Viewed narrowly, the judgment settles a local and specific legal controversy. Viewed more broadly, however, it speaks to an increasingly recurring constitutional question: what happens when the State’s power of eminent domain intersects with historic places of worship located within politically and religiously contested urban spaces especially when these culturally and religiously are those of the religious minorities? That question cannot be answered by reading the judgment in isolation.

The litigation arose from the continuing expansion of the Shri Kashi Vishwanath Dham Corridor, a project that has dramatically transformed the Varanasi urban landscape surrounding one of Hinduism’s oldest temples. The political patronage by a  specific expansionist, militarist interpretation of the faith (RSS-BJP-VHP combine) is not irrelevant. Hindusim in its purest practiced form has been over the centuries not linear or semitic, by vesting authenticity of faith on three north-Indian shrines –Ayodhya, Mathura and Kashi Viswanath—lies a structured and political effort to semitise the faith that was once localised and eclectic and control power, finance and practice.[1]

Unsurprisingly therefore, with the contours of the Indian state altering since the early 1990s and more sharply and substantively since 2014, the building of shrines at these three sites has drawn political, financial and state support. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) came to power with the steely organisational support of the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (RSS) and its more vocal/rabid wings (Bajrang Dal-BD and Vishwa Hindu Parishad-VHP) in the state of Uttar Pradesh in 2017.[2] Even three years prior to this, after the regime change at the Centre (2014), pressure was brought on the Varanasi district administration regarding the Kashi Viswanath shrine.[3]

Since its announcement, the Corridor has been presented by the Uttar Pradesh Government as an exercise in heritage conservation, pilgrimage facilitation and urban renewal. At the same time, it has generated sustained criticism from residents, traders, historians, architects, conservationists and civil society organisations, who have questioned the scale of demolition, displacement and the irreversible alteration of one of India’s oldest living cities.

Consequently, the Allahabad High Court’s interpretation of the Places of Worship Act (POW), 1991 is not simply a technical pronouncement on statutory construction. It is a judicial intervention in a redevelopment project that has, for several years, borne a clear majoritarian stamp: an intersection of constitutional law, heritage conservation, minority rights, urban planning and contemporary politics.

The Kashi Corridor is more than an infrastructure project

Few redevelopment projects in independent India have altered the physical and symbolic landscape of a historic city as dramatically as the Kashi Vishwanath Corridor. Conceived as an ambitious project connecting the Kashi Vishwanath Temple directly to the ghats of the Ganga, the redevelopment sought to replace the centuries-old maze of narrow lanes surrounding the temple with wide pedestrian corridors, plazas and public spaces capable of accommodating millions of pilgrims. The State justified the project as necessary to improve accessibility, crowd management, disaster preparedness and civic infrastructure around one of India’s most visited pilgrimage centres. Yet the area selected for redevelopment was not an empty tract awaiting urban renewal.

The neighbourhood surrounding the Kashi Vishwanath Temple represents one of the oldest continuously inhabited urban settlements in South Asia. For centuries, the sacred geography of Kashi evolved organically through a dense network of ancient and historic local temples of prime religious and cultural significance, shrines, mosques, markets, residences, dharamshalas, akharas, courtyards and interconnected gullies. Its heritage lay not merely in monumental religious structures but equally in the lived urban fabric that connected them. Historians have long described the city as a layered civilisational landscape in which Hindu, Muslim and other communities inhabited overlapping social and religious spaces, creating an urban ecology unlike that of most planned cities.

This evocative report on the issue reflects the majoritarian make-over of the Kashi-Viswanath Dham Corridor, not just in terms of a brute and uni-directional take-over of culture, art, faith and individual rights, but also as a clear-cut political design to re-shape the understanding and practice of the Hindu faith. “The ruling (BJP) government and Modi, who represents Varanasi in the Lok Sabha, Dharma Vyaparis (religion traders) instead of Dharma Adhikaris (religion upholders).” The report may be read here. The Indian Express had then quoted Rajendra Tiwari, the former Mahant of the same Kashi Viswanath temple here:  “Every part of the country is represented across these Ganga ghats. Where we are sitting is Lahori Tola, where people from Lahore came and settled. Then there are areas where the Bengalis settled, the South Indians, the Marathis.” They are changing the “vaastu” of the place, he says. “Yeh dharam adhikari nahin, dharam vypari hein (They don’t serve religion, they trade in religion).”

It is in this question that the recent judgement of the Allahabad High Court that clinically ignores. Adopting an approach that is jurisprudentially analysed by scholars as legal formalism (or mechanically applied jurisprudence), such an approach only narrowly protects the rule of law while turning a judicial ostrich like approach away from sociological jurisprudence and legal realism.

By completely ignoring the context of this aggressive and politically intentioned Corridor development and land acquisition, the Allahabad High Court a constitutional court has tragically obliterated the socio-political-administrative background to these demolitions and acquisitions. In leveraging the POW Act of 1991 to do so, the Court has also subtly but surely diluted the content and “Aims and Objectives” of the law.

It is in this overall context that the Dham Corridor “re=development” needs to be understood. Through the period that it took place, the redevelopment therefore triggered concerns extending beyond ordinary questions of land acquisition. Reports documenting the implementation of the project described the acquisition and demolition of hundreds of residential and commercial properties around the temple precinct. Local residents spoke of the disappearance of neighbourhoods that had existed for generations. Conservationists questioned whether the pursuit of monumental redevelopment had come at the cost of preserving Varanasi’s historic urban morphology. Architects debated whether the widening of lanes and creation of expansive public plazas fundamentally altered the cultural identity of a city historically defined by its intimate and densely layered built environment.

The project also generated controversy over the treatment of numerous smaller shrines, temples and archaeological remains reportedly discovered during demolition. While the temple administration maintained that significant structures had been carefully preserved wherever possible, it has been argued that redevelopment had prioritised visual grandeur over conservation of the city’s accumulated architectural heritage. The debate reflected competing visions of heritage itself: whether it should be understood principally through monumental architecture or through the preservation of living neighbourhoods that had evolved over centuries.

Redevelopment within a politically contested landscape

The constitutional significance of the Corridor cannot be understood without recognising another reality. The redevelopment has unfolded alongside continuing legal and political contestation surrounding the Gyanvapi Mosque, situated immediately adjacent to the Kashi Vishwanath Temple. In recent years, the mosque has become the subject of multiple civil suits, archaeological surveys and “competing” historical claims concerning the existence of a pre-existing temple beneath the present structure. Those proceedings, in turn, form part of a broader national debate concerning historical religious sites and the continued relevance of the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991, whose constitutional validity is presently under challenge before the Supreme Court.

Detailed reports on Gyanvapi Mosque, its history and the case may be read here, here, here, here and here.

Detailed reports on the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991 may be read here, here, here and here.

Detailed report on “contested” Mosques and Places of Worship Act may be read here, here and here.

The present litigation did not concern ownership of the Gyanvapi Mosque, nor did it involve competing historical claims regarding religious identity. Nevertheless, it emerged within this broader environment of heightened contestation, where disputes concerning places of worship are rarely perceived as isolated property disputes. Instead, they frequently engage larger constitutional questions concerning secularism, equality, historical memory and the relationship between religion and State power.

It is precisely because of this context that the Allahabad High Court’s interpretation of the Places of Worship Act assumes significance beyond the immediate facts before it. A judgment concerning six mosques in Dalmandi inevitably contributes to the evolving jurisprudence governing one of the Constitution’s most sensitive areas. As said before, it slants and limits the scope of application of a law enacted in 1991 for precisely this purpose: containment of aggressive politico-majoriatrian claims arounds places of worship.

Why the Places of Worship Act matters

To appreciate the importance of the Court’s ruling, it is necessary to revisit the constitutional purpose behind the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991. The legislation was enacted at a moment of extraordinary communal tension. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, disputes concerning historical places of worship increasingly became instruments of political mobilisation, culminating in the movement surrounding the Babri Masjid at Ayodhya. Parliament responded by enacting the Places of Worship Act to ensure that, with the sole exception of the Ayodhya dispute, the religious character of every place of worship as it existed on August 15, 1947 would remain unchanged.

The statute represented more than an ordinary property law. It was a legislative affirmation that independent India would not permit historical grievances to become the basis for contemporary contests over religious identity. By freezing the religious status of places of worship at the moment of Independence, Parliament sought to preserve communal harmony and reinforce the constitutional commitment to secularism embodied in the Preamble and the guarantees of equality and religious freedom.

Nearly three decades later, in the Babri Masjid demolition-Ayodhya judgment (2019), the Supreme Court described the Act as a legislative intervention that safeguards the secular character of the Republic by preventing historical wrongs, whether real or perceived, from being reopened through present-day litigation. The Court characterised the legislation as imposing a constitutional obligation of non-retrogression, ensuring that independent India’s future would not be continually reshaped by unresolved disputes from its past. It is against that constitutional backdrop that the Dalmandi dispute reached the Allahabad High Court.

Detailed reports on Babri Masjid demolition-Ayodhya judgment may be read here, here, here and here.

The question before the Court was not whether a mosque could be converted into a temple. The statute answers that unequivocally. Rather, it was whether Parliament intended the protection afforded by the Act to extend further, shielding places of worship from compulsory acquisition itself, or whether acquisition for a genuine public purpose remained outside the Act’s reach.

That seemingly narrow distinction lies at the heart of one of the most consequential interpretations of the Places of Worship Act delivered by any constitutional court since the legislation came into force.

The Dalmandi redevelopment project

The controversy before the Allahabad High Court arose from the Uttar Pradesh Government’s proposal to widen and beautify Dalmandi, one of Varanasi’s oldest commercial neighbourhoods situated approximately 800 metres from the Kashi Vishwanath Temple. As part of the continuing expansion of the Kashi Vishwanath Corridor, the State proposed to acquire numerous residential and commercial properties along the route to facilitate smoother movement of pilgrims and improve connectivity between the temple precinct and adjoining areas.

Unlike the earlier phases of the Corridor project, which had already witnessed extensive demolition of residential and commercial structures surrounding the temple, the proposed redevelopment of Dalmandi raised an additional legal question. The proposed alignment included six centuries-old mosques: Anjuman Intezamia Masjid, Masjid Rangile Shah, Masjid Ali Raza Khan, Masjid Karimullah Baig, Masjid Nisaran and Masjid Sangamarmar. According to the petitioners, these mosques were likely to be acquired and demolished as part of the road-widening exercise.

While urban redevelopment frequently involves difficult choices between public infrastructure and private property, the inclusion of functioning places of worship transformed what might otherwise have been an ordinary land acquisition dispute into a constitutional controversy. It raised a question that courts had not previously addressed in any substantial detail: does the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991 merely prohibit changes in the religious identity of places of worship, or does it also prevent the State from acquiring them altogether?

That question assumed particular significance because the litigation unfolded against the backdrop of continuing constitutional debates over the meaning and future of the Places of Worship Act itself. Several petitions challenging the validity of the legislation, or seeking a narrower interpretation of its provisions, are presently pending before the Supreme Court. Although the Allahabad High Court was not called upon to determine the constitutional validity of the statute, its interpretation of the Act inevitably contributes to the developing jurisprudence on one of India’s most consequential secularism laws.

The petition: More than a challenge to acquisition

The writ petition was filed by six tenants and shopkeepers carrying on business in Dalmandi. Their immediate concern was practical and personal: the proposed acquisition threatened the closure of their establishments and the loss of their livelihoods. Yet the petition deliberately framed the dispute as extending beyond commercial interests. It argued that the redevelopment would simultaneously extinguish historic places of worship that had existed long before Independence and therefore enjoyed statutory protection under the Places of Worship Act.

The petitioners contended that the six mosques proposed to be acquired had retained their religious character continuously since before August 15, 1947, bringing them squarely within the protective ambit of the 1991 legislation. Parliament, they argued, had enacted the Act to preserve precisely such sites from future interference. If pre-Independence places of worship could nevertheless be acquired and demolished in the name of redevelopment, the central objective of the legislation would stand substantially diluted.

Their challenge therefore rested on a purposive understanding of the statute. According to the petitioners, the Act could not be reduced to a prohibition against physically converting a mosque into a temple or vice versa. Such a narrow reading, they argued, ignored the broader legislative purpose of preserving religious sites from becoming casualties of contemporary political or administrative decisions. A mosque that had been acquired and demolished might not have been converted into another religious structure, but its existence as a functioning place of worship would nevertheless come to an end. From that perspective, acquisition could undermine the statutory protection just as effectively as formal conversion.

The petition also invoked broader constitutional guarantees. The petitioners argued that the proposed acquisition violated Articles 14, 21 and 25 of the Constitution by threatening both their right to livelihood and the community’s right to continue worship at long-standing mosques. They further questioned whether the project genuinely satisfied the requirement of public purpose, asserting that alternative alignments were available which could improve access to the temple without requiring demolition of existing neighbourhoods and religious structures.

Another important strand of the petition concerned the social consequences of redevelopment. Dalmandi is not merely a cluster of buildings; it is a living commercial locality whose economy has evolved over generations. The petitioners argued that the project would displace traders, workers and families whose livelihoods depended upon businesses established in the locality over several decades. While acknowledging the importance of improving civic infrastructure, they contended that the State had failed to adequately balance developmental objectives with constitutional guarantees protecting livelihood, religious practice and equality before the law.

The petition further alleged that the proposed alignment disproportionately affected one community and was therefore arbitrary. The High Court later described these assertions as “odd pleadings”, indicating that it found the allegations insufficiently substantiated by specific material placed on record. Nevertheless, the broader concern articulated by the petition—that redevelopment in religiously sensitive spaces demands heightened constitutional scrutiny—continued to inform the legal arguments advanced before the Court.

The State’s response: Eminent domain cannot be displaced by implication

The Uttar Pradesh Government fundamentally disagreed with the petitioners’ interpretation of the 1991 Act. According to the State, the legislation was enacted for a specific and limited purpose: to prohibit the conversion of places of worship from one religion or denomination to another. It was never intended to extinguish the State’s sovereign authority to compulsorily acquire land for public purposes. Reading such an exemption into the statute, the State argued, would effectively place every temple, mosque, church, gurudwara and shrine permanently beyond the reach of land acquisition laws, regardless of compelling public necessity. Parliament, it submitted, had expressed no such intention.

The State therefore relied upon the doctrine of eminent domain, the well-established constitutional principle recognising the State’s authority to acquire private property for a public purpose subject to payment of compensation and compliance with statutory safeguards. That power today is principally regulated by the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (RFCTLARR Act), which replaced the colonial Land Acquisition Act of 1894 with a framework emphasising social impact assessment, rehabilitation, transparency and fair compensation.

Crucially, the State argued that the RFCTLARR Act does not create a blanket exemption for religious properties. Instead, it prescribes the conditions under which acquisition may occur while balancing developmental needs with the rights of affected persons. If Parliament had intended places of worship to enjoy absolute immunity from acquisition, it could have expressly provided so. The absence of such an exemption, according to the State, was itself significant.

The Government also relied upon provisions of the Waqf Act, 1995, which contemplate acquisition of Waqf properties under certain circumstances while requiring adherence to statutory safeguards and compensation mechanisms. These provisions, the State argued, demonstrated that Parliament recognised acquisition of religious endowments as legally permissible, subject to due process, rather than absolutely prohibited. At a deeper level, the dispute reflected two competing constitutional visions.

For the petitioners, the Places of Worship Act represented a broad constitutional guarantee preserving the continued existence of historic places of worship against contemporary State action. For the State, the Act performed a narrower but equally important function: preventing religious conversion of sites while leaving intact the ordinary operation of land acquisition law. Resolving that conflict required the High Court to answer not merely what the statute says, but what Parliament intended the Act to protect. That inquiry would lead the Bench to adopt one of the narrowest judicial readings of the Places of Worship Act since its enactment in 1991.

The Court’s reasoning: Locus standi, statutory interpretation and the doctrine of eminent domain

The Allahabad High Court’s judgment proceeds in two distinct stages. The first concerns maintainability—whether the petitioners possessed the legal standing to challenge the acquisition. The second addresses the larger constitutional issue of whether the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991 limits the State’s power to compulsorily acquire places of worship. While the Court ultimately dismissed the petition on grounds of locus standi, it nevertheless chose to examine the substantive legal issue. In doing so, it delivered one of the most detailed judicial interpretations of the Places of Worship Act since its enactment.

A threshold question: Who can challenge the acquisition?

The Bench first noted that the petitioners were tenants and shopkeepers, not the owners of the properties proposed to be acquired. Although they undoubtedly stood to lose their businesses and livelihoods, the Court held that the legal challenge to acquisition primarily belongs to those whose proprietary rights are directly affected.

Under the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, it is ordinarily the title holder who possesses the right to object to acquisition, negotiate compensation or challenge the legality of the State’s exercise of eminent domain. Since none of the property owners had approached the Court, the Bench found it difficult to sustain a challenge instituted solely by tenants.

“We would think that the petitioners are more or less here, in order to protect their business and source of livelihood, rather than proprietary rights,” the Court remarked, reported LiveLaw. This observation should not be misunderstood as dismissing the hardships that acquisition may cause tenants. Rather, it reflects a long-established principle of land acquisition law: economic injury does not necessarily confer the same legal standing as proprietary ownership. Yet, the conclusion also reveals one of the limitations of the judgment.

The Court did not meaningfully engage with the evolving constitutional jurisprudence surrounding Article 21, where livelihood has increasingly been recognised as an integral component of the right to life. Decisions such as Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation have acknowledged that displacement and deprivation of livelihood engage constitutional protections beyond conventional property rights. While Olga Tellis arose in a different factual context, the judgment nevertheless illustrates that constitutional standing cannot always be viewed exclusively through the lens of ownership.

The Bench’s approach therefore reflects a relatively traditional understanding of locus standi in acquisition proceedings, even as constitutional jurisprudence has gradually expanded recognition of those indirectly affected by State action.

Can ordinary worshippers defend a mosque?

The Court adopted a similar approach regarding the six mosques proposed to be acquired. The petitioners argued that, as members of the Muslim community, they were entitled to seek judicial protection for places of worship that had existed for centuries. The Court disagreed.

Each of the six mosques, it observed, was a registered Waqf administered by its own Mutawalli. Under the statutory framework governing Waqf properties, it is primarily the Mutawalli and the State Waqf Board that are entrusted with protecting Waqf assets and representing them before courts.

The Bench therefore held:

“The mosques are admittedly registered Waqf, with their own Mutawalli in each case. No doubt, members of the Muslim community may come forward in certain cases, but essentially it is the Mutawalli and the Waqf Board, who have to protect such properties. We have, nevertheless, heard the petitioners on this issue as well. If we hear the petitioners on this issue and pass judgment, it might prejudice the rights of the Mutawalli and the Waqf Board, who might have something to say in the matter, and their locus is pre-eminent, and not of the petitioners”. (Para 36)

Importantly, the Court did not hold that the mosques themselves lacked legal protection. Instead, it concluded that these particular petitioners were not the appropriate parties to assert those rights. This distinction assumes significance because the judgment expressly leaves open the possibility of future litigation by the Waqf Board or the respective Mutawallis. In other words, the Court’s dismissal of the petition cannot be read as foreclosing all future challenges to the acquisition of the mosques.

Interpreting the Places of Worship Act: Conversion is not acquisition

The central legal question before the Bench was whether the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991 prevents the State from acquiring a place of worship that existed before August 15, 1947.

The petitioners relied primarily upon Sections 3 and 4 of the Act. Section 3 prohibits the conversion of any place of worship belonging to one religious denomination into a place of worship of another denomination or another section of the same religion. Section 4 declares that the religious character of every place of worship existing on 15 August 1947 shall continue to remain the same. According to the petitioners, these provisions effectively insulated pre-Independence places of worship from acquisition or demolition because any such action would inevitably alter their religious character.

The High Court rejected this interpretation. The Bench cautioned against reading Section 4 in isolation. If viewed independently, Section 4 might appear to suggest that every place of worship existing on 15 August 1947 must physically remain untouched forever. However, the Court held that such a reading would misconstrue the statute and disregard the legislative context in which it was enacted.

Instead, the Court adopted what it described as a harmonious construction of Sections 3 and 4. Read together, these provisions reveal Parliament’s true objective—to prevent one religious community or denomination from converting a place of worship belonging to another community after Independence. Thus, a temple existing on 15 August 1947 cannot subsequently become a mosque or church; equally, a mosque cannot be converted into a temple or any other place of worship. That, according to the Court, is the extent of the statutory prohibition.

The judgment stressed that Parliament enacted the Places of Worship Act in the aftermath of escalating communal disputes over religious sites to preserve communal harmony and maintain the religious status quo existing at the time of Independence. Nothing in the language of the Act, however, indicates an intention to withdraw the State’s traditional power to acquire land for public purposes.

“Now, Sections 3 and 4 of the Act of 1991 have to be harmoniously construed, in particular, sub-Section (1) of Section 4. Read in isolation, sub-Section (1) of Section 4 might seem to declare that the religious character of a place of worship existing on the 15th day of August, 1947 is immutable, to wit, if it was a temple, it will remain a temple, if a church, it would remain that, and if a mosque, it would continue to be so. But reading it this way, would be a misconstruction of the scope of the Statute. When Section 4(1) of the Act of 1991 is read together with Section 3, it is evident that there is a prohibition imposed by Section 3 upon any person converting any place of worship of any religious denomination or a sect thereof into a place of worship of a different sect of the same denomination or to that of a different religious denomination. Sections 3 and 4 of the Act of 1991, when harmoniously construed, prevent the religious character of a place of worship belonging to a religious denomination from being changed into a place of worship of another religious denomination, from whatever it was on the 15th day of August, 1947. In short, a temple on 15th August, 1947 cannot be converted to a church or a mosque, and likewise, a mosque or a church to a temple.” (Para 42)

According to the Court, interpreting the 1991 Act as creating absolute immunity from acquisition would place every religious property beyond the reach of public infrastructure projects, regardless of necessity or public interest. Such an interpretation, the Bench held, finds no support either in the statutory language or in the legislative purpose underlying the Act.

The Court therefore concluded that the Places of Worship Act protects religious identity, not ownership. It prevents the alteration of the religious character of places of worship but does not prohibit their acquisition for roads, public infrastructure or other secular public purposes carried out in accordance with law and accompanied by payment of compensation.

The Bench also found support for this interpretation in the amended provisions of the Waqf Act, 1995. Section 51 expressly recognises that Waqf properties may be acquired for public purposes under the RFCTLARR Act or other land acquisition laws, provided the acquisition is undertaken in consultation with the Waqf Board and subject to statutory safeguards, including that it should not contravene the Places of Worship Act, be for an undisputed public purpose, and provide appropriate compensation or suitable alternative land where required. Far from prohibiting acquisition, the Waqf Act, the Court held, prescribes the conditions under which such acquisition may lawfully take place.

