes across roughly 100 channels with a combined subscriber base exceeding 76 million subscribers. Researchers argue that these figures indicate that Hindutva hate music is not a niche phenomenon but a commercially successful content category operating within YouTube’s broader creator economy.

The report also raises concerns about YouTube’s own automated systems. Even where artists did not upload music videos themselves, YouTube automatically generated videos—known as “Art Tracks”—using album artwork and audio files. According to the researchers, this meant that hateful songs could continue circulating on YouTube even without dedicated video production, further expanding their visibility through YouTube Music integration and algorithmic recommendations. Researchers argue that these automated uploads demonstrate how platform infrastructure itself can contribute to the dissemination of harmful content.

Brand advertising beside hate content

One of the most troubling commercial finding concerns advertising. The report states that advertisements from internationally recognised companies appeared before or alongside videos containing anti-Muslim hate music.

Researchers documented advertisements from major multinational brands—including technology companies, consumer goods manufacturers and financial services firms—being served on videos that they argue contain hate speech and incitement. The report stresses that there is no suggestion that these companies intentionally chose to advertise on such videos. Rather, advertisements were placed through automated advertising systems that purchase inventory across YouTube. Nevertheless, the report argues that automated advertising effectively channels corporate advertising budgets towards creators producing hateful material. This, researchers contend, raises broader questions about advertiser oversight, brand safety mechanisms and the adequacy of platform controls designed to prevent commercial support for extremist content.

A small network, massive reach

Another important finding is the concentration of influence. Rather than thousands of independent creators, the report identifies a relatively small network of artists and YouTube channels responsible for producing a disproportionately large share of Hindutva hate music.

The researchers profiled dozens of prominent singers and creators who repeatedly produced songs centred on similar themes: portraying Muslims as enemies of the nation, glorifying violence, advocating the demolition of mosques, promoting conspiracy theories such as “love jihad” and “Ghazwa-e-Hind,” and encouraging Hindus to prepare for religious conflict. According to the report, this demonstrates that Hindutva hate music is not a spontaneous or decentralised phenomenon but an identifiable ecosystem with recurring artists, production houses, distribution channels and audiences.

The report argues that because the same creators repeatedly upload allegedly violative content across multiple platforms, enforcement against a relatively limited number of accounts could significantly reduce the overall reach of the ecosystem.

Music and offline communal mobilisation

A recurring theme throughout the report is the relationship between online music and offline communal mobilisation. Researchers emphasise that the songs they identified are not simply consumed privately through headphones. Instead, they frequently accompany religious processions, political rallies, vigilante activities, election campaigns and public demonstrations, giving digital content a tangible presence in physical spaces.

Several songs documented in the report call for the demolition of mosques, the construction of Hindu temples at disputed sites, retaliation for historical grievances associated with Mughal rule, or violent action against individuals portrayed as threatening Hindu society. Others celebrate cow vigilantism or invoke slogans commonly associated with Hindu nationalist mobilisation.

The report argues that when such music becomes embedded within public processions and viral social media videos, it helps normalise hostile narratives against minorities and reinforces communal identities through repetitive cultural messaging.

The Pahalgam attack and the rapid weaponisation of tragedy

The report devotes particular attention to the aftermath of the April 22, 2025 terrorist attack in Pahalgam, in which 26 civilians were killed. According to the researchers, Hindutva pop artists responded with remarkable speed. Within hours and days of the attack, multiple songs were released portraying Indian Muslims collectively as responsible or urging Hindus to unite against an alleged internal enemy.

Five songs released immediately after the attack reportedly accumulated more than 1.1 million YouTube views within a short period. Several rapidly spread to Spotify, Apple Music and Instagram Reels, where users created thousands of videos using the songs as background audio.

The report does not claim a direct causal relationship between these songs and subsequent incidents of communal violence. However, it argues that they contributed to an environment in which anti-Muslim hostility intensified.

Researchers cite monitoring by India Hate Lab, which documented 64 anti-Muslim hate rallies within ten days of the attack and 113 hate speech incidents and hate crimes within approximately three weeks. The report presents this as evidence that online hate music formed part of a broader ecosystem of communal mobilisation during a period of heightened national tension. Detailed report may be read here.

Less than two months after the Pahalgam attack, Citizens for Justice and Peace had mapped the rising hate attacks against Muslims, across five key states. The data based investigation had, on June 19, 2025, published 180 plus attacks with 37 % tied to ‘revenge’ for Pahalgam. CJP’s Mapping Hate: The Pahalgam Attack and its ripple effects may be read here.

Testing the platforms

Beyond documenting content, the researchers also sought to assess whether technology companies acted when alerted. The report explains that researchers formally reported numerous songs through the platforms’ own complaint mechanisms and monitored the outcomes over several months.

According to the report, most of the reported content remained available despite allegedly violating the platforms’ published hate speech policies. Researchers argue that this demonstrates substantial inconsistencies between the companies’ stated rules and their enforcement practices.

The report contends that the persistence of such content, despite repeated reporting, raises broader questions about transparency, accountability and the effectiveness of automated moderation systems, particularly in languages other than English.

Recommendations and a warning for Big Tech

The report concludes with an extensive set of recommendations directed at YouTube, Meta, Spotify and Apple. Among other measures, researchers call on platforms to:

• proactively identify and remove music that promotes hatred or violence against protected groups;
• improve moderation of music and audio content rather than focusing primarily on text and video;
• strengthen moderation capacity in Indian languages;
• ensure that creators repeatedly producing hate content are ineligible for monetisation;
• increase transparency regarding enforcement decisions;
• improve advertiser safeguards so that brands are not inadvertently funding extremist content; and
• invest in specialised moderation teams capable of recognising coded forms of communal hate speech.

Ultimately, Profiting from Hate Music argues that music has become one of the most powerful yet understudied vehicles for spreading communal hatred online. Rather than treating songs as merely another form of entertainment, the authors urge policymakers, researchers and technology companies to recognise them as influential political and cultural artefacts capable of shaping public attitudes at enormous scale. The study significantly expands the conversation around online hate speech in India. It shifts attention beyond viral speeches and inflammatory posts to an ecosystem where melody, repetition and algorithmic amplification intersect—raising difficult questions about the responsibilities of digital platforms when content that allegedly promotes hatred is not only hosted, but also recommended, monetised and transformed into a profitable business model.

The complete report may be read below:

Related:

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Central Government silent over the number of YouTube channels blocked in last 5 years; dismisses concern about press freedom and internet shutdowns

YouTube allows content containing false and incendiary information about India’s elections: report

From Outrage to Acquittal: The Raja Singh hate speech case comes to a close

The Supreme Court blinks when it comes to Hate Speech

CJP files complaint against BJP MLA & Minister Nitesh Rane and right-wing leaders over alleged hate speeches in Maharashtra and West Bengal

The post How big tech is profiting from Hindutva hate music appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The present controversy and alleged derogatory remark against Prophet Mohammad

The recent controversy centres on an Instagram podcast reel uploaded around June 19, 2026. In the video, Nazia Elahi Khan is seen in conversation with a host named Divya Singh. Viewers alleged that Khan made derogatory and offensive remarks regarding Prophet Muhammad and his family during this podcast, which subsequently went viral on social media platforms.

