The story of Punjab ’95—eventually released on ZEE5 as Satluj—has now become far larger than the film itself. It has evolved into one of the most significant contemporary debates on censorship, artistic freedom and the State’s uneasy relationship with politically sensitive histories. At its centre, lies a profound constitutional question: Can a democracy allow uncomfortable truths to be told through cinema, particularly when those truths concern allegations of abuse by State institutions?

The controversy surrounding Satluj is not simply about certification by the Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC), nor is it confined to questions of film regulation. It raises broader concerns about whether politically inconvenient narratives can find space in India’s public sphere at all. Over the course of three years, the film encountered repeated delays, demands for sweeping edits, multiple title changes, withdrawal from an international film festival, abandonment of its theatrical release, and finally, removal from an OTT platform within days of release. Each development added another layer to an increasingly troubling narrative about the shrinking space available for artistic engagement with contentious political history.

Ironically, the film itself tells the story of a man who dedicated his life to uncovering suppressed truths. That parallel has not gone unnoticed. Following the film’s removal from ZEE5, lead actor Diljit Dosanjh shared a still from the film on Instagram with a pointed message in Punjabi: “The same thing that happened to Satluj also happened to Shaheed Jaswant Singh Khalra.” Accompanied by the caption “I challenge the darkness,” the post transformed the controversy from a dispute over streaming rights into a larger commentary on memory, erasure and the continuing discomfort surrounding Khalra’s legacy. As reported by Hindustan Times, this marked Dosanjh’s first public response after the film’s abrupt removal, directly drawing a connection between the silencing of Khalra’s work in 1995 and what he perceived as the silencing of the film today. That comparison goes to the heart of why Satluj has generated such intense public debate.

Unlike fictional political dramas, Satluj is rooted in the life of a real human rights defender whose investigations forced India to confront one of the darkest chapters of Punjab’s insurgency years.

The story the film sought to tell

Originally conceived under the title Ghallughara, later renamed Punjab ’95, and finally released as Satluj, the film chronicles the life of Jaswant Singh Khalra, the Punjab-based human rights activist whose investigations into alleged enforced disappearances and secret cremations during the militancy period fundamentally altered public understanding of State violence in Punjab. Khalra was not a lawyer, journalist or politician.

He was a bank employee who gradually transformed into one of Punjab’s most influential human rights investigators after uncovering records revealing that thousands of unidentified bodies had been secretly cremated by the police without informing families or following legal procedure. By examining cremation registers and municipal records, Khalra alleged that security forces had carried out large-scale illegal cremations of persons who had disappeared during counter-insurgency operations. His work suggested that many of these individuals had never entered the criminal justice system at all.

These revelations that also attracted international attention and intensified demands for accountability during a period when allegations of fake encounters, custodial killings and enforced disappearances had already become the subject of sustained concern among domestic and international human rights organisations. Numerous media reports at the time documented Khalra’s efforts to compile documentary evidence of these alleged abuses and to bring them before judicial institutions and international forums. His investigations, however, came at an enormous personal cost.

[[On the disappearances in Punjab, the same subject that Khalra spent and gave his life working on, the Working Group (of the United Nations) on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, established in 1980, reported large numbers of enforced disappearances, attributing primary responsibility to the Punjab police. The Working Group also held that officers of the Punjab police acted with virtual impunity, disobeyed judicial orders, even ignored writs of habeas corpus and intimidated family members of disappeared persons so as to make them refrain from making complaints. The Group’s 1996/97 report also mentioned the disappearance of Jaswant Singh Khalra after he filed the petition regarding illegal cremations in the High Court, alleging that many of the cremated had been arrested by the Punjab police.[1]]]. Read Communalism Combat’s 2003 report on mass crimes violations here and here.

On September 6, 1995, Khalra was abducted outside his residence in Amritsar. According to findings that later emerged through criminal proceedings, he was illegally detained, tortured and murdered. His body was allegedly disposed of in the Harike canal after his killing. Following sustained litigation by his wife, Paramjit Kaur Khalra, the investigation was transferred to the Central Bureau of Investigation by the Supreme Court. Several Punjab Police officials were eventually convicted for Khalra’s abduction and murder, convictions that were later upheld through the judicial process. His death transformed him from a human rights investigator into one of the most enduring symbols of the struggle against impunity in India.

A film that was never intended to be fiction

Unlike many historical dramas that borrow loosely from real events, Punjab ’95 was conceived as a biographical account inspired by Khalra’s life and struggles. Produced by Ronnie Screwvala’s RSVP Movies in collaboration with MacGuffin Pictures and directed by Honey Trehan, the film cast Diljit Dosanjh in what he would later describe as one of the most meaningful roles of his career.

According to both Trehan and Dosanjh, the project was undertaken with the consent and involvement of Khalra’s family. Paramjit Kaur Khalra reportedly viewed the completed film and confirmed that the version eventually released was the same version the family had previously seen, reinforcing the filmmakers’ assertion that they had resisted attempts to dilute the substance of the narrative. As Trehan later told Variety, only the title changed; the filmmakers maintained that the content remained intact despite years of pressure.

Dosanjh repeatedly emphasised that it was Khalra’s sacrifice, rather than commercial considerations, that persuaded him to join the project. Before the OTT release, he described the film as a story of “conviction, courage and humanity” and remarked that opportunities to participate in narratives of such historical significance were rare.

Three years in limbo

Completed several years ago, the film was submitted to the Central Board of Film Certification in 2022 for theatrical release. What followed would become one of the most controversial certification disputes in recent Indian cinema.

According to the filmmakers, the CBFC initially sought an unprecedented 127 cuts, in addition to changes to the title and other modifications before certification could be granted. The scale of the proposed changes was extraordinary, particularly for a film based on documented historical events.

Detailed report may be read here.

The battle over Punjab ’95 did not end with the CBFC’s reported insistence on over a hundred cuts. If anything, that confrontation marked only the beginning of a prolonged struggle that would span multiple years, multiple titles, multiple release plans and multiple forums before culminating in an unprecedented removal from an OTT platform.

For most films, certification is an administrative hurdle preceding release. For Punjab ’95, certification itself became the site of contestation over who gets to narrate history—and under what conditions.

The filmmakers consistently maintained that the film sought neither to sensationalise Punjab’s militancy nor to reopen old political wounds. Rather, they argued that it was an attempt to document the life of a man whose investigations into alleged enforced disappearances had already been acknowledged through judicial proceedings and whose murder had resulted in criminal convictions. Yet despite drawing from documented events, the film remained caught in a prolonged impasse with the certification authorities.

The Changing of Names: From Ghallughara to Punjab ’95 to Satluj

Perhaps no aspect of the film’s journey illustrates the pressures surrounding politically sensitive storytelling more vividly than its repeated changes of title. The project was originally announced under the title Ghallughara, a deeply significant Punjabi word historically associated with the massacres of Sikhs in 1746, 1762 and, in contemporary political discourse, often invoked in relation to the violence of 1984. The title immediately situated the film within a broader historical memory of collective trauma.

However, when the film entered the certification process, the title reportedly became one of the points of objection. According to several media reports, including Times of India, the filmmakers were asked to abandon the original title. The project subsequently became Punjab ’95, directly referencing the year in which Jaswant Singh Khalra was abducted and killed. Even that proved insufficient. After years of delays, the filmmakers were ultimately unable to retain Punjab ’95 either.

When the film finally appeared before audiences in July 2026, it carried an entirely different name—Satluj, named after the river that flows through Punjab. The change was not a creative choice.

Director Honey Trehan candidly acknowledged this reality while speaking to Variety, explaining simply that they could not secure the previous title and therefore the film would release under the name Satluj. The statement itself reflected the unusual circumstances surrounding the production. Rarely does a filmmaker publicly acknowledge that a title central to the identity of a film had to be abandoned not because of artistic reconsideration but because it could not obtain approval.

The film that never reached Toronto

The obstacles facing Punjab ’95 were not confined to India. In September 2023, the film had been selected for a world premiere at the prestigious Toronto International Film Festival (TIFF), one of the world’s most important platforms for independent and political cinema. An international premiere would have introduced Khalra’s story to global audiences and placed the film within broader conversations on human rights and transitional justice. That premiere never happened. Just a day before its scheduled screening, the film was withdrawn from the festival.

Although no detailed official explanation was provided, Variety reported that sources attributed the withdrawal to political considerations, while several Indian publications subsequently highlighted the episode as another indication of the extraordinary pressures surrounding the project. The withdrawal immediately attracted attention because it departed from the normal dynamics of international film festivals.

Films are occasionally withdrawn because of production delays, unresolved rights disputes or technical reasons. Here, however, the project had already been completed. The concern centred not on the film’s readiness but on its subject matter. The aborted TIFF premiere therefore became another episode in the film’s increasingly remarkable history—one in which institutional obstacles repeatedly emerged whenever the film appeared close to reaching public audiences.

Abandoning theatres

Following years of uncertainty, repeated certification disputes and prolonged delays, the producers eventually abandoned plans for a theatrical release altogether. This decision itself was significant. Unlike theatrical exhibition, films released directly on OTT platforms generally do not require prior certification under the existing regulatory framework governing streaming services. For many filmmakers working on politically contentious subjects, digital platforms have increasingly been viewed as an alternative avenue for audiences after theatrical certification becomes difficult.

It appeared that Punjab ’95 had finally found that route. Director Honey Trehan repeatedly emphasised that the version eventually released digitally represented the film as originally intended. Paramjit Kaur Khalra, the widow of Jaswant Singh Khalra, reportedly viewed the completed version and confirmed that the film remained unchanged in substance. Trehan similarly stated that the version released on ZEE5 was the same film that had been defended throughout the certification battle.

Diljit Dosanjh echoed those assertions. During interactions with audiences before the release, he stated that if even a single cut had been imposed on the film, he would not have promoted it. According to media reports, he maintained that the film audiences would eventually watch was identical to the version he had seen years earlier.

For the filmmakers, the digital release therefore represented something more than distribution. It represented vindication. After years of negotiations, delays and resistance, the film would finally be seen. Or so it appeared.

When Satluj eventually appeared on ZEE5 on July 3, 2026, there was little of the elaborate publicity normally associated with a major release featuring one of India’s biggest stars. Diljit Dosanjh’s films typically receive extensive promotional campaigns across television, digital media and live events. Yet Satluj arrived with remarkably subdued publicity.

Forty-Eight Hours Later: The film disappears again

If the release of Satluj appeared to mark the end of one of Indian cinema’s longest censorship battles, what followed instead transformed the controversy into something arguably even more troubling. The film became available on ZEE5 on July 3, 2026. Within two days, it was gone.

On July 5, viewers attempting to access the film in India found that it had been removed from the platform. No advance notice had been issued. No detailed explanation accompanied the decision. A film that had survived years of certification disputes, title changes and release delays had once again become inaccessible to Indian audiences. This time, however, the removal did not originate from the Central Board of Film Certification. It came after the film had already been released. That distinction is constitutionally significant.

For decades, debates around censorship in India have centred on the CBFC’s powers before a film reaches theatres. Satluj presents an altogether different phenomenon: a film that was already lawfully available for public viewing disappearing from a digital platform after release, without any publicly available legal order directing its removal.

The episode immediately raised difficult questions about the growing vulnerability of artistic expression in the digital age. If films can be withdrawn after release without transparent legal processes or publicly disclosed reasons, censorship itself begins to move beyond formal statutory mechanisms into a far more opaque domain.

ZEE5’s unusual statement

Soon after the removal, ZEE5 confirmed that Satluj would no longer be available to stream in India. Its statement, however, was remarkable not only for what it said, but also for what it omitted. The platform thanked audiences for the “overwhelming response” received during the brief period the film remained online and declared that it stood firmly behind both the film and its creators.

“At ZEE5, we stand firmly by Satluj and the creative vision behind it. We believe powerful storytelling has the ability to inspire, endure and leave a lasting impact. We remain committed to championing authentic and meaningful narratives.”

The platform further stated: “In light of the current developments, Satluj will be unavailable in India until further notice.”

It assured viewers that it was exploring “every appropriate avenue through due process” to restore the film and reiterated its commitment to artistic integrity and meaningful storytelling. Yet nowhere did the statement explain what those “current developments” were.

Satluj may have paused. But the conversation it started hasn’t.

Thank you for the incredible love.
We hope to bring it back soon.#Satluj pic.twitter.com/Ox3MZIBvlT

— ZEE5Official (@ZEE5India) July 5, 2026

The ambiguity immediately became the central feature of the controversy. Neither the platform nor any government authority publicly disclosed what had changed between July 3, when the film was made available, and July 5, when it became unavailable. For a controversy that had already stretched across three years, the absence of transparency only intensified speculation.

Government sources and the ‘Anti-India’ explanation

Although no formal governmental order directing removal entered the public domain, reports published by NDTV cited official sources claiming that certain portions of the film could be misused by “anti-India forces.” According to those reports, the concern was not merely the subject matter itself but the possibility that specific scenes or narratives could allegedly be exploited by hostile actors. Sources also noted that while OTT platforms are not subject to prior certification requirements comparable to theatrical films, concerns had been raised regarding the content after its release. These reported explanations immediately generated fresh debate.

The phrase “anti-India forces” has increasingly appeared in public discourse surrounding politically sensitive expression. Yet its deployment in relation to a feature film based on documented historical events raised difficult questions.

• What precisely constituted the objectionable material?
• Which portions of the film were considered problematic?
• Did those portions depart from established judicial records?
• Had any competent authority examined whether the film incited violence or hatred?

No detailed answers were forthcoming. Instead, the controversy became characterised by broad assertions about national interest without corresponding public disclosure of the legal or factual basis for restricting access.

Restrictions on freedom of expression under Article 19(2) of the Constitution cannot ordinarily rest upon vague apprehensions alone. They must satisfy recognised constitutional grounds, such as sovereignty and integrity of India, public order, security of the State or incitement to an offence, and must also withstand judicial scrutiny regarding necessity and proportionality. Whether those standards were met in the case of Satluj remains impossible to evaluate because the reasons underlying the film’s removal have never been publicly articulated.

Diljit Dosanjh saw it coming

One of the most striking aspects of the controversy is that the film’s lead actor appeared to anticipate precisely what would happen. During an Instagram Live interaction with viewers shortly after the release, Diljit Dosanjh candidly admitted that he feared the film might not remain available for long.

“Today is Saturday. I feel it could be taken down by Monday. But no worries—you download it.”

The remark, widely reported by Hindustan Times, Times of India and other publications, initially appeared almost humorous. Within hours, it proved prophetic. After the removal, Dosanjh became considerably more direct. Posting a still from the film, he wrote:

“The same thing that happened to Satluj also happened to Shaheed Jaswant Singh Khalra.”

