A documentary about Khalid scheduled to be screened at the National Law School of India University (NLSIU) on September 14, was suddenly postponed. The Law & Society Committee, which had organised the event, said it had taken the decision because of “logistical and security considerations” and insisted that it was not backing down because of pressure. The documentary, Prisoner No. 626710 is Present, directed by Lalit Vachani, was to be shown to mark Political Prisoners’ Day and six years since Khalid’s arrest.

However, developments around the screening tell a different story. The postponement came after opposition from the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP), which had demanded that the screening be cancelled and subsequently claimed credit for its postponement. The News Minute reported that the organisation affiliated to the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) had formally complained to the NLSIU administration about the screening. The Quint likewise reported that the organisers maintained that their decision was not a response to external pressure. Significantly, the NLSIU episode was not an isolated incident.

Just weeks earlier, Jawaharlal Nehru University had formally cancelled the booking of an auditorium for a discussion around Khalid’s book, Fractured Communities: Adivasi Histories and the Politics of Power. While the university cited the organisers’ alleged “non-disclosure of the full facts” of the programme, this was contested by the organisers and as reported in The New Indian Express and Sabrangindia, the programme went ahead with retired professors addressing the gathering just outsider the School of Social Sciences-II building. A report on this may be read here.[1]

There is an unmistakable irony to these episodes.

While universities debate whether his work can be discussed, the much larger question remains unresolved: how long can a person remain imprisoned before the criminal justice system is required to put its case to trial?

Umar Khalid was arrested in September 2020 under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) in connection with the alleged larger conspiracy behind the February 2020 North-East Delhi riots. Six years later, the trial has still not begun. That fact is no longer a footnote to the case. It is the case. Two thousand, one hundred and ninety days as an under-trial prisoner.

Six years, and still waiting for a trial

Khalid has now spent six years in custody as an under trial. The prosecution case against him is “extensive” yet key allegations have not been buffeted by adequate evidence. The Delhi Police filed a charge sheet running into 11 volumes and more than 17,000 pages in September 2020. The larger conspiracy case involves many accused and, according to an August 2026 open letter signed by more than 100 public figures, the prosecution has listed around 900 witnesses. Yet the trial has not begun.

This creates a constitutional problem that cannot simply be answered by pointing to the seriousness of the allegations. Article 21 protects the right to life and personal liberty and has long been interpreted by the Supreme Court to include the right to a speedy trial. In Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court specifically recognised that prolonged incarceration can, in appropriate circumstances, justify bail even where stringent statutory restrictions apply.

The tension between that constitutional principle and the UAPA’s stringent bail regime now sits at the centre of Khalid’s case. Six years of imprisonment without trial means that the punishment of incarceration is being experienced before guilt has been adjudicated. That distinction matters.

Khalid has not been convicted of the allegations against him. The charges remain allegations. His guilt or innocence is ultimately for a trial court to determine after evidence is tested. But the trial has not begun.

The arrest came after years of being a public dissenter

Khalid’s current incarceration cannot be understood without the political and legal history that preceded it. A former JNU student leader and research scholar, Khalid emerged as a prominent public voice on questions of communalism, citizenship, minority rights and state power.

His name first became nationally prominent during the 2016 JNU controversy. In February that year, he was arrested in connection with an event held at JNU protesting the execution of Parliament attack convicts Afzal Guru and Maqbool Bhat. He and others were accused under provisions including sedition and criminal conspiracy. The case itself became emblematic of the criminalisation of political expression on university campuses. Then, SabrangIndia had interviewed Umar Khalid, and the two-part conversation can be viewed here and here.

In January 2019, the Delhi Police filed a charge sheet against Khalid and former JNU student leader Kanhaiya Kumar in the sedition case. Then came the political upheaval surrounding the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA 2019) and the proposed National Register of Citizens (NRC). Khalid was among those who participated in and addressed protests against the CAA-NRC framework in 2019 and 2020.

On February 17, 2020, Umar Khalid spoke about peaceful protest and invoked Gandhian methods. A portion of his remarks was subsequently circulated widely on social media after BJP IT-cell head Amit Malviya posted an edited interpretation of his comments. Worse, just ahead of the 2020 Delhi Assembly elections, Kapil Mishra of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) had stated on Twitter, “Delhi mein chote chote Pakistan bane (Delhi will become mini-Pakistan)” and “Shaheen Bagh mein Pak ki entry (Shaheen Bagh will serve as entry for Pakistan) as reported by The New Indian Express and The Hindu.” Mishra was even subsequently booked under Section 125 of the Representation of People Act, 1951 (RP Act), for promoting enmity between classes to gain an advantage during the elections and thereafter in June June 2024, Mishra was summoned by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. At the time in 2020, the Delhi High Court made the Delhi Police watch four videos in court establishing hate speeches that had been made by politicians but not acted on by the police. Kapil Mishra was one of the four videos. Justice Murlidhar who came down on the police sharply for inaction was summarily transferred to the Punjab and Haryana High Court. Despite the fact that the case dwindled to naught later, there have been sharp critiques on how justice has been selectively delivered. Not just Mishra but Anurag Thakur, were recorded delivering provocative and incendiary hate speeches at election rallies in February 2020. The courts, including the Supreme Court of India were eventually lenient with them (2026) as compared to the young Muslim student leadership at the helm of the anti-CAA/NRC protests. At an election rally, Anurag Thakur, an elected official of the BJP, was heard leading a chant of “Desh ke gaddaron ko…”, to which the crowd responded, “Goli maaron saalon ko.” The slogan went viral and drew widespread criticism. Just weeks later, Delhi witnessed large-scale communal violence that claimed 53 lives, with allegations raised that such speeches contributed to the charged atmosphere. Yet it was Umar and 17 others who bore the brunt of the blame for the violence.[2]

Days later, North-East Delhi descended into brute and targeted communal violence. Fifty-three people were killed and hundreds were injured. Ignoring the deliberate provocations by elected officials of the ruling BJP, the Delhi Police chose to target on the previous, vibrant and widespread anti-CAA/NRC protest leadership, developed a theory of a “larger conspiracy”, alleging that the anti-CAA protest movement had been used to plan and orchestrate the violence. Khalid became one of the principal accused in that case. Incidentally, while the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) was in power at the time and returned to power after the state elections, the Delhi police are controlled directly by the central/union ministry for home affairs.

September 2020: The beginning of six years behind bars

Khalid was arrested on September 13, 2020, under the UAPA. The prosecution alleged that he played a central role in the conspiracy behind the riots. The case was not merely an ordinary prosecution arising from individual acts of violence. The police’s case was that Khalid, and others were part of a broader conspiracy connected to the anti-CAA protests and that the protests themselves were used as part of a plan culminating in the violence.

The prosecution has repeatedly described Khalid as one of the alleged “masterminds” of the conspiracy. Khalid has consistently denied the allegations. What followed was a prolonged battle over bail and liberty.

2021: The first long bail battle

In April 2021, a Delhi trial court granted Khalid bail in a separate IPC case relating to the Delhi riots, observing that the material against him was sketchy and that he could not be incarcerated indefinitely on such material. That did not result in his release. His UAPA case continued.

By September 2021, his lawyers were back before the court seeking bail in the larger conspiracy case. The arguments went to the heart of the prosecution’s theory. Khalid’s lawyers argued that participation in protests, membership of WhatsApp groups and advocacy of a chakka jam could not, by themselves, constitute a terrorist conspiracy.

The defence also argued that the prosecution was attempting to paint a large number of individuals with the same brush and that the charge sheet presented a narrative rather than evidence establishing Khalid’s criminal role. The prosecution disputed this and argued that the protests had been systematically organised and synchronised. The bail hearings continued for months. In March 2022, the trial court rejected Khalid’s bail application. The court found a prima facie case against him under the UAPA. Khalid remained behind bars.

2023–24: The Supreme Court route and repeated adjournments

Khalid approached the Supreme Court. Notice was issued in May 2023. What followed was another prolonged sequence of hearings and adjournments. The matter was repeatedly listed before different benches. There were adjournments because of the unavailability of counsel, constitutional bench proceedings, changes in bench composition and the recusal of a judge.

On August 9, 2023, the matter came before Justices A.S. Bopanna and Prashant Kumar Mishra. Justice Bopanna indicated that the matter would come before another bench after Justice Mishra’s recusal. On September 12, the Supreme Court admitted the bail plea but indicated that the documentary material would have to be examined in detail. The hearings continued into October and November. In January 2024, the matter was again repeatedly adjourned. There were 44 deferrals of the matter before the apex court.

Finally, on February 14, 2024, Khalid withdrew the Supreme Court petition, with his counsel telling the court that he would pursue the matter before the trial court on account of a “change in circumstances”. That change did not result in liberty.

2024: Back to the trial court

In July 2024, Khalid moved the Karkardooma court for bail. The proceedings again became protracted. On May 28, 2024, the Karkardooma court rejected his bail plea. The prosecution argued, among other things, that Khalid had amplified what it described as a “false narrative” through social media. The defence rejected the allegations and continued to challenge the evidentiary basis of the prosecution case. The central problem, however, remained unchanged. Khalid was still in prison. And there was still no trial.

2025: Another rejection, another year in custody

On September 2, 2025, the Delhi High Court rejected Khalid’s bail plea. The court accepted the prosecution’s contention that the Delhi riots were the result of a “premeditated, well-orchestrated conspiracy” rather than a spontaneous eruption of violence. The court also held that delay in trial, by itself, could not justify bail given the gravity of the allegations.

Khalid challenged the decision before the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, the years continued to accumulate. In December 2025, a Delhi court granted him interim bail for 14 days so that he could attend his sister’s wedding. It was a brief departure from a pattern otherwise defined by continued incarceration. He returned to prison.

January 5, 2026: the Supreme Court’s crucial order

The most consequential development came on January 5, 2026. The Supreme Court, in Gulfisha Fatima v. State (NCT of Delhi), granted bail to five accused in the Delhi riots larger conspiracy case: Gulfisha Fatima, Meeran Haider, Shifa-ur-Rehman, Mohammad Saleem Khan and Shadab Ahmed. But it denied bail to Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam. The distinction drawn by the court became critical (and most contested).

The bench of Justices Aravind Kumar and N.V. Anjaria said that the prosecution material prima facie disclosed what it described as a “central and formative role” for Khalid and Imam, involving planning, mobilisation and strategic direction beyond “episodic and localised acts”. The court held that the threshold under Section 43D (5) of the UAPA was attracted. It also said that the accused could renew their bail applications after the examination of the protected witnesses or after one year from the judgment, whichever was earlier. At the same time, the court directed the trial court to expedite the proceedings.

April 2026: Review rejected

Khalid sought review of the January judgment. On April 20, 2026, the Supreme Court dismissed the review petition, finding no sufficient ground to review its January 5 judgment. The door to immediate reconsideration appeared closed.

May 2026: A Supreme Court bench questions the January approach

On May 18, 2026, a separate Supreme Court bench comprising Justices B.V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan delivered the judgment in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi v. National Investigation Agency. The bench emphasised the constitutional significance of liberty and the principle that bail is ordinarily the rule and imprisonment the exception. More significantly, the bench expressed reservations about the January Gulfisha Fatima judgment’s treatment of the Supreme Court’s earlier three-judge decision in K.A. Najeeb.

The judges held that judicial discipline required the two-judge bench deciding Gulfisha to follow the binding precedent laid down by the three-judge bench in Najeeb. The issue was subsequently referred to a larger bench after another Supreme Court bench identified a “perceived conflict” in the approaches taken by different benches. That development was seized upon by Khalid and Imam in their renewed bail proceedings.

And then came the latest bail battle

Khalid and Imam approached the Delhi High Court challenging the rejection of their third bail applications. The Delhi Police has now argued that they should not even be heard at this stage. In its response before the High Court, the police described the fresh bail proceedings as “illegal”, “misconceived” and an attempt to “mislead” the court.

