Sustaining a democratic system through periodic free and fair elections is one of the most critical political challenges the world has witnessed. Across countries, people have run the risk of their lives to call for free elections, democratic accountability, the rule of law and respect for human rights. Though elections are widely recognised as the indispensable foundation of democracy, there are concerns in place with respect to the election process and the challenges of negotiating for a credible and transparent political recruitment.  When the people believe that elections have been free and fair, they can be a powerful catalyst for political transformation, better governance, and human development. However, in the absence of credible elections, the people would have no recourse to peaceful political change. The risk of conflict increases while corruption, criminalisation, intimidation, and fraud go unchecked, rotting the entire political system from within. New democracies are struggling to consolidate democratic gains, while growing inequality is putting pressure on many older democracies to show that they are relevant to citizens’ concerns and well-being. Across the world, uncontrolled political finance threatens to hollow out democracy and rob it of its unique strengths. India, the world’s largest democracy with the largest electorate, is no exception. Seventy two years of democratic experience tells more stories of its inherent weaknesses than its positives of sustainability. Among the issues in place are questions of electoral dynamics and the inner dynamics of role induction. Many argue that the system calls for restructuring in view of the problems accumulated over time.

The 2019 elections might be a testing time for BJP, unlike the situation in 2014. But it would certainly be critical for the Far-Right Sangh Parivar because the Indian electorate is going to judge if Prime Minister Narendra Modi is still the symbol of the country’s credo of nationalism. The NDA dispensation is determined to move heaven and earth to capitalise the post-Pulwama, post-Balakot sentiments, but it remains to be seen if the pan-Indian electorate will come around this high-voltage campaign.

Even as the 2019 Lok Sabha elections are set to commence in a few weeks time, several questions have emerged with respect to the need for introspection on wider issues concerning the Indian polity. But seldom do these issues get the attention they deserved on account of the diversionary strategies resorted to by the major political parties in the country. There is a perceptible shift in the electoral strategies of these parties that unveils itself with their increasing emphasis on segmented issues that have emotional appeals or foster targetted disparagement. Understandably, corruption continues to be a convenient subject for such segmented engagements. A natural result of this process is the growing tendency to get the basic issues sidelined or being reduced to the symptomatic level. There is hardly any engagement on the structural or institutional causative matrix that produces a pathological condition in the polity.

Structurally, the Indian polity has undergone enormous changes during the last 27 years with hardly any serious debate on the basic issue—but with all attendant implications for the institutions in place and the society at large. The ‘reforms’ that transpired these changes tended to create new regimes of disinvestment that warranted the rollback of the welfare state and dispensing with the norms of social security system. The consequent emergence of the neoliberal state began to displace all regulatory mechanisms in place and institutional commitments that remained for more than four decades since independence. Both the UPA and NDA governments share the responsibility of fostering this dispense-raj through a spectrum of ‘reforms’ that actually resulted in retrogressive practices.  Naturally, the Congress and BJP, as well as their allies, tend to sideline the basic problems of the system which have their pervasive impact on the lives and livelihood of the people.

Meanwhile, on the sidelines of the apparent ‘prosperity’ and ‘growth’ trajectory, the country has been going through a spectre of uncomfortable realities—rising urban-rural unemployment, decline in manufacturing, low agricultural and industrial output, uncertain conditions in services sector, shifts and downfall in commodity trade, recession in the financial market etc. The present dispensation, under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, put a veil on vital information concerning the ground level realities, besides manipulating social statistics to suit the campaign requirements of the regime. It was only a few weeks ago that former BJP minister Yashwant Sinha had accused the NDA government of manipulating all the statistics including the growth figures to give a “false impression” of development. He was referring to the circumstances under which two members of the National Statistical Commission had to resign. Sinha said that in the post-demonetisation period also, data were manipulated to show the country’s growth trajectory in exaggerated terms (Outlook 2019).

Narendra Modi came to power in 2014 with an offer of generating 20 million jobs. His first four years in office, however, witnessed a sharp fall off in the job market.  The ILO recorded that the number of jobless in the country, in the current year, would have increased to 18.9 million. Given the uncomfortable conditions of the unemployment scenario in the country, the Modi government expectedly resorted to manipulating the methodology of sample survey usually employed by the National Sample Survey (NSS) office periodically (see Daniyal 2019).  The Central Statistics Office and the NITI Aayog also did the same with a view to arguing that the growth of the Indian economy was slower under the UPA dispensation. This brought to light questions about the integrity of national institutions and the gross political interference by the government and its agencies, like NITI Aayog. The dismantling of the Planning Commission is a glaring, but an alarming case of how a well-established institution has been replaced by a market-driven auxiliary agency of the crony capital.

This process has its beginning in the 1980s when the first spell of liberalisation ushered in. The Congress party became instrumental in effecting this shift in diverse areas of the polity and economy. Interestingly, the social base of the Congress itself began to undergo major structural changes in the post-emergency period, particularly after 1981. Though the Congress could still win the elections, its social landscape witnessed expanding frustration of its traditional vote bank, including the emerging urban middle class. In states like UP and other densely populated regions, the deep frustration found expression in their voting pattern. Rising unemployment in traditional sectors, besides shrinking opportunities in the emerging industrial fields, brought in greater uncertainties and unsure pathways. The Far Right under the BJP and its allies since 1980s began to capitalise this deeper social crisis by effectively manipulating the ‘cultural crisis’ set in by the Ayodhya  issue, on the one hand, and the common civil code (post-Shah Bano case) controversy, on the other. Occasionally, the Sangh Parivar also used ‘swadeshi’ and hyper nationalism to cover-up its commitment to a much faster neoliberal path of development. The social crisis caused by the dispense-raj naturally disrupted social solidarity of the Indian polity which paved the way for BJP making inroads into the social base, which the Congress traditionally held for long (Seethi 2017).

As years passed, the BJP also came out in open to accelerate the pace of ‘reforms’, the consequences of which are much deeper. Yet, the Congress couldn’t come forward with any alternative as the BJP has already co-opted its policy regime, using ‘culture’ as a social shield of countering and containing emerging social unrest. The success of Modi is his regime of ‘event’ managing the social constituency by negotiating with traditional caste groups even as it has been maintaining a ‘panoptican’ state in terms of monitoring and controlling its potential ‘enemies’ and ‘friends’(Ibid). There were reports of intolerance and violence unleashed across the country, in the wake of dissent and widespread criticism. Plausibly, this would continue to raise questions of survival under a surveillance raj.

A much greater advantage of the Modi regime is the global atmospheric pressure which fits in with a Far Right ‘historical bloc’ (as Gramsci referred to in the context of West European capitalist scenario). The post-global financial crisis and post-Euro zone crisis reminded both the US and UK that they needed to revisit their neoliberal globalist regimes, the implications of which are unpredictable at least for some time. Modi too will have to face the long term consequences of this structural shift in the global economy. But the social crisis got deepened in diverse forms, including communalisation and its natural result of disruption in social solidarity. The Congress has apparently no alternative social agenda. It has the sole agenda of meeting the ‘threat’ from BJP while the threats from social dislocations caused by the ‘austerity’ regime are much deeper, fundamental and all-pervading.

While the issues raised here may remain, though fundamental as they were, the election process that has begun now may not reflect these underlying problems and practices, ostensibly due to a surreptitious ‘consensus’ among the mainstream parties on a variety of issues. Hence, the campaign mode is set to address only symptoms of the pathological condition.