According to Dosanjh, the film recounting that struggle had itself become the subject of suppression. He later remarked that he had repeatedly wondered whether audiences would ever be allowed to watch the film at all, asking publicly: “Can’t we tell our own story?”

Beyond Satluj: What the controversy says about censorship in contemporary India

The removal of Satluj should not be viewed as an isolated controversy involving a single film, a streaming platform or a celebrated actor. Rather, it reflects a much broader transformation in how politically sensitive speech is regulated in India.

Traditionally, censorship in India has been associated with the Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC). Under the Cinematograph Act, films intended for theatrical release require certification before they can be publicly exhibited. That certification process has always been contentious. Filmmakers have repeatedly criticised the CBFC for functioning not merely as a certifying body but as an authority empowered to determine what citizens should or should not watch.

Over the years, several judicial decisions, including the Supreme Court’s landmark judgment in S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram, have emphasised that freedom of expression cannot be curtailed merely because a section of society finds a work controversial or offensive. In Rangarajan, the Court famously observed that freedom of expression cannot be suppressed on account of threat of demonstration or violence, warning that doing so would amount to surrendering constitutional freedoms to those willing to intimidate or disrupt public order.

The Court’s reasoning was unequivocal. If a film does not fall within the limited restrictions recognised under Article 19(2) of the Constitution, the State has an obligation to protect its exhibition rather than prohibit it merely because some groups oppose it. That constitutional philosophy appears increasingly difficult to reconcile with the contemporary reality confronting politically sensitive artistic works.

From formal censorship to informal control

The Satluj controversy demonstrates how censorship itself appears to be evolving. The earlier model was comparatively straightforward. A filmmaker submitted a completed work to the CBFC. The Board either certified it, sought modifications or refused certification. Its decisions could then be challenged before appellate authorities and constitutional courts. There existed, at least formally, a transparent statutory process.

The controversy surrounding Satluj suggests something considerably more complex. After years of battling certification, the filmmakers shifted to an OTT platform, where prior certification is generally unnecessary. The assumption was that digital distribution would allow audiences to access the work without navigating the same regulatory obstacles applicable to theatrical releases. Instead, the film disappeared after release, without a publicly available legal order, without any transparent adjudicatory process or without detailed reasons.

That shift is significant because it signals a movement away from formal censorship towards what many scholars describe as informal or indirect censorship—a situation in which legal prohibitions are replaced by institutional pressure, regulatory uncertainty, commercial risk or opaque decision-making.

The consequence may ultimately be the same. The public is denied access to the work. The only difference is that responsibility becomes more difficult to locate. Was the removal voluntary or was it prompted by governmental communication?  Did legal concerns emerge after release or were there political pressures? The public still does not know. In constitutional democracies, opacity itself is a problem. Restrictions upon expression derive legitimacy not merely from statutory authority but from transparency, accountability and the possibility of judicial review. When those elements disappear, censorship becomes considerably more difficult to challenge.

Political sensitivity is not a constitutional ground for censorship

One feature unites many of the most controversial censorship disputes in independent India- they concern politically sensitive history. Films addressing communal violence, caste oppression, insurgency, police excesses, emergency-era abuses or governmental failures have repeatedly encountered resistance from one institution or another.

Yet the Constitution contains no exception permitting censorship merely because a subject is politically uncomfortable. Article 19(1)(a) guarantees every citizen the right to freedom of speech and expression. That freedom is undoubtedly subject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2). Those restrictions include sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the State, public order, decency, morality, contempt of court, defamation and incitement to offences.

Notice what does not appear in Article 19(2)- there is no constitutional category called political sensitivity. There is no ground permitting restrictions because historical events remain controversial. Nor does the Constitution authorise suppression because a work may embarrass governments, expose institutional failures or revisit contested episodes of national history. Democracies are expected to accommodate precisely such speech.

Indeed, constitutional protections become most meaningful when they shield expression that unsettles prevailing political narratives. Speech that is universally accepted rarely requires constitutional protection. It is controversial speech, provided it remains within constitutional limits, that tests the strength of democratic institutions.

The chilling effect on political cinema

The implications of the Satluj controversy extend far beyond this single production. Cinema is an extraordinarily resource-intensive medium. A politically sensitive feature film often requires years of research, substantial financial investment and the willingness of producers, distributors and actors to assume considerable commercial risk.

When filmmakers witness a project spending three years in certification disputes, reportedly facing over one hundred proposed cuts, undergoing repeated title changes, losing its theatrical release, withdrawing from an international film festival and finally disappearing from a streaming platform within forty-eight hours, the lesson extends beyond that individual case. The consequence is self-censorship.

Future filmmakers may decide that certain subjects are simply not worth pursuing. Producers may avoid financing projects concerning custodial violence, communal riots, insurgency, enforced disappearances or politically contentious episodes. Streaming platforms may hesitate before acquiring similarly sensitive content. Actors may decline participation. Writers may soften narratives before anyone even asks them to do so. This phenomenon, the suppression of expression not through direct prohibition but through anticipatory fear, is one of the most enduring concerns in free speech jurisprudence.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognised that vague or excessive restrictions create a “chilling effect” on expression, discouraging lawful speech because individuals cannot confidently predict where regulatory boundaries actually lie.

Whose history is remembered?

At its core, the controversy surrounding Satluj is ultimately about memory. Jaswant Singh Khalra dedicated his life to documenting disappearances that many families feared would never be officially acknowledged. His investigations attempted to preserve records that otherwise risked disappearing from public consciousness. The film sought to tell that story. Whether audiences agree with every creative choice made by the filmmakers is beside the point.

Democratic societies do not require unanimity regarding historical interpretation. They require the freedom to debate it. Cinema occupies a unique place within that process. Unlike academic writing or judicial decisions, films reach millions who may never otherwise encounter chapters of history.

The journey of Punjab ’95—from Ghallughara, to Punjab ’95, to Satluj—is no longer simply the story of a film. It is the story of the increasingly uncertain space occupied by politically sensitive artistic expression in contemporary India.

A project inspired by the life of a murdered human rights activist reportedly encountered years of certification disputes, demands for extensive alterations, repeated title changes, the cancellation of its international premiere, the abandonment of theatrical release, and finally, its removal from an OTT platform within two days of release. Whether each of those developments arose from formal regulatory decisions, institutional caution or broader political sensitivities, the cumulative effect is unmistakable.

The public conversation has shifted from the content of the film to the conditions under which difficult histories may be narrated at all. That shift should concern anyone committed to constitutional democracy. The measure of a democracy is not how comfortably it accommodates stories that reinforce official narratives. It is how confidently it allows the telling of stories that question power, revisit painful histories and compel institutions to confront uncomfortable truths. The legacy of Jaswant Singh Khalra reminds us that documenting history is often an act of courage. The journey of Satluj suggests that saying that history through cinema may require courage too.

[1] E/CN. 4/1996/38, Commission on Human Rights, Fifty-second session, Report of the Working Group on Enforced on Involuntary Disappearances, paras 236-240; E/CN. 4/1997/34, para 181—from Background Materials by Ram Narayan Kumar for the Conference at Boston in 2003

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The post From Punjab ’95 to Satluj: When cinema becomes a battlefield over history, memory and censorship appeared first on SabrangIndia.

A meeting to commemorate the fifth death anniversary of Father Stan Swamy was held yesterday, Sunday, July 5. Organised by the Bombay Catholic Sabha at the Loyola Hall, it was well attended by close to two hundred Mumbaikars. Invited speakers spoke on the theme “Fr. Stan and his belief in the Constitution”

After a welcome address by Norbert Mendonca, President BCS, Father Luke Rodrigues of the Saint Peters Church initiated the meeting by appealing for efforts to take Father Stan Swamy’s message and sterling work forward amongst the people as the best tribute to Father Swamy and his legacy

Teesta Setalvad, Secretary of Citizens for Peace recounted her Father Stan Swamy’s extensive writings and documentation of the injustices and non-implementation of the laws that accord land rights to Adivasis, in Jharkand and elsewhere. Father Stan Swamy wrote regularly for Sabrangindia and his articles may be read here, here and here. Father Swamy’s biggest strength was his tireless work among Indian Adivasis, especially the indigenous peoples of Jharkand, Setalvad said, urging that his death and the incarceration of dozens of political prisoners whould compel rights groups and citizens to redouble efforts to get the draconian UAPA law, repealed. Read analyses of this law here and here.

Setalvad also detailed how Father Stan was unjustly targeted with the “(im) planting of documents and other evidence” in his computer, facts which came to light in December 2022, ten months after his death through the Arsenal Report that was first published both in The Washington Post and on the NDTV portal. This evidence, she said exposed the work of a malafide state. Campaigns to Repeal the UAPA and to ensure improved Prison Conditions should be the best way to take Father Stan Swamy’s legacy ahead

A message from Father Fraser Mascerenhas was also read out at the event where he emphasised the need to use the occasion of Father Stan Swamy’s death anniversary to renew the commitment for social justice for the disadvantaged and called upon all citizens to honour the Constitution by speaking out against injustice

Irfan Engineer, Director CSSS read out messages of solidarity from both Citizens for Democracy and senior activists Surendra Gadling and Dinkar Gota – who have undertaken a one day fast in memory of Father Stan Swam on July 5. Engineer further highlighted the work of Father Swamy in fighting for the constitutional values of ‘Fraternity & Dignity’ for vulnerable communities especially the Adivasis and defending their collective rights. He also said that Father Swamy made a courageous effort to protect the Adivasis from attempts by unscrupulous MNCs to grab their natural resources

Shakir Shaikh General Secretary, APCR spoke about the need to go to the Common People with Father Stan Swamy’s values and thoughts and the need to help the common citizens in the SIR Process. Advocate Raphael Dsouza, former President of the Bombay Catholic Sabha recounted shameful incidents during the (medical bail hearings that revealed the extent of injustice that Father Swamy was subjected to and how the uncaring process contributed to his death. Well known journalist Anto Akkara who had come from Kochi for the public meeting also spoke on the occasion

Senior advocate Mihir Desai , also national vice president, PUCL strongly asserted that the death of Father Stan Swamy was nothing less than an ‘encounter killing’ because Father Swamy was put in jail knowing well that a) he was innocent and b) Given his fragile health he would not survive the hardships of the incarceration.

Desai also said that the reason the system wanted Father Swamy behind bars was that they did not want representatives from marginalised communities to speak up. He highlighted ongoing efforts to judicially prove Father Swamy’s innocence and establish accountability for his “judicial murder”. He called upon citizens to be bold enough to fight for justice and believe in inherent good nature of humanity for the ‘Truth to Prevail.’

The session was moderated by Dolphy Dsouza, spokesperson of the BCS and closed with a Vote of Thanks by Brian D’souza of the BCS. The public meeting was co-organised by organisations like the Bombay Catholic Sabha (BCS), Centre for Study of Society & Secularism (CSSS), Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP), Christian Development Association (CDA), Association for Protection of Civil Rights (APCR), Mumbai for Peace and People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) etc and was well attended by a large crowd of 150+ citizens braving the heavy rains.

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The post To a living Saint, now dead five years: Meeting to commemorate July 5 appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In a detailed judgment running over thirty pages, Justice Sachin Datta awarded ₹18.44 lakh as compensation to the father of 19-year-old Deepak, who died while lodged in the lock-up of Police Station Karawal Nagar, Delhi in January 2018.[1] The Court held that once a person’s liberty is curtailed by the State, the constitutional obligation to safeguard that person’s life becomes absolute, and any failure to discharge that obligation amounts to an infringement of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.

Far more than an ordinary compensation order, the judgment is an extensive survey of constitutional jurisprudence on custodial deaths. Drawing from landmark Supreme Court authorities including Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, In Re: Inhuman Conditions in 1382 Prisons, alongside important High Court decisions from Delhi, Bombay, Karnataka, Punjab and Haryana, Allahabad and elsewhere, the Court reiterated that the State cannot evade constitutional responsibility merely because the exact cause of death remains disputed or because officials deny direct involvement.

Most importantly, the Court emphatically rejected the argument that a custodial suicide stands outside State responsibility. It observed that suicide within police custody is itself an unnatural custodial death and reflects a failure of those entrusted with the legal duty of ensuring the prisoner’s safety. Consequently, the State cannot avoid liability by arguing that the deceased took his own life.

The judgment is likely to assume considerable importance in future litigation involving custodial deaths, police accountability and constitutional compensation. Besides strengthening the evolving doctrine of public law compensation under Article 21, it also adopts the multiplier method commonly employed in motor accident compensation cases to determine damages in custodial death claims, thereby providing a more structured framework for assessing compensation in such cases.

The background

The writ petition was filed by Shyam Sundar, who approached the Delhi High Court seeking constitutional compensation following the death of his son Deepak, who died while in police custody at Police Station Karawal Nagar. The petition invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226, alleging a grave violation of the deceased’s fundamental right to life.

The events giving rise to the petition began on January 15, 2018, when Deepak was arrested at approximately 11:10 a.m. from the premises of Karkardooma Courts by Sub-Inspector Sandeep in connection with FIR No. 334 of 2017 registered at Police Station Karawal Nagar. According to the petitioner, after learning of his son’s arrest, he visited the police station to meet him. Instead of being allowed to meet his son, he himself was allegedly detained and confined inside the lock-up alongside Deepak for several hours. He was released only around 5:30 p.m. that evening.

The father’s account, recorded in the judgment, paints a disturbing picture of what allegedly transpired inside the police station. He alleged that both he and his son were subjected to physical assault, intimidation and abuse by police officials, specifically naming Sub-Inspector Sandeep and Constable Karamveer Singh. According to the petition, the officers allegedly demanded ₹20,000 to ₹30,000 in exchange for securing Deepak’s release.

The allegations did not end there. Later that same night, the father allegedly received a telephone call from Sub-Inspector Sandeep seeking further particulars regarding Deepak. During that conversation, according to the petitioner, the demand for money was reiterated. Being a person of limited financial means, the father informed the officer that he was incapable of arranging such an amount.

The following morning, believing that his son would be produced before a magistrate, the father contacted the police station. He was initially informed that Deepak had indeed been produced before the court.

Shortly thereafter, however, the situation took a devastating turn. The petitioner received a phone call from a local political leader informing him that Deepak had allegedly committed suicide while in police custody. By 11:56 a.m. on 16 January 2018, Deepak had been declared “brought dead” at Guru Tegh Bahadur Hospital.

The police thereafter sought a magisterial inquiry into the custodial death. Interestingly, as recorded in the judgment, the very officer against whom allegations had been levelled—Sub-Inspector Sandeep Kumar—was entrusted with several aspects of the post-incident investigation, including arranging the post-mortem examination, photographing the lock-up, seizing the alleged ligature material, and coordinating with the crime team for forensic examination of the scene.

A medical board conducted the post-mortem examination on January 17, 2018. The board concluded that the cause of death was “asphyxia due to ante-mortem hanging.” Following the examination, Deepak’s body was handed over to his father.