“Section 51 of the Waqf Act, 1995 (as amended by Act No. 14 of 2025) provides, by virtue of the second proviso to sub-Section (1A) of Section 51 that nothing contained in this sub-Section, that is to say, the prohibition on sale, gift, exchange, mortgage or transfer of Waqf property being void, shall affect any acquisition of Waqf properties for a public purpose, under the Act of 2013, or any other law relating to acquisition of land, if such acquisition is made in consultation with the Board. The Board, of course, means the Waqf Board. The third proviso says that the acquisition shall not be in contravention of the Act of 1991, the provision upon which learned Counsel for the petitioner has much harped.” (Para 44)

The Court’s understanding of eminent domain

The judgment is equally significant for its reaffirmation of the constitutional doctrine of eminent domain. The Bench held that nothing in the Places of Worship Act suggests Parliament intended to curtail the State’s sovereign authority to acquire land for public purposes. Such a conclusion, it reasoned, would create an extraordinary category of property permanently insulated from acquisition—something Parliament neither expressly stated nor necessarily intended.

The Court explained:

“The purport of the Act of 1991 is not to place beyond the pale of authority of the State’s right as the owner paramount of all lands in the territory of India and to acquire and use it for any public purpose, subject, of course, to the owner’s right to receive just and fair compensation. That is what the doctrine of eminent domain, after all, means. The Act of 1991 is not meant to derogate from that right of the State.” (Para 42)

The reasoning reflects a limited ,classical understanding of eminent domain: private rights yield to public necessity, subject to legality, due process and compensation. However, the judgment also illustrates a recurring feature of Indian constitutional adjudication. The Court devotes considerable attention to affirming the State’s acquisition powers but relatively little to examining the quality of judicial review that should accompany their exercise—particularly where acquisition affects centuries-old religious institutions. The distinction is important.

Recognising that the State possesses the power to acquire land does not automatically answer whether a particular acquisition satisfies constitutional standards of fairness, proportionality or necessity.

Reliance on Ismail Faruqui

To reinforce its interpretation, the Bench relied upon the Constitution Bench decision in Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India (1994). That decision, delivered in the aftermath of the acquisition of land around the disputed Ayodhya site, held that acquisition of a mosque is not constitutionally prohibited merely because it is a place of worship. The Constitution Bench observed that offering namaz is not necessarily confined to a mosque, and consequently a mosque does not enjoy absolute immunity from acquisition.

The Allahabad High Court relied upon these observations to conclude that acquisition of religious property remains constitutionally permissible where undertaken for a legitimate public purpose. The reliance is doctrinally understandable because Ismail Faruqui continues to remain binding precedent on land acquisition. Yet it also revives one of the most debated aspects of Indian constitutional law.

The observations concerning the essentiality of mosques to Islamic practice have been criticised by constitutional lawyers for venturing into theological questions that were arguably unnecessary for deciding the acquisition dispute before the Court. Indeed, in M. Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das (Ayodhya, 2019), the Supreme Court clarified that Ismail Faruqui should be understood in the limited context of acquisition and should not be read as a broader pronouncement on Islamic doctrine.

The Allahabad High Court follows precisely that limited approach. It relies on Ismail Faruqui not to determine the importance of mosques within Islam, but to reaffirm the narrower proposition that religious properties are not constitutionally immune from compulsory acquisition. Yet that conclusion, while legally defensible, does not exhaust the constitutional questions raised by the case. The more difficult issue is not whether acquisition is legally permissible.

It is how courts should scrutinise the exercise of that power when acquisition affects historic places of worship situated within politically contested landscapes. That question, significantly, remains largely unanswered by the judgment.

A narrow reading of a law enacted to preserve constitutional secularism

The Allahabad High Court’s judgment is likely to become an important precedent in future disputes involving religious properties and public infrastructure. Its central holding—that the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991 does not prohibit the State from acquiring places of worship for secular public purposes—is likely to be cited in litigation involving roads, railways, metro projects, heritage redevelopment and urban renewal schemes across the country. Yet, while the judgment provides a coherent textual interpretation of the statute, it also leaves several constitutional questions unanswered. These unanswered questions are important because they go to the heart of the constitutional balance between State power, religious freedom and secularism.

The High Court proceeds on the premise that Parliament intended the Places of Worship Act to prevent only one mischief—the conversion of a place of worship from one religion to another. There is textual support for this conclusion. Sections 3 and 4 repeatedly refer to “conversion” and “religious character.” Read literally, they do not expressly prohibit acquisition. However, constitutional interpretation rarely ends with the literal text. Every statute must also be understood in light of the constitutional purpose it seeks to achieve.

The Places of Worship Act was enacted in September 1991 during one of independent India’s most volatile communal moments. The Ram Janmabhoomi movement had transformed disputes over historical religious sites into instruments of mass political mobilisation. Parliament responded by freezing the religious character of every place of worship as it existed on August 15, 1947, making a conscious constitutional choice that independent India would not continually reopen disputes rooted in medieval history. In Ayodhya jugdment, the Supreme Court recognised precisely this objective.

The Court described the Places of Worship Act as a legislative instrument that protects the secular foundations of the Constitution by preventing history from becoming a source of recurring communal conflict. It called the Act a statutory reflection of India’s constitutional commitment to equality, fraternity and secularism, observing that the law imposes a principle of constitutional non-retrogression—the Republic would move forward from the moment of Independence rather than repeatedly litigate the past. Against that backdrop, an important question arises.

If Parliament intended to preserve communal harmony by protecting historic places of worship, does that protection concern only their religious identity, or also their continued existence? The Allahabad High Court answers only the first question. It does not meaningfully engage with the second. That omission does not necessarily render the judgment incorrect. But it does illustrate the limits of a purely textual approach when interpreting legislation enacted to serve a larger constitutional purpose.

Conversion and acquisition: A distinction that invites further debate

The judgment rests upon a clear distinction between conversion and acquisition. According to the Court, acquisition changes ownership; conversion changes religious identity. Legally, the distinction is logical. Constitutionally, however, it is more complicated. A mosque acquired for a road project has not become a temple; a church acquired for a metro line has not become a gurudwara; yet neither continues to function as a place of worship. This raises an important constitutional question that the judgment leaves unanswered.

Can the religious character of a place meaningfully survive once the place itself has ceased to exist? The answer is not obvious. One could argue, as the Court does, that Parliament deliberately chose only to prohibit conversion and not acquisition. Equally, one could argue that the continued existence of historic places of worship forms part of the very constitutional settlement the Act sought to preserve after Independence. Neither interpretation is implausible. The issue is likely to acquire greater significance if future redevelopment projects affect historic temples, mosques, churches or gurudwaras elsewhere in the country.

The meaning of “public purpose”

Perhaps the most important constitutional issue left largely unexplored by the judgment concerns the idea of public purpose. Throughout the decision, the Court accepts road widening, urban infrastructure and improved pilgrimage access as legitimate public purposes. Ordinarily, that proposition is uncontroversial. Courts have long recognised roads, railways, public transport and civic infrastructure as classic examples of public purpose. However, constitutional adjudication ordinarily does not stop there.

Where fundamental rights are affected, courts frequently ask additional questions.

• Is the objective legitimate?
• Was due fair and reasonable process followed in the actions of acquisition of ancient temples and mosques: dialogues, engagements, adjudication?
• Is the chosen measure necessary?
• Could the same objective have been achieved through less restrictive means?
• Has the State adequately balanced competing constitutional interests?

Those questions receive relatively limited attention in the present judgment. This is partly explained by the Court’s finding that the petition itself suffered from lack of locus standi. Once the Court concluded that the petitioners were not the appropriate parties to challenge the acquisition, it understandably refrained from undertaking a detailed proportionality analysis. Nevertheless, the broader constitutional issue remains. Redevelopment projects affecting centuries-old places of worship occupy a category distinct from ordinary land acquisition disputes. Such projects implicate not merely property rights but also religious freedom, cultural heritage, community identity and constitutional secularism. Future litigation instituted by title holders, Mutawallis or Waqf Boards may therefore require courts to scrutinise more closely whether the asserted public purpose justifies the particular acquisition in question.

The heritage dimension

Another notable feature of the judgment is what it does not discuss. The decision treats the dispute primarily as one concerning statutory interpretation and land acquisition. It says relatively little about heritage. Yet heritage formed an important part of the wider public debate surrounding the Kashi Vishwanath Corridor.

For several years, historians, architects, urban planners and conservationists have debated whether redevelopment of the temple precinct should be understood merely as infrastructure expansion or also as a profound transformation of one of India’s oldest living cities. The issue extends beyond individual buildings. Varanasi’s historic significance lies not only in monumental structures such as the Kashi Vishwanath Temple or the Gyanvapi Mosque but equally in the intricate network of neighbourhoods, shrines, markets and narrow lanes that evolved over centuries.

Urban heritage increasingly recognises that cities possess value not merely because of isolated monuments but because of the relationships between monuments, communities and everyday life. Indian constitutional law itself reflects this concern. Article 49 places an obligation upon the State to protect monuments of national importance, and Article 51A(f) recognises a fundamental duty to value and preserve the country’s composite culture. Neither provision directly governed the dispute before the Allahabad High Court. Yet both remind us that redevelopment of historically significant urban spaces inevitably raises constitutional questions extending beyond land acquisition alone.

What the judgment leaves open

It is equally important to understand what the Court did not decide. The judgment does not hold that every acquisition of a religious property is automatically valid. Nor does it approve every aspect of the Dalmandi redevelopment project. The Court does not examine whether the acquisition satisfies every procedural safeguard under the RFCTLARR Act; it does not determine whether consultation requirements under the Waqf Act were fully complied with; and it does not decide whether compensation is adequate. Nor does it adjudicate upon the independent rights of the Waqf Board or the Mutawallis, expressly leaving those questions open for future proceedings. Accordingly, the judgment should not be read more broadly than its ratio permits.

Its central proposition is narrower: the Places of Worship Act, by itself, does not prohibit acquisition of places of worship for a lawful public purpose. Whether a particular acquisition satisfies constitutional and statutory safeguards remains a separate inquiry.

Conclusion: Development, secularism and the future of the Places of Worship Act

The Allahabad High Court’s decision arrives at a moment when the constitutional future of the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991 itself remains under scrutiny before the Supreme Court. In that sense, the judgment is likely to influence debates extending far beyond the immediate dispute in Dalmandi. Its importance lies not because it diminishes the constitutional value of secularism, the Court expressly accepts the continuing force of the 1991 Act, but because it narrows the statute’s operational field. By distinguishing conversion from acquisition, the Court shifts future disputes involving redevelopment away from the Places of Worship Act and towards the law of eminent domain, land acquisition, proportionality and procedural fairness. Whether that shift ultimately strengthens constitutional governance or weakens one of Parliament’s most significant secular safeguards remains an open question.

If accepted more broadly, the judgment means that the principal legal battleground in future cases may no longer be whether the Places of Worship Act bars State action, but whether the exercise of eminent domain itself satisfies constitutional standards of fairness, necessity, proportionality and non-discrimination. That is a significant doctrinal shift. It also reflects a larger constitutional reality.

As Indian cities continue to redevelop historic religious precincts, whether in Varanasi, Mathura, Ujjain, Ayodhya or elsewhere, courts will increasingly be called upon to reconcile competing constitutional values: development and conservation, public infrastructure and religious freedom, State power and minority rights, heritage and modernisation. The Dalmandi judgment does not resolve those tensions. It marks the beginning of a new chapter in that conversation.

The complete judgment may be read below:

[1] Announced with much fanfare in March 2019, when prime minister Modi laid the foundation stone, it was formally inaugurated in 2021; https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2122058&reg=48&lang=2

[2] https://www.thehinducentre.com/the-arena/current-issues/advani-to-modi-to-yogi-a-hindutva-story-foretold/article64931577.ece; https://frontline.thehindu.com/cover-story/article25545271.ece

[3] Babri Masjid Demolition: Point of Departure, and of Arrival, Teesta Setalvad, Social Scientist; https://www.jstor.org/stable/27249507

Related:

When the Supreme Court directed protection for the Gyan Vapi Mosque, upheld the Places of Worship Act, 1991 (1994, 1995, 1997)

UP: After Gyanvapi, Mathura Court Orders Shahi Idgah Survey; ‘Violation’ of Places of Worship Act, Say Activists

The Challenge to Places of Worship Special Provisions Act, 1991 is Misconceived

Article 32 cannot be invoked to enforce all disputes relating to the Places of Worship Act: SC

When and How Ram Vilas Paswan made a strong pitch for the Places of Worship Act, 1991

Understanding the Supreme Court’s Interim Intervention in the Waqf Amendments, 2025

‘Reforms’: Sachar Committee, the 2013 Amendments and the motive behind the proposed changes in the Waqf Regime

Amendments to the Waqf Law were needed, but the grab-and-control Waqf Amendment Act, 2025 is not the answer

The post Public Purpose and Places of Worship: Allahabad HC’s Dalmandi verdict appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Against this backdrop, the Gauhati High Court’s decision in Aminul Hoque v. Union of India & Ors, delivered on June 30, 2026, dismissing the petitioner’s challenge to the opinion of Foreigners Tribunal No. 4, Kamrup (Metro), once again reiterates the settled principles governing proceedings under the Foreigners Act, 1946. In this June 30 judgement, the Court reaffirmed that the burden under Section 9 of the Act rests squarely upon the proceedee; that documentary evidence, rather than oral assertions, must establish citizenship; that writ courts exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot function as appellate authorities over findings of Foreigners Tribunals; and that discrepancies in documentary evidence may legitimately defeat a citizenship claim where linkage with pre-1971 ancestors remains unproved.

“Thus, though the petitioner had exhibited 15 (fifteen) documents as exhibits, the same does not appear to help the petitioner to establish that he has been able to discharge his burden as required under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1964 to prove that he is not a foreigner but an Indian Citizen.” (Para 27)

The judgment may sound as if it is entirely consistent with recent jurisprudence developed by the Gauhati High Court. However as the 2013 judgement of the same Court in Moslem Mandal shows, this is not how this particular court has ruled, always. Conflicting verdicts make access for substantive justice an even greater challenge for individual, impoverished victims of citizenship. The Aminul Hoque verdict relies upon familiar propositions regarding the burden of proof, admissibility of electronic records, evidentiary value of electoral rolls, proof of linkage documents and the narrow contours of certiorari jurisdiction. While the Court appears to meticulously examine each document produced by the petitioner, its treatment and evaluation especially given everyday realities behind “spelling differences” and “date differentials” in official documents discards their value. The entire verdict runs in to 21 pages.

Hence, the judgment raises larger constitutional questions about the evolving nature of citizenship adjudication in India. The decision reflects what may be described as a burden-centric approach, where the primary inquiry revolves around whether the proceedee has satisfactorily established lineage through admissible documentary evidence. Questions relating to procedural fairness, the practical realities of maintaining documentary continuity over several decades, and the heightened constitutional consequences flowing from a declaration of foreigner status receive comparatively limited engagement.

These concerns assume particular significance in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Sabitri Dey @ Swasthi Dey v. Union of India, where a Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta substantially reiterated formerly established jurisprudence governing Foreigners Tribunal proceedings. While affirming that Section 9 continues to place the burden upon the individual to establish Indian citizenship, the Supreme Court simultaneously clarified that this burden “operates within a legal process” and cannot replace the Tribunal’s obligation to conduct a fair, lawful and reasoned adjudication. The Court further held that citizenship proceedings remain subject to Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, emphasising that procedural fairness extends to “any person”, irrespective of whether they ultimately succeed in proving citizenship.

Detailed report on the judgement may be read here.

Although Aminul Hoque predates that decision, it provides an important lens through which the Supreme Court’s subsequent intervention may be understood. Substantially varying interpretations –even by constitutional courts –on the rigour of evidentiary procedures before Foreigners Tribunals have only obfuscated a life-and-death issue further. The present judgment reflects the evidentiary challenges routinely encountered in Assam’s Foreigners Tribunal regime: fragmented documentary records, changing spellings of names, migration across villages due to erosion and displacement, inconsistencies in electoral rolls, reliance upon legacy data, and the perennial difficulty of establishing genealogical continuity spanning several decades.

Rather than merely determining the fate of one individual, the judgment illustrates the structural tensions embedded within citizenship adjudication itself—between subjective evaluations of the statutory burden and constitutional fairness, documentary precision and lived realities, judicial restraint and meaningful scrutiny, and ultimately between sovereign power and individual liberty.

Facts giving rise to the dispute

The proceedings arose from an opinion dated February 28, 2019 passed by the Member, Foreigners Tribunal No. 4, Kamrup (Metro), Guwahati in FT Case No. FT(KM)-4/1077/2017. Acting upon a reference made by the competent authorities, the Tribunal declared the petitioner, Aminul Hoque, to be a foreigner who had entered India after March 25, 1971, thereby attracting the consequences contemplated under the Foreigners Act, 1946. Challenging this opinion, the petitioner invoked the writ jurisdiction of the Gauhati High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Before the Tribunal, the petitioner asserted that he was an Indian citizen by birth and traced his lineage through his father Mohiruddin Sheikh (also described in different documents as Mahruddin Sheikh, Mohiruddin and Mohir Uddin) and his grandfather Pasan Ali (also appearing as Pashan Sheikh/Pachan Ali in different records). According to the defence, the family originally resided at village Dhobakura, later shifted to Ghugudoba owing to erosion caused by the Brahmaputra, and subsequently settled at Hashdoba following family partition and migration over the years. The petitioner contended that these successive movements explained the appearance of his family in electoral rolls relating to different villages across different years.

To establish this lineage, the petitioner produced an extensive documentary record comprising fifteen exhibits. These included extracts from the 1951 NRC, certified electoral rolls of 1966, 1970, 1979, 1985, 1989, 1997, 2005, 2013, 2015 and 2017, a registered sale deed executed in favour of his projected grandfather in 1973, his PAN Card, EPIC, and a school certificate issued by the Headmaster of Hashdoba Anchalik High School. He also examined himself as DW-1 and produced his projected father as DW-2 in an attempt to establish the necessary family linkage between the pre-1971 ancestors and himself.

Clearly, the documentary record appeared substantial. Unlike several Foreigners Tribunal cases where the proceedee herein relies upon only a handful of documents, and the petitioner sought to construct a continuous genealogical chain spanning over five decades. The central question before both the Tribunal and the High Court, therefore, was not the absence of documentary material but whether the documents, read together, successfully established an uninterrupted legal link connecting the petitioner with ancestors whose presence in India prior to March 25, 1971 stood established.

It is in answering that question that the judgment assumes wider significance, for the High Court’s analysis demonstrates the exceptionally narrow –and even bureaucratically rigid–evidentiary scrutiny presently employed in citizenship adjudication. Rather than treating the documents cumulatively, the Court subjected each exhibit to independent examination before testing whether the entire chain remained internally consistent. Any unexplained discrepancy—whether relating to age, spelling, relationship, village, family composition or documentary proof—was treated as capable of weakening the overall linkage claim.

The resulting analysis reveals a judicial methodology that prioritises documentary perfection above all else, raising broader questions about the practical ability of rural citizens (or any citizens from the marginalised sections) to satisfy evidentiary standards in proceedings carrying the gravest of civil consequences.

Another detailed report on an earlier judicial treatment of documentary discrepancies may be read here.

The Court’s evidentiary analysis: Why every document failed to establish citizenship

The Gauhati High Court’s judgment is disturbing not only because it rejects the petitioner’s claim outright, but because of the meticulous manner in which it appears to scrutinise every document relied upon to establish citizenship. Rather than approaching the petitioner’s evidence cumulatively –and with an application of reasoning and logic– the Court examined each document individually, testing its admissibility, authenticity, evidentiary value and ability to establish the crucial element of linkage. Ultimately, the Court concluded that while some documents may have demonstrated the existence of particular individuals at different points in time, none successfully established the “connections” of the petitioner to an ancestor whose presence in India prior to March 25, 1971 stood legally established.

The judgment therefore illustrates a recurring feature of Foreigners Tribunal litigation in Assam: possession of numerous documents does not necessarily translate into proof of citizenship. What the law requires is an unbroken documentary chain demonstrating lineage, identity and continuity across generations.

• The 1951 NRC extract: A foundational document rejected

Among the most significant documents relied upon by the petitioner was a computer-generated extract of the 1951 National Register of Citizens (NRC), purportedly showing the name of his projected grandfather, Pasan Ali. Since the 1951 NRC predates the statutory cut-off date of March 25, 1971, such a document, if accepted, could have provided a crucial starting point for establishing ancestral presence in India.

The High Court, however, refused to attach evidentiary value to the document. The Court observed that the extract produced before the Tribunal was not the original NRC register but a computer-generated copy downloaded from the NRC database. As such, it constituted an electronic record within the meaning of the Indian Evidence Act. Since no certificate satisfying the mandatory requirements of Section 65B accompanied the document, the Court held that it was inadmissible in evidence. Consequently, the Tribunal was justified in excluding it from consideration. Arguably this is a hyper-technical rejection of an otherwise accepted document. Put differently, the state could have been called upon by the Court to produce its own digital record of the same roll for re-verification.

The Court relied upon settled jurisprudence governing electronic evidence to conclude that compliance with Section 65B is not merely procedural but mandatory when electronic records are sought to be proved.

This aspect of the judgment is particularly significant because many citizenship claims in Assam increasingly rely upon digitised legacy data generated during the NRC exercise. By insisting upon strict compliance with Section 65B, the Court effectively raises the evidentiary threshold for proving legacy records that are now maintained and accessed electronically.

From a doctrinal standpoint, the reasoning is consistent with the law governing electronic evidence. Yet it also raises practical concerns. Legacy data made available by government authorities for NRC verification is frequently accessed through official digital repositories rather than physical registers. Requiring every proceedee before a Foreigners Tribunal to procure a formal Section 65B certificate may impose an additional procedural hurdle upon individuals who have little control over the manner in which such historical records are digitised or maintained. The judgment does not engage with this practical difficulty, instead applying the evidentiary rule in a strictly formal manner.

• Electoral rolls: Presence is not enough; linkage must also be proved

The petitioner also relied extensively upon electoral rolls spanning several decades. He produced voter lists of 1966 and 1970 showing the names of Pasan Ali and Mohiruddin Sheikh, voter lists of subsequent years reflecting changes in residence, and later electoral rolls containing his own name.

