With the growing anticipation surrounding the census, India is also bracing for another game-changer ‘delimitation’. Delimitation is expected to serve the purpose of ‘One Person, One Vote, One Value’ but usually gets reduced to active politics or arbitrary demarcation. Issues like the North-South divide and the challenge of accommodating women’s reservation alongside existing SC-ST quotas are already sparking heated debates across the country. But there is something that remains absent from the present debates in the Indian media, and that is ‘gerrymandering’. The term is of American origin and is used to describe the deliberate drawing of boundaries to favour a particular political party and ultimately influencing election outcomes. The strategy is used in two ways; either to concentrate or diffuse the loyal voters. Expanding the constituency boundary and concentrating the ‘loyal votes dedicated to a particular party’, so the favoured candidate wins in one constituency only instead of influencing results of multiple constituencies is called ‘packing’. Another way is to distribute the ‘loyal voters’ –of the political opposition –into different constituencies, so they get reduced to minor vote constituents only, in all of them and therefore, after this exercise of diffusion, fail to crack first-past-the-post system. This pre-delimitation anticipation has become easier with the usage of the Electronic Voting System (EVS) and past voting data available on ECI website, which then used to analyse people’s voting pattern.

This can be illustrated with the recent delimitation of Jammu & Kashmir^[2]. Initially, Jammu was allocated 37 seats and Kashmir 46. After the recent delimitation, Jammu’s seats increased to 43, while Kashmir’s rose only slightly to 47. As a result, Jammu, with 44% of the population, now holds 48% of the seats, while Kashmir, with 56% of the population, holds only 52%. Previously, the distribution was more proportional—Kashmir had 55.4% of seats and Jammu 44.5%, matching their respective population shares. The addition of six new constituencies in the Hindu-majority areas of Jammu, likely to vote in a particular direction, has raised concerns of political bias—intentional or otherwise. In Padder, Muslim votes were scattered, leading to a weaker impact. Similarly, the reservation of seats for Kashmiri Pandits furthered suspicions of partisanship.

Although the BJP won roughly the same proportion of seats in the Jammu region in both 2014 and 2024—67.6% and 67.4% respectively—it failed to win any seats in the Kashmir region in either election. However, due to the addition of six new seats exclusively in the Jammu region, the region’s share in the total assembly rose from 44.6% in 2014 to 47.8% in 2024. This meant that even without expanding its voter base or increasing its performance, the BJP’s overall seat share in the Jammu & Kashmir Assembly rose from 30.1% to 32.2%.

This shift was not due to an electoral swing but a structural advantage created by the new delimitation—where additional seats in Jammu amplified its political weight. It raises serious concerns that the rebalancing of seats disproportionately boosted Jammu’s representation and, consequently, the electoral advantage of the BJP—whether intentionally or as an unintended consequence of the process^[3].

But delimitation dynamics extend beyond intra-state constituencies. By 2001, states like Tamil Nadu had five more seats than proportionate to their population, while Uttar Pradesh had eight fewer than its due share. Similarly, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, and Bihar witnessed significant population growth, yet their seat allocations remained unchanged. In contrast, states like Kerala and Andhra Pradesh gained additional seats. While there’s no definitive evidence linking these patterns directly to political motives, observers have pointed to the potential influence of coalition politics. The postponement of delimitation to 2026 under the Vajpayee-led NDA (National Democratic Alliance) government is often viewed in this light. At the time, the coalition’s fragility—especially after the AIADMK (All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam) exited the coalition within 18 months—likely made delimitation a politically sensitive move. Had southern states lost parliamentary representation due to population-based seat restructuring, it may have further strained ties with key regional allies. This led to the passage of the 84th Constitutional Amendment, extending the freeze on seat allocation based on the 1971 census until after 2026.

The growing North-South divide is increasingly shifting the political balance in favour of North India, often at the expense of the South. Makrand Paranjape, political commentator says “South is subsidising the North, bearing the burden of the latter’s population growth, unemployment, poverty, poor infrastructure, and social backwardness” ^[4] In fact, southern states are wealthier and contribute significantly to the central revenue pool but the union government has to distribute on population and need-basis. These states, which effectively carried out population control measures and have low fertility rate are already feeling penalised because of fiscal distribution by the union and can get punished again politically in a parliamentary way.

Theoretically, southern states are over-represented as of now. The wide vote-value disparity can be seen by the fact that in Uttar Pradesh, a single MP represents around three million of the population whereas, in Tamil Nadu, he/she represents around 1.8 million people^[5]. Assuming the total number of seats at 543, only 22 major states have retained the share of 524 seats. By 2026, Uttar Pradesh alone is set to hold 91 seats out of the 524 constituencies, marking a rise of 11 seats from its current 80-seat allocation. In contrast, Tamil Nadu will see its representation shrink by 10 seats from the existing 39. Additionally, the five southern states, namely Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Karnataka, Telangana, and Tamil Nadu, are projected to lose a combined 26 seats, while four northern states, including Rajasthan, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh, are expected to gain a total of 31 seats^[6]. This may represent the states proportionally but the fear of loss of regional political parties from parliament is concerning. It can significantly benefit political parties which perform well in northern states in terms of number of MPs.