The petitioner, however, consistently maintained that the official version did not explain the surrounding circumstances leading to the death. One aspect that particularly troubled the petitioner related to the recovery of articles from inside the lock-up.

According to the judgment, the Forensic Science Laboratory report noted that two blades had been recovered from the lock-up and further recorded that the possibility of the alleged ligature material having been cut using those blades could not be ruled out. The petitioner argued that Deepak had been searched thoroughly at the time of his arrest and no such objects had been found on his person. In these circumstances, the unexplained presence of the blades inside the lock-up raised serious questions regarding the police version of events.

The petitioner also relied heavily upon a departmental enquiry order dated 26 September 2018, contending that it demonstrated negligence on the part of police personnel stationed at Police Station Karawal Nagar and reinforced the State’s constitutional liability for the custodial death.

Another issue addressed during the proceedings concerned the petitioner’s relationship with the deceased. Although Deepak was biologically the son of the petitioner’s brother, the Court recorded that following the death of his biological mother when he was approximately one year old, he had been brought up and adopted by Shyam Sundar, with whom he shared a father-son relationship throughout his life. An affidavit affirming these facts was placed on record before the Court.

These factual circumstances ultimately formed the backdrop against which the Delhi High Court examined a much larger constitutional question: whether an unnatural death inside police custody, irrespective of disputes surrounding its precise cause, automatically engages the State’s constitutional liability to compensate the victim’s family under Article 21 of the Constitution.

The constitutional question before the Court

Although the petition contained serious allegations of custodial assault, extortion and police misconduct, Justice Sachin Datta made it clear that the High Court was not called upon, in these writ proceedings, to determine whether Deepak had been murdered, subjected to custodial torture, or whether individual police officers were criminally liable.

Instead, the Court carefully narrowed the controversy. The central issue before it was whether an undisputed unnatural death occurring inside police custody, regardless of whether it was ultimately caused by custodial violence, negligence or suicide, entitled the victim’s next of kin to constitutional compensation under Article 21 of the Constitution. Questions regarding criminal culpability, the Court observed, would have to be determined in appropriate proceedings independently of the constitutional remedy sought before it.

This distinction ultimately became the foundation of the judgment. Rather than treating compensation as dependent upon proving police brutality beyond doubt, the Court examined whether the constitutional obligation of the State itself had been breached merely because an individual entrusted to its custody had died an unnatural death. The answer, according to the Court, was unequivocal.

Petitioner’s Case: Every custodial death reflects a failure of the state’s constitutional duty

Appearing for the petitioner, Senior Advocate Trideep Pais argued that the State’s liability arose not merely because of allegations of police misconduct but because Deepak had died while completely under State control.

The petitioner contended that the circumstances surrounding the death demonstrated serious lapses on the part of police officials. Reliance was placed upon the forensic evidence showing recovery of two blades from inside the lock-up. Since Deepak had been searched upon arrest and no such objects had been recovered from him, the petitioner questioned how these articles came to be inside the lock-up and argued that the official version of suicide was riddled with unanswered questions.

The departmental enquiry, according to the petitioner, independently established negligence on the part of the police personnel posted at Police Station Karawal Nagar. Consequently, irrespective of the precise mechanism through which the death occurred, the State had failed in its constitutional obligation to safeguard the life of a person entirely under its control.

The petitioner also urged the Court to adopt the multiplier principle, developed in motor accident compensation jurisprudence through Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation, for calculating compensation in custodial death cases, arguing that constitutional compensation should be determined on objective principles rather than arbitrary figures.

The State’s Defence: Compensation is not automatic

The Government of NCT of Delhi resisted the petition by advancing a substantially different understanding of custodial death compensation. It argued that compensation does not automatically follow every custodial death and that claims for monetary relief must be governed primarily by Section 357A of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Delhi Victim Compensation Scheme, 2018.

According to the State, the statutory scheme constituted a comprehensive framework for determining both entitlement and quantum of compensation, and constitutional courts should ordinarily operate within those parameters.

The respondents further argued that the present case materially differed from cases involving proven custodial violence. Medical evidence, they pointed out, attributed the cause of death to ante-mortem hanging and did not reveal injuries conclusively suggestive of custodial assault. In the absence of established police brutality or direct culpability, the State argued that liability could not simply be presumed. Compensation, it submitted, must depend upon the degree of responsibility established in each individual case rather than broad constitutional presumptions.

In support of this submission, reliance was placed upon the Delhi High Court’s earlier decision in Shakila v. State (NCT of Delhi), where compensation had been discussed in the context of the Delhi Victim Compensation Scheme.

The Court’s Response: Custodial death is not an ordinary death—it is a constitutional failure

Justice Datta rejected the attempt to reduce the case to a mere dispute over compensation. The judgment begins its constitutional analysis with an emphatic observation that custodial deaths are fundamentally different from deaths occurring in ordinary circumstances.

The Court observed:

“Custodial death is not merely an individual tragedy but a matter of systemic concern, striking at the very foundation of the rule of law. When a person is deprived of liberty and placed in the custody of the State, the authorities assume a heightened duty of care.” (Para 21)

Unlike ordinary citizens, individuals lodged in police custody have surrendered every meaningful degree of personal liberty. They cannot leave, seek medical assistance independently, or protect themselves. They depend entirely upon the State for their safety.

Consequently, once liberty is taken away, the State simultaneously assumes what the Court described as a “heightened duty of care.”

Justice Datta observed that every lapse resulting in death inside custody—whether arising from violence, negligence, unexplained circumstances or suicide—necessarily demands judicial scrutiny because such incidents affect not merely the individual concerned but also public confidence in the justice system itself.

This articulation marks one of the strongest statements in recent custodial death jurisprudence regarding the constitutional nature of the State’s responsibility.

Drawing upon national and international standards

To reinforce this understanding, the Court referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in In Re: Inhuman Conditions in 1382 Prisons, where the Supreme Court had itself relied upon the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Guidelines on Investigating Deaths in Custody. Those guidelines classify deaths caused by intentional injury—including homicide and suicide—as unnatural deaths.

The Supreme Court had earlier endorsed these guidelines and recommended that they receive wider circulation among governments in India. Justice Datta invoked this principle to underline that suicide occurring within custody is not a natural event capable of insulating the State from constitutional scrutiny. Rather, it is categorised internationally and constitutionally as an unnatural custodial death.

Precedents invoked in the judgment

1. Nilabati Behera: The foundation of custodial death jurisprudence

The Court then turned to one of the cornerstones of Indian constitutional law—Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa (1993). Justice Datta described the decision as laying down the strict constitutional duty owed by the State to every individual placed in custody.

The Supreme Court had declared that prisoners, undertrials and detainees do not cease to enjoy the protection of Article 21 merely because they have been deprived of liberty. Their freedom may be lawfully restricted, but their right to life remains inviolable. Indeed, because they are unable to safeguard themselves, the responsibility resting upon police and prison authorities becomes even greater.

The Delhi High Court emphasised the Supreme Court’s observation that the State’s duty of care towards persons in custody is strict, admits no exceptions, and that the doctrine of sovereign immunity has no application where constitutional rights are violated.

Where a person dies in custody otherwise than according to procedure established by law, constitutional courts possess not merely the power but the obligation to award monetary compensation for the violation of fundamental rights under Articles 32 and 226.

Justice Datta noted that Nilabati Behera fundamentally transformed Indian constitutional law by recognising compensation as an independent public law remedy rather than merely a civil claim for damages.

2. Parvathamma: Even a custodial suicide raises questions of negligence

The judgment next relied extensively upon the Karnataka High Court’s decision in Parvathamma v. Chief Secretary to Government of Karnataka, a case involving an alleged custodial suicide. Justice Datta reproduced the Karnataka High Court’s reasoning questioning how a detainee managed to fashion a ligature, obtain the necessary material, and commit suicide inside a police station supposedly under constant supervision.

The Karnataka High Court had observed that, regardless of whether death resulted from torture or suicide, the burden rested squarely upon the police to demonstrate absence of negligence. Once an individual enters police custody, it becomes the responsibility of the police to ensure that he remains alive and safe until produced before the court.

The Court had also warned that custodial deaths cannot be treated in a “casual and cavalier fashion,” emphasising that constitutional courts must continuously evolve effective public law remedies to preserve the rule of law and protect citizens against abuse of State power. Justice Datta treated these observations as directly reinforcing the constitutional principles laid down in Nilabati Behera.

3. Bombay High Court: Suicide inside custody cannot be equated with suicide outside custody

One of the most significant discussions in the judgment concerns the Bombay High Court’s decision in Gopichand v. State of Maharashtra, which dealt specifically with custodial suicide. Rejecting the argument that suicide automatically severs State responsibility, the Bombay High Court had reasoned that a person in police custody experiences severe psychological trauma by virtue of detention itself. The existence of such trauma, it held, cannot be ignored while assessing constitutional liability.

Justice Datta reproduced the reasoning that there exists a direct logical relationship between police custody and the subsequent custodial death, even where death occurs by suicide.

The Bombay High Court had further observed that once death occurs inside police custody, the burden shifts to the authorities to demonstrate that conditions surrounding the detainee remained entirely normal and that no acts or omissions on their part contributed to the fatal outcome. Where they fail to discharge that burden, constitutional liability follows. This reasoning would become central to Justice Datta’s own conclusions regarding the State’s responsibility in Deepak’s case.

An unnatural custodial death is sufficient to attract constitutional liability

After surveying decades of constitutional jurisprudence, Justice Sachin Datta arrived at what is undoubtedly the central holding of the judgment. Rejecting the State’s attempt to limit compensation to cases involving proven custodial violence, the Court held that the very fact of an unnatural custodial death is sufficient to trigger constitutional liability.

In words that are likely to be repeatedly cited in future custodial death litigation, the Court declared that a person does not forfeit his fundamental rights merely because he has been arrested. Rather, the opposite is true. The moment an individual enters police custody, the constitutional burden upon the State becomes even heavier because the detainee is completely dependent upon State authorities for his safety, health and survival.

Justice Datta observed:

“It is well settled that when a person is in custody, he does not lose his fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution and the State assumes an absolute and inalienable duty to protect his life and dignity.” (Part 28)

The Court then articulated perhaps the most significant proposition emerging from the judgment. It held that an unnatural custodial death—even where the immediate cause is stated to be suicide—is not a private act divorced from State responsibility. Instead, such a death necessarily reflects a failure of the authorities entrusted with the constitutional obligation of protecting the prisoner.

Justice Datta observed:

“An unnatural death in custody, even if by suicide, is not a private act divorced from State responsibility, but reflects an omission of duty on the part of those charged with safekeeping. The State cannot escape responsibility by invoking statutory schemes or by contending absence of direct culpability. The very fact of custodial death, being unnatural, attracts liability and obliges the Court to mould relief in the form of compensation.” (Part 28)

This finding is particularly important because custodial suicide has frequently been invoked by investigating agencies as a defence against allegations of custodial misconduct. The Delhi High Court categorically rejected such an approach. Instead, it held that the question is not merely how the detainee died, but whether the State fulfilled its constitutional obligation to prevent that death.

State cannot escape responsibility by denying direct culpability

Justice Datta further rejected another recurring defence often advanced in custodial death cases—that unless direct police assault or torture is conclusively proved, compensation cannot be awarded. The Court held that constitutional liability under Article 21 is qualitatively different from criminal liability.

A criminal prosecution seeks to determine individual guilt. A constitutional court, on the other hand, examines whether the State has discharged its constitutional obligations. Accordingly, the Court held that the State cannot evade liability merely by asserting that no police officer has yet been found criminally responsible. Nor can it rely upon statutory compensation schemes to dilute constitutional remedies.

Justice Datta therefore concluded that the constitutional entitlement of the petitioner’s family to compensation was “beyond dispute.” The only remaining question concerned the amount that ought to be awarded.

Compensation under Article 21 is independent of statutory compensation schemes

A substantial portion of the judgment is devoted to answering one of the State’s principal legal arguments—that compensation must be restricted to the framework contained in Section 357A of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Delhi Victim Compensation Scheme, 2018.

Justice Datta firmly disagreed. The Court acknowledged that statutory victim compensation schemes undoubtedly provide one avenue of relief for victims and their families. However, constitutional compensation occupies an entirely different field. Tracing the law from Nilabati Behera, D.K. Basu, and subsequent Supreme Court decisions, Justice Datta explained that compensation awarded under Article 226 is not derived from statutory provisions. Instead, it flows directly from the violation of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21.

Consequently, statutory schemes supplement constitutional remedies—they do not replace them. The Court held:

” The statutory scheme under Section 357A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is only one avenue of relief; it supplements and does not curtail or exclude the power of this Court under Article 226 to award compensation for established infringement of fundamental rights. Custodial death, being unnatural, prima facie attracts liability under Article 21.” (Para 38)

This clarification considerably strengthens the scope of writ jurisdiction in custodial death cases. It confirms that constitutional courts are not constrained by the monetary limits prescribed under victim compensation schemes whenever Article 21 has been violated.

Why the court distinguished Shakila v. State

The respondents had placed considerable reliance upon the Delhi High Court’s earlier decision in Shakila v. State (NCT of Delhi).

Justice Datta carefully examined that precedent but concluded that it did not govern the present case.

The Court observed that Shakila principally dealt with an entirely different issue—namely, who qualifies as a “dependent” under the Delhi Victim Compensation Scheme and how compensation should be distributed under that statutory framework. It was not concerned with determining constitutional compensation under Article 226 based upon violation of Article 21.

Moreover, Justice Datta pointed out that Shakila had not considered the earlier Division Bench judgment in Kiran v. State, which had specifically approved the use of the multiplier principle while awarding compensation for custodial deaths.

Since a Division Bench decision binds a Single Judge, the Court held that Kiran, rather than Shakila, furnished the correct legal framework for determining compensation in the present case. This aspect of the judgment provides important doctrinal clarity regarding the relationship between constitutional compensation and statutory victim compensation schemes.

The court endorses the multiplier method for custodial death cases

Perhaps the most practically significant contribution of the judgment lies in its approach to determining compensation. Historically, constitutional compensation in custodial death cases has often varied widely from case to case, with courts awarding amounts based largely on judicial discretion. Justice Datta sought to bring greater consistency to this area.

Relying upon earlier decisions including Kiran v. State, Prakash Kaur v. State of Punjab, Sanjeevani v. State of Maharashtra, and the recent Allahabad High Court decision in Prema Devi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the Court held that the multiplier method evolved in motor accident compensation jurisprudence provides a rational and objective framework for calculating damages in custodial death cases as well.

