With these words, Hamela Khatun, also known as Hamela Begum, recalls the moment her world collapsed. A resident of Bhakeli Kanda in Darrang district, she grew up in a family of small farmers who survived on a patch of land along the Brahmaputra. Like millions in Assam’s char regions, river erosion was a familiar enemy. Their land vanished gradually, leaving the family impoverished and forcing them to migrate to Kerala as labourers.

Yet the destruction of their home was only the first blow. In 2009, the Border Branch of Darrang issued a notice against her under the Foreigners Act, accusing her of being an “illegal Bangladeshi migrant.” Overnight, a woman who had been born, raised, and registered as a voter for nearly two decades was declared a suspect. For Hamela, who had lived her entire life in Assam, the allegation was not merely bureaucratic confusion — it was a wound to her sense of belonging. The notice left the family shaken, terrified, and mentally shattered.

How help arrived — entirely by chance

In early 2025, as the family travelled to Bako in Kamrup district for temporary work, fate intervened. At a relative’s house, they unexpectedly encountered Advocate Abdul Hai, a member of CJP’s Assam legal team. With hesitation, they shared their ordeal — the FT notice, the years of fear, the absence of guidance, their displacement to Kerala, and the looming threat of deportation. Moved by their distress, Hai immediately informed CJP State Secretary Nanda Ghosh, who assured them that CJP would provide full legal assistance, completely free of cost.

This chance meeting, almost accidental, changed the entire course of Hamela’s case. For the first time in years, the family felt a faint sense of hope.

Hamela Khatun stands with CJP’s Assam Team

The Case Before the Foreigners Tribunal: What the state alleged

The reference against her — Ref. Case No. 294/2009, formally registered as F.T. Case 5861/2011 — was forwarded by the Superintendent of Police (Border), Mangaldai. It claimed that Hamela was not an Indian citizen but an illegal migrant who had entered Assam unlawfully. Her entire identity was placed under suspicion, and the Tribunal was asked to determine whether she was an Indian or a foreigner.

Crucially, under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946, the burden of proof lies on the accused — meaning Hamela had to prove her own citizenship, rather than the state proving she was a foreigner. For a poor, illiterate woman displaced by floods, this burden is extraordinarily harsh. Yet she refused to give up.

How Hamela Proved Her Citizenship: A lifetime of records, preserved against all odds

Despite years of displacement, poverty, and illiteracy, Hamela managed to gather a remarkable collection of documents establishing her lineage, identity, and continuous presence in Assam.

She proved that her grandfather, Jasim Mandal, appeared in the 1951 Legacy Data and in the 1960 Voters’ List. Her paternal uncles appeared in 1966 and 1977 Voters’ Lists, showing that the family has lived in the same region for decades. Her father, Haidar Ali, appeared consistently in voter lists from 1985 all the way up to 2025, establishing uninterrupted citizenship across generations. Similarly, her mother, Rupbhan Nessa, and her siblings were all documented in electoral rolls in Sipajhar LAC across the years 1997–2025.

Hamela also produced all her own electoral records from 2006, 2010, 2021, and 2025, each showing her as a resident of Mangaldai LAC. Alongside this, she submitted a residential certificate, a linkage certificate from the Gaon Panchayat, land documents from the 1950s and 60s, Aadhaar card, PAN card, ration card, bank passbook, and several other personal IDs.

In addition to documentary evidence, her father testified before the Tribunal. His deposition — detailing the family tree, place of origin, the names of his brothers and sisters, and his movements over the years — matched perfectly with every document filed. This consistency became a decisive factor in establishing her citizenship.

Tribunal’s Detailed Findings: A clear, decisive, evidence-based victory

The Tribunal, after examining every record, deposition, and certified document, delivered a clear and categorical finding. It held that Hamela’s forefathers were genuine Indian nationals, and her family lineage from her grandfather to her father was fully supported by electoral records dating back more than six decades. Her own voting history since 2006 further reinforced her claim.

The Tribunal found the evidence “reliable, trustworthy, and sufficient,” noting that there was nothing in the record to cast doubt on her claims. Her grandfather’s name appeared in the 1960 electoral roll, her uncles in 1966 and 1977, her father and mother across multiple voter lists until 2025, and her own name in four different rolls over nineteen years. Every link in her family tree was documented, certified, and verified.

Based on this, the Tribunal concluded:

“Musstt. Hamela Khatun @ Hamela Begum… is not a Foreigner/Illegal Migrant of any stream. The reference is answered in the negative.”

It directed the Superintendent of Police (Border), Mangaldai, and the Deputy Commissioner, Darrang, to take necessary action recognising her as an Indian citizen.

It was a complete victory — built entirely on evidence, consistency, and truth.

When the Order Reached Her Home: Relief after years of fear

On November 24, 2025, a CJP team comprising State In-charge Nanda Ghosh, DVM Joinal Abedin, Advocate Abdul Hai, driver Asikul Hussain, and local community volunteers travelled nearly six hours across rough, broken roads to reach Hamela’s house.

The journey was long, but when they arrived, they saw a sight that made every hour worth it — Hamela standing with a wide, relieved smile, holding the order copy that restored her identity.

She told the team, her voice trembling with gratitude: “You saved us by fighting the case for free. You stood by us in times of trouble.”

In a gesture of humility and affection, she offered them boiled eggs from her chickens and small flower seedlings from her garden — a heartfelt expression of thanks from someone who had endured years of erasure and suffering. She added, “I was worried for so long, but today I’m happy.”

As the team left, the sun was setting over the Brahmaputra, casting a warm glow over the green fields that surround her house — a fitting end to a journey that symbolised justice, dignity, and belonging.

Why Hamela’s story matters for Assam and India

Hamela’s struggle is emblematic of the larger issues in Assam’s citizenship verification system. Her case highlights how:

• River erosion uproots entire communities, leaving them without documents.
• Poor, illiterate women are disproportionately targeted and unable to navigate legal processes.
• The burden of proof under Section 9 places crushing pressure on the accused.
• Entire families with long-established presence in Assam can be declared “suspects” based on bureaucratic doubts.

Yet her case also demonstrates the power of community support, legal aid, and sustained documentation. It shows that even in a system stacked against the poor, justice is possible when facts are presented clearly and fearlessly.

Conclusion

Hamela’s story is ultimately one of resilience. She lost her land to the river. She lost her livelihood to displacement. The state tried to take her citizenship. But she fought back — through truth, documentation, and sheer courage. The Foreigners Tribunal vindicated her, reaffirming that she belongs to this land as firmly and deeply as her ancestors did.

Her journey — from erosion and poverty to legal recognition and dignity — stands as a reminder that citizenship is not merely a bureaucratic label. For India’s poorest and most vulnerable, it is the foundation of belonging, identity, and survival.

The complete order may be read here.

Related:

From Despair to Dignity: How CJP helped Elachan Bibi win back her identity, prove her citizenship

CJP scores big win! Citizenship restored to Mazirun Bewa, a widowed daily wage worker from Assam

CJP Exclusive: Homeland to No Man’s Land! Assam police’s unlawful crackdown on residents still battling for restoration of citizenship rights?

A Long Road to Justice: CJP helps Alijon Bibi reclaim her citizenship after 2-year legal battle

The post Washed Away by Floods, Targeted by the State: Hamela Khatun’s fight for citizenship appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The post Communal Profiling at Malabar Hill, CJP’s files complaint with Maharashtra Police and NCM appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The decision did more than meet Kaushik’s claims for compensation. It issued far-reaching institutional directions: the creation of a committee headed by retired Justice Asha Menon to propose a model Equal Opportunity Policy (EOP) for transgender persons, and then, further ordered that the policy, following the guidelines, would be binding on all establishments, public and private, until the Union Government delivered its own. Through this action, the Court bridged the historic gap between recognition and implementation of equality, making it move from being an aspiration into an enforceable mechanism.

A Case that Became a Constitutional Reckoning

Unfortunately, Jane’s experience is not unique. After revealing her gender identity, she was forced to turn in her resignation after only eight days on the job at a school in Uttar Pradesh; a school in Gujarat later rescinded her job offer on similar grounds. She subsequently filed with the Supreme Court, under Article 32, arguing that these actions were violations of her constitutional rights and of the 2019 Act that prohibits discrimination “in any matter relating to employment.”

The court agreed. The Bench noted that discrimination on the part of private employers that is gender identity-based “strikes at the heart of the constitutional guarantee of dignity and equality” and explained that by not doing something about such exclusions by private entities state was making an “omissive discrimination.” The judges reminded the government, in the end, that the TG Act and its 2020 Rules were not too long ago, “brutally reduced to dead letters” by the government’s bureaucratic apathy.

