He once told me that if one does not have intellectual honesty, then there is no point in doing academics. I understood the full import of this comment very gradually. Over the years, I realized why he was not feted like other academic dons and why no government recognition was ever conferred on him. His intellectual honesty always meant that he was on the wrong side of the political establishment. Today, when I understand how leading academics tailor their research to be “politically correct” or remain loyal to a “network”, I understand Prof. Ahmad’s comment with more clarity. It is painful that a scholar of his stature was ignored not just by various governments but also by the academic establishment.

Prof. Ahmad’s oeuvre spans original writings on caste and religion in Indian Muslims, the specter of communalism, education, kinship systems, etc. It was through his writings that we understood the multiple identities which Indian Muslims inhabit. His edited volume on caste amongst Muslims is still the best resource for any researcher willing to interrogate the category. Towards the later phase of his life, he devoted special attention to the question of backward castes amongst Muslims. Today organized under the umbrella of Pasmanda movement, many consider him the most important reason why the talk of Muslim caste permeated the Indian academia and civil society. He not just wrote on the issue but also toured different parts of country to deliver lectures. He would invite empirical pieces on caste and collect them in an edited book in which he would write a long introduction laying thread bare the problem at stake. At times, some of the pieces would argue the exact opposite of what he was proposing in the introduction but like a true scholar, he would include the contrary view also. He argued that caste discrimination existed with the Indian Muslim society and that there was no point denying it. This certainly did not go down well the Muslim establishment whose politics, academically or otherwise, depended on the denial of caste within their society.

I remember his interjections when the Sachar Committee Report was published in 2006. The Report showed that as a community, Muslims lagged far behind others in crucial indicators like education, representation, etc. The reception of the Report among Muslim intellectuals and those on the left was along predicted lines. Both made common ground in accusing state discrimination as the primary locus responsible for Muslim backwardness. It was only Prof. Ahmad who brought some nuance to the debate. He reminded the upper caste Muslim intellectuals how their forefathers had declared English education to be the work of the devil and hence had shunned modernity for nearly 150 years. He reminded them that Muslims were late starters in accessing modern education and that historic lag was bound to show as inequality between different communities. He reasoned that since there is a very small percentage of Muslims who can be called middle class, higher educational attainments will continue to be low.

To those on the left, he subtly pointed out that the indices for West Bengal (which was ruled by the CPM for the longest time) was far worse when compared to Gujarat (which had a BJP government). He reasoned that it was not the government or the state which was solely responsible for Muslim backwardness but rather matters internal to the community should also inquired into. But then discrimination and exclusion were the buzzwords of the time and no one paid any heed to what Imtiaz was arguing. I must also add that he was one of the few scholars who had actually read the Report; others were just fluffing.

Indian Islam was another area which retained his abiding interest. In his Ritual and Religion in India, he had stipulated that Indian Islam was simultaneously local and universal. The local elements could be seen in the practice of visitation to various dargahs, use of amulets and even rituals and practices in common with Hindus. At the same time, Indian Islam was also part of the universalism of the faith, seen in practices like Salat, Saum, Hajj, etc. This was not an idea which was original to Prof. Ahmad; such theorizations had an old history in the discipline of social anthropology. But his original formulation was that both these tendencies will continue to co-exist in what he called “Indian Islam”. In other words, he was arguing that the average Indian Muslim was perfectly happy to co-exist in two simultaneous and at times contradictory worldviews: those of the local Hindu cosmology and that of the great tradition of Islam. The historian of Islam in South Asia, Prof. Francis Robinson got into a detailed argument with him over the issue. Other scholars weighed in with the result that today no serious researcher of Islam in India can overlook the debate initiated by Prof. Ahmad.

Prof. Ahmad always encouraged difference and plurality of views. In that spirit, I must say that he was too much wedded to the idea of Nehruvian secularism and a linear view of modernization. Many a time, he assumed that modernization will take care of the orthodoxy within the Muslim community. Today, we know that things are far more complex: that Muslim orthodoxy is on the increase even as the educational levels of the community are going up. He also assumed that religious pluralism was inherent in the Indian ethos. While this might be true, placing too much emphasis on it makes us oblivious to the processes, internal to religious communities, which lead to the very subversion of that pluralism.