The Court also referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in Jagdish v. Mohan, where the Supreme Court had observed that compensation should not be viewed as charity or largesse but as an affirmation of constitutional dignity. Justice Datta reproduced the Supreme Court’s observation that:

“Awards of compensation are not law’s doles. In a discourse of rights, they constitute entitlements under law.” (Para 40)

This, the Court held, perfectly captures the constitutional philosophy underlying public law compensation. The objective is not generosity, but rather the enforcement of constitutional rights after their violation.

How the court arrived at the figure of ₹18.44 lakh

Having settled the legal principles, the Court turned to the actual computation of compensation. The material before the Court indicated that Deepak, aged 19 years, worked as a waiter and earned approximately ₹12,000 per month.

Justice Datta accepted the lower end of the asserted income and calculated compensation in accordance with the principles laid down in Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation and National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi. The calculation proceeded as follows:

• Monthly income: ₹12,000
• Annual income: ₹1,44,000
• Addition of 40% towards future prospects: ₹57,600
• Total annual income after future prospects: ₹2,01,600
• Deduction of 50% towards personal expenses (the deceased being a bachelor): ₹1,00,800
• Application of the multiplier of 18, applicable to persons aged between 15 and 20 years: ₹18,14,400
• Addition of ₹15,000 towards loss of estate.
• Addition of ₹15,000 towards funeral expenses.

The resulting compensation came to ₹18, 44, 400, which the Court directed the respondents to pay within eight weeks. Notably, by explicitly adopting the multiplier method, the Court has provided future litigants and constitutional courts with a far more structured methodology for quantifying compensation in custodial death cases, reducing dependence upon arbitrary lump-sum awards.

A significant expansion of constitutional accountability

Beyond the immediate relief granted to the petitioner’s family, the judgment represents a significant reaffirmation of India’s constitutional commitment to protecting life within State custody. Justice Datta makes it abundantly clear that the constitutional obligation of the State begins, and not ends, with arrest.

The judgment decisively rejects the notion that custodial suicide somehow falls outside constitutional responsibility. Instead, it recognises that a person confined within a police lock-up has surrendered virtually every means of self-protection. In those circumstances, ensuring that the detainee emerges alive is not merely an administrative responsibility but a constitutional obligation flowing directly from Article 21.

By reaffirming the doctrines of strict public law liability, rejecting attempts to confine relief within statutory compensation schemes, endorsing the multiplier method for assessing damages, and declaring that an unnatural custodial death itself constitutes sufficient basis for constitutional compensation, the Delhi High Court has added another important chapter to the evolving jurisprudence on custodial violence and State accountability. In doing so, the Court reinforces a foundational constitutional principle: when the State assumes control over an individual’s liberty, it assumes an equally inescapable responsibility for protecting that individual’s life and dignity.

The complete judgement may be read below:

[1] While, in 2018, the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) was in power in Delhi, with Arvind Kejriwal serving as the Chief Minister and Lieutenant Governor Anil Baija, the Delhi Police has always been directly governed by the union home ministry, an issue that has caused frictions between state and centre. Rajnath Singh was union home minister at the time.

Related:

Decoding the Sathankulam Judgement on Custodial Death – Part 1 – Context of Torture in India

Rights

“Your Helplessness feels in the garb of Protection”: SC rebukes CBI for failure to arrest officers in custodial death case of Deva Pardhi

Monitoring Torture: SC’s suo motu action on custodial deaths and CCTV camera non-compliance

Custodial Death of Dalit Law Student Somnath Suryawanshi: FIR registered after Supreme Court upholds Bombay HC directive

“Even a Murderer Wouldn’t Do This”: Ajith Kumar’s custodial death and Tamil Nadu’s shameful culture of impunity

“Shielding their own”: Supreme Court slams Madhya Pradesh police, transfers custodial death probe of a tribal man to CBI

The post State cannot escape liability for custodial suicide: Delhi HC appeared first on SabrangIndia.

‘Adivasi history is an unbroken chain of broken promises’: Dr. B.D. Sharma

What are these broken promises?

1. Massive displacement without rehabilitation:  Independent studies estimate that about 24 lakh acres of their land has been forcibly acquired by the govt and industries, resulting in about 19 lakh persons being  displaced. Of the displaced only 25% have been resettled, but no one has been rehabilitated because rehabilitation implies restoration of their social, cultural and community values.
2. Depletion of natural resources with local population having no share in it leading to enrichment of outsider companies, contractors and migrants. Beginning from the start of 20^th century excavation of minerals of all kinds has been taking place. But the plight of people in whose land all this mineral wealth is found have been reduced to increasing poverty, disease and lack of basic amenities.
3. Constitutional, legal and judicial provisions for the welfare and development of the Adivasi have been consistently violated.

(a)  the Vth Schedule of the Indian Constitution [Indian Constitution, Article 244(1)]clearly stipulates that a ‘Tribes Advisory Council’ (TAC) composed solely of members from the Adivasi community who will advice the Governor of the State about any and everything concerning the protection, well-being and development of the Adivasi people in the State.
Whereas the reality is that the meeting of the TAC takes place rarely, and it is convened by and presided over by the Chief Minister of the State and is controlled by the ruling party. TAC has thus been reduced to a toothless body. Verily a constitutional fraud meted out to the Adivasi people.

(b) The Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act [PESA],1996 [No:40 of 1996]  which was a fruit of long drawn disenchantment and struggle of the Adivasi people and their political representatives and which for the first time recognized the fact the Adivasi communities in India have had a rich social and cultural tradition of self-governance outlined the composition and functioning of the Gram Sabha. It gave significant powers to Gram Sabha in all matters pertaining to the welfare and development of tribal adivasi people.
Whereas the reality is this Act of the parliament has deliberately been left unimplemented in all the nine states. It means the capitalist ruling class does not want the Adivasi people to self-govern themselves.

(c) the Samatha Judgment, 1997 of the Supreme Court [Civil Appeal Nos:4601-2 of 1997] came as a huge relief to the Adivasi communities in Scheduled Areas infofar as it decreed that mining in Scheduled Areas can be undertaken only by Adivasi Cooperatives.  The judgment was meant to provide some significant safeguards for the Adivasis to control the excavation of minerals in their lands and to help develop themselves economically.
Whereas the reality is consistent efforts have been made by the state to ignore this verdict of the highest court. Several cases have been filed by affected communities but the ‘law of eminent domain’ of the colonial rulers are invoked to alienate Adivasi land and to loot the rich mineral resources.

(d) Forest Rights Act, 2006: [Act of Parliament No:2 of 2007] jal, jangal, jamin, as we know, are the basis of the  economic life of the Adivasi people. Of particular importance is their traditional rights in the forest have been infringed upon systematically over the decades. At long last, the govt came to the realization that a historic injustice has been done to the Adivasi and other traditional forest-dwellers. To correct this anomaly it enacted this Act empowering each forest-dwelling family to four acres of land. 
Whereas the reality is far from desirable. As per the information collected in the nine Scheduled Area States till 28th February, 2017, 41,65,395 claims (40,26,970 individual and 1,38,425 community claims) have been filed and 17,90,624 titles (17,27,655 individual and 62,969 community claims) have been distributed. That means about 24 lakh claims [41%] have been rejected! As for Jharkhand State, 1,02,510 claims were made, of which 56,181 claims have been distributed, and 46,329  (45%) have been rejected. It is a painful reality that nearly half of Adivasis and other forest-dwellers have been refused their ages-long existence in the forests of Jharkhand.

(e) ‘Owner of the land is also the owner of sub-soil minerals’. The Supreme Court of India in a path-breaking judgment [SC: Civil Appeal No 4549 of 2000] has said “we are of the opinion that there is nothing in the law which declares that all mineral wealth sub-soil rights vest in the State, on the other hand, the ownership of sub-soil/mineral wealth should normally follow the ownership of the land, unless the owner of the land is deprived of the same by some valid process.”
The rich minerals in their lands are being looted by the govt and private companies. The Supreme Court has declared 214 out of the 219 Coal-Blocks in the country illegal and ordered their closure and levied a fine on them for their illegal mining. But the Central & State Govts have found a way out by re-allotting these illegal mines through auction to make it look legal!  Lot of assurance is given that Adivasi land will not be given to industrialists, yet at the same time mines in Scheduled Areas are being allotted to govt and private companies. Cheating game.

(f) Mere membership of a banned organisation will not make a person a criminal unless he resorts to violence or incites people to violence or creates public disorder by violence or incitement to violence. [SC: Criminal Appeal No: 889 of 2007] The court rejected the doctrine of ‘guilt by association‘.
It is common knowledge that very many young men & women are held in prison on the suspicion of being naxalites”.  After arresting them other penal clauses are added on. It is an easy label that can be put on any one whom the police  want to catch. It does not require any proof or witness. Let us keep in mind that they are  not even members of any naxalite outfit. Supreme Court says even membership in a banned organisation does not make a person a criminal. How far removed are  the law and order forces from the judiciary!

(g) Domicile Policy, already enacted by the govt, is meant to side-line the native population and to facilitate outsiders to grab the job opportunities.
Six Criteria to define who could be called a sthaniya niwasi or local resident of Jharkhand

1. Those who have their or their ancestors’ names in land records as per the last survey. The gram pradhan (village head) can identify the landless as a local resident on the basis of his language, cultural practices and traditions.
2. Those living in Jharkhand for the past 30 years for reasons of business, jobs, etc., and have acquired immovable properties, and their children, would be considered locals.
3. Employees of the Jharkhand government, or government-aided institutions, organisations etc. — and their spouses and children — would be considered locals.
4. Employees of the Central Government living in Jharkhand, and their spouses and children.
5. Those holding constitutional posts, their spouses and children.
6. Those who were born in Jharkhand, and have completed their education till matriculation.

Needless to say, this policy is meant to push the native Adivasi Moolvasi people to the margins of society and enable outsiders to capture whatever job opportunities available in the state. This is already in practice and exclusion of indigenous people is taking place very quietly. This must be reversed by all means.

(h) ‘Land Bank’ is the most recent plot to further weaken Adivasi people.  The State govt plans to acquire about 20 lakh acres of land of which about 10 lakh acres are to be allotted to industries. This includes even ‘Common Land’ such as water bodies, rivers & rivulets, hills & hillocks, village roads, sarnas, masnas.  This is being done without the knowledge and consent of people and their respective Gram Sabhas. People have started to express their protest by appealing to the  Governor to stop this illegal action of the govt. Sad to say Adivasi leaders have not taken up this problem and mobilize people into an andolan.

Enough is enough . . .                                                                                                                           
– the frustration of Adivasi people is expressed through some of them erecting Pathalgadis. We may not agree with all that is written on them, but we need to ask WHY they are doing this.

• The govt must stop looking at this as a law & order problem but make sincere effort to remedy the ‘historic injustice’ being done to Adivasi people;
•  The ruling class must realize that Adivasi People are not asking for charity but certainly want their constitutional, legal, judicial rights are  acknowledged and honoured by the rest of society;
• Rights are never given but always taken !

The post Why Adivasis seek to re-assert their traditional identity appeared first on SabrangIndia.

I learnt that lesson a few days ago when the film Satluj quietly appeared on an OTT platform. I told myself there was no hurry. I would watch it at leisure over the weekend. By the time I was ready, it had vanished.

The Zee network had removed the film barely two days after its release. It is no longer available for viewers in India. If I wish to watch it now, I may have to do so from another country. That raises a disturbing question: why should an Indian have to leave India to watch a film about an Indian citizen?

The answer is uncomfortable. The State is still afraid of confronting the truth. In Punjab’s case, that truth has a name: Jaswant Singh Khalra.

It is remarkable that decades after he was abducted and murdered, Khalra continues to unsettle powerful institutions. The fear is not of the man himself. It is of what he uncovered and what his story continues to reveal about one of the darkest chapters in independent India’s history.

Khalra’s name returned to public attention early last year when Punjab 95, a film based on his life, was submitted to the Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC). In a decision that was as revealing as it was astonishing, the Board reportedly suggested 127 cuts.

The effect was virtually to deny certification. The public was once again prevented from seeing the complete story of a man who sacrificed his life to expose the disappearance and secret cremation of hundreds of innocent people.

Eventually, the authorities relented enough to permit an OTT release, but only after the producer agreed to abandon the original title. Punjab 95 became the more generic Satluj, named after the great river that silently witnessed some of Punjab’s most tragic years.

My connection with Khalra is indirect, but deeply personal.

In 1994, a Catholic church in Patiala district was burgled and vandalised. The attack was initially blamed on Sikh militants. Concerned by the implications, Archbishop Alan de Lastic of Delhi constituted a fact-finding team, of which I was a member.

That visit was my first to Punjab, though I had already written extensively on terrorism in the state as an editorial writer with The Hindustan Times. What I encountered challenged many of my assumptions. Our investigation concluded that the attack on the church had not been carried out by militants at all, but by local anti-social elements.

It was an important lesson. National narratives often simplify complicated realities. Truth rarely conforms to convenient assumptions.

A few years later, after joining The Tribune, I encountered Khalra’s story in earnest. On May 18, 2003, the late Ram Narayan Kumar, whom I admired greatly, visited me carrying a newly published book, Reduced to Ashes: The Insurgency and Human Rights in Punjab. Written by Ram Narayan Kumar, Amrik Singh, Ashok Agrwaal and Jaskaran Kaur, it remains one of the most disturbing books I have ever read. I later reviewed it in The Tribune.

Its opening chapter was devoted to Jaswant Singh Khalra.

The story it told was extraordinary, precisely because its hero was an ordinary man. Khalra was not an armed revolutionary. He was not a political firebrand. As the Akali Dal’s human rights secretary, he simply decided to verify disturbing rumours surrounding unidentified bodies being cremated by the police.

His investigation began with crematoria in Amritsar. He examined their records with meticulous care. Each body officially required around 300 kilograms of firewood for cremation. Yet Khalra discovered that, in practice, several bodies were frequently burned together to save money. Nobody came back to collect the ashes.

Behind these accounting entries lay a horrifying reality.

Young men were being picked up from villages without warrants, blindfolded, tortured in illegal detention centres, killed in staged encounters and then cremated as unidentified terrorists. Their names disappeared from official records. Their families were denied even the consolation of performing their last rites.

In Amritsar district alone, Khalra documented records of more than one thousand such cremations.

He approached the Punjab and Haryana High Court through a habeas corpus petition. Astonishingly, the petition was dismissed on the ground that he lacked locus standi. Yet the rejection only strengthened his resolve. He understood that he had uncovered evidence of something systematic and terrifying.

Predictably, threats followed.

Among those who openly threatened him was Ajit Singh Sandhu, then Senior Superintendent (SP) of Police of Tarn Taran district.

The threat soon became reality.

One morning, while Khalra was washing his car outside his Amritsar residence, a police vehicle arrived. He was forcibly taken away in broad daylight. Fortunately, a journalist witnessed the abduction and immediately informed Khalra’s wife, Paramjit Kaur, who worked as a librarian at Guru Nanak Dev University.