While acknowledging the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019, and the 2020 Rules, the Court regretted that they “have been brutally rendered dead letters” (para 35, p. 29). It further criticized the “grossly indifferent approach to the transgender community,” noting that this inaction “cannot in any way be fairly regarded as inadvertent or accidental; it is deliberate and is undoubtedly rooted in societal stigma, compounded by a lack of bureaucratic will” (para 35, p. 29). This scathing indictment of bureaucratic failure was coupled with a clear finding that the petitioner’s termination constituted a violation of her dignity, livelihood, and equality.

In asserting both direct and indirect discrimination, the Court put the question of gender identity discrimination into a framework of systemic injustice, and not simply a personal grievance. The damages awarded to Kaushik were symbolic, but profound: declaring through the judiciary that dignity is not contingent on conformity.

The Constitutional Arc: From NALSA to Kaushik

The judgment in Jane Kaushik v. Union of India is not disconnected from a trajectory of equality jurisprudence over the last decade or so. Its reasoning is founded upon three separate but constitutional landmark decisions — National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India [(2014) 5 SCC 438], Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. [(2017) 10 SCC 1], and Navtej Singh Johar and Ors. v. Union of India (Ministry of Law and Justice) [(2018) 10 SCC 1] — each of which represented a point in India’s constitutional journey from recognition to dignity.

In National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India (NALSA), the Supreme Court expressly recognized transgender individuals as “the third gender,” indicating that Articles 14, 15, 16, 19, and 21 recognize the right to equality and dignity for all individuals, regardless of their gender identity. The judgment stated, “Gender identity is inherent to the concept of personhood…one of the most fundamental elements of dignity, self-determination, and freedom.” The Court also mandated that the state governments recognize self-identification and take proactive measures relating to education and employment. The Kaushik Bench cited NALSA to reaffirm that, “Articles 15 and 16 must be read in a manner that prohibits discrimination based on gender identity” (para 30, p. 26), but importantly extended this reasoning into the employment context, stating that neither public nor private employers may deny employment based on gender identity.

Three years later, in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, a nine-judge Bench recognized that the right to privacy under Article 21 includes bodily integrity, decisional autonomy, and the right to express one’s identity. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud wrote that “privacy protects individual autonomy and recognizes the right to make vital personal choices.” Kaushik recognizes this principle and extends autonomy to the workplace, contending that the right to live with dignity includes the right to livelihood without stigma.

Finally, in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, Section 377 of the IPC was invalidated, decriminalizing relations between persons of the same sex, and holding that equality is grounded in constitutional morality rather than public morality. With NALSA, Puttaswamy, and Navtej all providing a philosophical basis for the holding in Kaushik, they enforce those rights in the workplace. From recognition of identity, to protection of autonomy, to the enforcement of economic dignity, Jane Kaushik marks an evolution in India’s constitutional journey to not only a right to exist but to a right to thrive.

Equality Beyond Formalism: The Court’s Expansive Interpretation

One particularly notable aspect of the Kaushik case is its recognition of substantive equality, an embodied notion of equality that requires not just that all people be treated the same, but that normative structural barriers are eliminated so that certain groups can realize their rights.

Citing Articles 14 through 16 of the Indian Constitution, the Court validated that discrimination based on gender identity is a form of discrimination based on sex. The Court also connected this idea to the right to a dignified life and to live under Article 21 of the Constitution by stating that refusing employment based on gender identity results in “economic and social death” to an individual. The judgment invoked something called constitutional morality and reminded employers, both public and private, that the obligation of equality is not discretionary; it is a part of being a democratic citizen.

This point is significant because, as observed by CJP in its report about transgender rights in 2023, a lot of the discrimination experienced by the transgender community is not a result of outright bad intentions but rather due to inertia and ignorance by the institutional structure. The Court’s reasoning captured that in its justification by holding that to omit, or not act, can itself be a form of discrimination.

By recognizing “omissive discrimination,” the Bench also expanded and layered the idea of state obligations. As the Bench explained, equality means positive obligations. The State must ensure that the rights of transgender persons are not merely enshrined in law, but that they are realized and effective.

Strengthening Employment Protection

The first sphere of impact of the judgment for the transgender community is with respect to employment security.  The Court found expressly that the protections available under the TG Act apply equally to public and private employment, which makes it unlawful for any establishment to deny employment, promotion, or continuance for reasons relating to gender identity.

This means that where previously, major alterations to workplaces across India were difficult to put in place properly (at a general level, but increasingly across specific employment compartments governed by individual laws, such as recognition also in respect of ‘male and female’), this is now a seismic shift in practice and the obligation on employers. Employers must now make reasonable accommodation, whether borrowing the term from disability rights jurisprudence or applying the principle from the Court in respect of substantive equality, on any decision or treatment, covering everything that applies to transgender persons: recruitment forms, uniforms, leave policy, goodwill policy, and grievance procedures, also all included.

Having also ordered a compensation award to Kaushik, the Court now presents a precedent in respect of damages in fear to workplace discrimination, making it clear that discrimination is not only a negative ethic but an illicit treatment too. As earlier argued in CJP’s “The Discordant Symphony”, the work for transgender rights in India is not only about legal recognition, but within the real act, one of accessing responsible means of livelihood. This judgment helps stitch the gap between legal and lived rights responsibly, moving now toward enforceable law work.

Mandating an Equal Opportunity Policy

Arguably, one of the most progressive components of the ruling is the instruction to draft a template Equal Opportunity Policy (EOP) for transgender persons. The Court observed that Rule 12 of the 2020 Rules already imposes an obligation on every establishment to implement an EOP, designate a complaint officer, and create an environment free of discrimination, but noted that few, if any, establishments had done so.

The newly constituted Justice Asha Menon Committee is to produce a uniform EOP to be used by all establishments. Until it is formally adopted by the Union Government, the Court ruled that the guidelines of the committee will have a binding effect.

This shifts the responsibility of inclusion from a moral goal to a legal duty. The Court effectively constitutionalizes workplace inclusivity as an obligation of employers. Employers, schools, corporations, etc., now have an ongoing obligation to have trans-inclusive policies, grievance policies, and sensitization regimes.

As CJP’s earlier analysis in “From Judgments to Handbook: India’s Transformative Journey towards LGBTQIA Equality” pointed out, systemic inclusion cannot be left to goodwill; it has to be planned design. The Supreme Court has now offered precisely that design.

Ripple Effects: Recruitment Norms and Affirmative Action

Jane Kaushik’s implications transcend a single case. For the public sector, the judgment reopens discussion around reservation and affirmative action for transgender persons. Only a handful of states, including Karnataka, which offered a 1 % horizontal reservation, and Odisha, which instructed departments last month to incorporate “transgender” as a category of gender separately on forms, have taken action on inclusive hiring policies.

By calling out inaction by the state, the Supreme Court has signalled that governments cannot sit idly. Departments will have to insist on representation, reasonable relaxations, and non-discriminatory criteria in recruiting and promoting.

The implications for the private sector are equally significant. Employment discrimination based on gender identity now not only carries reputational risk, but legal risk as well. The binding EOP means private institutions will now need to modify their recruiting advertisements, the recruiting application forms, and internal HR policies to ensure inclusion. Selection committees and the Board of Directors will require mandatory sensitivity training, and failure to comply could result in judicial assessment.

In that regard, the judgement extends the ethos of equality into India’s economic systems, making sure that the transformative promise of the Constitution governs behaviour not only by the State, but the marketplace as well.

Constitutional Morality Meets the Workplace

Through Jane Kaushik v. Union of India, the Supreme Court has issued one of its most important equality decisions since Navtej Johar. It extends the Constitution into dimensions of society where discrimination can often continue without intervention. It does this by asserting the need to implement a national Equal Opportunity Policy and assigning significant responsibility to the State to respond to “omissive discrimination”, therefore transforming equality from a right to a collective responsibility of every institution.

For India’s transgender citizens, this decision substantively transforms symbolic recognition into meaningful participation – from simply existing to being able to be employed, from invisibility to the possibility of inclusion. True progress is not identified merely in laws or decisions but in the security of dignity in everyday life.

The next test is whether this landmark ruling is remembered, not as a judicial victory but as when workplaces, all over India, began to embody the values of the Constitution itself.

The judgment in Jane Kaushik v. Union of India can be read here:

The judgment in National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India can be read here:

The judgment in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India can be read here:

The judgment in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India can be read here:

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Preksha Bothara)

Related

Reflecting on Transgender Rights in 2023: Have Legal Recognition and Advocacy Efforts Broken the Cycle of Discrimination and Ostracism?

The discordant symphony: where does the transgender community go from here?

From Judgments to Handbook: India’s Transformative Journey towards LGBTQIA+ Equality

Can pride be apolitical? Perspectives from queer and trans* community

Mapping Gender-Based Violence in India: Trends, determinants, and institutional frameworks

MAT highlights state’s duty under Transgender Act 2019 for Trans inclusion

The post Beyond mere Recognition: The Jane Kaushik judgment and the next frontier of transgender equality appeared first on SabrangIndia.