Ordinarily, electoral rolls prepared before the cut-off date constitute important evidence in citizenship proceedings because they establish that a particular individual was recognised as an elector in India before March 25, 1971.

However, the High Court reiterated another “settled” principle: pre-1971 electoral records establish only the existence of the recorded individual—not the citizenship of every person claiming descent from that individual. The crucial question always remains whether the proceedee has successfully proved the family linkage connecting himself to the projected ancestor.

Examining the electoral records closely, the Court noticed several inconsistencies. The names of the projected ancestors appeared across different villages—Dhobakura, Ghugudoba and Hashdoba. The petitioner explained these changes by referring to river erosion, displacement and subsequent settlement elsewhere, a phenomenon not uncommon in Assam’s flood-prone districts.

The Court did not reject this explanation outright. Instead, it held that the explanation itself required independent documentary corroboration. Merely asserting that a family migrated because of erosion could not bridge the evidentiary gap unless supported by continuous documentary material establishing that the individuals appearing in different electoral rolls were indeed the same persons. The question that begs attention here is what document if at all –across India and applicable to any or all displaced by natural disasters individuals or groups—could ever establish such “continuous documentary material.” Again, by adhering to a narrow manifestation of “established procedure” the Gauhati HC, a constitutional court, ignored the vast (and bitter reality) that hundreds of thousands of displaced Assamese face—the absence of these “legally convincing documents.”

The Court also examined the ages recorded in different voter lists and observed discrepancies which, in its view, weakened the reliability of the projected genealogy. These inconsistencies, though individually minor, assumed greater significance because the petitioner’s entire citizenship claim depended upon establishing an uninterrupted documentary chain extending across several decades.

Accordingly, the Court concluded that while the electoral rolls undoubtedly demonstrated the presence of persons bearing similar names, they did not satisfactorily establish that the petitioner was their lawful descendant.

• The registered sale deed: Ownership cannot establish lineage

Another important document relied upon by the petitioner was a registered sale deed executed in 1973 in favour of the projected grandfather. The petitioner argued that ownership of immovable property further corroborated the family’s long-standing residence in Assam.

The High Court accepted that the sale deed was a genuine registered document but observed that its evidentiary value remained limited.

A sale deed may establish ownership of land by the recorded purchaser. It does not, however, establish the identity of descendants claiming through that purchaser unless independent evidence proves the genealogical relationship between them.

Since the Court had already found the linkage evidence deficient, the sale deed could not independently prove the petitioner’s citizenship.

The judgment simply reiterates another practice followed by Foreigners Tribunal that do not often follow the rules of logic and reasoning of the Indian Evidence Act: documents proving property ownership cannot substitute proof of lineage. They merely establish that a particular person owned land; they do not establish that every claimant tracing ancestry to that person has successfully proved the relationship.

• PAN Card and EPIC: Identity documents are not proof of citizenship

The petitioner also relied upon his Permanent Account Number (PAN) Card and Electoral Photo Identity Card (EPIC). The High Court attached virtually no evidentiary weight to either document. Referring to earlier precedents, the Court reiterated that neither a PAN Card nor an EPIC constitutes proof of Indian citizenship. These documents primarily establish identity for administrative purposes and cannot override the statutory inquiry contemplated under the Foreigners Act.

The Court observed that issuance of such documents proceeds upon administrative verification and does not amount to a judicial determination of citizenship. Consequently, possession of these documents cannot discharge the burden imposed under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act.

The judgment once again reflects the narrow philosophy that often –though not always –governs citizenship litigation.

School certificate and oral evidence: Insufficient to bridge the evidentiary gap

Perhaps the most revealing aspect of the judgment concerns the treatment of the petitioner’s school certificate and oral testimony. The petitioner relied upon a certificate issued by the Headmaster of Hashdoba Anchalik High School to establish his parentage and educational history.

The Court declined to rely upon the certificate because the Headmaster who issued it was not examined before the Tribunal and the original admission register from which the certificate was prepared was never produced. In the absence of foundational evidence proving how the entries were made, the Court held that the certificate possessed little evidentiary value. A more pro-active approach could have resulted in a constitutional court questioning the Foreigner Tribunal proceedings for this “lapse” rather than rejecting the proceedee’s claim altogether.

Similarly, although the petitioner’s projected father entered the witness box and attempted to establish the family relationship through oral testimony, the Court held that such evidence could not compensate for deficiencies in documentary proof.

The High Court also observed that oral assertions regarding lineage, however sincere, cannot by themselves discharge the burden imposed under Section 9 where documentary evidence capable of establishing family linkage is either absent or inconsistent.

In effect, questionably, the Court treated documentary evidence as the primary mode of proving citizenship, while oral testimony assumed only a corroborative role. Where the documentary chain itself remained incomplete, oral evidence was considered insufficient to cure the defect.

This approach reflects some –not all—of the the prevailing judicial emphasis on documentary certainty in citizenship adjudication. However, it simultaneously raises an important question: whether proceedings determining a person’s legal status should demand documentary continuity of a standard that vast numbers of Indians, rural citizens, particularly those displaced by erosion, migration or historical administrative deficiencies, may find exceptionally difficult to satisfy.

Judicial restraint and the limits of Article 226: Deference to the Foreigners Tribunal

Having concluded that the petitioner failed to “establish a satisfactory documentary chain linking him to his projected ancestors,” the Gauhati High Court turned to what ultimately became the decisive legal question: whether the High Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, could re-appreciate the evidence and arrive at a different factual conclusion from that reached by the Foreigners Tribunal. The Court answered this question firmly in the negative.

Relying upon a long line of precedents, the Bench reiterated that a writ court exercising certiorari jurisdiction does not function as an appellate forum over the findings of a Foreigners Tribunal. Its role is confined to examining whether the Tribunal acted within its jurisdiction, followed the prescribed procedure, observed principles of natural justice and arrived at findings that are not perverse or unsupported by any evidence. Mere disagreement with the appreciation of evidence does not justify interference under Article 226.

To reinforce this proposition, the Court referred to the Constitution Bench decision in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, which continues to govern the scope of certiorari jurisdiction. The Court also relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences v. Bikartan Das, reiterating that writ courts cannot substitute their own factual conclusions merely because another view of the evidence may be possible.

Applying these principles, the High Court concluded that the Tribunal had examined every document placed before it, evaluated the oral testimony of both witnesses and assigned reasons for rejecting the petitioner’s claim. Unfortunately even though some oral testimonies –notably that of the Headmaster of the school were not recorded—the HC still came to this conclusion.

Whether those conclusions were ultimately correct on facts was, according to the Court, not a question that could ordinarily be reopened in writ proceedings. The judgment therefore reflects a pronounced judicial deference to the specialised role assigned to Foreigners Tribunals under the Foreigners Act and the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order.

“In this case in hand, the petitioner has not been able to establish that the learned Tribunal had committed any patent error in appreciating the pleadings and evidence on record, or that it considered extraneous materials or that the decision was based on ignorance of law or in disregard to the provisions of law.” (Para 30)

“In the light of the discussions made hereinbefore, the Court finds no material to hold that the opinion assailed in this writ petition is bad on facts or in law. The learned counsel for the petitioner could not show that the said opinion was perverse on any count whatsoever. Therefore, this challenge fails and consequently, this writ petition is dismissed.” (Para 31)

A burden-centric model of citizenship adjudication

Read holistically, the judgment reveals a judicial philosophy that has shaped Assam’s citizenship jurisprudence intermittently over the past two decades. The Court repeatedly returns to one statutory principle: Section 9 of the Foreigners Act places the burden of proving citizenship upon the proceedee. Everything else in the judgment flows from that premise.

The Court examines every document not to determine whether it raises a reasonable probability of Indian citizenship but to ascertain whether it conclusively discharges the burden imposed by Section 9. Where inconsistencies emerge, the benefit does not accrue to the proceedee. Instead, the deficiencies are treated as failures to satisfy the statutory burden. This approach may be described as burden-centric adjudication.

Under this model:

• the reference made by the State initiates the proceedings;
• the proceedee must affirmatively establish Indian citizenship;
• documentary evidence assumes primacy over oral testimony;
• every link in the genealogical chain must be independently proved;
• unexplained discrepancies weaken the entire claim; and
• failure to establish linkage results in the statutory burden remaining undischarged.

Doctrinally, this reasoning finds some support in earlier Supreme Court decisions, particularly Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India, which upheld the reverse burden contained in Section 9 on the ground that questions relating to nationality, birth and ancestry lie especially within the knowledge of the individual concerned. Interestingly while Sonowal has been cited on this aspect –upholding burden of proof—the same judgement of the SC has been ignored when it comes to the crucial and material issue of material grounds for issuance of notice by the Assam Border Police in the first place.

The Gauhati High Court’s judgment faithfully applies that doctrine. However, the decision also exposes the practical implications of a jurisprudence that places overwhelming emphasis upon documentary precision in a region where historical documentation has often been fragmented by displacement, erosion, illiteracy and administrative inconsistency.

Does the judgment impose an unrealistic evidentiary standard?

Perhaps the most significant question emerging from the judgment is not whether the Court correctly applied existing law, but whether the evidentiary standard demanded by that law adequately reflects the realities of citizenship documentation in Assam. The petitioner produced fifteen documents spanning nearly seven decades. These included pre-1971 electoral rolls, a 1951 NRC extract, land records, a registered sale deed, multiple voter lists, school records, PAN and EPIC, along with oral evidence from his projected father. Yet none proved sufficient.

Individually, many documents were rejected because they did not establish linkage. Others were discounted because of technical deficiencies in admissibility. Some suffered from discrepancies in names, ages or villages. Oral testimony was treated as incapable of curing documentary gaps. From a purely evidentiary standpoint, each conclusion may appear legally sustainable. Viewed collectively, however, the judgment raises a broader concern.

Citizenship proceedings frequently involve families whose records extend back fifty or seventy years. Variations in spelling, transliteration between Assamese, Bengali and English, inconsistent recording of ages, migration due to annual flooding, subdivision of villages and changing administrative boundaries are hardly exceptional features of rural documentation in Assam—they are endemic realities. The judgment gives relatively little consideration to these structural realities. Instead, it proceeds upon an implicit assumption that documentary continuity should ordinarily be capable of precise reconstruction. Whether such an expectation is realistic is a question that remains largely unexplored.

The treatment of linkage evidence

Another notable aspect of the judgment is its treatment of linkage. The Court correctly observes that proving the existence of an ancestor in India before March 25, 1971 is only the first step. The decisive issue is whether the proceedee has successfully demonstrated that he is indeed the descendant of that ancestor. This requirement has become the cornerstone of Assam’s Foreigners Tribunal jurisprudence. Yet the present judgment illustrates how linkage has gradually evolved from a factual inquiry into an exceptionally demanding documentary exercise. Each missing document, each discrepancy in age, each variation in spelling and each unexplained shift in residence becomes capable of weakening the entire genealogical chain.

The consequence is that citizenship litigation often turns less upon the existence of ancestral residence than upon the ability to reconstruct documentary history with remarkable precision across multiple decades. Whether this reflects the legislative intention underlying Section 9 or has developed incrementally through judicial practice is itself worthy of closer examination.

The Supreme Court’s intervention: A shift from burden to process

It is against this background that the Supreme Court’s recent judgment in Sabitri Dey @ Swasthi Dey v. Union of India assumes profound significance. Although the Supreme Court did not dilute the statutory burden under Section 9, it fundamentally altered the constitutional framework within which that burden must operate. The Court categorically held that the burden on the proceedee does not replace the legal process itself.

Section 9, according to the Bench, authorises neither automatic declarations nor mechanical acceptance of police references. Instead, the burden functions within a fair adjudicatory process that requires meaningful notice, disclosure of the “main grounds”, objective consideration of the State’s evidence and a reasoned determination by the Tribunal.

Most crucially, this recent 21 page judgement in Aminol Haque delivered by the GHC is silent on the whether or not the Foreigners Tribunal had examined the basis of the “notice” issued by the Assam Border Police to the proceedee, whether the notice itself disclosed material grounds for justifying the proceedings around adjudication of a person’s citizenship etc. Did the Court in Aminol Haque examine whether the initiation of proceedings were wholly without jurisdiction, non est, and void ab initio? The verdict is silent on this.[1]

Most importantly, the Supreme Court held that proceedings before Foreigners Tribunals remain subject to Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution because both provisions protect “any person”, irrespective of citizenship. This marks a subtle but significant constitutional shift.

The focus moves beyond the question “Has the proceedee discharged the burden?”

It also asks:

• Was the adjudication fair?
• Was the notice meaningful?
• Were the grounds adequately disclosed?
• Did the Tribunal independently evaluate the evidence?
• Were reasons properly recorded?
• Was the conclusion reached through a lawful and reasoned process?

These questions receive comparatively limited attention in Aminul Hoque, where the primary emphasis remains upon whether the petitioner successfully proved his case.

The Supreme Court’s judgment does not invalidate this evidentiary inquiry. Rather, it insists that evidentiary assessment itself must occur within a procedurally robust constitutional framework. Consequently, Sabitri Dey represents not a rejection of Section 9 but a recalibration of its operation. The burden continues to rest upon the proceedee. But the legitimacy of the outcome now depends equally upon the fairness of the process through which that burden is evaluated. It is precisely this constitutional dimension that may shape the future trajectory of citizenship jurisprudence in Assam.

Beyond one case: What Aminul Hoque tells us about the future of citizenship adjudication

The Gauhati High Court’s decision ultimately dismissed the writ petition, affirmed the opinion of the Foreigners Tribunal and upheld the declaration of the petitioner as a post March 25, 1971 foreigner. In doing so, the Court concluded that there was no jurisdictional error, perversity or violation of natural justice warranting interference under Article 226. The Tribunal had, in the Court’s view, appreciated the documentary and oral evidence in accordance with law, and the petitioner’s failure to establish linkage meant that the statutory burden under Section 9 remained undischarged.

From a strictly doctrinal perspective, the judgment is difficult to fault. It faithfully follows established precedents of both the Gauhati High Court and the Supreme Court regarding the burden of proof, the evidentiary value of public documents, the admissibility of electronic records, and the limited scope of judicial review under Article 226. It neither creates new legal principles nor departs from settled jurisprudence. Rather, it is emblematic of the legal framework that has governed Foreigners Tribunal litigation in Assam for nearly two decades. Yet, legal correctness is not the only lens through which judgments involving citizenship should be examined.

Citizenship occupies a unique constitutional position. Unlike most adjudicatory disputes, proceedings before a Foreigners Tribunal determine whether an individual belongs to the constitutional community itself. A declaration of foreigner status is not merely an adverse civil finding—it fundamentally alters the individual’s relationship with the State. It may lead to detention in transit camps, deportation, disenfranchisement, separation from family members who remain Indian citizens, and, in some cases, prolonged uncertainty regarding nationality. These are consequences of exceptional gravity, making citizenship litigation qualitatively different from ordinary civil or administrative proceedings.

It is precisely because of these consequences that the Supreme Court, in Sabitri Dey @ Swasthi Dey, described citizenship and foreigner determination as matters of “high constitutional and legal significance.” The Court recognised that while Parliament may legitimately prescribe a reverse burden under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, that burden cannot eclipse the constitutional guarantees of fairness, reasonableness and non-arbitrariness embodied in Articles 14 and 21.

A jurisprudence in transition

Viewed together, Aminul Hoque and Sabitri Dey reveal that citizenship jurisprudence in India is undergoing a turbulent transition. The Gauhati High Court’s judgment represents what may be a clinical and narrow view on Foreigners Tribunal jurisprudence. The principal questions are:

• Has the proceedee produced admissible documents?
• Has family linkage been proved?
• Are the electoral rolls internally consistent?
• Have documentary discrepancies been satisfactorily explained?
• Has the burden under Section 9 been discharged?

However by leaping to look at evidence from a narrow, even bureaucratically top-heavy perspective, this judgement and others of its ilk fail to scrutinise the merit or applicability of the “notice” issued. As a wide range of international and national studies including those conducted by Citizens for Justice and Peace  have shown, the act and process of issuing such notices has been proven to be ad hoc, manifestly arbitrary and even selective. No rigour in enquiry by the authorities prior to such issuance neither takes place nor is examined by the Foreigner Tribunal.

The recent Supreme Court judgment by underlining a basic flaw in this approach reiterates a constitutional process model.

Under this approach, the inquiry expands beyond abstract and even subjective assessments of “documentary sufficiency” to include procedural legitimacy. The Court asks not only whether the proceedee proved citizenship, but also whether the adjudication itself satisfied constitutional standards. Accordingly, the focus shifts towards questions such as:

• Were the “main grounds” of the allegation properly disclosed?
• Was notice effectively served?
• Did the Tribunal independently evaluate the State’s evidence?
• Were the findings supported by reasons?
• Was the opportunity to defend meaningful rather than merely formal?
• Did the adjudication satisfy the requirements of Articles 14 and 21?

These questions do not replace Section 9; they contextualise it within constitutional guarantees.

The challenge of documentary perfection

One of the most striking features of Aminul Hoque is the extraordinarily high premium placed on documentary continuity. The judgment expects a seamless genealogical chain extending across multiple decades, villages and administrative records. Every link in that chain must withstand judicial scrutiny. Variations in names, inconsistencies in ages, changes in residence, absence of foundational records and deficiencies in proving public documents all become capable of defeating the claim.

Citizenship cannot be determined on speculation or conjecture. While some aspects of documentary proof may be needed as a reliable means of establishing lineage, ground circumstances, the sensitive issue of citizenship adjudication in Assam presents a unique factual context. Large sections of the population have experienced repeated displacement due to river erosion. Entire villages have disappeared and re-emerged elsewhere. Administrative boundaries have changed. Large sections of the local population migrate intra-state. Names have been transliterated between Assamese, Bengali and English with varying spellings. Ages have often been recorded approximately rather than precisely. Legacy records from the 1950s and 1960s were not created with future citizenship litigation in mind. These realities do not excuse deficiencies in evidence. But they do underscore the importance of evaluating documentary inconsistencies in context rather than in isolation.

The High Court’s judgment gives comparatively limited consideration to these structural realities, preferring instead to apply conventional evidentiary principles with considerable rigour. Whether that approach adequately accommodates the lived realities of documentation in Assam remains an open constitutional question.

Fairness as a constitutional imperative

Perhaps the most enduring contribution of the Supreme Court’s judgment is that it reframes citizenship adjudication as a constitutional exercise rather than merely a statutory one. By holding that Articles 14 and 21 protect “any person”, the Court has made clear that procedural fairness does not depend upon citizenship. The very purpose of the adjudication is to determine citizenship; fairness cannot therefore be withheld until citizenship is first established. This principle has implications extending well beyond ex-parte proceedings.

It informs the manner in which notices are drafted, evidence is appreciated, reasons are recorded, and proceedings are conducted. It reinforces the quasi-judicial character of Foreigners Tribunals and emphasises that their role is not merely to verify police references but to independently determine one of the most consequential legal questions an individual can face.

Conclusion

The Gauhati High Court’s decision in Aminul Hoque reinforces the reverse burden under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, demands strict proof of genealogical linkage, accords limited evidentiary value to identity documents such as PAN and EPIC, insists upon compliance with Section 65B for electronic records, and reiterates the narrow scope of judicial review under Article 226. The judgement is marked by a huge lacunae in not examining the grounds or methods employed in issuance of the “notice” in the first place. Hence, the judgment also illustrates the limitations of a jurisprudence centred almost exclusively upon documentary proof and evidentiary precision. Citizenship is unlike any other legal status. The consequences of an erroneous declaration extend beyond the courtroom, affecting liberty, family life, identity and belonging. Such consequences demand not only accurate fact-finding but also procedures that command constitutional legitimacy.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Sabitri Dey on the other hand provides an essential constitutional complement to them. By reaffirming that the burden under Section 9 operates within a framework of fairness, reasoned adjudication and meaningful procedural safeguards, the Supreme Court has signalled that the legitimacy of citizenship determination depends as much upon the integrity of the process as upon the correctness of the final outcome. The Gauhati High Court’s adjudication remains limiting and burden-centric. The Supreme Court, crucially, introduces a more process-oriented constitutional framework.

The complete judgement may be read below:

[1] It is well settled inter alia by the judgments of the Honourable Supreme Court in Sarbananda Sonowal (II) v. Union of India, (2007) 1 SCC 174 (paras 42, 55 and 60),  and Md. Rahim Ali, @ Abdur Rahim v. State of Assam (paras 35-41), as also by a Full Bench of the Hon’ble Gauhati High Court in State of Assam v. Moslem Mondal, (2013) 1 GLT 809, that the Foreigners Tribunal is required to independently apply its mind to the grounds and materials produced before it by the State and come to a conclusion that there are sufficient grounds to initiate proceedings against any person who is alleged to be a foreigner.  It is further well settled that in the absence of grounds supported by objective materials which justify proceeding against a person, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to issue a notice calling upon him to appear and show cause why he should not be declared a foreigner.  It is further well settled that if the notice issued by the Tribunal does not contain the main grounds on the basis of which the Tribunal is satisfied that it is a fit case to proceed, then the entire proceedings are void ab initio and the reverse burden of proof under Section 9 of the Act does not get cast upon the proceedee, and any opinion rendered by the Tribunal is void and non est and has to be struck down on this ground alone.

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The Odisha State Sentence Review Board has recommended his release from jail on ground of “good behaviour.” On July 14, 2026, a bench comprising of Justices Manoj Misra and Vijay Bishnoi of the Supreme Court through its order had asked the Odisha Government to take a decision on the premature release of Singh by August 19. Reportedly, the bench also made an oral observation that, “You take a decision by August 15. Let him also celebrate Independence Day by then.” Reported the Hindustan Times.

Singh, who is said to be associated with the Bharatiya Janata Party and the Bajrang Dal, is serving life imprisonment not only for the murder of Australian missionary Graham Staines and his two sons, but also for the 1999 murder of Catholic priest Arul Das, who was shot with an arrow while fleeing a building that had been set on fire. Reported the new Indian Express. He was also convicted for the murder of Shaikh Rahman, a Muslim garment merchant, who was brutally assaulted, had his hands severed, and whose body and garment stall were set ablaze.

In July 2024, the Supreme Court had sought the Odisha government’s response on a plea filed through advocate Vishnu Shankar Jain seeking Singh’s remission of sentence and release, asserting that he met the state government’s criteria for granting remission (i.e. 25 years). The reformative theory of Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer was invoked and reliance was placed on the Court’s 2022 judgment permitting the premature release of the convict in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case.

The current remission, therefore reflects a broader pattern in India of state governments ruled by the incumbent-BJP granting remission to those convicted in cases of gross communal violence. One such earlier instance was the release of the convicts in the 2002 Bilkis Bano gang rape and family murder case, a decision that remained in force until it was struck down by the Supreme Court.