Even as the structural matrix of the Indian polity continues to sustain its neoliberal moorings, the institutional practices and watchdog mechanisms undergo phases of challenge – it included independence and integrity of judiciary, election commission, investigating agencies etc. This naturally raises several questions about democratic precepts and constitutional mechanisms in place.

It is against this backdrop that the attempts at electoral reforms in India are viewed as critical in sustaining good practices in democracy and ensuring transparency and credibility in the political recruitment process.  The agenda of electoral reforms is to ensure deepening of the democratic process, strengthening the instruments of public accountability and guaranteeing opportunity for meaningful voter participation. Hence the debate on electoral reforms must address questions of enhancing representativeness, promoting societal accommodation and conciliation, incorporating constitutional and international safeguards to vulnerable groups, providing accountable, stable and efficient governance etc.

Many find several gaps in the electoral system already in place which tends to undermine the very process of transfer of power and the freedom of the individual voter. The legal foundation is fragile which allows the distortions to remain in the polity. It is said that the political class is still unwilling to reform the system which may empower the voter as against the power they enjoy at present in manipulating the system. Some would argue that the system of preferential voting is the answer to problem of “fictitious” representation under the existing electoral practices. It has been warned that unless the mounting expense for electoral campaign is curtailed drastically, the system would continue to be the monopoly of the rich and democracy will transform into plutocracy.

It is true that the electoral reforms debate, initiated since the late 1960s, almost coincided with a radical transformation in Indian politics such as the rise of regional political formations, and the consequent decline of the ‘monolithic’ character of the major political formation, the INC. However, the political class in India realised that appeal of the ideology or nationalism or policies or programmes was not strong enough to secure the support of the people. This obviously helped strengthen money and muscle power which began to dictate the electoral politics in India. Though everyone agrees on the need for reforms, there is hardly any consensus on the substance of the reform.

Obviously, electoral reforms have to go beyond voters and their behaviour because India’s growing middle and upper class is under siege – in the hands of big capital and corporate class.  There is also a perceptible shift from social democracy to market democracy which is undermining the public space and redefining what life ought to be. It may again be curious to know how mounting money power influences the Indian elections. Let us turn our attention to the growing presence of business interest in the Union and State Legislatures. It has been warned by many that direct representation of business in legislatures has much more serious consequences for policy making than influencing it through funding parties from outside.

One major example of a ‘reform’ introduced in the system, recently, may be noted for its inherent genetic defect. The NDA Government announced, in its 2017 budget, that electoral bonds would be issued to “cleanse the system of political funding in the country” which would also fall in line with the Government’s move to strengthen ‘cashless economy.’ Electoral bonds would be put in place as bearer instrument like a Promissory Note (like a bank note that is payable to the bearer on demand and free of interest). It can be bought by any citizen of India or a body incorporated in India. This was introduced after changes in the Finance Act 2017 and subsequent amendments in the Income Tax Act, the RBI Act, and the Representation of People Act.

Experts and policy makers, including former chief election commissioners have already come down against the move for undermining transparency in the name of “cleansing the system.” It inevitably makes political funding by big companies and business contractors secretive as neither the donors nor the parties have to make public who donated what to which party. This is seen as a blatant violation of the constitutional principle of free and fair elections. The CPI (M) filed a petition in the Supreme Court on this issue. It opposed the electoral bonds on the ground that the move would only legitimise corruption. Prakash Karat wrote:

The donations made through anonymous bonds will only facilitate and legitimise bribery. Earlier, a company which won a contract would have had to pay a bribe illegally under the table. The electoral bond scheme will make all such kickbacks legal. For instance, if a commission of 10 per cent has to be paid by a company for getting a contract worth Rs 1,000 crore, all it has to do is to provide an electoral bond for the amount of Rs 100 crore to the ruling party. There is no way for the public to know about such a donation, nor can any investigating agency ask questions about it. …The Modi government has found a way to legitimise bribery and kickbacks.  For instance, in the Rafale deal, the Anil Ambani company has been given the offsets contract when it has no legitimate grounds whatsoever for getting the contract.  The quid pro quo for such a deal can now be possibly in the form of electoral bonds to the BJP, with no questions asked whatsoever(Karat 2019).

In an affidavit, the NDA government argued that the electoral bonds would uphold transparency in funding and donations received by political parties. Countering the CPI(M) petition, the NDA Government argued,

the scheme envisages building a transparent system of acquiring bonds with validated KYC and an audit trail. Besides, a limited window and a very short maturity period shall make any misuse improbable. Donors who buy these bonds, their balance sheet will reflect such donations made. The electoral bonds will prompt donors to take the banking route to donate, with their identity captured by the issuing authority. This will ensure transparency, accountability and a big step towards electoral reform (Sebastian 2019).

The Economic Times reported that the BJP became the biggest beneficiary of the electoral bond scheme launched by the NDA government in 2017-18, securing almost 95 per cent of the bonds worth over Rs. 200 crore. The audit and income tax reports submitted by the BJP to the Election Commission of India revealed this (The Economic Times 2018). According to New Delhi-based Centre for Media Studies, the spending on election is likely to increase substantially in the coming weeks, and the Chairman of the Centre went to the extent of cautioning that the new move would amount to “auctioning of our democracy to the highest-paying corporation” (Sabrang India 2019).  With amendments being put in place, companies can donate to political parties and their campaigns, even removing the ceiling on corporate donations. Curiously, new business concerns can also donate to political parties, facilitating new companies to be set up exclusively for the purpose. The ‘reform’ also removed mandatory requirements for companies to reveal how much they donated and to which party.

The amendments were introduced in the Lok Sabha as a money bill to bypass the Upper House, to get away from a possible setback there.  Sabrang India reported that “a similar tactic was used to pass with little debate rules that changed the definition of a foreign company.

Previously, all subsidiaries of international entities were treated as overseas donors and not allowed to make political contributions. Now if a foreign firm has a stake of less than 50 per cent in a company operating in India, that unit can fund Indian elections.” Sabrang also noted that while several experts and lawmakers protested the moves, the amendment is expected to benefit both Bharatiya Janata Party as well as the main opposition Congress party. As such “nobody from the opposition spoke up because they too could gain if they came to power” (Sabrang India 2019).

According to experts, if the donation is made to the ruling dispensation, “the electorate would have no way of knowing the extent of crony capitalism because the party in power would obviously ‘reward’ major and significant donors with government contracts, licenses and tenders. Moreover, the government in power would get detailed information on which the corporation has donated what amount, and can thus arm twist those who have funded its rivals more.” Former chief election commissioner S Y Quraishi said that the “electoral bonds are the exact antithesis of transparency.” He pointed out that the bonds might “ensure the anonymity” of donors, but would “also kill whatever little transparency that exists now.”

The issues outlined here represent only a cross section of the challenges the Indian polity has been going through. The past five years witnessed several levels of violence – from caste, communal and gender violence to aggressive campaigns and attacks on individuals and movements for freedom of expression, rights on food, health, education, employment, wages, reservation etc. As the issues get snowballed, BJP’s hyper-nationalist campaigns tend to assume new dimensions and a feverish pitch. The Pulwama terrorist attack and the Balakot airstrikes are thus likely to become rallying points to externalise the mounting internal problems. BJP knows—more than any other party in this country—that ‘national security’ could be a comfortable terrain to bank upon in times of crisis. Obviously, the structural crisis of the Indian polity gets worsened with each episode of campaigns playing down the real issues in Indian polity.

