On Wednesday, December 4 2019, the Union cabinet gave a go ahead for the Citizenship Amendment Bill (CAB) to be tabled in the Parliament next week. This would possibly be the first piece of legislation perniciously discriminatory, based on religion/faith. This Bill violates Articles 14 and 15 of the Indian Constitution. It would therefore be brazenly against secularism—the basic structure of the Constitution. This Bill is coming after the exercise of National Register of Citizens (NRC) conducted in the north eastern provinces.

The NRC disenfranchised around 19 lakh people, rendering them state-less, non-citizens in Assam. This was done under the supervision of the apex court led by former Chief Justice Ranjan Gogoi, who himself is from Assam. Thus, even the highest judicial institution does not seem to be of any help, in this politically motivated exercise of disenfranchising people of a particular faith. There are many other instances, including the Ayodhya title verdict of November 9, 2019, which render hapless citizens much more vulnerable than can be imagined.

In a third world country such as India where people sitting in the highest offices are not able to produce authentic educational degrees and certificates in proof of date of birth, common masses are forced to retrieve multiple documents pertaining to their ancestry. This has already created spine-chilling fear among people. Having found out that this exercise in Assam has turned out to have converted fairly large number of Hindus also into non-citizens, the BJP government, true to its perniciously divisive and hate-filled majoritarian ideology and praxis, is now coming out with a legislative bill which seeks to provide all relief only to those who are not Muslims.

This Citizenship Amendment Bill (CAB) is quite consistent with the treatment meted out to the Palestinians by the state of Israel, with unmistakable Zionist ideology: only Jews have citizenship entitlement. This is one of the greatest ironies of human history that the incumbent Hindutva regime derives its ideological inspiration from the Nazism of Hitler (and Fascism of Mussolini), who was the cruellest persecutor of the Jews. Yet, it also remains friends with the Zionist Jews, in terms of both ideology and praxis.

The wonderfully inclusionary nationalism of India’s anti-colonial freedom struggle and its self-conscious assumption of role as the world-leader against all kinds of persecutions and oppressions, the Indian National Congress had come out to condemn the Hitler’s great anti-Jewish pogrom of November 9, 1938, infamous as ‘Crystal Night’. On December 12, 1938, the Congress went on to offer the concession of asylum in India to the German Jews. Thus, this too will go down in history as a big irony, that these persecuted Jews today appear to be with the Hindutva forces, the regressive bête noire of the Indian nationalism espoused mainly by the Indian National Congress.   

The chief theoretician of Hindutva, Vinayak Damodar Savarkar (1883-1966), had already proposed such brazenly discriminatory notions of citizenship and nationhood. Savarkar wrote his book, Hindutva, in 1917, clandestinely in the Cellular Jail, of the Andaman Islands, published it underground, in 1923. Savarkar was the President of the Hindu Mahasabha during 1937-1942, while its Secretary, during 1926-1931, was K. B. Hedgewar (1889-1940), the founder of the RSS.  

Savarkar’s speech, on ‘India’s Foreign Policy’, delivered at Pune on August 1, 1938, said, “…Germany has every right to resort to Nazism and Italy to Fascism…Hitler knows better than Pandit Nehru does what suits Germany best…”. In his speech at Malegaon, on October 14, 1938, Savarkar said, “A nation is formed by a majority… what did the Jews do in Germany? They being in minority were to be driven out from Germany”. And in a speech of December 11, 1938, Savarkar said that “in Germany the movement of the Germans is the national movement but that of the Jews is a communal one”. These views find echoes in a 1939 book, We, or our Nationahood Defined, by M. S. Golwalkar (1906-1973). He wrote, “…Muslims may stay in the country wholly subordinated to the Hindu nation claiming nothing, deserving no privileges, far less any preferential treatment, not even citizen’s rights”. All these views were endorsed and popularised in 1939 by the Marathi newspapers, The Mahratta, and also in Kesari (December 8 and 15, 1939). From 1924 to 1935, Kesari remained immensely impressed with Fascism in Italy.

Savarkar, few years before his death in 1966, also wrote a book in Marathi, Six Glorious Epochs of Indian History, wherein he justified the idea of rape of Muslim women in riots as a political tool.

B. S. Moonje (1872-1948), the mentor of Hedgewar, was the first Hindutva icon to have contacted the fascist regime and its dictator in Italy in March 1931. He was on a tour of Europe after the first Round Table Conference. Moonje particularly visited the Fascist military training schools, and he ‘played a crucial role in moulding the RSS along Italian (Fascist) lines’. M. R. Jayakar (1873-1959), another leader of Hindu Mahasabha also ‘drew inspirations from the fascist paramilitary organizations’.

The entire gamut of political opposition is either silent or meek. Apparently, growing number of Hindus don’t seem to be as much outraged with whatever is happening now. If state-backed lynching is not able to rouse the people, what else really can!

For me, as a student of modern Indian history, cause of greatest concern is: how has India become this menacing?

The colonial construction about India’s past was done in a manner as to paint the Muslim rulers merely as invaders, and all Muslims responsible for whatever the Muslim rulers did in medieval past. Even after independence, the historiography of Partition has been articulated and popularised mostly to vilify Muslims as mere separatists and fifth-columnists. Almost entire guilt of partition has been put squarely on Muslims. This has been done even in the nationalist, liberal-secular persuasions of historiography. The rising majoritarianism not only of the Hindutva forces but also within the Congress, particularly from 1938 onwards, remained least known, even to the academic historians. Then, what to say of the popular spaces!

