Justice Sumeet Goel, deciding on December 2, 2025, held that the petitioner’s conduct, as reflected in the FIR, witness statements, and electronic evidence, prima facie shows active participation in creating hostility, resentment, and communal disharmony directed at the Purvanchal community and migrant labourers in Ludhiana.

The petition was filed under Section 482 BNSS, 2023, seeking pre-arrest protection in FIR No. 270/2025 registered for offences under Sections 304, 196, 352, 353(1), 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 and Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000.

The FIR: Allegations of abusive language, threats, intimidation, and derogatory gendered slurs

The case originates from an FIR (No. 270 dated 21.10.2025, P.S. Division No. 7, Ludhiana) lodged by complainant Braj Bhushan Singh, who belongs to the Purvanchal community. He alleged that:

• Routine verbal abuse and humiliation: Both accused regularly insulted and abused Purvanchal migrants, particularly labourers and roadside vendors.
• Threats, blackmail, and intimidation of poor vendors: Co-accused Machan allegedly threatened, intimidated, and blackmailed poor workers, with the petitioner implicated in this broader course of conduct.
• Derogatory and gendered remarks about Purvanchal women: The complaint asserts that both accused made explicitly derogatory remarks about the women of the Purvanchal community, causing widespread anger and indignation.
• Speeches provoking inter-community hostility: They allegedly delivered provocative and hateful speeches aimed at creating friction between Punjabi and Purvanchal communities.

To reinforce the credibility of the allegations, the complainant submitted a memorandum signed by numerous members of the community, demonstrating collective concern and the seriousness of the impact.

Digital Evidence: The pen drive and the viral interview

During the inquiry before registration of the FIR, the complainant handed over a pen-drive containing a video interview recorded by co-accused Machan.

Justice Goel notes that this digital material revealed:

• Explicit communal targeting: The petitioner allegedly claimed that migrants from Uttar Pradesh and Bihar bring large quantities of ganja to Punjab and sell it in Ludhiana.
• Gendered slurs and moral policing: He allegedly stated that women of the Purvanchal community are involved in flesh trade.
• Statements projecting migrants as a threat: He purportedly claimed that migrants are now “ruling Punjab”, suggesting cultural takeover or demographic dominance.
• Viral circulation and public reaction: The enquiry showed that the hate-filled interview went viral on social media, resulting in widespread resentment among the Purvanchal community and creating a potential for law-and-order disturbance.

These statements, the Court noted, became viral on social media, generating substantial resentment within the community and creating a potential for law-and-order disruption.

Alleged incident of waylaying and mobile phone snatching

The Court also relied on the statement of witness Nitin Kumar recorded under Section 180 BNSS. He stated that on September 24, 2025, the petitioner, co-accused Machan, and some Nihang persons:

• surrounded and threatened him and one Mukesh Kumar, and
• snatched his mobile phone

This aspect, the Court observed, showed that the petitioner’s alleged conduct was not limited to speech-related offences, but extended to physical intimidation and obstruction.

Petitioner’s Defence: False implication and cross-version case

Counsel for the petitioner advanced a series of arguments:

1. False implication with no direct involvement: The petitioner claimed he had been falsely roped in through a supplementary statement.
2. Case arising out of cross-versions: It was argued that the incident was merely a verbal altercation outside the police station between Punjabi and Purvanchal groups, leading to FIRs from both sides.
3. No recovery needed; no threat of absconsion: He contended that:

• nothing incriminating was left to be recovered,
• custodial interrogation was unnecessary,
• he was unlikely to abscond or tamper with evidence.

4. Allegations vague and malicious: The defence insisted that the statements attributed to him were vague, motivated, and exaggerated.

Justice Goel noted these submissions but found them insufficient in light of the investigation material.

State’s Stand: Strong incriminating material, witness statements, and criminal antecedents

The State vigorously opposed the plea, pointing to:

1. Prima facie digital evidence of hate speech: The viral interview contained abusive, humiliating, caste-targeted, and communal remarks.
2. Witness statements supporting intimidation: Nitin Kumar’s testimony confirmed physical intimidation and mobile snatching.
3. Criminal antecedents of the petitioner: The petitioner was earlier named in FIR No. 118/2021 (Mohali) involving offences under Sections 120-B, 124-A, 153-A, 153-B, 295-A, 298 IPC, all related to communal tension and public order.
4. Need to identify others involved: The State argued custodial interrogation was essential to-

• identify other co-participants,
• verify the source of recordings,
• trace circulation patterns,
• recover devices or data.

The State argued that custodial interrogation was essential to identify other persons involved, recover material, and scrutinise electronic evidence. Justice Goel accepted the State’s submissions.

Court’s Reasoning: Speech, social harm, and the public order threshold

Application of Speech Act Theory: The judgment is notable for introducing Speech Act Theory (by Austin and Searle) into the anticipatory bail context. Justice Goel observed: “Utterances must be examined not just for their literal meaning but for the communicative intention and the action they convey.” (Para 6)

He emphasised the three-layered nature of speech:

• Locutionary act — the words spoken
• Illocutionary act — the intention behind the words
• Perlocutionary act — the effect on the audience

Applying this framework, the Court found that the petitioner’s alleged statements had a perlocutionary capacity to provoke hostility and disturb communal peace.

Material not confined to a “roadside altercation”: The Court held that:

• This was not a minor quarrel or isolated outburst.
• It involved systematic targeting, with real potential to disturb public order, community relations, and societal peace.

Supplementary naming no ground to dilute evidence: The defence argument that the petitioner was named only through a supplementary statement was rejected as insufficient to discard the digital and testimonial material emerging from the investigation.

Seriousness of offence and societal impact: The Court stressed that the alleged speech-

• was not limited to individual harm,
• but created a sense of insecurity within the community at large,
• required a strong judicial response to prevent recurrence.

Necessity of custodial interrogation: The Court relied on State v. Anil Sharma (1997), reiterating that “Custodial interrogation is qualitatively more elicitation-oriented… interrogation with the protection of pre-arrest bail often reduces to a mere ritual.” (Para 9)

Justice Goel held that:

• effective investigation requires custodial questioning,
• particularly when electronic evidence and multiple actors are involved,
• a pre-arrest bail order would severely undermine the inquiry.

Conclusion: Anticipatory bail denied, petition dismissed

Given the gravity of allegations, the substantial digital evidence, and the requirement of custodial interrogation, the Court concluded that the petitioner did not deserve anticipatory bail. It held:

• A prima facie case is clearly made out.
• The material gathered justifies custodial interrogation.
• No grounds exist to believe the petitioner was falsely implicated.
• Granting anticipatory bail would impede effective investigation and undermine communal harmony.

Accordingly, the Court ordered:

“The material on record and preliminary investigation appear to establish a reasonable basis for the accusations. Thus, it is not appropriate to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioner, as it would necessarily cause impediment in effective investigation.” (Para 9)

“Considering the gravity of allegations, the nature of the evidence collected so far and the requirement of effective investigation, and the necessity of the custodial interrogation for a fair and thorough investigation, this Court is of the considered opinion that the petitioner does not deserve the concession of anticipatory bail in the factual milieu of the case in hand.” (Para 10)

All pending applications were also disposed of, with the Court cautioning that its observations should not be construed as findings on the merits of the case.