The alleged statements sparked widespread outrage within the Muslim community, leading to protests and demands for legal action across multiple states. Community leaders and organisations, including the Raza Academy, argued that the remarks were deeply hurtful to their religious sentiments.

Khan in her defense has also claimed in some reports that the viral videos of her remarks are AI-generated not hers!

Legal action and protests across the country

Following the circulation of the podcast, multiple FIRs and complaints were registered against Khan:

• Bhiwandi, Maharashtra: The first FIR was registered on Monday evening (June 22, 2026) at the Shanti Nagar Police Station. The complaint was filed by a local resident, Adnan Ansari. Ansari stated he saw the reel on June 19 and consulted with community members before approaching the police. The Shanti Nagar police booked Khan for “deliberate acts intended to outrage religious feelings” and under relevant sections of the Information Technology (IT) Act. Senior Inspector Vinayak Gaikwad confirmed the FIR.

Nazia Elahi Khan Par Bhiwandi Shanti Nagar Police Mein FIR Darj For Insulting Prophet In A Podcast, FIR Filed By MIM Team pic.twitter.com/wXvCnsnTSv

— Gallinews India (@gallinews) June 22, 2026

• Mumbai, Maharashtra: A second case, classified as a ‘zero FIR,’ was registered on Tuesday (June 23, 2026) at the JJ Marg Police Station in South Mumbai over the same video content. Police officials noted that this case is likely to be transferred to West Bengal, where Khan currently resides, for further investigation. Representatives of the Raza Academy also submitted a written complaint to the Pydhonie police station seeking action.

Two FIRs have been registered in the Mumbai Metropolitan Region against BJP Minority Morcha leader and social media influencer Nazia Elahi Khan, 41, over alleged derogatory remarks about Prophet Muhammad that reportedly hurt religious sentiments.

The first FIR was registered on… pic.twitter.com/DMVWgu5h37

— The Observer Post (@TheObserverPost) June 23, 2026

• Malegaon, Maharashtra: Reports indicate an FIR has also been filed in Malegaon against Khan, accusing her of hurting religious sentiments.
• Uttar Pradesh & Madhya Pradesh: Protests and demands for action have occurred in various locations, including Bareilly, Muzaffarnagar, Bulandshahr (Uttar Pradesh), and Khargone and Rewa (Madhya Pradesh). In Bareilly, members of the Muslim community submitted a memorandum to the Aonla Sub-Divisional Magistrate (SDM), demanding strict action against her. AIMIM representatives in Khatauli (Muzaffarnagar) also demanded legal action.
• On June 24, members of the All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (AIMIM) submitted a memorandum to the Kota District Collector in Rajasthan demanding strict legal action against Nazia Elahi Khan over her alleged remarks. According to the party, the memorandum was submitted on the instructions of AIMIM President Asaduddin Owaisi and Rajasthan State President Jameel Ahmed Khan. The delegation, led by District Vice President Zahid Nizami Mastan and accompanied by other party office-bearers, urged the administration to initiate appropriate legal proceedings over the alleged insult to the Prophet.

Huzoor ﷺ ki shaan mein ki gayi gustakhi ke khilaf aur Nazia Elahi ke viruddh sakht kanooni karwai ki maang ko lekar aaj AIMIM ke qaumi sadar @asadowaisi sahab aur AIMIM Rajasthan ke Pradesh Adhyaksh Jameel Ahmed Khan sahab ke nirdesh par Kota Zila Collector ko gyapan saupa gaya।… pic.twitter.com/e0xenYLslo

— Jameel Khan (@jameelwecan) June 24, 2026

• Hyderabad Police also registered a case against Nazia Elahi Khan over her remark, following a complaint by religious organisation.

Hyderabad Police registered a case against an accused Nazia elahi Khan over alleged derogatory remarks against religious figures, following a complaint by religious scholars and organisations. DCP Charminar Zone assured strict legal action, stressing the need to maintain peace… pic.twitter.com/pt7R6AMP1k

— Nawab Abrar (@nawababrar131) June 25, 2026

The investigations are ongoing, with Mumbai police examining whether the probe should be transferred to West Bengal.

Arrest of Nazia Elahi Khan by Kolkata Police in August 2021 in relation to cheating case

Nazia Elahi Khan was previously arrested by the Girish Park Police in Kolkata on August 26, 2021 in connection with FIR No. 116 of 2020, registered under Sections 419, 420, 506, and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, relating to allegations of cheating, impersonation, criminal intimidation, and common intention. The investigation revealed that Khan had allegedly exploited a vulnerable individual involved in a complex matrimonial dispute, extracting Rs 6 lakh under the pretence that her high-level connections could secure a swift and favourable legal outcome. When the promised legal relief failed to materialise and the client demanded the return of his funds, Khan allegedly resorted to intimidation and threats, leading directly to her arrest. She remained in judicial custody until September 18, 2021, when she was granted bail on the ground of her 13-year-old son’s illness.

According to records cited in the case, investigators alleged that despite repeatedly claiming to be an advocate, she was unable during custody to produce documents establishing her legal qualifications or formal educational credentials. The case also relies on a complaint allegedly submitted by Khan to Girish Park Police Station on May 25, 2012, in which she described her qualifications as B.Com., LL.B., a document that investigators have treated as material evidence in the ongoing impersonation proceedings.

Copy of FIR No. 116/2020 registered at Girish Park Police Station

Hate Profile: weaponising Muslim identity, the strategy of provocation

Operating under the self-adopted alias “Nazia Sanatani,” Khan began systematically catering to hard-line right-wing audiences. She recognised a potent dynamic in digital identity politics: when an individual born into a minority group echoes the prejudices of the majority, their statements are often treated as undeniable validation of those prejudices. She became an “insider” willing to confirm the worst fears of the Hindutva base, effectively weaponising her background to provide a veneer of authority to baseless claims.

The remarks made by Nazia Elahi Khan are extremely offensive and derogatory towards Islam and the Prophet Muhammad PBUH.

Has anyone filed any complaints? pic.twitter.com/10I2W86iKO

— S (@Shirink_13) August 4, 2024

Hindus should stay vigilant and should boycott Muslims from government sectors and private sectors: Nazia

On June 8, 2026, Nazia Elahi Khan also courted controversy after calling for the social and economic boycott of Muslims during a press conference. She urged Hindus to refrain from employing Muslims in both government and private sectors for the next two to three years. She reportedly said that “Hindus should stay vigilant and should boycott Muslims from government sectors and private sectors.”

She further alleged that Muslims posed an internal security threat and asserting that “120 crore Hindus” should remain vigilant against various forms of “jihad.” She further questioned the patriotism of Indian Muslims and called for their boycott from employment and public life.

A BJP leader’s call, made during a press conference, to boycott Indian Muslims from government jobs, private employment, and public life is a blatant attack on the Constitution of India and the secular foundations of our republic.