The Supreme Court’s January 5 order, the police says, gave Khalid and Imam liberty to renew their bail applications only after one of two events occurred: the examination of protected witnesses or the expiry of one year from the judgment. According to the prosecution, neither event had occurred when the fresh pleas were filed.

Therefore, the police say, the applications are premature. Scroll.in, reporting on August 27, quoted the prosecution’s position that the May judgment in Andrabi, arising from another case, could not override the specific directions issued in Gulfisha. The police have also relied on the Supreme Court’s May 22 order in Tasleem Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi), which acknowledged the divergence between the Gulfisha and Andrabi approaches and referred the issue to a larger bench.

The State’s position is that until the larger bench settles the question, the January judgment continues to bind the High Court.

When does pre-trial detention become punishment?

The prosecution’s argument is this: the allegations are grave, Section 43D(5) applies, the Supreme Court has already assessed the material and Khalid’s alleged role is different from that of the accused who were granted bail. But there is another side to the equation. Khalid has spent six years in prison without trial. The prosecution has reportedly listed around 900 witnesses and there is no sign of the trial beginning any time soon.

The case involves thousands of pages of evidence and many accused. The more complicated the prosecution case becomes, the longer it can take to bring it to trial. But that cannot mean that the complexity of the prosecution’s own case becomes a reason for indefinite pre-trial incarceration. This is precisely why K.A. Najeeb matters. The Supreme Court’s three-judge bench in that case recognised that statutory restrictions on bail cannot be interpreted in a manner that makes constitutional rights meaningless. Where incarceration becomes excessively prolonged and there is no reasonable prospect of the trial being completed within a meaningful timeframe, Article 21 can acquire decisive significance. Detailed pieces may be read here, here and here.

A six-year incarceration has become a public question

On August 15, more than 100 writers, academics, activists, filmmakers, journalists and public figures wrote to Chief Justice of India Surya Kant urging intervention in the continued incarceration of Khalid and Sharjeel Imam. As reported by The Wire, the signatories invoked K.A. Najeeb and argued that nearly six years of detention without the commencement of trial demands constitutional scrutiny. Their intervention reflects a broader anxiety about what prolonged pre-trial incarceration does to the meaning of liberty itself.

Six years is a long time to spend behind bars without a verdict. Umar Khalid has not been convicted of the charges against him, yet six years of pre-trial incarceration have already become a defining fact of his case. His bail battles continue, the prosecution and defence remain locked in arguments over the scope of the UAPA, and the larger question of how long a person can remain imprisoned while awaiting trial remains unresolved.

The courts will ultimately decide the charges against Khalid. But six years of incarceration without that determination cannot be reduced to another date in a long procedural timeline. It is a measure of the extraordinary cost of prolonged pre-trial detention. For Khalid, the wait for trial is no longer simply a stage in the criminal process. It has itself become the story.

Detailed pieces may be read here, here, here and here.

A profile on Umar Khalid may be viewed here.

[1] Professor Avinash Kumar, who had submitted the requisition for the auditorium, was particularly categorical. “The stated reason for the cancellation of the booking of the SSS auditorium is false,” he said, according to Hindustan Times report. Kumar maintained that the Dean had been fully informed that the event was going to discuss Khalid’s book and that the requisition had been prepared in the format suggested by the Dean himself.

His question was simple: if the university did not know what the event was about, why was the auditorium booking approved in the first place?

[2] In 2020, prior to the Delhi riots, Parvesh Verma was a Member of Parliament (MP) in the Lok Sabha, representing the West Delhi constituency. He belonged to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

During the February 2020 Delhi Assembly elections, Kapil Mishra was a BJP candidate from the Karawal Nagar constituency (which he lost). He did not hold a formal government or party organizational position during the February 2020 riots. In early 2020, prior to the Delhi riots in February, Anurag Thakur held the designation of Union Minister of State (MoS) for Finance and Corporate Affairs in the Government of India. Simultaneously, he was a serving Member of Parliament (MP) in the Lok Sabha representing the Hamirpur constituency of Himachal Pradesh.

Related:

The Conspiracy of Silence: HC denies bail to Delhi riots accused

How free are all Indians to exercise their right to peacefully protest under Article 19?

UAPA: Delhi HC denies bail, Umar Khalid’s Incarceration to Continue

4 years onward, activist Gulfisha Fatima remains behind bars

Order denying bail to Dr. Umar Khalid, a mockery of judicial system?

Dastardly attempt to assassinate Umar Khalid

Witch hunt against Umar Khalid and Kanhaiya Kumar continues

The post Six Years Behind Bars, Still No Trial: Umar Khalid’s long wait for justice appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Sent as a personal message, Prof Ghanshyam Shah drew my attention to the fact that, at one point, the sect’s top sadhus had declared that they were not Hindus during a case in the Supreme Court. He further told me that its temples once did not allow “untouchables” to enter.

Nothing unusual, I thought, for a groundbreaking study, supported by an Ahmedabad-based Dalit rights NGO, Navsarjan Trust, “Understanding Untouchability”, had found the widespread prevalence of untouchability in 1,589 Gujarat villages it surveyed. It said that more than 90 per cent of rural Dalits reported facing “no entry” in temples during religious ceremonies. The 2009 survey became such an eyesore for the state government that the latter sponsored a parallel study to counter the Navsarjan claim.

I looked it up, and sources told me that the case was Sastri Yagnapurushdasji and Others v. Muldas Bhudardas Vaishya and Another. It so happened that in 1947, the Province of Bombay passed the Bombay Harijan Temple Entry Act—later superseded by the Bombay Hindu Places of Public Worship (Entry-Authorisation) Act, 1956—to eradicate untouchability by legally granting Dalits (then referred to as Harijans) the right to enter and worship in all Hindu public places of worship on equal terms.

Following the law’s passage, leaders and followers (satsangis) of one of the major Swaminarayan sects, operating from Ahmedabad, filed a suit seeking a permanent injunction to prevent non-satsangi Dalits—those not initiated into the spiritual teachings of Swaminarayan—from entering their temples.

The sect’s argument for exempting its temples from the social reform legislation was that the Swaminarayan faith, or Swaminarayan sampradaya, was an entirely separate and distinct religion, not part of the Hindu religion. Hence, the Bombay temple-entry laws—which applied specifically to “Hindu” places of public worship—did not apply to Swaminarayan temples.

The case, which began in Ahmedabad, went up to the Supreme Court, whose Constitution Bench, led by Chief Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar, ruled on January 14, 1966, that the Swaminarayan sect was an integral part of the Hindu religion. The court observed that Hinduism, unlike prophetic, monotheistic religions, does not depend on a single founder, a single holy book, or a uniform dogma. It described Hinduism as a broad, inclusive “way of life” capable of accommodating diverse theological views, reform movements, and sub-traditions. It went on to trace the theological foundation of Swaminarayan (Sahajanand Swami) to the Vishishtadvaita philosophy of Ramanuja. It noted that the sect accepts the authority of foundational Hindu scriptures—the Vedas, the Upanishads, the Bhagavad Gita, and the Bhagavata Purana—and worships traditional Hindu deities alongside its founder. Consequently, internal reforms or distinct sectarian practices did not sever it from the Hindu fold.

The court held that freedom of religion under Articles 25 and 26 cannot override constitutional mandates aimed at ending social evils like untouchability. Article 25(2)(b) specifically preserves the state’s power to provide for social welfare and reform by opening Hindu religious institutions to all classes and sections of Hindus.

Therefore, Swaminarayan temples fall squarely within the scope of public Hindu temples, making it unlawful to bar Dalit Hindus from entry.

Sources tell me that neither BAPS nor the Maninagar group, the two largest branches of the sect, were parties to the litigation, and that the case was fought by followers and sadhus of the original Swaminarayan sampradaya—specifically the Northern Gadi, centred at the Shri Nar Narayan Dev Temple in Kalupur, Ahmedabad.

Yet, despite claims of equality before God, the fact is that historical and sociological evidence suggests that Dalits (formerly untouchables) faced significant exclusion and separate worship practices within the Swaminarayan framework, and BAPS was no exception between the late 19th and mid-20th centuries.

While BAPS and “modern” Swaminarayan organisations emphasise spiritual equality, there have been several ways in which caste distinctions were enforced.

The primary ethical manual for all Swaminarayan followers—including BAPS—is the Shikshapatri, was written the 19th century. The Shikshapatri no doubt sought to initiate followers across caste lines and preached against outward notions of pollution in bhakti, yet it explicitly accommodated traditional Varnashrama Dharma. It referred to Slokas 17–20 and 91 in order to instruct followers not to abandon the duties and ritual observances of their own caste. In fact, there were ritual purity rules which dictated that touching members of the “lowest castes” (antyaja or outcastes) caused ritual impurity requiring purificatory bathing.

An authoritative interpretation of Shikshapatri published by the temple authorities under the title “The Epistle of Precepts” states that the caste system is “designed for effective organisation and management of society. It provides a distribution of manpower for various necessary jobs.” Comparing it with “White collar/Blue collar separation of the work force in the West”, the write-up insists that it is “enforced by birth”, and that depending on “one’s past karmas”, one is “born to endure the miseries or pleasures arising from a particular caste”. It adds: “If the caste system and the duties for each caste were followed then there is no doubt that we could return the former glory of ‘Rama Rajya’. The caste system is in no way a burden and needs to be preserved.”

Because caste rules prevented low-caste followers from worshipping alongside upper-caste Patidars and Brahmins in major temples, the sampradaya is said to have historically addressed Dalit devotion by building separate shrines or requiring external worship. Sociologist Raymond Brady Williams is cited for documenting that in parts of Gujarat (such as Chhani near Vadodara), separate temples were maintained specifically for Dalit devotees, where they could manage and perform rituals themselves without entering dominant-caste shrines. Further, early colonial observers and 19th-century commentators noted that while untouchables were inducted as disciples, social conservatism among dominant-caste followers led them to build segregated shrines or sit outside during satsang assemblies.

It is within this framework that BAPS (or, for that matter, the Maninagar Gadi) never claimed to be non-Hindu. Unlike the orthodox Ahmedabad litigants in the 1948-1966 Yagnapurushdasji case—or groups like the Ramakrishna Mission, which in the 1980s famously petitioned courts for non-Hindu minority status under Article 30 to protect its schools—BAPS never made any legal, institutional, or theological claim of being a separate, non-Hindu religion.

Instead, BAPS took the opposite approach, establishing itself as an assertive, global champion of classical Hindu identity, identifying itself as a “socio-spiritual Hindu organisation” rooted in Vedic Sanatana Dharma, whatever that may mean. Today, its literature, constitutional charters, and global temples—such as the Akshardham complexes in Delhi, Gandhinagar, and Robbinsville, New Jersey—are officially branded as Hindu mandirs and centres of Hindu culture.

In fact, sources insist that BAPS protagonists have sought to justify the claim that the assertion “We are not Hindu” was primarily an expedient legal defence, not an authentic theological shift.

The 1948-1966 court plaint (Sastri Yagnapurushdasji v. Muldas Bhudardas Vaishya), originally filed on January 12, 1948, in the Civil Court at Ahmedabad, explicitly argued that the religion of the Swaminarayan sect was “distinct and separate from the Hindu religion”, just to bypass the Bombay Harijan Temple Entry Act.

Further, BAPS never sought to endorse the “non-Hindu minority” legal trend that prevailed across India during the mid-to-late 20th century, when several prominent Hindu-origin organisations filed official court petitions seeking status as distinct, non-Hindu religious minorities to protect their institutions from state control or social legislation—something the Ramakrishna Mission in West Bengal, as well as the Lingayats in Karnataka, did.