The complete judgment may be read here.

Related:                      

A New Silence: The Supreme Court’s turn toward non-interference in hate-speech cases

Unveiling the diverse impact of Hate Speech: From elections to escalating violence

Hate speeches, stone pelting, brandishing of weapons – what VHP’s Shaurya Yatras have achieved till date

India’s Struggle for Social Harmony: Challenges Amidst Surge in Hate Speech

Three separate benches of the Indian Supreme Court interrogate hate speech

CJP writes to Minorities Commission over repeated attacks on Muslims

The post Punjab & Haryana High Court refuses anticipatory bail to journalist accused of provocative, communal statements against Purvanchal community appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The Division Bench of Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Justice Sourendra Pandey delivered the ruling in a criminal writ petition filed by Neeraj Kumar @ Neeraj Singh, who had remained in the Central Jail, Gaya, even after securing bail in a case under Sections 30(a) and 37 of the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016.

Release order issued on September 29 — but prisoner not released

Neeraj Kumar’s ordeal began after the Special Excise Judge issued a release warrant on September 29, 2025, which was promptly sent to the Superintendent of the Central Jail, Gaya. Yet, instead of being released, he continued to languish in custody. The Court meticulously reconstructed the timeline:

• The petitioner was arrested in Sarbahda P.S. Case No. 91/2025 and lodged in Central Jail, Gaya.
• He was granted bail on September 23, 2025.
• A release warrant dated September 29, 2025 was issued by the Exclusive Special Excise Judge, Gaya, directing that he be released unless required in another case.
• The jail acknowledged receipt of this release order.

Yet, the petitioner remained confined.

Instead of complying with the bail order, the Jail Superintendent relied on an earlier production warrant issued by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Buxar, in connection with an unrelated theft case under Section 303(2) of the Bhartiya Nyay Sanhita. Significantly, the production warrant had fixed the production date as September 4, 2025—well before the release warrant arrived, and long expired by the time the petitioner’s liberty was at stake.

The High Court noted that the jail authorities had been corresponding with police officials for “vehicle with adequate force” to take the accused to Buxar, but at no point had they secured a fresh production warrant after the earlier one lapsed, even though both Section 304 and Section 305 of the Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 allowed such recourse.

The Bench held unequivocally:

“…once the date fixed in the production warrant expired and the order of release had already reached in the hand of the Superintendent of Central Jail, Gaya Jee, he had no option but to release the petitioner.” (Para 3)

Instead, the jail kept him confined “for 18 days even after release without there being any order of a competent court,” as initially observed by the Court. Later, after accounting for a virtual production on October 4, the Bench narrowed the illegal period to five days—still an admitted constitutional violation.

IG Prisons Called to Court; Durga Puja holiday excuse rejected

On November 12, 2025, disturbed by what it termed “disturbing features” of the case, the Court summoned the IG, Prisons. Appearing online, the IG attempted to justify the delay, arguing that the non-release “occasioned due to the intervening Durga Puja holidays.”

The Bench rejected this outright, pointing out that:

• In-charge courts function even during holidays,
• The petitioner’s virtual production on October 4 occurred during Puja holidays, disproving the justification,
• The delay reflected not an isolated lapse but a habitual administrative practice.

The Court recorded that upon being confronted, the IG “immediately realised” and conceded:

“Yes, there is an illegal detention for at least five days.” (Para 6)

Court observes systemic violations across Bihar

The Bench expressed grave concern that such illegal detentions were not unique to this jail.

Justice Prasad observed: “There being an admitted position that it is a case of unauthorized detention of the petitioner from 29.09.2025 until 04.10.2025 and this practice is going on without drawing much attention of the Department, this Court being a Constitutional Court cannot remain a silent spectator.” (Para 7)

The Court’s warning was not limited to the Gaya jail, but directed at the State’s entire prison administration.

On Compensation: Court rejects ‘tokenism’, Cites Rudul Sah and Delhi High Court precedent

When asked to suggest a reasonable compensation amount, the IG proposed ₹10,000—a suggestion the Bench considered wholly inadequate.

The petitioner’s counsel demanded serious compensation, arguing that monetary relief must reflect the gravity of an Article 21 violation and citing:

• K.K. Pathak v. Ravi Shankar Prasad (2019), where the Patna High Court held that compensation for constitutional wrongs must be recovered from erring officials;
• Pankaj Kumar Sharma v. GNCTD (2023), where the Delhi High Court awarded ₹50,000 for only half an hour of illegal detention;
• Arvind Kumar Gupta v. State of Bihar (2025), where ₹1 lakh each was awarded for unauthorized police custody.

The Bench quoted extensively from Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar (1983), reaffirming that denying compensation would amount to “lip service” to fundamental rights.

After weighing these precedents, the Court held:

“Having considered the entire materials and the submissions as recorded hereinabove, we are of the considered opinion that a consolidated amount of Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs) would be a reasonable amount which may be awarded to the petitioner by way of compensation for his unauthorized detention by the Jail Superintendent, Central Jail, Gaya Jee.” (Para 11)

Crucially, the Court reiterated the principle that public money cannot bear the burden of unconstitutional action:

“The Respondent State of Bihar shall pay the compensation amount of Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs) to the petitioner within one month from today. Following the settled principle as discussed in the case of K.K. Pathak (supra), we direct that the amount so paid to the petitioner shall be realized from the erring official in accordance with law.” (Para 12)

State-wide Reform Direction: Mandatory guidelines in two weeks

Recognising the systemic implications, the Court issued a sweeping administrative directive:

• The IG, Prisons must issue uniform guidelines to all Jail Superintendents in Bihar,
• These guidelines must ensure strict compliance with release orders and constitutional guarantees,
• They must be issued within two weeks.

“Since we have come to know that this practice is going on in other jurisdictions of the Jail Superintendents in the State, the I.G., Prisons and Correctional Services is directed to issue appropriate guidelines to all the Jail Superintendents in the State of Bihar requiring them to strictly abide by the Constitutional Mandate and order of the Court without any exception. Such guideline shall be issued within a period of two weeks from today.” (Para 12)

The writ petition was accordingly allowed.

The complete judgement may be read here.

Related:

A Decade after Bisada: Why Uttar Pradesh’s attempt to drop the Akhlaq lynching case defies law and constitution

Bihar Elections: Trains for votes? The unanswered mystery of the ‘phantom’ specials from Haryana to Bihar

‘They Have a Right to Be Heard’: Supreme Court suggests Union brings back alleged deportees from Bangladesh “at least as a temporary measure”

A Terror Case Without Evidence: Allahabad High Court’s ‘heavy heart’ acquittal After 28 Years

The post Six Days Behind Bars After Bail: Patna High Court orders ₹2 lakh relief, flags state-wide pattern of illegal detention appeared first on SabrangIndia.

“This report does not critique religion or its festivals. It examines whether public religious mobilisations are being used to spread exclusionary rhetoric and whether authorities are responding.”

Background: Sanatan Hindu Ekta Padyatra

Launched by prominent right-wing Hindutva leaders, the Sanatan Ekta Padyatra is being promoted as a socio-spiritual movement. Led by Dhirendra Krishna Shastri of Bageshwar Dham, the yatra was flagged off from Delhi with the stated objectives of establishing a Hindu nation, eradicating casteism, and fostering social unity. Scheduled from November 7 to 16, it passed through 422 village panchayats across Delhi, Haryana, and Uttar Pradesh.