Equally condemnable is the reckless attempt to… pic.twitter.com/67JmdbwBjy

— Dr Syed Naseer Hussain, M P (@NasirHussainINC) June 8, 2026

Her strategy involved constant, high-visibility provocations. She launched what her supporters called the “Hindu Dharam Tour,” traveling to deliver speeches that consistently vilified the Muslim community. In May 2024, in Karda, Maharashtra, she utilised the “Love Jihad” conspiracy theory, falsely claiming that 2,800 Hindu women had been murdered by Muslim men, and asking the crowd, “How can a Muslim man love you when he can so easily give triple talaq and destroy lives?”

In January 2025, in Belagavi, Karnataka, she amplified the “Ghazwa-e-Hind” conspiracy, alleging that local mosques and shrines were covert training grounds designed to entrap Hindu women for an eventual Islamic takeover.

When public speaking engagements waned, Khan demonstrated a willingness to manufacture crises to maintain her digital relevance.

In February 2025, she posted a video claiming Muslim men had intentionally rammed her vehicle in an assassination attempt in Uttar Pradesh. The Kanpur Dehat Police quickly debunked the claim, stating her own driver had fallen asleep at the wheel, and publicly urged citizens not to spread her communal misinformation.

In April 2026, amid the controversy surrounding Lenskart’s alleged dress code on religious symbols, Nazia Elahi Khan entered a Lenskart store in Mumbai along with her supporters and applied tilak to several employees. Videos of the incident showed her confronting the store staff over the alleged policy, asserting that Hindu employees should not be discouraged from displaying their religious identity.

“Sharia lagu karwana hai kya?” :- Nazia Elahi Khan

BJP Minority Morcha leader Nazia Elahi Khan entered a Lenskart outlet in Mumbai’s Andheri area and confronted the store manager, identified as Mohsin Khan, alleging that Hindu employees were being discouraged from wearing… pic.twitter.com/nXQAUmxmZj

— Clips (@Masterstroke_ab) April 23, 2026

Nazia Elahi Khan is not an office-bearer: BJP Minority Morcha

Amid the growing controversy, the BJP Minority Morcha publicly distanced itself from Nazia Elahi Khan. In a statement issued on June 24, the Morcha’s National President, Jamal Siddiqui, clarified that Nazia Elahi Khan is not an office-bearer of the organisation and that no individual by that name holds any official position within the BJP Minority Morcha. He further stated that any claim of representing the Morcha or the BJP in that capacity is “false and misleading.”

The BJP Minority Morcha has said that Nazia Ilahi Khan is not an office-bearer of the organisation. National President of the Morcha, Jamal Siddiqui, stated that no person by that name holds any official position within the body. He further said that any claim of representing the… pic.twitter.com/ymmR8CVqUm

— The Observer Post (@TheObserverPost) June 24, 2026

The CJP archive: documenting a habitual offender

Her speeches have frequently been delivered from platforms hosted by organisations advancing right wing propaganda of communal hatred and have consistently echoed themes such as “Love Jihad”, “Ghazwa-e-Hind”, economic boycott of Muslims, and allegations questioning the patriotism of Indian Muslims.

The sheer volume of FIRs filed against the Nazia Elahi Khan validates the long-standing warnings issued by civil rights monitors. Organisations like Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP) have meticulously tracked Khan’s activities for years, maintaining detailed dossiers that classify her as a “habitual hate offender” whose actions are designed to subvert the law for political gain.

The most critical intervention by CJP occurred during the volatile lead-up to the Delhi Assembly elections in early 2025. On January 20, 2025, CJP filed a comprehensive complaint with the Chief Electoral Officer of Delhi regarding a speech Khan delivered at an event organised by the Hindu nationalist group “Chetna” in Rohini. CJP provided exact transcripts to the Election Commission, demonstrating that Khan explicitly violated the Model Code of Conduct and the Representation of the People Act.

CJP takes action against #HateSpeech! A complaint has been filed against BJP leader Nazia Elahi Khan for inciting communal hatred during the #Delhi poll campaign. Read: https://t.co/Y5VsQjYgtB

— Citizens for Justice and Peace (@cjpindia) January 21, 2025

According to CJP, the transcripts of the speech delivered in Delhi revealed Khan telling the Delhi audience that Muslims were inherently violent and primed for criminal activity; “Tell them (Muslims) to get education, they will not! […] But if you tell them to rape, they will do it immediately. Tell them to do love jihad, they will do it immediately. Tell them to throw bombs, bullets, and ammunition! They will throw it immediately.” She further instructed Hindu parents to teach their daughters that “no Abdul is good.” CJP argued that Khan was deliberately deployed to polarise the electorate. The fact that she faced no significant legal consequences for this speech, and was allowed to continue her “Hindu Dharam Tour” for another year and a half, highlights what activists describe as the systemic apathy of law enforcement when dealing with right-wing hate speech.

Legal position governing hate speech

The law governing hate speech is well settled and imposes a clear obligation upon the State and law enforcement authorities to prevent and prosecute such offences. Despite the settled legal position and repeated directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, incidents of inflammatory and communal speeches continue to occur with impunity. Such speeches are deliberately designed to promote enmity and hatred between religious communities, disturb communal harmony, outrage religious sentiments, provoke breaches of public peace, and disseminate false and inflammatory narratives likely to incite discrimination, hostility, or offences against a particular community.

These acts attract, inter alia, Sections 196 (promoting enmity between different groups), 197 (imputations prejudicial to national integration and constitutional allegiance), 299 and 302 (deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage and wound religious feelings), 352 (intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of peace), and 353 (circulation of false information likely to incite offences or create fear and alarm) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. The dissemination of such inflammatory speech through public meetings and social media further aggravates its impact by expanding its reach and increasing the likelihood of communal disharmony and public disorder.

Supreme Court directions and statutory duties

The Hon’ble Supreme Court has repeatedly held that law enforcement agencies are under a mandatory obligation to prevent and prosecute incidents of hate speech without waiting for private complaints. In Shaheen Abdulla v. Union of India & Ors. (W.P. (C) No. 940 of 2022), the Court directed all States and Union Territories to register suo moto FIRs immediately whenever any speech attracts offences relating to promotion of communal hatred, irrespective of the religion or identity of the speaker. The Court categorically directed that police authorities must act without waiting for any complaint and must ensure equal enforcement of the law so as to preserve the secular character of the Constitution.

The Supreme Court has further emphasised the preventive responsibilities of the police. By orders dated February 3, 2023, while dealing with proposed communal gatherings in Maharashtra, the Court directed that permissions for public events must be subject to the condition that no hate speech is delivered and clarified that the police are duty-bound to exercise preventive powers, including action under Section 151 of the Code of Criminal Procedure wherever circumstances so require.