Yet, for a long time, in BAPS, while non-Brahmin dominant castes (predominantly Patidars) made up much of the sadhu leadership, Dalits were not accepted into the ascetic order. Dalit satsangis, it was claimed, historically observed customary caste restrictions as part of their caste duty (dharma), resulting in a virtual absence of Dalit ascetics. It was only beginning in the 1980s and 1990s, under Pramukh Swami Maharaj, that BAPS formally began breaking this precedent by initiating sadhus from Dalit and Adivasi backgrounds and integrating them into full temple rituals and sanctum priesthood.

And what is the Dalit status today in BAPS temples? Sources tell me that while officially there are no caste-based restrictions on Dalits in its temples, neither BAPS nor any other Swaminarayan Gadi publishes an official caste census of its monastic order. Doctrinally, the sects maintain that upon taking initiation (diksha), a sadhu renounces their worldly identity and pre-monastic caste.

However, detailed field studies and academic documentation by sociologists and historians such as Raymond Brady Williams, Rachel Dwyer, David Hardiman, and Ghanshyam Shah provide some idea, stating that while BAPS formally ended caste-based exclusions for monastic initiation in the late 20th century, the actual proportion of Dalit and Adivasi sadhus is estimated to be well under 1%—representing a tiny handful of individuals out of more than 1,100 to 1,200 living sadhus. And most of the marginalised-community inductions into the sadhu order have come from Adivasi (tribal) communities in eastern and southern Gujarat, rather than Dalits. Adivasis, in the caste-based structure of Hinduism, do not fall under the “untouchables” category.

As for other Swaminarayan sects—the Vadtal and Ahmedabad Gadi (the original sampradaya)—the proportion of those wearing saffron robes is effectively 0%. Patidars overwhelmingly rank across almost all Swaminarayan sects and are heavily concentrated among dominant landowning and mercantile castes—estimated by sociologists to make up 60% to over 80% of the sadhus, while Brahmins and Banias comprise most of the remaining portion of the ascetic order.

In several Swaminarayan establishments, the low-caste candidates who entered the monastic path were permanently relegated to the status of parshads (also called palas or bhagats). They wore white clothes, performed manual labour, and were barred from receiving full saffron renunciation (bhagwati diksha).

As for BAPS, in the 1980s–1990s, as part of its expanded youth initiatives, there was tribal/backward-class outreach. At the 1981 Swaminarayan bicentenary mega event in Ahmedabad, Pramukh Swami initiated a massive cohort of young, educated men into the monastic order, beginning a formal systematisation of the training pipeline, which included initiating youths from backward-class and tribal (Adivasi) backgrounds into saffron robes, granting them new ascetic names and the sacred thread.

According to Williams, Pramukh Swami “abolished for BAPS the caste-related category of ascetics permanently in white”. From that period onwards, the parshad (white-clad) status in BAPS ceased to be an indicator of lower caste. Instead, it became a mandatory, temporary probationary phase (typically lasting one to three years) that every novice—regardless of caste or social background—must undergo before taking full saffron vows.

David Hardiman, a prominent subaltern historian and sociologist of modern Gujarat and Professor Emeritus of History at the University of Warwick, noted in “Class Base of the Swaminarayan Sect” (Economic and Political Weekly, 1988) that while the Swaminarayan Sampradaya historically served as an ideological vehicle for the upwardly mobile Kanbi/Patidar agrarian elite, the sect incorporated lower-caste and Adivasi groups through moral reform (temperance, vegetarianism), which structurally limited Dalits from rising into spiritual leadership or ascetic power within dominant institutions.

I would like to end with the following observation by Prof Ghanshyam Shah in “Untouchability in Rural India”, co-authored with Harsh Mander, Sukhadeo Thorat, et al.:

“While the evidence … suggests that the more blatant and extreme forms of untouchability appear to have declined, discrimination continues and is most prevalent in the religious and personal spheres.”

Further:

“Removal of untouchability was on their agenda; it was however primarily confined to removing the taboo of physical touch rather than socio-economic discrimination and inequality.”

Courtesy: CounterView

The post Swaminarayan, untouchability and the ‘we are not Hindu’ argument appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The first reports of children falling ill emerged in the early phase of the crisis, with fever, rashes and other symptoms being reported from the tribal belt. The official account initially placed the number of deaths far below the figures subsequently reported by villagers and local representatives. According to Dainik Bhaskar, the government initially reported eight deaths, while the toll later rose through figures of 19, 22, 24 and 27. By September, Congress leaders were citing 30 deaths and media reports had placed the number at 31, although the administration had not released a final official figure.

Scroll, in its September 4 report, said that at least 25 Baiga and Gond children had died since May and reported that a suspected measles-malaria outbreak had remained undetected for two months in remote Adivasi habitations because of the absence of an adequate healthcare system. The report brought into sharp focus what villagers had been saying: that the crisis was not merely about an infectious disease, but about how little access these communities had to functioning public healthcare in the first place.

The Press Club of India strongly condemns the suspension of the Instagram accounts of three independent journalists following their ground reporting from Balaghat, Madhya Pradesh, on a public health crisis involving the deaths of children from the Adivasi community. pic.twitter.com/3lcjVXcbEd

— Press Club of India (@PCITweets) September 8, 2026

The deaths cannot be reduced to a single disease

The investigations have identified measles, malaria and, in some cases, possible measles-malaria co-infection. Children were also found suffering from dehydration, anaemia, respiratory complications and severe malnutrition. Officials have said that different children presented with different clinical conditions and that no single disease has been established as the cause of every reported death. Some children reportedly died at home or before reaching a healthcare facility, leaving investigators without medical records or diagnostic samples in several cases. A retrospective case-by-case review, including verbal autopsies, is consequently being undertaken.

But the absence of a single pathogen does not make the crisis any less serious. In fact, the health data emerging from the region points towards a much deeper structural failure. A Central government screening exercise covered 32,433 people. It identified 7,711 children with severe acute malnutrition, of whom 518 required admission to Nutrition Rehabilitation Centres. Another 13,406 children were treated for diarrhoea and 274 for severe pneumonia. Since July, 431 children had reportedly been admitted to hospitals, with 52 still undergoing treatment at the time of the report.

These figures make it difficult to view the deaths simply as an isolated outbreak. They reveal communities in which infectious disease, malnutrition, unsafe or inadequate water, poor sanitation and delayed access to medical treatment are interacting with one another.

Balaghat was not an unexpected health-risk zone

The crisis also did not emerge in an epidemiological vacuum. Balaghat has been identified as a major malaria hotspot. According to the health data, of the 2,126 malaria cases reported in Madhya Pradesh in 2025, 685 came from Balaghat. By July 2026, the district had already recorded 174 of the State’s 583 reported malaria cases.

The question, therefore, is not simply why children contracted malaria, measles or other infections. It is why children living in communities already known to face severe deprivation were allowed to reach such critical levels of illness before an adequate response was mounted.

That question becomes more pointed when viewed against the Union government’s own welfare architecture. The Pradhan Mantri Janjati Adivasi Nyaya Maha Abhiyan, or PM-JANMAN, was created specifically to improve the socio-economic conditions of PVTG communities. The scheme carries an outlay of ₹24,104 crore over three years and includes interventions intended to address basic services and infrastructure in PVTG habitations. Yet a Parliamentary Standing Committee, as reported by The Hindu, subsequently questioned why there were still no clear answers about the causes of the deaths months after the first cases had appeared.

The contradiction is difficult to ignore: government schemes may report near-complete sanctions and high aggregate levels of “saturation”, but the reality on the ground was children falling severely ill in settlements where access to basic healthcare remained precarious.

The protests exposed what official figures did not

As the number of deaths became increasingly contested, anger grew in the affected communities. One of the most disturbing allegations concerned the death of four-year-old Luvkush in Baigatola. Villagers alleged that the administration arranged his cremation without a post-mortem while his parents were away in Hyderabad looking for work. The allegation was followed by villagers blocking the Balaghat-Baihar road. The protests were not simply expressions of grief. They were also demands for recognition, accountability and answers.

The issue deepened when the administration issued an order restricting photography and media coverage in hospitals. The order was withdrawn within hours following protests, as per Scroll. The Collector subsequently clarified that it had been issued in haste and was intended to prevent demonstrations rather than restrict media coverage. But in a crisis already marked by conflicting death figures and allegations that cases were not being adequately recorded, even a short-lived attempt to restrict what could be documented inevitably raised questions about transparency.

There was another serious institutional controversy. According to The Hindu, then Chief Medical and Health Officer Dr Paresh Uplab continued to describe the illnesses as seasonal ailments even as the reported death toll had risen substantially. He was subsequently removed, with Dr Manoj Pandey taking charge, followed later by Dr Shatrughan Singh Dahiya.

The issue, therefore, was no longer simply whether the children had died from measles, malaria, malnutrition or a combination of conditions. It was also whether the State had accurately recognised the crisis while it was unfolding.

The State’s response came in stages

The government has since substantially expanded its response. The 50-bed paediatric facility at the district hospital was expanded to 150 beds, while a Covid ward was temporarily converted into a paediatric ward. Mobile Medical Units were deployed in Birsa and Baihar to provide fever screening, outpatient consultations, maternal and child healthcare, tuberculosis and non-communicable disease screening, medicines and primary diagnosis in remote areas.

According to the Dainik Bhasker report, more than 600 drinking-water sources were purified, insecticide spraying was carried out in 4,338 households and fogging was undertaken in affected and adjoining areas. More than 14,000 children aged between one and ten received an additional Measles-Rubella vaccine dose.

The government also expanded surveillance to around 50 villages, increased sanitation interventions and strengthened treatment and referral arrangements. As reported by The Sun Today, the Chief Minister visited Balaghat on August 30, met affected families and announced ₹2 lakh assistance for each family of a deceased child. The government also announced a ₹225-crore development plan covering 100 villages formerly affected by Naxal activity.

These interventions are necessary. But they also raise an uncomfortable question: why did many of these measures become visible only after the deaths, protests and national attention?

Parliament asks the question the villages had already been asking

The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Social Justice and Empowerment questioned representatives of the Tribal Affairs Ministry, the Jal Shakti Ministry and the Department of Telecommunications about the Balaghat deaths, The Hindu reported. Members asked why, months after the first cases, there were still no clear answers regarding the causes of death. The Committee also questioned the implementation of PM-JANMAN and sought village-wise saturation data rather than aggregate figures.

A scheme cannot be considered successful merely because projects have been sanctioned on paper. A health intervention cannot be judged by the number of mobile units deployed after an outbreak. And a welfare programme cannot be called saturated while children in the communities it targets remain severely malnourished and struggle to reach medical care.

Political intervention followed public outrage

The Opposition also intervened. Times of India reported that Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha Rahul Gandhi described reports of 30 tribal children dying in Balaghat as extremely concerning and distressing, and called on Chief Minister Mohan Yadav to ensure immediate investigation, treatment and relief. Madhya Pradesh Leader of Opposition Umang Singhar separately wrote to Prime Minister Narendra Modi seeking a high-level medical inquiry and questioning how children could die from illnesses that may be treatable with timely intervention.

LoP @RahulGandhi Ji Writes- “बालाघाट, मध्य प्रदेश में 30 आदिवासी बच्चों की मौत की खबर बेहद चिंताजनक और पीड़ादायक है। इस घातक बीमारी के साथ पीने के पानी, पोषण, और समय पर इलाज जैसी बुनियादी सुविधाओं का अभाव बच्चों की जान ले रहा है।

ये सरकार की पूर्ण विफलता है। मुख्यमंत्री स्वयं… https://t.co/dUc5of2PSl pic.twitter.com/hrAlC0J2wD

— Mumbai Congress (@INCMumbai) September 5, 2026

बालाघाट, मध्य प्रदेश में 30 आदिवासी बच्चों की मृत्यु की खबर बेहद चिंताजनक और पीड़ादायक है।

इस घातक बीमारी के साथ पीने के पानी, पोषण, और समय पर इलाज जैसी बुनियादी सुविधाओं का अभाव बच्चों की जान ले रहा है।

ये सरकार की पूर्ण विफलता है। मुख्यमंत्री स्वयं इसका समाधान करें और क्षेत्र… pic.twitter.com/1fkfehcdnN

— Rahul Gandhi (@RahulGandhi) September 5, 2026

Recently, Cockroach Janata Party founder Abhijit Dipke also visited Balaghat.