As part of the campaign, seven resolutions were announced, like promoting social harmony and supporting the “grand construction” of the Shri Janmabhoomi temple. The controversy primarily stems from the first and central resolution: the demand to declare India a Hindu Rashtra. This directly conflicts with the Constitution’s commitment to a secular state and violates the guarantees of freedom of religion under Article 25 as well as equality and non-discrimination under Articles 14 and 15.

However, the publicly stated resolutions tell only part of the story. Across multiple stops in Delhi, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, and Madhya Pradesh, several speakers, including the Padyatra’s principal organisers, delivered inflammatory speeches that went far beyond calls for spiritual unity or social harmony. These speeches invoked communal conspiracy theories (“love jihad,” “land jihad”), portrayed Muslims as demographic threats, justified vigilante violence, and openly advocated for religious segregation and economic boycotts. Many of these statements raise serious concerns under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), and established Supreme Court jurisprudence on hate speech and incitement. 

Details of the Hate Speech Delivered

Below is a consolidated analysis of the most objectionable statements made during the Sanatan Hindu Ekta Padyatra, grouped under 3 main themes and mapped against the relevant legal frameworks.
The reference links of the speeches, with timestamps mentioned, are given below-

Ghaziabad, Nov 3

Palwal, Nov 10

Palwal, Nov 12

Chhatarpur, Nov 14

Faridabad, Nov 8

Banchari, Nov 12

Mathura, Nov 15

Palwal, Haryana, Nov 10

Banchari, Nov 12

A.  Direct Hate Speech (Violence, Hostility, Social Boycott)

(Statements advocating violence, hostility, coercion, or social/economic boycott; calls for expulsion; explicit majoritarian supremacy)

Across multiple stops of the Sanatan Hindu Ekta Padyatra, speakers issued direct calls that clearly cross the constitutional threshold into incitement as interpreted in Amish Devgan and Shreya Singhal. In Ghaziabad (Nov 3), the speaker declared that India “should become a Hindu Rashtra” (0:39–0:42) and added that population decline “should happen to those who follow the ‘chadar’ and the ‘father’,” (1:17–1:20) a statement which the Supreme Court would classify as high-intensity dehumanising hate speech. Similarly, in Palwal (Nov 10), a public oath was taken to ensure that “love jihad and aaved dharmantaran will not be allowed” (0:20–0:27), effectively encouraging vigilantism against interfaith couples and converts. Under Patricia Mukhim, such statements, though framed as “protection,” amount to direct incitement toward unlawful acts.

In Delhi (Nov 7), hostility was escalated through demographic-war rhetoric: “tumhari sampatti tumhari hogi, kabza unka hoga” (2:30–2:44), and by invoking civilisational conflict through “ye desh Babar ka nahi, Raghuvar ka hai” (2:58–3:02). The Court in Amish Devgan specifically flagged the use of derogatory historical figures to mobilise hatred in the present. In Faridabad (Nov 10), a speaker warned: “jab desh lutega… tumhari beti love jihad mei pad jayegi… tumhara beta jis din shukravar ko jaane lagega,” (2:34–2:56) creating a direct incentive to treat Muslim men as targets of suspicion and implying moral justifications for coercive action.

Following the Delhi car blast, Dhirendra Shastri, addressing Palwal (Nov 12), asked: “yehi (Muslims) kyu aatangwadi hote hain?” (0:27–0:39), treating the entire community as terrorists. He further warned that unless Hindus united, bomb blasts like Delhi would occur “in every gali” (0:57–1:26), which satisfies the proximity test under Shreya Singhal. In Chhatarpur, MP (Nov 14), dissenters to Hindu symbols were told to “get their ticket to Lahore” (0:00–0:13), echoing classic expulsion rhetoric the Court has treated as unprotected. The chant recorded in Faridabad (Nov 8) — “tel lagao Dabur ka, naam mita do Babur ka; jo Ram ka nahi wo kisi kaam ka nahi” — directly targets Muslims through symbolic eradication. In Banchari, Palwal (Nov 12), speakers vowed to conduct compulsory “ghar wapsi” for those who had “left Sanatan” (0:29–0:46), amounting to a call for coercive reconversion, contrary to Shafin Jahan (Hadiya), which protects decisional autonomy in matters of faith.

Finally, in Mathura (Nov 15), spiritual leader Devkinandan Thakur invoked the Babri Masjid demolition (“4:20–4:50”) while urging the crowd to “move toward Mathura and Vrindavan,” hinting at mobilisation to claim the Shahi Idgah Mosque. The Supreme Court in the Ayodhya judgment warned that religious disputes must not be weaponised for incitement. These statements collectively amount to direct hate speech under Indian constitutional and criminal jurisprudence.

B. Discriminatory / Exclusionary “Othering”

(Normalising prejudice, othering minorities, delegitimising citizenship, religious tests for belonging)

Several speeches sought to redefine citizenship and community belonging in expressly exclusionary terms. In Ghaziabad (Nov 3), the speaker framed Hindu women as victims of Muslim men by warning that “our daughters fall into love jihad” (0:44–1:01), establishing a stereotype that casts Muslim men as predatory. He also suggested that Hindus “are not extremist,” implying that extremism is inherent to other communities (1:32–1:39). Such rhetorical othering aligns with what Patricia Mukhim describes as hate speech that delegitimises equal citizenship.

In Delhi (Nov 7), converts were described as outsiders: “Hindu issai mei converted hota hai toh ‘sister’ aur ‘sir’ kehlata hai… Hindu Musalman mei converted hota hai toh ‘bhai-jaan, amma-jaan’ kehlata hai,” followed by a suggestion that Hindus should first identify only as “Hindu” before any caste label (1:47–2:22). This constructs religious identity as the sole marker of national legitimacy. In Haryana (Nov 10), the crowd was asked if they want to see their children “wearing topi” or “going to church on Sunday” (0:04–0:25), depicting basic religious expression by minorities as inherently undesirable. The line “jab topi walo ki ekta ho sakti, toh tilak walo ki kyu nahi” (0:30–0:37) frames religious groups as competing blocs, contradicting the constitutional ideal of fraternity.

Kajal Hindusthani, in Palwal (Nov 10), urged the crowd to “be Hindus, buy from Hindus, employ only Hindus” (0:20–0:33), an explicit economic boycott. Section 196 of BNS emphasises that no citizen can be coerced into religious conformity; here, exclusion is extended to everyday economic life. In Chhatarpur (Nov 14), slogans like “jo Ram ka nahi, wo kisi kaam ka nahi” (0:24–0:33) reduce non-Hindus to second-class status. The DNA-testing analogy used to delegitimise dissenter’s mirrors what Amish Devgan classifies as dehumanising metaphors, which have no constitutional protection. In Banchari (Nov 12), Nagendra Maharaj’s line— “those who object to Vande Mataram or Ram should go to Pakistan or Afghanistan” (0:33–0:41)—constructs a religious test for belonging, contrary to the secular character upheld repeatedly by the Supreme Court.