An earlier draft was presented as the Keynote address at the National Seminar on “Electoral Politics in India: Dynamics and Trends” organised by the VK Sukumaran Nayar Chair for Parliamentary Affairs, under the Department of Political Science, University of Kerala.

This write up has also appeared in the Global South Colloquy.  The author is Dean of Social Sciences and Professor, School of International Relations and Politics, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kerala. He can be reached at kmseethimgu@gmail.com
 
References

Daniyal Shoaib (2019): “ Modi government bid to hide unemployment rate, other key data hurts Indian democracy,” Scroll.in, 31 January, available at https://scroll.in/article/911442/the-daily-fix-modi-governments-moves-to-hide-official-statistics-greatly-damages-indian-democracy

Karat, Prakash (2019): “No to Electoral Bonds,” Peoples Democracy, 24 March, available at https://peoplesdemocracy.in/2018/1125_pd/no-electoral-bonds

Outlook (2019): “Modi Government First In India’s History To Manipulate Data, Says Yashwant Sinha After NSSO Report,” 1 February, https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/india-news-modi-government-first-in-indias-history-to-manipulate-data-says-yashwant-sinha-after-nsso-report/324676

Sabrang India (2019): “Is India’s democracy being sold through electoral bonds?, 22 March, available at https://www.sabrangindia.in/article/indias-democracy-being-sold-through-electoral-bonds

Sebastian, Manu (2019): “Anonymous Electoral Bonds Promote Transparency In Funding of Political Parties, Centre Tells SC,” Livelaw.in, 14 March, available at https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/anonymous-electoral-bonds-promote-transparency-in-funding-of-political-parties-centre-tells-sc-143559

Seethi, K.M. (2017): “Tectonic Shift In ‘Congress System’: Debating ‘Leadership’ and Silence on Policy Regime,” Countercurrents, 18 March, available at https://countercurrents.org/2017/03/18/tectonic-shift-in-congress-system-debating-leadership-and-silence-on-policy-regime/

The Economic Times (2018): “Electoral bonds: Ruling BJP bags 95% of funds,” 29 November, available at https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/electoral-bonds-ruling-bjp-bags-95-of-funds/articleshow/66858037.cms

Courtesy: Counter Current.

The post ‘Testing Time’ for the Indian Electorate appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Many treaties and agreements in international relations are the natural outcome of conflicts and wars between two or more players. In India-Pakistan relations too, the two major agreements signed between them, the Tashkent Declaration (1966) and the Shimla Pact (1972) were the follow-up of negotiations started in the wake of the 1965 and 1971 wars. But the Lahore Declaration, signed between Prime Minister of India, Atal Behari Vajpayee, and Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, on 21 February 1999 was followed by reports of Pakistani intrusion into Kashmir and a prolonged war with India in the months of May, June and July 1999. What makes the Lahore Declaration quite significant at that time was a host developments emerging from 1998—the Pokhran and Chagai nuclear tests and the sanctions imposed by the Western powers.

It was often stated that one of the supreme accomplishments of Vajpayee was his commitment to keep open channels of conversations with Pakistan and encourage friendly relations. His launching of Delhi-Lahore bus service and the signing of Lahore Declaration were seen as great successes in that sense. Even Nawaz Sharif was reported to have said that Vajpayee could “now win elections even in Pakistan” (Ray 2018).  No doubt, Vajpayee’s ‘bus diplomacy’ found an important place in India-Pakistan ‘people-to-people’ contacts. Eminent people like Kuldeep Nayar, Mallika Sarabhai, Dev Anand, Javed Akhtar and others had accompanied Vajpayee.

The Lahore Declaration was, in many ways, a commitment to help revive and strengthen the spirit of Shimla Accord, which, for many years, had not worked in the expected direction. The Lahore Declaration acknowledged that “the nuclear dimension of the security environment of the two countries adds to their responsibility for avoidance of conflict between the two countries.” The Declaration recognised that “confidence building measures for improving the security environment” is very important. Most importantly, the two countries agreed to “intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir” and “refrain from intervention and interference in each other’s internal affairs.” There was also a commitment to “take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons and discuss concepts and doctrines with a view to elaborating measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at prevention of conflict.” It is also to be noted that both countries reaffirmed “their condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and their determination to combat this menace”(India, Ministry of External Affairs  1999).

Following the directive given by the two Prime Ministers, the Foreign Secretaries of Pakistan and India also signed a Memorandum of Understanding on 21st February 1999, identifying measures aimed at promoting an environment of peace and security between the two countries.

As per this MoU, both had agreed to “engage in bilateral consultations on security concepts, and nuclear doctrines, with a view to developing measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at avoidance of conflict.” The two sides also had undertaken “to provide each other with advance notification in respect of ballistic missile flight tests, and shall conclude a bilateral agreement in this regard.” Besides, the two sides agreed to “continue to abide by their respective unilateral moratorium on conducting further nuclear test explosions unless either side, in exercise of its national sovereignty decides that extraordinary events have jeopardised its supreme interests.”

A few weeks after the signing of the Declaration, there were reports about Pakistani intrusion into Kashmir, which eventually became a war between India and Pakistan from May 1999 onwards (Seethi 1999). There were even calls for the use of nuclear weapons in both countries. The CIA had warned that during the 1999 Kargil war, when the Pakistan military army was suffering major setbacks, the Nawaz Sharif government was planning to deploy and use its nuclear weapons against India. The CIA’s assessment was part of its classified briefing for the President in July 1999.  Bruce Riedel, who had worked in the National Security Council of the White House, was reported to have said that “The morning of the Fourth (of July, 1999), the CIA wrote in its top-secret Daily Brief that Pakistan was preparing its nuclear weapons for deployment and possible use. The intelligence was very compelling. The mood in the Oval Office was grim” (The Economic Times 2018). Later, there were reports about a “confirmation of truth” by Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif that the Kargil “misadventure” in 1999 by troops of his country was a stab in the back for the then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee as the two neighbours were engaged in a peace process” (First Post  2016). Obviously, Nawaz Sharif was pointing to the role of army in derailing the peace process. The military takeover under Gen. Pervez Musharraf, in the wake of the Kargil war, had upset Nawaz Sharif’s calculations.

Admittedly,  Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif  had gone to the extent of recognizing the necessity of going “beyond stated positions and devise a solution that would take the interests of India, Pakistan and the Kashmiri people into consideration,” as noted by AG Noorani. He wrote:
“Only a week later, Inder Kumar Gujral reneged on the accord. He would not agree to a working group on Kashmir. This accord was a precursor to the aborted Agra Declaration of July 16, 2001, which also provided for a composite dialogue. Gujral reneged on the first. Atal Behari Vajpayee allowed Advani and Co. to wreck the second. A recent disclosure in The Telegraph (July 22, 2001) is relevant: “One of the myths about Indian diplomacy is that there are hardliners and softliners on Pakistan. In the Indian establishment you cannot deal with Pakistan and be what peaceniks would call a ‘softliner’ ” (Noorani 2002).

Noorani continues: “When he was Prime Minister, I.K. Gujral, who was miffed at criticism that he was soft on Pakistan, told this correspondent: ‘Do you think I will give away anything to Pakistan? I am as much a nationalist as anyone else.’ He stressed that his Gujral doctrine ‘did not cover Pakistan’.” Noorani said that this “was tragic” insofar as Sharif had “secured a mandate to settle Kashmir. Deadlock ensued.” Noorani also quotes a report from The Hindu (3 April 1999) which stated that “In a radical proposal, Mr. Vajpayee suggested to Mr. Sharif that the two countries open the Line of Control (LoC) at Uri in Indian Kashmir to allow Kashmiris living close to it to meet each other” (Ibid).