After he retired from the university, he was regularly seen on television adding nuance to otherwise drab debates. He weighed in on the majoritarian turn which the country was taking but was always optimistic that this was a passing phase. Sadly, his belief in the innate moderation of Indian normative psyche might not have too many takers. But the conviction with which he uttered those words could only come from a man deeply weeded to the idea of India.

Anyone writing the story of Indian Muslims post-Independence will have to engage with Prof. Ahmad’s ideas. And that’s a legacy that very few academicians leave behind.

A regular contributor to NewAgeIslam.com, Arshad Alam is a writer and researcher on Islam and Muslims in South Asia. 

Courtesy: New Age Islam

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BARABANKI: In line with the age-old tradition, Holi was celebrated at the Dargah of 19th century Sufi saint Haji Waris Ali Shah in Dewa town of Barabanki district, 25 kilometres from state capital Lucknow, by scores of Hindus of Muslims who showered each other with flower petals, abeer and gulal, on Wednesday.

The only Sufi shrine in the country where Holi is played, Dewa Sharif is known for its Hindu-Muslim unity with the priests here wearing traditional Hindu yellow robes (pitambar).

It is not recorded as to when this tradition started here, but it should be over a century old.

Wamiq Warsi, head of Halqai Fuqrai Warsi Astana Aliya Dewa Sharif, a committee of Sufi saints, said, “Dewa Sharif is a place of universal brotherhood and peace. The message of Paigham-e-Mohabbat that goes from here since the time of Haji Waris Ali Shah is very clear and poignant – that the one who loves us is ours. And today, on the basis of that, thousands of people come to Dewa Sharif to celebrate Holi and then pay their respects to the holy deity. This tradition has been going on since the time of our ancestors. In today’s time, this Holi celebration of Dewa Sharif sets a great example of unity and brotherhood in the country.”

The Holi juloos (procession) commences in the morning from the Qaumi Ekta Dwar in Dewa with flowers. It circles the town and then reaches the mausoleum around noon. By this time, gathers on the premises and Holi is played with rose petals, gulaal and abeer.

Anurag Tiwari, a local who has played Holi at the shrine for many years, said, “Devotion and love are parts of all faiths. Here at the dargah of Haji sa’ab (as the sufi saint is referred to), we profess our love for a kind elderly who has watched our back for over a century. We share our joys, fears and grief with him.”

Courtesy: New Age Islam

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Main Points

1.  Taliban promised that the rights of women would be protected under the framework of “Sharia”, but they have not provided any additional details.

2.  From 1996 to 2001, repression was a component of the Taliban’s reign, as they imposed several restrictions on women.

3.  The Revolutionary Association of Afghan Women (RAWA) published an “abbreviated” list of 29 restrictions imposed on women and 11 restrictions imposed on all Afghans between 1996 and 2001.

4.   The four schools of Islamic law disagree on the subject of Hijab and Niqab.

5. The only point on which the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence disagreed was whether a woman’s hands and face should be covered or left exposed.

6.  Taliban are unlikely to reform and the greatest fears of women in Afghan may come true.

The Taliban controlled almost three-quarters of Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001, enforcing a harsh interpretation of Sharia, or Islamic law. The Taliban arose as one of the most powerful forces in the Afghan Civil War in 1994, consisting primarily of students (Talib) from Pashtun districts of eastern and southern Afghanistan and had fought in the Soviet-Afghan War. The movement extended throughout most of Afghanistan under Mohammed Omar’s leadership. In 1996, the Taliban formed the dictatorial Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, and Kandahar became the new Afghan capital. At its peak, only three countries, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates recognised the Taliban’s authority. After being ousted from power in 2001, the Taliban reorganised as an insurgent force to fight the US-backed Karzai administration and the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan’s war. As a result of the war, thousands of civilians were killed, and millions were displaced. After two decades of fighting, the Taliban have raced to victory in Afghanistan. The group took Kabul on August 15, 2021, capping an extremely quick push across the country. All of this occurred as a result of the US-Taliban peace agreement, in which Taliban leaders have sworn to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for terrorists posing a threat to the West. However, concerns have already been expressed about how the group plans to govern the country, as well as the implications of their rule for women, human rights, and political liberties.