That this majoritarianism had certainly no less roles in dividing India, remained, and still remains, least popularised version of Indian history. This has further contributed in creating majoritarian hatred against Muslims. This has gradually created a permissive and receptive atmosphere for the Hindutva ideology among the increasingly growing number of Hindus.

During the anti-Emergency movement, the ‘respectable’ socialists went on to provide further legitimacy to such divisive forces. As said by Arvind Rajagopal, “With the taint of the Gandhi’s assassination, the RSS was truly a political pariah. But after the Emergency, acquiring political power came within reach. The fortunes of secularism, and of Hindutva, were decisively changed thereafter”.

The RSS ‘realised the significance of popular mobilization’ and later on ‘fabricated an account of democratic struggle that exists mainly in its own records’. They wear it on their sleeves and proudly call it ‘second freedom struggle’. They had stayed away from the anti-colonial freedom struggle and had also compromised with the British. In a meeting with the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow at Bombay on October 9, 1939, Savarkar had assured him that ‘the Hindu Mahasabha favoured an unambiguous undertaking of Dominion Status at the end of the World War II’ and thus, ‘the Mahasabha was more interested in succeeding the British with their complicity, rather than fighting them’.

Not only this, Indira Gandhi herself, after coming back to power in 1980, tilted rightward. She accepted the invitation of VHP’s Ekta Mata Yatra (also called Ganga Jal Yatra) which was its first mass contact programme. The Ramjanmabhoomi campaign came after this Yatra, and the rest is history that continues to haunt us. Rajiv Gandhi’s Assam Accord (1985) is the genesis of this citizenship precipice.

The incumbent government, continuously failing miserably on economic fronts, is constantly resorting to communal polarization. The Indians have to see through these destructive designs.   

*The author is a professor at Centre of Advanced Study in History, Aligarh Muslim University

The post A Legislative Bill for Faith-based Citizenship: How India Has Reached This Point of Disaster? appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In July 2016, when the national media gaze fell on the Dalit upsurge in Una taluk of Gir Somnath district, Gujarat, another incident of Dalit brutality on Dalit assertion occurred in a colony called Babu Tola in Paroo block in Muzaffarpur district, Bihar but went relatively under-reported.

Two Dalit youths, Rajiv Paswan and Munna Paswan, allegedly attempted to steal a motorbike of a local Bhumihar. The two Paswans were thrashed by a mob and a member of the mob urinated into the mouth of one of the Paswans. Rajiv Paswan’s mother, Sunita Devi, lodged a first information report with the Paroo police against 11 persons, including Mukesh Thakur, the husband of the village sarpanch.

The police arrested two of the 11 accused, and confirmed the thrashing of the two Dalits, while the allegation of urination was said to have not been substantiated. Meanwhile, the opposition parties in Bihar made it a huge issue, using it as a stick with which to beat ruling Nitish Kumar government. The Union Minister and the Lok Janshakti Party (LJP) president, Ram Vilas Paswan, visited the family of the two Dalit youths and demanded an inquiry by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI).

Though, in the state assembly, the opposition leader of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) Sushil Modi lashed out at the Nitish Kumar administration, Union Minister Giriraj Singh, a Bhumihar leader from Bihar, steered clear of the issue. Initially, the incident created a very charged political atmosphere in Bihar. Some political observers even recalled 1974–75, when the Nav Nirman Andolan of Gujarat almost coincided with the Jayaprakash Narayan-led Sampoorna Kranti in Bihar, which eventually forced the Congress government to impose the Emergency. Ultimately, the Congress party faced a steady decline in subsequent decades, particularly in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh.

Many hoped that there would emerge a huge Dalit mobilisation behind this atrocity, and that it would also merge with the ongoing fierce Dalit upsurge in Gujarat led by Jignesh Mewani. But, that was not to be. The politics around this incident of Dalit atrocity in Paroo did not go far in Bihar. Why?

Morphology of the Issue
Atrocities against the Dalits could not be articulated to polarise the community and mobilise it into a Dalit versus Savarna Hindu affair. It remained merely a Paswan versus Bhumihar confrontation. In Bihar, unlike many other parts of the country, Dalits remain a highly differentiated group, which is, therefore, not a consolidated socio-political constituency. There remains a chronic resentment against the Paswan (Dusadh) hegemony on the part of non-Paswan Dalits. Dusadhs were first among the “untouchables” to have formed their caste association in 1891, asking for Kshatriya status.

Out of 23 Dalit communities, 22 are now categorised as Mahadalits. Even within the Mahadalits, four communities—Ravidas, Pasi, Dhobi and Musahar—are perceived as dominating the remaining 18 Mahadalit castes. The differentiation between Mahadalits and Paswans, and the intra-Mahadalit dichotomy between groups having an upper hand therein and rest of the Mahadalits is a scenario making Dalit unification, a fond hope, difficult to realise. (Arguably, an almost comparable situation obtains within the larger genus of the Other Backward Classes (OBCs), where out of 131 groups, 32 communities are most backward [ati pichhrha]; which partly explains why Nitish Kumar remains shaky about his political base vis-à-vis his domineering ally, Lalu Prasad Yadav.)