I’m on my way to Balaghat, MP, where 30 Tribal children have died.

I’ve received information from one of the Tribal activists that MP Police is now moving to detain some of the Tribal students coordinating my visit.

Why is it always a BJP-ruled state that seems so afraid of the…

— Abhijeet Dipke (@abhijeet_dipke) September 11, 2026

The Gondwana Gantantra Party went further, giving the administration 15 days to provide ₹50 lakh compensation to the family of every deceased child and demanding a CBI investigation. These interventions have ensured that the deaths cannot simply disappear into the administrative language of “seasonal illness”, “surveillance” or “ongoing investigation”.

The High Court steps in

The Madhya Pradesh High Court sought a response from the State government on a public interest litigation concerning the deaths of more than 30 tribal children. As reported by LiveLaw, the petition alleged inadequate medical care and pointed to around 400 children being treated in a facility that initially had only 50 beds. The petition was filed after media reports brought the deaths to public attention.

The Court initially directed the petitioner to personally visit the affected areas and verify the claims rather than proceed solely on newspaper reports. After the petitioner submitted a ground report, the Court issued notices to the State Health Department, Women and Child Development Department, the Balaghat Collector and other authorities. The ground report alleged that handpumps in affected areas were producing yellow-coloured water, that children and women had not received nutritious food on time for months, and that poor sanitation was contributing to infections. It further alleged that significant administrative action followed only after the number of deaths had crossed 30.

What does Balaghat reveal?

The most disturbing feature of the Balaghat crisis may ultimately be that none of its individual components is entirely new. Malaria was already a known problem. Malnutrition was already present. The affected communities were already among India’s most vulnerable tribal populations. Remote settlements already faced difficulties accessing healthcare. Yet the crisis escalated to the point where dozens of children were reported dead and hundreds became ill before the State response reached the scale now being described.

Whether the final death toll is 25, 30 or another number, whether individual deaths are ultimately attributed to malaria, measles, malnutrition, respiratory complications or combinations of these, the underlying failures remain visible: severe malnutrition, inadequate healthcare access, sanitation concerns, difficulties with transportation and referral, questions around drinking water, delayed detection and serious disagreement between communities and the administration over the scale of the crisis.

The tragedy in Balaghat is therefore not only about how these children died. It is about how long they were allowed to remain vulnerable before the State responded with urgency.

Related:

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‘Forum for Electoral Integrity’ petitions NHRC over mass voter disenfranchisement under SIR

‘Forum for Electoral Integrity’ petitions NHRC over mass voter disenfranchisement under SIR

Beaten to Death Outside His Own Home: What Delhi owes Chongtham Vikram Singh

Midnight Arrest, Daylight Questions: Why was Santosh Pandit taken into custody?

The post Deaths, Denials and Delayed Action: The Balaghat crisis appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In the aftermath of BJP’s landslide 2014 victory which brought it back to power in Delhi, many saw it as a stamp on the “majoritarian” rule. Ideally, in a democracy change of governments is par for the course. But in India many, especially the generation born after 2000, mistook Narendra Modi-led decimation of India’s oldest party as a call for societal change. This section saw itself as “viral tools” to bring that long-awaited change in India. Delusion is a dangerous syndrome which kills the ability to remain calm and balanced in the face of provocation. While those who get power often become deluded, the delusion tends to wash off on their camp followers too. Who can deny that the youth brigade count themselves among the most visible camp followers of the politicians.

There is no time better than youth to dream, idealise, aspire and achieve. With a burning desire to go the extra mile and achieve what their parents couldn’t, the youth put heart and mind in their mission.

Cruelly, life does not follow the film-like scripts. Not all dreams get fulfilled. Since the gap between job seekers and jobs in the market is glacial, many dreams remain unfulfilled. Like the immature romance, many dreams too get rocked. Once the dream of joining a good job and starting a meaningful life becomes a chimera, frustration sets in. The frustrated youth desperately look for an alternative career path.

Here comes political patronage as a charming option. It dangles the carrot and many unemployed youth, “cockroaches” in the words of a Supreme Court judge, aim for the carrot forgetting that the carrot always comes with a stick. Politicians dangle those carrots which for the unemployed youth appear too tempting to ignore.

This rather long premise is to help understand characters like Swatantra Bhardwaj, the goon who will now languish in jail for how long we don’t know. He bared his devilish side via a viral podcast. He claimed that he broke the skull of Sanjay Azad, father of student activist Nishu Azad, during the CJP’s Jantar Mantar protest and still remained scot-free because of his political connections. Bhardwaj could have kept quiet and possibly tried to undergo a behavioural change. But he didn’t. He spilled something which mercifully is still considered unpalatable to law-abiding citizens. The law, even if belatedly and at much prodding from a bunch of politicians and activists, finally caught up with this goon. The goon wrongly believed that his powerful “brothers” would always shield him.

The likes of Bhardwaj can be interesting study subjects for students of politics and sociology. Soon after Bhardwaj’s arrest, a video clip of a vlogger from Darbhanga in Bihar went viral. Speaking in chaste Maithili, the vlogger is heard telling parents of a particular caste to be careful while sending their children to Delhi for higher education. Bhardwaj who also comes from Darbhanga apparently joined the caravan of young Bihari students who reached and continue to reach Delhi to prepare for the Civil Services and other exams. We do not know if Bhardwaj ever sat for the UPSC exam. But we know that the boy from Darbhanga whose parents sent him to Delhi to try and become IAS/IPS ended up becoming a communal monster.

The internet is a great liberator. It has created an army of instant influencers, vloggers, commentators, political pundits and citizen journalists. Since Bhardwaj did not have a meaningful job in hand, he became an influencer. With no solid knowledge of Hinduism which keeps tolerance and acceptance among its cardinal principles, Bhardwaj perhaps started learning a lot of rubbish from the ‘WhatsApp university.”

The likes of Bhardwaj are doing a great disservice to his faith. My father, a high school teacher, had many Brahmin friends. He could give a run for the money to many pucca Maithil Brahmins when it came to speaking chaste Maithili. In fact, his closeness to the Brahmins and long association in the school system where Muslim teachers and students were always in a minority, had somehow ingrained a belief that Brahmin children were brilliant by birth. He would often cite examples of his Brahmin friends’ children excelling in studies. “Dekho us Mishraji/Jhaji ke beta ko, kaise top kiya hai aur achchi naukri mein gaya hai (Look at that son of Mishraji/Jhaji and he topped exams and secured a good job”), is how he would encourage us to emulate those “brilliant Brahmin boys.” Alas, much water has flowed down the Ganga, Gandak, Budhi Gandak and Bagmati since the days of my father going gaga over the achievements of many of his friends’ children.

Bhardwaj is a pawn in the dirty game of politics. He might have enjoyed some patronage, got a few crumbs while he walked down a dangerous path but ultimately fell victim to machinations he should have kept himself away from.

As a fellow Bihari and a native of Darbhanga, my heart goes out to the middle class parents who pawn jewellery and mortgage ancestral property to send their ladlas and ladlis (beloved sons and daughters) to a big city like Delhi to study hard and crack the tough UPSC exam but their wards ends up in wrong hands. The parents do not lack in showering love, affection and making sacrifices for their offspring. Where they lacked and continue to lack is what Ravish Kumar had pointed out over a decade ago.

They failed as parents in inculcating the values of love and compassion for fellow human beings. They failed to tell their children that co-existence is not a weakness. They bought and passed on the wrong notion that a multicultural India can be painted in one colour. They should have told their children that this country belongs to every valid citizen and India does not exclusively belong to one caste, community or party.

As the boy from Darbhanga has ruined his future because he mistook his so-called “closeness” to “bhais in politics” as a license to break laws, his case must serve as a lesson to all the parents out there.

Ravish Kumar’s warning still holds true.

(This article has been taken from Mohammed Wajihuddin’s social media post).

The post Why Swatantra Bhardwaj is a pawn in our politics appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The complaints concern BJP MLA Gopichand Padalkar, Dr. Dhavalsinh Mohite-Patil, MLA Sangram Jagtap, Shri Ram Sangh President Sagar Baig, Sangram Bapu and public speaker & RSS member Pushpendra Kulshreshtha. Each complaint identifies the date and location of the event, sets out CJP’s objections to particular statements and urges police authorities to take action under the relevant provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

CJP is dedicated to finding and bringing to light instances of Hate Speech, so that the persons propagating these venomous ideas can be unmasked and brought to justice. To learn more about our campaign against hate speech, please become a member. To support our initiatives, please donate now!

1.  Complaint against BJP MLA Gopichand Padalkar and Dr. Dhavalsinh Mohite-Patil

The complaint dated July 31, 2026, concerned speeches delivered at a public gathering in Georai, Beed district, Maharashtra, on June 19, 2026.

The complaint named BJP MLA Gopichand Padalkar and Dr. Dhavalsinh Mohite-Patil and stated that the speeches were delivered before a public gathering.

Statements attributed to Gopichand Padalkar

According to the transcript reproduced in the complaint, Padalkar spoke about alleged encroachments and religious structures, stating that “When we visited that village, we found total encroachment. That mosque was built right on the road. Our request and challenge to the police administration is this: if any place of worship has been built on government land, it must first be demolished, and a bulldozer must be run over it!”

He further referred to alleged temple and religious lands and questioned the revenue and police administration over action.

Padalkar also spoke about village names associated with Mughal rulers, stating:

“And that is why I want to request you all. Why am I telling you this? Because in Beed district, there are villages that bear the signs of Mughal rule—Imampur, Aurangpur Kukda… Ah, even after Aurangzeb has passed, why is there still an Aurangpur Kukda here? Shahjahanpur, Umrad Khurd, Dari Shahjahanpur, Sultanpur…

Wipe out these names now! Find out what their original names were.”

The speech then referred to various expressions involving the word “Jihad”. Padalkar stated:

“Land Jihad, Love Jihad, Juice Jihad—you see all of this in the media—Corporate Jihad. Our educated daughters working in big companies are also being targeted. People might think this is just random talk, but it is not. This is a matter that goes beyond politics. Understand this clearly, Hindus!”

He also referred to demographic and religious changes in Jammu and Kashmir, the North-East, Kerala and Tamil Nadu and made allegations concerning Bangladeshis and states governed by political parties.

Statements attributed to Dr. Dhavalsinh Mohite-Patil

The complaint recorded Dr. Mohite-Patil using derogatory language while referring to Muslims and political leaders.

He urged Hindu mobilisation and stated:

“If Hindus stand united, then the Hindu community will stand by you. Because it is written in our religion: ‘Dharmo Rakshati Rakshitah’ (He who protects Dharma is protected by Dharma).”

The most significant portion reproduced in the complaint stated that the highest place belongs to our mother and father. After that, if anyone looks at our motherland or our religion with an evil eye in the future, we will gouge their eyes out first, and only then will we look at the Constitution!

He continued while stating that “Because if these people do not respect our Constitution… if these people do not respect our Constitution, then it becomes very difficult to get justice through the medium of the Constitution and that is why staying united is the need of the hour today. Gathering together and building the strength of Hindus is the need of the hour today.”