While the Model Code of Conduct (MCC) is in force for the ongoing Bihar Assembly elections, Choubey, a senior BJP leader and sitting MP, delivered a speech that directly targeted the state’s Muslim population. In his address, he appealed to “Muslim brothers” to “reduce their population” and claimed that “ghuspaithiye (infiltrators) are coming from across the border.” The remarks, CJP noted, deliberately conflated Indian Muslims with illegal immigrants and invoked communal stereotypes to create fear and prejudice among voters.

CJP has urged immediate intervention by both the Election Commission and state authorities to safeguard the neutrality and integrity of the electoral process.

A dangerous conflation of faith and foreignness

According to the complaint, Choubey’s remarks go beyond electoral rhetoric. They represent a calculated act of hate speech, portraying Indian Muslims as demographic threats and foreign infiltrators — a narrative that has become disturbingly frequent in election campaigns.

By stating, “Our population is also declining. I appeal to my Muslim brothers as well: reduce your population. Ghuspaithiye are coming from across the border… our government is working to remove them,” the MP collapsed the boundary between citizen and non-citizen, implying that the Muslim presence itself was suspect.

CJP’s complaint underscores that such rhetoric de-nationalises Indian Muslims, recasting them as outsiders within their own country — a move that weaponises religious identity to secure electoral advantage.

Clear violations of electoral and criminal law

CJP’s complaint meticulously details how the speech violates several provisions of law:

• Under the Representation of the People Act, 1951:
  • Section 123(3) and (3A) — forbidding appeals on religious grounds and promotion of enmity between communities.
  • Section 125 — making it a punishable offence to promote hatred in connection with elections.
  • Section 123(2) — covering undue influence on the electorate through intimidation or communal fear.
• Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023:
  • Section 196 — promoting enmity between groups.
  • Section 297 — statements conducing to public mischief.
  • Section 356 — outraging group dignity.

The organisation also cited violations of the Model Code of Conduct, which explicitly prohibits appeals to religion or acts that aggravate communal tension, and constitutional breaches of Articles 14, 15, 19, 21, and 25 — which guarantee equality, dignity, and freedom of conscience to all citizens.

A pattern of Islamophobic rhetoric

Pirpainti, a constituency in Bhagalpur district, has a mixed population and a history of communal sensitivity. In this context, CJP warned that such inflammatory remarks carry “dangerous polarising potential” — alienating Muslim citizens, normalising prejudice, and reducing the election to a contest over identity rather than policy.

The complaint places Choubey’s remarks within a wider and troubling pattern of electoral Islamophobia, where demographic myths and border anxieties are repeatedly used to stigmatise India’s Muslim citizens. It warns that this form of hate-driven politics seeks to redefine citizenship itself — who belongs and who does not — through the language of religion and fear.

Calling Choubey’s statements “hate propaganda delivered under the cover of governance and nationalism,” the complaint asserts that such conduct corrodes the very spirit of democracy. It notes that communal appeals not only distort voter choice but also legitimise bigotry as a form of governance, thereby eroding India’s secular foundation.

CJP invoked key Supreme Court precedents, including Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen (2017), which forbids religious appeals in elections, and Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. Union of India (2014), which recognised hate speech as an assault on equality and fraternity.

CJP’s prayer and demands

Through the complaint, CJP has urged the Election Commission of India and Bihar’s election authorities to:

1. Take immediate cognisance of the complaint.
2. Register an FIR against Ashwini Kumar Choubey under relevant provisions of the Representation of the People Act and Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita.
3. Debar him from further campaigning pending inquiry.
4. Issue a public censure and advisory to all political parties to desist from communal appeals.

The complaint concludes by calling upon the Election Commission to ensure compliance with the constitutional mandate of free, fair, and secular elections under Article 324.

The complaint may be read here.

Related:

From Despair to Dignity: How CJP helped Elachan Bibi win back her identity, prove her citizenship

Two Hate-Filled Speeches, One Election: CJP complaints against Himanta Biswa Sarma and Tausif Alam for spreading hate and fear in Bihar elections

From ‘Tauba Tauba’ to ‘Expel the Ghuspaithiya’: The language of exclusion in Bihar’s election season

CJP urges YouTube to remove content targeting CJI Gavai from Ajeet Bharti’s channel

The post Hate Has No Place in Elections: CJP moves State EC against BJP MP Ashwini Choubey’s communal speech appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Tharu Community and Dudhwa National Park

In the Palia Tehsil area of Lakhimpur Kheri district resides the Tharu community, known for its rich cultural heritage and deep-rooted connection to nature. Recognised as a Scheduled Tribe in 1967, most Tharu families depend heavily on forest resources for their livelihood, including bamboo, sugarcane, timber, and other forest produce.

The Tharu community inhabits around 40 villages situated in and around the Dudhwa National Park, which was established in 1977. The subsequent declaration of Dudhwa as a Tiger Reserve further intensified restrictions on land use and access to forest resources for local residents.

Section 2 of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 (Restriction on the de-reservation of forests or use of forest land for non-forest purposes) provides that:

“Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force in a State, no State Government or other authority shall make, except with the prior approval of the Central Government, any order directing—
(i) that any reserved forest (within the meaning of the expression ‘reserved forest’ in any law for the time being in force in that State) or any portion thereof, shall cease to be reserved;
(ii) that any forest land or any portion thereof may be used for any non-forest purpose.”

While this law was intended to prevent the diversion of forest land, its rigid implementation in Dudhwa effectively displaced the Tharu population from their traditional habitats. Following the creation of the National Park and Tiger Reserve, many Tharu villages found themselves enclosed within or adjacent to protected forest zones, leading to the loss of access to ancestral lands and essential resources.

Forest Rights Act, 2006 and Criminalisation of the Tharu Tribe

The Forest Rights Act, 2006 (FRA) (attached below) recognises and vests the rights of forest-dwelling communities by providing a legal framework through which they can claim ownership over land, forest resources, and livelihoods. It was enacted to undo the historical injustice faced by Adivasi and traditional forest-dependent communities who were excluded from forest governance for decades.

Section 4(2) of the FRA provides that:

“The forest rights recognised under this Act in critical wildlife habitats of National Parks and Sanctuaries may subsequently be modified or resettled, provided that no forest rights holders shall be resettled or have their rights in any manner affected for the purposes of creating inviolate areas for wildlife conservation.”

However, in practice, these provisions were ignored. The Tharu community was arbitrarily denied their forest rights, including the right to collect firewood, graze cattle, and access forest produce, despite fulfilling all statutory criteria. In 2012, when members of the Tharu tribe petitioned the court demanding recognition of their rights, the Forest Department responded by filing thousands of fabricated “forest crime” cases against them.

As reported by The Times of India, BJP MLA Romi Sahani from Palia constituency stated that “they filed cases not only against those who went into the forest, but also people who never left home, the physically incapable, and even the dead.”

Over the years, the Tharu community has continued to face bureaucratic harassment and administrative pressure, resulting in the systematic erosion of the rights guaranteed to them under the FRA. Seventy-year-old Badhana Devi recounts, “If we raise our voices or refuse to pay when officers come, we are threatened with new cases.”

In 2020, the District Level Committee (DLC) further rejected the Tharu community’s forest rights claims, disregarding the explicit provisions of the FRA, which confer rights irrespective of the revenue status of a village. (See CJP’s previous coverage: “Vested Rights under Threat: Tharu Tribe Petitions High Court against Administrative Harassment”)

These instances illustrate a clear misuse of statutory powers and administrative authority, effectively stripping the Tharu community of their constitutionally protected rights under the pretext of performing “official duties.” What was meant to be a restorative statute has instead become a tool of persecution, deepening the community’s marginalisation.

Misuse of Conservation Laws across India

Over the years, similar patterns of criminalisation of Adivasi and tribal groups have been witnessed across India. In Uttarakhand, for instance, the Van Gujjars were evicted from their homes as part of a drive to ‘clear encroachments on forest property’. They invoked their right to inhabit forest land under Section 3 of the FRA, 2006 (read below). Further, Section 4 of the Act clearly states that, in cases where these members are residing in critical wildlife areas and National Parks, it is important first to rehabilitate them, to provide them a secure livelihood.

The Uttarakhand High Court, through an interim order, upheld the Van Gujjars’ right to migrate to their summer homesteads and held that any attempt to evict them would violate Article 21 of the Constitution as well as their rights under the FRA, 2006.

In the Hoshangabad district of Madhya Pradesh, the Adivasi tribes such as the Korkus and Rajbhars have faced similar ordeals. At Itarsi, the Central Proof Range was established as a testing ground for armaments and ammunition, leading the government to acquire vast stretches of forest land and displace Adivasi and Dalit families. The concept of ‘protected forests’ was further expanded under Section 4(2) of the Forest (Conservation) Amendment Act, 2023 (attached below), to include land used for strategic or defence projects and paramilitary camps. These exemptions and definitional ambiguities are now frequently misused by the government to bypass conservation obligations and to criminalise local communities.