Although the Taliban clearly promised an amnesty shortly after reclaiming control in Afghanistan and stated that women and girls would be permitted to attend school and even work within the framework of “Sharia”, they have not provided any additional details. At a news conference, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said that women will have rights to education, health care, and jobs and that they will be “happy” under the “Sharia Law”. He added saying “The Taliban is dedicated to ensuring women’s rights based on Islam. Women can work in the health sector and other fields where they are required. There will be no discrimination against women”. Suhail Shaheen, another Taliban spokesman, says the group will respect women’s and minorities’ rights “as per Afghan customs and Islamic values.”

Concerns are being raised about how the Taliban would interpret Islamic teachings this time about women’s rights. The last time they were in power from 1996 to 2001, repression was a component of the Taliban’s reign. They moved quickly to impose several restrictions on women. Women were unable to attend school, have employment, or leave their houses without the presence of a male relative. Those who disobeyed the Taliban’s orders and their interpretation of Islam were subjected to floggings or beatings, which were often cruel and against Islam, according to several other interpretations of Islam.

The Revolutionary Association of Afghan Women (RAWA) published an “abbreviated” list of 29 restrictions imposed on women and 11 restrictions imposed on all Afghans between 1996 and 2001, when the Taliban ruled. After two decades, the Taliban leaders are reported to have said that they would respect women’s rights as per Islamic values and the questions are to be raised about what are the Islamic values they are referring to in their interviews. Are the “Islamic values” of 2021 are going to be different from those of 1996-2001? Since in Islamic Jurisprudence, there is somewhat flexibility and the derivative rules [furu’i masail] might be changed to be adjustable with the need of the time, can we expect so from the Taliban? Another concern is if they will build a new jurisprudence to be known as Talibani jurisprudence, as there are various types of Islamic jurisprudence in the traditional interpretation of Islam; Hanafi, Shafii, Maliki, Hanbali, and Jafari – with each having a different interpretation in the derivative rules of Islam.

For example, on the subject of Hijab and Niqab, the only point on which Muslim jurists of the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence disagreed was whether a woman’s hands and face should be covered or left exposed. The four schools of Islamic law disagree on this point. Most Maliki and Hanafi jurists believed that a woman’s complete body ought to be covered, except for her face and hands. The Hanbali and Shafii jurisprudence, the two strictest of the four schools, required Muslim women to cover their entire bodies, including their face and hands. As for the Taliban’s Hijab Law, it is unclear at this time, despite Talibani spokespersons recently agreeing to allow women to work in offices, whether there would be a concession in the law of Hijab or if the strictest version of Hijab will be made mandatory for women. Concerns regarding women’s rights arise when we consider the Taliban’s past, which initially emerged in the public arena twenty years ago as the most radical organisation denying women their rights.

Taliban restrictions and mistreatment of women during its reign from 1996 to 2001, according to RAWA’s report, include the:

1- Complete ban on women’s work outside the home, which also applies to female teachers, engineers, and most professionals. Only a few female doctors and nurses are allowed to work in some hospitals in Kabul.

2- Complete ban on women’s activity outside the home unless accompanied by a mahram (close male relative such as a father, brother, or husband).

3- Ban on women dealing with male shopkeepers.

4- Ban on women being treated by male doctors.

5- Ban on women studying at schools, universities, or any other educational institution. (Taliban have converted girls’ schools into religious seminaries.)

6- Requirement that women wear a long veil (Burqa), which covers them from head to toe.