In less than a decade after the Lahore Declaration, India-Pakistan relations witnessed a series of twists and turns, following the Indian Parliament attack in 2001, India–Pakistan standoff during 2001-02, the Samjhauta Express bombings in 2007, the Mumbai attacks of 2008 etc. The following decade also witnessed a series of events upsetting the process of peace building in India-Pakistan relations. Pathankot, Uri and Pulwama attacks only added to the festering wounds in bilateral ties. What is significant in the transformation of bilateral relations, during the last two decades since the Lahore Declaration, is the burgeoning role of militants and Pakistani-based jihadi groups. Pakistan says that it, too, is suffering from the menace of terrorism and the number of causalities within the country is much higher than in India. However, India insisted that stringent action against the terrorist groups is a precondition for any dialogue with Pakistan.

More importantly, the weapons’ capability of both countries has increased considerably over the last two decades. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists reports say that “Pakistan now has a nuclear weapons stockpile of 140 to 150 warheads.” This apparently exceeded the projection made by the US Defense Intelligence Agency in 1999 that Pakistan would have 60 to 80 warheads by 2020.  It estimated that Pakistan’s stockpile “could more realistically grow to 220 to 250 warheads by 2025, if the current trend continues. If that happens, it would make Pakistan the world’s fifth-largest nuclear weapon state” (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 2018a).

The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists also stated that “India continues to modernize its nuclear arsenal, with at least five new weapon systems now under development to complement or replace existing nuclear-capable aircraft, land-based delivery systems, and sea-based systems.”  India was “estimated to have produced enough military plutonium for 150 to 200 nuclear warheads, but has likely produced only 130 to 140. Nonetheless, additional plutonium will be required to produce warheads for missiles now under development, and India is reportedly building several new plutonium production facilities” (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 2018b).

Evidently, the nuclear scenario of South Asia is too dangerous and both India and Pakistan have not adhered to the spirit of Lahore Declaration all these years. Moreover, even the spirit of regionalism in South Asian has been undermined with the 19^th SAARC summit scheduled to be held in Pakistan in 2016 has been indefinitely postponed due to bilateral issues. The Lahore Declaration itself had made a commitment to strengthening regional cooperation through SAARC, and it remains, unfortunately, a pipe-dream.

References
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (2018a): “Pakistani nuclear forces, 2018, available at  https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2018.1507796
 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (2018b): “Indian nuclear forces, 2018, available at  https://thebulletin.org/2018/11/indian-nuclear-forces-2018/
First Post (2016): “Sharif’s remarks on Kargil being a stab in Vajpayee’s back are confirmation of truth: MEA,” 18 February, available at https://www.firstpost.com/world/sharifs-remarks-on-kargil-being-a-stab-in-vajpayees-back-are-confirmation-of-truth-mea-2632544.html

India, Ministry of External Affairs (1999): “Lahore Declaration Joint Statement, Memorandum of Understanding, February 02, 1999,” available at  https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18997/Lahore+Declaration+February+1999

Noorani, A.G. (2002): “The truth about the Lahore Summit,” 16 February- 1 March, https://frontline.thehindu.com/static/html/fl1904/19040850.htm

Ray , Sanjana (2018): “Vajpayee Sahab Can Win Elections in Pakistan: Nawaz Sharif in 1999,” The quint, 18 July , https://www.thequint.com/news/india/vajpayee-sahab-can-win-elections-in-pakistan-nawaz-sharif-said-in-1999#gs.hB37eqJe

Seethi, K.M. (1999):  “A Tragedy of Betrayals: Questions Beyond the LoC in Kashmir,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol.34, No.37, September 11.

The Economic Times (2018): “Pakistan was to deploy nukes against India during Kargil war,” 12 July, available at https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/pakistan-was-to-deploy-nukes-against-india-during-kargil-war/articleshow/50019153.cms

This article has also appeared in Global South Colloquy

The author is Dean of Social Sciences and Professor, School of International Relations and Politics, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kerala. He can be reached at kmseethimgu@gmail.com

Courtesy : Counter Current

The post Unlocking the India-Pakistan Dilemma : Twenty Years of ‘Lahore Declaration’ and Missed Opportunities appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Vakkom Moulavi

Even as Kerala has been in the midst of resuscitating the ‘cultural capital’ of the early 20^th century ‘renaissance’ (a term widely used to denote the ‘reform’ and ‘restructuring’ of the social sphere), in the background of the Sabarimala temple entry issue and the ‘women’s wall’ being organised as part of gender equality campaign, questions have been asked if the efforts underway constituted a ‘communal’ agenda, sidelining (if not undermining) many facets of ‘renaissance’ that got underway within and across minority communities and castes in the state. The opposition parties in the state have come down heavily against the LDF Government, calling it a ‘majoritarian wall’ in total disregard of the reforms that took place within the Muslim and Christian communities.

The Government, in fact, had invited nearly 200 such organisations to discuss the social strategies of dealing with the crisis that got worsened during the last several weeks, but some sections deliberately kept out of it. This included several Muslim organisations who apparently got confused with the question in regard to the ‘inheritance’ of ‘Muslim renaissance.’ The dominant sections of the traditional Muslim community (having affiliation with the Sunni organisations) never accepted the contributions of the major Muslim reformers of Kerala like Vakkom Moulavi et al. Even those who claim themselves as ‘inheritors’ of renaissance/reform movement among them are not sure about their role in a women empowerment/gender equality campaign in the present context. However, they all agree that the state of Kerala has been going through a critical phase of communalisation which the Sangh Parivar organisations are determined to cash in on in the background of the Sabarimala issue. This certainly calls for a revisit of the process of communalisation in the state and how it has, over years, undermined the reform agenda of the Muslim community.

Communalism in modern India
Communalism has been a critical problem of modern India and it unfolds itself in the ever-intensifying scenario of social tensions and conflicts across the country. Though long-acclaimed as the bastion of secularism in India, Kerala society too is confronting the complex process of communalisation and its accompanying social conflicts. Locating the sources of communalisation and their socio-historical context could well be an important task of social scientists in addressing the complex issues underlying the phenomenon [1]. Communalisation is certainly a part of, if not the by-product of, the over-all socio-economic processes taking place in the Indian and global context. No doubt, the share of ‘history’ is also significant, particularly when ‘history’ itself could emerge as a legitimising factor for communalisation.

Many questions are raised in the contemporary debates on communalism whether stagnation and regression of secularisation in Kerala should be understood in terms of the failure of social reform or the inability of social reform to address the whole lot of challenges of modernity. The implicit assumption of such questioning is that any social reform agenda must necessarily be a complete whole having a broad spectrum of politico-economic objectives. Also, such debates uncritically ignore the limits and possibilities of the social reform process within the existing socio-political milieu. Therefore, any stocktaking in terms of “success or failure” may end up with stereotypical readings of the social reform process—that too without understanding its internal dynamics, probably with unrecognized prejudices. Shouldn’t we enquire whether the reform process itself had undergone internal changes and contradictions because of various cross-undercurrents within? We should begin our analysis by a deeper understanding of the wider socio-political realm, within which the social reform process took place. In fact, the wider socio-political realm, by and large, sustained different combinations of social tensions and conflicts—within and across cultures/religions –- as a result of the cross-undercurrents within the Indian nationalism and the stratagem employed by the colonial apparatus, the effects of both have far-reaching implications for social reforms, extending to even Kerala.