Perhaps the most alarming example lies in the implementation of the Wildlife Protection Act, 1972. Under the pretext of ‘conservation’, the Act has criminalised essential livelihood practices of forest dwellers, such as collecting mahua, grazing cattle, and fishing. Entry into these lands itself became a punishable offence. A report by the Criminal Justice and Public Accountability Project (CPA) reveals that most offences registered against Adivasi communities were categorised as ‘threats to ecological security and animal habitats’, often without any specific allegations.

Further, forest dwellers and Adivasis continue to face evictions through industrialisation and mining projects. The mineral-rich states of Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, and Jharkhand are particularly affected. To facilitate mineral extraction, the standard state response has been to first declare forest land as ‘protected’ under the Forest (Conservation) Amendment Act, 2023, and then evict its inhabitants in the name of ‘conservation’. This systematic process not only undermines the FRA’s purpose but also perpetuates the cycle of dispossession and displacement of forest communities.

Legal Framework: Setting a Precedent for the Tharu Position

The judicial trajectory surrounding forest rights has consistently reinforced the constitutional legitimacy and welfare-oriented purpose of the Forest Rights Act (FRA), 2006. As seen in the preceding instances, from the Tharu community in Uttar Pradesh to the Van Gujars of Uttarakhand and the Adivasi groups in Madhya Pradesh, the administrative machinery has often undermined the FRA’s intent through procedural denials and criminalisation. However, Indian courts have, on several occasions, upheld the protective spirit of the FRA and reaffirmed the rights of forest-dwelling communities.

In Wildlife First v. Union of India, 2019 (read below),  the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the FRA, recognising it as a vital mechanism for securing the livelihoods and cultural identity of Scheduled Tribes and other traditional forest dwellers. The Court underscored that the Act does not weaken forest conservation but instead democratises it by empowering local communities as custodians of the environment.

Similarly, in Orissa Mining Corporation Ltd. v. Ministry of Environment and Forests & Ors., 2013, concerning the proposed bauxite mining project in the Niyamgiri Hills, the Supreme Court upheld the Ministry’s decision to deny forest clearance. The Court found that the project violated both the FRA and the customary rights of the Dongria Kondh tribe, whose spiritual and cultural ties to the Niyamgiri Hills were constitutionally protected.
In paragraph 43 of the judgment (attached below), the Court characterised the FRA as a “social welfare or remedial statute” designed to recognise and vest forest rights. The legislative intent, it observed, is unambiguously to safeguard the customs, usages, and traditional practices of forest dwellers. The judgment further emphasised that under the Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 (PESA) (read below), particularly Section 4(d), the Gram Sabha is entrusted with the duty to preserve and protect tribal traditions, cultural identity, and community resources.

This landmark ruling thus establishes a jurisprudential framework that directly supports the claims of the Tharu petitioners. Their ongoing struggle to secure recognition of their Community Forest Resources (CFRs) in the Terai region echoes the Dongria Kondhs’ defence of their sacred landscapes. The same legal reasoning: recognition of customary rights, participatory decision-making through the Gram Sabha, and the FRA’s remedial purpose, should guide judicial interpretation in the Tharu case as well.

Constitutional Implication: Articles 14, 21, and 300A

The arbitrary usage of the Indian Forest Act and Wildlife (Protection) Act, to arrest and detain Tharu Tribe members, under the guise of ‘protecting wildlife and natural habitat’, violates equality and liberty guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution. The forest officials particularly target people belonging to Scheduled Tribes, who often lack legal and financial recourse to raise their voices. The FIRs are filed without looking at the facts of the circumstance (as in the case of Surdas Ram Bhajan), and any sort of resistance is framed as insurgency. Therefore, non-arbitrariness, which is at the heart of Article 14, is violated.

Article 21 guarantees the right to life and personal liberty. The FRA helps secure the right to life for forest-dwelling communities by protecting their ability to earn a livelihood from the forest. The petitioners argue that non-conferment of their forest rights is a violation of Article 21, and a further perpetuation of historical injustice, against which the FRA was meant to protect.

Article 300A of the Constitution protects the right of an individual to not be deprived of their property, secured by the authority of law. The Adivasis and Tharu tribe members are forced into a system of private/state property, as a result of unsettled land rights and lack of clear demarcations. The logic holds that any land that is not owned by individuals automatically becomes state property.

Thus, the 4000 cases against Tharu Community members violate their right to life, equality and property.

Conclusion and Way Forward

The core purpose of the Forest Rights Act (FRA), 2006 was to rectify the “historical injustice” committed against forest-dwelling communities, particularly Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers, whose customary rights to forest lands and resources were denied during the colonial period and, regrettably, even after independence (as reiterated in Orissa Mining Corporation Ltd. v. Ministry of Environment and Forests).

In the case of the Tharu community, the lands they had long inhabited were declared “forest land” or designated as “protected areas” for wildlife conservation, disregarding their traditional conservation practices and deep ecological dependence on forest resources.

The extensive rights guaranteed under the FRA remain largely unrealised due to the excessive control exercised by forest officials, whose discretion often renders these legal protections ineffective in practice. Furthermore, the recent Forest Conservation (Amendment) Act, 2023, has weakened the FRA’s intent by allowing the Union Government to grant forest clearances even before the rights of forest-dwelling communities are settled or their consent obtained. This legal overlap has created a dangerous precedent where conservation is invoked to justify dispossession.

These developments also highlight how state machinery, including the Police and Forest Departments, disproportionately target communities residing in and around forest areas, a significant proportion of whom belong to Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes.

The petition submitted by Santari Ram Rana and Sadai before the Allahabad High Court exposes this subtle yet pervasive bureaucratic violence embedded within law. Unlike overt forms of repression, this harm is inflicted quietly through administrative procedures, documentation, and regulatory control, reflecting a colonial mindset that continues to view forests as needing protection from the very people who have protected them for generations.

While the writ petition remains pending before the High Court, members of the Tharu community must continue asserting their legal and cultural rights, drawing inspiration from the Van Gujjars of Uttarakhand and the Adivasi movements in Hoshangabad. Only through sustained advocacy, awareness, and judicial engagement can the original spirit of the Forest Rights Act be truly realised.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Shyamli Pengoriya)

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The post When Conservation Becomes Coercion: The silent violence faced by the Tharus of Kheri appeared first on SabrangIndia.

According to the NCRB, suicide remains most prevalent among daily wage earners, housewives, and students. These descriptions are not only about occupational status, but reflections on India’s social hierarchies. The “daily wage earner,” who made up 26.4% of all suicide victims in 2023, is the precarious worker, buried in debt, inflation, and insecure employment. The “housewife,” at nearly 14.7%, is a symbol for unpaid domestic labour under patriarchal control and social isolation. The “student,” accounting for 8.5% of total suicides, demonstrates the systemic public and private failure to provide a humane education and mental health support. For the NCRB, these are merely descriptive occupational categories, yet they carry moral and political significance; they are indicators of whose despair is acknowledged and whose is not.

Numbers without Context

The NCRB identifies “family problems” (32%) and “illness” (18%) as primary contributors to suicide. This seems simple on paper – family dysfunction and health issues. However, these classifications conceal more than they disclose. What the Bureau calls “family problems” may include domestically violent behaviour, dowry harassment, or control related to one’s gender. “Illness” likely includes untreated depression among other illnesses, stigma related to disability, and traumatic, life-changing events. Then, stripped of the structural analysis, we easily convert the collective suffering to private pathology in the data.

There is no clearer example of this than student suicides. In 2023, India reported 13,044 student suicides, or about 36 a day, with Maharashtra (2,578) and Tamil Nadu (1,982) having the highest number, followed by Madhya Pradesh (1,668). These states have the largest educational ecosystems, or competition for schools, outside of state-controlled educational ecosystems. Similar patterns recur beneath the statistics: students migrating from rural to urban centres; that caste-based discrimination continues as students are excluded to elite institutions in various ways, if they are even included; and pressures from family about economics that bar a young person’s choice to attend school prevent their abilities to enjoy school, carry their anxieties into learning spaces when they keep “school pressures” from family. The NCRB does not ask whether “academic pressure” is systemically tilted “equal” – it is not.

In February 2024, the Supreme Court released its comprehensive Guidelines on the Mental Health of Students, citing what it referred to as an “epidemic of psychological distress” on campuses across India. The Court called upon universities and colleges to create counselling cells, train faculty to identify early indicators of distress, and implement systems that can protect students from discrimination that may take place on the basis of caste, gender, or the socio-economic status of their family of origin. These Guidelines were developed as an extension of the Court’s findings in Sukdeb Saha v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2024), in which it explained that the State has a “positive constitutional obligation” under Articles 21 and 21A to ensure mental well-being in educational and workplace environments. A detailed summary done by CHMLP can be read here. In that case, the Court condemned the State’s failure to create a coherent national framework for the prevention of student suicides, in particular to direct the states to view student suicide as a consequence of policy failure rather than a private tragedy.