7- Whipping, beating, and verbal abuse of women not clothed in accordance with Taliban rules, or of women unaccompanied by a mahram.

8- Whipping of women in public for having non-covered ankles.

9- Public stoning of women accused of having sex outside marriage. (A number of lovers are stoned to death under this rule).

10- Ban on the use of cosmetics. (Many women with painted nails have had fingers cut off).

11- Ban on women talking or shaking hands with non-mahram males.

12- Ban on women laughing loudly. (No stranger should hear a woman’s voice).

13- Ban on women wearing high heel shoes, which would produce sound while walking. (A man must not hear a woman’s footsteps.)

14- Ban on women riding in a taxi without a mahram.

15- Ban on women’s presence in radio, television, or public gatherings of any kind.

16- Ban on women playing sports or entering a sports center or club.

17- Ban on women riding bicycles or motorcycles, even with their mahrams.

18- Ban on women wearing brightly coloured clothes. In Taliban terms, these are “sexually attracting colours.”

19- Ban on women gathering for festive occasions such as the Eids, or for any recreational purpose.

20- Ban on women washing clothes next to rivers or in a public place.

21- Modification of all place names including the word “women.” For example, “women’s garden” has been renamed “spring garden”.

22- Ban on women appearing on the balconies of their apartments or houses.

23- Compulsory painting of all windows, so women can’t be seen from outside their homes.

24- Ban on male tailors taking women’s measurements or sewing women’s clothes.

25- Ban on female public baths.

26- Ban on males and females travelling on the same bus. Public buses have now been designated “males only” (or “females only”).

27- Ban on flared (wide) pant-legs, even under a burqa.

28- Ban on the photographing or filming of women.

29- Ban on women’s pictures printed in newspapers and books, or hung on the walls of houses and shops.”

It further says, “Apart from the above restrictions on women, the Taliban has:

– Banned listening to music, not only for women but men as well.

– Banned the watching of movies, television, and videos, for everyone.

– Banned celebrating the traditional New Year (Nowroz) on March 21. The Taliban has proclaimed the holiday un-Islamic.

– Disavowed Labour Day (May 1st) because it is deemed a “communist” holiday.

– Ordered that all people with non-Islamic names change them to Islamic ones.

– Forced haircuts upon Afghan youth.

– Ordered that men wear Islamic clothes and a cap.

– Ordered that men not shave or trim their beards, which should grow long enough to protrude from a fist clasped at the point of the chin.

– Ordered that all people attend prayers in mosques five times daily.

– Banned the keeping of pigeons and playing with the birds, describing it as un-Islamic. The violators will be imprisoned and the birds shall be killed. The kite flying has also been stopped.

– Ordered all onlookers, while encouraging the sportsmen, to chant Allah-o-Akbar (God is great) and refrain from clapping.

– Ban on certain games including kite flying which is “un-Islamic” according to Taliban.

– Anyone who carries objectionable literature will be executed.

– Anyone who converts from Islam to any other religion will be executed.

– All boy students must wear turbans. They say “No turban, no education”.

– Non-Muslim minorities must distinct badge or stitch a yellow cloth onto their dress to be differentiated from the majority Muslim population. Just like what did Nazis with Jews.

– Banned the use of the internet by both ordinary Afghans and foreigners.

And so on…”

Rawa further says that The Special Rapporteur’s attention has been called to the Ordinance on the Women’s Veil, which has allegedly been issued by a nine-member professional committee of the High Court of the Islamic State of Afghanistan and which reads as follows:

“A denier of the veil is an infidel and an unveiled woman is lewd”.

“Conditions of wearing a veil:

1. The veil must cover the whole body.

2. Women’s clothes must not be thin.

3. Women’s clothes must not be decorated and colourful.

4. Women’s clothes must not be narrow and tight to prevent the seditious limbs from being noticed. The veil must not be thin.