What CJP alleged in the complaint

CJP stated that Padalkar’s speech repeatedly portrayed Muslims as unlawful encroachers and invoked theories including “Land Jihad”, “Love Jihad”, “Juice Jihad” and “Corporate Jihad”.

The complaint stated that the demand for bulldozer action specifically directed attention towards mosques and Muslim religious sites and that the speech sought the removal of names associated with Muslim rulers.

Regarding Dr. Mohite-Patil, CJP specifically highlighted the use of derogatory language and the statement that people would “gouge their eyes out first, and only then” look at the Constitution. The complaint described this as advocacy of violence and rejection of constitutional processes.

CJP urged authorities to immediately investigate the remarks under the relevant provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. It requested action against speech promoting enmity and incitement to hatred and referred to the need to protect dignity and communal harmony.

The copy of complaint dated July 31, 2026 can be accessed here

2. Complaint concerning speeches by Sangram Jagtap and Sagar Baig at Shevgaon

On August 11, 2026, CJP filed a complaint with Ahilyanagar Police authorities. The complaint concerned speeches delivered during a Hindu Janakrosh Morcha at Shevgaon in Ahilyanagar district, Maharashtra, on June 17, 2026. The speakers named in the complaint included MLA Sangram Jagtap and Shri Ram Sangh President Sagar Baig. The gathering followed a case involving the death of a Hindu woman and allegations concerning a Muslim man.

Statements attributed to Sangram Jagtap

According to the complaint, Jagtap addressed the gathering and spoke about the family of the accused person. He stated that “Tomorrow, after today’s meeting concludes, the responsibility lies with you all to ensure that his family does not continue to live in this area. You must take this responsibility upon yourselves.”

He further stated:

“The names of the family members listed on his ration card… no person associated with that ration card should remain here.”

The speech continued while stating that “A life of one of our children has been lost. Our child’s life is gone. His family must not stay here. Even after his death, they should not be allowed to bury him in this soil.”

Jagtap also stated:

“These people come and detonate bombs among us, and after they are sentenced or hanged, they are buried in our soil.”

He then called for collective action:

“Not a single person listed on that ration card should remain within the surroundings of this Shevgaon.”

The complaint further recorded Jagtap stating that if authorities considered the family’s presence a possible law-and-order issue, “If a law-and-order situation is going to arise because of them, then the Hindu community must create a law-and-order situation here.” He also said that “Only then… only then, in the times ahead, will anyone think twice before acting. No one will dare to cast an evil eye on our daughters. I tell you, they must learn a lesson from our actions.”

Statements attributed to Sagar Baig

The complaint recorded Sagar Baig speaking about possible criminal cases against persons participating in Hindutva-related activities. He stated:

“If anyone thinks that by filing cases against these boys or arresting them, the work will stop, then clear that misunderstanding from your mind. The work can never be stopped.”

He further said:

“Whichever case is filed during the work for Hindutva, do not be afraid; we are with you. If anyone requires assistance with legal expenses or lawyer fees, we are with you as the Rashtriya Shriram Sangh and the entire Hindu community.”

What CJP alleged in the complaint

CJP stated that the speeches called for the collective expulsion of a Muslim family from Shevgaon and went beyond criticism of an accused individual by targeting family members associated with him. The complaint specifically highlighted the statements concerning preventing the family from living in the locality and denying burial in the soil of the area.

CJP also raised objections to the statement suggesting that the Hindu community should create a law-and-order situation and to assurances that criminal cases should not deter participants.

The complaint urged police authorities to examine the speeches and take action under applicable criminal provisions. It also sought action consistent with judicial directions requiring law-enforcement agencies to act against hate speech and incitement.

The copy of complaint dated August 11, 2026 can be read here

3. Complaint concerning Sangram Jagtap and Sangram Bapu at Jalna

On July 31, 2026, CJP filed a complaint with the Jalna Police authorities. The complaint concerned a Hindu Jan Akrosh Morcha held at Partur in Jalna district, Maharashtra, on June 24, 2026. The complaint identified MLA Sangram Jagtap and Sangram Bapu as speakers.

Statements attributed to Sangram Jagtap

Jagtap spoke about Muslim children and alleged that they were taught violence. According to the complaint, he said that “And what are they taught? What is the first thing they are taught? ‘Sar Tan Se Juda’! What kind of ‘Sar Tan Se Juda’ is this?”

He contrasted this with scientific achievements and stated that children should be taught about Chandrayaan and the possibility of building a “Suryayaan”. He then stated:

“Their only teaching is that Sharia law must be implemented across the world. And if they want Sharia law, they should immediately leave this land of India and go wherever they want—be it Dubai or Pakistan, they should go to their Arab countries.”

The speech also contained a threat of physical violence:

“Eat eggs, eat chicken, eat mutton—but do not cross the line. If you go beyond that, then just like Afzal Khan’s entrails were ripped out, your entrails will be pulled out! Keep that in mind.”

Statements attributed to Sangram Bapu

According to the complaint, Sangram Bapu addressed the gathering and referred to Hindu strength.

He stated that “If they think that the youths of Ahmednagar will get scared, put their tails between their legs, and sit quietly at home… these Hindus possess the strength to cut down whatever remains of yours!”

He also called upon participants to monitor their respective localities that “Everyone must keep a strict vigil on their respective areas!” The complaint further recorded the slogan that “Uthao dande, bhagao lande.”

What CJP alleged in the complaint

CJP stated that the speeches collectively portrayed Muslims as supporters of violence and Sharia-based governance and called upon them to leave India. The complaint highlighted the threat referring to Afzal Khan’s entrails and the statement attributed to Sangram Bapu concerning the ability of Hindus to “cut down whatever remains”.

CJP also objected to the slogan recorded at the gathering, describing it as a call for collective mobilisation using a derogatory expression directed at Muslims. CJP sought investigation and appropriate criminal action against the speakers and organisers under the relevant provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, and urged authorities to act in accordance with judicial directions concerning hate speech and public order.

The copy of complaint dated July 31, 2026 can be accessed here

4. Complaint against Pushpendra Kulshreshtha over speech at Virat Hindu Sammelan, Mumbai

On July 28, 2026, CJP filed complaint and concerned a speech delivered by Pushpendra Kulshreshtha at the “Virat Hindu Sammelan” in Mumbai, Maharashtra, on June 27, 2026. The complaint stated that the speech included statements concerning Muslims, equal rights, secularism, the Gyanvapi dispute, Sanatan religion and public punishment.

Statements recorded in the complaint

Kulshreshtha questioned the proposition that India belonged equally to Hindus and Muslims, stating that “As much as the land of Bharat belongs to Hindus, it equally belongs to Muslims’—was this remembered in 2026? Before this, was it not remembered?”

He also criticised secularism and the concept of equality among religions, stating that “India is secular’—from morning till evening, those who define secularism, those who do the drama of ‘all religions are equal’—they neither define religion nor anything else; they just create their own rote definition and promote it.”

Referring to the Gyanvapi dispute, he stated “On the very first page… inside Banaras, the place which some people till recently, some supreme fools used to call the ‘Gyanvapi Mosque’… ‘Gyan’ and ‘Vyapi’—neither of these words has any relation to a mosque!”

He subsequently declared that there was only one religion, there is only one religion, and there will only be one religion—its name is Sanatan.

While discussing alleged financial irregularities concerning temple funds, Kulshreshtha stated:

“Stand them at every crossroads and whoever has stolen even ₹1 to ₹200 crore from the Ram Temple should be shot dead publicly!”

What CJP alleged in the complaint

CJP stated that the speech attacked the constitutional principle of equal rights and ridiculed secularism and the concept of all religions being equal. The complaint also objected to the statements concerning the Gyanvapi Mosque, stating that they were made in the context of a sensitive religious dispute. CJP specifically highlighted the declaration that only one religion existed and would exist—Sanatan—as a statement denying equal standing to other religions.

The complaint also identified the call for persons accused of theft to be publicly shot as inflammatory language encouraging violence and lawlessness.

CJP urged Maharashtra police authorities to investigate the speech under the relevant provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, and take action against speech promoting communal hostility and violence.

The complaint also referred to Supreme Court directions concerning suo motu action against hate speech and Maharashtra Police circulars requiring preventive measures and immediate action where speeches create law-and-order concerns.

The copy of complaint dated July 28, 2026 can be accessed here

Common demands made by CJP across the complaints

Across the four complaints, CJP repeatedly urged the police and other authorities to examine the speeches and take action under the relevant provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

The complaints referred to Supreme Court decisions and directions concerning hate speech, including the requirement that law-enforcement authorities take appropriate action where speeches attract criminal offences, even where a formal complaint is not forthcoming.

CJP also referred to the need for police authorities to preserve peace and communal harmony, record public gatherings and speeches, identify persons responsible for unlawful statements and take preventive and legal action where required.

The complaints repeatedly stressed that the speeches were delivered before public audiences and had also circulated through videos and social media platforms, extending their reach beyond those physically present at the events.

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The post CJP files four complaints over hate speeches at gatherings across Maharashtra appeared first on SabrangIndia.

A Division Bench of Justices Atul Sreedharan and Achal Sachdev quashed the NSA detention order passed against Chaudhary, holding that her continued incarceration under the Act violated Article 21 of the Constitution. The Court found that the grounds of detention were unsupported by material, repetitive and speculative, and that the District Magistrate had passed the order without proper application of mind.

The judgment is significant not merely, because it sets aside an NSA detention order. The Court closely reconstructed the chronology relied upon by the State, examined the WhatsApp conversations and videos forming the evidentiary basis of the detention, scrutinised the circumstances of Chaudhary’s arrest, and then questioned the District Magistrate’s failure to independently assess whether the extraordinary power of preventive detention was warranted at all.

Its conclusion was unequivocal: the State had failed to establish the evidentiary foundation necessary to deprive Chaudhary of her liberty under the NSA.

The Court also went considerably further. Holding that the State had exercised its authority in a “casual and cavalier” manner, it awarded Chaudhary ₹5 lakh compensation and directed that the amount be recovered from the salaries of the District Magistrate, Gautam Buddha Nagar, and other officers found responsible, “right down to the SHO” who had prepared the initial report supporting the detention.

The chronology that undermined the State’s case

The case arose out of labour agitation in Gautam Buddha Nagar in April 2026. Thousands of workers had taken to the streets over low wages, the absence of salary increases for several years and working conditions involving shifts of up to twelve hours. The State alleged that the protests subsequently descended into vandalism and arson, and portrayed Chaudhary as an “agent provocateur” responsible for provoking the violence.

Chaudhary, a history graduate who had completed her M.A. in History and was pursuing her first year of law at Delhi University, had no previous criminal antecedents—a fact expressly admitted by the State. The fundamental difficulty with the State’s case was chronological.

The State’s own position was that Chaudhary was taken into custody on April 12. At the same time, it was undisputed that the violence began only on April 13. The State nevertheless sought to attribute the subsequent violence to Chaudhary by alleging that she and her associates had entered into a conspiracy before her arrest and that the violence was the eventual consequence of that conspiracy. The Court examined that proposition against the actual material placed before it. It did not find the necessary link.

The High Court repeatedly asked the State to identify the specific WhatsApp message or video in which Chaudhary had incited people to engage in rioting, arson or destruction of public or private property. The State was unable to identify even a single such communication. That finding goes to the core of the detention order. The State was not merely required to establish that violence had occurred. It had to demonstrate why Chaudhary’s detention under the NSA was necessary to prevent its recurrence or continuation. The material, according to the Court, did not establish that connection.