That communalism emerged in this setting of colonial modernity is not a new argument. The stagnation and regression of the secularisation process can, thus, be located within modernity itself. Modernity as such was a critical domain to be understood in a wider realm of the structural changes brought about by colonialism and the inevitable responses generated in the context of nationalist politics. Nationalism itself was a problematique engaged differently by different forces. Communal politics in India, in its real sense, began as a response to the structural changes brought about by colonialism and the inevitable race for power and privileges. The mindsets of upper class Hindus and upper class Muslims were moulded by these factors of structural changes that were later interpreted to mean as endemic feelings of cultural/religious dichotomy, if not of distrust. Thus, the history of communalism goes back to the conditions which disrupted social harmony with the onslaught of colonialism. The question here is whether the social reform process had its inevitable share in the making of various identities both at the macro and micro levels. When this is addressed in the context of the social reform among the Muslims of Kerala, several points merit our attention.

Muslim Reform Movement
The emerging criticisms of the Muslim reform process in Kerala that there was “near complete absence of engagement with the enlightenment paradigm” or “a realistic engagement with modernity” are not only exaggerated but they tend to dampen our intellectual propensity to study social reform process in its complexity and in its socio-historical context.[2] The reform among the Muslims of Kerala did not have a uniform, unilinear character due to the particular circumstances under which it emerged and had to sustain itself. The experiences of south Kerala (Travancore-Cochin) and north Kerala (Malabar) differed, as they had undergone different socio-historical processes and changes. But there had been as many tensions within each segment, as there were between the north and the south.

The Muslim reform process in Kerala extending over half a century since 1880s had different engagements with modernity – from an accommodation within the colonial modernity to expanding concerns of nationalism and the politics of bargain within. The dominant stream of the reform agenda among the Muslims was spearheaded by Sanahullah Makhti Thangal (1847-1912), Vakkom Abdul Cader Moulavi (1873-1932), Sheikh Mohammed Hamadani Thangal (died in 1922), Maulana Chalilakathu Kunjahammed Haji (1856-1919), K.M.Moulavi (died in 1964), et al. under the Islahi movement. They addressed many critical issues of religion and society, thereby taking up the challenges of modernity in right earnest. At no point did they disengage themselves from the enlightenment paradigm. Their voices were not only inspiring but got manifested in their profound thoughts and activities through organisations such as Mohammadiya Sabha in Kannur, Chirayainkil Thaluk Muslim Samajam, Lajunathul Mohammadiya Sangham in Alappuzha, Muslim Aikka Sangham in Kodungaloor, Kerala Naduvattul Mujahideen etc.

The Muslim reform movement, as it was underway profoundly till the early thirties in Kerala, did not seek “a return to the Islamic polity” of a pristine purity, as speculated by many, but it was forward looking, critically and constantly engaging with the challenges presented by modernity. For instance, Makhti Thangal, the pioneer of Muslim reform movement, began his career as a British official, but opted to remain in the realm of Islah, seeking to engage with modernity. On one end of the spectrum, he confronted the Church missionaries who propagated a highly distorted image of Islam; on the other hand, Thangal exhorted the Muslims to come out of their social seclusion to undertake English education (besides in their mother tongue, Malayalam) and through it the emerging challenges of modernity[3]. Makhti Thangal was not anti-British in his essential character, just as Sir Syed Ahamed Khan was during this time, but sought to uplift the Muslims from their self-imposed backwardness and to prepare them to face challenges of modern times.

Similarly, Vakkom Moulavi’s Islahi [4] movement, which spanned over the first three decades of the 20th century, was addressing the challenges of modernity and the critical issues presented by the enlightenment paradigm. The very launching of Swadesabhimani (Patriot) in 1905 heralded the beginning of this engagement. Moulavi’s Swadesabhimani was the first newspaper in Kerala which established communication links with the London-based Reuter. The press itself was imported from England. Those who would talk about Swadesabhimani Ramakrishna Pillai seldom mention about the moving spirit behind it and the symbiotic relationship that prevailed between Vakkom Moulavi and Ramakrishna Pillai[5] While the Islahi movement was profoundly social, it also exhibited its politico-religious commitments. It was essentially anti-colonial in character; yet it did not seek to offer any Islamic alternative in political terms. Instead, Vakkom Moulavi’s major initiative was to liberate the Muslims from the morass of self-delusions to which they had fallen for so long. But this should not be interpreted to mean a mere ‘purification’ campaign, as argued by some[6], calling for a return to the pristine purity of the holy texts. Moulavi had an entirely different approach to the importance of the holy texts, which exhibited both hermeneutical as well as social foundations. Both were combined in the very principle of ijtihad[7], to which he was profoundly committed. The principal aim of the Islahi movement should therefore be kept in perspective. It was primarily a call for engaging with modernity, and the Muslims were called upon to come forward to understand both religion and modern society in dialectical terms, not to the level of discarding one in favour of the other. Most historians tend to ignore this, for one reason or other.

Those who underestimate Vakkom Moulavi’s Islahi movement try to disregard its inherent potential as such. His basic position on religious reforms centres on the concept of ijtihad. Moulavi strongly argued that the door of ijtihad couldn’t be closed[8]. He exhorted the Muslims to rediscover and reinstate ijtihad, the principle of independent judgment with a view to rebuilding the shariat in the light of modern thought and experience [9]. Moulavi’s adherence to the Islamic hermeneutical tradition could be seen in his insistence on individual ijtihad, which was not only permitted but was essential to arrive at decisions where the holy texts were either ambiguous or silent. His perspicuous analysis on the laws of Islam further provides evidences of his rational approach. Even while affirming that “the laws of Islam concerning spiritual matters are eternal,” he strongly argued that “the laws of Islam concerning temporal matters are not immutable, and hence depending on the conditions of time and place, they are subject to change”[10]. The most radical of his views can be seen in his perspectives on the Islamic laws. Vakkom Moulavi said that the Muslims should address their socio-economic problems even transcending the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence if they were unable to equip them [11]. Obviously, the Islahi movement Vakkom Moulavi, carried on for three decades, did not seek a mere pilgrimage to the past, but it was a progressive engagement with modernity. It addressed not only the questions of laws and beliefs in Islam, but took up challenges of modern education, including women’s education, gender justice, rational outlook on social and religious matters etc[12].  Needless to say, very few ulama could accept Moulavi’s exegesis concerning spatio-temporal matters. That is why he had to face stiff opposition from orthodox elements who were only concerned about the scriptural matrix of Islam, besides keeping the community in perpetual ignorance and superstition.

Even as Vakkom Moulavi’s Islahi movement got underway (in the most dynamic way with multiple agenda of reforms), traditional Mullahs rose in revolt against the mission he had set in motion. They obviously did not have any scholarship or any sense of the implications of modernity. This led them to initiate a counter campaign even calling Vakkom Moulavi ‘kafir’ (infidel/disbeliever) and ‘Wahhabi’ (a derogatory term used against Mohammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab and his followers). It is true that Moulavi Moulavi had written about Wahhab (as part of cataloging the reform efforts in the Islamic history) pointing to his mission of ‘purging’. But Moulavi never considered himself as a Wahhabi. Rather many of his modernist views were derived from the writings and perspectives of Al-Ghazali  (whose Kīmyāyé Sa’ādat [The Alchemy of Happiness] he translated into Arabic Malayalam), Muhammad Abduh of Egypt (whose ‘Al-Manar’ had deeply influenced him), Shah Waliullah (1703–1762)  Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (1838-1897) and Syed Ahmad Khan (1817 -1898).  A common thread of all these traditions is the humanism embedded in Islam and its potential to engage modernity and all its challenges.