Subsequently, by order dated January 17, 2024, the Court directed the District Magistrates and Superintendents of Police in Maharashtra and Chhattisgarh to take all necessary preventive measures, including installation of CCTV cameras and video recording of public events, to ensure identification and prosecution of persons delivering hate speeches or inciting communal violence. These directions reaffirm that police authorities have a continuing constitutional and statutory obligation not merely to prosecute offences after they occur but also to prevent their commission through timely intervention.

In compliance with these judicial directions, the Director General of Police, Maharashtra, issued Circular dated February 2, 2023, directing all police units to strictly implement the Supreme Court’s mandate by taking suo moto action wherever speeches disclose offences relating to communal hatred. Thereafter, by Circular dated April 3, 2023, the Maharashtra Police prescribed comprehensive preventive measures for public meetings and processions, including prior meetings with organisers, imposition of conditions while granting permissions, intelligence gathering, preventive action against anti-social elements, compulsory audio-video recording of events, immediate registration of offences wherever violations occur, and prompt arrests wherever warranted.

These directions make it abundantly clear that failure to initiate timely preventive and prosecutorial action in cases of hate speech would amount to a failure to discharge statutory and constitutional duties entrusted to the police authorities.

Judicial Precedents on Hate Speech

The constitutional position regarding hate speech has been consistently reaffirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In Firoz Iqbal Khan v. Union of India (W.P. (C) No. 956 of 2020), the Court observed that India’s constitutional democracy is founded upon the peaceful coexistence of diverse religious and cultural communities and held that any attempt to vilify a religious community must be viewed with grave disfavour as it strikes at the core of constitutional values. Earlier, in Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. Union of India, (2014) AIR SC 1591, the Supreme Court recognised that hate speech marginalises vulnerable groups, legitimises discrimination, and lays the foundation for exclusion, violence, and even genocide, thereby posing a direct threat to the right to life and dignity guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.

Further strengthening this jurisprudence, in Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India (W.P. (C) No. 943 of 2021), by order dated April 28, 2023, the Supreme Court extended its earlier directions to all States and Union Territories, mandating registration of suo moto FIRs whenever speeches disclose offences relating to communal hatred, irrespective of the identity or religion of the speaker. The Court reiterated that the police cannot remain passive spectators and must promptly initiate criminal proceedings whenever cognizable offences of hate speech are committed. Collectively, these decisions establish that hate speech is not merely an exercise of free expression but constitutes an abuse of constitutional freedoms where it promotes hostility, discrimination, or violence against protected communities, thereby requiring immediate preventive and penal action by the State.

Moreover, the controversy has expanded beyond social media, with police complaints, memoranda, and demands for legal action being made in several states, including Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Maharashtra, Telangana, and Delhi. Amid the growing backlash, the BJP Minority Morcha clarified that Nazia Elahi Khan does not hold any official position in the organisation. With multiple complaints now before the authorities, the matter has shifted from public outrage to the legal process, and the response of law enforcement and the courts will determine its course

Related

CJP files complaint against BJP leader Nazia Elahi Khan over hate speech in Delhi

CJP files 3 MCC violation complaints with CEO Maharashtra against Suresh Chavhanke for hate speech

CJP files 5 hate speech complaints before CEO Maharashtra as violated MCC

The post Nazia Elahi Khan faces multiple FIRs over alleged hate speech appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Telangana | Special Court for MPs/MLAs at Hyderabad acquitted MLA Raja Singh in a case registered under Sections 153A(a)(b), 295A, 504, 505(2) and 506 of the IPC.

Raja Singh was arrested by the Mangalhat Police. After the learned Magistrate declined to grant police remand, he…

— ANI (@ANI) June 30, 2026

The controversy that sparked nationwide outrage

The origins of the case can be traced to August 2022, when stand-up comedian Munawar Faruqui was scheduled to perform in Hyderabad. Raja Singh, then a BJP MLA representing the Goshamahal Assembly constituency, publicly opposed the event, accusing Faruqui of repeatedly insulting Hindu deities during his comedy performances. Anticipating possible law-and-order issues, the Hyderabad Police placed Singh under preventive house arrest on August 20, 2022, while providing extensive security arrangements to ensure that Faruqui’s performance could proceed peacefully.

Detailed report may be read here.

Within days, however, the controversy escalated dramatically. Raja Singh uploaded a video on his YouTube channel responding to Faruqui’s show. During the course of the video, he made a series of derogatory remarks concerning Prophet Muhammad, including references that many Muslims considered deeply offensive and blasphemous. The video spread rapidly across multiple social media platforms, provoking immediate condemnation from religious organisations, civil society groups and political leaders.

The remarks came at an especially sensitive time. Only weeks earlier, India had witnessed a diplomatic crisis after controversial comments about Prophet Muhammad by former BJP spokesperson Nupur Sharma had triggered protests across several countries and sharp criticism from governments in the Gulf and other Muslim-majority nations. Against this backdrop, Raja Singh’s statements were viewed as another flashpoint capable of inflaming already fragile communal relations.

Hyderabad witness widespread protests

Public anger against Raja Singh’s remarks was swift and intense. Thousands of people assembled across different parts of Hyderabad, particularly in the Old City, demanding his immediate arrest. Large demonstrations were organised outside the office of Hyderabad Police Commissioner C.V. Anand, while protest marches and public gatherings took place in several neighbourhoods including Shalibanda, Mangalhat and Charminar.

The protests continued for several days, with demonstrators alleging that repeated instances of hate speech by political leaders were being met with inadequate legal action. Protesters raised slogans, burnt effigies of Raja Singh and demanded strict criminal prosecution.

The demonstrations eventually turned volatile in certain areas. Reports indicated incidents of stone-pelting, clashes between sections of protesters and the police, and the use of baton charges by law enforcement to disperse crowds. Several protesters were detained. Authorities deployed additional police personnel, Rapid Action Force contingents and paramilitary forces to restore order. Educational institutions, commercial establishments and fuel stations in parts of Hyderabad remained closed as a precaution amid fears of communal violence.

The scale of the protests reflected the seriousness with which the Muslim community viewed the remarks and underscored the potential of inflammatory political speech to disturb public order in communally sensitive environments.

Criminal proceedings initiated

Following multiple complaints, the Mangalhat Police registered a criminal case against Raja Singh under several provisions of the Indian Penal Code dealing with communal hatred and public disorder.

The charges included:

• Section 153A IPC for promoting enmity between different religious groups;
• Section 295A IPC for deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings;
• Section 504 IPC for intentional insult likely to provoke breach of peace;
• Section 505(2) IPC for statements promoting hatred, enmity or ill-will between different communities; and
• Section 506 IPC relating to criminal intimidation.

These provisions constitute the principal statutory framework under which hate speech prosecutions have traditionally been pursued in India. Their application generally requires the prosecution to establish not merely that offensive words were spoken, but that the speech satisfied specific statutory ingredients such as deliberate intention, malicious conduct or promotion of communal hatred.

Arrest, release and preventive detention

Raja Singh was initially arrested on August 23, 2022. However, a magistrate declined to grant police custody owing to procedural deficiencies in the remand application, resulting in his release shortly thereafter.