It is worth noting that prior to this; Singh’s plea for remission has been evaluated on five separate occasions, and has been turned down each time, with the most recent rejection occurring in February 2024.

How the Remission Was Filed and Processed

Singh’s possible release has drawn political attention in the past. During a campaign for his release in 2022, when the BJD government was in power, Sudarshan TV editor-in-chief Suresh Chavhanke attempted to meet him in prison but was denied permission. Mohan Charan Majhi, (now the Chief Minister of Odisha), had also joined a protest outside the jail demanding Singh’s release. However, the Board’s consideration of Singh’s case was based on the prescribed remission process and the reports submitted by the relevant authorities. This clearly establishes that organised political demand for Singh’s release predates, by a considerable margin, the administrative process that has now produced it.

At its September 2025 meeting, the Board considered 107 cases. It recommended the release of 18 life convicts, rejected 75 applications, and deferred 14, including Singh’s. Singh’s case remained pending because the Board required a fresh report from his home district.

According to The Hindu, the State Sentence Review Board met in the first week of July 2026 to consider the premature release of eligible life convicts. Among the cases reviewed was that of Dara Singh. In his petition before the Supreme Court, he stated that he deeply regretted the offences committed over two decades earlier and sought an opportunity to “give back to society” through service-oriented work.  He also claimed that he bore no personal animosity towards the victims and described his actions as the result of “youthful rage.” Singh was 37 years old at the time of his arrest!

Under Odisha’s 2022 premature-release guidelines, a convict whose sentence has been commuted from death to life becomes eligible for remission consideration after 25 years in custody, subject to a recommendation from the State Sentence Review Board (SSRB) and government approval. Five out of six members of the SSRB belong to the executive branch of government. The presence of ruling-party legislators, when the CM has supported Singh’s release, on the deciding panel raises questions whether the government will independently apply its mind.

Comparison with the Bilkis Bano Case

Setting the two cases side by side is useful because they involve a similar factual pattern. In both instances, persons convicted of life imprisonment in communal hate-crime cases were considered for or granted premature release.

The release in Bano’s case followed a plea filed by one convict, Radheshyam Bhagwandas Shah, who argued he had already served over 15 years and sought early release. Shah had first tried this route in Gujarat, where the Gujarat High Court itself had indicated that Maharashtra, the state where his trial was actually conducted after the Supreme Court moved it there on Bano’s plea, was the appropriate government to decide his remission, not Gujarat. On May 13, 2022, Supreme Court order directed Gujarat (rather than Maharashtra) to decide the remission question. Acting on the Court’s direction, the Gujarat government formed a committee, which went on to recommend that the sentences of all 11 convicts in the case be remitted. The panel that granted remission included BJP legislators, the same party that governed Gujarat at the time of the riots. One of those legislators publicly defended the convicts by remarking that some of them were “Brahmins” with good values. Reported NDTV.

Several activists, along with Bilkis Bano herself petitioned the Court in November 2022. On January 8, 2024, Justices B.V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan quashed the remission, holding that Gujarat was never the appropriate government and that the May 2022 order directing Gujarat to decide had itself been obtained by concealing material facts. The convicts were ordered back to prison within two weeks.

In Bano’s case, when the Gujarat government had released eleven convicts on August 15, 2022, they were welcomed with sweets and had their feet touched by supporters. Singh has for years been celebrated by sections of the Hindu right. Organisations such as the Dharmarakhyak Sri Dara Singh Bachao Samiti and Dara Sena have publicly campaigned for his release and portrayed him as a defender of Hinduism.

Given this, especially when the incumbent Odisha Chief Minister has also, before assuming office, expressed support for Singh’s release, there is a significant possibility that Singh’s release too will receive a public welcome similar to that accorded to the Bano’s convicts. The repeated public glorification of individuals convicted in cases of communal violence by organisations affiliated with or aligned to the BJP-RSS ecosystem raises serious concerns about the social and political messaging such releases convey.

While concealment of material facts was the decisive ground in Bano’s case, the Court also separately described Gujarat’s orders as stereotyped and passed without application of mind. Odisha’s Sentence Review Board considered Singh’s file within a batch of dozens of prisoners in a single sitting arguably meets the same structural vulnerability.

Five factors were decided in Laxman Naskar v. Union of India (2000), to decide on pre-mature release of convicts, namely:

i) Whether the offence is an individual act of crime without affecting the society at large?

ii) Whether there is any chance of future recurrence of committing crime?

iii) Whether the convict has lost his potentiality in committing crime?

iv) Whether there is any fruitful purpose of confining this convict any more?

v) Socio-economic condition of the convict’s family.

The first factor alone arguably requires reckoning with the fact that his is not a single offence but three separate convictions, spanning roughly a year, each targeting a different religious minority.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this judgement primer has been worked on by Tanishka Shah)

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Karat had originally approached the Supreme Court after the Delhi High Court upheld the refusal of an Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (ACMM) to direct registration of an FIR under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). She had sought criminal action against Thakur and Verma for offences under Sections 153A, 153B, 295A and 505 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), alleging that their speeches promoted enmity between communities and incited hatred during the polarised campaign surrounding the anti-CAA protests.

The complaint stemmed from BJP MP Anurag Thakur’s election rally on January 27, 2020, where he led the crowd in chanting the slogan, “Desh ke gaddaron ko, goli maaron saalon ko” (“Shoot the traitors”). It also challenged speeches delivered by BJP leader Parvesh Verma, who described Shaheen Bagh protesters as “infiltrators” and claimed they would “enter your homes, rape your daughters and sisters, and kill them” if elected to power.

On April 26, a Bench comprising Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta dismissed Karat’s appeal, agreeing with the Delhi High Court’s conclusion that no cognisable offence was made out. The Court reasoned that the speeches did not explicitly target any identifiable religious or other protected community and therefore did not attract the penal provisions invoked.

Detailed report may be read here.

While the Supreme Court overruled the Delhi High Court on one significant legal question—holding that prior sanction under Section 196 CrPC is not required before a Magistrate directs registration of an FIR under Section 156(3)—it nevertheless endorsed the conclusion that the speeches disclosed no cognisable offence.

The review petition contends that this conclusion amounts to an “error apparent on the face of the record.” According to Karat, neither the Magistrate nor the Delhi High Court had examined the substantive allegations of hate speech. Instead, both courts confined themselves to the procedural question of whether sanction under Section 196 CrPC was a prerequisite for directing investigation.

The petition points out that the Delhi High Court had expressly recorded that the ACMM had not entered into the merits of the allegations. It had also clarified that its observations were limited to the issue of sanction and would not prejudice any future adjudication on whether the speeches constituted criminal offences.

However, despite partly allowing Karat’s appeal by reversing the High Court’s interpretation of Section 196 CrPC, the Supreme Court, in paragraphs 136 to 138 of its judgment, went on to hold that it agreed with the ultimate conclusion that no cognisable offence was made out. The review petition argues that the Court effectively decided the substantive criminal liability of the BJP leaders without the parties having addressed detailed arguments on the merits of the alleged hate speech.

As per the LiveLaw report, Karat further relies on contemporaneous findings of the Election Commission of India (ECI), which had taken action against both BJP leaders during the 2020 Delhi Assembly election campaign. The ECI found that the speeches violated the Model Code of Conduct, had the potential to aggravate existing differences between religious communities and promote mutual hatred. Acting on these findings, the Commission removed both leaders from the BJP’s list of star campaigners and imposed temporary campaign bans.

The review petition also questions the reliance placed on the police status report submitted before the trial court. The police had concluded that no cognisable offence was disclosed, reasoning that Thakur’s slogan did not refer to any specific community and that Verma’s remarks on the Shaheen Bagh protests amounted to political criticism rather than criminal hate speech. According to Karat, the Supreme Court reproduced this reasoning without independently evaluating the material on record, including video recordings of the speeches and the Election Commission’s findings.

Arguing that the issue was never subjected to a full judicial examination, the review petition urges the Supreme Court to recall its finding that no cognisable offence was disclosed and to adjudicate the hate speech allegations afresh after hearing the parties on the merits. The petition has been filed through Advocates Sylona Mohapatra, Tara Nirula and Adit Pujari.

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The post Brinda Karat seeks review of SC verdict in Thakur-Verma hate speech case appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The judgment in Sabitri Dey @ Swasthi Dey v. Union of India and the connected appeals marks one of the most important pronouncements on the functioning of Foreigners Tribunals in Assam in recent months. While it does not decide the citizenship claims of any of the appellants, it significantly strengthens procedural safeguards governing citizenship determination by reiterating that the constitutional guarantees of fairness, equality and due process extend to every individual, including those whose nationality is under question. The ruling assumes particular significance amid renewed debates around citizenship documentation and verification processes, including the ongoing discussions surrounding electoral roll revisions and proof of citizenship.

Background: 27 appeals arising from ex-parte declarations

The batch comprised 27 appeals challenging judgments of the Gauhati High Court, which had upheld opinions of various Foreigners Tribunals, and, in certain older matters, the erstwhile Illegal Migrants (Determination) Tribunals, declaring the appellants to be foreigners. Although the factual circumstances varied, a common thread ran through all the cases: the declarations had either been passed entirely ex-parte or had become effectively ex-parte after the individuals failed to continue participating in the proceedings.

In several matters, the appellants never appeared before the Tribunal despite notices being recorded as served. In others, they initially entered appearance, filed written statements or sought adjournments but subsequently defaulted, resulting in ex-parte opinions. A third category involved cases where the Gauhati High Court itself examined documentary evidence, including electoral rolls, family linkage documents and citizenship records, for the first time while exercising writ jurisdiction, instead of remitting the matters to the statutory Tribunal for factual determination.

The appellants contended that they had been declared foreigners without receiving a meaningful opportunity to contest the references and that the proceedings before the Tribunals failed to satisfy statutory as well as constitutional requirements of fairness. The Supreme Court, therefore, framed the central question not as whether Tribunals possess the power to proceed ex-parte, but whether such proceedings can culminate in declarations of foreigner status without meaningful adjudication, independent assessment of evidence and adherence to procedural safeguards.

Citizenship determination cannot become a mechanical exercise

At the heart of the judgment lies the Court’s unequivocal rejection of the proposition that the burden of proof under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act authorises Tribunals to mechanically declare a person a foreigner merely because the individual failed to appear or failed to discharge that burden.

“In view of the above factual backdrop, the common issue which arises for consideration is whether, in proceedings under the Foreigners Act, 1946 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1946 Act”) and the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1964 Order”), an opinion declaring a person to be a foreigner can be sustained where the proceeding before the Tribunal was ex parte or had become effectively ex parte, without a meaningful examination of service of notice, opportunity of hearing, the material forming the basis of the reference, and the evidence adduced by the State. The issue is not whether a Tribunal is powerless to proceed ex parte in every case. The narrower and more important question is whether an ex parte or effectively ex parte proceeding can result in a mechanical declaration of foreigner status without the Tribunal satisfying itself that the minimum requirements of lawful and fair adjudication have been met.” (Para 7)

Section 9 provides that where any question arises as to whether a person is a foreigner, the burden of proving that he or she is not a foreigner rests upon that individual, notwithstanding the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. The State relied heavily upon this statutory burden to justify the Tribunal proceedings. However, the Court drew a crucial distinction between the burden of proof and the adjudicatory process itself.

Another crucial verdict that deals with these issues related to Assam’s acute citizenship crisis is the 2013 Gauhati High Court ruling in State of Assam vs Moslem Mandal that mandated that Foreigners Tribunals must adhere to fair investigation and due process, including providing the “main grounds” for suspicion, while acknowledging the severe burden of proof on individuals. This article on Citizens for Justice and Peace website examines the ramifications of Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946.

The Bench held that the rationale behind Section 9 is understandable because questions relating to birth, ancestry, family lineage, migration and nationality ordinarily lie within the special knowledge of the person concerned. Yet, the existence of such a burden does not absolve the Tribunal of its independent obligation to conduct a lawful inquiry.

Rejecting a mechanical interpretation of Section 9, the Court observed that the provision neither authorises automatic declarations nor permits the Tribunal to treat the mere existence of a reference—or the absence of the proceedee—as conclusive proof of foreigner status. Instead, the statutory burden operates only within the framework of a legally valid adjudicatory process.

“However, the existence of a statutory burden under Section 9 of the 1946 Act cannot be read to mean that the Tribunal is relieved of its own obligation to conduct a lawful adjudication. Section 9 does not authorise a mechanical declaration. It does not permit the reference to be accepted as conclusive merely because it has been made. It also does not permit the Tribunal to treat absence of the proceedee as a substitute for examination of the material placed before it. The burden on the proceedee operates within a legal process. It does not replace the legal process itself.” (Para 12)

The Bench stressed that absence from proceedings cannot substitute proof. Even where a proceedee defaults, the Tribunal remains duty-bound to examine the material placed by the State, assess whether it supports the allegation and independently arrive at a reasoned conclusion.

Reading Section 9 alongside the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964

The Court devoted considerable attention to harmonising Section 9 of the Foreigners Act with Paragraph 3 of the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964, which prescribes the procedure governing Tribunal proceedings.

Paragraph 3 requires the Tribunal to furnish the proceedee with the “main grounds” on which they are alleged to be a foreigner, provide a reasonable opportunity to make a representation, permit production of evidence and thereafter consider the evidence produced before rendering its opinion. It also obligates the Tribunal to hear persons considered necessary, record concise findings of fact and state its conclusions in the final order.

“The burden under Section 9 of the 1946 Act must therefore be understood in the context of the 1964 Order. Paragraph 3 of the 1964 Order requires that the proceedee must be served with the main grounds on which he or she is alleged to be a foreigner. The expression “main grounds” is of significance. It cannot be reduced to a bare assertion that the person is suspected to be a foreigner. The proceedee must know, at least in substance, the basis on which the allegation is founded. Only then can the proceedee meaningfully answer the reference and discharge the burden cast upon him or her.” (Para 13)

According to the Court, these procedural requirements demonstrate that Foreigners Tribunals perform adjudicatory, not merely administrative, functions.

The Bench rejected any interpretation reducing the expression “main grounds” to a vague allegation or a bare suspicion that an individual may be a foreigner. Rather, the Court held that the expression necessarily requires disclosure of the essential factual basis underlying the allegation, enabling the proceedee to meaningfully answer the reference.

Without such disclosure, the statutory burden imposed by Section 9 becomes impossible to discharge because an individual cannot reasonably rebut an undefined allegation or prove a negative without knowing the case they are required to meet.

“The procedure prescribed under Paragraph 3 of the 1964 Order also shows that the proceeding before the Tribunal is not an administrative formality. The proceedee has to be given an opportunity to file a reply, produce evidence and be heard. The concerned Superintendent of Police may also produce evidence. The Tribunal may hear such persons as it considers necessary. After the case is heard, the Tribunal is required to submit its opinion. The final order must contain a concise statement of facts and the conclusion. These requirements are inconsistent with any notion that the Tribunal may simply affirm the reference upon non-appearance of the proceedee.” (Para 14)

The Court emphasised that the procedure prescribed under the 1964 Order contemplates far more than formal compliance. The opportunity to file replies and produce evidence must be genuine and effective rather than illusory. Consequently, the Tribunal cannot simply affirm the police reference upon the non-appearance of the proceedee without examining the material independently and recording reasons.

“Even in a case where the proceedee fails to appear despite service, the Tribunal continues to act as a quasi-judicial forum. It must satisfy itself that notice was duly served in accordance with law. It must examine whether the main grounds were made available to the proceedee. It must consider the evidence produced by the State. It must assess whether the material placed before it is capable of supporting the conclusion that the proceedee is a foreigner. It must record reasons, even if briefly. An ex parte proceeding may dispense with the participation of the absent party, but it does not dispense with objective consideration and meaningful adjudication by the Tribunal.” (Para 15)

Constitutional guarantees apply even when citizenship is under challenge

Having interpreted the statutory framework, the Supreme Court proceeded to anchor the entire process of citizenship determination within the Constitution. The Bench held that proceedings before Foreigners Tribunals cannot be viewed merely as statutory exercises under the Foreigners Act, 1946. Rather, they engage constitutional guarantees under Articles 14 and 21 because the consequences of being declared a foreigner directly affect a person’s liberty, dignity and legal status.

The Court laid particular emphasis on the language employed in the Constitution. Article 14 guarantees equality before law and equal protection of laws to “any person”, while Article 21 provides that “no person” shall be deprived of life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. Neither provision confines its protection exclusively to Indian citizens.

Accordingly, the Bench held that constitutional safeguards extend even to individuals whose citizenship is itself under dispute.

“Article 14 of the Constitution uses the expression “any person”. Article 21 of the Constitution uses the expression “no person”. Neither provision is confined to citizens. The protection of equality before law, equal protection of laws, life and personal liberty is, therefore, available to every person within the territory of India. A person proceeded against before a Foreigners Tribunal may ultimately fail to establish Indian citizenship, but the process by which such determination is made must still satisfy the constitutional requirements of fairness, reasonableness and non-arbitrariness.” (Para 20)

This distinction forms the constitutional foundation of the judgment. The Court clarified that while Parliament possesses the authority to regulate citizenship and the State is fully empowered to identify and remove illegal migrants, the procedure adopted for doing so cannot be arbitrary or unfair merely because the individual is ultimately found not to be an Indian citizen.

The judgment therefore separates the substantive outcome of citizenship determination from the fairness of the process by which that determination is reached, holding that constitutional protections govern the latter irrespective of the former.

Fair procedure survives even where the State seeks to identify foreigners

The Bench relied upon a long line of constitutional precedents to reinforce this principle. Referring to Louis De Raedt v. Union of India (1991), the Court reiterated that although foreigners do not enjoy the freedoms guaranteed under Article 19, they nevertheless possess the protection of Article 21 in respect of life and personal liberty. Consequently, while the State may regulate the entry, residence and removal of foreigners, those actions must still conform to fair procedure.

The Court also relied upon National Human Rights Commission v. State of Arunachal Pradesh (1996), where the Supreme Court had rejected the argument that persons whose citizenship is disputed can be denied constitutional safeguards. That decision recognised that Article 21 continues to protect individuals even when their nationality remains under inquiry.

The Bench further invoked the landmark judgment in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978), which transformed Article 21 by holding that “procedure established by law” must mean a procedure that is fair, just and reasonable, rather than arbitrary, oppressive or fanciful.

Applying this principle to proceedings before Foreigners Tribunals, the Court observed that the existence of a special burden of proof under Section 9 does not dilute constitutional requirements of procedural fairness. Simply because Parliament has shifted the evidentiary burden onto the proceedee does not authorise the Tribunal to disregard principles of fairness or natural justice.

Mechanical proceedings offend Articles 14 and 21

The Court’s reasoning extended beyond Article 21 to Article 14. The Bench observed that arbitrariness is fundamentally inconsistent with equality before law. Therefore, proceedings culminating in a declaration of foreigner status cannot survive constitutional scrutiny if they are conducted mechanically, one-sidedly or without genuine application of mind.

The Court explained that equal protection requires far more than formal compliance with statutory requirements. Merely issuing a notice or mechanically passing an order does not satisfy constitutional standards.

“Article 14 of the Constitution also upholds the content of fair procedure. A State action which is arbitrary cannot claim the protection of law merely because it is clothed in statutory form. A proceeding which may result in a person being declared a foreigner cannot be sustained if the procedure adopted is mechanical, one-sided, or devoid of application of mind. Equal protection of laws requires that the statutory procedure be applied in a real and meaningful manner. It is not enough that a notice is formally issued or that an order is formally passed. The Tribunal must examine whether the proceedee had a fair opportunity, whether the main grounds were disclosed, whether the evidence before it was capable of supporting the reference, and whether the conclusion follows from the material on record.” (Para 24)

Instead, the Tribunal must actively satisfy itself that:

• notice was properly served in accordance with law;
• the “main grounds” of the allegation were adequately disclosed;
• the proceedee had a genuine opportunity to respond;
• the evidence produced by the State is capable of supporting the allegation; and
• the conclusion logically follows from the material available on record.

The Court thus made clear that fairness is measured by the substance of the proceedings rather than their formal appearance.

Natural justice remains integral to Foreigners Tribunal proceedings

Another significant aspect of the judgment is its detailed reaffirmation of the principles of natural justice. The Bench observed that proceedings before Foreigners Tribunals carry consequences far more serious than ordinary civil disputes. A declaration that a person is a foreigner may result in detention, deportation, separation from family and community, loss of civil rights and, in certain situations, even statelessness. Because of these grave consequences, adherence to natural justice assumes exceptional importance.

“In proceedings before the Foreigners Tribunal, this principle assumes particular importance. The person proceeded against is often required to establish facts relating to ancestry, residence, identity and family linkage through old public documents. Such a person cannot be expected to discharge the statutory burden under Section 9 of the 1946 Act unless the main grounds of the allegation are disclosed and a meaningful opportunity is afforded to file a response and produce evidence. The opportunity contemplated by Paragraph 3 of the 1964 Order must therefore be an effective opportunity, and not a merely formal one.” (Para 28)

The Court reiterated the foundational rule of audi alteram partem—that no person should be condemned unheard. Tracing the development of this doctrine through Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works, the Bench observed that even where a statute is silent, fairness ordinarily requires that a person likely to be affected by an adverse decision be given an opportunity of hearing. The rule, the Court noted, is not merely technical but constitutes a fundamental principle of fair play.

The Court also relied upon A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, which recognised that principles of natural justice supplement statutory provisions rather than supplant them. Applying this principle, the Bench held that nothing in the Foreigners Act excludes natural justice. On the contrary, the procedural safeguards contained in Paragraph 3 of the 1964 Order reinforce those principles by requiring meaningful notice, opportunity to respond, consideration of evidence and reasoned findings.

Similarly, relying on Canara Bank v. Debasis Das, the Court reiterated that notice constitutes the first and most essential limb of natural justice. A notice must precisely inform a person of the case they have to answer; vague allegations or undefined suspicions cannot satisfy this requirement.

The Court reinforces its earlier decision in Md. Rahim Ali

A substantial part of the judgment builds upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Md. Rahim Ali @ Abdur Rahim v. State of Assam (2024), which had already interpreted Section 9 of the Foreigners Act alongside Paragraph 3 of the 1964 Order. Reaffirming that precedent, the Bench held that authorities cannot initiate proceedings on mere suspicion unsupported by material. Instead, the reference must disclose the “main grounds” underlying the allegation so that the proceedee understands the essential basis of the case.