Somewhat analogically, Muzaffarpur is also known for the long-standing political rivalry between the two upper castes, the Bhumihars and Rajputs. This has been the case since the 1920s, and has been articulated in Babu Janakdhari Prasad’s Hindi memoir, Kuchh Apni, Kuchh Desh Ki (1970). Prasad was a noted freedom fighter from Muzaffarpur. This rivalry hots up during elections, coming to the fore at all times except when the polarisation is along the backward–forward axis or there is a religious binary of the Hindu–Muslim divide.

Another explanation could be the absence of a numerically visible Dalit middle class that could provide the raison d’être for intra-Dalit cross-caste issues and provide intellectual, strategic and logistic sustenance to Dalit agitations. Though Dalits constitute only about 15% of the total population of Bihar, they form 34% of the land labourers. As many as 70% of the Dalits live below the poverty line (BPL); only 5%–8% of Dalits have toilets and electricity connections in their houses.

Though Dalits constitute only about 15% of the total population of Bihar, they form 34% of the land labourers. As many as 70% of the Dalits live below the poverty line (BPL); only 5%–8% of Dalits have toilets and electricity connections in their houses.

In short, socially and economically they have a long way to go before the community can rise above the imperatives of the here and now and assert as a conglomeration against the dominant Savarnas, many of whose pelf and privileges are at the cost of Dalits as a whole.

In Muzaffarpur, out of 11 assembly seats, two (Bochahan and Sakra) are reserved for the Dalits. Both these seats are in eastern Muzaffarpur, whereas Paroo is in western Muzaffarpur. In the 2015 assembly elections, an adjacent assembly seat, Kanti (unreserved), was won by Ashok Choudhry, an independent Dalit candidate, replacing the incumbent Bhumihar, Ajit Singh. Kanti is regarded as a Bhumihar stronghold, though Pasmanda Muslims have also represented this constituency at least twice (in 1995 and in 2000). The Paroo assembly seat, adjacent to Kanti, is also regarded as being under the sway of Rajputs and Bhumihars. Generally, only these two castes have been elected from the Paroo assembly. Only once was a Dalit elected from here, when the seat was a reserved one. Hence, the wresting of the Kanti (unreserved) seat in 2015 by a Dalit was a big blow to the Bhumihars. Some of the local political observers have opined that this was an indirect factor behind the Bhumihar–Dalit conflict in Paroo.

The incumbent member of the legislative assembly of Paroo (since 2010) is a Rajput from the BJP. During 1995–2005, a Yadav represented it. Paroo is also becoming a centre of Maoist activities where Mallahs (an ati pichhrha OBC segment; fisherfolk) have considerable presence. Of late, however, a good number of Mallahs are supposed to have joined the Bajrang Dal too.1

History of Harijan/Dalit Politics
Prasanna Kumar Chaudhry and Shrikant have studied the history of Dalits comprehensively and published a book titled Swarg Par Dhawa: Bihar Mein Dalit Andolan (2005).In January 1922, Ganesh Dutt Singh (1868–1943), a Bhumihar leader, had argued for the untouchables’ representation in the councils and in local bodies. He remained the minister for local self-government during 1921–43. The point was conceded due to a variety of factors, including the Khilafat and non-cooperation movements, Gandhi’s exertions, and the “colonial knowledge” derived from burgeoning self-assertion movements in the Bombay and Madras presidencies. A Bhumihar landlord–leader, C P N Singh from the Sursand Estate2 was nominated for the untouchable seat. The untouchables being represented by the upper castes was not an isolated phenomenon as far as Bihar was concerned. Jagat Narain Lal (1896–1966) raised this issue (in the legislative council) of nominating Europeans and upper castes from the untouchable quota.

In 1932, a Harijan Sevak Sangh was set up in Muzaffarpur with three major objectives: eradication of untouchability, temple entry, and access to water wells. This was largely a pro-Congress body, which also opened three schools for Harijans in the district. In 1938, the organisation canvassed for recruitment in the constabulary of Bihar police. Nathuni Bhagat had worked towards mobilising his Ravidas community, and in April 1939, he had presided over the session of the Ravidas Sabha in Patna. As a token of remembrance, a government high school was named after him in Muzaffarpur.

Dalit Movements in Colonial Bihar
It is not that the Harijans had absolutely no participation in the freedom movement. In the Quit India Movement (1942), Jaigovind Paswan of Shitalpur was martyred at the Bidupur Bazar of Muzaffarpur (now Vaishali). Another Harijan, Budhan, also sacrificed his life for the movement. The impression that Bihar did not see any Dalit movement in colonial India has been contested by Chaudhry and Shrikant (111: 2005). They say that the struggle against untouchability and for access to water tanks/wells started almost simultaneously with such movements in western and southern India.

In Bihar, however, these movements remained pro-Gandhi. In 1923, the Arya Samaj had its annual session in Muzaffarpur. On 25–27 May 1927, their session was held at Mahua Bazar (now in Vaishali), where the Doms had raised the issue of access to water wells, and from there they took a procession to use many water wells in the surrounding areas.4 The proposal of the Temple Entry Bill of 1933 was met with fierce opposition in Bihar. Mahant Darshan Das, of the Maniyari Estate of Muzaffarpur, had particularly opposed the proposed bill by saying that such legislation will create chaos. Subsequently, another meeting of the Varnashram Swaraj Sangh was held at Pakri, a village in Muzaffarpur, to oppose the proposed bill (Choudhry and Shrikant 2005: 141–42).