The Hyderabad Police subsequently took the unusual step of invoking the Telangana Preventive Detention Act. On August 25, 2022, Singh was re-arrested under preventive detention on the ground that his repeated speeches and activities posed a continuing threat to public order and communal harmony.

The invocation of preventive detention against a sitting legislator attracted significant public attention. Preventive detention laws are ordinarily reserved for situations where authorities believe that ordinary criminal law is insufficient to prevent imminent threats to public order. Their use against an elected representative underscored the seriousness with which the administration viewed the potential consequences of Singh’s speeches.

Raja Singh remained in detention for approximately seventy-seven days before the Telangana High Court quashed the detention order in November 2022 and directed his release on bail.

BJP distances itself

The controversy also produced immediate political consequences. Within hours of Raja Singh’s arrest, the Bharatiya Janata Party suspended him from the party and issued a show-cause notice. The suspension came amid intense domestic and international scrutiny over inflammatory remarks concerning Prophet Muhammad by BJP leaders.

Party spokespersons publicly stated that the BJP did not endorse hate speech or statements capable of hurting religious sentiments. Political commentators widely viewed the suspension as an attempt to contain the growing controversy, particularly in light of the diplomatic fallout that had followed earlier controversies involving party spokespersons.

Despite the suspension, Raja Singh remained politically influential within Telangana. Before the 2023 Assembly elections, the BJP revoked his suspension, renominated him from Goshamahal, and he successfully retained his Assembly seat. In 2025, however, he resigned from the BJP following disagreements over the appointment of the Telangana state party president.

Trial before the Special Court

The criminal proceedings continued before the Special Court designated to hear cases involving Members of Parliament and Members of Legislative Assemblies.

Over the course of nearly four years, the prosecution examined witnesses, produced documentary material and relied upon recordings of the disputed speech. The defence, on the other hand, challenged both the evidentiary basis of the prosecution and the interpretation of the statements attributed to Raja Singh.

Following the judgment, as reported by ANI, defence counsel Advocate K. Karuna Sagar stated that the complainant himself had acknowledged during cross-examination that certain portions of the disputed speech referred to material found in Islamic literature. According to the defence, after evaluating the witness testimony and documentary evidence, the court concluded that the prosecution had failed to establish the ingredients of the alleged offences. The court consequently acquitted Raja Singh of all charges after holding that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.

#WATCH | Hyderabad, Telangana: Karunasagar, High Court advocate says, “Today the Special MP/MLA Court has acquitted MLA Raja Singh from the 2022 case which was registered by PS Mangalat for allegedly commenting on the life of Prophet Muhammad. The complainant in the case has… https://t.co/Ds7zQyzt3U pic.twitter.com/YqltQwRjkE

— ANI (@ANI) June 30, 2026

Raja Singh’s response

Following the acquittal, while speaking to ANI, Raja Singh described the judgment as a “victory of truth, justice and the rule of law.”

He maintained that he had never intended to hurt the religious sentiments of any community and alleged that the criminal case, along with his preventive detention, had been initiated under political pressure exerted by the AIMIM upon the then Bharat Rashtra Samithi (BRS) government.

He further claimed that several other criminal cases registered against him under successive governments were politically motivated and expressed confidence that he would eventually secure acquittal in those proceedings as well.

#WATCH | Hyderabad, Telangana: BJP MLA Raja Singh says, “A case was registered against me in 2022, alleging that I had made comments about someone’s deity; under pressure from the AIMIM, the then BRS government and police invoked the PD Act (Preventive Detention Act) and kept me… https://t.co/Ds7zQyzt3U pic.twitter.com/9EMfAnjsvE

— ANI (@ANI) June 30, 2026

A history of inflammatory speeches

Although acquitted in this particular prosecution, Raja Singh continues to remain one of India’s most controversial political figures because of his long history of inflammatory communal rhetoric.

Over the past decade, numerous FIRs have been registered against him alleging hate speech, promotion of communal enmity and incitement. His speeches have frequently targeted Muslims and other minority communities and have repeatedly attracted criticism from civil society organisations and human rights groups.

On July 16, 2024, Citizens for Justice and Peace sent three separate complaints to relevant authorities of Maharashtra against three separate incidents of hate speeches delivered by BJP MLA Raja Singh in the month of May. In all the three incidents highlighted in the complaint, BJP MLA Raja Singh can be heard delivered provocative and inflammatory statements against the Muslim community at events organised by the Sakal Hindu Samaj.  Details may be read here.

A dedicated profile of Raja Singh may be viewed here.

The broader legal questions

The acquittal illustrates one of the most persistent challenges in hate speech litigation in India. Public outrage, widespread protests or even deeply offensive speech do not automatically translate into criminal conviction. Criminal courts remain bound by the foundational principles of criminal jurisprudence, requiring the prosecution to establish every element of the alleged offences beyond reasonable doubt through admissible evidence.

At the same time, the judgment should not be understood as judicial approval of the speech itself. The court’s conclusion is confined to the evidence presented during trial and the prosecution’s inability to satisfy the high evidentiary threshold required for conviction under the Indian Penal Code.

The case therefore exposes a broader structural issue within India’s legal framework. Existing provisions such as Sections 153A and 295A IPC—now substantially reflected in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita—continue to be the principal statutory tools used to prosecute hate speech.

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The post From Outrage to Acquittal: The Raja Singh hate speech case comes to a close appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In these places, people from diverse backgrounds and different faiths stepped forward to actively participate in local customs that have been preserved for generations.

Uttar Pradesh: a Dalit family’s 35-year-old Muharram tradition in Balrampur

In Chahatwa village, under the Gumdi Gram Panchayat in the Shridattganj block of Balrampur district, Uttar Pradesh, a unique tradition has been alive for over 35 years. Here, a Dalit Hindu family prepares and installs a Tazia every single year for Muharram. The tradition started with the family elder, Asharam. It was later passed down to his son, Shiv Prasad, and is now being carried forward by his grandson, Kamal Kanojia. Three generations of this family have kept the practice going without a single break, making it a key part of the village’s Muharram activities.

The dedication of the family has been covered by local journalists and media platforms, showing how a personal family promise turned into a symbol of community unity.

35 साल से मुहर्रम पर ताजिया रख रहा बलरामपुर का दलित परिवार, बना सांप्रदायिक सौहार्द की मिसाल –#BreakingNews #Muharram #Dalit https://t.co/MrNL20PFiT

— Journo Mirror (@JournoMirror) June 29, 2026

According to Kamal Kanojia, the practice started because of a personal milestone. Decades ago, the elders made a vow to honour a special family wish. When that wish came true, they promised to install a Tazia every year during the holy month of Muharram. Since then, the family has followed this custom with deep faith, as reported by Dainik Bhaskar.

Every year, the Kanojia family works together to build the Tazia. Once it is ready, people from nearby villages visit Chahatwa to see it and pay their respects. What began as a private family vow has grown into a major regional event that brings different communities together.