“The Court explained that the burden under Section 9 is not to be understood as permitting the authorities to proceed on a bare allegation or an unsupported suspicion. The authority must possess some material basis for initiating the proceeding, and the proceedee must be informed of the substance of the case which he or she is required to meet.” (Para 17)

The Court drew an important distinction between a formal accusation and the statutory requirement of disclosing “main grounds”. The latter, it held, demands disclosure of the essential factual basis of the allegation rather than a vague assertion that an individual is suspected to be a foreigner. Without such disclosure, the opportunity to defend oneself becomes illusory, rendering the statutory burden under Section 9 practically impossible to discharge.

“The decision in Md. Rahim Ali (Supra) is important for another reason. This Court drew a clear distinction between the mere allegation that a person is a foreigner and the “main grounds” contemplated under Paragraph 3(1) of the 1964 Order. The expression “main grounds” requires something more than a formal accusation. It requires disclosure of the essential basis on which the allegation is founded, so that the proceedee is not left to answer an undefined suspicion. Without such disclosure, the opportunity to file a representation and produce evidence would be more illusory than real.” (Para 17)

The Bench reiterated another observation from Md. Rahim Ali: a declaration of foreigner status carries extraordinary civil consequences, including detention, deportation, and disruption of family life and the possibility of statelessness. Consequently, such declarations must always rest upon material capable of supporting the conclusion and must emerge from a process that satisfies constitutional standards of fairness.

Having established these constitutional and statutory principles, the Court proceeded to examine the three categories of appeals before it and explain why each required remand despite the differing factual circumstances.

“This Court in Md. Rahim Ali (Supra) also clarified that Section 9 does not exclude the principles of natural justice. The statutory burden placed upon the proceedee operates only after the proceeding is lawfully initiated and after the proceedee is placed in a position to understand the case against him or her. The burden cannot be shifted in a vacuum. A person cannot be expected to prove the negative without being told, with reasonable clarity, the material basis on which he or she is alleged to be a foreigner. The consequence of a declaration by a Foreigners Tribunal was also discussed by this Court as it was held that such a declaration is not a routine civil consequence. It may lead to detention, deportation, separation from family and community, and in a given case, even the possibility of statelessness. This Court therefore emphasised that the process by which such a declaration is made must satisfy the minimum requirements of fairness and must rest upon material capable of supporting the conclusion.” (Para 18)

Supreme Court identifies three categories of cases but applies a common constitutional standard

Having laid down the statutory and constitutional framework, the Supreme Court examined the 27 appeals before it by classifying them into three distinct categories. While the factual circumstances differed, the Court observed that the underlying concern remained identical in every case: whether a declaration of foreigner status carrying grave civil consequences could be sustained where the proceedings before the Foreigners Tribunal were either entirely ex-parte or had effectively become ex-parte without meaningful adjudication.

The Bench clarified that this classification was adopted only for analytical convenience. Regardless of whether the proceedee never appeared, appeared initially before defaulting, or whether the High Court later examined evidence in writ proceedings, every case ultimately raised the same constitutional question—whether the Tribunal had discharged its adjudicatory responsibility before declaring a person to be a foreigner.

Category I: Mere non-appearance cannot justify automatic declaration as a foreigner

The first category comprised cases where the appellants never appeared before the Foreigners Tribunal despite the Tribunal or the Gauhati High Court recording service of notice. The State argued that once notice had been served and the proceedee failed to participate, the Tribunal was entitled to proceed ex-parte and declare the individual a foreigner.

The Supreme Court agreed only in part.bThe Bench recognised that Paragraph 3(7) of the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 obligates a proceedee to appear before the Tribunal after due service of notice and that the Tribunal cannot indefinitely postpone proceedings merely because a person chooses not to participate. Accordingly, the Court held that Tribunals possess the statutory authority to proceed ex-parte where notices have been duly served.

However, the Court emphatically rejected the proposition that the power to proceed ex-parte automatically authorises a declaration of foreigner status. Reading Paragraph 3(7) together with Paragraphs 3(1), 3(10) and 3(16), the Bench held that even in the absence of the proceedee, the Tribunal continues to function as a quasi-judicial body and must independently discharge its adjudicatory responsibilities. It cannot simply endorse the police reference because the person failed to appear.

Instead, the Tribunal must still:

• verify whether notice was lawfully served;
• ensure that the “main grounds” of the allegation were communicated;
• consider the evidence produced by the Superintendent of Police;
• assess whether the material is capable of supporting the allegation that the proceedee is a foreigner; and
• record a reasoned opinion containing a concise statement of facts and conclusions.

The Court observed that Section 9 places the burden upon the proceedee, but that burden does not convert the absence of the proceedee into proof of the allegation. This distinction constitutes one of the judgment’s central legal holdings. Non-participation may deprive an individual of the opportunity to lead evidence, but it cannot relieve the Tribunal of its obligation to independently examine whether the State has established sufficient material to justify the declaration.

“Thus, even where the proceeding is ex parte, the Tribunal is still required to perform an adjudicatory function. The non-appearance of the proceedee may deprive him or her of the opportunity to lead evidence, but it does not relieve the Tribunal of the obligation to examine whether the reference is supported by the material produced by the State. Section 9 of the 1946 Act places the burden upon the proceedee, but that burden does not convert the absence of the proceedee into proof of the allegation. The Tribunal must still apply its mind to the main grounds, the proof of service, the evidence placed before it and the question referred.” (Para 32)

Finding that the appellants in this category had been declared foreigners without such meaningful adjudication, the Supreme Court held that the matters required fresh consideration before the respective Foreigners Tribunals. At the same time, it clarified that this opportunity was being granted only once and subject to stringent conditions to prevent delay or abuse of process.

“The matters falling in this category show that the appellants have been declared foreigners without any contest on their behalf before the Tribunal. Having regard to the grave consequences of such declaration, and having regard to the statutory requirement that even the final order of the Tribunal must contain a concise statement of facts and conclusion, we are of the view that these matters deserve to be remitted to the concerned Tribunals for fresh consideration. This opportunity shall be granted only once and shall remain subject to strict conditions so that the remand is not used to delay the proceedings.” (Para 33)

Category II: High Courts cannot become the primary forum for deciding citizenship facts

The second category dealt with cases in which the Gauhati High Court, while exercising writ jurisdiction, undertook its own appreciation of documentary evidence—including electoral rolls, family lineage documents and other citizenship records—to uphold ex-parte declarations passed by the Tribunals.

The Supreme Court held that this approach fundamentally misconceived the statutory framework governing Foreigners Tribunals. The Bench observed that Paragraph 3 of the 1964 Order clearly designates the Tribunal as the primary fact-finding authority. It is before the Tribunal that the proceedee must produce documents, the State must lead evidence and disputed questions concerning ancestry, identity, electoral records, residence and family linkage must be examined.

Nationality disputes often involve complex factual inquiries requiring scrutiny of decades-old public records, oral testimony, linkage evidence and documentary proof. Such evidence may require explanation, comparison, corroboration and rebuttal. These exercises, the Court held, fall squarely within the statutory jurisdiction of the Foreigners Tribunal rather than the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. Accordingly, where the Tribunal itself has failed to undertake a complete adjudication because proceedings became ex-parte, the deficiency cannot ordinarily be cured by the High Court appreciating evidence for the first time.

“In matters concerning nationality, the evidence often relates to ancestry, family linkage, residence, identity, electoral records and other public documents. Such material may require proof, explanation, comparison, and where necessary, rebuttal. The burden under Section 9 of the 1946 Act is also to be discharged before the Tribunal. The State evidence is likewise to be placed before and considered by the Tribunal. Therefore, where the proceeding before the Tribunal was ex parte and the documents relied upon by the proceedee were not tested before the statutory forum, the High Court should not ordinarily become the first forum for appreciation of such material.” (Para 37)

The Bench therefore ruled that factual examination undertaken directly by the High Court cannot substitute the adjudicatory process contemplated by the Foreigners Act and the 1964 Order. The proper course in such circumstances is to remit the matter to the Tribunal so that both parties may lead evidence before the designated statutory forum and obtain a fresh, reasoned opinion.

In doing so, the Court reaffirmed an important principle governing judicial review: while High Courts possess wide constitutional powers under Article 226, they ordinarily should not become the first forum to evaluate disputed evidence where the legislature has created a specialised adjudicatory mechanism for that purpose.

“In the matters falling in this category, the High Court examined the documents and material placed before it while declining interference with the ex parte opinion of the Tribunal. Such an exercise, in the facts of the present batch, cannot cure the absence of a proper adjudication before the Tribunal under Paragraph 3 of the 1964 Order. The appropriate course is to remit these matters to the concerned Tribunals, so that the appellants may produce their material, the State may adduce its evidence, and the Tribunal may return a fresh opinion in accordance with law.” (Para 38)

Category III: Default after participation does not absolve the Tribunal of its duties

The third category comprised appeals where the appellants had initially participated in the proceedings before the Foreigners Tribunal—by entering appearance, filing written statements, seeking adjournments or appearing through counsel—but later defaulted, resulting in ex-parte opinions.

The Supreme Court acknowledged that these cases stood on a somewhat different footing from the first category because the appellants had knowledge of the proceedings and had, at least initially, availed themselves of the opportunity provided under the statute. The Bench accepted that Paragraph 3(7) obligates a proceedee to remain present throughout the proceedings, while Paragraph 3(12) expressly provides that adjournments should be granted sparingly and only for recorded reasons.

Accordingly, the Tribunal cannot be faulted merely because it refused repeated adjournments or proceeded with the matter after the proceedee repeatedly remained absent. The Court emphasised that individuals cannot frustrate the adjudicatory process through deliberate or negligent non-participation, particularly because Section 9 places the burden of proving citizenship upon them.

Nevertheless, the Bench held that the proceedee’s default does not alter the legal character of the Tribunal’s function. Even where proceedings become effectively ex-parte after initial participation, the Tribunal remains bound by Paragraphs 3(15) and 3(16) of the 1964 Order. Its final opinion must continue to reflect independent application of mind to the issues referred, consideration of the State’s evidence and evaluation of whatever material has already been placed on record by the proceedee.

The Court observed that many appellants in this category had been declared foreigners before the evidence they sought to rely upon was fully considered by the statutory forum. Given the severe consequences attached to such declarations, the Bench held that these matters too required fresh adjudication so that citizenship could be determined after a complete evidentiary inquiry.

‘In the matters falling in this category, the proceedings had become effectively ex parte at the stage when the appellants were required to continue their defence or adduce evidence. The consequence is that the declarations against them were made without a complete adjudication on the material which they seek to place before the statutory forum. In view of the serious consequences which follow such declarations, and in order to ensure that the determination of status is made after a complete and reasoned adjudication, we consider it appropriate to remit these matters also to the concerned Tribunals.” (Para 43)

At the same time, the Court cautioned that the remand should not be interpreted as condoning the conduct of the appellants. It described the opportunity as one final chance, requiring the individuals to appear before the Tribunal, file their written statements and documents within the prescribed time and cooperate fully with the proceedings. Failure to do so would entitle the Tribunal to proceed in accordance with law.

“This remand is not to be understood as approval of the conduct of the appellants in defaulting before the Tribunal. It is granted only as one final opportunity, keeping in view the nature of the determination and the consequences which may follow. The appellants in this category shall therefore be required to appear before the concerned Tribunals, file their written statements and documents within the time granted, and cooperate with the proceedings without seeking unnecessary adjournments. If they fail to do so, the Tribunal shall be at liberty to proceed in accordance with law.” (Para 44)

By adopting this balanced approach, the Supreme Court ensured that procedural fairness was preserved without permitting repeated defaults to obstruct the statutory process of citizenship determination.

Court stops short of deciding citizenship claims, orders fresh adjudication

While allowing all 27 appeals, the Supreme Court was careful to define the limited scope of its intervention. The Bench repeatedly clarified that it was not adjudicating upon the citizenship claims of any of the appellants, nor was it expressing any opinion regarding the authenticity, admissibility, relevance or evidentiary value of the documents relied upon by them. Those questions, the Court held, must be independently decided by the concerned Foreigners Tribunals after a fresh evaluation of the evidence placed by both sides.

The judgment therefore does not confer citizenship upon any of the appellants, nor does it weaken the statutory framework governing the identification of foreigners. Instead, it reinforces that the legitimacy of the outcome depends upon the legitimacy of the process by which that outcome is reached.

The Court recognised that Parliament, under Article 11 of the Constitution, possesses the legislative authority to regulate citizenship, while the Foreigners Act, 1946 and the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 establish the statutory mechanism for determining whether an individual is or is not a foreigner. It also acknowledged the State’s legitimate interest in ensuring that persons who are not entitled to Indian citizenship do not obtain such status through false claims, procedural abuse or delay.

At the same time, the Bench emphasised that this sovereign interest cannot justify compromising procedural fairness. Reiterating the central principle running throughout the judgment, the Court held that the determination of citizenship and foreigner status must always emerge from “a process which is fair, lawful and reasoned.” It clarified that the statutory burden under Section 9 remains fully applicable and that the remand does not dilute or shift that burden in favour of the appellants. Rather, it ensures that the serious consequences of a declaration as a foreigner follow only after an adjudication consistent with the Foreigners Act, the 1964 Order and the constitutional mandate of fairness under Articles 14 and 21.

“Citizenship and foreigner status occupy a field of high constitutional and legal significance. Article 11 of the Constitution preserves the power of Parliament to make provisions with respect to the acquisition and termination of citizenship and all other matters relating to citizenship. Separately, the 1946 Act and the 1964 Order provide the statutory mechanism through which questions as to whether a person is or is not a foreigner are referred to and determined by the Tribunal. The State has a legitimate and compelling interest in ensuring that persons who are not legally entitled to claim Indian citizenship do not secure such status by misuse of process, by false claims, or by taking advantage of procedural delays.” (Para 46)

“At the same time, the determination of such status must be made through a process which is fair, lawful and reasoned. The statutory burden under Section 9 of the 1946 Act remains fully applicable. The remand being directed by this Court is not intended to dilute that burden, nor is it intended to confer any equity in favour of a person who is unable to establish his or her claim in accordance with law. It is only to ensure that the serious consequence of being declared a foreigner follows from an adjudication which satisfies the requirements of the 1946 Act, the 1964 Order, and the constitutional mandate of fairness.” (Para 47)

Gauhati High Court and Tribunal orders set aside

Applying these principles, the Supreme Court set aside all the impugned judgments of the Gauhati High Court affirming the declarations of the appellants as foreigners. Consequently, the corresponding opinions rendered by the concerned Foreigners Tribunals, as well as the erstwhile Illegal Migrants (Determination) Tribunals in certain older matters, were also quashed. The Bench directed that every reference be adjudicated afresh by the competent Foreigners Tribunal, independently and without being influenced either by the earlier Tribunal opinions or by the findings recorded by the Gauhati High Court.

The Court thereby restored the statutory Tribunal to its role as the primary fact-finding authority in nationality disputes, reaffirming that factual questions relating to ancestry, electoral records, family linkage and documentary evidence must first be examined by the specialised forum created under the law.

Strict conditions attached to the remand

The Supreme Court was equally careful to ensure that its judgment was not interpreted as rewarding procedural default. Recognising that many of the appellants had either failed to appear before the Tribunals or had discontinued participation midway through the proceedings, the Bench imposed a series of stringent conditions while remanding the matters.

The appellants were directed to appear before the respective Foreigners Tribunals within four weeks from the date of the judgment. Upon their appearance, the Tribunals were instructed to permit them to file written statements, affidavits and documentary evidence within a reasonable period to be fixed by the Tribunal. However, extensions of time were to be granted only upon sufficient cause recorded in writing.

The State and the concerned reference authorities were likewise granted liberty to produce additional material and lead evidence in accordance with law. Thereafter, the Tribunals were directed to evaluate the evidence produced by both sides before rendering fresh opinions under the Foreigners Act and the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order.

The Bench further directed the appellants to cooperate fully with the proceedings and specifically restrained them from seeking unnecessary adjournments. Should any appellant fail to appear within the stipulated period, or, having appeared, fail to participate meaningfully, the Tribunal would be at liberty to proceed in accordance with law.

Interim protection from coercive action

Recognising the serious consequences that flow from declarations of foreigner status, the Supreme Court granted limited interim protection to the appellants pending fresh adjudication.

The Court directed that no coercive steps, including detention or deportation based on the earlier Tribunal opinions, should be taken against the appellants until fresh opinions are rendered by the concerned Tribunals.

This protection, however, was expressly made conditional upon the appellants appearing before the Tribunals within the stipulated time and cooperating with the proceedings. If they defaulted once again, the protection would cease, leaving the Tribunal free to proceed in accordance with law.

To avoid prolonged uncertainty, the Bench also requested the Foreigners Tribunals to dispose of the remanded references expeditiously, preferably within six months from the date on which the appellants first appear pursuant to the judgment.

A significant reaffirmation of procedural safeguards

The judgment represents one of the Supreme Court’s clearest articulations of the constitutional limits governing citizenship determination. While preserving the statutory burden under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, the Court has made it equally clear that this burden cannot transform Foreigners Tribunal proceedings into a mechanical exercise or permit declarations based solely on non-appearance or unsupported allegations.

By harmonising the Foreigners Act with the procedural safeguards embedded in the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 and the guarantees of equality and personal liberty under Articles 14 and 21, the Bench reaffirmed that fair procedure is not contingent upon citizenship. Even where an individual ultimately fails to establish Indian citizenship, the determination must emerge from a meaningful adjudication marked by adequate notice, disclosure of the grounds of allegation, independent scrutiny of evidence and reasoned findings.

The ruling also reinforces the institutional role of Foreigners Tribunals as the primary adjudicatory forums for citizenship disputes, cautioning High Courts against becoming the first forum for factual appreciation of documentary evidence in writ proceedings. At the same time, it balances individual rights with the State’s sovereign authority to regulate citizenship by reiterating that the remand neither weakens the burden under Section 9 nor creates any presumption in favour of the appellants.

In doing so, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed a foundational constitutional principle: the State’s power to determine citizenship must be exercised through procedures that are fair, lawful and reasoned, because the legitimacy of the outcome depends as much upon the integrity of the process as upon the correctness of the final decision.

The complete judgment may be read below:

Related:

SC remands 27 citizenship cases, reaffirms constitutional fairness

Gauhati High Court upholds foreigner declaration, rejects mental illness plea

Abdul Sheikh Citizenship Case: Gauhati High Court issues notice, continues protection against deportation

“All I Wanted Was Peace”: How 55-year-old widow Aklima Sarkar won back her citizenship

Defending Citizenship, On the Ground | CJP Assam 2025

From Despair to Dignity: How CJP helped Elachan Bibi win back her identity, prove her citizenship

The post SC: Reasoned & Fair adjudication by Foreigners Tribunals, a must for proving citizenship appeared first on SabrangIndia.

On June 15, Praful Vaniya, Superintendent of Police (Intelligence) in the Gujarat State Police Service (SPS), issued a notice announcing the arrival of the new Anti-Radicalisation Cell (ARC). The notice also provides a step-by-step identification, prevention, detection, intervention and re-integration checklist that the police has in mind.

The SOP for Gujarat’s newly operationalised ARC claims to lay down ways to assess and decode behavioural indicators for identifying ‘radicalised’ individuals – but the details listed seem exclusively focused on Muslim radicals, conflate Muslim religious practices with security threats, and are silent on any markers of Hindu radicalism of the kind the state witnessed in 2002 and after or the rest of India has witnessed over the past decade.

From monitoring beards and niqabs to seeing Middle East travels as suspicious, from questioning the use of Signal for messaging to watching those supporting Muslim rights on social media, the SOP appears designed to penalise common Muslims – and is silent on the violent activities of cow vigilantes and the calls by Hindutva radicals for the boycott and even killing of Muslims.

Who is a ‘radicalised person’?

“A radicalised person refers to an individual affecting law and order in the State who, driven by extremist (‘kattarpant’) ideologies, engages in anti-national activities to harm the unity and integrity of the nation, creates an atmosphere of fear among the people, and try to manipulate a sane/rational person to get them to convert their religion” – these are the exact words of the notice, seen by The Wire.

Further, the notice flags “Suddenly keeping a beard, wearing a niqab, frequent use of Arabic words, reducing contact with friends and family, expressing intense protest/resentment against events happening to the Muslim community globally, praising terrorists, or showing a change in behaviour after traveling abroad (e.g., Afghanistan, Middle East)”. Next, the notice asks officers to trace purchase activity of ‘radicalised indviduals’ – “Purchasing fertilisers containing potassium nitrate, sulphur, or ammonium nitrate; acquiring LPG cylinders; making frequent visits to forest-like areas; making frequent contact with individuals residing in the Gulf, PoK (Pakistan-occupied Kashmir), or Afghanistan through encrypted apps; or withdrawing large amounts of cash”, the notice says, .

Even downloading VPN apps or using Signal or Element messengers have been listed as signs to watch out for. Other listed criteria includes ‘being members of extremist Telegram groups; following ISIS/AQ (Al-Qaeda) accounts, sharing Nasheeds, Dabiq/Rumiyah magazines; or using cryptocurrency (especially Monero) without any apparent source of income’.

Those ‘visiting extremist networks or Arabic colleges/madrasas’, performing a religious ritual like Itikaf (seclusion in a mosque) before planned activities, ‘suddenly leaving their education or employment citing Islamic duty’, or ‘visiting ‘kattarvad’ leaders after being released from prison’ are also flagged as potentially radicalised. It also orders officers to obtain complete details of maulanas teaching in madrasas, prepare a directory, and gather information/records on ‘whether they maintain contact with organisations holding extremist ideologies’.

The SOP recommends the monitoring of ‘extremist preachers, communal organisations, radicalised individuals who are or have been in prisons’, and specifically names those belonging to Salafi and Wahhabi school of Islamic thought within Sunni Islam.

Under the SOP’s ‘Intervention – Counselling and Guidance’ stage, the ARC is directed to identify and verify influential community leaders, social media influencers, NGOs, religious scholars, psychologists and educational experts who can assist in de-radicalisation efforts. It calls for counselling sessions involving family members, religious experts and psychiatrists, while requiring that the identity of individuals undergoing counselling be kept confidential. The SOP also instructs authorities to help such individuals reintegrate into education and employment and maintain regular contact with them. However, it states that if an individual commits or prepares to commit a cognisable offence after undergoing counselling, legal action should be initiated under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita and the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, with all such actions reported to the state headquarters.

While the Gujarat ARC has formally taken shape only this year, its origins date back over a decade. The idea of a dedicated deradicalisation mechanism first gained traction in 2015, at a Directors General and Inspectors General of Police conference in Gujarat’s Rann of Kutch, where the Telangana Police’s deradicalisation model was presented as a template for states grappling with online radicalisation.