Stephen Henningham points out that in 1936, a significant movement of the community of Musahars had also emerged in Tirhut (which included Muzaffarpur). It is worthwhile to recall this story of mobilisation (Henningham 1981: 1153–56).

Having organised several “social uplift” meetings, in late May [1936] their leader, Santdas Bhagat, mounted a large demonstration against a Muzaffarpur sugar factory. Unfortunately little is yet known about the background of Santdas Bhagat [alias Dadaji]. A few weeks later he drew several thousand Musahars to a meeting at Dalsingsarai in Darbhanga at which complaints were levelled against Ramasre Prasad Chaudhuri, MLC, a leading local zamindar, and against [the manager] of the Harsingpur [near Dalsinghsarai, Samastipur] sugar factory. (Henningham 1981: 1153)

According to an official report, the Musahars, subsequently, held a demonstration at the sugar factory, sent a letter of protest to Chaudhuri, and assembled in large numbers near Chaudhuri’s residence, armed with lathis. Chaudhuri gathered a large body of men and a clash seemed imminent when armed police arrived, arrested the Musahar leaders, and dispersed the crowd with a lathi charge. Later, the police charged the Musahar leaders and 30 of their followers with riotous behaviour. In the ensuing weeks, one of the Musahars held two large meetings, in which the police intervened and arrested a leading Musahar spokesman. Probably as a result of this repression, Musahar activity subsided for some months. In September 1937, Musahars demonstrated outside the Sitamarhi court when some of their caste-fellows who were undertrial prisoners were being considered for bail. Meanwhile, violence ensued and the Musahars were beaten up severely by the police. The protesters dispersed. After the Sitamarhi court incident, the Musahar protest subsided, except for a brief revival in June 1938.

Nonetheless, by and large, the Bihar Harijans remained mostly with the Congress. Their prominent leaders were Jaglal Chaudhary (1895–1975) and Jagjivan Ram (1908–86). However, in the 1946 elections in Bihar, four out of 15 Harijan members of the legislative assembly (MLAs) were from the Hindu Mahasabha. A reminder to the advocates of Dalit–Muslim unity!

There is no firm evidence that the Bihar Congress showed any interest in the Musahar campaign, though there is an allegation that at first, “certain Congress agents” were responsible for encouraging Santdas Bhagat to protest. And, it should be noted that the Bihar Provincial Kisan Sabha—a Congress socialist-dominated organisation, conventionally regarded as being on the “left” of the mainstream Congress—kept a careful distance from the poor peasantry. Thus, although it claimed to represent “all who live for cultivation,” the Bihar Provincial Kisan Sabha took little interest in the plight of landless labourers, except to assure them that there was no need for them to organise separately. Notably, Santdas Bhagat’s wife Sati (of the village Pota in Belsand, Sitamarhi) was a brave companion in his agitations.

Militant Dalit Politics
Nonetheless, by and large, the Bihar Harijans remained mostly with the Congress. Their prominent leaders were Jaglal Chaudhary (1895–1975) and Jagjivan Ram (1908–86). However, in the 1946 elections in Bihar, four out of 15 Harijan members of the legislative assembly (MLAs) were from the Hindu Mahasabha. A reminder to the advocates of Dalit–Muslim unity!

In the late-colonial period, the socialists, and in the post-independence period, the “mainstream” Dalit politics in Bihar had ignored agrarian issues. When the Khet Mazdoor Sangh was set up in August 1937 at the Hindu Sabha Maidan of Patna, comrade Manzar Rizvi had opposed Jagjivan Ram’s presidential candidature for the body, and the socialist writer and activist, Rambriksha Benipuri (1899–1968) went on to speak against the need of any such organisation.

The Bihar Harijans were alienated from the ruling Congress in a significant way. Mushahri (in Muzaffarpur) was the first to come in touch with Naxalism during 1968–70, and the counter-elitist who organised them along these lines was a Bhumihar, Raj Kishor Singh (Sajjad 2014b: 158–63). This was around the time when in southern and western parts of India, a militant Dalit politics was emerging under the intellectual and political leadership of the Dalit Panthers (1972).

Subsequently, some of the Dalit massacres, mostly in the Magadh area of Bihar, committed by the private armies of the landlords, rescripted the history of Dalit politics after the 1970s and 1980s.5 The Bihar Harijans discovered Ambedkar only in the 1980s. However, even in the 1980s, a veteran commentator on Dalit politics, Gail Omvedt (in her book, Dalit Vision, 1995), said that V P Singh and his political lieutenant Ramvilas Paswan, “fairly smothered the presence of independent Dalit leaders and movements,” whereas in the 1990s, the bulk of the Dalits remained with the OBC politics led by Lalu Prasad Yadav. In the Lalu–Rabri era, the Bochahan MLA, Ramai Ram and the Sakra MLAs were counted as Dalit leaders. Yadav kept changing the candidates who were to be fielded from Sakra in every election. They were handpicked by Yadav, mostly from among the Dalit teachers of the Lohia College in Muzaffarpur.

Conclusions
Thus, these leaders who were imposed upon the Dalits from above could never create their own mass base. These politicians had serious limitations and they expectedly failed to build up a consolidated, assertive Dalit movement. Shyam Rajak of the Lalu–Rabri era emerged as an articulate and sharp leader. Later, he switched over to join with Nitish Kumar. Yadav is believed to have been so annoyed with Rajak that with the Yadav–Nitish Kumar alliance, Yadav put his foot down to keep Rajak at bay. Rajak seems to have been consigned to political oblivion.