These pronouncements reaffirm a simple truth that the NCRB’s data failed to reveal: student suicides are not individual personal crises but expressions of collective neglect, of caste hierarchy, and of inadequate mental health infrastructure. Nonetheless, and despite these judicial interventions, implementation remains inconsistent, as most such institutions continue to treat mental health services as optional, rather than as the institutional responsibility they need to understand it as.

The Silence around Farmer Suicides and those of Workers

The way the NCRB handles farmer suicides chillingly captures the politics of omission. In 2023, 12,567 farmers and agricultural labourers died by suicide — a 5% increase from 2022. Maharashtra, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, and Madhya Pradesh made up over 60% of these suicides. Yet again, for every year, the report does not discuss structural causes: falling crop prices, shocks due to climate change, debt, and neglect in policy.

Organisations from civil society, such as the All India Kisan Sabha and P. Sainath’s People’s Archive of Rural India, have documented hundreds of farmer suicides that are absent from the NCRB report. Many suicides are coded under “other professions” or not included at all due to technical reasons of land ownership. Tenant farmers, sharecroppers, and women farmers who do the vast majority of agricultural work are missing. The NCRB’s silence about these deaths is a political act that removes the agrarian crisis from public consciousness by rendering structural violence into an absence in administrative categories.

In a similar vein, the cadre of “daily wage earners” has increased dramatically in the last five years, subsuming what was a more distinct representation of labour distress. It now includes construction workers, gig workers, sanitation workers, and small artisans who are all trapped in elements of insecurity. That nearly one in four people who commit suicide in India are daily wage earners, should not be an observation of a statistical trend, but a reproach of an economy that cares more for productivity than for people.

The Unseen Intersections of Caste, Gender, and Mental Health

By refusing to break suicide data down by caste identity, the NCRB obscures an understanding of mental distress in terms of social humiliation and exclusion. For instance, the case of Darshan Solanki, a student at IIT Bombay, who died by suicide in 2023, was widely identified in news reports as a death resulting from caste discrimination, but it would not be categorized under anything official. Likewise, the suicides of Dalit and Adivasi students across medical and technical institutions in India, who endure daily micro-aggressions from their peer groups in the form of “competition,”, also go undocumented in suicides that become of relevance to national statistics.

Gender issues exacerbate susceptibility. The relation between domestic violence, demands for dowry, and emotional abuse remains the most consistent factor for women in suicide. Yet, the label “housewife” that the NCRB has categorized those women under is a clear indication of biased and patriarchal categorization that sits below the level of humanity when suffering is reduced to a bureaucratic category. By neglecting to label intimate partner violence and coercion within marriage as a cause, the Bureau also erases the structural violence that is encountered in everyday life.

Despite the passage of the Mental Healthcare Act of 2017, mental health continues to be an undercurrent in policy and also data collected for the report. Governments allocate less than 1% of total health spending to mental health for community mental health services, which should be alarming. The NCRB noted “mental illness” as a cause for suicide in only 4.1% of suicides recorded in the annual report, and experts recognize this figure is severely understated. What this illustrates is not a rethinking of resilience, but denial. The state can measure death, rather than despair.

Disappearing the Crisis

Data manipulation encompasses not only the omission of unpleasant cases but also the reclassification of data. In 2023, several states, including Maharashtra and Telangana, reported a decline in farmer suicides due to “better welfare delivery,” although independent reports indicated a mostly correspondingly higher number. Similarly, the circumstances leading to a decline in cybercrime in Mumbai were simply reclassified to generate an 11.7% decrease in cybercrime. Suicides are often reclassified into other occupations or left unqualified to further the claims of administrative success.

The sanitization of statistics is part of a larger pattern: the act of withholding documentation to showcase progress. In Jammu & Kashmir, in 2023, the NCRB reported zero counts of communal violence and non-sedition prosecutions, while hundreds of detentions were conducted under the Public Safety Act.  Further, the NCRB stopped collecting data on lynchings and hate crimes from 2017 onwards, stating that the data collected was “unreliable”. By deciding what “counts,” the state ultimately will dictate what “counts” as a national issue.

Toward a Politics of Care

While the NCRB’s Crime in India report quantifies violence enacted by other people, Accidental Deaths and Suicides in India quantifies violence enacted by systems — by poverty, patriarchy, and policy. Still, states treat these deaths not as a social emergency, but as a statistical inevitability. A humane interpretation of the numbers insists that we view suicide not as the failing of an individual, but as the failing of governance.

There are still signs of resilience. Grassroots organizations like Kisan Mitra Helpline, Students’ Collective for Mental Health, and SNEHA have sought to offer mental health counselling, debt mediation, and legal aid to communities at risk. The Supreme Court’s latest directions to improve student mental health are also positive, but without an investment in a mental health infrastructure, these are largely symbolic.

To address India’s suicide epidemic, policy needs to shift from counting deaths to preventing deaths. This requires an acknowledgement of the structural nature of despair, deeply rooted in inequity of wealth, caste humiliation, and gendered violence, and a reimagining of the welfare state as one of care, rather than control. Until then, each number in the NCRB’s ledger will remain an indictment of a country that is still growing but not healing.

The Accidental Deaths and Suicides in India report serves a dual purpose, chronicling suffering and depoliticizing it. Each suicide occurs as an isolated act, separated from the systems that created it. The result is a perception of neutrality; the data is both the proof and the excuse.

The judgment in Sukdeb Saha v. State of Andhra Pradesh can be read here.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Preksha Bothara)

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The post Lives in the Margins: Reading India’s suicide data beyond the numbers appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Delivered within 24 hours of each other on November 4, 2025, these campaign speeches have been described by CJP as “a double assault on India’s constitutional morality and the sanctity of the electoral process.” One, by a sitting Chief Minister, communalises the campaign through religious vilification and genocidal language; the other, by a local candidate, turns political rivalry into a threat of physical mutilation.

The Siwan Rally: Himanta Biswa Sarma’s speech of hate and fear

At an election rally in Raghunathpur, Siwan, Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma compared RJD candidate Osama Shahab to global terrorist Osama bin Laden, telling the audience that they must “eliminate all Osama Bin Ladens” from Bihar. Sarma further warned that a victory for Shahab would be “a defeat for Hindus,” promising to watch the results from the Kamakhya temple in Assam and invoking figures like Babur and Aurangzeb to frame the election as a Hindu versus Muslim battle.

His remarks — equating a Muslim candidate with terrorism, describing Muslims as “infiltrators” who threaten women, and boasting of stopping salaries of “mullahs” — were deemed by the complaint to be “state-sponsored demonisation” and “an incitement to exterminatory politics.” Delivered by a Chief Minister under the Model Code of Conduct, they constitute, according to the complaint, “a direct assault on the secular fabric of the Constitution.”

CJP’s complaint lays out an exhaustive legal analysis: violations of Sections 123(2), 123(3), 123(3A), and 125 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and Sections 196, 297, and 356 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. Through the complaint, it has been claimed that Sarma’s speech breaches the Ministerial Code of Conduct, since he holds constitutional office and bears heightened responsibility to maintain neutrality and restraint.

Describing the speech as “hate institutionalised as political strategy,” the complaint also notes that Sarma’s words collapse the constitutional boundary between religion and citizenship — constructing Muslims as infiltrators and enemies of the nation. CJP has demanded the registration of an FIR, Sarma’s debarment from further campaigning, and a public censure from the Election Commission.

The complaint may be read here.

The Kishanganj Rally: Tausif Alam’s threats of violence

On the same day, in Laucha Naya Haat, Kishanganj, AIMIM’s Tausif Alam took the campaign stage to retaliate against RJD leader Tejashwi Yadav, who had earlier called AIMIM chief Asaduddin Owaisi an “extremist.” In a shocking display of aggression, Alam told the crowd: “Tejashwi Yadav called our leader Owaisi an extremist. Tell him — I will cut his eyes, fingers, and tongue if he dares insult Owaisi Sahab again.”

He went further, mocking Tejashwi as the “son of a fodder thief,” an evident reference to his father, Lalu Prasad Yadav.

The complaint describes these remarks as “acts of open intimidation and violent abuse that degrade democratic discourse.” It cites violations of Sections 115, 326, 349, and 356 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, along with Sections 123(2), 123(4), and 125 of the RPA, 1951, and multiple provisions of the Model Code of Conduct.

The complaint further emphasises that this is not political hyperbole but a “direct threat of grievous bodily harm” designed to intimidate a rival candidate and vitiate the atmosphere of free choice. CJP has called for an FIR against Alam, his temporary debarment from campaigning, and a public censure to reaffirm that threats of violence have no place in electoral politics.

The complaint may be read here.