“This Court repeatedly asked the learned counsel for the State to point out from the WhatsApp chats and the video recordings as to which one of them incited people or disclosed a conspiracy inciting people to indulge in acts of rioting, arson and destruction of public and private property? The learned counsel for the State has not been able to show a single message from the WhatsApp chats between the Petitioner and her associates or any video clip which would reveal any incitement from the Petitioner, either evidently or by necessary implication, which would disclose that it was the involvement of the Petitioner and the conspiracy hatched by her that resulted in the violence which erupted from 13.04.2026, much after the Petitioner was taken into custody by the State on 11.04.2026 (as held by this Court). Even otherwise, the undisputed case of the State is also that the violence erupted after the Petitioner was taken to custody by the police.” (Para 20)

A call for mobilisation was not an incitement to violence

One of the principal pieces of material relied upon by the State was a WhatsApp exchange in which Chaudhary allegedly called upon people to gather in support of workers and to oppose what she described as unlawful police action. The Court’s treatment of this communication is constitutionally significant. Even if the communication were accepted in its entirety, the Bench held that it did not constitute an exhortation to violence. At most, it called upon people to assemble in solidarity with labourers and to oppose excessive or unlawful exercise of police authority.

The Court also examined the videos relied upon by the State. The footage showed a large gathering of men and women, including persons in rural attire, with one individual apparently addressing the gathering. The Court found nothing in the footage indicating that the crowd was armed or engaged in violence. Instead, the material appeared to show people exercising their right to speak and agitate for higher wages and humane working hours.

“The video images relied upon by the State show a large number of people having gathered, which include men and women in traditional rural clothing, all standing near a lamp posts and one video image of a person who seems to be addressing the public. None of these videos disclose that the crowd is agitated or armed with lathi, stones or any such articles, which may be used in an act of violence, but appear to be exercising their constitutional right and freedom of speech and agitating their demands for higher pay and humane working hours.” (Para 21)

The judgment thus refuses an important form of executive overreach: the retrospective attribution of violence to an entire protest movement, or to an individual associated with it, without evidence establishing individual culpability or incitement.

Preventive detention cannot become a substitute for ordinary criminal law

The Court’s clearest legal proposition is that the NSA is an exceptional power. Preventive detention, it held, “is an exception”. It cannot be used as a substitute for ordinary criminal law merely to ensure that a person remains incarcerated because she might otherwise obtain bail in a criminal case.

The State had correctly pointed out that preventive detention does not necessarily require a person to have been convicted, or even to have been involved in several criminal cases. The statutory power can operate on the basis of a genuine apprehension concerning public order or national security. But that does not mean that the detaining authority’s satisfaction is beyond evidentiary scrutiny. The High Court expressly rejected the proposition that “subjective satisfaction” permits detention based upon bare allegations. The subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority must emerge from relevant material capable of supporting the inference drawn.

In the present case, the Court found the grounds of detention to be “repetitive, speculative and … only opinion based”, without material capable of sustaining those opinions.

The Court therefore laid down a simple but important constitutional proposition: an extraordinary power that directly results in the deprivation of liberty under Article 21 cannot be exercised on “surmises, biases, conjectures and opinions”. The material must cross the threshold from allegation to evidence; otherwise, the detention becomes arbitrary.

“Any detention under the NSA is an exception. It is not a substitute to ensure that a person who may receive bail on account of merits of his case, is still detained in custody under a concocted reasoning by the State. The elaborate grounds of detention of the District Magistrate are repetitive, speculative and are only opinion based without referring to a shred of evidence / material in support of sustaining those opinions. The grounds of detention must traverse beyond mere allegations and opinion. Allegations which raise a subjective opinion in the mind of the District Magistrate must be supported with reference to material for the formation of such opinion, else the same would be arbitrary. It must be understood that the exercise of such a discretion which directly violates a person’s rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, cannot be exercised lightly on the basis of surmises, biases, conjectures and opinions. It is the exercise of an extraordinary authority which results in the summary incarceration of a citizen merely on the opinion of the detaining authority which must be such that where a constitution court examining the grounds of detention is also satisfied that the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the District Magistrate, crosses the threshold of mere surmises and conjectures and was justly based upon the material on record and not detaining the detenue under the stringent provisions of the NSA would in all probability than not, result in the public order being disturbed or would result in an act by the detenue which is deleterious to national security. The absence of such material would render the grounds of detention and the order of detention unjustified, deserving to be set aside.” (Para 22)

The arrest record raised a more serious procedural concern

The judgment becomes particularly significant when it turns from the substantive allegations to the legality of the arrest process itself. Chaudhary’s case was that she had been taken into custody at approximately 5:30 p.m. on April 11 from Botanical Garden Metro Station. The State maintained that her arrest took place only on April 12. The Court tested these competing versions against the WhatsApp material produced by the State itself.

Messages sent to Chaudhary by an associate beginning at 5:56 p.m. on April 11 went unanswered. Several further messages and a missed call also received no response. The Court contrasted this with an earlier exchange that afternoon in which Chaudhary had been actively communicating with the same associate.

The material, the Court held, rendered Chaudhary’s claim that she was already in State custody from the evening of April 11 probable and undermined the State’s contention that she remained free until her formal arrest on April 12. But it was the Section 130 BNSS notice that caused the Court greater concern.

The State relied upon the notice to establish that Chaudhary had been proceeded against for failing to furnish a bond for good behaviour. Yet the notice contained General Diary Entry No. 37—the very entry on the basis of which the State claimed she had been arrested. The Court noted that the GD entry had been generated at 10:20 a.m. on April 12. The notice, however, did not mention the time at which it was issued.

Justice Achal Sachdev pointed out that if the notice had genuinely preceded the arrest, the GD number could not logically have appeared on it in the manner in which it did. Justice Sreedharan agreed, holding that the notice appeared to have been prepared after the arrest, describing the procedure as “ex post facto” and “nothing more than a sham”. The State was unable to answer what the Court described as “visible fabrication in the record”. This finding is particularly consequential in a preventive-detention case.

“My learned brother on the bench Justice Achal Sachdev, pointed out that the General Diary Entry No. 37 was generated at 10.20 am on 12.04.2026 and the mention of the G.D number in the notice under Section 130 goes to reveal that the notice was prepared after the arrest of the petitioner for, had the same been prepared before the arrest of the Petitioner, the G.D. number would not have been mentioned on the notice u/s. 130 BNSS. Mentioning the G.D. number in the notice under Section 130 of the BNSS reveals that the Petitioner was already arrested and the procedure of giving a notice under Section 130 of the BNSS was ex post facto the arrest and nothing more than a sham. I agree with the view of brother Justice Achal Sachdev that the notice u/s. 130 of the BNSS was prepared after the arrest of the Petitioner and that is the reason why the time of issuance is not mentioned in the notice and its omission is deliberate. Answer was sought from the Ld. Counsel for the state with regard to visible fabrication in the record for which no answer is forthcoming from the Ld. Counsel for the State.” (Para 17)

The Court’s scrutiny therefore went beyond whether the NSA order contained adequate reasons. It questioned the integrity of the very process through which the State sought to justify its exercise of coercive power.

The District Magistrate was required to exercise independent judgment

The Court’s criticism of the District Magistrate, Medha Roopam, is equally significant. The detention grounds ran into several pages. But the Court made clear that the length of a detention order cannot establish that the authority has applied its mind. The District Magistrate was required to examine the police dossier “threadbare”, particularly when the police report consisted largely of allegations unsupported by credible material.

The circumstances demanded greater scrutiny: Chaudhary was a young student activist, had no previous criminal record, was agitating in support of labourers, and the material before the authority did not demonstrate that she had incited violence. Instead, the Court found that the circumstances suggested that the District Magistrate had sought to “set an example” out of Chaudhary and deter others from exercising their right to freedom of speech and expression in public spaces in support of labourers.

The finding is devastating for the legality of the detention order because the District Magistrate’s statutory role is not to mechanically endorse the police version. Preventive detention requires an independent satisfaction on the part of the detaining authority. Where the underlying police material is itself weak, contradictory or unsupported, the District Magistrate has an even greater obligation to interrogate it before authorising incarceration under an exceptional statute. The Court concluded that this obligation had not been discharged.

“In this case, the conduct of the District Magistrate Gautam Buddha Nagar who passed the impugned order, is worthy of derision. In a case where the police report against the Petitioner were only allegations without there being any credible material against her, the District Magistrate was expected to be vigilant and examine the record threadbare to determine if there was any material in support of the allegations and even thereafter, assess whether the oppressive provisions of the NSA were warranted against the Petitioner and how the general law of the land was inadequate against a female student activist without any previous criminal record, agitating for the rights of labourers and where the material on record did not disclose that she had in any way incited violence, reveals that the District Magistrate desired to set an example out of the Petitioner and deter others from exercising their right to freedom of speech and expression in public spaces in support of the labourers. The District Magistrate Gautam Buddha Nagar is guilty of violating her oath of allegiance, making this a fit case for the imposition of compensation to the petitioner.” (Para 31)

The Court draws a constitutional line around protest

The judgment also makes an important statement about the constitutional status of public protest. The High Court held that freedom of speech and expression extends beyond speech in the abstract. It includes the right to come onto the streets, gather peacefully and agitate for one’s rights. The State cannot prevent public gatherings merely because it assumes that they may result in a breach of peace.

The Court warned that such an approach would amount to “throwing the baby out of the bath water” and could ultimately result in the cessation of collective expression in public spaces. Importantly, the Court did not ignore the State’s obligation to maintain public order. It expressly recognised that peaceful demonstrations may be infiltrated by persons interested in creating violence and that the violent acts of such persons may subsequently be attributed unjustly to an entire gathering. But its answer was not to suppress the gathering itself.

The State, the Court said, possesses a strong police force and must train it to manage large gatherings while preserving accountability through measures such as videography. The principle is therefore not that every protest is constitutionally immune from regulation. It is that the State must distinguish between peaceful dissent and actual threats to public order rather than treating the possibility of disorder as proof of disorder.

“In this case, this Court has seen from the material on record that at the petitioner has called for citizens in support of the labourers and to agitate for their rights. There is no material to reflect that such agitation will have to be violent or challenging the authority of the State. The freedom of speech and expression extends to coming out on the streets and agitating a cause, and gathering peacefully without arms or without threat to the public order. However, the State must also realize that a peaceful agitation where people collect without arms or ammunitions, can still be scuttled by mischievous elements, who may be sent by parties, who are interested in ensuring that such an agitation is broken and also where such elements may indulge in acts of violence, which thereafter gets attributed to the entire group which is patently unjust. Preventing people from gathering in public spaces or agitating their rights on the grounds of assumed breach of peace, would be throwing the baby out of the bath water. If such a view is taken by the State and approved of by the Courts, it would lead to a cessation of the collective expression of opinion in public spaces. The Constitution protects such a right and the same cannot be trifled with merely on the subjective opinion of the State. The State must also realize that it has a strong and powerful police force, which must be trained in ensuring public order in such large gatherings and also resort to videography of the gathering and the manner in which it is conducted, so that accountability may be affixed, in the event of an outbreak of violence.” (Para 23)

“The loyalty is towards the Constitution and not the political executive”

The Court’s observations on the bureaucracy take the judgment beyond the immediate facts of Chaudhary’s detention. In considering compensation, the Bench turned to the constitutional responsibilities attached to the powers exercised by the IAS and IPS.

It reminded public officials that the immense powers conferred upon them exist alongside an equally serious responsibility to protect the constitutional rights, dignity and welfare of citizens. Most significantly, the Court observed that their loyalty is to the Constitution and not to the political executive, and that they are servants of the people in a democracy. The Court then issued an extraordinary warning.

When bureaucrats and police officers disregard their constitutional oath and exercise power in a manner that violates civil liberties, citizens may begin to regard them as an “oppressive vestige of the British Empire”. Such conduct, the Court warned, can generate distrust, anger and civil unrest. It concluded with the striking observation that unless such conduct is checked, “it shan’t be long before the errant in the bureaucracy reduce the State of Uttar Pradesh to an Orwellian Dystopia.”