She desperately searched police stations, only to be told that perhaps terrorists had kidnapped him. It was only after she approached SGPC president G.S. Tohra, who sent a telegram to Supreme Court Justice Kuldip Singh, that the judicial process began.

Treating the telegram as a petition, Justice Kuldip Singh ordered hearings. The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) was entrusted not merely with tracing Khalra’s disappearance but with investigating the larger issue of illegal cremations and extra-judicial killings.

The investigation confirmed the worst fears.

Khalra had indeed been illegally detained, tortured and murdered. His body was allegedly cut into pieces to prevent identification before being secretly disposed of. Ajit Singh Sandhu and several of his subordinates were arrested. Later, Sandhu reportedly threw himself before a moving train.

The CBI investigation did not deliver complete justice. But it established beyond reasonable doubt that the allegations Khalra had painstakingly documented were not imaginary. They pointed to an organised system in which constitutional safeguards had collapsed under the weight of counter-insurgency operations.

Reading Reduced to Ashes left a lasting impression on me. It was difficult to believe that such brutality could occur in the world’s largest democracy. Yet the evidence was overwhelming.

The book also convinced me that preserving Khalra’s memory was not simply about honouring one individual. It was about defending the principle that democratic societies cannot survive if truth itself becomes inconvenient.

Last year, I encountered Khalra’s name once again, this time in an unexpected place—a modest elementary school in the United States named after him.

There was something profoundly moving about that gesture. Thousands of miles away from Punjab, a community had chosen to ensure that children would grow up asking who Jaswant Singh Khalra was. Even more heartening was the presence of his wife and daughter at the inauguration. What he had been denied in life, they were gradually reclaiming through memory: dignity, recognition and truth.

Meanwhile, in India, a film inspired by his life remained in cans. Perhaps that contrast tells its own story.

Governments may suppress uncomfortable films. Certification boards may insist on scores of cuts to shield institutions from scrutiny. Platforms may quietly remove films after release. But truth survives in books, judicial records, eyewitness accounts, classrooms, conversations and even in the name of a school building in a distant land.

Jaswant Singh Khalra never carried a gun. His weapons were documents, persistence and moral courage. He asked a simple question: Where have all the sons of Punjab gone?

He paid for asking it with his life.

Yet because he asked it, generations to come will continue searching for the answer—and no amount of censorship can permanently erase either the question or the man who dared to raise it.

Truth buried is never truth erased. Jaswant Singh Khalra’s courage endures beyond censorship, reminding every democracy that memory, justice and conscience ultimately outlive fear.

(The writer is a senior journalist and editorial writer; ajphilip@gmail.com)

The post Satluj: A film encountered appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The present controversy and alleged derogatory remark against Prophet Mohammad

The recent controversy centres on an Instagram podcast reel uploaded around June 19, 2026. In the video, Nazia Elahi Khan is seen in conversation with a host named Divya Singh. Viewers alleged that Khan made derogatory and offensive remarks regarding Prophet Muhammad and his family during this podcast, which subsequently went viral on social media platforms.

The alleged statements sparked widespread outrage within the Muslim community, leading to protests and demands for legal action across multiple states. Community leaders and organisations, including the Raza Academy, argued that the remarks were deeply hurtful to their religious sentiments.

Khan in her defense has also claimed in some reports that the viral videos of her remarks are AI-generated not hers!

Legal action and protests across the country

Following the circulation of the podcast, multiple FIRs and complaints were registered against Khan:

• Bhiwandi, Maharashtra: The first FIR was registered on Monday evening (June 22, 2026) at the Shanti Nagar Police Station. The complaint was filed by a local resident, Adnan Ansari. Ansari stated he saw the reel on June 19 and consulted with community members before approaching the police. The Shanti Nagar police booked Khan for “deliberate acts intended to outrage religious feelings” and under relevant sections of the Information Technology (IT) Act. Senior Inspector Vinayak Gaikwad confirmed the FIR.

Nazia Elahi Khan Par Bhiwandi Shanti Nagar Police Mein FIR Darj For Insulting Prophet In A Podcast, FIR Filed By MIM Team pic.twitter.com/wXvCnsnTSv

— Gallinews India (@gallinews) June 22, 2026

• Mumbai, Maharashtra: A second case, classified as a ‘zero FIR,’ was registered on Tuesday (June 23, 2026) at the JJ Marg Police Station in South Mumbai over the same video content. Police officials noted that this case is likely to be transferred to West Bengal, where Khan currently resides, for further investigation. Representatives of the Raza Academy also submitted a written complaint to the Pydhonie police station seeking action.

Two FIRs have been registered in the Mumbai Metropolitan Region against BJP Minority Morcha leader and social media influencer Nazia Elahi Khan, 41, over alleged derogatory remarks about Prophet Muhammad that reportedly hurt religious sentiments.

The first FIR was registered on… pic.twitter.com/DMVWgu5h37

— The Observer Post (@TheObserverPost) June 23, 2026

• Malegaon, Maharashtra: Reports indicate an FIR has also been filed in Malegaon against Khan, accusing her of hurting religious sentiments.
• Uttar Pradesh & Madhya Pradesh: Protests and demands for action have occurred in various locations, including Bareilly, Muzaffarnagar, Bulandshahr (Uttar Pradesh), and Khargone and Rewa (Madhya Pradesh). In Bareilly, members of the Muslim community submitted a memorandum to the Aonla Sub-Divisional Magistrate (SDM), demanding strict action against her. AIMIM representatives in Khatauli (Muzaffarnagar) also demanded legal action.
• On June 24, members of the All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (AIMIM) submitted a memorandum to the Kota District Collector in Rajasthan demanding strict legal action against Nazia Elahi Khan over her alleged remarks. According to the party, the memorandum was submitted on the instructions of AIMIM President Asaduddin Owaisi and Rajasthan State President Jameel Ahmed Khan. The delegation, led by District Vice President Zahid Nizami Mastan and accompanied by other party office-bearers, urged the administration to initiate appropriate legal proceedings over the alleged insult to the Prophet.

Huzoor ﷺ ki shaan mein ki gayi gustakhi ke khilaf aur Nazia Elahi ke viruddh sakht kanooni karwai ki maang ko lekar aaj AIMIM ke qaumi sadar @asadowaisi sahab aur AIMIM Rajasthan ke Pradesh Adhyaksh Jameel Ahmed Khan sahab ke nirdesh par Kota Zila Collector ko gyapan saupa gaya।… pic.twitter.com/e0xenYLslo

— Jameel Khan (@jameelwecan) June 24, 2026

• Hyderabad Police also registered a case against Nazia Elahi Khan over her remark, following a complaint by religious organisation.

Hyderabad Police registered a case against an accused Nazia elahi Khan over alleged derogatory remarks against religious figures, following a complaint by religious scholars and organisations. DCP Charminar Zone assured strict legal action, stressing the need to maintain peace… pic.twitter.com/pt7R6AMP1k

— Nawab Abrar (@nawababrar131) June 25, 2026

The investigations are ongoing, with Mumbai police examining whether the probe should be transferred to West Bengal.

Arrest of Nazia Elahi Khan by Kolkata Police in August 2021 in relation to cheating case

Nazia Elahi Khan was previously arrested by the Girish Park Police in Kolkata on August 26, 2021 in connection with FIR No. 116 of 2020, registered under Sections 419, 420, 506, and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, relating to allegations of cheating, impersonation, criminal intimidation, and common intention. The investigation revealed that Khan had allegedly exploited a vulnerable individual involved in a complex matrimonial dispute, extracting Rs 6 lakh under the pretence that her high-level connections could secure a swift and favourable legal outcome. When the promised legal relief failed to materialise and the client demanded the return of his funds, Khan allegedly resorted to intimidation and threats, leading directly to her arrest. She remained in judicial custody until September 18, 2021, when she was granted bail on the ground of her 13-year-old son’s illness.

According to records cited in the case, investigators alleged that despite repeatedly claiming to be an advocate, she was unable during custody to produce documents establishing her legal qualifications or formal educational credentials. The case also relies on a complaint allegedly submitted by Khan to Girish Park Police Station on May 25, 2012, in which she described her qualifications as B.Com., LL.B., a document that investigators have treated as material evidence in the ongoing impersonation proceedings.

Copy of FIR No. 116/2020 registered at Girish Park Police Station

Hate Profile: weaponising Muslim identity, the strategy of provocation

Operating under the self-adopted alias “Nazia Sanatani,” Khan began systematically catering to hard-line right-wing audiences. She recognised a potent dynamic in digital identity politics: when an individual born into a minority group echoes the prejudices of the majority, their statements are often treated as undeniable validation of those prejudices. She became an “insider” willing to confirm the worst fears of the Hindutva base, effectively weaponising her background to provide a veneer of authority to baseless claims.

The remarks made by Nazia Elahi Khan are extremely offensive and derogatory towards Islam and the Prophet Muhammad PBUH.

Has anyone filed any complaints? pic.twitter.com/10I2W86iKO

— S (@Shirink_13) August 4, 2024

Hindus should stay vigilant and should boycott Muslims from government sectors and private sectors: Nazia

On June 8, 2026, Nazia Elahi Khan also courted controversy after calling for the social and economic boycott of Muslims during a press conference. She urged Hindus to refrain from employing Muslims in both government and private sectors for the next two to three years. She reportedly said that “Hindus should stay vigilant and should boycott Muslims from government sectors and private sectors.”

She further alleged that Muslims posed an internal security threat and asserting that “120 crore Hindus” should remain vigilant against various forms of “jihad.” She further questioned the patriotism of Indian Muslims and called for their boycott from employment and public life.

A BJP leader’s call, made during a press conference, to boycott Indian Muslims from government jobs, private employment, and public life is a blatant attack on the Constitution of India and the secular foundations of our republic.

Equally condemnable is the reckless attempt to… pic.twitter.com/67JmdbwBjy

— Dr Syed Naseer Hussain, M P (@NasirHussainINC) June 8, 2026

Her strategy involved constant, high-visibility provocations. She launched what her supporters called the “Hindu Dharam Tour,” traveling to deliver speeches that consistently vilified the Muslim community. In May 2024, in Karda, Maharashtra, she utilised the “Love Jihad” conspiracy theory, falsely claiming that 2,800 Hindu women had been murdered by Muslim men, and asking the crowd, “How can a Muslim man love you when he can so easily give triple talaq and destroy lives?”

In January 2025, in Belagavi, Karnataka, she amplified the “Ghazwa-e-Hind” conspiracy, alleging that local mosques and shrines were covert training grounds designed to entrap Hindu women for an eventual Islamic takeover.

When public speaking engagements waned, Khan demonstrated a willingness to manufacture crises to maintain her digital relevance.

In February 2025, she posted a video claiming Muslim men had intentionally rammed her vehicle in an assassination attempt in Uttar Pradesh. The Kanpur Dehat Police quickly debunked the claim, stating her own driver had fallen asleep at the wheel, and publicly urged citizens not to spread her communal misinformation.

In April 2026, amid the controversy surrounding Lenskart’s alleged dress code on religious symbols, Nazia Elahi Khan entered a Lenskart store in Mumbai along with her supporters and applied tilak to several employees. Videos of the incident showed her confronting the store staff over the alleged policy, asserting that Hindu employees should not be discouraged from displaying their religious identity.

“Sharia lagu karwana hai kya?” :- Nazia Elahi Khan

BJP Minority Morcha leader Nazia Elahi Khan entered a Lenskart outlet in Mumbai’s Andheri area and confronted the store manager, identified as Mohsin Khan, alleging that Hindu employees were being discouraged from wearing… pic.twitter.com/nXQAUmxmZj

— Clips (@Masterstroke_ab) April 23, 2026

Nazia Elahi Khan is not an office-bearer: BJP Minority Morcha

Amid the growing controversy, the BJP Minority Morcha publicly distanced itself from Nazia Elahi Khan. In a statement issued on June 24, the Morcha’s National President, Jamal Siddiqui, clarified that Nazia Elahi Khan is not an office-bearer of the organisation and that no individual by that name holds any official position within the BJP Minority Morcha. He further stated that any claim of representing the Morcha or the BJP in that capacity is “false and misleading.”

The BJP Minority Morcha has said that Nazia Ilahi Khan is not an office-bearer of the organisation. National President of the Morcha, Jamal Siddiqui, stated that no person by that name holds any official position within the body. He further said that any claim of representing the… pic.twitter.com/ymmR8CVqUm

— The Observer Post (@TheObserverPost) June 24, 2026

The CJP archive: documenting a habitual offender

Her speeches have frequently been delivered from platforms hosted by organisations advancing right wing propaganda of communal hatred and have consistently echoed themes such as “Love Jihad”, “Ghazwa-e-Hind”, economic boycott of Muslims, and allegations questioning the patriotism of Indian Muslims.

The sheer volume of FIRs filed against the Nazia Elahi Khan validates the long-standing warnings issued by civil rights monitors. Organisations like Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP) have meticulously tracked Khan’s activities for years, maintaining detailed dossiers that classify her as a “habitual hate offender” whose actions are designed to subvert the law for political gain.

The most critical intervention by CJP occurred during the volatile lead-up to the Delhi Assembly elections in early 2025. On January 20, 2025, CJP filed a comprehensive complaint with the Chief Electoral Officer of Delhi regarding a speech Khan delivered at an event organised by the Hindu nationalist group “Chetna” in Rohini. CJP provided exact transcripts to the Election Commission, demonstrating that Khan explicitly violated the Model Code of Conduct and the Representation of the People Act.

CJP takes action against #HateSpeech! A complaint has been filed against BJP leader Nazia Elahi Khan for inciting communal hatred during the #Delhi poll campaign. Read: https://t.co/Y5VsQjYgtB

— Citizens for Justice and Peace (@cjpindia) January 21, 2025

According to CJP, the transcripts of the speech delivered in Delhi revealed Khan telling the Delhi audience that Muslims were inherently violent and primed for criminal activity; “Tell them (Muslims) to get education, they will not! […] But if you tell them to rape, they will do it immediately. Tell them to do love jihad, they will do it immediately. Tell them to throw bombs, bullets, and ammunition! They will throw it immediately.” She further instructed Hindu parents to teach their daughters that “no Abdul is good.” CJP argued that Khan was deliberately deployed to polarise the electorate. The fact that she faced no significant legal consequences for this speech, and was allowed to continue her “Hindu Dharam Tour” for another year and a half, highlights what activists describe as the systemic apathy of law enforcement when dealing with right-wing hate speech.

Legal position governing hate speech

The law governing hate speech is well settled and imposes a clear obligation upon the State and law enforcement authorities to prevent and prosecute such offences. Despite the settled legal position and repeated directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, incidents of inflammatory and communal speeches continue to occur with impunity. Such speeches are deliberately designed to promote enmity and hatred between religious communities, disturb communal harmony, outrage religious sentiments, provoke breaches of public peace, and disseminate false and inflammatory narratives likely to incite discrimination, hostility, or offences against a particular community.