In 2020, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Union home minister Amit Shah at the annual conference of DGPs and IGPs, recommended the idea of this cell.

The BJP subsequently promised to establish an ARC in its 2022 Gujarat assembly election manifesto, and began operationalising the proposal. Following the recommendations, a task force including a faculty head of the Gandhinagar-based Rashtriya Raksha University and police officials of the state Anti-Terrorism Squad, Crime Branch and Ahmedabad Central Jail was set up. But the project reportedly could not take off because of “lack of funds”.

On June 15, the SOP was circulated to district and commissionerate offices and laid out the ARC’s functioning – from identifying individuals deemed vulnerable to radicalisation and maintaining dossiers on them to counselling, rehabilitation and post-intervention monitoring. The SOP states that the ARC will function in coordination with district police units, the Special Operations Group (SOG), prison authorities and state Intelligence Bureau officers.

Communally targeted policing

Barrister Arif Ansari believes that this SOP is an open violation of the very basic fundamentals of the Constitution. “Article 14, 19, 21, 25, all are being buried under the kind of surveillance the state wants to impose on Muslims. This is state-sanctioned stereotyping and appears to be clearly motivated for electoral gains. India’s founding fathers made sure that all religions had equal respect and rights, but for Muslims, the morning begins with demolitions and evening ends with law being deployed against us,” Ansari told The Wire.

“After the 1980s, Gujarat became the laboratory of communal fascism. And the manufacturers of this policy were successful in planting this ideology in the state. Then we saw 2002, and the same politicians would be elected again and again,” Hiren Gandhi, a social activist, told The Wire.

While Gandhi recalls how post the 1980s, anti-Muslim leaders, policies and politics became the norm in Gujarat, he believes that the ARC should be placed in the broader context of how politics and sentiments have evolved in the BJP-run state.

“This kind of a mechanism is absolutely wrong but understand that it is nothing new. This is happening in ways and methods across India. During Covid-19, the same kind of radicalism rhetoric was peddled against the Tablighi Jamaat, they were dehumanised using their religion. This is a disgusting kind of politics killing democratic rights,” Gandhi said.

The SOP has also drawn political criticism. In a July 14 letter to Gujarat chief minister Bhupendra Patel, CPI(M) Rajya Sabha MP John Brittas urged the state government to keep its implementation in abeyance pending an independent review, arguing that several of its reported provisions risk conflating ordinary manifestations of Muslim religious identity with indicators of radicalisation.

“While intelligence agencies may legitimately monitor unlawful activities based on credible information, any framework that enables surveillance or profiling primarily on the basis of religion, appearance, language, dress or religious observance would raise profound constitutional concerns. Such measures, if undertaken without clearly defined legal thresholds, objective safeguards and judicial oversight, would be inconsistent with the constitutional guarantees of equality before law, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, dignity and privacy,” Brittas writes.

“Our constitutional jurisprudence has emphasised that the State cannot proceed on the basis of stereotypes or collective suspicion. Equality before law requires that every citizen be assessed on the basis of credible evidence of unlawful conduct, not on the basis of faith, cultural identity, attire, language, appearance or lawful religious practices. Any institutional framework that creates an impression of profiling a particular community would be inconsistent with the constitutional promise of equal protection of laws. Effective intelligence depends upon trust between citizens and law-enforcement agencies. Policies that appear to stigmatise an entire community undermine that trust, discourage cooperation with investigative agencies, and risk alienating precisely those citizens whose partnership is indispensable in combating extremism,” he continues.

Human rights campaigner Shabnam Hashmi asked why other kinds of radicalisation – often openly visible in today’s India – find no place in the SOP. “See, I will not dispute the fact that radicalisation is happening in different communities. But this opens up the gates to harass and pick up anyone they want to, and mainly people who have dissenting voices. That is that is what it will be used for. Secondly, if we are talking of radicalisation, what about the Hindu radicalisation? What about the threats which are being distributed openly? What about the Dharam Sansads, which are giving open calls to kill Muslims, to make India Islam-free, is that no radicalisation? This is very selective profiling of the Muslim community,” she told The Wire.

Hashmi added that while today, this Cell is targeting Muslims, “Tomorrow, it’ll target maybe Dalits, or Adivasi, or Christians.”

Former Chhattisgarh Special DGP R.K. Vij said that while radicalism is defined very widely in the SOP, the sub steps with regard to one community seem to be mentioned as an example. “This may also be understood whether Gujarat Police is mentioning the community owing to their past experience in the field,” Vij said.

The Wire reached out to Gujarat’s Deputy Inspector General of Police, Dr Sudhirkumar J. Desai, to ask about the phrasing used in the SOP and allegations of it being communally motivated. This article will be updated when a response is received.

With inputs from Sharmita Kar.

Tarushi Aswani is an independent journalist.

Courtesy: The Wire

The post For Gujarat Police, Beard, Niqab Make ‘Radicalisation’ Checklist, Cow Vigilantism Doesn’t appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The newly inserted section, described as a “declaration form”, requires applicants to state whether either of their parents was included in the last SIR. If the answer is yes, the applicant must provide the Assembly Constituency number, the polling station (Part Number) and the Serial Number under which the parent appeared in the last SIR. If the parents were not included, the applicant is required to provide their names and, wherever available, their Elector Photo Identity Card (EPIC) numbers.

The introduction of this declaration changes the information sought from first-time applicants. However, the statutory Form 6 prescribed under the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960 has not been amended through any publicly available Gazette notification to incorporate this additional requirement.

The existing offline declaration form may be accessed from here:

Form 6 is a statutory form governed by the Registration of Electors Rules

Form 6 is the statutory application prescribed for inclusion of a person’s name in the electoral roll. It derives its legal authority from the Representation of the People Act, 1950 and the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960. Article 326 of the Constitution guarantees registration as an elector to every adult citizen who is ordinarily resident in a constituency, subject only to the disqualifications provided by law.

Since Form 6 forms part of the Registration of Electors Rules, its contents are governed by delegated legislation rather than administrative practice. Under Section 28 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950, the Central Government may frame or amend the Rules only after consultation with the Election Commission, and such amendments must be notified in the Official Gazette and laid before Parliament.

The existing offline Form 6 may be accessed from here

Whenever statutory electoral forms have been modified in the past, those changes have been carried out by amending the Registration of Electors Rules through Gazette notifications issued by the Ministry of Law and Justice. The legal requirement assumes significance because the additional parental declaration presently appears only during online submission through ECINET. The downloadable Form 6 available for offline submission continues to reflect the notified statutory format and does not contain this declaration.

The result is that the online and offline versions of Form 6 no longer correspond with each other, raising the question of whether a substantive addition to a statutory form can be introduced through the online portal without a corresponding amendment to the Rules.

The 2022 amendments illustrate how changes to statutory forms were previously made

The present position is markedly different from the process followed in 2022 when the electoral registration forms were comprehensively revised.

The Election Laws (Amendment) Act, 2021 amended several provisions of the Representation of the People Act. Pursuant to those amendments, the Ministry of Law and Justice notified the Registration of Electors (Amendment) Rules, 2022 through a Gazette Notification dated June 17, 2022, and the revised Rules came into force on August 1, 2022.

The amended notification can be accessed from here

Those amendments substantially reorganised the electoral registration framework. Form 6 ceased to be a composite application and became a form meant exclusively for registration of a new elector. Applications relating to shifting of residence from one Assembly constituency to another were transferred to Form 8, whose scope was expanded to include correction of entries, change of residence within or across constituencies, replacement of EPIC cards and recording of disability status. Consequently, Form 8A, which earlier dealt with transposition of entries within the same constituency, and Form 001, relating to replacement of EPIC cards, were both discontinued.

The amendments also introduced Form 6B for furnishing Aadhaar details by existing electors. Importantly, this change was accompanied by amendments to the statutory Rules and a separately prescribed form. The framework also expressly provided that furnishing Aadhaar was voluntary and that non-submission would not result in denial of registration or deletion from the electoral roll.

The significance of the 2022 exercise lies in the legal process that accompanied it. Every change to the statutory forms was preceded by amendments to the Registration of Electors Rules and brought into force through Gazette notification. By contrast, the parental declaration now appearing in the online Form 6 does not appear to be supported by any corresponding amendment to the statutory Rules that has been placed in the public domain.

The modified Form 6 raises questions beyond the parental declaration

The issues surrounding the modified Form 6 extend beyond the newly introduced parental declaration. They also affect electors whose names have been deleted during the Special Intensive Revision.

The Election Commission has stated that electors whose names were deleted during the SIR may seek re-enrolment by filing Form 6 during the claims and objections process. This instruction raises an important legal question because, following the amendments that came into force on August 1, 2022, Form 6 is prescribed exclusively for the registration of a new elector.

The declaration contained in Form 6 requires every applicant to state that he or she has not been previously included in any electoral roll. A person seeking restoration after deletion during the SIR cannot truthfully make such a declaration because the very basis of the application is that the person was already enrolled and was subsequently removed from the electoral roll.

The statutory declaration and the process of re-enrolment therefore appear difficult to reconcile. The issue assumes greater significance because the declaration itself warns that furnishing false information or making an incorrect declaration constitutes an offence under Section 31 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950, punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both. No public clarification has been issued explaining how deleted electors are expected to comply with this statutory declaration while applying for re-enrolment.

The parental declaration inserted into the online Form 6 gives rise to another set of practical questions. Young applicants may not know the Assembly constituency, Part Number or Serial Number under which their parents were enrolled during the previous SIR. The position becomes even more complicated where parents have shifted residence over the years, where they were themselves deleted during the SIR, or where proceedings challenging those deletions are still pending. The Election Commission has not clarified whether inability to furnish these particulars would affect the processing of an application or whether the declaration is intended only for record purposes.

The absence of category-wise disclosures leaves important questions unanswered

The concerns arising from Form 6 are part of a broader issue relating to the transparency of the Special Intensive Revision itself.

While the Election Commission has released aggregate figures relating to additions and deletions, it has not published category-wise information that would enable independent reconciliation of the final electoral rolls.

For instance, although the Commission has announced the number of newly added electors, it has not disclosed the categories under which these electors were added or the districts and Assembly constituencies where these additions have taken place. Without such information, it is difficult to independently assess how the additions have affected constituency-wise electoral rolls.

Similar questions arise in relation to Form 6A, which governs the enrolment of overseas electors. No constituency-wise or district-wise data has been published indicating where such electors have been added following the SIR.

The same absence of detailed disclosure extends to Form 7, which is used for objections and deletion of names from the electoral roll. While overall deletion figures have been released, there is no publicly available information identifying the constituencies where these deletions occurred or the categories under which they were sustained after verification.

Likewise, no detailed constituency-wise information has been published regarding Form 8, which deals with correction of entries and shifting of residence. It remains unclear how many electors were shifted between constituencies, how many merely corrected their particulars, and what impact these changes had on the final electoral rolls.

Without category-wise disclosures relating to Forms 6, 6A, 7 and 8, it is difficult to reconcile additions, deletions, corrections and transfers reflected during the SIR. It also remains unclear whether there is any overlap between these categories or how the aggregate figures released by the Commission translate into the final constituency-wise electoral rolls.

Taken together, these issues raise questions not only about the introduction of the parental declaration in the online Form 6 but also about the manner in which changes affecting statutory electoral forms have been implemented during the SIR. The absence of a publicly notified amendment to the Registration of Electors Rules, the use of Form 6 for re-enrolment despite its post-2022 structure, and the limited category-wise disclosure of additions and deletions leave several aspects of the exercise without a clear statutory or administrative explanation.

Related:

Exclusive Investigation SIR: How many voters did the ECI actually disenfranchise? Why do final figures show inexplicable ‘additions’?

Judgement delivered, paradox prevails: every voter a citizen, but what is the fate of 51.8 million excluded?

SC greenlights SIR, upholds ECI’s power to revise electoral rolls

The Bihar Verdict 2025: How an election was engineered before votes were cast

The post EC’s new online Form 6 requirement raises questions over procedure and legality appeared first on SabrangIndia.

To facilitate the issuance of the Permanent Residence Certificate (PRC) required for proving citizenship under the SIR process, the Congress government in Karnataka recently issued an order simplifying the rules. The order, however, came late and was also made in haste.

Even before the Election Commission had an opportunity to express any opinion on the matter, Shobha and her brigade began raising objections to the PRC that are not only baseless and ridiculous but also dangerous.

The full text of the complaint may be accessed here:

The Constitution of India guarantees One Nation, One Citizenship. No State Government can create a parallel mechanism that undermines this constitutional principle.

The Karnataka Congress Government’s Permanent Residence Certificate (PRC) notification raises serious… pic.twitter.com/essRFW0GES

— Shobha Karandlaje (@ShobhaBJP) July 10, 2026

The essence of Shobha’s allegations is as follows:

1. The Karnataka government is unconstitutionally creating a new category called “Permanent Residents” as an alternative to “Indian citizenship.” Through this, even those who are not citizens of India are allegedly being enabled to acquire citizenship.
2. Permanent Residence Certificates should not be issued to non-citizens. Therefore, the Union government must direct that such certificates be issued only to those whose Indian citizenship has already been established.
3. Until the constitutional validity and legal status of Karnataka’s Permanent Residence Certificate are decided, the issuance of these certificates should be prohibited.

At first glance, the complaint contains neither logic nor patriotism. Not even the slightest concern for the public interest is visible. Instead, it reflects nothing more than the mind-set of, “Even if one eye is lost, it is worth it so long as the person hated loses both eyes,” driven entirely by malice and hatred.

The first question, therefore, is whether these allegations contain any substance.

Shobhaji and  BJP:

Isn’t the Permanent Residence Certificate itself meant to establish citizenship?

Being members of the BJP and the RSS, familiarity with logic, law, and the Constitution has naturally remained limited. Even more disturbing is that administration officials and advisers to the Opposition INC government, who were expected to provide sound legal guidance after assuming office appear to have become just as fallacious as the BJP itself. The complaint speaks for itself.

The argument insists that a Permanent Residence Certificate should be issued only after Indian citizenship has already been proven. But, Shobhaji, does any single document exist in India that conclusively certifies someone as an Indian citizen? As a Union Minister, you should perhaps ask  the Prime Minister this question.

After all, the government has already declared that even a passport—once regarded as proof of citizenship—is merely a travel document, no different in principle from a bus ticket. If that is the position even for those who possess passports, how are the overwhelming majority of poor and oppressed Hindus expected to prove their citizenship, Shobhaji?

When that is the reality, what colonial-era documents, prescribed by you , the actual Aryan migrants who now claim authority, are this country’s indigenous people expected to produce beyond evidence that they have lived in India for decades?

Does your ilk have slightest understanding of the lives of Hindu daily-wage labourers, Hindu agricultural workers, Hindu Devadasis, Hindu transgender persons, or Hindu migrant workers? We know there already that is nothing Bharatiya (patriotic) about the Bharatiya Janata Party. But Nor is this a party representing Hindus as a whole. Through this very allegation, proof has once again been furnished that it represents nothing more than the Brahminical interests of the privileged classes of the Savarna Hindus.

When the government itself does not issue any definitive document establishing citizenship, how can it be argued that even a Permanent Residence Certificate—often obtained by ordinary people only after immense hardship—should be rejected unless citizenship has already been proven? Isn’t that the height of absurdity, sophistry, and cruelty?

PRC: A Provision Made Available by the Election Commission Itself

Shobhaji,

The SIR process is, in fact, intended to verify people’s citizenship. The body conducting that exercise is none other than the Central Election Commission, which functions as an instrument of your government.

It is your own Central Election Commission that has declared, as part of its rules, that submission of any one of the following documents is sufficient to establish a person’s status as a voter and, by extension, as a citizen.

The list of documents is as follows:

1. Identity card or pension order issued to regular employees by any Central or State government or government undertaking.
2. Any document, identity card, or certificate issued in India before  July 1, 1987 by governments, local authorities, post offices, the Life Insurance Corporation, or banks.
3. Birth certificate issued by the competent authority.
4. Passport.
5. SSLC certificate or any other recognized educational certificate issued by an authorized educational authority or university.
6. Permanent Residence Certificate issued by the competent State authority.
7. Forest Rights Certificate.
8. Any caste certificate issued by the competent authority.
9. NRC records, wherever an NRC has been conducted. (At present, this applies only to Assam.)
10. Family records prepared by State governments or local authorities.
11. Any government-issued land or house records.
12. Aadhaar Card. However the Supreme Court has indirectly legitimised the indirect rejection of Aadhar card in its May 27 judgement. 

 

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Now pay attention to Item 6:

Permanent Residence Certificate issued by Competent State Authority.

That means:

1. A Permanent Residence Certificate is one of the accepted documents for establishing citizenship; and
2. It is issued by the competent authority of the State government, not by the Union government. Nor is it issued after citizenship has already been established. On the contrary, the BJP-controlled, Supreme Court-approved Election Commission has explicitly stated that State governments may issue this document for the very purpose of enabling people to establish their citizenship.

Therefore, this is not some new mechanism invented by the Congress government in Karnataka.

(The DK Shivakumar government has certainly displayed delay and inertia in implementing this process. That raises a separate question as to whether the document will ultimately reach those who genuinely lack it. But that is an entirely different issue.)

That is why the allegation that the Permanent Residence Certificate is a “conspiracy to confer citizenship upon non-citizens” is itself malicious. If genuine commitment exists behind this accusation, then opposition should be directed against those who accepted this provision in the first place—the Prime Minister and the Home Minister, in other words, your own government—and against the Central Election Commission that functions at your behest.

Nor is the Permanent Residence Certificate the only State-issued document included in this list. The Commission has also recognized five other documents that are issued by State governments:

1. Identity documents for State government employees.
2. SSLC and other recognized educational certificates issued by authorized educational institutions or universities.
3. Caste certificates issued by the competent authority.
4. Family records prepared by State governments or local authorities.
5. Government-issued land or house records.

Are all these documents not issued by State governments? Hasn’t the Central Election Commission itself recognized them as valid documents? Then how can these documents suddenly become alternatives or substitutes for Indian citizenship?

If that is indeed the argument, were these very documents withheld from poor and oppressed Hindu communities in BJP-ruled States wherever the SIR process was conducted?

For that reason, the allegations made by Shobha and the BJP against the PRC are devoid of substance. They are absurd and built entirely on sophistry.

More importantly, they are dangerous.

The very same line of argument was deployed by the BJP in West Bengal, where it was used as a strategy to deny documentation—particularly to Muslims—and thereby push them out of the electoral rolls. As though waiting for precisely such a pretext, the Election Commission accepted the BJP’s allegations almost in their entirety.

ECI Orders That Curtailed West Bengal’s People-Friendly PRC

When the ECI  initiated the controversial SIR exercise in Bihar through the TMC government in West Bengal anticipated its implications. In July 2025, it issued an order simplifying the process of issuing Domicile Certificates so that residents of West Bengal could obtain the document without being subjected to unnecessary harassment.

However, once the SIR process commenced in West Bengal and district authorities began issuing Domicile Certificates, the BJP in the state demanded that under no circumstances should Domicile Certificates (PRCs) issued after July 2025 be accepted.

The Election Commission promptly accepted that demand. It began separately classifying and rejecting PRCs issued after July 2025.

A detailed report on the matter is available here:

The Central Election Commission subsequently went a step further. Not only did it reject Domicile Certificates altogether, it also issued fresh notices even to those who had previously been issued such certificates. It was only after the Mamata Banerjee government launched a massive public campaign across West Bengal in protest that the Election Commission agreed to accept the document once again—but only after imposing several stringent conditions.

The full text can be accessed here:

The Government Order dated November 2, 1999 relating to Domicile Certificates in West Bengal is available here:

That order makes it clear that eligibility for obtaining a Domicile Certificate is restricted. It also mandates that, in addition to documentary requirements, every applicant’s citizenship and police verification must be completed.

In its final order dated February 8, the Election Commission stipulated that:

1. A West Bengal Domicile Certificate must conform strictly to the Government Order dated November 2, 1999.
2. It must be issued only by the competent authority.
3. An Electoral Registration Officer (ERO) may recognize the certificate only after being satisfied that every prescribed procedure has been duly followed.

Responsibility for this verification was assigned to Micro Observers.

In other words, the Election Commission refused to recognize the simplified procedure introduced by the West Bengal government or the certificates issued under that simplified framework.

A similar situation is now unfolding in Karnataka. The DK Shivakumar government has simplified the rules governing the issuance of Permanent Residence Certificates, and the BJP has begun the very same campaign of misinformation that was witnessed in West Bengal.

Karnataka’s PRC Is People-Friendly—But Will the Election Commission Accept It?

Under Karnataka’s newly issued PRC guidelines, eligibility for Permanent Residence is based on criteria such as a minimum of ten years’ residence in Karnataka, ten years of schooling in the state, ownership of immovable property, and similar qualifications. To establish these requirements, the rules provide that documents such as an Aadhaar card, ration card, Revenue Department records, electoral rolls, and similar records are sufficient.

The guidelines go further. Officials conducting verification are permitted to undertake local inquiries and obtain reports from Village Accountants. Oral testimony has also been recognized as a form of evidence.

Most importantly, the new rules explicitly state that an application must not be rejected merely because a particular document is unavailable. They also require authorities to provide written reasons for any rejection, thereby strengthening official accountability while making the process significantly more inclusive.

There can therefore be little doubt that these new rules are more people-friendly than the previous framework.

The real question, however, is whether a Permanent Residence Certificate obtained through such a simplified and inclusive process will be accepted as a valid document under an SIR exercise that has been designed precisely to exclude as many people as possible.

Furthermore, while framing these new rules, the Karnataka government has implicitly indicated that the amendments were introduced specifically and exclusively to address the requirements of the SIR process. Consequently, although Karnataka’s revised PRC rules may be more citizen-friendly than before, it is doubtful whether they will be Election Commission-friendly or ultimately accepted for SIR purposes.

The Election Commission is under no obligation to accept amendments introduced by the Karnataka government. Just as it did in West Bengal, it may reject them altogether or impose its own conditions, leaving the final decision to the discretion of its own officials and thereby making the process even more stringent.

Indeed, Karnataka’s Chief Electoral Officer has already declined to make any commitment regarding the validity of the state’s revised PRC rules, maintaining that no definitive position can yet be taken.

Is Congress Prepared to Relinquish Power and Confront the Election Commission?

There may be another strategy at work behind all this.