Such statements normalise hostility and social exclusion, and the Court in Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan explicitly warned that such majoritarian narratives fuel discrimination and justify vigilantism, attracting Sections 196 (Promoting enmity between different groups), Section 197 (assertions prejudicial to national integration), and Section 299 (Deliberate acts, intended to outrage religious feelings).

C. Fearmongering & Demographic Conspiracy Claims

(Alarmist misinformation about population, survival, territorial takeover; invoking existential threat narratives)

A consistent theme throughout the padyatra was the portrayal of Hindus as being on the verge of demographic extinction. In Ghaziabad (Nov 3), the speaker claimed that Hindus are “khatam ho rahe hai” despite India’s overwhelming Hindu majority, and that once “Hindus do not unite, they will not be safe” (1:55–2:06). He also asserted that Hindus are declining “day by day” (1:04–1:16), ignoring census realities. This comes under spreading demographic conspiracy narratives constitutes incitement because it fosters suspicion and hostility against minorities.

In Delhi (Nov 7), the crowd was told that “20 saal baad, Bharat ka Hindu apne astitva ki ladai lad raha hoga” (0:38–), and that minorities would seize Hindu property: “sampatti tumhari hogi, kabza unka hoga” (2:30–2:44). Such claims resemble classic “replacement” conspiracy theories. When combined with militaristic lines like “na toh pad rehna hai, na kad rehna hai” (0:55–0:58), the rhetoric urges mobilisation against an imagined security threat. In Haryana (Nov 10), Partition was invoked (“Jinnah ki leadership mein… alag Pakistan bana”), followed by an analogy that if “Sanatan Dharma ke naam par” India does not become a Hindu Rashtra, it will face a “Bangladesh-like situation” where “haq kisi aur ka hoga” (1:53–2:06). The Supreme Court in Pravasi Bhalai explicitly noted that selective historical parallels are often used to trigger fear and justify majoritarian aggression.

After the Delhi blast, Dhirendra Shastri claimed that unless Hindus unite, “aisa har gali mein hoga” (0:57–1:26), and asserted that the arrested individual— “doctor, musalman… crore-o ki jaan lene ki tayaari”—was preparing mass murder, furthering the narrative that Muslims pose a blanket existential threat. Fear of demographic loss was also invoked repeatedly: in Delhi (Nov 7), the claim that Hindus have become minorities in “9 states” is factually incorrect yet presented as imminent collapse. In Banchari (Nov 12), Nagendra Maharaj warned that Hindus could be “expelled from their homes like Srinagar,” framing political developments as religious persecution.

Such narratives fall squarely within the Supreme Court’s treatment of misinformation that has a proximate connection to public disorder (Shreya Singhal). Fearmongering of this kind shifts the public mindset from coexistence to hostility, creating conditions for violence without issuing explicit violent commands.

Legal Framework

India’s constitutional and statutory framework places clear limits on speech that promotes enmity, incites violence, or undermines the country’s secular structure. Several statements delivered during the Sanatan Ekta Padyatra appear to contravene these provisions.

Constitutional Provisions

Various provisions of the Indian Constitution safeguard against hate speech and communal othering.

1. Article 14 — Equality before law

Communal othering, demographic fear-mongering, and calls for exclusion (“be Hindus, buy only from Hindus”) violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection to all communities.

2. Article 15 — Non-discrimination on grounds of religion

Calls for a ‘Hindu Rashtra’, alongside statements urging economic segregation, employment discrimination, or “ghar wapsi” of all converts, contradict the constitutional prohibition against discrimination on religious grounds.

3. Article 19(1)(a) & 19(2) — Freedom of speech and its reasonable restrictions

Speech that threatens public order, incites violence, or promotes communal disharmony falls squarely within the restrictions permitted under Article 19(2).
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that advocacy crossing into incitement is not protected speech.

4. Article 25 — Freedom of religion

Sections of the BNS

1. Section 196 of BNS: Promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, etc., and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony

(1) Whoever—

• by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or through electronic communication or otherwise, promotes or attempts to promote, on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community or any other ground whatsoever, disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities; or Liability of owner, occupier, etc., of land on which an unlawful assembly or riot takes place. Affray. Assaulting or obstructing a public servant when suppressing a riot, etc.
  (b) commits any act which is prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities, and which disturbs or is likely to disturb the public tranquillity;

2. Section 197 of BNS: Imputations, assertions prejudicial to national integration.

(1) Whoever, by words either spoken or written or by signs or by visible representations or through electronic communication or otherwise, —

(a) makes or publishes any imputation that any class of persons cannot, by reason of their being members of any religious, racial, language or regional group or caste or community, bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India as by law established or uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India; or

(c) makes or publishes any assertion, counsel, plea or appeal concerning the obligation of any class of persons, by reason of their being members of any religious, racial, language or regional group or caste or community, and such assertion, counsel, plea or appeal causes or is likely to cause disharmony or feelings of enmity or hatred or ill-will between such members and other persons; or

3. Section 299: Deliberate and malicious acts, intended to outrage religious feelings of any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs. 

Whoever, with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of any class of citizens of India, by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or through electronic means or otherwise, insults or attempts to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of that class, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.

4. Section 352: Intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of peace.

 Whoever intentionally insults in any manner, and thereby gives provocation to any person, intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation will cause him to break the public peace, or to commit any other offence, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.

5. Section 353: Statements conducing to public mischief.

 (1) Whoever makes, publishes or circulates any statement, false information, rumour, or report, including through electronic means—

(b) with intent to cause, or which is likely to cause, fear or alarm to the public, or to any section of the public whereby any person may be induced to commit an offence against the State or against the public tranquillity; or

(c) with intent to incite, or which is likely to incite, any class or community of persons to commit any offence against any other class or community, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.

Judicial Precedents

Indian constitutional jurisprudence has consistently sought to balance freedom of expression with the imperative of preserving public order, equality, and the secular fabric of the nation. While there is no universally accepted definition of ‘hate speech’, the Supreme Court has laid down clear principles that define when speech crosses the boundary from protected expression into unlawful incitement or communal hatred.

The foundational judgment in Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar (1962) affirmed that criminal provisions affecting speech must be interpreted narrowly. The statute is constitutionally valid only to the extent it punishes speech that has the intention or tendency to create disorder or incitement to violence or disturbance of law and order.

The Padyatra speeches, alleging demographic conquest, “love jihad,” and calling for social boycotts and vigilante resistance, demonstrate a direct intention to cause disharmony between religious groups travelling through communally sensitive regions of Delhi, Haryana, and Uttar Pradesh. The route’s culmination at Banke Bihari Temple, Vrindavan, a site recently embroiled in controversy, heightens the imminent potential for communal mobilisation.

A decade later, Kesavananda Bharati v. Union of India (1973) reaffirmed the inviolable constitutional commitment to secularism, equality, and fundamental rights by introducing the Basic Structure doctrine. Through this, the Court held that any attempt, legislative or otherwise, that undermines the secular character of the Republic would be unconstitutional at its core. This principle shapes the broader legal environment within which communal speech is assessed.

On debates around ‘love jihad’ and ‘illegal conversion’, the Supreme Court in the Hadiya Marriage Case (2018), held that the right to marry a person of one’s choice is integral to Article 21, and the choice of a partner lies within the exclusive domain of an individual, and is a part of the core zone of privacy, which is inviolable.