These acts attract, inter alia, Sections 196 (promoting enmity between different groups), 197 (imputations prejudicial to national integration and constitutional allegiance), 299 and 302 (deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage and wound religious feelings), 352 (intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of peace), and 353 (circulation of false information likely to incite offences or create fear and alarm) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. The dissemination of such inflammatory speech through public meetings and social media further aggravates its impact by expanding its reach and increasing the likelihood of communal disharmony and public disorder.

Supreme Court directions and statutory duties

The Hon’ble Supreme Court has repeatedly held that law enforcement agencies are under a mandatory obligation to prevent and prosecute incidents of hate speech without waiting for private complaints. In Shaheen Abdulla v. Union of India & Ors. (W.P. (C) No. 940 of 2022), the Court directed all States and Union Territories to register suo moto FIRs immediately whenever any speech attracts offences relating to promotion of communal hatred, irrespective of the religion or identity of the speaker. The Court categorically directed that police authorities must act without waiting for any complaint and must ensure equal enforcement of the law so as to preserve the secular character of the Constitution.

The Supreme Court has further emphasised the preventive responsibilities of the police. By orders dated February 3, 2023, while dealing with proposed communal gatherings in Maharashtra, the Court directed that permissions for public events must be subject to the condition that no hate speech is delivered and clarified that the police are duty-bound to exercise preventive powers, including action under Section 151 of the Code of Criminal Procedure wherever circumstances so require.

Subsequently, by order dated January 17, 2024, the Court directed the District Magistrates and Superintendents of Police in Maharashtra and Chhattisgarh to take all necessary preventive measures, including installation of CCTV cameras and video recording of public events, to ensure identification and prosecution of persons delivering hate speeches or inciting communal violence. These directions reaffirm that police authorities have a continuing constitutional and statutory obligation not merely to prosecute offences after they occur but also to prevent their commission through timely intervention.

In compliance with these judicial directions, the Director General of Police, Maharashtra, issued Circular dated February 2, 2023, directing all police units to strictly implement the Supreme Court’s mandate by taking suo moto action wherever speeches disclose offences relating to communal hatred. Thereafter, by Circular dated April 3, 2023, the Maharashtra Police prescribed comprehensive preventive measures for public meetings and processions, including prior meetings with organisers, imposition of conditions while granting permissions, intelligence gathering, preventive action against anti-social elements, compulsory audio-video recording of events, immediate registration of offences wherever violations occur, and prompt arrests wherever warranted.

These directions make it abundantly clear that failure to initiate timely preventive and prosecutorial action in cases of hate speech would amount to a failure to discharge statutory and constitutional duties entrusted to the police authorities.

Judicial Precedents on Hate Speech

The constitutional position regarding hate speech has been consistently reaffirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In Firoz Iqbal Khan v. Union of India (W.P. (C) No. 956 of 2020), the Court observed that India’s constitutional democracy is founded upon the peaceful coexistence of diverse religious and cultural communities and held that any attempt to vilify a religious community must be viewed with grave disfavour as it strikes at the core of constitutional values. Earlier, in Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. Union of India, (2014) AIR SC 1591, the Supreme Court recognised that hate speech marginalises vulnerable groups, legitimises discrimination, and lays the foundation for exclusion, violence, and even genocide, thereby posing a direct threat to the right to life and dignity guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.

Further strengthening this jurisprudence, in Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India (W.P. (C) No. 943 of 2021), by order dated April 28, 2023, the Supreme Court extended its earlier directions to all States and Union Territories, mandating registration of suo moto FIRs whenever speeches disclose offences relating to communal hatred, irrespective of the identity or religion of the speaker. The Court reiterated that the police cannot remain passive spectators and must promptly initiate criminal proceedings whenever cognizable offences of hate speech are committed. Collectively, these decisions establish that hate speech is not merely an exercise of free expression but constitutes an abuse of constitutional freedoms where it promotes hostility, discrimination, or violence against protected communities, thereby requiring immediate preventive and penal action by the State.

Moreover, the controversy has expanded beyond social media, with police complaints, memoranda, and demands for legal action being made in several states, including Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Maharashtra, Telangana, and Delhi. Amid the growing backlash, the BJP Minority Morcha clarified that Nazia Elahi Khan does not hold any official position in the organisation. With multiple complaints now before the authorities, the matter has shifted from public outrage to the legal process, and the response of law enforcement and the courts will determine its course

Related

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CJP files 5 hate speech complaints before CEO Maharashtra as violated MCC

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Stan Swamy listed all the activities that have made him a ‘Desh Drohi,’ a traitor of the country, in his open letter after he was charged with sedition. This short note was written by Fr Stan Swamy after the Jharkhand authorities filed a case of sedition against him for supporting the adivasi Pathalgadi movement. He is one of 20 activists accused of sedition, a committed Jesuit priest.

During the past two decades, I have identified myself with the Adivasi people and their struggle for a life of dignity and self-respect. As a writer, I have tried to analyse the different issues they are facing. In this process, I have clearly expressed dissent with several policies, laws enacted by the govt in the light of the Indian Constitution. I have questioned the validity, legality, justness of several steps taken by the govt and the ruling class.

As for the Pathalgadi issue, I have asked the question “Why are Adivasis doing this?” I believe they have been exploited and oppressed beyond tolerance. The rich minerals which are excavated in their land have enriched outsider industrialists and businessmen and impoverished the Adivasi people to the extent there are starvation deaths taking place.

They have had no share in what is produced. Also, the laws and policies enacted for their wellbeing are deliberately left unimplemented. So they have reached a situation where they realised ‘enough is enough’ and are seeking to re-invent their identity by empowering their Gram Sabhas through Pathalgadis. Their action is understandable.

Some questions that I have raised are as follows:

1. I have questioned the Non-implementation of the 5th Schedule of the Constitution [Indian Constitution, Article 244(1)]clearly stipulates that a ‘Tribes Advisory Council’ (TAC) composed solely of members from the Adivasi community who will advise the Governor of the State about any and everything concerning the protection, well-being and development of the Adivasi people in the State. The Governor is the constitutional custodian of the Adivasi people and he/she can make laws on his/her own and can annul any other law enacted by the parliament or state assembly always keeping in mind the welfare of the Adivasi people.

Whereas the reality is that in none of the States during all these nearly seven decades has any State Governor ever used his/her constitutional discretionary power to reach out to the Adivasi people proffering the excuse that they have to work in harmony with the elected government of the State. The meeting of the TAC takes place rarely, and it is convened by and presided over by the Chief Minister of the State and is controlled by the ruling party. TAC has thus been reduced to a toothless body. Verily a constitutional fraud meted out to the Adivasi people.

2) I have questioned why the Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act [PESA],1996 [No:40 of 1996] have been neatly ignored which for the first time recognized the fact the Adivasi communities in India have had a rich social and cultural tradition of self-governance through the Gram Sabha.
Whereas the reality is this Act of the parliament has deliberately been left unimplemented in all the nine states. It means the capitalist ruling class does not want the Adivasi people to self-govern themselves.

3) I have questioned the silence of the govt on Samatha Judgment, 1997 of the Supreme Court [Civil Appeal Nos:4601-2 of 1997] which came as a huge relief to the Adivasi communities in Scheduled Areas. It came at a time when consequent to the policy of globalization, liberalization, marketisation, privatisation national and international corporate houses started to invade particularly the Adivasi areas in central India to mine the mineral riches. The govt machinery gave its full cooperation to these companies. Any resistance by the Adivasi people was put down with an iron hand. The judgment was meant to provide some significant safeguards for the Adivasis to control the excavation of minerals in their lands and to help develop themselves economically.

Whereas the reality is the state has ignored this verdict of the highest court. Several cases have been filed by affected communities but the ‘law of eminent domain’ of the colonial rulers are invoked to alienate Adivasi land and to loot the rich mineral resources.

4) I have questioned the half-hearted action of govt on Forest Rights Act, 2006: [Act of Parliament No:2 of 2007] jal, jangal, jamin, as we know, are the basis of the economic life of the Adivasi people. Of particular importance is their traditional rights in the forest have been infringed upon systematically over the decades. At long last, the govt came to the realization that a historic injustice has been done to the Adivasi and other traditional forest-dwellers. To correct this anomaly, it enacted this Act.

Whereas the reality is far from desirable. From 2006 to 2011 of its operation, about 30 lakh applications were made all over the country for title-deeds, of which 11 lakhs were approved but 14 lakhs were rejected and five lakhs were pending. Of late the Jharkhand govt is trying to bypass the Gram Sabha in the process of acquiring forest land for industrial set up.

5) I have questioned the inaction of the govt to carry out the SC order ‘Owner of the land is also the owner of sub-soil minerals’. [SC: Civil Appeal No 4549 of 2000] wherein it has said “we are of the opinion that there is nothing in the law which declares that all mineral wealth sub-soil rights vest in the State, on the other hand, the ownership of sub-soil/mineral wealth should normally follow the ownership of the land, unless the owner of the land is deprived of the same by some valid process.”

The rich minerals in their lands are being looted by the govt and private companies. The Supreme Court has declared 214 out of the 219 Coal-Blocks in the country illegal and ordered their closure and levied a fine on them for their illegal mining. But the Central & State Govts have found a way out by re-allotting these illegal mines through auction to make it look legal!

6) I have questioned the reasons why SC observation is being ignored that ‘Mere membership of a banned organisation will not make a person a criminal unless he resorts to violence or incites people to violence or creates public disorder by violence or incitement to violence. [SC: Criminal Appeal No: 889 of 2007]. The court rejected the doctrine of ‘guilt by association’.

It is common knowledge that many young men and women are held in prison on the suspicion of being “helpers of Naxalites”. After arresting them other penal clauses are added on. It is an easy label that can be put on anyone whom the police want to catch. It does not require any proof or witness. Supreme Court says even membership in a banned organisation does not make a person a criminal. How far removed are the law and order forces from the judiciary!

7) I have questioned the recently enacted Amendment to ‘Land Acquisition Act 2013’ by Jharkhand govt which sound a death-knell for the Adivasi Community. This does away with the requirement for “Social Impact Assessment’ which was aimed at safeguarding the environment, social relations and cultural values of affected people. The most damaging factor is the govt can allow any agricultural land for non-agricultural purposes. So, any and everything can be included.
8) I have questioned ‘Land Bank’ which I see as the most recent plot to annihilate the Adivasi people.

During ‘Momentum Jharkhand’ in February 2017 the govt announced that 21 lakh acres in Land Bank of which 10 lakh acres is ready for allotment to industrialists.

Gair-Majurwa” land (uncultivated land) can be ‘khas’ (private) or ‘aam’ (common). As per tradition, individual Adivasi families or communities have been in possession and use this land [jamabandi]. Now the govt shockingly cancelled all ‘jamabandi’ titles and claims that all ‘gair-majurwa’ land belongs to the govt and it is free to allot it to anybody (read industrial houses) to set up their small and big industries.

People are in the dark about their land being written off. The TAC has not given its approval as is required by the Vth Sched., the respective Gram Sabhas have not given their consent as required by PESA Act, affected Adivasi people have not given their consent as required by Land Acquisition Act (2013).

Above are the questions I have consistently raised.

If this makes me a ‘Desh Drohi’ then so be it!

The post I raise my voice for Adivasis, am I a Traitor? appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The judgment is a strong reaffirmation of the constitutional guarantees under Articles 19 and 21, recognising that the freedom to express political disagreement and the right to live with dignity cannot be curtailed through executive action unsupported by law. Rejecting the police’s justification, the Court concluded that the externment proceedings were unsupported by material, based on an erroneous application of the Maharashtra Police Act, and tainted by mala fides.

The hearing also attracted considerable public attention because of Justice Jamdar’s unusually candid oral observations questioning the increasing use of criminal law against protesters and commenting on Maharashtra’s contemporary political landscape. Although these remarks do not form part of the operative judgment, they underscore the constitutional concerns that informed the Court’s approach to the case.

Background: Externment order passed against SDPI office-bearer

The petitioner, Saeed Ahmad Abdul Wahid Chaudhary, serves as the General Secretary of the Social Democratic Party of India (SDPI), a political party registered with the Election Commission of India under Section 29A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The writ petition challenged two administrative orders: an externment order dated December 3, 2025 passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Zone VI, Chembur, Mumbai, and the appellate order dated March 27, 2026 passed by the Divisional Commissioner, Konkan Division, affirming the externment.

The externment directed that Chaudhary be removed from the area for one year under Section 56 of the Maharashtra Police Act.

According to the State authorities, several FIRs had been registered against him, principally in connection with protests organised against decisions of the Union Government. These included demonstrations concerning amendments to citizenship laws, the Gyanvapi mosque dispute, and other politically contentious issues. The police alleged that the protests had been conducted despite the denial of permission and that slogans critical of the Central Government had been raised during these demonstrations.

Represented by Advocate Payoshi Roy, the petitioner contended that the criminal cases relied upon by the authorities were overwhelmingly under Section 188 of the Indian Penal Code for alleged disobedience of prohibitory orders. These FIRs, it was argued, arose solely because the petitioner had organised morchas, dharnas and agitations in his capacity as a political office-bearer opposing governmental decisions. Such activities, the petitioner submitted, could not legitimately constitute grounds for invoking the drastic power of externment under Section 56 of the Maharashtra Police Act.

The petition further alleged that the externment proceedings reflected a mala fide exercise of power and lacked the statutory “subjective satisfaction” required under the Act. To support this challenge, reliance was placed upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India as well as the Gujarat High Court’s decision in Mohmmad Kaleem Taufiq Ahmed Siddiqui v. State of Gujarat, both of which recognised the constitutional protection afforded to peaceful democratic protest.

The State, on the other hand, defended the externment by relying upon an affidavit filed by the Deputy Commissioner of Police. The prosecution argued that the petitioner had organised demonstrations despite police refusal of permission and that the slogans raised during such protests justified preventive action under the Maharashtra Police Act.

However, the High Court found that the State’s case fundamentally misunderstood both the purpose and scope of the externment provisions.

Justice Jamdar’s Oral Remarks: ‘Citizens are being made slaves of the government’

During the hearing, as reported by LiveLaw, Justice Madhav Jamdar made a series of pointed oral observations questioning the increasing tendency to invoke criminal law against citizens who protest governmental policies.

Expressing concern over the police’s approach, the Court observed that democratic governance cannot function if citizens are prevented from voicing disagreement with the government of the day.

Questioning the rationale behind the externment proceedings, reported LiveLaw, Justice Jamdar orally remarked: “All citizens are being made slaves of the Indian Government. They cannot stage protests, they cannot agitate… What is all this? If people protest, you will slap cases. It is the right of citizens to protest.”