In Karnataka, the first draft of the electoral roll is scheduled to be published on August 5. Thereafter, objections may be filed and supporting documents submitted until September 5. But what happens if, after August 5, the Chief Electoral Officer declares that PRC documents will not be accepted? Will voters who relied on those assurances—farmers, agricultural labourers, daily-wage workers, and other ordinary citizens—be able to assemble an entirely new set of documents within a month? Is the Election Commission’s studied silence, then, part of a deliberate strategy to maximize exclusion from the electoral rolls?

If that is indeed the case, will the Congress government and the Congress party launch a constitutional confrontation against the Election Commission? Will they be prepared to declare non-cooperation with the Commission in order to protect the people and the Republic, even at the cost of losing power? Will they create a constitutional crisis if necessary and wage a political battle to defend the Constitution?

Or will they simply continue publicizing their own people-friendly initiative while, in substance, leaving the PRC incapable of protecting the very people it was meant to serve, thereby allowing the BJP’s agenda to prevail?

The Congress party’s conduct in other states where the SIR process has already been completed does not leave much room for uncertainty about the answer.

Without Repealing the SIR, the Oppressed Cannot Be Protected

The Modi government and the Election Commission are conducting the SIR exercise with the determined objective of removing as many people as possible from the electoral rolls on one pretext or another. Even if only a minor procedural lapse is found in the issuance of a Domicile Certificate, the Commission can simply declare another “discrepancy” and invalidate the document.

That is because the Supreme Court has already held that the Election Commission possesses the authority to frame such rules within the SIR process.

For that reason, Karnataka’s Muslims, Dalit and other oppressed communities cannot be shielded from the BJP–RSS–Election Commission’s SIR offensive merely through the Congress government’s half-hearted PRC initiative.

That is precisely why democracy itself cannot survive unless the SIR process is repealed.

And even after the present SIR exercise concludes, another sustained people’s movement will be necessary—not only to secure the inclusion of those who have been excluded from the electoral rolls, but also to ensure that the SIR process itself is ultimately repealed.

[1] Minister of State for Labour & Employment and Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME) in the Government of India. A senior Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leader, she currently serves as the Member of Parliament for the Bangalore North constituency

[2] https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/karnataka/not-23-hindu-deaths-only-nine-congress-tells-bjp/article22515602.ece

Disclaimer: The views expressed here are the author’s personal views, and do not necessarily represent the views of Sabrangindia.

Related:

SIR 2025-2026: A backdoor exercise to bring in the NRC?

Karnataka’s new PRC rules are people-friendly, but will the ECI accept them?

To Karnataka’s Anti-SIR Movement: A note of caution and concern

The post PRC, SIR and a BJP Hawk Shobha Karandlaje! appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In several cases across India especially over the last two years, police investigations and subsequent reporting have uncovered allegations that were not merely inaccurate but allegedly deliberately manufactured to implicate Muslims. These were not instances of mistaken identity or hurried conclusions. According to investigators, they involved conscious attempts to create communal flashpoints by exploiting existing prejudices around issues such as “love jihad”, Pakistan, cow slaughter, religious conversion and temple desecration. By the time the cycle is closed –deliberate dissemination and outrage, followed by investigation, the damage has been done.

What makes these incidents particularly significant is that each relied upon narratives that have become deeply embedded in India’s contemporary communal discourse. The allegations were believable not because they were supported by evidence, but because they echoed stereotypes that had already been normalised through decades of uncontested political rhetoric, misinformation and communal propaganda. This draws attention to the urgent need for social and political forces to immediately and systematically bust this rhetoric, one myth at a time.

Viewed individually, each incident may appear to be an isolated “conspiracy or local criminal act”. Viewed together, however, they reveal a disturbing pattern in which religion itself becomes a political weapon, with fabricated allegations serving as instruments to deepen suspicion, reinforce prejudice and fracture relations between communities.

2026: Manufacturing communal hatred through false allegations, staged incidents and misinformation

• A 12-year-old allegedly used to manufacture a communal controversy

On June 21, 2026, thousands gathered in Bareilly district for the traditional Muharram Tazia procession, one of the most significant observances in the Islamic calendar. Amid the procession, a short video suddenly began circulating across WhatsApp groups and social media platforms. The clip appeared to show a 12-year-old boy shouting “Pakistan Zindabad.” The implication was immediate and inflammatory: that pro-Pakistan slogans had been raised during a Muslim religious procession.

Given the charged political atmosphere surrounding such allegations, the video quickly acquired communal overtones. Similar allegations in the past have often been invoked to portray Indian Muslims as anti-national, resulting in criminal cases, public outrage and demands for punitive action. But the investigation reportedly uncovered an altogether different narrative.

According to police findings reported by Deccan Herald, the child had allegedly not acted on his own. Investigators found that two adult men had encouraged and instructed the boy to raise the slogan while ensuring that the incident was recorded on video. The purpose, investigators alleged, was to create precisely the kind of viral content that would portray the Muslim procession in a communal light and provoke public anger.

The incident illustrates how communal narratives can now be so easily manufactured with extraordinary simplicity. A child, a mobile phone and a few seconds of video were allegedly enough to produce material capable of triggering nationwide outrage before investigators could establish the facts.

Had the police accepted the viral clip at face value, the episode might simply have entered the long list of alleged instances used to stigmatise an entire community. Instead, the investigation reportedly suggested that the controversy itself had been orchestrated.

• A fabricated ‘Love Jihad’ case unravels in Uttar Pradesh

Barely three weeks earlier, another investigation exposed what may be one of the clearest examples of how communal narratives themselves can allegedly be weaponised. On June 2, 2026, police in Uttar Pradesh booked a Vishwa Hindu Parishad supporter, Nakul Gurjar, after an investigation into what initially appeared to be a routine “love jihad” complaint took an unexpected turn.

According to The Siasat Daily, a woman named Bhawna allegedly told investigators that Gurjar had approached her with a proposal: she would falsely implicate two Muslim men in a “love jihad” case. In return, she was allegedly promised employment and financial compensation. Investigators further alleged that the plan involved extorting ₹10 lakh from the two Muslim men after trapping them in fabricated criminal allegations. Notably, the incident took place on May 30 in Meerut’s Jagriti Vihar Extension area, and within five hours of questioning by the Meerut police, they realised that it was a trap.

The case was particularly significant because “love jihad” allegations have frequently been invoked in political speeches, criminal prosecutions and public campaigns across several states. Such allegations often generate immediate public outrage, long before investigations establish whether any criminal offence has occurred. Here, however, police alleged that the conspiracy was not the crime supposedly committed by Muslim men—but the creation of the allegation itself.

The investigation therefore exposed how one of the country’s most politically potent communal narratives could allegedly be manipulated for extortion, criminal intimidation and communal mobilisation.

• Police allege a cow slaughter case was staged to implicate a Muslim man

Few allegations inflame communal passions in India as rapidly as accusations involving cow slaughter. Against that backdrop, the investigation conducted in Bijnor, Uttar Pradesh, assumed extraordinary significance.

According to The Print, Uttar Pradesh Police alleged that a man named Jagpal had orchestrated a cow slaughter incident with the intention of falsely implicating a Muslim resident. Three people, including a village head here, were arrested for allegedly conspiring to get a calf slaughtered to falsely implicate a potential rival in the upcoming gram pradhan election. Initial allegations were being levelled against one Hasan and his associates in connection with the incident. However, acting on a tip-off, police arrested Faizan following an encounter. During questioning, he allegedly revealed that he and his associates had carried out the act at the behest of incumbent village pradhan Jagpal and his brother Kiranpal. Notably, Additional Superintendent of Police (Rural) Prakash Kumar said parts of a bovine calf were found in a field in Changipur village under Noorpur police station limits on June 18. The arrest took place on June 21.

The alleged conspiracy reversed the assumptions that typically accompany such cases. Ordinarily, public discourse begins with the presumption that a cow has been slaughtered and investigators are searching for the guilty party. In this instance, investigators instead alleged that the incident itself had been engineered to ensure suspicion immediately fell upon a Muslim individual.

The implications extend well beyond this single case. Across northern India, allegations of cow slaughter have repeatedly resulted in mob violence, social boycotts, arrests and, in several instances, lynchings. Where such allegations are themselves fabricated, the accusation becomes a weapon capable of unleashing consequences that far outlast the eventual investigation.

The Bijnor case therefore demonstrates how communal stereotypes can allegedly be converted into instruments of criminal conspiracy, relying on the expectation that public suspicion would naturally gravitate towards Muslims before evidence had even been examined.

When fabricated allegations become political capital

These incidents also reveal another important characteristic of communal misinformation. False allegations rarely remain confined to social media. Once they begin circulating, they often find their way into public speeches, neighbourhood conversations, local protests and political campaigns. Each viral post becomes another anecdote supporting larger claims that Muslims are systematically threatening Hindu society.

Even after police investigations or independent fact-checks expose the fabrication, the original allegation often continues to circulate, detached from the correction. This asymmetry gives false communal narratives extraordinary power. The accusation spreads nationally, while the correction remains local. The allegation reinforces prejudice, however the investigation receives comparatively little attention.

Old Videos, New Hatred: How misinformation was used to manufacture communal flashpoints

If the Bareilly, Bijnor and “love jihad” conspiracies demonstrated how criminal allegations could allegedly be fabricated to implicate Muslims, another set of incidents from 2026 revealed an equally dangerous strategy: the deliberate communalisation of unrelated videos and events.

In an era where a thirty-second clip can reach millions before fact-checkers or investigators intervene, misinformation has become one of the most effective tools for manufacturing communal outrage. Images stripped of context, unrelated incidents relabelled as religious conflict, and fabricated narratives built around genuine videos have repeatedly been used to reinforce the perception that Muslims are engaged in organised attacks on Hindus.

Investigations into several such incidents in 2026 exposed how communal narratives were constructed not through evidence but through strategic distortion.

• Temple brawl falsely portrayed as violence by Muslims during Eid celebrations

In early June 2026, social media users began circulating a video purportedly showing Muslims attacking Hindus during Eid celebrations. The footage, which rapidly spread across multiple platforms, was accompanied by captions alleging that Muslims had entered a temple premises and violently assaulted devotees during the festival.

The claims carried all the ingredients of a communal flashpoint. Shared without context, the video appeared to confirm a narrative frequently promoted online—that Hindu religious spaces were increasingly under attack from Muslims. However, an investigation by AFP Fact Check dismantled the viral claim. Notably, the video had been posted on May 23, while it was only on May 29 that a local assistant police inspector at the Kodoli police station, Chetan Masutage, confirmed to AFP that “no Muslims were involved” in the clash.

The fact-check found that the footage had absolutely no connection with Eid celebrations or communal violence. Instead, it depicted a local altercation at an Indian temple involving individuals from the same community, with no evidence whatsoever that Muslims had participated in the incident. The communal captions accompanying the video had been entirely fabricated after the fact. By changing only the accompanying text—not the video itself—those circulating the clip transformed an ordinary local dispute into what appeared to be evidence of organised communal aggression.

The episode highlighted one of the defining characteristics of modern misinformation campaigns: authenticity of footage is often less important than authenticity of context. A genuine video can become a powerful vehicle for falsehood once stripped of its original circumstances. For many viewers, the correction never travelled as far as the original allegation.

• A scripted entertainment video recast as evidence of ‘Love Jihad’

During December 2025, another misleading video spread rapidly across social media. This time, the clip appeared to show a Muslim man pretending to be Hindu in order to trap a Hindu woman, reinforcing familiar “love jihad” narratives that have become central to communal campaigns across several states. The video was uploaded by a user named ‘monty_deepak_sharma’ on December 3, 2025, with Factly busting the myth on December 15, 2025.

The accompanying captions claimed that the footage was genuine evidence exposing the tactics allegedly employed by Muslim men to deceive Hindu women by concealing their identities. The claims were false. An investigation by Factly established that the video was not a real incident at all. It had been created as scripted entertainment content, with actors performing fictional roles for online audiences. There was no criminal offence, no deception, and no evidence that the events portrayed had occurred.

Yet once detached from its original context, the fictional performance acquired an entirely different political meaning. The transformation was revealing. Rather than creating fabricated evidence from scratch, misinformation networks increasingly repurpose existing content—films, comedy sketches, staged performances or old recordings—and present them as documentary proof of communal conspiracies.

The objective is not merely to deceive viewers about a single incident but to reinforce broader stereotypes already circulating within public discourse. By the time the video was debunked, thousands had already viewed it as confirmation that “love jihad” was an organised and continuing phenomenon.

The mechanics of communal misinformation

The two episodes shared a striking similarity. Neither required forged documents, or sophisticated digital manipulation. Both relied upon something much simpler: removing context. A temple dispute became an alleged Muslim attack, and a scripted performance became evidence of organised religious conspiracy. The resulting narratives fit seamlessly into pre-existing communal stereotypes, making them both believable and highly shareable.

When it comes to misinformation, it has been repeatedly observed that false communal claims succeed not merely because they are dramatic but because they resonate with narratives audiences have already encountered. Once those narratives become familiar, new allegations require remarkably little evidence to appear credible. The incidents from June 2026 illustrate precisely this dynamic.

Rather than inventing entirely new stories, those spreading the misinformation borrowed ordinary events and inserted them into a communal framework that portrayed Muslims as aggressors. The factual details became secondary; the communal message remained central.

2025: Fabricated evidence, fake identities and manufactured communal narratives

If the cases from 2026 demonstrated how communal narratives could be manufactured through staged incidents and misinformation, the events that unfolded across India in 2025 revealed an even broader phenomenon. Investigations that year uncovered allegations ranging from fake terror threats and fabricated “love jihad” claims to staged temple vandalism and the deliberate assumption of Muslim identities to commit crimes.

Taken together, these incidents exposed how communal stereotypes themselves had become tools that could be exploited for political mobilisation, extortion, personal vendettas and public incitement. In each case, the initial accusation targeted Muslims; only later did investigations reveal a very different story.

• Temple walls defaced to falsely implicate Muslims

Few incidents generated as much outrage in 2025 as the discovery of provocative graffiti on the walls of several temples in Aligarh, Uttar Pradesh.

In late October, devotees arriving at the temples found messages reading “I Love Muhammad” scrawled across the walls. Photographs of the vandalised temples spread rapidly across social media, accompanied by claims that Muslims had deliberately desecrated Hindu places of worship to provoke communal unrest.

Given the emotionally charged nature of the incident, outrage followed almost immediately. The graffiti was widely projected as another instance of religious provocation by Muslims, reinforcing existing narratives that Hindu religious spaces were under deliberate attack.

The police investigation, however, fundamentally altered the narrative. According to a report of Times of India, the vandalism had not been carried out by Muslims at all. Instead, police registered an FIR against five individuals, alleging that they had deliberately written the slogans on temple walls to frame local Muslim residents and inflame communal tensions. Reports further noted that the investigation was aided by the fact that the slogan itself had been misspelled—a detail that contributed to unravelling the conspiracy and identifying the accused. Four persons were subsequently arrested in connection with the case. Police said the slogans were found scribbled on four shrines on October 25, with the police discovering the truth on October 31, 2025.

The incident was remarkable because it inverted the assumptions surrounding communal vandalism. What initially appeared to be an act of religious desecration by Muslims was instead alleged to have been an attempt to manufacture precisely that perception. Rather than responding to communal hostility, investigators suggested that the hostility itself was being consciously engineered. Had the conspiracy not been uncovered, the graffiti would likely have entered public memory as yet another example of alleged Muslim aggression against Hindu religious sites. Instead, it became evidence of how easily religious symbols can be manipulated to produce communal suspicion.

• A fake terror threat designed to implicate Muslims

Another investigation in 2025 demonstrated how even national security concerns could be exploited to create communal suspicion. In September 2025, police investigating a terror threat directed at Mumbai initially appeared to be dealing with a potentially serious security matter. Threat messages had created alarm and naturally attracted attention because of their apparent association with terrorism. The investigation eventually revealed something far less ideological but equally revealing.

According to police, as per the report of Times of India, the accused had allegedly fabricated the threat to settle a personal dispute with a former friend. The case exposed how terror allegations—particularly when associated with Muslim identities—could be weaponised to give greater credibility to personal vendettas and amplify public fear.  Although the motive was reportedly personal rather than communal, the incident reflected a broader pattern observed across several cases: exploiting prevailing public assumptions about Muslims and terrorism to make fabricated allegations appear instantly believable. Notably, the issue had come to the forefront on September 4, with police uncovering the truth on September 6.

• The Nishikant Dubey death threat case where a Hindu man allegedly posed as a Muslim

One of the most politically significant cases of the year involved BJP Member of Parliament Nishikant Dubey. In September 2025, Scroll reported, Dubey withdrew a complaint filed ragainst the death threats received by him allegedly from a Muslim individual after it was revealed that the person behind the same was a Hindu. The narrative changed dramatically after the police investigation.

According to reports, investigators found that the person responsible was not a Muslim at all but a Hindu man who had allegedly assumed a Muslim identity while issuing the threats. Following the findings, Dubey withdrew his complaint.  The case underscored the ease with which communal assumptions could shape public perception. In July 2018, the Delhi Police had filed the case based on a complaint by the Godda MP, who had alleged that a prisoner in Jharkhand’s Sahibganj jail had threatened to kill him, according to The New Indian Express. On September 3, Dubey said on social media that the investigation into the case had found that a resident of Godda district’s Kumardih village, Kundan Kumar Das, had threatened him and “conspired to frame some Muslim boys” in the case.

Simply attributing the threats to a Muslim identity was sufficient to generate widespread political attention. The subsequent revelation that the accused had allegedly fabricated that identity received comparatively limited public discussion.

From individual conspiracies to a recurring pattern

The episode illustrated how communal identities themselves can become instruments of deception, allowing fabricated allegations to acquire immediate credibility because they align with existing prejudices. The Dubey incident was not an isolated example. Throughout 2025, multiple reports documented instances where individuals deliberately assumed Muslim names or identities while committing crimes, fully aware that such identities would immediately invite suspicion or reinforce communal stereotypes. An analysis published by The Quint examined this emerging phenomenon, documenting several cases in which accused persons allegedly used fake Muslim names to commit offences ranging from fraud to harassment. Investigators in these cases found that the perpetrators were not Muslims but individuals exploiting communal biases to misdirect investigations or inflame religious tensions.  The significance of this pattern lies beyond individual criminality. A fake Muslim identity is effective only because it taps into an existing social expectation—that crimes attributed to Muslims are more readily believed, more likely to provoke outrage, and more easily woven into larger communal narratives. In this sense, prejudice itself becomes an operational tool for deception.

The events of 2025 reveal an important shift. These were no longer simply false rumours circulating on anonymous social media accounts. Investigations uncovered planned acts of vandalism, fabricated criminal complaints, assumed religious identities, and manufactured evidence, all allegedly designed to ensure that suspicion would immediately fall upon Muslims. Whether the objective was extortion, personal revenge, political mobilisation or communal provocation, the method remained strikingly consistent.

The accusation came first, public outrage followed, with the truth emerging only later. By then, the communal narrative had often already achieved its purpose.

From Manufactured Narratives to Public Mobilisation

The cases discussed thus far reveal how fabricated allegations can be used to falsely implicate Muslims in individual criminal incidents. But the consequences of these narratives do not end with police complaints or viral social media posts. Once a false claim enters public discourse, it often acquires a life of its own. Political speeches, protest gatherings, neighbourhood meetings and organised campaigns begin invoking these allegations as proof of a broader conspiracy. Individual incidents—whether verified or entirely fabricated—are woven together to portray Muslims as a collective threat.

Several incidents from 2025 illustrate precisely how unverified or demonstrably false allegations were invoked to justify communal mobilisation and discrimination.

• A double murder transformed into a speech about ‘jihadis’

On April 20, 2025, members of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and Bajrang Dal organised a protest in Karol Bagh, Delhi, following the murders of Karan and Rakesh Sood. The murders themselves were reportedly being investigated as arising from a monetary dispute. Yet during the protest, speakers shifted the focus away from the facts of the case and instead sought to place the incident within a much larger communal narrative.

According to documentation by Hindutva Watch, one speaker described Muslims as people with a “jihadi mentality”, claiming that they were those who “sell drugs” and “fix punctures” before alleging that they routinely targeted Hindu society through organised conspiracies. Rather than discussing the evidence surrounding the murders, the speakers repeatedly referred to “jihadis,” portraying the crime as part of a broader communal campaign.  The speech then moved beyond the Delhi murders altogether.

One of the speakers invoked a controversy involving Tata Consultancy Services (TCS) in Nashik, claiming that 188 Hindu women had been subjected to a “collective sexual assault” by Muslim employees as part of a “love jihad” conspiracy. This allegation had already circulated widely across social media.

Despite their being no concrete evidence whatsoever supporting the extraordinary claim that 188 Hindu women had been sexually assaulted or forcibly converted by Muslim employees working at TCS. Despite the absence of evidence, the allegation was presented before a public gathering as an established fact.

Read detailed report here.

The speaker proceeded to claim that Muslims working in multinational companies deliberately identify vulnerable Hindu women during job interviews, lure them into relationships, compel them to wear hijabs and burqas, invite them to iftar gatherings, secretly record intimate encounters, and later blackmail them into religious conversion. None of these sweeping allegations was supported by evidence during the speech. Instead, a series of unverified and previously debunked claims was woven together into a single narrative portraying Muslim professionals as participants in a nationwide conspiracy against Hindu women.  The significance of the Karol Bagh speech lies not merely in its rhetoric but in its method.

Rather than introducing entirely new allegations, the speaker recycled existing misinformation, presenting previously discredited claims as factual proof before a politically charged audience. The result was the transformation of an unrelated criminal investigation into another platform for communal mobilisation.

• When misinformation becomes the basis for discrimination

The consequences of such narratives extend beyond speeches. Throughout 2025, allegations of “love jihad”—many of them unsupported or later disproved—continued to influence everyday interactions between communities. One striking example emerged from Indore, Madhya Pradesh, where reports documented how Muslim traders and workers were pushed out of a local market after rumours and allegations surrounding “love jihad” gained traction.

According to reporting by Religion Unplugged, Muslim shopkeepers and workers found themselves increasingly excluded from commercial activity as suspicion fuelled by communal narratives translated into social and economic discrimination. Businesses that had operated in the market for years suddenly faced hostility because of collective allegations directed at Muslims rather than any proven misconduct by individual traders.

The episode demonstrates how misinformation rarely remains confined to the digital sphere. False narratives eventually reshape real lives, employment opportunities disappear, businesses suffer, neighbourhood relationships deteriorate and entire communities become suspect.

The cumulative effect of repeated falsehoods

The significance of these incidents lies not only in the fact that individual allegations were eventually disproved, but also in the cumulative effect they have on public discourse. In many cases, police investigations exposed fabricated complaints, independent fact-checks debunked misleading videos, and courts rejected prosecutions that lacked credible evidence. However, by the time these findings emerged, the original allegations had often already reached a much wider audience.