Moulavi’s movement saw positive results when there was general receptivity to his call. However, since the early 1930s, it did not progress further in a wider realm due to the particular circumstances imposed by the nationalist politics, on the one hand, and the politics of bargain on the other.

While the Mappila resistance to the British rule, through a series of rebellions since the 19th century has been identified as an appropriate response to the colonial policy, the 1921 uprising earned the ‘disrepute’ as ‘communal’ because, the Mappilas were believed to have drawn inspiration from Islamic texts and sought to establish ‘‘Khilafat kingdoms.” But little did we see the impact of the political call sent out by the Khilafat movement, set in motion by the so-called secular, nationalist Congress under Mahatma Gandhi. The Mappilas, inspired by Gandhiji and the nationalist Congress who favoured mixing up religion with politics as a tactical struggle, soon found the Congress virtually disowning them. Even Gandhiji became critical of the rebellion and the Mappilas, while conveniently forgetting the fact that the stage was partly set by the Congress itself with its launching of the Khilafat movement as a tactical realm of confronting the British for their betrayal in Turkey[13]. This seemed to have a lasting impression on even secular Muslims of Kerala, particularly in Malabar. The situation was aptly summed up by E.M.S. Namboodirippad:
The Hindu intelligentsia of Malabar started going more or less in the same direction as their counterparts in North India. The Arya Samaj and other Hindu communal organisations came and started their work in Malabar, first by way of affording relief to Hindu refuges fleeing from the areas of the rebellion, then by reconverting those Hindus who had been forcibly converted to Islam by the rebels and ultimately going to the extent of converting Muslims to Hinduism. The Muslim intelligentsia were terror-stricken because of the post-rebellion repression that they had to go through but were nevertheless extremely indignant. They could do nothing, but be resentful for the time being, but that was by itself sufficient for the creation of an atmosphere ideally suited for communal squabbles[14].

Locating the site of communalism, E.M.S. writes:
In fact, the Malabar Congressmen themselves were split into Hindus and Muslims. When they started reorganising the Congress in the post-rebellion years, there were virtually two centres of the Congress – one Hindu and the other Muslim – each having its own paper, Mathrubhumi and Al-Ameen. It is also remarkable that some Hindu Congressmen were themselves the organizers of the Hindu Mahasabha. The gulf between the two groups was so wide that though each claimed to be a group of congressmen, one could not cooperate with the other even in organising the Congress[15].

The analysis of E.M.S. holds importance even today. The formation of Muslim League in Kerala in the mid-thirties was the logical culmination of this Muslim alienation started in the post-rebellion period. This was accentuated by a host of problems emanating from the nationalist scene since the 1920s just as the Congress-Hindu Mahasabha hobnobbing, the Nehru Report, issues of cow slaughter etc. The emergence of the League could thus be seen as a setback to the secular politics in the country. Communal politics gained strength since the 1920s, and it continued to affect secularisation and democratisation process in India. Kerala was not immune to these cross-undercurrents in the nationalist politics. However, the gains of social reform process could not be consolidated in the emerging scenario of the Congress-League tussle. Meanwhile, the situation created by the absence of a strong leadership, after Vakkom Moulavi, was soon to be appropriated by the more orthodox Ulama, on the one hand, and the Jamaat-i-Islami on the other. Kerala Naduvatul Mujahiden, however, continued to strive hard to make inroads into the Muslim masses. But this was considerably constrained by the emerging confrontation and competition within the Muslim community for leadership. The most long-lasting setback of the reform process started in the late 1950s when all religious and communal forces arrayed themselves against the democratically elected communist government in Kerala under the banner of vimochana samaram. Ever since, the successive governments in Kerala have been engaging the religious and communal forces in the state, most strategically, in the electoral process.

Conclusion
Thus, the present-day communalisation cannot be seen in isolation by merely searching for its roots in the social reform process. The problem lies with modernity itself, with the way it was engaged by both the colonial apparatus and the nationalist leadership. Its genesis could be traced back to the structural changes brought about by colonialism and the manner in which the upper class Hindus and Muslims responded to them. The metropolitan capital succeeded in widening the gulf, as it would ultimately undermine the strident anti-colonial struggle. Situated as it was, between the colonial apparatus and the emerging nationalist movement, the social reform process could not be expected to address larger issues of facilitating capitalism or agrarian reform or labour process or commodity production. It was rather too much to expect such a broad-based agenda from the social reform movements.

Though the Muslim reform process did not continue beyond 1930s, the gains of the same did have a lasting influence on the socio-body politic of Kerala. The secular-democratic process gained momentum over a period of three-four decades since 1930s, and the entire social fabric of Kerala remained strong, at least until the early 1980s. Caste-based, religion-based, community-based organisations began to gain strength across the world since the early 1980s when neoliberalism got underway rejuvenating the far-right and all reactionary forces. Kerala society, having been exposed to these influences in a variety of ways, could not escape from the emerging scenario of caste/communal consolidations because the capital accumulation process taking place at the national and global levels along neoliberal lines called for caste-based, religion-based, and community-based social capital formations in order to offset any class-based resistance to the policies of modern techno-capitalism. The emergence of the Modi Government in 2014 further encouraged the communal forces across the country to consolidate the far-right mobilization. This wider realm of communalisation process cannot be glossed over when we engage ourselves in locating the sites of its origin.

(This is a revised paper I had presented at the University of Calicut in a seminar organised by the Department of History, a decade and a half ago, on the theme “Kerala Renaissance and Social Reform Process: A Contemporary Reappraisal.” For details see  K.M. Seethi, “Communalism and the Muslim Reform Movement in Kerala: Problems of Engaging with Modernity,” VMMRC, 2 September 2006).