The Court further questioned why slogans critical of political leaders or the ruling party should invite such severe executive action.

Referring to the allegations against the petitioner, Justice Jamdar observed that slogans such as “BJP Government Murdabad” or “Amit Shah Murdabad” represented political expression, asking why such slogans should become grounds for externing a citizen.

The Court also reminded the State of the constitutional role of law enforcement agencies, orally remarking that: “Police are not servants of the Chief Minister or the Prime Minister. They are public servants.”

Justice Jamdar even warned that he was inclined to impose substantial costs on the officers responsible for passing such an order, reflecting the Court’s deep dissatisfaction with the manner in which the statutory power had been exercised.

These oral observations, though not forming part of the written judgment, echoed the constitutional principles ultimately embodied in the Court’s final order—that executive powers cannot be deployed to suppress legitimate political opposition or peaceful democratic activity.

‘Horse-Trading’ and the ‘Washing Machine’: Court’s sharp political commentary

The hearing also attracted national attention because of Justice Jamdar’s comments on the prevailing political climate in Maharashtra. During the proceedings, as per the LiveLaw report, after noting that the petitioner belonged to the SDPI, the Court referred to the ongoing movement of legislators between political parties.

Justice Jamdar observed that while the State Assembly was occupied with discussions regarding shifting political loyalties and the election of its Presiding Officer, more pressing public issues, including the death of a ten-year-old child in a road accident,appeared to receive comparatively little attention.

In a lighter vein, the Judge remarked that the petitioner himself might consider changing political sides, adding that “horse-trading” appeared to be occurring across Maharashtra. Referring to the criminal cases pending against the petitioner, Justice Jamdar further quipped that perhaps he should join the “washing machine“—an unmistakable allusion to the popular political expression suggesting that corruption or criminal allegations tend to disappear after politicians join the ruling establishment.

Although these comments were made humorously and do not constitute judicial findings, they quickly became among the most widely discussed aspects of the hearing because of their obvious political significance and broader commentary on contemporary public discourse.

The Court’s Legal Reasoning: Why the externment order could not stand

While the oral observations generated widespread attention, the written judgment is equally significant for its careful examination of the statutory limits governing externment powers under the Maharashtra Police Act and its reaffirmation of constitutional protections for political dissent. Justice Madhav Jamdar systematically dismantled the factual and legal basis relied upon by the police, ultimately concluding that the externment order rested on no legally sustainable foundation.

At the heart of the dispute was Section 56 of the Maharashtra Police Act, a preventive provision that empowers designated authorities to direct a person to remove themselves from a particular area under narrowly defined circumstances. Since an externment order deprives an individual of the freedom to reside and move freely within a particular territory, the provision has consistently been treated by courts as an extraordinary preventive measure that must be exercised with great caution.

The Court therefore began its analysis not with the allegations against the petitioner, but with the statutory requirements themselves.

1. Section 56 of the Maharashtra Police Act: A preventive, not punitive, power

Justice Jamdar reproduced the relevant portions of Section 56(1)(a) and (b) of the Maharashtra Police Act to determine whether the authorities had satisfied the statutory conditions before directing the petitioner’s externment.

Under Section 56(1)(a), externment may be ordered only where the movements or acts of a person are causing, or are calculated to cause, alarm, danger or harm to persons or property.

Section 56(1)(b), on the other hand, authorises externment where there are reasonable grounds to believe that a person is engaged in, or is about to engage in, offences involving force or violence or offences punishable under specified chapters of the Indian Penal Code, particularly offences against the human body, coupled with an assessment that witnesses are unwilling to come forward because of fear.

The Court emphasised that these are not broad administrative powers permitting the State to remove inconvenient political opponents from a locality. Rather, they are exceptional preventive measures intended to address genuine threats to public safety.

Consequently, before an externment order can lawfully be passed, the authorities must possess objective material capable of supporting the statutory satisfaction required under Section 56.

Merely reproducing the language of the statute without factual support is insufficient.

2. The allegations against the petitioner did not meet the statutory threshold

Applying these principles to the facts before it, the Court found that the police had failed to demonstrate how the petitioner’s conduct satisfied either limb of Section 56.

Justice Jamdar noted that it was an admitted position that Saeed Ahmad Abdul Wahid Chaudhary had organised protests, morchas and dharnas in his capacity as Secretary of the Social Democratic Party of India against decisions taken by the Union Government. The State itself accepted that these demonstrations constituted the basis of the proceedings.

However, beyond recording that protests had been organised and slogans raised, the authorities had placed no material before the Court demonstrating that the petitioner’s activities had caused alarm, danger or harm to persons or property.

The FIRs relied upon by the State primarily alleged that demonstrations had been organised without police permission and therefore constituted offences under Section 188 of the Indian Penal Code for disobedience of promulgated orders.

Justice Jamdar observed that an alleged violation of Section 188 IPC, carrying only a relatively minor punishment, could not by itself justify invoking the extraordinary machinery of externment.

The Court stated in unambiguous terms that there was “no material on record” demonstrating that the petitioner’s movements or activities caused, or were calculated to cause, alarm, danger or harm as required by Section 56. Instead, every FIR relied upon by the authorities essentially alleged only that he had organised political protests against decisions of the Government of India and that some of these protests had taken place without prior permission. Such allegations, the Court held, simply did not satisfy the statutory requirements for externment.

“There is no material on record to show that the movements or acts of the Petitioner are causing or calculated to cause alarm, danger or harm to person or property. In all these FIR, the allegation is that the Petitioner, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Social Democratic Party of India, has arranged agitations/morchas/dharnas, opposing certain decisions taken by the Government of India. The other allegation is that such agitations/morchas/dharnas have been arranged without permission of the Police. The same is an offence under Section 188 of the IPC and maximum punishment is of simple imprisonment of one month. However, that cannot be a ground for passing the externment order under the provisions of the Maharashtra Police Act.” (Para 7)

This distinction proved decisive. The judgment makes clear that unlawful assembly or violation of regulatory conditions governing protests may attract criminal consequences under the applicable penal provisions, but such allegations cannot automatically be elevated into grounds for preventive exile under the Maharashtra Police Act.

To hold otherwise would fundamentally alter the character of Section 56, transforming a narrowly tailored preventive provision into an instrument capable of suppressing political opposition.

3. The court finds the authorities’ ‘subjective satisfaction’ was vitiated

One of the most important aspects of the judgment concerns the doctrine of subjective satisfaction, which lies at the heart of preventive measures such as externment. Although externment orders involve administrative discretion, that discretion is not immune from judicial scrutiny.

The authority must genuinely arrive at the statutory satisfaction based upon relevant material. Justice Jamdar carefully examined the externment proposal and the affidavit filed by the police. While these documents repeatedly asserted that the petitioner’s activities were causing alarm, danger and harm to the public, the Court found that the supporting material did not justify these conclusions.

The FIRs themselves narrated only that the petitioner had organised agitations against decisions of the Union Government and raised political slogans. There was no evidence of violence, no evidence of intimidation, no evidence of danger to public safety, or of harm to persons or property.

The Court therefore concluded that the findings recorded by the authorities were unsupported by the factual record. Consequently, the statutory “subjective satisfaction” required under Section 56 stood vitiated because it rested upon assertions rather than evidence.

“Although the Externment Proposal, the details of which are set out in the Affidavit-in-Reply, records that the movements and acts of the Petitioner are causing or are calculated to cause, alarm, danger and harm to the public and property, perusal of the FIRs on the basis of which action is taken and the gist of which is set out in the Affidvit-in-Reply shows that the only allegation is that the Petitioner has arranged agitations/morchas/dharnas against certain decisions of the Union of India and given slogans. Thus, the subjective satisfaction recorded by the authorities that movements and acts of the Petitioner are causing or are calculated to cause, alarm, danger and harm to the public and property, is without any material to support the same. Thus, the subjective satisfaction is vitiated.” (Para 9)

Justice Jamdar held that although the authorities had formally recorded that the petitioner’s movements were causing alarm and danger, a scrutiny of the underlying FIRs revealed no factual basis capable of supporting such a conclusion. The recorded satisfaction was therefore unsupported by material and legally unsustainable. The judgment thus reiterates a long-standing principle of administrative law—that preventive powers cannot be exercised merely by reciting statutory language. The existence of objective material remains subject to judicial review.

4. A finding of mala fides against the state

Perhaps the most striking aspect of the written judgment is the Court’s express acceptance of the petitioner’s allegation that the action bore the hallmarks of mala fides. After analysing the nature of the FIRs and the statutory requirements, Justice Jamdar observed that there was substance in the petitioner’s contention that the externment proceedings constituted a mala fide exercise of power.

“There is substance in the contention raised by Ms. Roy, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, that the action taken is a mala fide action.” (Para 8)

Although the judgment does not embark upon an elaborate discussion of improper motive, this finding carries considerable legal significance. Indian courts are ordinarily reluctant to attribute mala fides to executive authorities without compelling material.

The Court’s conclusion therefore reflects its view that the statutory power had been invoked for a purpose divorced from the object for which Section 56 was enacted. Externment exists to prevent imminent threats to public order—not to remove political activists whose principal activity consists of organising protests against governmental policies.

By accepting the allegation of mala fides, the Court effectively recognised that preventive policing cannot become a substitute for managing political dissent. The finding significantly strengthens the constitutional character of the judgment, indicating that the problem before the Court was not merely one of procedural irregularity but one involving the misuse of statutory authority itself.

5. The judgment as a constitutional reaffirmation of the right to dissent

Beyond the statutory shortcomings in the externment proceedings, Justice Madhav Jamdar anchored the decision firmly within India’s constitutional framework, emphasising that democratic disagreement with the government lies at the heart of constitutional governance. The judgment makes it abundantly clear that preventive policing cannot become a mechanism for punishing political expression, particularly where citizens seek to voice opposition through peaceful and organised protest.

The Court rejected the implicit premise underlying the State’s action, that repeated protests against government policies, coupled with criminal cases arising from such demonstrations, could justify the extraordinary remedy of externment. Instead, it recognised that such an approach strikes directly at the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution.

“It is settled legal position that an order of externment is an extraordinary measure and effect of such order is of depriving a citizen of his fundamental right of free movement throughout the territory of India.” (Para 10)

Referring specifically to Articles 19 and 21, Justice Jamdar observed that the Constitution protects not only the right of citizens to express their opinions but also their right to live with dignity. These guarantees, the Court held, are substantially impaired when the State seeks to remove a person from his locality merely because he has criticised governmental decisions or organised political demonstrations.

The Court unequivocally held:

“The action taken by the Respondent–State of Maharashtra of externing the Petitioner, merely for opposing certain decisions of the Government of India, affects the Petitioner’s fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression and also right to live with dignity.” (Para 12)

The observation is significant because it extends the analysis beyond the freedom of speech guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (a). By invoking Article 21, the Court recognised that an externment order has consequences that reach far beyond physical displacement. It disrupts an individual’s social existence, political participation, livelihood, community ties and personal dignity. The judgment therefore situates externment not merely as an administrative measure but as one carrying profound constitutional implications.

Political opposition cannot be converted into grounds for preventive action

One of the clearest messages emerging from the judgment is that criticism of the government, even if forceful, unpopular or politically inconvenient, does not transform a citizen into a threat to public order.

Throughout the proceedings, the State repeatedly relied upon the petitioner’s participation in protests against governmental decisions, including demonstrations concerning citizenship-related issues and other matters of public controversy. However, Justice Jamdar drew a sharp constitutional distinction between opposition to government policy and conduct that genuinely threatens public safety.

The judgment records that the petitioner’s activities consisted principally of organising agitations, morchas and dharnas against decisions taken by the Government of India. The allegations further indicated that he had raised political slogans and organised demonstrations despite refusal of police permission. Yet none of these circumstances, the Court held, established the statutory conditions necessary for externment. This distinction assumes considerable constitutional importance.

Democratic governments routinely face criticism, protests and organised political mobilisation. If such activities were sufficient to justify preventive measures like externment, the constitutional guarantee of political speech would become contingent upon executive approval. Justice Jamdar’s judgment rejects precisely such an approach. Instead, it reaffirms that disagreement with governmental decisions is not a constitutional anomaly—it is one of the defining characteristics of a functioning democracy.

Precedents invoked in the judgment

1. Reliance on Anuradha Bhasin: Democratic rights cannot be suppressed

The Court’s constitutional reasoning was reinforced by its reliance upon the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India. Although Anuradha Bhasin primarily concerned restrictions imposed under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure following the constitutional changes in Jammu and Kashmir, the principles articulated by the Supreme Court regarding democratic freedoms were considered directly relevant to the present case.

Justice Jamdar noted that the Supreme Court had clearly held that extraordinary executive powers cannot be used as instruments to suppress legitimate expressions of opinion, grievances or democratic rights.

By invoking Anuradha Bhasin, the Bombay High Court placed the present dispute within a broader constitutional jurisprudence recognising that preventive powers must always be exercised consistently with democratic freedoms.

The precedent underscores that constitutional rights cannot be displaced merely because executive authorities find political protests inconvenient or uncomfortable.

2. Support from the Gujarat High Court’s decision on political protests

The Court also relied upon the Gujarat High Court’s decision in Mohmmad Kaleem Taufiq Ahmed Siddiqui v. State of Gujarat, a case involving remarkably similar facts.

Justice Jamdar observed that the Gujarat High Court had considered a situation where an externment order had likewise been issued against a citizen for participating in protests against decisions of the Union Government. The Gujarat High Court held that such circumstances could not legally justify externment and consequently set aside the order.

Finding the reasoning directly applicable, Justice Jamdar held that the principles laid down by both the Supreme Court in Anuradha Bhasin and the Gujarat High Court squarely governed the present dispute.

The reliance on these precedents strengthens the judgment’s doctrinal foundation by demonstrating that courts across jurisdictions have consistently viewed preventive restrictions on political protest with constitutional scepticism.

3. Externment is an extraordinary measure, not an ordinary administrative tool

The judgment also draws support from the Supreme Court’s decision in Deepak s/o Laxman Dongre v. State of Maharashtra, which characterised externment as an extraordinary measure because of its direct impact on an individual’s liberty and freedom of movement.

Justice Jamdar reiterated that externment cannot be treated as a routine administrative response to alleged misconduct.

Unlike ordinary criminal prosecution, an externment order effectively banishes an individual from a particular area, restricting movement, disrupting family life, employment and political participation. Such a drastic consequence necessarily demands strict compliance with statutory safeguards and close judicial scrutiny.

The Court’s reasoning reinforces the settled principle that preventive measures must remain exceptional. Administrative convenience or political sensitivity cannot dilute the high threshold established by law.

Externment orders quashed in their entirety

Having found that the statutory conditions under Section 56 were absent, that the authorities’ subjective satisfaction lacked evidentiary support, that the proceedings were vitiated by mala fides, and that the petitioner’s constitutional rights had been infringed, the Court allowed the writ petition in full.