A Pattern of Electoral Decay: Hate as common ground

Though ideologically opposite, the two speeches share a disturbing symmetry. Both substitute argument with aggression, civic discourse with communal or personal hostility. In Siwan, hate was religiously coded — against Muslims, invoking “infiltrators” and “Osamas.” In Kishanganj, hate was personally targeted — against a rival, invoking mutilation and humiliation.

CJP’s complaints thus expose a broader crisis: the normalisation of hate and violence in electioneering. Both incidents, as highlighted in the complaint, have the potential to trigger communal tension and retaliatory violence in Bihar’s politically sensitive districts. The Election Commission’s inaction, it argues, would erode not just the Model Code of Conduct but the very credibility of free and fair elections.

The complaints legal framing situates these speeches within the broader constitutional architecture of Articles 14, 15, 19, 21, and 25, and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen (2017) and Ziyauddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Mehra (1975), which define religious appeals and hate speech as “corrupt practices” that vitiate elections.

A call for restoring democratic dignity

Together, these complaints articulate an urgent appeal — that India’s electoral arena must not be reduced to a theatre of hate, threat, or intimidation. When political speech turns into a weapon — whether through communal vilification or violent menace — it corrodes the very spirit of democratic civility and constitutional equality. Electoral politics draws its legitimacy from civility, equality, and reasoned dissent — not from the language of fear or vengeance. The complaint reminds the Election Commission and the public alike that elections are not merely contests for power but tests of the Republic’s moral fibre.

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The post CJP seeks action against Assam CM Himanta Biswa Sarma and AIMIM’s Tausif Alam for election code violations in Bihar appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The complaint, addressed to the Chief Electoral Officer (Telangana), the Director General of Police (Telangana), and the Chief Election Commissioner, details how Kumar used the BJP’s roadshow at Borabanda Crossroads, Jubilee Hills, to launch a series of public remarks that demeaned Islamic religious practices while glorifying Hindu identity as a test of authenticity and courage.

Among his most inflammatory statements were:

“If a day comes when I must wear a skull cap for votes, I’d rather cut off my head.”

“I’m an unapologetic Hindu — I won’t insult other faiths by faking a namaz.”

He further mocked Chief Minister Revanth Reddy and a Congress candidate for wearing skull caps, questioning their sincerity and daring them to “prove their Hindu courage” by visiting temples with Muslim leaders.

CJP’s complaint deemed these remarks to be “a textbook example of hate speech” and a direct violation of the Model Code of Conduct (MCC), the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (RPA), and the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS).

Religious mockery as political appeal

According to the complaint, Kumar’s statements do not merely express religious pride — they constitute a deliberate and divisive appeal to religion for electoral gain. By contrasting “unapologetic Hindu authenticity” with “fake Muslim gestures,” the speech urges voters to make electoral choices based on religious identity rather than policy or performance.

CJP has alleged violations under:

• Section 123(3) (appeal on religious grounds) and Section 123(3A) (promotion of enmity) of the RPA,
• Section 125 (offence of promoting enmity between classes in elections),
• and Sections 196, 297, and 356 of the BNS, which criminalise promoting enmity, public mischief, and deliberate insult to religion.

The complaint notes that these remarks, made at a public, recorded, and widely disseminated campaign event, fall squarely within the ambit of hate speech and constitute both a criminal offence and an electoral malpractice.

Erosion of Constitutional values

CJP’s complaint situates the incident within the constitutional mandate of secularism and equality, citing Articles 14, 15, 19, 21, and 25 of the Constitution. It argues that by mocking the skull cap and namaz, Kumar has not only insulted the religious sentiments of a community but has also degraded the dignity of Muslim citizens, violating their rights to equality, dignity, and free profession of religion.

Quoting the Supreme Court’s judgment in Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen (2017), CJP reminds the ECI that “religion cannot be used to influence the choice of voters — even indirectly.” Kumar’s remarks, it states, are not “expressions of faith” but “acts of public provocation designed to divide voters and delegitimise inclusivity.”

Impact on the electoral climate

The Jubilee Hills constituency, home to a diverse and interfaith electorate, has already witnessed heightened polarisation. CJP provides that Kumar’s remarks risk inflaming communal sentiments, intimidating minority voters, and damaging the fairness and integrity of the election.

The complaint further asserts that the remarks have the potential to chill interfaith coexistence by equating expressions of respect (like wearing a skull cap) with betrayal, while valorising exclusivist religious assertion as political bravery.

CJP’s demands

CJP has urged the Election Commission and state authorities to act swiftly and decisively:

1. Take cognisance of the video evidence of the Jubilee Hills roadshow and register an FIR under relevant provisions of the RPA and BNS.
2. Debar Bandi Sanjay Kumar from further campaigning pending inquiry.
3. Issue a public censure to the BJP and all political parties to refrain from religiously provocative campaigning.
4. Forward the complaint to the ECI for further constitutional action under Article 324.

Reclaiming the secular spirit of elections

CJP emphasised the dangerous descent into hate-driven politics as dangerous by providing that when a political leader declares that wearing a skull cap merits decapitation and ridicules namaz as performance, it ceases to be political speech — it becomes humiliation, hate, and a constitutional offence. Through this complaint, CJP calls upon the Election Commission to reaffirm its constitutional duty to keep elections secular, equal, and dignified — ensuring that faith remains a matter of conscience, not a tool for votes.

The Complaint can be read here:

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From Despair to Dignity: How CJP helped Elachan Bibi win back her identity, prove her citizenship

Two Hate-Filled Speeches, One Election: CJP complaints against Himanta Biswa Sarma and Tausif Alam for spreading hate and fear in Bihar elections

From ‘Tauba Tauba’ to ‘Expel the Ghuspaithiya’: The language of exclusion in Bihar’s election season

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The post From Campaign Trail to Communal Provocation: CJP files complaint against Bandi Sanjay Kumar for divisive campaigning in Hyderabad by-election appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The matter might have ended at this stage requiring the respondents to file a counter affidavit. However, the matter cannot be treated to be so simple inasmuch as this Court is deluged with such matters on the basis of First Information Reports being filed left and right by the authorities and complainants under the provisions of the Act, 1955. (Para 15)

In this case, officers intercepted the transportation of nine living and healthy progeny of cows within Uttar Pradesh. Even though a slaughter or transport across state lines was not in issue, the owner of the vehicle was charged under Section 3, Section 5A, and Section 8 of the 1955 Act and Section 11 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960.

In determining that no offense had occurred, the Court ordered protection for the petitioner and went even further, directing the Principal Secretary (Home) and Director General of Police to personally file affidavits explaining this misuse pattern. The bench also asked for an explanation as to why the State has not issued a formal Government Order (GR) to carry out the Supreme Court’s binding directions from the judgment in Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India (July 2018) to prevent mob violence and cow vigilantism.

The Preventive Measures mandated by the apex court in the Tehseen S. Poonawalla  case have been encapsulated in this action-oriented pamphlet widely disseminated by Citizens for Justice and Peace that may be read here.

For over a decade, CJP has systematically documented and intervened against the abuse of the “cow protection” laws. Since 2017, CJP’s legal and advocacy teams have tracked the rise of mob vigilantism, along with its legal facilitators, all over India — fact-finding, litigation, and public education being the methods of doing this work. Investigations like India: The New Lynchdom (2018, CJP) and Cow Vigilantism: A Tool for Terrorising Minorities (2020, CJP) have mapped hundreds of instances where such laws have reportedly been used to sanction mob, extrajudicial violence, and have documented how the criminal justice system has been captured, even driven, by majoritarian agendas. Against this background, this becomes an important moment of judicial awareness of what CJP and other human rights defenders have been implementing for years.

It is important to note that this order is not limited to a single petitioner. It represents a judicial and legal recognition that the ongoing misuse of the 1955 Act occurs as part of a broader culture of impunity that encourages vigilantes, criminalizes livelihoods, and undermines the rule of law.

Statutory Background of the UP Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act, 1955

The 1955 Act was made to ban the killing of cows and their offspring and to control the transport of cows, all for the purpose of implementing Article 48 of the Constitution. The Act defines three regular aspects, where slaughter is banned under Section 3, transport within U.P. out-of-state is restricted under Section 5A, and punishment of three to ten years’ rigorous imprisonment and fine of ₹3–5 lakh is introduced under Section 8 for violations. Section 2(d) defines “slaughter” as “killing by any method whatsoever, and includes maiming and inflicting physical injury which in the ordinary course will cause death.” This definition shows that there must be some form of harm that would ultimately lead to death.

The Court emphasised that this requirement is routinely overlooked. It quoted Kaliya v. State of U.P. (2024 126 ACC 61), in which the Allahabad High Court cautioned that the conveyance of cows or calves in Uttar Pradesh does not invoke Section 5A since it only prohibits transport outside of that state. It also relied on the case of Parasram Ji v. Imtiaz (AIR 1962 All 22), a 1962 decision from the Allahabad High Court, which held that there is a difference between mere preparation and an attempt to slaughter. Preparation does not constitute an offence under the Act if the cow is tied up, for example. By citing Parasram Ji, the Bench emphasized that there was more than sixty years of settled law that the police were ignoring.