In recent times, Ratanlal, a history teacher in a college under the Delhi University, has been trying to organise Dalit politics in Muzaffarpur–Vaishali. But, he too is associated essentially with the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD). A non-governmental organisation (NGO), Dalit Sewa Sansthan, has also been functioning in Muzaffarpur since 1994, apart from some other NGOs working exclusively for the Musahar community in Bihar. Even though Jitan Manjhi, a member of the Musahar community recently served as the chief minister of Bihar, the Musahars’ roles and impact remain far from satisfactory in uplifting the Dalits.6 Earlier too, on occasions, shortlived chief ministers were chosen from Dalit communities, namely, Bhola Paswan Shastri and Ram Sundar Das.

Ramvilas Paswan’s son Chirag Paswan seems to have lost even before emerging as a leader. He seems unable to connect himself with the popular Dalit base in Bihar. Rather, he is being dismissed by his own core constituency as an arrogant leader, born with a silver spoon. The LJP, just like most regional parties, is busy perpetuating dynasty more than pursuing a meaningful politics in any significant way.

Even in Gaya district, where 30% of the population is Dalit, an organised and assertive Dalit politics is absent. In these regions, the only significant Dalit politics is in the history of the radical left parties since the 1970s.

In short, an economically backward Bihar has to still wait for the emergence of a definite proportion of the middle class among the Dalits, which is a sine qua non for the emergence of a group of intelligentsia, a set of leadership, and a support-base to launch and sustain a popular movement of Dalits. It is small wonder then that the Paroo incident in north Bihar failed to become the Una of Gujarat.
 
(The author (sajjad.history@gmail.com) is with the Centre of Advanced Study, Department of History, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh; this piece appeared in the Economic and Political Weekly and is being reproduced here with the permission of the author )

Disclaimer: The views expressed here are the author's personal views, and do not necessarily represent the views of Sabrangindia.
 

Notes
1 This aspect is elaborated upon in my forthcoming essay on the Lalganj (Vaishali) riots.
2 Bihar and Orissa Legislative Council, Questions and Answers, 1 September 1927, pp 354–55, 2 September 1927, pp 393–99; Cf Chaudhry and Shrikant (2005), pp 200–02. This has to be rechecked from the primary evidence, for whether the Bihar and Orissa Local Self-government Act 1885 had really made any amendment to make a space for the untouchables in 1927.
3 He was the general secretary of both the Bihar Hindu Sabha and the All India Hindu Mahasabha in 1926; he also became a minister in the Shri Krishna Sinha’s cabinet in 1957. For more details about him, see Sajjad (2014a).
4 Bihar and Orissa Police Abstract, 119/27. Another such incident is described in the periodical, Desh, 30 June 1927, edited by Rajendra Prasad, the first President of India.
5 One of the significant studies is Das 1983; also see Frankel 1989, pp 046–132.
6 For details of the Musahar life, see Mukul (1999).

References
Chaudhry, Prasanna Kumar and Shrikant (2005): Swarg Par Dhawa: Bihar Mein Dalit Andolan, New Delhi: Vaani.
Das, Arvind (1983): Agrarian Unrest and Socio-economic Change in Bihar, 1900–1980, New Delhi: Manohar.
Frankel, Francine (1989): “Caste, Land and Dominance in Bihar: Breakdown of the Brahmanical Social Order,” Dominance and State Power in Modern India: Decline of a Social Order, Francine Frankel and M S A Rao (eds), Vol 1, New Delhi: OUP.
Henningham, Stephen (1981): “Autonomy and Organisation: Harijan and Adivasi Protest Movements,” Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 16, No 27, pp 1153–56.
Mukul (1999): “The Untouchable Present: Everyday Life of Musahars in North Bihar,” Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 34, No 49.
Sajjad, Mohammad (2014a): Muslim Politics in Bihar: Changing Contours, New Delhi: Routledge.
— (2014b): Contesting Colonialism and Separatism: Muslims of Muzaffarpur since 1857, New Delhi: Primus.

The post Why an Attack on Dalits in Muzaffarpur does not Ignite an Una Like Resistance: Bihar appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Image: Rediff

When the police officers in the field were unable (or unwilling?) to control the violence, the state administration brought in its more competent and credible officer, Kundan Krishnan, IPS.

 The immediate provocation for the communal violence was this: A young Muslim, Md. Mubarak, of the village, Maker (20 km North of the town of Chhapra, and bordering on Saraiya thana area of Muzaffarpur, where in a village –Azizpur, there was a communal violence on January 18, 2015), allegedly circulated a video on WhatsApp. This video is said to have depicted a Muslim urinating on the images of Hindu gods and goddesses. The accused is believed to have criminal antecedents. Though, Mubarak has eventually been arrested by the police from Kalyan (Maharashtra), it is yet to be ascertained whether or not the local police of Maker delayed taking action on Mubarak on August5, 2016 or whether the accused was actually present in the village on August 4-5. One of the reports says that some of the people of the village Maker had informed the police about the video.