The modern understanding of hate speech was articulated in Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. Union of India (2014), where the Supreme Court held that

Hate speech is an effort to marginalise individuals based on their membership in a group. Using expression that exposes the group to hatred, hate speech seeks to delegitimize group members in the eyes of the majority, reducing their social standing and acceptance within society. Hate speech, therefore, rises beyond causing distress to individual group members. It can have a societal impact.

Responding to this mandate, the Law Commission’s 267th Report proposed a structured framework for understanding hate speech. Para 5.2 laid down the criteria for identifying hate speech:

(i) The extremity of the speech

(ii) Incitement

(iii) Status of the author of the speech

(iv) Status of victims of the speech

(v) Potentiality of the speech

(vi) Context of the Speech

The Court’s earlier ruling in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) further clarified that only speech amounting to “incitement to imminent lawless action” can be legitimately restricted under Article 19(2), reinforcing the centrality of context, intent, and likely consequences.

In Patricia vs State of Meghalaya (2021), the Supreme Court quashed a FIR against a journalist, concluding that the post was a genuine plea for justice and equality rather than an attempt to promote hatred or communal discord. In Amish Devgan v. Union of India (2020), the court further stated that: the mode of exercise of free speech, the context and the extent of abuse of freedom are important in determining the contours of permissible restrictions.

Aftermath of Padyatra

The Sanatan Ekta Padyatra triggered immediate political and social pushback across several states. The Azaad Samaj Party (ASP) condemned the march on constitutional grounds, arguing that India’s identity as a secular republic cannot be undermined by a public movement openly calling for a “Hindu Rashtra.” ASP formally petitioned the President to halt the yatra, while the Dalit Pichda Samaj Sanathan (DPSS) joined ASP in filing a PIL before the Supreme Court seeking a complete stop to the march and a ban on its “inflammatory” speeches. In response, Gwalior-based politician Damodar Singh Yadav announced a counter-mobilisation titled the Samvidhan Bachao Yatra, set to begin on November 16, framing it as a defence of constitutional values.

On the ground, several areas witnessed unrest directly linked to the padyatra. Samagra Bharat reported that on 9 November in Indergarh (Datia district, MP), residents gathered at Ambedkar Park and attempted to burn an effigy of Dhirendra Shastri, alleging that his speeches promoted caste humiliation and communal hatred. Members of the Hindu Sangathan retaliated with stone-pelting, leading to a police lathi-charge when tensions escalated. Locals later filed an FIR against Shastri, but authorities have taken no concrete action. A week later, on 17 November, Patrika reported a scuffle at Vrindavan’s Banke Bihari Temple during Shastri’s visit, where a confrontation between temple priests and the police resulted in torn garments and allegations that the padyatra’s politicised presence compromised the sanctity and security of the temple premises.

Broader Pattern of Impunity towards Hate Speeches

The fallout from the padyatra reflects a broader pattern in which communal mobilisation and hate speech by far-right Hindutva leaders are met with minimal institutional response. India has witnessed repeated episodes of religiously charged violence—such as the 2019 lynching of Tabrez Ansari in Jharkhand, where the victim was forced to chant “Jai Shri Ram”—and mass events like the 2024 Ayodhya Ram Mandir consecration have increasingly become sites for majoritarian mobilisation. Despite this backdrop, police responses remain inconsistent, especially when politically influential individuals are involved. NDTV reports that although five FIRs were filed over two years against BJP legislator T. Raja Singh for comments such as “The Old City of Hyderabad is a mmini-Pakistan” two were closed, and the remaining three have seen no decisive progress.

Legal scrutiny has extended to Baba Dhirendra Shastri as well, with multiple complaints for delivering hate speeches in Udaipur, Maharashtra, and Madhya Pradesh. In 2023, a PIL before the Gujarat High Court sought enforcement of the Supreme Court’s Tehseen Poonawalla guidelines—requiring preventive intelligence units, immediate action against hate speech, and punitive steps against officials who fail to curb mob violence—but the petition was declined. This pattern of judicial reluctance, combined with police inaction, underscores a systemic tolerance toward inflammatory communal rhetoric, even when it directly violates constitutional guarantees and statutory prohibitions under the BNS. The result is a public environment where speeches like those delivered during the Sanatan Ekta Padyatra, openly calling for a Hindu Rashtra and targeting minority communities, continue largely unchecked, emboldening majoritarian mobilisation while eroding constitutional safeguards.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this has been worked on by Shyamli Pengoriya)

Related:

Targeted as ‘Bangladeshis’: The hate speech fuelling deportations

India Hate Lab Report 2024: Unveiling the rise of hate speech and communal rhetoric

2024: CJP’s battle against communal rallies before and after they unfold

Exclusion at the Gate: Navratri becomes the new front for communal politics

Hate Has No Place in Elections: CJP moves State EC against BJP MP Ashwini Choubey’s communal speech

The post The Politics of Processions: How the Sanatan Ekta Padyatra amplified hate speech in plain sight appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The Uttar Pradesh government claims to have only applied to withdraw the prosecution against Mohammad Akhlaq’s killers and that this request will be decided by a judge at the next hearing scheduled for December 12, 2025. However, when viewed through the lens of the history of this case, the timeline for this case, and the current political climate surrounding this case, it is evident that the actions taken by the Uttar Pradesh Government in withdrawing the prosecution against those responsible for lynching Mohammad Akhlaq are not only withdrawing from having any responsibility for pursuing justice but are also an example of how for the past 10 years the government has systematically neglected this case, given political support to those accused of this heinous crime and created an environment of hostility toward the family of Mohammad Akhlaq.

The circumstances surrounding the lynching of one man’s father are now much broader than that man’s father’s murder. The current circumstances have become a long-term narrative about what a state can create over time and distribute through state-sponsored actions, as well as about eliminating any ultimate responsibility associated with that state.

September 28, 2015: The Night that Violence knocked on a Family’s Door

A news announcement spread through the Bisada Temple loudspeaker about animals being slaughtered resulted in the instant transformation of an unsubstantiated rumour into a murder sentence. A mob descended on the home of 50-year-old Mohammad Akhlaq and his family within minutes of the announcement being made, and forcibly removed Akhlaq and his son from the property, beating both Mohammad and his son Danish with sticks and metal rods, not stopping until their bodies lay in a pool of their own blood on the street in front of their house. Akhlaq died as a result of the beating he received; Danish survived but required immediate neurosurgery. This particularly brutal act of violence was planned by those committing the act, as well as the community, through the use of whisper campaigns, political pressure, and the manipulation of the emotional appeal of cow-vigilantism. These events were reconstructed in detail by Sabrang in “Akhlaq’s Lynching: 7 Years On – Only 1 of 25 Witnesses Testifies; Trial Reaches Evidence Stage”.

The FIR that was filed at the Jarcha Police Station references the appropriate sections related to charges of murder, attempted murder, rioting, and unlawful assembly. The nature of the charges against those involved in this act of violence was virtually disregarded from the day it occurred, and politicians, media, and community leaders received ample time to speculate on whether there were indeed any cow products found in Akhlaq’s home before the death of Akhlaq. Public and political perceptions and narratives surrounding the event changed shortly after the announcement of Akhlaq’s death. Sabrang’s “Meet Hari Om: Part of the Mob That Killed Mohd Akhlaque” further illuminated individual roles and admissions from those involved.