“It goes without saying that those in the bureaucracy and the police, when they act in a manner which is harmonious with their oath of allegiance, the thankful citizens of this State shall elevate them, and very rightly so, to a position which would be envied by the Gods themselves. However, every time they ignore that solemn oath and act contrary to it, the people of the State of Uttar Pradesh would view them as an oppressive vestige of the British Empire arousing angst and hatred towards them creating an environment of civil unrest and this Court, while correcting their excesses and/or illegalities, especially those that impinge upon the civil liberties of the citizens without adequate cause or due process (inhering in the procedure established by law), may pass harsh orders to compensate the citizen so wronged, besides recording their despotic conduct. Else, it shan’t be long before the errant in the bureaucracy reduce the State of Uttar Pradesh to an Orwellian Dystopia.” (Para 30)

Personal financial consequences for the officers

The Court’s response to the State’s conduct was not confined to declaratory relief. Chaudhary had sought ₹50 lakh in compensation. The State argued that quashing the NSA order would not result in any substantial release from custody because Chaudhary remained in judicial custody in the underlying criminal cases, where her bail applications had been rejected. The Court accepted that the period of NSA detention had merged with her judicial custody and therefore declined to award the full amount claimed.

It nevertheless found that the State’s “casual and cavalier exercise of authority” had violated her constitutional rights and awarded ₹5 lakh as compensation. More significantly, the Court did not direct the compensation to be borne merely by the public exchequer. It ordered recovery from the salary of the District Magistrate and all other officers who were responsible, “right down to the SHO” who had prepared the initial report supporting the NSA detention.

The Court further directed that its displeasure against the District Magistrate and police officers involved in preparing the dossier be recorded in their service records. This is perhaps the judgment’s strongest institutional message.

“Undoubtedly, even if the order in this particular case is quashed, the petitioner would still remain in jail as an under trial till she secures bail in all the criminal cases registered against her. As the period of detention merges with the period of judicial custody, the amount as prayed for by the petitioner, need not be considered in its entirety. However, on account of the casual and cavalier exercise of authority by the State through the District Magistrate Gautam Buddha Nagar, which has violated the constitutional rights of the petitioner, this Court considers it sufficient to grant ₹5 lakhs as compensation to the petitioner. This Court also directs that the said amount must be recovered from the salary of the District Magistrate Gautam Buddha Nagar, who has passed this order of detention without application of mind and from all such other officers who may have been responsible, right down to the SHO of the Police Station, who had prepared the initial report warranting the detention of the petitioner under the provisions of the NSA. The displeasure of this Court against the conduct of the District Magistrate concerned and all such other officers of the police who were involved in preparing the dossier against the petition, be noted in their service records.” (Para 33)

The Court has effectively rejected the proposition that an unconstitutional exercise of State power should have no personal consequences for those who exercise it. Where individual officials are found responsible for an arbitrary deprivation of liberty, accountability may follow the chain of decision-making down to the officer who initiated the process.

The judgment is ultimately about the limits of preventive State power

The Allahabad High Court’s decision is not a declaration that Chaudhary is innocent of the criminal allegations against her. The Court expressly recorded that the chargesheet in the underlying case had been filed, cognizance had been taken and her bail application had been rejected. She would consequently remain in judicial custody even after the NSA detention was quashed, unless released in the other criminal cases.

The High Court was not deciding whether Chaudhary committed the offences alleged against her. It was deciding whether the executive had lawfully established the extraordinary conditions necessary to deprive her of liberty under the NSA. On that question, the Court found the State’s case fundamentally deficient.

Preventive detention may be exceptional by design. But precisely because it authorises incarceration without the safeguards of an ordinary criminal trial, the material supporting its exercise must meet a correspondingly serious standard of scrutiny. The Allahabad High Court’s judgment insists on that standard. And in doing so, it makes a broader point about the rule of law: Article 21 is not merely a protection against unlawful imprisonment after the event. It is a constitutional command that every exercise of coercive State power affecting liberty must remain tethered to law, evidence, reason and institutional responsibility.

The complete judgment may be read below:

Related:

Allahabad HC quashes NSA detention of Aakriti Chaudhary, questions ‘concocted’ State narrative in Noida workers’ protest case

Satya Niketan Collapse: When students and neighbours had to rescue students from a system that had failed them

Vande Mataram and the 2026 Amendment: From voluntary honour to penal coercion

Declared ‘Foreigner’, denied a hearing, pushed across the border: Gauhati HC pulls up Assam

The Normalisation of Suicide at IITs: Institutional blindness and failure

Six Days On, Still No FIR: What happened to Shaheen and Nafisa Khan at Saket Police Station?

The post ‘Subjective Satisfaction’ Cannot Be Built On Conjecture: Allahabad HC quashes NSA detention of Akriti Chaudhary appeared first on SabrangIndia.

BAPS’ exclusionary stance towards women is well known. I have personally experienced, and written about, their religious gurus’ behaviour towards women. In one instance, amidst the dastardly Akshardham terrorist attack in September 2002 in Gandhinagar, a Times of India colleague covering the event was stopped by BAPS sadhus from taking shelter in their residential area even as bullets were flying next to her.

Instead of pointing the finger directly at the monument’s operating company, SETE (Société d’Exploitation de la Tour Eiffel), for falling in line with the hijab protagonists in France, a section of enthusiasts preferred to mainly attack Bochasanwasi Akshar Purushottam Swaminarayan Sanstha (BAPS).

I have read numerous comments on social media attacking BAPS. One of them was from Shiv Sena (UBT) leader Priyanka Chaturvedi, who strongly criticized the sect, stating that the demand to remove women from the Eiffel Tower was “not a reflection of how India thinks — in policy or in the Constitution.” She insisted that if BAPS enforces such customs, they must “keep it restricted to those confined areas”, adding, “please don’t expect the world to follow the diktat.”

Not that I disagree with what Chaturvedi and others have to say. Their viewpoint on BAPS — or, for that matter, other religious sects, be they of any religion — is not only correct, it needs to be repeated umpteen times in India. In India, religious establishments are known to discriminate against women. However, what shocked me was that these reactions had little to say about the SETE directive to its female staff.

Hijab is known to be strictly regulated or prohibited in specific public institutions, roles, and contexts under the French doctrine of laïcité (state secularism). Yet, SETE seemed to violate the very principle it is supposed to uphold. It favoured the exact opposite logic. The underlying justification for religious veiling — or restrictions on interaction between unrelated men and women — is that female visibility and male-female contact must be regulated according to faith-based modesty standards.

When SETE management agreed to accommodate the BAPS delegation’s celibacy vows by directing female workers to clear their desks, hide in back rooms, and let male colleagues take over, it effectively legitimized the premise that a woman’s physical presence in a public workplace can be treated as a religious impediment. Clearly, SETE yielded to a conservative religious modesty doctrine at the expense of workplace equality.

Indeed, it was commendable that on September 7, 2026, the Eiffel Tower was forced to close for the day after its staff staged a walkout and strike. The industrial action followed anger over the management directive during the BAPS delegation’s visit on September 5 (Saturday), when female employees were reportedly ordered to step away from their workstations, stay out of sight, and be replaced by male colleagues. As anger escalated among the staff during the weekend, the primary trade union representing the workers, CGT, called an emergency meeting, leading to the strike on September 7 (Monday), shutting down the monument to tourists.

The staff union condemned what it described as a humiliating and discriminatory workplace violation. According to statements released by the CGT, the union objected to female employees being formally directed to leave their assigned duties and wait in separate back rooms or offices while the delegation toured the monument. At customer service, ticketing, and operational desks, women were directly swapped out and replaced by male coworkers so that no female presence would be encountered along the delegation’s route. Further, female workers were forbidden from walking through or entering common corridors, lifts, and platforms during the BAPS visit.

Workers emphasized that the Eiffel Tower is a preeminent global symbol of France and secular public life. They argued that coercing female public-facing staff to “render themselves invisible” because of their sex directly violated French labour laws, non-discrimination protections, and the fundamental principle of gender equality (égalité).

The incident provoked strong condemnation across French civil society and the political spectrum. Emmanuel Grégoire, the Paris deputy mayor, backed the workers’ strike as entirely legitimate, declaring: “Equality between women and men will never stop at the foot of our historical monuments, nor anywhere in this city.”

An official inquiry was launched into how management authorized the request. Former Prime Minister Gabriel Attal and French Equality Minister Aurore Bergé both issued statements affirming that no religious doctrine, belief, or visiting delegation can supersede French labour laws or dictate the presence of women in public spaces.

I personally seem to agree with those in India who assert that the blame should be directed at Eiffel Tower management. The management should have simply said “no.” Religious groups make accommodation requests everywhere; it was the duty of Eiffel Tower management to know French secular and labour laws and simply refuse the terms if they violated workplace equality. BAPS was a visiting delegation, not an employer in France, and had no legal authority to order French civil staff into back rooms. Therefore, SETE management caved inappropriately to customer preferences at the cost of its own workers.

Meanwhile, BAPS supporters are defending the sect’s monastic vows, arguing that the monks’ vows of celibacy and non-interaction with women are “voluntary” and centuries-old ascetic disciplines. They argue that European institutions “often bend rules” or “accommodate other religious sensibilities”, so what is wrong if SETE acted the way it did at BAPS’ request?

There appears to be reason to believe that SETE acted the way it did to appease the current French ruling establishment, which is known to be close to Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The BAPS delegation’s controversial visit to the Eiffel Tower took place a day after Modi virtually inaugurated the sprawling BAPS temple in Paris.

Not without reason, the Indian government opted to distance itself entirely from the dispute. When asked about the incident during a press briefing in New Delhi, Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) spokesperson stated: “We are aware of the opening of a temple by the BAPS Sanstha in the Paris area. As to the particular issue pertaining to the Tower, this is a matter purely between the entities concerned.”

When questioned about Modi having virtually addressed the inauguration of the BAPS temple in Paris just a day prior, the MEA dismissed any political link, calling it standard protocol for the Prime Minister to send goodwill messages for major cultural milestones.

Modi thinks it’s a cultural milestone? Do the French authorities also think the same way?

I am really puzzled.

So far, the only Indian voice I have seen that has unequivocally stood with the Eiffel Tower workers themselves is that of the All India Democratic Women’s Association (AIDWA), which expressed solidarity with the Indian Alliance Paris (IAP) in supporting the workers’ strike. IAP is a Paris-based collective of Indian students, researchers and professionals, critical of BAPS and the spread of Hindu nationalism in Europe.

Significantly, IAP was not a group that suddenly discovered BAPS after the Eiffel Tower controversy. On September 5, even as the BAPS delegation was visiting the Tower, it had organized a public meeting in Paris, co-hosted by several organizations including the CGT trade union, to draw attention to BAPS’s conservative gender politics and its wider political connections. Activists and researchers from France, India and the US participated, a documentary was screened and a press statement was issued. IAP has said it had tried to warn French political parties about BAPS, but received little attention until the Eiffel Tower workers went on strike.

After the strike, IAP unequivocally backed the workers, while making another important point: the controversy must not become “fodder for more racism”. BAPS, it stressed, does not represent all Hindus and certainly does not represent India.

Courtesy: CounterView

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And where is the CCTV footage that could help establish what happened inside the station? Two journalists allege they were assaulted at Delhi’s Saket Police Station.

They allege the assault intensified after police learnt they were Muslim. Teesta Setalvad speaks with Shaheen Khan and Nafeesa Khan about journalism, their experience as Muslim women, their rights as citizens, and the unanswered questions around CCTV footage and police accountability.

The post They Asked Questions. Then Came the Assault: Shaheen & Nafeesa Khan | Teesta Setalvad appeared first on SabrangIndia.