5. Women must not perfume themselves. If a perfumed woman passes by a crowd of men, she is considered to be adulterous.

6. Women’s clothes must not resemble men’s clothes.

“In addition,

1. They must not perfume themselves.

2. They must not wear adorning clothes.

3. They must not wear thin clothes.

4. They must not wear narrow and tight clothes.

5. They must cover their entire bodies.

6. Their clothes must not resemble men’s clothes.

7. Muslim women’s clothes must not resemble non-Muslim women’s clothes.

8. Their foot ornaments must not produce sound.

9. They must not wear sound-producing garments.

10. They must not walk in the middle of the streets.

11. They must not go out of their houses without their husband’s permission.

12. They must not talk to strange men.

13. If it is necessary to talk, they must talk in a low voice and without laughter.

14. They must not look at strangers.

15. They must not mix with strangers.”

Source: http://www.rawa.org/rules.htm

After considering the findings of the RAWA survey as well as the recent vows of Taliban spokespersons to protect women’s rights, one would infer that the Taliban are unlikely to reform and that Afghan women’s worst fears may come true. 

First published on New Age Islam

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Many Reformists And Thinkers Were Assassinated By Extremists.

Main Points:

1. Extremist interpretation of Quranic verses turn young Muslims into terrorists.

2. Secularists and liberal thinkers are branded apostates and enemies of Islam.

3.Muslims have a very rigid notion of religion that prevents them from reform.

The stagnation in Muslim thought across the Muslim world has always been a cause of concern for Muslim intellectuals, liberal Islamic scholars and reformers. But their attempts have always faced fierce resistance from the fundamentalists who are so much obsessed with the puritanical Islam that they think that any reform in the Muslim thought will corrupt the faith. Therefore, these reformers were either assassinated or declared apostates and had to go into self-exile. Moreover, every such attempt is believed to be a conspiracy of the West and the reformers are considered agents of the enemies of Islam. The result is that all such attempts to bring reform among Muslims have failed in the past and will fail in future as well.

These were the observations of a renowned Iraqi writer Mahdi Qassem which he made in his article published in Sawt-al-Iraq on March 10, 2021.

His observations reflect the frustration of a large number of Muslim intellectuals and liberal Islamic scholars, especially of the Arab world. The stagnation in the religious thought has reached such a degree that any attempt at reform is seen with suspicion.

This stagnation in Islamic thought of the modern age has caused immense and irreparable damage to Muslims. The two major problems facing Muslims today —Sectarianism and Terrorism — are the result of this intellectual stagnation and the refusal to adapt to needs and requirements of the modern age.

Mahdi Qassem cites the examples of some prominent Muslim academicians, scholars and thinkers who were declared apostates or assassinated or there were attempts at their life. He cites the example of Husayn Muruwa (1910-1987) who was assassinated at his home in Beirut. Muruwa was a Lebanese philosopher and a senior member of Lebanese Communist Party. He wrote a number of books. His most outstanding work was Materialist Tendencies in Arabic Islamic Philosophy. In this book he interpreted traditional Arabic texts from the Marxist point of view.

Another writer and thinker who was assassinated because of his reformist thought was Faragh Foda (1946-1992). He was a prominent writer and human rights activist of Egypt. Foda became an eyesore for the radical Islamists of Egypt for his critical writings on Muslim religious thought. The titles of his books give a hint of his critical attitude. Some of his books are Pleasure Marriage, Sectarianism to Where?, Dialogue about Shariah etc. Obviously he was critical of Sectarianism in Islam, the general concept of Sharia and corrupt practices in the name of temporary marriages. Al Azhar declared him and other secularist writers enemies of Islam. Foda advocated separation of religion from state. The Gama’a Islamiyya accused him of blasphemy and declared him an apostate. The members of Gama’a Islamiyya assassinated him on June 8, 1992.

However, Faragh Foda’s daughter Samar refuted the allegation that her father was an apostate . She said that he was a thinker and defended moderate Islam. She claimed that not a single text in his father’s writings was against Islam.