Asharam often tells visitors that the family believes this tradition brings peace, blessings, and well-being to their home. His son, Shiv Prasad, agrees, noting that the family saw good changes in their farming, business, and daily life after starting this practice. For them, continuing the custom is a way to respect their elders’ faith and keep the village’s identity alive. Local neighbours say the family is a living example of how mutual respect keeps harmony alive in rural areas, as reported

Bihar: a century-old legacy led by a Hindu family in east Champaran

In Bihar’s East Champaran district, the village of Patahi has followed a unique Muharram tradition for more than a century. As soon as the month of Muharram begins, the entire village gets ready. The most unique part of the procession is that it is led by members of the Singh family, who are Hindus.

For generations, this family has held the responsibility of leading the Tazia procession through the village streets. The community spirit of this annual event has been recorded on video, showing the close bonds between the neighbours.

During Muharram, the courtyard of Shiv Shankar Singh’s house becomes the main centre for preparations. Family members gather to build and decorate the Tazia before taking it out through the village. As the procession moves along, participants perform traditional lathi (bamboo staff) displays to remember the historic events of Karbala. Shah Mohammed, a resident of nearby Padumker village, remembers watching the Singh family lead the procession every year of his life. Other locals also see the family as an essential part of the town’s history, as reported

When asked how it all started, current members of the Singh family say the exact details have been lost over time. However, they know the practice dates back to their great-grandfather, Devi Singh, during British rule. Back then, official permits were needed for public processions, and the license for this Muharram event was issued directly in the name of the Singh family.

Today, the younger generation hopes to keep this tradition alive for years to come. One family member shared that while people may follow different religions in private, when they stand together for the procession, they represent the true spirit of India.

Bihar: crafting traditions in Gaya’s Atri village

In Atri village of Bihar’s Gaya district, community cooperation is visible through local art. During Muharram this year, five out of the seven Tazias in the village’s main procession were built and carried by local Hindu families. According to village elders, these families are simply following a practice they inherited from their ancestors. Making a Tazia takes time, patience, and team effort. Families spend several days shaping bamboo frames, cutting colored paper, and assembling the decorative structures.

Even though the event marks an important chapter in Islamic history, participation in Atri goes beyond just one community. Residents describe it as a normal, long-standing social tradition rather than something unusual. For these families, building the Tazia is a shared responsibility passed down from one generation to the next.

Madhya Pradesh: five generations of devotion in Vidisha

In the town of Vidisha, Madhya Pradesh, the Kushwaha family is central to the annual Muharram activities. For decades, this Hindu family has served at the shrine of Bawdi Waale Baba, which sits right across from a Hanuman temple in Khai Mohalla. Because the shrine and the temple face each other, people regularly visit both places to pay respects, showing the shared heritage of the town.

Every year during Muharram, the Kushwahas manage the arrangements for the Baba’s procession. Today, the fifth generation of the family is continuing this work with deep dedication. The sacred symbol of the Baba is carried on the head of the oldest male member of the family. Decorated with fresh flowers and garlands, the symbol is carried through the main market, drawing thousands of people from Vidisha and nearby areas.

“I have seen my elders serving Baba since I was a child, and the same tradition continues today. There was a time when our family was very poor, but our service never stopped. With Baba’s blessings, our family prospered, and today our children and grandchildren are carrying on this legacy.” — Chhoti Bai Kushwaha, oldest family member. As a report in ETV.

Bihar: a century of unity in Gurdaspur, Begusarai

While news stories about unity often focus on big cities, the small village of Gurdaspur in Bihar’s Begusarai district has spent nearly a century showing how brotherhood works in daily life. The Hindu and Muslim residents of this village, which has about 500 families, celebrate Muharram together as one large family.

For nearly 100 years, a small village in Bihar has quietly done what the rest of the country still struggles to achieve.

Every Muharram, Hindus and Muslims come together to keep an extraordinary tradition alive.

The story of Gurdaspur, Begusarai, is one every Indian should… pic.twitter.com/XabdDJDlVK

— FOEJ Media (@FoejMedia) June 26, 2026

The foundation of this tradition was laid by the late Bal Govind Mahto. Decades ago, he became the President of the Muharram Committee and took care of all the arrangements. From the first day of Muharram to the tenth day (Ashura), he managed the rituals and got the official permits for the procession. When he grew old, he handed the responsibility to his grandson, Vishnudev Mahto, who served the committee for nearly 30 years. Today, his nephew, Pankaj Kumar Mahto, carries on the work.

Evolution of the Gurdaspur Muharram committee Leadership

The ritual side of this tradition has also been kept alive by a local woman named Kushma Devi. The daughter of Bal Govind Mahto, she performed the Muharram rituals with care for years. When her health declined, she passed the duties to her daughter, Urmila Devi. Today, along with her daily housework, Urmila Devi performs all the traditional ceremonies from the first to the tenth of Muharram according to local customs.

Assam and Jammu & Kashmir: regional expressions of solidarity

Further east, in the tea town of Margherita in Assam, Muharram draws many different communities together. The annual procession sees active participation from local Muslim families, Assamese Hindus, Bengali residents, and tribal communities living near the tea estates. The procession moves through the green landscape with local instruments, making the day a shared reflection on justice and regional unity.

Meanwhile, in Srinagar, Jammu & Kashmir, Muharram focuses on community service and mutual support. Along with the traditional mourning processions, people from different communities work together to set up Sabeels (free stalls offering water, milk, and tea) for the public.

Joint blood donation camps are also organised across the city, where youth from various backgrounds donate blood side by side to honor the message of humanity.

Shared traditions passed across generations

The long-standing Muharram traditions across India show that harmony is kept alive through the simple, daily actions of regular families. Whether it is the Kanojia family in Uttar Pradesh keeping a 35-year vow, the Singh family in East Champaran holding a century-old license, the Kushwahas in Vidisha managing a shrine, or the Mahto family in Begusarai leading a committee, these practices continue because of mutual respect.

By treating these customs as a shared responsibility, these villages have kept close ties over the years. Passed down from parents to children, these old rituals continue to thrive, showing that respect and humanity are the true elements of their shared culture. Given the high voltage hate generated by politicians and political outfits holding power, this simple yet powerful assertion by ordinary Indians stands out. And sends a strong message.

Related:

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The post Shared Muharram Heritage: Hindus lead Tazias, Sikhs serve water appeared first on SabrangIndia.

This grassroots movement emerged as a direct response to a vast administrative anti-encroachment campaign officially designated as “Operation Sweep.” The Rajasthan’s Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP)-ruled state government’s demolition drive had recently resulted in the demolition of several Islamic religious structures i.e. Mosques/Madrasas and the issuance of hundreds of legal eviction notices to such, reportedly without providing any reasonable opportunity of hearing. In response to these administrative actions, the assembled protesters submitted formal memorandums to local authorities, demanding an immediate suspension of the demolition drive and strict adherence to established legal processes, and the prevention of alleged selective communal targeting of minority religious sites.