The allegations of police complicity with the Bajrang Dal rioters in the town of Chhapra are based on the fact that while Muslim-owned shops were being looted and burnt, the police remained a mute spectator, the thana (police station) being less than 50 metre away. Reports have also come in about Bajrang Dal activists coming out on the streets on motorbikes. They roamed through the town and announced a bandh. This mob also included some women. Police vehicles were damaged and the IPS officer Krishnan was also attacked. Following this, the Indo Tibetan Border Police Force (ITBP) and Rapid Action Force (RAF) were also deployed.

The local BJP MLAC. N. Gupta had joined the mob at Karimchak mohalla and if eye witnesses are to be believed, even the ITBP winked at the criminal acts of the mob. Now, the allegations, with the video clippings, are there that the MLA also shouted provocative slogans along with the Bajrang Dal people.

Saran district is known for Yadava electoral dominance even in the pre-Karpoori (Thakur) era, and long before Lalu Yadav emerged as a political hegemon in 1990. The late Ram Jaipal Singh Yadav used to be minister in the early 1970s, and was elected several times from Sonepur in the 1960s and 1970s. Another Yadav, Darogha Rai was the chief minister of Bihar (February-December 1970); his son, Chandrika Yadav represents Parsa – one of the Saran seats. This dominance is aptly reflected in naming of the long bridge on the Rewa Ghat of the river Gandak after Darogha Rai. This bridge connects Muzaffarpur with Chhapra through the National Highway 102. Ever since independence, Muslims in the assembly segments of the district of Saran used to be mere voters with almost no assertion over political power. Though, till 1946, the Muslims of Chhapra town have had considerable presence in education, employment, and trade. In recent times, however one Salim Parvez, has emerged as an important JDU leader of the district. He was also pitted against Rabri Devi of the RJD in the Lok Sabha elections of 2014.

The Saran Division (comprising the districts of Saran, Siwan, and Gopalganj) borders on the district of Deoria in Uttar Pradesh. Incidentally, the current chief of the Bajrang Dal, Rajesh Pandey also belongs to Deoria. Pandey was earlier the media manager of Atal Bihari Vajpayee in Lucknow during the elections.

[[The Bajrang Dal was formed in 1984 as a wing of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad founded in 1964. The slogan of the Dal is Seva (Service), Suraksha (Protection), Sanskar (Culture). By virtue of these stated concerns, they have been deeply concerned with cow protection. According to the Human Rights Watch, the Dal was alleged to have been at the forefront of the Gujarat massacre 2002. Its cadres were also accused in the Parbhani mosque blasts (2003) and in the Nanded blasts (2006) in Maharashtra.]]
 
In the midst of competitive communalism of the 1980s (Shah Bano versus Ram Janambhumi) and the emergence of the gangster-legislator Mohammed Shahabuddin in the 1990s, came the rise of Lalu in the 1990s. The last two developments escalated aspiration levels among  a section of the Muslim youth – the aspiration to rise through criminal clout.  The story is not much different with other social groups.

Munna(Vijay) Shukla has his sway across Muzaffarpur and Vaishali, and he is a role model of sorts for a section of Bhumihar youth; the same goes with Suraj Bhan, and Anant Singh in the Mokama-Barh belt of Central Bihar; Anand Mohan Singh, is similarly lionised by the Rajput youth, and Pappu Yadav is another icon for the youth of his community. That is how the people of Bihar and eastern UP have been living under the shadows of gangsters cum legislators cum caste heroes, for the last many decades. 

This process of criminal-turned-caste/community hero attained greater salience in the 1980s. An astute observer of Bihar, Arvind N. Das (1948-2000)had this to say, in his seminal book, The  Republic of Bihar (1992, p. 136)

“[T]he state has been carved out into zones of influence of local ‘leaders’, mostly with daunting criminal records. Many of them are MLAs; some are ministers. From Mohammed Sulaiman’s territory in Kishanganj through Pappu Yadav’s domain in Purnea-Madhepura, one can cross Bihar by passing through Anand Mohan Singh’s area and then into the realm of Raghunath Pandey [Muzaffarpur], and ‘Samrat’ Ashok and further into the Gopalganj belt of Salaluddin and the wild west of Champaran. Alternatively, one can go through, Makhi Paswan’s Khagaria, Kailu Yadav’s region, into the Dularchand tal and then through Dilip Singh’s land and on to the lawless Kaimur ranges crossing the realm of Surendra Yadav”.

 As an insider of the locality and being a sufferer at the hands of such petty criminals, being worshipped by the community and villagers as their heroes, I have observed that at the local level, these ambitious, criminally oriented youth of various castes and communities operate as syndicates and cooperatives, and as suppliers and traffickers of illegal arms. During the day, these characters will roam about the villages and markets on bikes, gambling every now and then; evenings see them taking to drink. They are frequent visitors to the police thanas and the Block Development Offices. They act as fixers and brokers within such establishments. No state functionary knows them better than the local police and the deputy collectors of the Bihar Administrative Services serving as the Block Development Officers.

Even then the higher state functionaries in the police and the administration either remain woefully ignorant (or feign to be so) about these characters. Their crimes often remain unreported. These characters also act as huge resource persons for the bigger gangsters-turned-legislators. They act as informers and as henchmen, besides indulging in vehicle-snatching and kidnapping for ransom. I have at some length narrated about this phenomenon in the chapter 11 of my book on Muzaffarpur, Contesting Colonialism and Separatism (2014), and also in my essay in the Economic and Political Weekly (January 31, 2015), on the Azizpur violence of January 18, 2015, besides my [another] forthcoming essay on the Lalganj violence of November 2015.  A more responsible media and police would or should look more closely into these trends- this deadly cocktail of crime and communalism –all for political gains. The police and media need to, similarly, expose the social base of the Bajrang Dal to question which kinds of un(der)employed youth are the backbones of such organisations. In the case of Saran, there are some indications that the new rural elites, specifically Yadavas, have joined the Bajrang Dal in significant numbers, particularly since the late 1980s.