Another prominent writer of Egypt who became the target of the extremists was the Nobel Laureate Naguib Mahfouz. He was also critical of cultural censorship and advocated freedom of expression. He denounced what he called cultural terrorism. The Islamists regarded Naguib Mahfouz’s novels as blasphemous and Al Azhar had banned his novel “Children of Gabalawi”. In 1992, he along with hundreds of Egyptian intellectuals had signed a letter denouncing cultural terrorism. In October 1994, an extremist attacked him with a knife and severely injured his neck. But he survived the attack.

Apart from these thinkers and liberal scholars there are dozens of other philosophers and thinkers who were victimised for their unconventional views on Islam and the Quran.

One such thinker was Egyptian scholar Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd who was also a victim of intolerant religious attitude. He was the Professor of Islamic and Arabic Studies in Cairo University. He was an advocate of freedom of thought and scientific research and a critic of contemporary Islamic discourse. He had his own views on the Quran. He accepted Quran as a divine book but was of the view that the Quran was a cultural product which had to be read and interpreted in context of the language and culture of the seventh century Arabs and could be interpreted in many ways.

For his views, a court of Egypt declared him apostate and ordered his separation from his wife. He went into self-exile in Europe but later returned to Egypt and died a natural death.

Mahdi Qassem also blames the growth of terrorism and extremism among the third generation of Muslims born and brought up in Europe on the extremist interpretation of certain verses of the Quran. He wonders how the young Muslims who were born in liberal European society and were educated in the colleges and universities of Europe turned terrorists and joined Al Qaida and ISIS. He blames this on the refusal of Muslims to bring any kind of reform. He writes:

“Many third generation descendants of Muslim (immigrants) were born in western welfare states and studied in their best schools and universities. Moreover, they grew up in real democracies and open societies that promote the values of tolerance and of giving every individual a chance to develop his personal skills and abilities and that punish every kind of racism and hate-mongering. But it is young men and women of third generation of all people who joined terrorist organisations like Al Qaida and ISIS and others… and perpetrated horrible and barbaric crimes of murder, massacre and burning people alive.”

He also observes that any reform in Muslim thought and behaviour is not possible because Muslims have developed a very rigid concept of religion. He writes:

“I believe that any future attempt ( at reform) will fail as well, for Islam is the only religion in the world that resists reform and will never be reformed neither by force nor through a flexible (approach). Not only because it requires changing or omitting many Quranic verses that call for violent jihad and for forceful coercion, but also because the Salafis and their sheikhs believe that any enlightened reform of this kind will empty Islam of its content and essence, and lead to its distortion and annulment, turning it into what they see as a fake religion like Christianity and Judaism.”(English translation by MEMRI)

The irony is that many old and new Islamic scholars believe in the theory of abrogation that calls for abrogation of certain verses of the Quran but only those verses that advocate peace and harmony with non-Muslims. They call the war verses that ask believers to keep fighting all non-Muslims in all times and in all circumstances universally applicable.

Therefore, sectarianism and terrorism cannot be fought and eliminated as long as Quranic verses are not interpreted in the light of modern social and political requirements.

This article was first published on New Age Islam

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Over the last couple of years, Bangladesh has seen a rise in religious extremism and communal hatred. Attacks on cultural activists and secularists have also seen a rise. This is mainly because of Sheikh Hasina government’s policy of ‘Strategic Compromise’ with the conservative and extremist organisation Hefazat-e-Islam for political purposes. The Hefazat is an umbrella organisation of madrasa teachers based in Chittagong with links to Jama’t-e-Islami and other dozens of Islamist organisations that aim to turn Bangladesh into an Islamic state. Sheikh Hasina’s position earlier was that the Hefazat had links to Jama’t-e-Islami. The organisation had organised a massive rally in Dhaka in April 2013 against Shahbagh Movement staged to demand capital punishment for war criminals associated with the Jamat-e-Islami and the BNP.

However, strangely the Hasina government wooed the Hefazat before the general elections that were held on December 30, 2018 in order to garner the vote bank held by the Islamist parties and the influential clerics. Since, the Election Commission had deregistered the Jamat-e-Islami that had a considerable hold over the religious or madrasa section, the Sheikh Hasina government allied with Hefazat to counter Jamat-e-Islami’s influence over the madrasa section and general Muslims.