Notes and References
[1] For a cross section of studies relating to communalism, see K. N. Panikkar (ed.),   Communalism in India: History, Politics and Culture (New Delhi: Manohar 1991); Gyanendra Pandey, The Constructions of Communalism in Colonial North India (Delhi: Oxford University Press 1990); Ram Puniyani, Communal Politics: Facts versus Myths (New Delhi: Sage 2003); Asghar Ali Engineer, Communalism in India (New Delhi: Vikas 1995); Bipan Chandra, Communalism in Modern India (New Delhi: Vikas 1984) and; Bipan Chandra, Nationalism and Colonialism in Modern India (New Delhi: Orient Longman 1981).
[2] An instance of the refusal/inability to understand such reform attempts in a broader perspective can be seen in the work of Roland Miller, a Canadian scholar who had lived in Kerala for nearly a quarter of a century to study the Mappilas. Even while Miller acknowledged that “the wind of change” in Islamic reform in Kerala “blew from the south” in the personality of Vakkom Moulavi, he could not fully grasp the depth of his thought and came to the slapdash conclusion that Moulvai’s reform was basically a “conservative reform.” See Roland E. Millar, Mappila Muslims of Kerala: A Study in Islamic Trends (Madras: Orient Longman 1992): 270-74; also see Jose Abraham, Islamic Reform and Colonial Discourse on Modernity in India, Socio-Political and Religious Thought of Vakkom Moulavi (New York:  Palgrave Macmillan 2014).
[3] See Makthi Thangalude Sambhoorna Krithikal (Tirur: Kerala Islamic Mission 1981): 632-46.
[4] Conceptually, Islah unfolds the broad agenda of reform within the community.
[5] See T. Venugopalan, Swedesabhimani: Rajadrohiyaya Rajyasnehi (Kochi: The Kerala Press Academi, 1996): 43-56 and 218-59. While acknowledging the relationship between Moulavi and Pillai in the right spirit, Venugopalan, like many others, failed to grasp the essence of the Islahi movement, which led him say that Vakkom Moulvai was neither a religious reformer nor a religious modernist (225).
[6] See Ibid:226.
[7] Ijtihad has different connotations in the Arabic lexicon, but, in the main, it implies “strenuous endeavour” – an intellectual activity denoting the pursuit of an individual scholar to derive rules from the authentic texts (the Quran and the Hadith) without relying on the opinion of other scholars. This is what Iqbal called the principle of movement in Islam. See Bernard G. Weiss, “Ijtihad,” in The Encyclopaedia of Religion (New York: Macmillan 1987), vol.7: 90-92; also see Sir Mohammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of religious Thought in Islam (Lahore: S.H. Muhammad Ashraf 1982):148.
[8] Vakkom Moulvi, Lau-ssabah (Nilakkamukku: Islam Dharmaparipalana Sangham, 1930); This has been reproduced in Vakkom Moulaviyude Thiranjedutha Krithikal (Vakkom: Vakkom Moulavi Publications 1979), edited by S. Mohamed Abda, 312-13 (hereafter cited as Selected Works),
[9] See Selected Works: 91.
[10] Ibid: 129.
[11] Vakkom Moulavi, “Islam Mathanaveekaranam,” in Sahrudayopaharam (Idava: Bharakkathul Muslimmen 1930); also see Selected Works”167-68.
[12] See Vakkom Moulavi, “ Nammude Sthreekal,” Al-Islam, Vol. 1, No.1, April 1918; also see Selected Works:185-87.
[13] See W.C. Smith, Modern Islam in India (London: Victor Gollancz 1946), p.207; also see Gail Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India (Delhi: Oxford University Press 1982).
[14] See E.M.S. Namboodiripad, Kerala Society and Politics: An Historical Survey (New Delhi: National Book Centre 1984): 121.
[15] Ibid:122.
 
The author is Dean of Social Sciences and Professor, School of International Relations and Politics, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kerala. He can be reached at  kmseethimgu@gmail.com
 

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During the campaign for a much hyped “Naya (new) Pakistan” Imran Khan had promised that his party would create 10 million new jobs and build 5 million homes for the poor if they win. He also made a claim that the rich Pakistani   diaspora had assured him that they would step in with substantive investment and expertise to reconstruct the country.  In his first press conference (even as the entire election results were still to be announced), Imran Khan announced that he wanted Pakistan to become the country that his leader “Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah had dreamed of” (Dawn 2018b). He said that he wanted to “share the kind of Pakistan” he envisioned—“the type of state that was established in Madina, where widows and the poor were taken care of “(Ibid).

If it i was Nizam-i Mustafa (the system of the Prophet Muhammad) that Imran referred to, there was already an experiment undertaken by a nine-party popular movement begun by the Jamaat-i Islami in 1977 to overthrow the secular government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and establish an ‘Islamic system’ of government in Pakistan. The movement broke done after the military coup of Zia-ul-Haq and, then, Pakistan witnessed another decade of authoritarian military rule under the facade of ‘Islamisation’ drive.

One does not know if Imran was still aware of the ‘dream’ of Jinnah which the latter had categorically made clear on 11 August 1947 in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan:
“You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your Mosques or to any other places of worship in this state of Pakistan, You may belong to any religion or caste or creed – that has nothing to do with the business of the state… we are starting in the days when there is no discrimination, no distinction between one community and another, no discrimination between one caste or creed or another. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one state… you should keep that in front of us as our ideal, and you will find, in course of time, Hindus would cease to be Hindus, and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual but in the political sense as citizens of the state (Jinnah 1947).

Does PTI’s “Islamic Republic” allow room for such an egalitarian society? What is the status of minorities in Pakistan even after 70 years? The Ahmadi community, for instance, announced their boycott of the July 25 elections to protest the ‘discriminatory’ move to have a separate voter list for them. Imran did not hide his bias on their status. He had openly rejected any idea of repealing the Second Amendment to the Pakistani Constitution which declares the Ahmadis as non-Muslims.

In his first press conference, Imran brought to light the plight of the poor, women and children. He says: “Farmers are not paid for their hard work, 25 million children are out of school, our women continue to die in childbirth because we can’t give them basic healthcare, we can’t give the people clean drinking water. A country is not recognised by the lifestyle of the rich, but by the lifestyle of the poor. No country that has an island of rich people and a sea of poor people can prosper” (Dawn 2018b). It may be recalled that in a pre-election interview Imran said that “The political class here doesn’t change that much. You can introduce new actors but you can’t change the political class wholesale. This is why I give the example of Mahathir Mohamad, who changed Malaysia with the same political class by giving them clean leadership” (Dawn 2018a). This was obviously an indication that Imran’s PTI does not envisage any fundamental change in the political economy of the State of Pakistan.  The ruling political class has always been characterised by a combination of military-bureaucratic-political forces.

There is already a feeling everywhere that Imran and his PTI could be the natural ‘selection’ of the military. Given such a spate of criticisms across a wider political spectrum, within and across the world, it remains to be seen how he would negotiate between these state apparatuses.  In an interview Imran was asked to speak on the military’s influence in setting Pakistan’s foreign policy. He said: “The army will get involved where there are security situations. If you look at the US policy in Afghanistan, a lot of the US-Afghan policy was influenced by Pentagon. Even when Barack Obama didn’t want to continue the war in Afghanistan, he did it because he was convinced by Pentagon” (Dawn 2018a).  Imran also said: “When you have democratic governments that perform and deliver, that is their strength. We have had military influence on politics in Pakistan because we have had the worst political governments. I am not saying it is justified but where there is a vacuum something will fill it.” He also said: “Under crooked and corrupt governments, people welcome the military with open arms. In 1999 when Musharraf’s martial law was declared, people were celebrating in Lahore – Nawaz’s political centre! – because governance had failed” (Dawn 2018a).

Imran has also been criticised for his ambiguous position on Islamic forces in Pakistan. Many even suspected if he was ‘soft’ on such issues. During the election campaign, he declared that there should be “a dual policy: one is dialogue and the other is military action. I have been labelled ‘Taliban Khan’ just because I did not agree with this one-dimensional policy that Pakistan implemented under American pressure.” Imran said: “the war in Afghanistan was a classic example of how military solutions alone did not work. “The US has been there for 15 years with a military option but has failed. If there is consensus among the American and Afghan governments and allies that they want unconditional peace talks with Taliban, it means the military option has failed” (Dawn 2018a).

The most challenging test of Imran’s policy regime could be Pakistan’s relations with India which witnessed a setback during the last few years. His anti-India rhetoric had already raised suspicions that a political dispensation under Imran would be more ‘aggressive’ in dealing with India. In the interview with Dawn, he said that his rival “Nawaz Sharif tried everything, even personal [gestures] calling him [Modi] over to his house. No one got in his way. But I think it is the policy of the Narendra Modi government to try and isolate Pakistan. They have a very aggressive anti-Pakistan posture because Modi wants to blame Pakistan for all the barbarism they are doing in Kashmir. What can one do in the face of this attitude?” (Dawn 2018a).