The use of the murder scene is an attempt to portray or manipulate the public perception of the incident as a religious act motivated by slights to the religion of Islam.

The Investigation: Charges Filed, yet Justice Already Compromised

The police in Gautam Buddha Nagar, in its first chargesheet, named 15 main accused, including a juvenile and a local BJP leader’s son, along with 25 witnesses. Four more accused were later added, bringing the total to 19. One of them died in 2016. The prosecution has appeared to take its course through the court system; however, beneath the surface, evidence is starting to show that political pressure has compromised the investigation, as well as apathy within the institutions involved.

The Forensic Report coming out of Mathura stated that the sample of red meat taken from the house of a man who was killed had belonged to “a cow or calf,” and it changed the trajectory of this case completely. The family of the victim immediately alleged that their sample was switched. Furthermore, the timing of when the forensic report was delivered raised suspicions because the mob attacked based on a rumour and not the forensic evidence from a laboratory; however, the public debate quickly shifted away from the circumstances surrounding the killing and focused on the purported evidence.

The major shift in this case happened in 2016 when a court in Surajpur ordered that an FIR be filed against the surviving family members of Akhlaq, and thus turned the focus of the case completely upside down. At that point, the surviving family members were already grieving, emotionally traumatized, and socially isolated, and now faced with the criminal allegations of cow slaughter. This whole methodology set forth a structure by which a lynching victim is presumed guilty, while the people who committed the act are presumed to be victims.

2015–2017: Delay, Bail, and the Slow Death of Due Process

The public often forgets that the justice system did not simply fail in 2025; it faltered every year since 2015.

Bail was granted to each of the accused, with repeated adjournments of court hearings and extremely slow progress in witness testimony. Sabrang’s reporting, including “All Killers of Mohammad Akhlaq Get Bail in Dadri Lynching”, captured how each bail order was met with political celebration, further chilling the environment for witnesses. As of December 2017, the trial had barely progressed past the evidence stage. Multiple important witnesses were reluctant to testify in a public courtroom and thus did not receive adequate witness protection. The handling of police transfers caused inconsistencies in the investigation and prosecution of the case. At the same time, the family of the victim suffered from social isolation in Bisada as a result of the crimes, ultimately ending in them being forced to leave their homes. The victim’s family reported receiving threats during this period, and in the village itself, residents celebrated when defendants were released from custody on bail, where they were photographed with local BJP leaders, recognized for their “innocent status” as Hindu youth, celebrated, and received garlands as gifts.

Each public display of support for the accused was another blow to the victim’s family and a message to the justice system.

National Outrage: The Award Wapsi Moment and a Fading Democratic Landscape

In October 2015, there was a lynching and it sparked one of the largest cultural protests of the decade, known as the Award Wapsi Movement. The writers who participated in this movement, such as Nayantara Sahgal, Ashok Vajpeyi, Sara Joseph, Shashi Deshpande and others, all returned their Sahitya Akademi awards to protest against the continued violence. Their action collectively raised awareness of a growing intolerance in the country and directly referred to the lynching of Akhlaq as a moment of moral decline.

The state’s response to the writers was hostile. The government ministers called all of the protesting writers “politically motivated”. An RSS publication even went so far as to quote from the Vedas to imply that cow slaughter justified the death penalty. The Chief Ministers of several states issued statements demanding that any Muslims who consume beef should “go to Pakistan”. These were not isolated statements or the thoughts of a few fringe political groups; they illustrate the political environment that was influencing decisions regarding this case.

However, the anger and activism surrounding this event was short-lived. Today, ten years after the lynching took place and as a result, the state is withdrawing prosecution against those who committed the lynching, the anger expressed by people in 2015 has turned into a sense of quiet fear. Many of the once bold voices have become relatively quiet due to harassment, intimidation and surveillance. The transition from a period of protest to a time where most people are silent does not reflect a changing belief system; it is an indication that democracy has become less expansive.

Legal and Constitutional Problems with the Withdrawal

A major point of contention in regards to the state of Uttar Pradesh’s motion to dismiss was that there was no new exculpatory evidence in support of the defendant. Several media reports indicate that the state’s filing primarily relied on the assertion that there were “inconsistencies” in the witnesses’ testimonies and that social harmony was at risk. Such vague assertions do not meet the legal standards outlined in the jurisprudential interpretation of Section 321 of the CrPC. A defendant cannot be dismissed unless there is newly discovered evidence that would fundamentally alter the state’s case against him. In this case, the medical evidence substantiating Akhlaq and Danish’s injuries and the contemporaneous FIR, and the eyewitness accounts all consistently corroborate the state’s case against them. In similar instances, courts have continued to deny a motion for dismissal. A trial court should require that the state produce a complete and thorough review of the prosecution’s case file, as well as a detailed affidavit from the Prosecuting Attorney detailing changes to the evidence that would justify the dismissal of the case.

Further, the application seems to ignore the very explicit requirements laid out by the Supreme Court in Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India (2018). The Supreme Court held that mob lynching constitutes a separate social and constitutional emergency and requires immediate intervention. The Court ordered each state to create a “fast track mechanism” for lynching cases, appoint a nodal official, enforce preventive protocols, create strong witness protection systems, and hold police accountable for their failures

Withdrawal attempts in pending lynching trials must be considered in light of whether the state complied with the aforementioned Supreme Court’s orders. The Tehseen Poonawalla case mandates are binding on trial courts. The trial court in Gautam Buddha Nagar must consider whether the state has satisfied its obligations in this matter, and whether permitting withdrawal would defeat the entire remedial framework the Supreme Court established for addressing lynching.

In addition to the requirement to uphold statutory obligations, a factor that should also be of utmost importance for the state is whether the withdrawal has the potential to serve the ‘public interest’. Lynching is not just a crime committed against an individual; it also attacks the rule of law, social order, and equitable treatment of all individuals under the Constitution. A significant deterrent effect exists not just because offenders are punished, but because lynching demonstrates a systematic and transparent application of justice through our court systems. Discontinuation of a lynching prosecution has the potential to increase the likelihood of similar acts of vigilante violence. A decision by the court to withdraw this case must take into account how that decision will affect the larger community, particularly how it sends a message to vulnerable communities. In essence, Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution impose a duty on the Government to provide protection for life and to ensure that all persons are treated equally under the law. Accordingly, if a withdrawal occurs without adequate justification, which can only be supported through the use of clear and convincing evidence, the function of the Criminal Justice System as a protector will be diminished.

Take into account the possible influence of political factors; as noted in Sabrang’s coverage of the ceremony honouring the defendants, there were reports of assurances given to the defendants, and those reports provide essential contextual background for this case. In addition to the reports from Sabrang, what is also important to take into account are the instances of political patronage that have been shown to exist, be it via public demonstrations of support for persons who were accused or by statements made by politicians elected into office, or through institutional signals indicating support.