On this basis of an insider’s experience, and relying on the apparently plausible police version that Mubarak has established criminal antecedents, one can surmise that this person is operating as a part of a group and not as a lone actor. In this view of this background, the hand that seems to have guided Mubarak ought to be identified. One of my friends having served in the rural administration of Bihar commented on the Saran violence in the following words:

“What bothers me is the utter lumpenisation of the grassroots. And a riot or a communal tension here or a caste wrangle there could well be the result of failed political ambitions at level of the Panchayat elections. Their desirability apart, they invariably manage to churn elemental passions which float the atmosphere after the elections are over. Add to this a disturbingly typical image of today’s youth in Bihar – armed with a bike, a smartphone and possibly some illegal arms too, most probably unemployed or semi employed, imbibing incessant stream of images form Internet, and TV, imbibing prohibited alcohol too, at the edge of the urban economy, averse to do what his parents are doing, unable to find or provide a job in the metropolis that could support his daydreams; he would remain split between his desired self-image and his run-down existence. This split would find manifestations in his attempts to contrive a meaning for his largely meaningless life. Some of them would turn into Gau-bhakts, some would listen with interest the exploits of Salafism. All of them start their bikes at the same time, take a round of the local market, look (lecherously) at the girls, who go to tuitions, with more than erotic interest, dig deep into the sub-terrannean recesses of the internet to come out with images which cry vociferously that their respective religions are in danger. They contort their face, clench their fists, twitch their nostrils, crease their forehead and decide that some excitement was long overdue. The rest is done by the internet. Mayhem, murder and massacre follow.” '

Society is undergoing a disturbing flux. These hoodlums, on being elected to Panchayats, would make money and will have luxury houses in the towns, escaping the scanner of the Income Tax Department.  Some others would raise funds for constructing or renovating masjids and mandirs: in order to assert their respective identities, they will build the tallest possible minars, use the costliest possible marble in the masjids, besides eventually becoming Hajis, and then flaunt this ‘status’ to claim an enhanced moral authority in the locality. Quite often they are brick-manufacturers as well. This is how these Panchayat functionaries raise money,  often purchase symbols of the ascendant political parties at the time of assembly elections, and eventually aspire even to enter into the Parliament.

[[For a comparative understanding, just go and talk to a Muslim engaged in raising funds for educational upliftment and better healthcare versus those raising funds for masjids.  The former will point out the huge difference: how difficult it is to raise fund for the former purpose, and how easier to raise fund for the latter! Once reluctance to contribute to the local masjid fund is known, the goons and their neighbourhood patrons will declare the conscientious objector/dissenter to be an outcast of sorts. The odds are that the next time round the person refusing to donate will meekly contribute to the ‘pious cause’ and the aspiring criminal-politician will by then have scored a point. With each bout of communal tension and violence, the criminal gets entrenched in the community as a champion-protector. 

Saran does not have any noticeable industries (the chocolate factory, ‘Morton’ at Marhowrah, has shut down a long ago), nor does it have rich agriculture, as no effective irrigation system has there been in place despite the river Gandak flowing past Lalu’s promise of rail coach factory is a recent development. Maker is close to the historic village Vaishali which is yet to figure on the rail map despite its promising prospects of tourism economy.

The Indian Railways seem to have forgotten and abandoned Lord Mahavir and Lord Buddha as national icons, despite the fact that so many ministers who held the prestigious and powerful railway ministry have hailed from Bihar. If Vaishali is brought on the rail map– as a rail junction connecting with Hajipur-Patna, Champaran, Saran and Darbhanga–the link would usher in a communication revolution besides offering markets for the vegetable and spices growing peasants of North Bihar. Let us not forget that Bihar is among the provinces – barring the provinces with difficult terrains – having lowest per capita rail road availability. The low-lying waterlogged lands (chaur) offer little hope to the farmers. The Hindu upper caste land-owning elites (more particularly the Rajputs and the Bhumihars) have secured public employment by opening up degree colleges in the early decades of independence, which were subsequently taken over by the government. The district may have poor literacy, but even its rural areas have got many government degree colleges, including one at Amnour – the ancestral village of Rajiv Pratap Rudy, close to the village of Maker. Rudy is the incumbent BJP MP of Chhapra, and is the Union Minister of Skill Development. While assessing the accomplishments of his ministry would be too early, it can perhaps be metaphorically said that sections of the people from his constituency have been developed the skills of crime and violence, and the minister has preferred to remain silent on this latest bout of violence in his constituency.

Highly placed officers, overburdened with administrative tasks, may not have much time to look into the history of the region they serve. Probably because of this, Krishnan, said that Saran is known for communal harmony. One of the first major communal riots was the Basantpur (Siwan) riots of 1893. Anand A. Yang, who has studied Saran’s history, demonstrates how the cow vigilantes, using the communication networks of the people’s gatherings of weekly markets (haats) mobilised the majority community to chastise putative beef-eaters. Large scale killings were also carried out in Basantpur.