In his post-election speech, Imran, however, appeared to be more soft-spoken though he still harped on sensitive issues like Kashmir. He said that it would be “very good for all of us if we have good relations with India. We need to have trade ties, and the more we will trade, both countries will benefit”(Dawn 2018b). Everyone knows that it was Pakistan that was still hesitant on the issue of strengthening trade ties with India. It is yet to accord the most favoured nation (MFN) status to India even as it maintains a negative list of more than a thousand items which are not permitted to be imported from India.  New Delhi keeps reminding that its granting of MFN status to Pakistan should not be treated as a mere gesture and hence reciprocity is called for. Referring to Kashmir, Imran said that “Kashmir is a core issue, and the situation in Kashmir, and what the people of Kashmir have seen in the last 30 years. They have really suffered…Pakistan and India’s leadership should sit at a table and try to fix this problem. It’s not going anywhere.” In a more conciliatory tone Imran said:  “We are at square one right now [with India]. If India’s leadership is ready, we are ready to improve ties with India. If you step forward one step, we will take two steps forward. I say this with conviction, this will be the most important thing for the subcontinent, for both countries to have friendship” (Daily Pakistan 2018). A major question is if Pakistan will allow the democratic process to take the lead on both sides of Kashmir. Azad Kashmir is still a democratic-deficit zone which Imran does not want to concede when he talks about issues in the Indian administered Jammu and Kashmir. One major cause of the perennial crisis in Kashmir is the continued support the militants get from Pakistan which India considers as a critical factor stalling the peace process.

The most crucial tests of Imran Khan would be his handling of Pakistan economy and the burgeoning threats from Islamic forces. The economy has already been facing several problems—from resource crunch to worsening balance of payment situation. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has already warned that “the current account and budget deficits are gloomy.”  According to the IMF, the country’s current account deficit stood at 4.8% of total national income ($16.6 billion), which was 83% higher than the government’s official estimates. The IMF has also warned that Pakistan’s official gross foreign currency reserves could fall to $12.1 billion–barely enough financing 10 weeks of imports.  The IMF also asked Pakistan to improve its anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing regimes. They also sought to devalue the currency to minimise damages to the external sector, and levy more taxes to control the growing budget deficit. It said that surging imports have led to a widening current account deficit and a significant decline in international reserves despite higher external financing. FY 2017/18’s current account deficit could reach 4.8% of GDP, with gross international reserves further declining in the context of limited exchange rate flexibility.  This is equal to $16.6 billion – and far higher than $12.1 billion deficit that Pakistan has experienced in the previous fiscal year (IMF 2018).

The World Bank’s latest estimates also paint a dismal picture for Pakistan. It says that “Pakistan remains one of the lowest performers in the South Asia Region on human development indicators, especially in education (etc)…  Infant and under five mortality rates represent a similar story. Gender disparities persist in education, health and all economic sectors. Pakistan has one of the lowest female labour force participation rates in the region. Nutrition also remains a significant cross-cutting challenge, as 44% of children under five are stunted. The spending on health, nutrition, and education, now totalling 3 per cent of GDP, significantly lower than most other countries. Increased allocation will only be possible after increasing government revenues. The tax-to-GDP ratio, at 12.4 percent, is one of the lowest in the world and it is still half of what it could be for Pakistan.”

The Fund-Bank estimates have a particular importance for Pakistan given its long-term dependence on the external sources and its high spending on defence and arms build-up, besides its financing of various forces. Remittances constitute a major share of Pakistan’s foreign exchange.  According to latest reports, remittances have declined by 19.82% compared to the situation the previous year (it was $1.609 billion in September 2016 but in 2017, it has been reduced to $1.29 billion) (Times of Islamabad 10 March 2017; Dawn 10 June 2017). Like other countries in South and Southeast Asia, Pakistan too will have to bear the burden of declining remittances due to the localisation drive underway in the GCC countries.

Most importantly, Imran has to address the situation arising out of the rise of terrorism and fundamentalism in Pakistan. He must be aware that it has much to do with the emergence of an oligarchic power structure (civil-military-religious nexus), which had its beginnings in the 1960s, but got accentuated in the 1970s after  General Zia-ul-Haq  came to power((Seethi 2015).  It was during the rule of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in the 1990s that the Islamic forces like Taliban branched out, within and across the boundary in Afghanistan. An major  factor that has significantly assisted their growth is the making of a vast number of jobless families, people without any means of existence and without expectations, as a consequence of lopsided policies in agriculture and industry. As  Hamza Alvi wrote, every tractor displaced at least a dozen families of sharecroppers. Hundreds of thousands of them were without a source of livelihood. Under these circumstances, the advent of the well-financed madrasas, who took over their children, gave them free tuition, accommodation and food, appeared to be a great miracle (Alvi 2010). Over years, the armed groups, many of them with battle-hardened Taliban, are in the forefront of a sectarian carnage in Pakistan, which have been on the increase — killings of members of rival sects, Sunnis vs Shias, Deobandi Sunnis vs Barelvi Sunnis, etc. (Seethi 2014). Over the years, these militant bands assumed new forms and carried new nomenclatures. Islamic militant outfits such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Toiba, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Jaish-e-Mohammed are various forms of Jihadism in the making, seeking to take over the State by military means, mainly relying on the discontent of the middle class. Instead of conceptualising a workable policy with a view to dealing with such militant groups, successive governments have pandered to them. The high cost of this great lapse is that Pakistan has become the killing fields of South Asia.

In Pakistan, the State’s monopoly of force is dented by a variety of armed Islamist groups that have schemes of their own. The ruling dispensations have not so far recognised that the more they try to acquiesce to these religious extremists, the harder and more uncompromising they tend to become. It remains to be seen how Imran Khan’s ‘Naya’ Pakistan is going to address this crucial question.

References
Alvi, Hamza (2010): “The Rise of Religious Fundamentalism in Pakistan,” LUBP, https://lubpak.com/archives/5589
Dawn (2018a): “You can’t win without electables and money: Imran,” 5 July, https://www.dawn.com/news/1418060/you-cant-win-without-electables-and-money-imran
Dawn (2018b): “Imran promises wide-ranging reforms: All policies for the people” Dawn.com  26 July 26,  https://www.dawn.com/news/1423029/imran-promises-wide-ranging-reforms-all-policies-for-the-people
Daily Pakistan (2018): “‘Will run Pakistan like never before,’ Imran Khan vows to eradicate corruption and live a simple life in victory speech,”  https://en.dailypakistan.com.pk/lifestyle/well-spoken-indias-rishi-kapoor-praises-imran-khan-on-his-election-victory-speech/
IMF (2018):Pakistan: IMF Country Report No. 18/78, FIRST POST-PROGRAM MONITORING  DISCUSSIONS,  https://www.google.co.in/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=2ahUKEwjrz9ngk73cAhXEQo8KHSD_CiUQFjAAegQIBRAC&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.imf.org%2F~%2Fmedia%2FFiles%2FPublications%2FCR%2F2018%2Fcr1878.ashx&usg=AOvVaw2lXQHNabxWLsLYV6XASIcX
Seethi, K.M. (2014): “Pakistan School Killing: South Asia’s Killing Fields,” Tehelka, , 19 December.
Seethi, K.M. (2015): “Political Islam, Violence and Civil Society in Pakistan,” Indian Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol.8. No.1.
The World Bank (2018): The World bank in Pakistan:  Overview 17 April, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/pakistan/overview

The author is Professor, School of International Relations and Politics, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kerala. He can be reached at kmseethimgu@gmail.com

First Published on https://countercurrents.org
 

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