Justice Jamdar quashed both the original externment order dated December 3, 2025 passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Zone VI, Chembur, Mumbai, as well as the appellate order dated March 27, 2026 passed by the Divisional Commissioner, Konkan Division, thereby completely restoring the petitioner’s rights.

A judgment with wider constitutional significance

Although the immediate dispute concerned the externment of a single political activist, the judgment speaks to a much broader constitutional concern: the increasing use of preventive legal mechanisms against political dissent.

Externment laws were enacted to protect society from individuals whose conduct presents a demonstrable threat to public order or safety. They were never intended to become instruments for regulating political speech or discouraging public protest. Justice Jamdar’s decision restores that distinction.

By insisting that the statutory prerequisites under Section 56 must be established through objective material, by recognising the chilling effect of punitive action against protesters, and by reaffirming that Articles 19 and 21 protect not merely abstract liberties but the practical ability of citizens to oppose governmental decisions, the judgment reinforces a foundational constitutional principle—that democracy cannot function without dissent.

Read alongside the Court’s striking oral observations questioning attempts to criminalise protest, criticising the misuse of police powers, and cautioning against treating political opposition as a threat to public order, the decision stands as a robust reminder that constitutional governance demands tolerance of disagreement. Governments may disagree with protesters, investigate genuine criminality where it exists, and regulate assemblies in accordance with law, but they cannot employ extraordinary preventive powers to exile citizens simply because they challenge those in authority.

In doing so, the Bombay High Court has delivered a judgment that is likely to resonate well beyond the facts of this individual case, strengthening the constitutional jurisprudence on political dissent, preventive policing and the limits of executive power.

The complete judgment may be read below:

Related:

How “Khalistani” became a weaponised political label against Sikh dissent

Silence in the Statistics: What NCRB data doesn’t say about dissent

Maharashtra Special Public Security Bill: Bogey of “urban naxals” invoked to legitimise clamping down of dissent?

Mob justice in Bengal? Mahua Moitra’s siege and the High Court’s constitutional message

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At the last INDIA bloc meeting at Delhi’s Constitution Club in June, Congress president Mallikarjun Kharge announced that the Opposition parties will send a letter to the CJI “regarding serious questions raised about the Special Intensive Revision (SIR), manipulation of the electoral rolls, and the fairness of elections.” This letter dated June 28, 2026 appears to be the first step in this direction.

While DMK and AAP’s signatures on the letter to CJI signal that the two parties come on board on key issues that affect all parties, a senior Opposition leader ruled out any deeper participation in the short term. AAP quit the mega Opposition group in 2025 after agreeing to contest only during the 2024 Lok Sabha polls. The DMK left the alliance last month after the Congress decided to support the Tamil Nadu chief minister C Joseph Vijay-led Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK) government.

Why this letter is significant

The detailed letter to the CJI flags the questionable methods by which the Election Commission (ECI) under the present Chief Election Commissioner (CEC), Gyanesh Kumar, in the name of ‘clean up’ of electoral rolls has undertaken an exercise that has had an opposite and anti-democratic outcome! On the Bihar 2025 SIR, the letter states that, “

“This massive exercise just before the assembly elections, was ill-timed and its faulty implementation a monumental disaster. This, despite the fact that electoral rolls, after they were digitized (2002) were continuously revised and updated by the Commission. But a de-novo revision, never attempted in the fashion adopted by the Commission would ordinarily have required at least a year to do, without being suspect. The documentation process, adopted for the first time, was inherently exclusionary and politically motivated. Verification of voters based on filling forms and production of documents, questioning citizenship, left voters disenfranchised. Lakhs of voters did not possess the required documents. Many of them did not have the capacity to fill forms and forward them as mandated. This was particularly true of those who are poor, uneducated, including Dalits, Adivasis, members of the minority community and migrant workers. There were instances, that the Commission was aware of, where videos circulating on the social media showed booth level officers themselves filling the forms by forging signatures, and in some instances, uploading these forms without the consent of the voters. Even deceased persons were shown to be submitting forms. There was complete lack of transparency and administrative confusion in the implementation of this process exacerbated by the timeframe within which it was required to be done. Instructions of the Commission were changed midway from time to time. There was confusion even amongst election officials.”

Besides the letter states that the “grievance redressal mechanism was inadequate and there was a massive arbitrary deletion of names without proper notice. The alleged objective of the exercise was to remove duplicate voters and the names of the deceased and migrants from the voter’s lists. But the process, as implemented, lacked not just transparency but was implemented in a manner unknown to all processes undertaken in the past. The existing updated electoral rolls were used at the time of the Lok Sabha elections (2024). Even in 2014, the then updated electoral rolls reflected an outcome that none questioned. The whole process of the SIR, according to us, was meant to favour the BJP.”

On Bengal, the letter points to the shocking and deliberate malfunctioning by the ECI. The letter alleges that it appears that the Commission “was concerned only with the outcome of that election since it raised no real issues of manipulation in other states like Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Assam where the SIR was not implemented.”

However, states the communication,

It was apparent that the West Bengal Government was under siege with the presence of 2 lakh 40 thousand CAPF personnel. To put this in context, 3 lakh 50 thousand CAPF personnel were deployed for the entire Lok Sabha election in 2024. There was also a massive deletion of names from the electoral rolls, including those arbitrarily removed, under a never-used-before-category titled ‘logical discrepancies’.

This devious ploy alone left 27 lakh people without the right to vote.

This Hon’ble Court (the Supreme Court) constituted Tribunals to dispose of the appeals where names stood deleted. One of the 19 Tribunals hearing the appeals headed by Justice T.S. Sivagnanam, found that of the 1777 names deleted for which appeals were heard by him, 1717 were wrongly deleted. This means 96% of the names were wrongly deleted. If the same proportion is applied on other pending appeals before the 19 tribunals, it would mean that more than 25 lakh voters were unable to cast their votes due to a process which was inherently flawed.

Most of the deletions were found to be in constituencies where the All India Trinamool Congress (AITC) was dominant. The SIR is an unusual process with which the ordinary voter is unfamiliar. The requirement of filling forms, forwarding them and furnishing of documents in a country where there is massive poverty and illiteracy is essentially exclusionary.

Massive deletions, non-transparent processes, the unprecedented numbers of CAPF personnel deployed, the nomination of two representatives of the Union government of their choice and the Returning Officer chosen by the blatantly biased Commission at the counting centres, with no nominee of the AITC, made for a partisan process and consequently suspect. The en masse transfer of 483 officials including the then Chief Secretary, Home Secretary and others replaced by officers posted by the Commission was an unusual exercise. Such extreme steps were not taken in any election in the past.

Stating that before launching any such exercise like an SIR, the ECI must have previous inquiries and investigations to show “the extent to which the electoral rolls in each state were polluted and why it was necessary to do this exercise for these elections and in such haste.” However, “Even many BLOs in West Bengal were deprived of their right to vote.” While the ECI has been provided enough data and information to show that public confidence in the SIR process has been eroded, the ECI remains deaf to all independent representations, assert the Opposition.

The Letter to the Chief Justice of India (CJI) Justice Surya Kant acknowledges that such a communication by the Opposition to the highest judiciary is unusual, asserts that it is warranted given the unprecedented crisis for institutional democracy and the faith of all Indians in Indian democracy. Hence, the Opposition has demanded through this letter that the “impending SIR in the states of Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat etc. be suspended” and such a process launched if at all when the next Assembly Election is five years away.

Though no details have been provided, the communication makes a brief reference to the fact that “serious questions are also being raised about the process of electronic voting, and in particular about the role of electronic voting machines,” and hence “return to paper ballots” may be the answer.”

Finally urging that “ a transparent electoral process, in which every Indian has full confidence, is essential to sustaining public trust in our democracy,” the letter also points out how law enforcement agencies like the CBI, ED and NIA “ are used not only to target those in opposition. These agencies are also used for the purpose of manipulating the outcome of results in the elections, apart from bringing down elected governments.”

Senior Opposition leader and Trinamool’s Rajya Sabha floor leader Derek O’Brien wrote, “Good going from INDIA. And yes, @AamAadmiParty @arivalayam DMK also signed the joint letter to CJI.”

The letter may be read here:

Related:

SIR and the Making of a Stateless Citizen? | R. Rajagopal Speaks Out | Teesta Setalvad

Karnataka launches SIR with 5.5 crore voters, State Govt voices transparency concerns

Karnataka launches SIR with 5.5 crore voters, State Govt voices transparency concerns

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Stan Swamy, the Martyr, is no longer around today- but if he were physically present in this world today, what exactly would he be doing?

If Stan Swamy, the Martyr, were alive today, he would be in the midst of the Adivasis. His life would be very simple and frugal. He would eat their food, sing their songs, and dance with them. He would identify with them totally. Yes, of course, he would be angry if others tried to destroy their identity, their culture and customs, their traditions, and their value systems. He would master their language and walk the talk with them.

If Stan Swamy, the Martyr, were alive today, he would accompany the Adivasis and other subalterns in their relentless quest for justice. He would have no qualms of conscience to take on the powerful, vested interests who deny the Adivasis of their legitimate jal- jungle– jameen rights. He would have been fearless in exposing the profiteers, who loot the nation of its precious natural resources for their greed in amassing scandalous amounts of wealth. He would challenge the system for destroying the environment and the fragile ecosystems in Jharkhand, in the Aravalli hills, in the Nicobar Islands, and elsewhere!

If Stan Swamy, the Martyr, were alive today, he would fight for the land rights of the Adivasis! He would join the Adivasis, the Dalits, other subalterns, and civil society members in the struggles against the violation of laws in acquiring land for mega projects, for mining (coal mining continues to be rampant in Jharkhand and in other tribal areas today), and infrastructural development, which flout the rights of the downtrodden. He would challenge all corporate encroachments. He would raise his voice in democratic, legitimate ways against the state-sponsored violations of laws and the assault on the democratic rights of people, aimed at paving the way for unrestricted exploitation of land and natural resources. He would question the non-implementation of the 5th Schedule of the Constitution, and why the Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act [PESA], which is being ignored. He would strongly express his disappointment at the silence of the Government on the landmark 1997 Samantha Judgment of the Supreme Court; he would speak out strongly against the half-hearted action of the Government on the ‘Forest Rights Act, 2006’. He would express his apprehensions at the Amendment to the ‘Land Acquisition Act 2013’ by the Jharkhand government, which was a death-knell for the Adivasi Community. He would strongly disagree with the setting up of ‘Land Banks’, which he saw as a calculated plot to annihilate the Adivasis.

If Stan Swamy, the Martyr, were alive today, he would be with the young adults! He would take seriously the letter (dated May 24, 2026) of Fr Arturo Sosa, the Superior General of the Jesuits, in which he says that we are missioned “to accompany young adults in their search for a hope-filled future. That search today is not an easy one. We are seeing a trampling on human rights, a disregard for our common home, the breakdown of international order, war, and a recklessness about human life at all its stages.” Through the ‘Persecuted Prisoners’ Solidarity Committee’, he would challenge the indiscriminate arrest of three thousand young Adivasis under the label of ‘naxals’ just because they questioned and resisted unjust land alienation and displacement. He would have supported the demands and the initiatives of the youth protesting (some even fasting) at ‘Jantar Mantar’, Delhi!

If Stan Swamy, the Martyr, were alive today, he would openly take on the Special Intensive Revision (SIR). He would regard it as a blatant attack on the country’s citizens and a gross violation of the Constitutional guarantee of the right to exercise one’s franchise. He would be concerned that thousands of Adivasis, minorities, and other poor people would be systematically disenfranchised for want of ‘legitimate’ documents. He would join civil society groups as they voice their protests on the SIR and highlight the mass disenfranchisement of citizens in West Bengal, Bihar, and elsewhere!

If Stan Swamy, the Martyr, were alive today, he would take a stand for the small farmers and the ordinary workers! He would voice his concern about how the three Central Farm Laws (which are now on hold) are patently against the small farmer. He would speak strongly against the four labour codes, which have become law today!  The small farmers and the ordinary workers are pitted against the powerful corporations.

If Stan Swamy, the Martyr, were alive today, he would have welcomed ‘Magnifica Humanitas’. The first encyclical of Pope Leo XIV makes an unequivocal and non-negotiable case for the protection and the enhancement of the dignity of the human person, the inviolability of human rights and the indispensability of justice and peace in today’s world. Pope Leo states, “human rights are inviolable, since they are “inherent in the human person and in human dignity.” Consequently, they are universal and inalienable. Precisely because they are grounded in the common dignity of every man and woman, they have practical consequences and legal effects, for “it would be vain to proclaim human rights if, at the same time, everything was not done to ensure the duty of respecting them, respect by all, in all places and for all.” Stan would say that this is exactly what the Church should be doing!

If Stan Swamy, the Martyr, were alive today, he would rededicate himself to the letter and spirit of the Constitution of India.  He would speak about the sanctity of it and that no one has the right to trample on it. He would insist that justice, liberty, equality, fraternity, dignity, unity, integrity, secularism, and pluralism are the values enshrined in our Constitution. Women should be empowered and given their rightful and equal place in Parliament. That delimitation and delisting are gross manipulations. That citizens have the right to dissent and voice their protest against corruption, communalism, and corporatisation.  He would take on the draconian Unlawful Activities Prevention Act(UAPA), which ensured his death, and which still keeps the likes of Umar Khalid and others illegally incarcerated.

If Stan Swamy, the Martyr, were alive today, he would say once again those immortal words he said before his arrest on 8 October 2020. “Over the last two decades, I have identified myself with the Adivasi people and their struggle for a life of dignity and self-respect… In this process, I have clearly expressed my dissent over several policies and laws enacted by the government in light of the Indian Constitution. I have questioned the validity, legality, and justness of several steps taken by the government and the ruling class. If this makes me a ‘deshdrohi’, then so be it. We are part of the process. In a way, I am happy to be part of this process. I am not a silent spectator, but part of the game and ready to pay the price, whatever be it…. I/we must be ready to face the consequences. I would just add that what is happening to me is not unique. Many activists, lawyers, writers, journalists, student leaders, poets, intellectuals, and others who stand for the rights of Adivasis, Dalits, and the marginalised and express their dissent to the ruling powers of the country are being targeted. Grateful to all who have stood in solidarity with me all these years.”

If Stan Swamy, the Martyr, were alive today, he would have challenged ME and YOU! He would say in his own calm, gentle, unassuming way, “Wake up, now! It is high time you realise what is happening to the country and to our people! And do something about it urgently and collaboratively!”

If Stan Swamy, the Martyr, were alive today … but Stan Swamy NEVER died! He lives forever!

July 2, 2026

(The author is a human rights, reconciliation, and peace activist trainer & writer.)

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