In other words, the very existence of political patronage creates a duty upon the court to view any motion to withdraw from prosecution through the prism of “political expediency.” A court must exercise vigilance over any motion to withdraw from a criminal prosecution, especially if it appears that political factors were involved in the decision-making process for prosecuting the case. A court must ensure that there is a clear distinction between prosecutorial discretion exercised for legitimate purposes versus prosecutorial discretion exercised under pressure from the Executive. If the court finds that an order to withdraw from a criminal prosecution merely serves the purpose of political expediency and does not promote the cause of justice, the court should deny any request made for an order to withdraw.

The Survivors: A Family Forced into Silence and Displacement

Victims and Witnesses’ Rights also require Judicial Attention. The family of Mohammad Akhlaq has experienced significant social hostility and displacement, and has been subjected to delays caused by the judicial process for nearly 10 years. Their right to be heard cannot be extinguished solely because the State wishes to withdraw from the trial. Victim Impact Hearings have been required by Courts, and/or Intervention Applications have been allowed for cases that are of large Public Interest. In a case as emotionally charged and symbolic as the Dadri Lynching, the Trial Court has an obligation to provide an opportunity for the survivors to be heard before any decision on withdrawal is made. Providing an opportunity for survivors to be heard acknowledges their constitutional rights to be heard as participants in the justice system and as complainants.

Justice Delayed, Denied, and Now Intentionally Buried

Ten years ago, the brutal murder of Akhlaq led to the emergence of a violent clash between Hindu cow vigilantes and India’s Muslim community, bringing to light the inaction (or complicity) of India’s various governmental and judicial institutions at all levels. Therefore, the prosecution attempt by the State of India to withdraw prosecution against the accused in this case today is not just a legal step but finalizing the death knell of accountability.

The failure of the Justice System was a deliberate and systemic failure at ALL levels of the Indian Judiciary, Executive, and Legislative System. The Justice System failed by creating the accused families as the “accused”; the Justice System failed by honouring the accused; the Justice System failed when judgment was delayed for 10 years; and once again, the Justice System failed if the State successfully withdraws the prosecution against the accused men.

If the Court allows the State to withdraw the prosecution, not only does it allow fifteen men to go free of blame, but it endorses and supports a decade of continuous state violence against marginalized communities so that the so-called “majority” can avenge their “honour”. It sends a message to all marginalized communities that justice will always be conditional, temporary, and rescindable by the State at will.

A government that has been elected through a democratic means should be there to ensure the safety of its citizens. In the example of Mohammad Akhlaq, however, rather than protecting him, the government protected those who killed him by their indifference, inaction, and now erasing his memory.

Akhlaq was killed quickly due to violence. The violence done to Akhlaq by the failure of the system to find justice for him was done by a systematic approach to violence. Unless the courts take immediate action, Akhlaq will no longer have the chance to see justice served against those who killed him.

The judgment in Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India can be read here.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Preksha Bothara)

Related:                                                               

The Lynching of Mohammed Akhlaq

Another mob lynching of Muslim men in Jharkhand and UP

Ramzan shadowed by targeted violence: lynching, assaults, and harassment taint the holy month in India

Two separate incidents in West Bengal result in lynching of three Muslim men in 3 days

Akhlaq’s Lynching: 7 Years on, Only 1 of 25 Witnesses Testify as Trial Reaches Evidence Stage

Meet Hari Om, part of a Mob that killed Mohd Akhlaque

Akhlaq’s Killers from Dadri Assured Job in NTPC by BJP MLA: Impunity Surpassed

All Killers of Mohammed Akhlaq Get Bail : Dadri Lynching

FIR Against Akhlaq’s Family Travesty of Justice, UP Govt Must Intervene

The post A Decade after Bisada: Why Uttar Pradesh’s attempt to drop the Akhlaq lynching case defies law and constitution appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The timeline of suspicion

The timing remains the primary indictment against the transparency of the process. With the Bihar Assembly polls scheduled for November 6 and 11, 2025, the departure of these trains on November 3 was not a random administrative decision. It suggests a meticulously timed arrival, allowing thousands of passengers just enough leeway to disperse into specific constituencies before the crucial “silent period” (campaigning ban) came into force.

According to the RTI responses, the special trains operated on a synchronised schedule departing on November 3, 2025, from origins in Karnal and Gurugram, Haryana. These unannounced services were routed via Patna (PNBE) to terminate at strategic locations in Bihar, specifically Bhagalpur and Barauni, thereby creating a direct corridor between the two states mere days before the critical voting phase.

The RTI stonewall: “rush clearance” or cover-up?

The RTI responses from the Commercial Department of the Delhi Division are notable not for what they reveal, but for what they conceal. When the RTI activist Ajay Basudev Bose demanded specifics regarding who booked the trains, the total fare paid, the security deposits, and the exact passenger count, the Railway authorities deflected.

The official reply cited vague “Press Releases” and the generic excuse of “Rush Clearance.” However, the Coach Composition details betrayed the scale of the operation that Configuration A – “12 GS + 2 GSCN + 2 SLR” and Configuration B – “9 GS + 9 GSCN + 2 SLR.”

This composition is heavily skewed towards General Seating (GS), capable of ferrying thousands of individuals in high density. The refusal to disclose the financial trail—specifically who footed the bill—has led critics to argue that the “Rush Clearance” narrative is a bureaucratic veil. As noted in the appeal by activists, the stonewalling on the question of payment “Smells like a cover-up!”

Why were they run specifically from Haryana when they could not run such trains during Chhath?: Kapil Sibal

On November 9, during a joint press briefing, Rajya Sabha MP and legal luminary Kapil Sibal dismantled this defense with a simple question of logic that “Why were they run specifically from Haryana when they could not run such trains during Chhath?”

Sibal’s argument highlights a critical anomaly. Migrant workers return to Bihar from across India—Delhi, Mumbai, Surat, Punjab. Yet, the concentration of these specific, unannounced trains originated from Haryana, a state ruled by the BJP, heading into a state where the BJP was a key contender. If this were purely for Chhath, why were similar “emergency” trains not reported from non-NDA ruled states with equal urgency?

The “professional voter” theory: a modern booth capture?

The dimensional part of this story was introduced by RJD MP A.D. Singh, who moved the allegation from logistical support to criminal conspiracy. Singh suggested that the passengers were not merely home-bound migrants, but a mercenary force of “professional voters”—individuals moved across state lines to vote in multiple constituencies or impersonate absent voters.

“The passengers would be ‘professional voters’ who vote from constituency to constituency on a particular date. They must be having fake EPIC cards for which the EC has been helping them.” — A.D. Singh

Singh further alleged a direct nexus, claiming he received information that railway officials were instructed to coordinate these movements directly with Haryana BJP chief Mohan Lal Badoli and other party functionaries. He issued a direct challenge that remains unmet:

“The payment has been made by the BJP. Let the rail minister say who paid the money for these trains.”

The “festival alibi” vs. geographic logic

The Railway Ministry responded quickly, arguing that the situation was due to the overlap with Chhath Puja and Diwali. Their statement said, “This festival season, the railways is running 12,000 special trains; 10,700 special trains are scheduled and about 2000 trains are unscheduled. We are operating war rooms at three levels, divisional, zonal, and Railway board level.” “Whenever there is a sudden rush of passengers at any station, we immediately put into service unscheduled special trains” as per a report in The Print.