Again, in October 1946, Saran found itself in the midst of the fire of communal violence, when ‘anti-Noakhali Day’ was observed on October 25, 1946. Incidentally, the violence on August 6, 2016 started from the same Karimchak mohalla of the Chhapra town, where the October 1946 riots had started. In my book, I have cited evidences to narrate how villages after villages of Saran (such as Khodaibagh, Rasulpur, Jalalpur, Olhanpur, Nagra, Katendar, Paighambarpur) had to be vacated by  Muslims, then. Even the then collector of Chhapra was accused of having abetted the riots, along with the leaders of the local Congress and of the Muslim League on either side.

Let me quote from my book, Contesting Colonialism and Separatism (2014):

“Very next day [26 October 1946], the town of Chapra witnessed worst form of anti-Muslim pogrom, and then it spread to the rest of Bihar. Even the ‘Indian [Hindu] Collector of Chapra had taken an important part in the riot’. ‘The worst elements—hoarders, black marketers and Hindu Sabha communalists—came to the top in the town [Chapra] Congress Committee, they roused hate sentiments, and when Noakhali Day was observed on 25 October it became the signal for riot which soon spread to rural areas. . .police sub-inspectors actually instigated the rioters. . . . [In Jalalpur village of Parsathana in Chapra, almost bordering the district of Muzaffarpur, across the Rewaghat of the river Gandak], the office-bearers of the town Congress Committee and Muslim League fomented the trouble by their rapid propaganda. . . . Most provocative editorials were written by The Searchlight . . . Hindu Sabhites, AryaSamajis, profiteers and zamindars who have recently entrenched themselves inside the Congress organization, exploited its fair name to aid their nefarious propaganda’. ‘Even the office bearers of the town [Chapra] Congress Committee and Muslim League helped in the fomenting of trouble by their rabid propaganda”.
 
After independence, in some of these villages, graves of the victims came to be declared as ‘worthy of worship’. Hindus of these villages still continue to revere some of such Muslim graves. Is it because of the contrition and remorse about the ‘collective guilt’ committed in 1946? This is a question awaiting academic exploration in rural Saran, suggests one of my friends having taught political science in a college of Chhapra.   Subsequent to the October 1946 riots, when Gandhiji visited the affected areas in March 1947, there some expressions of public remorse. Pyarelal, in his, Mahatma Gandhi: The Last Phase, reports that many Congressmen actually came and confessed before Gandhiji about their involvement in the killings. But that was then and the man was Gandhiji. We are now living in an age when adulation of Godse – the killer of Gandhiji, has become the dominant and accepted political ideology.

Moreover, from the archives of newspapers, The People’s Age, and the one owned by the then chief minister, Shri Krishna Sinha (1887-1961), Rashtravani, of 1946, I have also found out the redeeming stories whereby suffering Muslims came out to protect Hindus, and vice versa. In one such instance,

“In Chapra, Ganesh Tewari of Congress, ‘went to all affected areas and persuaded angry mobs to disperse’. . . . In village Nagraj for example a local gentlemen named Narbadeshwar Pande threw himself between two angry mobs and ultimately succeeded in turning them back, ‘A Muslim Hakim, Khuda Bakhsh, had his brother slaughtered before his own eyes. But in the night he found a Hindu boy belonging to one of the murderers’ families taking shelter in his house. He fed and kept the boy for the night and sent him back with escort, the next morning . . . a (large) number of Hindus faced angry mobs of their own community for the ‘crime’ of giving shelter to their Muslim neighbours. Among them are three Communists of Dalhawa who organized the joint defence of their Mohalla’.

These kinds of stories of fraternal relations understandably determined the harmonious mutual co-existence of the two communities in post- independence period”.
 
One can only hope that these redeeming instances will help restore normalcy even today. If we wish to ensure sustainable peace, the criminal justice system needs to become much more effective. Sadly, this is an aspect around which the Indian democracy has almost wilfully failed.  Even the Lalu-Rabri regime (1990-2005), which has earned many laurels on the count of having controlled the outburst of communal riots with a firm hand, it has been found equally disappointing in terms of bringing the rioters of Bhagalpur (1989) and Sitamarhi-Riga (1992) to book.  If the Justice Ruben committee could not be set up to report on the 1946 riots, the S. R Adige Report on the Sitamarhi riots (1992) remains hidden under a carpet as yet.

Image: Rediff
 
Besides, the immediate economic factors around growing social tensions also need to be addressed. In short, this deadly cocktail of crime and communalisation needs both serious and comprehensive attention. A massive police crackdown on the mohalla hoodlums is the urgent need. In most of the recent riots in Saran and Tirhut, we have found a pattern wherein the immediate flashpoint has been some misdeeds of the hoodlums which then provoke communal violence at which stage hoodlums who have resorted to loot and arson come out in large numbers on motorbikes; this cohesive action lends itself to the conclusion that there is an element of pre-planning behind them. Yet, even then, the local police and intelligence claimed to have been caught unawares. It is an accepted fact that these hoodlums have been getting political patronage. This possibility cannot be ruled out even in the case of the Saran violence of August 2016 either. 
 
(The author is an Associate Professor, Centre of Advanced Study in History, Aligarh Muslim University, and has published two books)

Also Read: Communal Violence in Chhapra & Maker: A Fact Finding Report
 

The post The Saran Riots of 2016 appeared first on SabrangIndia.