सर्व धर्म शांति सभा, बाड़मेर।
“जहाँ सत्य, अहिंसा और धर्म का पग-पग लगता डेरा,
वो भारत देश है हमारा…”
सर्व धर्म शांति सभा में शामिल होकर आपसी भाईचारे, सामाजिक सौहार्द, संविधान के सम्मान और देश की एकता-अखंडता का संदेश दिया।
हमारी विविधता ही हमारी सबसे बड़ी ताकत है। सभी धर्मों, सभी… pic.twitter.com/1SqELVvewY

— Ummeda Ram Beniwal (@UmmedaRamBaytu) June 26, 2026

Background

The tensions in the region originated from a large-scale anti-encroachment and security drive initiated by the Rajasthan government in coordination with border security agencies. This enforcement campaign, named “Operation Sweep,” that began on spans a massive 1,050-kilometer border belt that physically separates India from Pakistan. Pursuant to directions issued by the Union Home Ministry, a joint team comprising the district administration, police, and the Border Security Force (BSF) undertook an operation concerning “alleged illegal constructions within 15 kilometres of the India–Pakistan border in Rajasthan’s Barmer district”, from June 18, 2026 onwards.

Rajasthan Bulldozer Action: Barmer में Operation Clean के तहत Ind-Pak सीमा की मस्जिद पर गरजा बुलडोजर #Rajasthan #BulldozerAction #OperationClean #LatestNews pic.twitter.com/PZHZMN0FxK

— Punjab Kesari (@punjabkesari) June 22, 2026

The operation covers four major administrative districts that contain significant Muslim populations, namely Barmer, Jaisalmer, Bikaner, and Sri Ganganagar. The state government and the associated security apparatus classified the drive as a highly necessary procedural measure designed to clear unauthorised constructions and reinforce critical security infrastructure within a highly sensitive strategic military corridor. However, the execution of these orders quickly drew allegations of systemic bias from local communities.

According to precise data released on dated June 23, 2026 during a press conference by the Association for Protection of Civil Rights (APCR), approximately three hundred and fifty mosques and various Islamic religious structures situated across these four border districts were served with administrative demolition notices. Prior to the major public mobilisation, the regional enforcement drive had already resulted in the direct demolition of four separate mosques within the Barmer sector, alongside the destruction of an ancient mazaar, or shrine, in the Jaisalmer district. Local community activists and non-governmental organisations subsequently filed public complaints, asserting that the administration was selectively penalising Muslim places of worship while simultaneously ignoring similar documentation anomalies in the religious and residential structures of other communities.

Demolition of Mosques and Attack on Religious Freedom in India
23 JUNE 2026 | 3:30 PM | PRESS CLUB OF INDIA pic.twitter.com/D4RLnmwAY2

— APCR-Association for Protection of Civil Rights (@apcrofindia) June 24, 2026

In direct response to the sudden executions of these demolition orders, community members from both major religious groups organised public demonstrations to systematically de-escalate potential communal friction and demand immediate legal interventions.

Peaceful public mobilisation across Barmer and Jaisalmer

According to the Maktoob Media, the major public assemblies were recorded in the village of Badbir within the Barmer district, as well as in multiple commercial and residential locations across Jaisalmer. Hundreds of local residents gathered collectively outside the Barmer District Magistrate’s office to conduct an interfaith peace assembly.

The primary objective of these localised rallies was to challenge the execution of the demolition orders through entirely peaceful, constitutional means rather than through civil disobedience. The gathered protesters formally submitted a collective memorandum addressed to the President of India, urgently requesting an immediate pause on the entire demolition drive until transparent, unbiased legal verifications could be executed by the judiciary.

Local community leader demands equal treatment

Surtaram Meghwal, a two-time elected Dalit Sarpanch of Paradia village, emerged as one of the primary figures directing the local public response and articulating the grievances of the unified communities. Meghwal openly challenged the statutory validity of the state’s actions, stating his belief that the demolitions were an extrajudicial exercise being carried out without following any due legal process. He argued that if mosques were being actively checked and demolished by the state, then temples should also be examined under the exact same legal standards to ensure absolute administrative fairness.

Rajasthan: In #Barmer, Advocate Surtaram Meghawal, the Sarpanch of Paradia village, publicly warned the BJP govt against what he described as the selective demolition of #mosques while sparing #temples.

He urged the govt to uphold the Raj Dharma advocated by former PM Atal… pic.twitter.com/cQDPoQB8yB

— MuslimMirror.com (@MuslimMirror) June 25, 2026

Meghwal further detailed the ground realities of the public mobilisation that took place in Badbir following the destruction of multiple religious sites. He communicated to Maktoob that the villagers protested against the demolition of these religious structures to oppose the government actions and convey their collective message peacefully. He noted that since the protest began, the region had witnessed even greater brotherhood with more citizens coming forward in mutual support and reflecting a shared belief that there was still ample time to resolve the administrative issue through dialogue. Addressing the underlying socio-political dynamic of the border region, Meghwal explicitly blamed external political factors for generating artificial friction.

He questioned the procedural fairness of the drive, asking why only mosques and religious structures of Muslims were being targeted and reiterated his stance as a two-time Sarpanch that Hindus and Muslims harbor no inherent issues with each other in the region. He concluded that institutional politics would not break the unity of the people of Rajasthan, as they would consistently stand in solidarity with their Muslim neighbors, as Maktoob Media reported

Dialogue over division

The events in Barmer and Jaisalmer are illustrative of how local leadership and resistance is the best and most effective anti-dote to what is perceived as targeted injustice. Such moves are effective and pre-emptive and preventive, an antidote to communal conflict. Hindu and Muslim residents in these districts have come together to hold joint protests, submitted memorandums to the authorities, and sought legal remedies through constitutional processes. Their actions reflected a shared belief that disputes should be addressed through dialogue, fairness, and the rule of law.

The interfaith assemblies also highlighted the long-standing bonds between the communities living in the border region. Despite facing difficult living conditions and administrative challenges, residents chose to stand together and protect the harmony that has existed in their villages for generations. While the legality of the demolition drive will ultimately be decided through judicial and administrative processes, the peaceful response of the local people demonstrated the value of maintaining communal harmony during times of uncertainty. The events serve as a reminder that equal application of the law, respect for due process, and continued dialogue between communities and public authorities are essential for preserving public trust and social harmony.

Related

When Citizens Say No: The quiet revolt against hate in India’s streets

CJP’s 2025 intervention against ‘Digital Hate’: Holding television news channels accountable before the NBDSA

Public Resistance and Democratic Assertion: India through protests, 2025

The post Brotherhood in Rajasthan: Hindus, Muslims Protect Border Mosques appeared first on SabrangIndia.

That challenge from citizens has now reached the Bombay High Court. This week, the People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) and the Forum Against Oppression of Women filed a writ petition challenging the constitutional validity of the Maharashtra Special Public Safety Act (MSPSA), contending that the law violates fundamental constitutional guarantees and grants excessive, unchecked powers to the executive. The challenge marks the beginning of a legal test for a legislation that has generated sustained opposition from civil liberties organisations, trade unions, academics, lawyers, students’ groups, political parties and democratic rights movements across Maharashtra.