In this case, where slaughter, maiming, or interstate transportation was not charged, none of the violations applied. The judgment reminded us again of the Court’s own earlier warnings. In Rahmuddin v. State of U.P.(Criminal MISC. Bail Application No. – 34008 of 2020), the Court noted that the Act was being “misused against innocent persons” when it mentioned the meat was recovered, but often claimed all the meat to be cow meat without a laboratory test. In Jugadi Alias Nizamuddin v. State of U.P. (Criminal MISC Anticipatory Bail Application U/S 438 CR.P.C. No. – 182 of 2023), bail was granted before an arrest, as only cow-dung and a rope were recovered, but it was branded a “glaring example of misuse of penal law.” These rulings serve the greater purpose of demonstrating the number of mechanical FIRs that are being registered, even before investigation, and the abuse and incarceration that innocent people continue to experience.

Ambiguous legal provisions and ineffective procedural safeguards enable police overreach and selective police power against certain communities, mostly Muslims and Dalits. Consequently, the findings of the Allahabad High Court lend judicial authority to what human-rights defenders have been calling, for a long time, a systematic abuse of “cow-protection” laws.

This detailed legal explainer prepared by CJP in 2018 de-constructs how such laws have become a source of victimization.

The Court’s reasoning: From Casual FIRs to Vigilantism

After concluding that there was no offence made out, the Bench stated it was “deluged with such matters” resulting from indiscriminate First Information Reports (FIRs) under the 1955 Act (para 15). It directed the Principal Secretary (Home) and the DGP to show cause why the officers continue to lodge these FIRs in spite of the clear judicial precedent, in particular, the cases of Kaliya and Parasram Ji refer to cases in para 15. The Court required that the affidavits submitted by the officers included relevant affidavit material as to the taking of proposed disciplinary action by the State against the complainants and police personnel for making unwarranted FIRs, and if not, the Court required explanation for why the State did not issue a formal “Government Order” to legally preclude any such future FIRs, which served, in proportion, to undue disadvantage of cost in furthering the FIR towards frivolous case of prosecution.

In a serious observation, the Bench did not merely engage in procedural fault-finding; it also uncovered a more pervasive social consequence:

Yet another connected aspect of the matter under the garb of the Act, 1955 is vigilantism which is being practiced by various persons. Why we say this is because a few days back, a Bench of this Court was seized of a matter in which the car of the person was stopped by vigilantes and thereafter, it was not traceable. (See- Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 9152 of 2025 Inre; Bablu Vs. State of U.P and Ors). In the said writ, instructions have been called for by the Court. Violence, lynching and vigilantism is the order of the day. (Para 30).

The Court relied on Bablu v. State of U.P. (W.P. No. 9152 of 2025), where vigilantes encircled a vehicle, which later went missing, to illustrate how misuse of the statute invites disorder. Moreover, it established the illustration of occurrence within the wider phenomenon of “mob violence” by linking directly with the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India that “vigilantism cannot, by any consideration, be allowed to take shape… it ushers in anarchy, chaos and disorder.”

National Legal Framework: The Tehseen S. Poonawalla Mandate

In the case of Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India, the Supreme Court remarked on the very real and concerning increase in lynchings and violence related to cows. The Court, speaking through Chief Justice Dipak Misra, A.M. Khanwilkar, and D.Y. Chandrachud, found that lynching was “a failing of the rule of law and of the lofty ideals of the Constitution itself.” The Court noted that State agencies have the “primary responsibility” to protect against cow-vigilantism or any type of mob violence.

In paragraph 40 of the judgement, the Supreme Court gave a thorough set of preventative, remedial, and punitive directions: every district must appoint a nodal police officer (not below the rank of Superintendent) for oversight for prevention of mob violence; identify sensitive areas; establish fast-track courts for lynching cases; develop compensatory schemes for victims under Section 357A of the CrPC; and identify negligent officials and hold them accountable.

Despite these unequivocal mandates, however, the Allahabad High Court found that Uttar Pradesh had taken no action to meaningfully operationalise the Supreme Court directions. It found that a circular issued by the DGP on 26 July 2018 could not substitute for a Government Order issued under Article 162 of the Constitution, as such an order would reflect Government policy. The Bench thus required an explanation for the non-compliance and required affidavits showing compliance, on the basis that the lack of the Government Order undermined the prevention and punishment framework contemplated by the Supreme Court.

Notwithstanding these clear directions, the Allahabad High Court noticed that Uttar Pradesh had taken no decisive steps toward operationalizing the guidelines. Its finding was that a circular issued by the DGP on 26 July 2018 was not an adequate alternative to a Government Order issued pursuant to Article 162 of the Constitution. Only a Government Order could adequately reflect the policy of the Government. The Bench mandated a rationale of non-compliance and required affidavits evidencing compliance, noting that, absent an order from the Government, the preventive and punitive framework envisaged by the Supreme Court simply could not be accomplished.

Constitutional Implications: Articles 14, 19, and 21

The aggressive and arbitrary usage of the 1955 Act violates the equality, liberty, and due-process guarantees of the Constitution. Article 14 guarantees equality before the law, and this equality is violated when FIRs are lodged with no basis in fact or when officers exercise their discretion to target only particular communities. The equal protection principle is breached when FIRs are lodged “left and right” (para 15) when there are no fundamental elements of an offence. Therefore, non-arbitrariness, which is at the heart of Article 14, is violated.

Article 19 protects against arbitrary seizure of vehicles or criminalizing intra-State cattle transport, colloquially known as the “anti-cow slaughter provisions,” which interfere with unreasonable restrictions on the lawful trade, profession, and movement of citizens. Kaliya v. State of U.P. explicitly clarified that intra-State transport is not an offence. It is clear how restrictions on engaging in an occupation, profession, or trade when they are established directly restrict citizens’ economic liberty.

Under Article 21, the arbitrary actions are a further deprivation of liberty and dignity without due process of law. In Rahmuddin, the Court noted that accused persons languish in prison because meat samples are rarely sent for analysis and dispose of the need for due process. The combination of legal negligence and social malice undermines the conception of equal citizenship and uses the protection of cows as an excuse to persecute people. The High Court, accepting that using the 1955 Act has “wasted precious judicial time” (para 41) and that citizens should not have to “spend valuable money and time” to seek relief, demonstrates that this violation is both an individualized violation and a burden on the judiciary.

As CJP’s analyses have frequently stated, police impunity and informally inflicted violence contribute to the sense that “there are two sets of citizens: one protected by the law and the other punished by law.”

The judgment’s call for the most senior officials to be held individually accountable brings back an important idea behind constitutional governance: that executive negligence in the enforcement of the fundamental rights of every citizen cannot be excused by the silence of an institution. When the authorities of the State ignore orders made by the Supreme Court and allow vigilantes to act, the authorities of the State cease to execute their constitutional duty to uphold the rule of law.

Misuse, Vigilantism, and the Rule of Law

The Allahabad High Court’s ruling in Rahul Yadav exposes that the U.P. Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act has transitioned from a regulatory instrument to a tool for arbitrary prosecution. The Court explicitly points out that “under the garb of the Act is vigilantism,” giving judicial voice to what human-rights reporting has documented for some time—that the selective enforcement of cow-protection laws legitimizes mob violence to the detriment of threatened communities.

In reports like Divide and Rule in the Name of the Cow, CJP documents how false charges of cow slaughter/transport have been aimed at Muslims and Dalits. Sabrang’s investigations show that even after Tehseen Poonawalla, most States have not yet implemented mandatory measures as required, such as putting in place effective nodal officers or monitoring hate crimes regularly. This collection of ground reports gives both the socio-legal context to what the High Court has now acknowledged formally: the misuse of the 1955 Act has become institutionalized.

The Bench’s instruction that the Principal Secretary (Home) and DGP provide personal affidavits marks a moment when the judiciary will demand institutional accountability, not just individual relief. Whether this results in real change will depend on what the State does, if it finally issues the long-overdue Government Order required by Tehseen S. Poonawalla and takes corrective action with respect to the errant officials.

The abuse of the 1955 Act, therefore, remains a legal and moral paradox—a law intended to protect life but used under circumstances that inhibit liberty, equality, and the viability of constitutional democracy.

The judgment in Rahul Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh can be read here

The judgment in Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India can be read here

The judgment in Kaliya v. State of U.P. can be read here

The judgment in Parasram Ji v. Imtiaz, can be read here

The judgment in Rahmuddin v. State of U.P. can be read here

The judgment in Jugadi Alias Nizamuddin v. State of U.P can be read here

The judgment in Bablu v. State of U.P. can be read here

Related:

Cow Vigilantism: The primary cause of persecution of Muslim minority in India

India: The new Lynchdom

Right wing groups indoctrinate Hindu youth to wield Trishuls to protect religion, cows

Cow vigilantism, a tool for terrorising minorities?