Though Hefazat and its affiliates always allied with the BNP, they allied with Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League as part of a ‘Strategic Compromise’. Before the elections, the Hefazat organised a huge rally in support of Awami League which was addressed by Sheikh Hasina.

Hefazat-e-Islam formed an Islamic Democratic Alliance with 15 Islamist parties to support Awami League in the elections. This helped Awami League with a resounding victory in the polls.

But the going has not been easy for the Hasina government since then. The Hefazat has been blackmailing the Hasina government into accepting its demands and its leader Junaid Babunagri has been issuing Taliban like diktats to the government.

In 2021, Father of Nation Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s centenary year falls and the nation is gearing up for the celebrations. The Hasina government has planned to install a grand statue of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in Dhaka but the leader of Hefazat Maulana Junaid Babunagari has threatened to stop any installation of the statue of Sheikh Mujib on the grounds that it is un-Islamic.

Earlier in 2017, Sheikh Hasina government had removed the statue of the Greek Goddess of Justice Themis from the precincts of the Supreme Court after the Hefazat had staged demonstrations against the statue.

Junaid Babunagri had last Friday held a rally in Hathazari in Chittagong in which he issued four demands to the government. 1) Closure of all activities of International Society of Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON) in Bangladesh. 2) Banning religious activities of the Ahmadiyya community and declaring them un-Islamic 3) Expulsion of French Ambassador 4) Closure of French Embassy in Dhaka.

On 2 November Junaid Babunagari had staged a huge demonstration against the French government in Dhaka and had planned a march from Bait ul Mokarram Mosque in Dhaka to the French Embassy. But due to police barricading he had to cancel the march. However, he had threatened to launch another movement if the French embassy was not closed and the ambassador not expelled. He even threatened to destroy the embassy if his demand was not met.

Because of his strong arm tactics, the government has already accepted the demands of the Hefazat that affect the secular fabric of the country and violate the spirit of the Constitution.

The government omitted educational content of schools that the Hefazat considered un-Islamic. The government also removed content related to non-Muslim authors from the primary and secondary school textbooks under Hefazat’s pressure. The Hasina government recognised the below standard Qaumi Madrasa degrees and in return the Hefazat honoured Sheikh Hasina with the title of Mother of the Qaum.

The biggest challenge before the Hasina government is the installation of the statue of her father Bangabandhu Mujibur Rahman next year. Shahryar Kabir, the man instrumental behind the War Crimes Tribunal and documenting extensively the atrocities perpetrated by the pro-Pakistani forces in 1971 said, “We are confronted with a Taliban leader. The Deputy Minister of Education Mahibul Hasan Choudhury has said that action would be taken against those who opposed the installation of Bangabandhu sculpture if they did not apologise.

The opposition to the statue may turn into a serious confrontation as Junaid Babunagari has threatened to launch a violent protest against the statue.

By espousing the issues of blasphemy, statues, madrasas and Rohingyas, Junaid Babunagari is actually trying to project himself as the leader of the Muslim masses. Sheikh Hasina’s ‘Strategic Comprise’ with Hefazat is going to turn Bangladesh into a hotbed of religious extremism as the link of a former Hefazat leader with Al Qaida and Hizbul Mujahideen is commonly known. The support of Pakistan to Hefazat cannot be ruled out.

Sheikh Hasina had come to power with the support of the masses and her party manifesto is based on secularism, democracy and equality but now Sheikh Hasina government’s policy seems to be drifting away from its basic principles and taking the country towards chaos, extremism and anarchy under pressure from Hefazat and other Islamist forces. The Digital Security Act was passed under their pressure which is being used for blasphemy cases against secularists and cultural activists.

If Sheikh Hasina does not cut her ties with Hefazat and continues to pander to their extremist ideology, Bangladesh will again become a hotbed of religious extremism.

First published on https://www.newageislam.com/

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