False communal narratives rarely operate in isolation. Instead, each new allegation builds upon earlier ones, creating a larger body of stories that appear to reinforce one another. A fabricated “love jihad” allegation strengthens existing perceptions shaped by previous claims. A staged Pakistan slogan is viewed alongside earlier allegations of anti-national activity. Acts of vandalism falsely attributed to Muslims are cited as further proof of an already accepted narrative. As these incidents accumulate, repetition begins to substitute for evidence.

This creates an environment in which suspicion becomes normalised. Allegations against Muslims are more readily accepted because they resemble stories that have circulated before, regardless of whether those earlier claims were ever substantiated. Even after investigations disprove individual incidents, the broader narrative often survives, continuing to shape public perceptions long after the facts have been established.

When investigations expose the truth

Another striking feature of many of the incidents discussed in this investigation is that the conspiracies were not uncovered by speculation or political debate, but through official investigations.

In several cases, it was the police who concluded that a child had allegedly been coached to raise Pakistan slogans during the Muharram procession in Bareilly. Police investigations also uncovered alleged conspiracies involving fabricated “love jihad” complaints, identified those accused of defacing temples in Aligarh to falsely implicate Muslims, and reportedly found that a Hindu man had assumed a Muslim identity while issuing death threats.

These findings highlight an important aspect of the problem. The issue is not simply that misinformation circulates, but that communal allegations often gain widespread acceptance before they are properly investigated. By the time police complete their inquiries or courts assess the evidence, the original claims have frequently spread through social media platforms, messaging applications, television debates and public speeches. Although official investigations may ultimately establish the facts, they often struggle to undo the impact of allegations that have already entered the public consciousness.

The Pattern Did Not Begin in 2026: Earlier cases reveal how false allegations against Muslims can endure for years before the truth emerges

The incidents of 2025 and 2026 are not isolated aberrations. They belong to a much longer trajectory in which allegations against Muslims have often acquired legitimacy long before they are subjected to judicial scrutiny or independent investigation.

In several cases, the truth has emerged only after years of litigation, prolonged criminal proceedings or detailed fact-checking exercises. By that stage, however, those accused have frequently spent years defending themselves against allegations that eventually failed to withstand scrutiny.

The following cases illustrate the enduring costs of weaponising communal accusations:

• Six years after being branded ‘pro-Pakistan’, seventeen Muslim men were found to have been falsely prosecuted

One of the clearest examples comes from Madhya Pradesh, where 17 Muslim men were accused in 2017 of celebrating Pakistan’s victory after an India-Pakistan cricket match. The allegations carried enormous political weight.

Celebrating Pakistan’s victory in India is frequently portrayed not merely as poor judgment but as evidence of anti-national sentiment and disloyalty. The accusation quickly attracted public attention and reinforced familiar stereotypes questioning the patriotism of Indian Muslims. For the seventeen accused men, however, the allegations translated into criminal prosecution. It was only six years later, in March 2024, that courts examining the evidence concluded that the prosecution’s case could not be sustained.

As reported by Article 14, the courts found that the police case was false, effectively bringing to an end year of legal uncertainty faced by the accused. The judgment exposed serious deficiencies in the evidence relied upon to prosecute the men and underscored the dangers of criminal cases driven by communal assumptions rather than credible proof.

The case raises difficult questions about the consequences of false communal allegations. Even where courts ultimately reject such prosecutions, the process itself becomes punishment. Years spent attending court hearings, legal expenses, social stigma and the label of being “anti-national” cannot simply be erased by an acquittal or dismissal. The correction comes, but it comes years too late.

• Ramzan, Roza and the allegation of forced conversion

Another case that drew significant attention emerged from Uttar Pradesh during Ramzan 2025. A Muslim woman was arrested under the state’s anti-conversion law after allegations that she had persuaded a minor Hindu girl to observe roza (fasting) and convert to Islam. The allegations immediately acquired communal significance because they appeared to fit within broader political narratives surrounding unlawful religious conversions. Subsequent reporting, however, suggested that the factual background was far more complex.

According to The Wire, the dispute appeared to revolve less around organised religious conversion than around personal and financial disagreements between the families involved. The report questioned the evidentiary basis of invoking anti-conversion legislation and examined how routine interpersonal disputes could become transformed into allegations of religious conversion once communal narratives entered the picture. Crucial to note is that an FIR was lodged in Jhansi on March 13, 2025 after a Hindu man alleged that his daughter aged 16 was lured by two Muslim women in his neighbourhood to keep fast during Ramzan in a bid to convert her to Islam. On March 26, additional sessions judge Jhansi Vijay Kumar Verma denied bail to Shahnaz.

Whether or not criminal liability ultimately survives judicial scrutiny, the case illustrates how allegations of conversion can rapidly escalate into communal controversies before investigators establish the underlying facts.

• Karnataka: A neighbourhood scuffle falsely communalised

Another example emerged from Karnataka, where claims circulated widely alleging that Muslims had pelted stones at a Ganesh idol. The allegation spread quickly across social media and was presented yet another instance of religious hostility directed against Hindu festivals. Independent verification, however, told a different story. Notably, Kreately Media, which has shared communal misinformation on several occasions, shared the video on X on September 4 and wrote, “They hate idol worshippers”.

An investigation by Alt News, published just a day later, found that the viral claims were misleading. Rather than a communal attack by Muslims, the incident stemmed from a scuffle involving Hindu groups, with no evidence supporting the allegation that Muslims had targeted the Ganesh idol. The communal framing had been added only after the incident entered social media circulation.

Like the temple video falsely linked to Eid celebrations in 2026, the Karnataka episode demonstrated how ordinary disputes can be stripped of their original context and repackaged as evidence of communal aggression. The transformation requires little more than an altered caption. The consequences, however, can be profound.

A recurring blueprint for communal polarisation

Although the incidents documented in this investigation differ in their immediate facts, they reveal a remarkably consistent pattern in the way communal narratives are constructed and disseminated. The allegations vary—from Pakistan slogans and “love jihad” to cow slaughter, religious conversion, temple desecration and terrorism—but the underlying method remains strikingly similar.

In almost every case, the sequence follows a familiar trajectory. A sensational allegation is made, often identifying Muslims as the perpetrators at the outset. The claim is then amplified through social media platforms, messaging applications, local networks and, in some instances, political speeches or public demonstrations. The allegations generate widespread public outrage before investigators have had an opportunity to verify the facts. It is only later, through police investigations, independent journalism, fact-checking organisations or judicial proceedings, that the accuracy of the original claims comes under scrutiny.

As the cases examined here demonstrate, a significant number of these allegations either proved to be entirely fabricated or were found to be materially different from the narratives that initially captured public attention. By that stage, however, the allegations had often already entered public discourse, making the subsequent corrections far less visible than the original claims.

The incidents documented in this investigation point to a phenomenon that extends beyond the spread of misinformation. They demonstrate how existing communal prejudices can be deliberately exploited because those responsible understand that allegations involving Muslims often attract immediate public attention and are less likely to be questioned in their initial stages.

Whether it is a fabricated Pakistan slogan, a staged act of temple vandalism, a false allegation of “love jihad” or a misleading claim of religious conversion, these narratives frequently gain traction because they resonate with stereotypes that have already become embedded in sections of public discourse. The allegations are often amplified long before evidence is examined, allowing them to shape public opinion even if they are later disproved.

The consequences are significant. Individuals falsely accused may face criminal proceedings, social ostracism, threats, economic losses and lasting damage to their reputations. More broadly, such allegations reinforce collective suspicion towards an entire community, contributing to an atmosphere in which discrimination and exclusion appear increasingly justified.

In this sense, the weaponisation of religion is not confined to the dissemination of hate speech. It also involves the strategic use of fabricated or misleading allegations to lend credibility to existing prejudices and to normalise distrust of a particular community. Even when investigations eventually expose the truth, the original allegations often continue to influence public perceptions, demonstrating that the impact of such narratives frequently extends well beyond the outcome of any individual case.

Need: Sustained Hate Watch Campaigns at the Community & professional levels

This unbroken and cynical cycle of targeting misinformation and hate needs equally sustained and creative contestation, intervention. From housing societies, classrooms, playgrounds to parks, local trains and buses, discourses need to foreground the dangers of such invidious blood-letting. CJP has attempted in the past and continues to generate materials and interventions that can be used as discursive tools to combat this phenomenon. Read about these efforts here, here, here, here, here and here.

Conclusion: The Constitutional Cost of Manufactured Communal Narratives

Viewed in isolation, each of the incidents documented in this investigation may appear to be an unrelated act of misinformation, a local criminal conspiracy, or an instance of communal rumour. The motives also differ. In some cases, the objective appears to have been extortion or personal revenge; in others, political mobilisation, social media attention, or the deliberate creation of communal unrest. Yet, when these incidents are examined together, they reveal a strikingly consistent pattern in the manufacture and circulation of false allegations against Muslims.

The pattern extends far beyond the simple spread of misinformation. It demonstrates how certain allegations are repeatedly chosen because they draw upon narratives that are already deeply embedded in public discourse. Whether the incident occurred in Uttar Pradesh, Delhi, Karnataka or Madhya Pradesh, the accusations almost invariably revolved around the same themes: “love jihad“, Pakistan slogans, cow slaughter, religious conversion, temple desecration, terrorism or attacks on Hindu festivals. These are not random allegations. They are accusations that have, over the years, acquired enormous political and emotional resonance. As a result, they require relatively little supporting evidence to gain traction because they reinforce stories that sections of the public have already heard repeatedly through political speeches, television debates, election campaigns and social media.

One of the clearest lessons emerging from these cases is that the accusation itself often becomes more consequential than the truth. In many of the incidents discussed in this investigation, police investigations, independent journalists, fact-checking organisations or courts ultimately dismantled the original allegations. The Bareilly incident revealed that a child had allegedly been coached to raise Pakistan slogans during a Muharram procession. Investigations uncovered alleged conspiracies to fabricate “love jihad” cases and falsely implicate Muslim youths. Police reportedly exposed a plan to frame a Muslim man in a fabricated cow slaughter case in Bijnor. The Aligarh temple graffiti investigation led to the arrest of individuals accused of writing provocative slogans to falsely implicate Muslims. Investigators also found that a Hindu man had allegedly posed as a Muslim while issuing death threats to a Member of Parliament. Earlier cases similarly exposed misleading communal claims surrounding Ganesh festival violence, false allegations of conversion, and criminal prosecutions that courts later found to be baseless.

These investigations underline an important reality. The problem is not simply that misinformation exists; it is that false communal allegations often become accepted as truth before any meaningful investigation has taken place. Investigations require time. Evidence must be collected, witnesses examined and facts verified. Social media operates according to an entirely different logic. Within hours, an allegation can spread across WhatsApp groups, Facebook pages, Telegram channels and X, before being repeated by political actors, local organisations or television debates. By the time investigators establish what actually occurred, the original narrative has often travelled much further than the correction.

The incidents examined in this investigation also reveal a remarkably consistent blueprint for communal polarisation. In case after case, the sequence follows the same trajectory. A sensational allegation is first made against Muslims. The allegation is then amplified through social media, local networks and, in some instances, political speeches or public gatherings. Public outrage follows almost immediately, while the factual basis of the allegation remains unverified. Only later do police investigations, fact-checking organisations, journalists or courts examine the evidence. In a significant number of the cases documented here, that evidence proved the original allegations to be false, misleading or materially different from the claims that had initially captured public attention.

The cumulative effect of these repeated falsehoods is perhaps even more significant than any individual incident. A single fabricated allegation may eventually be disproved, but communal narratives do not function in isolation. Each new accusation builds upon earlier ones, creating an ecosystem in which repetition gradually substitutes for evidence. A fabricated “love jihad” allegation reinforces memories of previous claims. A staged Pakistan slogan appears to confirm existing suspicions. A false allegation of temple desecration is interpreted alongside earlier rumours. Over time, these incidents collectively contribute to an environment in which allegations against Muslims appear increasingly plausible simply because similar stories have circulated before, regardless of whether those earlier stories were ever substantiated.

This process has profound implications for the administration of justice. Criminal law is built upon the principle that individuals are judged on the basis of evidence and personal culpability. The incidents documented here demonstrate how communal narratives frequently abandon that principle. Allegations against one individual are projected as evidence of the conduct of an entire community. In some of the cases discussed in this investigation, even that individual culpability proved illusory because investigators found that Muslims had been falsely implicated from the outset. Yet the allegations continued to reinforce broader stereotypes portraying Muslims as inherently suspect, disloyal or dangerous. In this way, fabricated allegations cease to be about individual criminal conduct and instead become instruments for the collective criminalisation of an entire religious community.

Equally troubling is the imbalance between the reach of the allegation and the reach of the correction. The original accusation often receives extensive media attention, dominates social media conversations and becomes the subject of political speeches and public mobilisation. By contrast, the eventual finding that the allegation was fabricated or unsupported frequently receives only limited coverage. Many people remember hearing that Pakistan slogans were raised or that temples had been desecrated. Far fewer remember learning that police later concluded the slogans had allegedly been orchestrated or that the vandalism had reportedly been staged to implicate Muslims. This asymmetry ensures that even disproved allegations continue to influence public memory long after they have collapsed under scrutiny.

The consequences extend well beyond misinformation. Individuals who are falsely accused may face criminal investigations, arrests, prolonged legal proceedings, threats, economic hardship and lasting reputational harm. Communities become increasingly vulnerable to social boycotts, discrimination and exclusion. Businesses suffer, neighbourhood relationships deteriorate and public trust between communities weakens. Even where investigations ultimately establish the truth, they cannot easily undo the social and psychological damage caused by the original allegations.

The cases documented in this investigation therefore demonstrate that the weaponisation of religion today is not confined to inflammatory speeches or overt acts of communal violence. Increasingly, it operates through the manufacture of facts themselves. A staged slogan, a fabricated criminal complaint, a misleading video, a false identity, an edited clip or a rumour repeated often enough can become the foundation upon which broader communal narratives are constructed. The objective is not always to secure convictions in a court of law. More often, it is to secure convictions in the court of public opinion, where allegations spread rapidly and corrections struggle to command equal attention.

This raises important constitutional concerns. India’s constitutional framework rests upon the promise that every individual will be treated equally before the law, irrespective of religion. Article 14 guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the laws. Article 15 prohibits discrimination on grounds of religion, among other protected characteristics. Article 21, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, protects not only life and personal liberty but also the dignity and reputation of every individual. Equally fundamental to the criminal justice system is the presumption of innocence—the principle that guilt must be established through evidence, tested through due process and determined by an independent court. Manufactured communal allegations invert each of these principles. Suspicion precedes investigation, identity precedes evidence, and public outrage often precedes due process.

Ultimately, the incidents examined in this investigation are not merely stories about misinformation or isolated conspiracies. Together, they expose a recurring method by which religion can be weaponised to manufacture social divisions and legitimise discrimination. They illustrate how carefully crafted falsehoods, amplified through digital platforms and public discourse, can transform unverified allegations into accepted truths, often with serious consequences for those falsely accused and for communal harmony more broadly.

The greatest danger, therefore, is not simply that false allegations continue to be made. It is that they are repeatedly constructed around familiar communal stereotypes, allowing prejudice itself to become the foundation upon which those allegations are believed. In such an environment, the rule of law is weakened, constitutional guarantees are placed under strain, and the distinction between fact and communal fiction becomes increasingly blurred. Protecting India’s constitutional commitment to equality, secularism and due process requires not only exposing individual falsehoods but also recognising—and resisting—the broader pattern through which fabricated communal narratives are repeatedly manufactured, amplified and deployed to deepen religious polarisation.

Related:

SIR 2025-26: Dismantling the very Idea of India?

How big tech is profiting from Hindutva hate music

Judging the Judge: The communal backlash against a lynching verdict

Shared Muharram Heritage: Hindus lead Tazias, Sikhs serve water

Nazia Elahi Khan faces multiple FIRs over alleged hate speech

Bombay HC condemns use of externment to silence political dissent; says opposition to government cannot be treated as a crime

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The Indian Constitution was never conceived merely as a framework for governing an independent nation. Constitutional historian Granville Austin famously described it as an instrument of a “social revolution”; a document intended to transform Indian society by replacing entrenched hierarchies with the principles of justice, liberty, equality and fraternity. This distinction lies at the heart of the debate surrounding the place of ancient Indian texts such as the Manusmriti in legal education.

Socio-political critic and columnist Solomon Mubash argues in his recent essay, From Constitutional Morality to Brahmanical Logic: Judicial Violence and Power, that the controversy extends far beyond curriculum design or the study of history. Instead, he contends that it reflects a deeper contest over the moral and ideological foundations of the Indian republic. Whether or not one agrees with every aspect of his argument, the questions he raises extend far beyond the classroom.

At stake is not whether students should read the Manusmriti. Any serious student of law, history, religion or sociology must engage with texts that have shaped the intellectual traditions of the subcontinent. The real question is how such texts should be situated within a constitutional democracy founded on equal citizenship.

History and heritage are not the same thing.

History seeks to understand the past—its achievements as well as its contradictions. Heritage often seeks to celebrate it. Confusing the two risks turning scholarly inquiry into cultural endorsement. Ancient texts deserve academic engagement because they reveal how societies understood law, authority and social order. They do not automatically acquire normative authority simply because they are old.

The Manusmriti occupies a distinctive and contested place in India’s intellectual history. As Indologist Patrick Olivelle, whose translation remains among the most authoritative, notes, it is one of the most influential Dharmashastra texts prescribing norms of social and legal conduct. Historians have also pointed out that while its actual legal authority varied across regions and historical periods, its prescriptions articulated a social order organised around hereditary hierarchy.

The text differentiates duties, privileges and punishments according to caste and gender. Women, Shudras and those placed outside the varna order occupy unequal positions within its normative framework. Scholars including B.R. Ambedkar, Nicholas Dirks and Christophe Jaffrelot have therefore interpreted the Manusmriti as a powerful symbol of graded social inequality, even while recognising that lived social practises were often more complex than any single text could capture.

Recognising this historical reality is not an act of hostility towards Indian civilisation. It is an acknowledgement that every civilisation contains traditions worthy of preservation alongside institutions that deserve critical scrutiny.

It is precisely this distinction that informed Dr B.R. Ambedkar’s understanding of constitutional morality. In his final address to the Constituent Assembly on 25 November 1949, Ambedkar warned that political democracy could not survive unless it rested upon social democracy founded on liberty, equality and fraternity. He cautioned that India was entering “a life of contradictions”, where political equality would coexist with deep social and economic inequality unless constitutional values transformed society itself.

For Ambedkar, constitutional morality was therefore not blind allegiance to a legal document. It was a civic ethic that required citizens and institutions to judge inherited customs against constitutional principles rather than treating tradition as the ultimate source of legitimacy.

His public burning of the Manusmriti during the Mahad Satyagraha in 1927 has generally been understood by historians as a symbolic rejection of scriptural sanction for caste hierarchy—not a rejection of Indian civilisation itself. His later leadership of the Constitution’s Drafting Committee represented an attempt to replace birth-based status with equal constitutional citizenship.

That constitutional commitment found concrete expression in Articles 14, 15 and 17 of the Constitution, which guarantee equality before the law, prohibit discrimination on specified grounds and abolish untouchability. A Dalit labourer, a Brahmin scholar, an Adivasi woman and a member of a religious minority stand equal before the law not because tradition confers equal worth upon them, but because the Constitution does.

That was the revolutionary promise of the Republic.

Mubash argues that a continuing tension exists between constitutional morality and what he describes as Brahmanical social logic. Regardless of whether one adopts that terminology, the broader constitutional question remains relevant. The tension between constitutional ideals and entrenched social hierarchies continues to surface whenever caste-based discrimination is defended in the language of tradition, women’s autonomy is subordinated to customary norms, or inherited privilege seeks legitimacy through appeals to civilisational continuity rather than constitutional principle.

The danger lies in confusing antiquity with authority. No constitutional democracy derives its legitimacy from the age of its ideas. Its legitimacy derives from the justice of its institutions.

Constitutional morality asks a different question from historical tradition. It asks not whether a practice is ancient but whether it is just; not whether it is customary but whether it respects the equal dignity of every citizen. The Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed this principle in decisions such as Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018) and Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala (2018), holding that constitutional morality must prevail where social morality infringes fundamental rights.

Yet the constitutional transformation envisioned by Ambedkar remains incomplete. Ambedkar himself distinguished between political democracy and social democracy, warning that the former could not endure without the latter. More than seven decades after Independence, the continued incidence of caste-based atrocities, manual scavenging, honour killings and structural exclusion—documented in reports of the National Crime Records Bureau, the National Human Rights Commission and successive government agencies—demonstrates that constitutional equality has not fully displaced social hierarchy.

The response to this challenge cannot be historical amnesia. Ancient texts should be read, debated and critically examined. But they must be approached as historical artefacts rather than constitutional guides. Legal education should encourage students not only to understand what such texts prescribed but also to examine who benefited from those prescriptions, who was excluded by them, and why independent India consciously chose a different constitutional path.

Every civilisation possesses traditions worth preserving. Every intellectual tradition contains ideas worthy of study. But no tradition becomes immune from criticism merely because it is ancient.

The Constitution occupies a unique place in India’s public life because it represents a conscious normative departure from systems that assign human worth by birth. As Granville Austin argued, it sought to facilitate a peaceful social revolution through democratic institutions rather than through coercion. It is therefore not merely a legal document but an aspirational framework for building a society in which liberty is not restricted by caste, equality is not constrained by status and fraternity is not defeated by inherited divisions.

The Constitution is not a mirror reflecting India as it was. It is a blueprint imagining India as it could be, and ought to be.

The real challenge before Indian institutions is not that they have forgotten their roots. It is that they sometimes forget the purpose of the constitutional project itself. That project was never about recovering an idealised past. It was about constructing a more equal future.

The future of Indian democracy will not ultimately be determined by how frequently it invokes its civilisational inheritance. It will depend on whether its institutions continue to uphold the constitutional vision articulated by Ambedkar, embedded in the Constitution and reaffirmed by the Supreme Court. India’s civilisational inheritance deserves careful study. Its Constitution deserves primacy. The Constitution is not the antithesis of Indian civilisation; it is arguably the Republic’s most profound civilisational achievement.

Oindrila Dasgupta is a doctoral researcher at Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University and teaches Social Inclusion and Journalism. Her work focuses on role of journalism in terms of social justice praxis and pedagogy in India.

Courtesy: The AIDEM

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