One key reason behind the freeze on Lok Sabha and State Assembly seats was to maintain balance in presidential elections. Under Articles 54 and 55 of the Constitution, the President is elected by an electoral college comprising all MPs and MLAs, with the value of an MLA’s vote based on the population of their state. A major concern was that states with lower population growth—mainly in the South—would lose influence in both Parliament and presidential elections if seat allocation followed a conventional population-based formula. The rationale behind the freeze was to allow time for population control measures to reduce the demographic gap between the North and South. However, this objective has clearly not been achieved. Instead of narrowing, the gap has only widened over time—now raising even more serious questions about representation and fairness in the upcoming delimitation exercise. If the proposed delimitation takes place in the conventional way—allocating seats solely based on population—it could severely diminish the political voice of these states in national decision-making. In the long run, such an imbalance could lead to alienation and a sense of democratic unfairness.^[7]

There are several proposal for solutions. For instance, freezing inter-state seats once again can prevent the unintended under-representation of the south but freezing seats can’t change the parenting pattern of the states. Thus, this may not be a sustainable solution. One solution is increasing the number of parliamentary seats. Based on the 2011 Census data, calculations estimate 718 seats in the Lok Sabha and 848 representatives in parliament when projected for 2026^[8]. The new created seats will be distributed on the basis of population, without any state losing any previous seat. This increase is crucial to consider, as the principle of having one representative per 750,000 people in the Lok Sabha and one per 75,000 in the Legislative Assembly has been vastly exceeded, reaching millions in some areas unevenly across the country. Creating new constituencies can enhance the accessibility of MPs to the public, leading to better representation and governance.

Apart from suggestions made, the composition of the Delimitation Commission^[9] determines the quality and impartiality of the demarcation. The Delimitation Commission comprises of judges of Supreme Court and High Court, Chief Election Commission and politicians from different parties in each state. The relevance of politicians has continuously been questioned as ‘political interference’ or ‘explicit gerrymandering’ but the defence states the need for regional knowledge of the needs and culture of the people, which sometimes allow bureaucrats also to give their opinions. But even if gerrymandering takes place in the name of factors such as geography, communication and public convenience, no reports can be published due to constitutional safeguards. In the case of delimitation, the Commission’s verdict is final and beyond judicial review, meaning it cannot be challenged in the Supreme Court.

This makes the role of delimitation—and the neutrality of the Delimitation Commission—all the more crucial in ensuring that every Indian’s voice is truly heard, from every street to the highest corridors of power. While the existing framework already raises concerns about SC-ST and women’s reservations due to the unpredictable rotation pattern, India urgently needs an innovative and inclusive approach to reform. Without it, the growing political tension may soon become a storm brewing in plain sight. 

(The author is an independent journalist covering polity, governance, and social issues)

^[1] Verma, A. K. (2006). Delimitation in India: Methodological Issues. Economic and Political Weekly, 794-799.

^[2] Kumar, A., & Srivastava, K. Boundary Lines and Ballots: Exploring Delimitation, Electoral Dynamics, and Reservation in India

^[3] Jha, Abhishek (2024, October 9) ‘Did delimitation change the electoral game in Jammu and Kashmir?’ Hindustan Times https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/jammu-and-kashmir-results-did-delimitation-change-the-electoral-game-in-jk-101728411603455.html

^[4] Kumar, A., & Srivastava, K. Boundary Lines and Ballots: Exploring Delimitation, Electoral Dynamics, and Reservation in India

^[5] Kumar, A., & Srivastava, K. Boundary Lines and Ballots: Exploring Delimitation, Electoral Dynamics, and Reservation in India

^[6] Patel, P. K., & Sekher, T. V. (2024). Parliamentary Delimitation: A Study on India’s Demographic Struggle for Political Representation. Journal of Asian and African Studies, 00219096241295634.

^[7] Sivaramakrishnan, K. C. (2001). Constituencies Delimitation: Deep Freeze Again?. Economic and Political Weekly, 4694-4696.

^[8] Patel, P. K., & Sekher, T. V. (2024). Parliamentary Delimitation: A Study on India’s Demographic Struggle for Political Representation. Journal of Asian and African Studies, 00219096241295634.

^[9] Singh, C. P. (2000). A century of constituency delimitation in India. Political Geography, 19(4), 517-532.

Related:

India at the Crossroads: The delimitation exercise and its implications for democracy

What the 2026 delimitation process has in store for Indian Muslims

Election Commission of India receives 467 suggestions and objections over the proposed delimitation exercise in Assam

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