Importantly, many of the arguments now being advanced before the High Court closely mirror concerns that were repeatedly raised during the legislative process itself. Among the organisations that consistently opposed the legislation was Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP), which submitted detailed objections to the Joint Select Committee examining the then Bill, participated in the broader state-wide campaign against the legislation, and warned that the law’s vague provisions could become a tool for suppressing dissent rather than addressing genuine security threats.

A constitutional challenge to the heart of the law

According to the petition filed before the High Court, the Act suffers from a fundamental constitutional defect: it authorises severe restrictions on freedoms of speech, expression, association and assembly without incorporating the procedural safeguards that constitutional jurisprudence requires when the State seeks to limit such rights.

The petition argues that the law violates Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution and undermines broader constitutional principles of liberty, equality and democratic participation. It further contends that the Act creates a framework through which organisations can be declared unlawful on the basis of broad executive discretion, while insulating those decisions from meaningful scrutiny.

Particularly significant is the challenge to the Act’s definitions of “unlawful activity” and “unlawful organisation.” According to the petitioners, these definitions are so broad and vague that they can potentially encompass trade unions, social movements, human rights organisations, political opposition groups and individuals engaged in peaceful dissent.

The challenge therefore strikes at the central architecture of the legislation rather than merely isolated provisions. It asks whether a law ostensibly enacted to combat extremism can constitutionally employ language so expansive that ordinary democratic activity may fall within its ambit.

A warning raised long before the Act was passed

The constitutional challenge did not emerge in a vacuum. For months before the legislation was enacted, Maharashtra witnessed one of the most extensive civil society mobilisations against a proposed law in recent memory. More than 12,750 objections and suggestions were reportedly submitted to the Joint Select Committee examining the Bill, making it one of the largest public responses ever received by the Maharashtra legislature. More than ninety percent of the submissions reportedly opposed the legislation.

Citizens for Justice and Peace was among the organisations at the forefront of this campaign. In April 2025, CJP submitted a detailed objection memorandum to the Joint Select Committee, warning that the legislation posed a serious threat to constitutional freedoms and democratic dissent. CJP argued that the Bill’s framing around the idea of “Urban Naxalism” rested on an inherently vague and politically charged concept that lacked clear legal meaning. Significantly, the organisation pointed out that the Union Ministry of Home Affairs itself had previously stated that it does not use the term “urban naxal” as an official category in dealing with Left-Wing Extremism. CJP warned that a law justified through such an indeterminate concept risked becoming a mechanism for targeting journalists, activists, artists, civil society organisations and political critics rather than genuine security threats.

Today, many of those concerns have reappeared in the constitutional challenge before the High Court.

The battle over “unlawful activity”

One of the most striking parallels between the writ petition and earlier civil society objections concerns the Act’s definition of unlawful activity.

The petition before the High Court argues that the definition is overbroad and vague, allowing the State to invoke the law against a wide range of lawful democratic activities.

CJP’s earlier objections had similarly focused on Section 2(f), arguing that phrases such as conduct that creates a “danger or menace to public order” were left undefined and provided no clear legal standards. According to CJP, terms such as “menace” were capable of subjective interpretation and could permit authorities to categorise ordinary activities as unlawful according to their discretion. The concern was not merely semantic. Constitutional law has long recognised that vague criminal provisions create opportunities for arbitrary enforcement. When citizens cannot reasonably determine what conduct is prohibited, enforcement becomes dependent on the discretion of the executive rather than the rule of law.

That concern now sits at the centre of the High Court challenge.

The question of executive power

The writ petition also challenges the breadth of powers conferred upon the State government to declare organisations unlawful. Again, this reflects a recurring theme in earlier objections raised by civil liberties groups.

CJP argued that the proposed framework granted extraordinary authority to the executive while providing inadequate independent oversight. It questioned the composition of the Advisory Board established under the legislation, noting that members need only be qualified for appointment as High Court judges rather than serving judicial officers. Because appointments are ultimately controlled by the government itself, CJP warned that the mechanism lacked sufficient institutional independence. The broader concern was that a law designed to regulate political organisations and associations should not depend primarily upon executive opinion.

The constitutional challenge now similarly questions whether the legislation creates a system in which governmental discretion is insufficiently constrained by objective standards and procedural safeguards.

Existing laws already covered the field

Another criticism repeatedly advanced by opponents of the legislation was that Maharashtra already possessed an extensive arsenal of security laws.

CJP argued that provisions dealing with terrorism, organised crime, unlawful activities and threats to national security already exist through laws such as the UAPA, the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita and the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act. It questioned why an additional statute with even broader powers was necessary at all. The constitutional challenge raises a related issue. If existing criminal law already addresses violent extremism and organised criminal activity, what precisely justifies a separate law empowering the State to declare organisations unlawful through broad and vaguely worded standards?

This question becomes especially important because the Act itself repeatedly invokes concerns regarding Left-Wing Extremism while failing to define key terms such as “naxalism” or “left-wing extremist” within its operative provisions.

A state-wide democratic resistance

The present litigation is also the culmination of a much broader political and civic campaign. In April 2025, protests against the Bill were organised across Maharashtra, bringing together civil liberties organisations, workers’ groups, farmers’ organisations, students’ groups, political parties and grassroots movements. Demonstrations took place across dozens of districts and reflected an unusually broad coalition united by concerns regarding civil liberties and democratic freedoms.

CJP played a visible role in that mobilisation, participating in a wider coalition that argued the legislation threatened constitutionally protected rights of speech, association, assembly and protest. The campaign consistently maintained that the law’s vague language created the risk that peaceful political opposition could be conflated with threats to public security. The filing of the writ petition therefore represents not the beginning of resistance to the law, but the latest stage of a struggle that has been unfolding for over a year. The formal objections raised by CJP have been detailed and may be perused here.

Why the High Court’s decision matters

The challenge before the Bombay High Court extends beyond the future of a single state law. At its core lies a constitutional question that has repeatedly confronted Indian courts: how far can the State go in the name of security before constitutional freedoms are impermissibly compromised?

The petition asks whether a law can authorise severe consequences, including the declaration of organisations as unlawful, through definitions that have been described as vague, subjective and susceptible to political misuse. It raises concerns about executive overreach, procedural fairness, access to justice and the protection of democratic dissent.

For organisations such as Citizens for Justice and Peace, the issue has never been whether the State can act against genuine violence or armed insurgency. Rather, the concern has been whether legislation drafted in the language of security can ultimately be deployed against lawful political activity.

The complete dissent note by CJP may be read here.

Detailed reports may be read here, here and here.

Related:

Public Resistance and Democratic Assertion: India through protests, 2025

Dissent Note: The alarming scope of Maharashtra’s Special Public Safety Bill, 2024

Censorship After NEET: A substitute for accountability

The Supreme Court in 2025: When procedure trumped principle

Assam, the third state to pass UCC: Gender justice or targeted communalism the aim?

The post From Protest to Petition: Maharashtra’s Public Safety Act in the dock appeared first on SabrangIndia.