This is extraordinary. The book was going to be a massive commercial success, even if there had been no controversy around it. Penguin’s decision to back out of publishing it made no commercial sense at all. Sonia Gandhi a major Indian political figure, she has not been known to be shrill and provocative in her public pronouncements. For Penguin to hide behind ‘legal’ advice is disingenuous. It is abundantly clear that the publisher attempted to censor Mrs Gandhi’s memoirs, and the author refused to bend.

This is hardly the first time Penguin has done this. Recently, the publisher backed out of publishing the American journalist Joe Sacco’s graphic book, The Once and Future Riot. This is a book based on the communal riots that were instigated in Muzzafarnagar in western Uttar Pradesh in 2013. These riots were used to sharpen communal polarisation in the lead up to the 2014 elections, and were a contributory factor in the success of the BJP in that election. Then there is the case of a book by a former Army chief, which too Penguin was supposed to publish, but backed out of.

In two of these instances, fortunately, the books have found alternative publishers. Mrs Gandhi’s memoirs are being published by HarperCollins, another major publisher, and Joe Sacco’s book is being published by LeftWord Books.

There is a disturbing trend apparent here – of Penguin not publishing books that are in some way critical of the BJP, the RSS, the current government, and the Prime Minister. This trend started even before the BJP came to power in the May 2014 elections. Earlier that year, Penguin withdrew and pulped a book by the historian Wendy Doniger, when faced with a legal case filed by an RSS vigilante, Dinanath Batra. (Mr Batra has been dead for over two years now, so Penguin can’t even blame him for its recent actions.) Prof. Doniger’s book was subsequently published by Speaking Tiger without any changes in the text.

After the controversy around Sonia Gandhi’s book, other authors have also gone public with their experience with Penguin. One of them is Dhirendra K. Jha, who had signed a two-book contract with Penguin. His first, Gandhi’s Assassin, was published in 2022, but the second, a biography of the late RSS chief M.S. Golwalkar, ran into trouble with the publisher. Penguin insisted on deleting all references to the Nazi regime, of which Golwalkar was a well-known admirer; critical references to Golwalkar’s own 1939 book We or Our Nationhood Defined; and details of a 1942 RSS camp for which the author had documentary evidence. The author refused to make these changes, and the book was published by Simon & Schuster India.

While Penguin is the biggest culprit in terms of trying to muzzle and censor books critical of the Hindu Right, others also occasionally develop cold feet. For example, on the day the results were declared for the 2014 Lok Sabha elections that placed the BJP in power, 16 May, Orient Blackswan ‘set aside’ a book on communalism and sexual violence in Gujarat. As in the case of the Wendy Doniger book earlier that year, the culprit in this case was again Dinanath Batra, the RSS vigilante, who threatened the publisher with a lawsuit.

In many of these cases, the publisher has hidden behind a smokescreen of ‘fact-checking’ and ‘editorial due diligence’. These arguments are efforts to muddy the waters. Any publisher that takes itself seriously adheres to their internal standards of editorial due diligence and, in the case of non-fiction, fact-checking. However, as the examples of the Golwalkar biography and the Sonia Gandhi memoirs show, Penguin has repeatedly crossed the line between due diligence and outright censorship. There can be no justification for asking the author to cut out references to the Nazi regime from a book on Golwalkar, when it is a well-known fact, cited by numerous authors previously, that Golwalkar wrote approvingly about the Nazis and their campaign for the extermination of Jews. The conclusion is inescapable: Someone at the very top of Penguin is either extraordinarily cowardly, or a right-wing bigot – or both.

Some people argue that publishers such as Penguin, because they are so big, have a lot to lose, and have a responsibility towards safeguarding their employees’ well-being and jobs. This is a ludicrous argument. It is small publishers such as LeftWord who have a lot more to lose. Big publishers not only have deep pockets and access to legal resources, they also have stature and prestige in the market and in society. Any number of eminent authors, citizens, opinion makers will jump to their defence if they are attacked. Small publishers have very little. If the government decides to go after a small publisher, the publisher could very well face the prospect of simply being shut down.

Small publishers have a lot more to lose, and yet, they are the ones who seem to have more of a spine. When a Penguin tries to muzzle critical voices, it has several pernicious long term implications. It makes the idea of censorship seem normal. It bolsters the idea that books are ‘dangerous’. It adds to the atmosphere of fear. It disincentivises risk taking by others.

Publishing is unlike most other businesses. It doesn’t involve merely producing goods and making profits. The ‘goods’ that a publisher produces are books, and books are carriers of ideas. Ideas are not a ‘product’. They form the bedrock for all social interactions in society. For any healthy society to thrive, you need a diversity of ideas to circulate. These include ideas that challenge the status quo. No society can progress unless challenging ideas, dissenting ideas circulate freely.

Through its recent actions of stifling free expression of ideas, Penguin has harmed the publishing ecosystem and the very idea of democracy.

This article appeared in People’s Democracy, Sept. 7–13, 2026.

Courtesy: https://sudu26.substack.com/

The post Penguin’s Shenanigans appeared first on SabrangIndia.

I argue however that, when this 2026 defence of ancient Hindu jurisprudence is placed alongside Mahmood’s long-standing jurisprudential positions—most notably his January 11-24, 1986 Frontline interview during the Shah Bano controversy—a consistent ideological trajectory emerges.

Far from a progressive effort to humanise legal history, Mahmood’s intellectual framework represents a sophisticated defence of systemic patriarchy. Across four decades, his legal logic systematically rebrands female subordination as benevolent care, denies women’s non-monetary economic contributions, and reduces women to perpetual financial and social liabilities who require lifelong male custodianship.

A foundational pillar of Mahmood’s legal philosophy is the absolute rejection of women’s independent economic agency within the marital unit. In his January 11-24 1986 Frontline interview (“Secularism on the Bend”), Mahmood forcefully criticised the Supreme Court’s ruling (April 23, 1985) in Mohammed Ahmad Khan vs. Shah Bano Begum, which had granted a meagre maintenance allowance to a 73-year-old divorced woman under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Mahmood argued that Shah Bano (1916-1992) was not entitled to maintenance from her former husband because she was an affluent woman with three adult, solvent sons—one of whom was a practicing lawyer. Under his interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence, the primary financial liability to support an elderly mother falls squarely upon her male offspring rather than her former spouse, regardless of the duration of the marriage.

When directly (and publicly) challenged on whether a wife’s decades of domestic labour, childcare, and household management constitute an economic contribution to the marriage that justifies post-divorce support or a share in marital property, Mahmood’s response was unambiguous. He rejected the “Western concept of matrimonial property”, asserting that in India, an uneducated or homemaker wife does not make an economic contribution. Instead, he explicitly declared her to be a financial burden: “How is that an economic contribution? On the contrary, she is a liability. She needs to be maintained in any case”. He went so far as to claim that a wife could only legally demand financial compensation for her domestic services if she formally declared herself an “employee” or an “agent of the husband” rather than a mother.

This worldview is far from an isolated legal quirk; it aligns directly with a broader, long-standing tradition of South Asian patriarchal instructional literature designed to socialise women into absolute domestic servitude. A prime historical example is Ashraf Ali Thanwi’s reformist handbook Bihishti Zewar (Heavenly Ornaments, 1905). Written at the turn of the twentieth century as an instructional guide for Muslim women, Thanwi’s text systematically constructs a piety centered on female self-effacement, unquestioning submission, and absolute obedience to the husband. In Bihishti Zewar, a wife is instructed that her religious duty and spiritual salvation depend on serving her husband as her earthly lord—enduring his tempers without complaint, prioritizing his comfort over her basic needs, and viewing her presence in the household as an act of perpetual devotion.

What Thanwi codified as religious virtue in 1905, Mahmood “secularised” and operationalised as legal jurisprudence in 1986 and 2026. In both frameworks, the woman’s internal value is tied entirely to her domestic utility, while her structural status is reduced to an uncompensated, obedient dependent. Thanwi’s theological insistence that a woman must endure systemic domestic inequity in exchange for heavenly reward seamlessly mirrors Mahmood’s legal assertion that an uneducated homemaker generates no economic value and remains merely a financial liability.

Decades later, in his September 2026 analysis of the Manusmriti, Mahmood deploys this exact same paternalistic logic. By equating the verse’s prescription of lifelong male guardianship with modern maintenance obligations, Mahmood once again reduces female existence to an inherent financial dependency. In all these contexts—whether examining Thanwi’s reformist didactic manuals, classical Sanskrit codes, or medieval Islamic jurisprudence—there is a shared refusal to recognise women as equal economic or legal partners in a household. A woman’s labour inside the home is dismissed as non-existent or dutifully owed, her status is framed as an inherent liability, and her entitlement to survival is made contingent upon the paternalistic charity of male guardians.

This institutionalised denial of agency seamlessly informs Mahmood’s defence of structural male dominance and the restriction of female self-determination. In his discussion of divorce law, Mahmood attempted to construct a facade of gender parity by claiming that Islamic law grants equal rights of unilateral dissolution to both men and women. He argued that a woman can unilaterally discard her husband through khula just as a man can through talaq, and that seeking a judicial decree is merely a confirmatory remedy against male chauvinism rather than a structural requirement.

Yet, this assertion conveniently glossed over the severe, asymmetrical financial penalties embedded in the process. While a man pronouncing talaq retains his assets and merely pays the agreed mehr (dower), a woman initiating khula is legally required to forfeit or return her mehr. When pressed on how an economically dependent, illiterate woman could realistically exercise this right without facing total destitution, Mahmood shifted the entire burden back onto women and their families, insisting that financial terms should have been negotiated in the nikahnama (marriage contract) prior to the wedding. When reminded that young girls and illiterate women rarely possess the agency or leverage to negotiate such contracts, Mahmood dismissed the widespread grievances of Muslim women’s rights groups who characterized personal laws as instruments of oppression, attributing their critique to sheer “ignorance of law”.

This pattern of dismissing female agency culminates in Mahmood’s semantic reinterpretation of classical patriarchal texts. In his 2026 Indian Express column, Mahmood attempts to sanitize the phrase na stri swatantrayamarhati—traditionally translated by both classical commentators and colonial scholars as “a woman does not deserve independence”—by translating it as “never left unprotected”. In doing so, he deliberately conflates the denial of autonomy with an act of paternalistic devotion. By framing the institutionalized denial of female freedom as a sacred male duty of safety, Tahir Mahmood constructs an apologetic framework that shields historic patriarchy from legitimate critique.

As the historian, Mubarak Ali observes in his critical study “Behishti Zewar Aur Aurat” (in his Urdu language book, Tareekh Aur Aurat, 1993), textually mandated codes of female conduct invariably function to “confine the woman within the domestic sphere while sanctifying her subjugation as moral virtue”, and that such normative texts manipulate legal and religious rhetoric to stripping women of independent agency under the guise of protecting tradition.

When read together, Mahmood’s writings across forty years (1986 and 2026) reveal a cohesive, conservative worldview that normalises gender hierarchy under the guise of legal protectionism. Whether relying on didactic texts like Bihishti Zewar, or opposing the Supreme Court’s secular intervention (1985) in Shah Bano, or reinterpreting the Manusmriti for a modern readership, the core thesis remains unchanged: women do not require constitutional equality, independent legal agency, or economic recognition; they merely require male oversight. By recasting the denial of independence as an act of care and framing female domestic existence as a financial liability, Mahmood, relying upon the same rhetorical sleight of hand, provides an intellectual defence of systemic misogyny that ensures women remain perpetual wards of male authority. In both instances (Indian Express, Sept 1, 2026, and Frontline, January 11-24, 1986), systemic misogyny and the denial of gender justice are sanitized as reverence for scriptural tradition and personal law, reducing female autonomy to a negotiable casualty of cultural preservation.

(The author teaches Modern and Contemporary Indian History at the Aligarh Muslim University. His X handle is: @sajjadhist)

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