SC urged to formulate guidelines to curb Cow Vigilantism

Cow Slaughter Prevention Laws in India

Divide and Rule in the Name of the Cow

28 States and UTs have appointed nodal officers to curb hate speech in compliance with 2018 Tehseen Poonawalla verdict :Union Home Ministry to Supreme Court

“Vigilantism is not permissible, needs to be checked”: SC, following up Tehseen Poonawalla case

Several steps forward but miles to go in the battle for a hate-free India: Supreme Court in 2023

The post Judicial Pushback against Cow Vigilantism: Allahabad HC flags arbitrary FIRs, demands accountability from top officials appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The Numbers behind the Screen

The data illustrates both advances and stagnation. On the one hand, the total number of reported cyber offences has increased, but they still account for only a tiny portion of overall (other) crimes. A 2023 Internet Freedom Foundation study found that nearly 68% of respondents who faced digital fraud or harassment did not report or seek help from the police because they did not believe the police would take action, or did not seek help due to fear of being shamed online. Even individuals who reported complaints were often turned away, told that the incident was “not serious enough” or “outside the jurisdiction” of their local police department.

The NCRB’s data on cyber offences is heavily biased towards documenting financial offences: 65% of total reported offences in 2023 were either banking or investment fraud, while non-financial classes of cyber offences – such as stalking, cyberbullying, morphing, etc. – are represented in total under 5%. Nevertheless, first-person reports from TN/NGO’s such as CyberPeace Foundation and Internet Democracy Project find that these personal and gendered violations may be even more pervasive, particularly for women, queer folks, and students. Statistically, these violations are invisible because the state cannot understand these forms of abuse as violence.

The NCRB’s Crime in India model is based on a First Information Report (FIR) registration. If a complaint is never registered as an FIR, it never appears in the Bureau’s reports. Consequently, what we have nationally is not a decrease in crime but an increase in barriers, this time bureaucratic, to counting crimes.

The Mirage of Decline: Delhi, Mumbai and the Art of Statistical Censorship

In Delhi, Mumbai, and many other large metro cities, the figures showed an abrupt decline despite the alarming figures. In Mumbai, the report shows a decline of 11.7% from the previous year in total cybercrime cases, whilst RTI data suggested that only two percent of all complaints made to the National Cyber Crime Portal were ever converted into FIRs. In Delhi, likewise, all categories show declines in clear contradiction to multiple news articles from the media presentations of data that clearly suggested increases in cyber fraud, phishing scams, and gender-based online harassment. The disconnection between the data provided through the official reports and lived human experience represents, in and of itself, a new type of censorship – a digital censorship.

The observable decrease in cybercrimes in regions such as Delhi and Mumbai illustrates how underreporting has functioned as a method of digital governance. Police officers in Mumbai, for example, privately confirmed to the Times of India (2023) that increased reports of cyber fraud were negatively affecting the public’s perception of law and order in the city, and many police stations even ceased to record phishing and fake-profile incidents as cybercrime, instead logging them as petty property offences. The entirety of the TOI report can be read here.

The situation in Delhi is paradoxically similar. The NCRB reports a slight decrease in the number of cybercrime incidents reported in 2023, yet, according to the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, the city’s cybercrime reporting helpline received over 80,000 calls. This disparity is an articulation of what one officer termed “reclassifying for efficiency,” meaning the police advised the victims to call the bank, private website, or intermediary instead of filing a FIR or police report.

This form reduces the number of FIRs filed but improves the statistical reporting; using the data as a measure no longer reveals security; it is a measure of bureaucratic discipline. The illusion of a positive or outward improvement conceals a structural refusal to document crime. Therefore, the censorship of cyberspace does not come from assertion, but comes from data.

Gender, Class, and the Digital Divide

The statistics given by the bureau also erase the social hierarchies within digital victimisation. The usual victims within a phishing scam and job fraud scheme is not the urban middle class, but rather it is low-income workers, migrant families, or elderly populations – all of whom are least literate in navigating digital bureaucracy. In 2023, the National Payments Corporation of India found that UPI-linked fraud was up by 71%, yet many victims did not feel assured or capable of making a formal complaint. The NCRB marks this crime as “banking offences” and erases the human story of systemic victimization or exploitation.

For women, queers, and minors, the stakes are different but equally severe. While image-based abuse, stalking, and cyber blackmail are on the rise, the report lists only 10,730 cases of “cyberstalking” or “cyberbullying” in 2023. That is highly impossible statistically, in a population of 1.4 billion. Experts agree that it is “ludicrously low” given the modern reach of social media and similar avenues. Ground-level studies conducted by Sabrang India and The Hindu have shown police would often, depending on the situation, suggest to women that deleting accounts was better than pursuing legal action for cyberstalking.

This gendered digital divide reproduces offline hierarchies: women and marginalized communities endure disproportionate online violence, and the state responds in a procedural and disengaged manner. In converting these experiences into codes for action, as the bureau does, the violence itself is rendered invisible — a point stripped of dignity and pain.

Invisible Harms, Invisible Justice

Cybercrime, unlike conventional crime, leaves behind traces, such as screenshots, IP logs, and chat histories, yet the Indian legal system has not adapted to utilize these for legal accountability. Data from the bureau for 2023 denotes that 22% of cybercrimes were charged, and less than 3% were convicted at trial. This poor record is compounded by the fact that there is no system for protecting victims or offering mental health services for victims of online harassment.

The NCRB’s framework also does not distinguish between cyber offences that are conducted based on economic fraud and cybercrime that is motivated by gendered violence or political ideology. Hate campaigns against journalists and activists, such as doxing or coordinated trolling, rarely go as far as registration. The India Freedom of Expression Index (IFEI) reports that 226 journalists suffered online abuse in 2023, and it seldom seems to be reflected in the observation category in the report. The very Digital Personal Data Protection Act of 2023 did focus on privacy, yet failed to discuss the accountability of platforms or intermediaries.

So, the issue is not that we lack data; rather, the data is abstract. Cybercrime is documented, but not interpreted or contextualized. Victims become statistics and records, devoid of narrative and recourse.

From Privacy to Accountability: Rethinking Digital Governance

A rights-based framework for cyber governance must move beyond the NCRB’s numerical formalism. Start with a recognition: that digital violence is not a niche technical problem, but a civic crisis that brings forward social hierarchies of power. Reforms should strengthen reporting mechanisms with a requirement of FIR registration if there is an investigation, and provide police with training to sensitively handle gendered and caste-based cyber offences.

Transparency is equally important. The bureau should report how many complaints on their portal turn into FIRs, and they should report on the data of those complaints in a disaggregated manner by gender, caste, and age. This would surface both the social pattern of online harms and expose the administrative bottlenecks to access to justice.

India’s approach towards cybercrime has primarily adopted an approach to surveillance more than safety, with broad internet shutdowns – recorded over 80 in 2023 by Access Now and SFLC.in – used as instruments for the appearance of prevention, even in the contexts of protests and communal tensions. Broad shutdowns, although often explained as security measures, mute voices and obfuscate evidence. Interventions instead of maintaining accountability for perpetrators, punish entire populations, thereby further complicating digital justice.

As the digital-acquainted world expands, so must the social governance moral imagination. Repairing safety for citizens online requires more than cybersecurity infrastructure, but accountability, empathy, and counting all the invisible victims.

Counting the Uncounted

The NCRB’s 2023 data on cybercrime showcases a contradiction within India’s digital transformation. A rise of 31.2% in reported offences demonstrates both acknowledgement of the growing threat of online crime and limitations in reporting incidents of crime. It is not that citizens are less threatened in cities such as Delhi and Mumbai; fewer offences are permitted to be documented in the first instance. The state’s digital apparatus is noting its accomplishments through denials and silence.

Gendered violence, class-based fraud, and ideological harassment thrive in the silence of non-reporting. When the NCRB records fewer incidences of crimes, it is not recognised as justice but rather accepted as erasure. In a democracy that prides itself on statistical knowledge, the absence of numbers becomes the strongest measurement of control.

Cybercrime is not, therefore, simply a technological challenge; it is a challenge to citizenship. Until every form of harm experienced in digital spaces can be translated into redress in the physical world, India’s digital democracy remains one of invisible victims, and a crisis of numbers devoid of presence.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Preksha Bothara)

Related:

Counting Crimes, Discounting Justice: The NCRB’s statistical blind spots

Mapping Gender-Based Violence in India: Trends, determinants, and institutional frameworks

State-sponsored attempts at surveillance erode right to privacy, target specific persons and expose lacunae in legislation

The Ghost of Shreya Singhal: Re-litigating digital free speech

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