Caught on camera: the ‘free ticket’ confession

Apart from the RTI revelations, video evidence has now surfaced that seemingly confirms the precise mechanics of this alleged “voter smuggling” operation. While the Railway Ministry maintained the bureaucratic defence of “rush clearance,” ground reports from Sonipat and Karnal tell a radically different story that the trains were the hardware, but the ruling party provided the software—specifically, free tickets and food.

Special trains by Railways and Free tickets by BJP.
Proof:
1. https://t.co/1adtpz4spe
2. https://t.co/FCkmOxbR2X
3. https://t.co/ebyuWJzRpK

— Mohammed Zubair (@zoo_bear) November 9, 2025

Investigative footage from SNA News and Swarnpatr captures a brazen display of electoral mobilisation where the distinction between state infrastructure and party machinery completely collapsed.

This was from Karnal pic.twitter.com/ck2OngR8yG

— Ashish Bagchi (@BagchiAsh) November 28, 2025

In the exposed footage, the denial of “sponsored travel” unravels through the testimonies of the passengers themselves. When asked who paid for their journey, multiple laborers are seen on camera admitting, “Ticket BJP ne diya hai” (BJP gave the ticket) and “Modi sarkar ne paisa diya” (The Modi government paid). Even more incriminating is the on-record admission by local BJP functionaries present at the station. In one instance, a party worker explicitly states, “Ticket BJP arrange kara ke de rahi hai… bilkul nishulk” (The BJP is arranging the tickets… absolutely free), justifying the expenditure as a necessary service to help poor laborers participate in the “festival of democracy.”

This visual proof directly contradicts the “festival rush” narrative; these were not passengers buying tickets to go home for Chhath, but voters being ferried free of cost with the specific instruction to “cast their vote” (“Vot girane ja rahe hai”), a fact corroborated by video documentation where local leaders admit to the free distribution of tickets  and passengers confirm they did not pay a single rupee for the journey.

MCC and “corrupt practice” under RP Act, 1951

Even with the elections concluded, the legal ramifications of these allegations persist. If proven, they point to a structural rot in the electoral process involving two key frameworks:

First, violation of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (RP Act) The core allegation triggers Section 123(5) of the RP Act, which deals with “Corrupt Practices.”

Section 123(5): The hiring or procuring, whether on payment or otherwise, of any vehicle or vessel by a candidate or his agent… for the free conveyance of any elector… to or from any polling station…

While the text specifies “to or from a polling station,” judicial interpretation of “corrupt practice” often extends to the entire election apparatus. If a political party paid for trains to transport voters from Haryana to Bihar for the explicit purpose of voting, it violates the spirit of this prohibition. The RTI’s failure to disclose the “party or person who booked” the trains effectively suppresses evidence of a potential federal crime.

Secondly, misuse of official machinery under the Model Code of Conduct (MCC) The MCC is unequivocal, the party in power at the Centre must not use its official position for campaigning.

Para VII of MCC: The party in power whether at the Centre or in the State… shall ensure that no cause is given for any complaint that it has used its official position for the purposes of its election campaign.

The Indian Railways is a central ministry. If “unscheduled” trains were allocated based on backchannel requests from political functionaries to aid a specific party’s mobilisation, it constitutes a gross misuse of state machinery, shattering the “level playing field” the ECI is sworn to protect.

Institutional failure: the ECI’s abdication

The most troubling part of the “Phantom Trains” episode is the inaction of the regulator. The ECI, which is empowered by Article 324 of the Constitution to supervise and control elections, has remained silent.

The Bihar 2025 Assembly elections may be over, but the alleged “Trains for Votes” incident should not be brushed aside. The RTI documents clearly show an irregularity that needs an institutional response. If the Indian Railways—the country’s main transport network—can be used in a way that shifts voters on polling day as alleged, then the idea of a free and fair election is at risk.

The unanswered question of who paid for these trains raises serious doubts. Until the Election Commission conducts a transparent audit of these “Phantom Trains,” the election process will continue to face suspicion that government machinery was used to influence the outcome.

Related

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Bihar’s SIR process reveals an exercise of illegitimate powers, ECI forcing district machinery to resort to unethical practices: CCG’s Open Letter

The post Bihar Elections: Trains for votes? The unanswered mystery of the ‘phantom’ specials from Haryana to Bihar appeared first on SabrangIndia.

With these words, Hamela Khatun, also known as Hamela Begum, recalls the moment her world collapsed. A resident of Bhakeli Kanda in Darrang district, she grew up in a family of small farmers who survived on a patch of land along the Brahmaputra. Like millions in Assam’s char regions, river erosion was a familiar enemy. Their land vanished gradually, leaving the family impoverished and forcing them to migrate to Kerala as labourers.

Yet the destruction of their home was only the first blow. In 2009, the Border Branch of Darrang issued a notice against her under the Foreigners Act, accusing her of being an “illegal Bangladeshi migrant.” Overnight, a woman who had been born, raised, and registered as a voter for nearly two decades was declared a suspect. For Hamela, who had lived her entire life in Assam, the allegation was not merely bureaucratic confusion — it was a wound to her sense of belonging. The notice left the family shaken, terrified, and mentally shattered.

How help arrived — entirely by chance

In early 2025, as the family travelled to Bako in Kamrup district for temporary work, fate intervened. At a relative’s house, they unexpectedly encountered Advocate Abdul Hai, a member of CJP’s Assam legal team. With hesitation, they shared their ordeal — the FT notice, the years of fear, the absence of guidance, their displacement to Kerala, and the looming threat of deportation. Moved by their distress, Hai immediately informed CJP State Secretary Nanda Ghosh, who assured them that CJP would provide full legal assistance, completely free of cost.

This chance meeting, almost accidental, changed the entire course of Hamela’s case. For the first time in years, the family felt a faint sense of hope.

Hamela Khatun stands with CJP’s Assam Team

The Case Before the Foreigners Tribunal: What the state alleged

The reference against her — Ref. Case No. 294/2009, formally registered as F.T. Case 5861/2011 — was forwarded by the Superintendent of Police (Border), Mangaldai. It claimed that Hamela was not an Indian citizen but an illegal migrant who had entered Assam unlawfully. Her entire identity was placed under suspicion, and the Tribunal was asked to determine whether she was an Indian or a foreigner.

Crucially, under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946, the burden of proof lies on the accused — meaning Hamela had to prove her own citizenship, rather than the state proving she was a foreigner. For a poor, illiterate woman displaced by floods, this burden is extraordinarily harsh. Yet she refused to give up.

How Hamela Proved Her Citizenship: A lifetime of records, preserved against all odds

Despite years of displacement, poverty, and illiteracy, Hamela managed to gather a remarkable collection of documents establishing her lineage, identity, and continuous presence in Assam.

She proved that her grandfather, Jasim Mandal, appeared in the 1951 Legacy Data and in the 1960 Voters’ List. Her paternal uncles appeared in 1966 and 1977 Voters’ Lists, showing that the family has lived in the same region for decades. Her father, Haidar Ali, appeared consistently in voter lists from 1985 all the way up to 2025, establishing uninterrupted citizenship across generations. Similarly, her mother, Rupbhan Nessa, and her siblings were all documented in electoral rolls in Sipajhar LAC across the years 1997–2025.

Hamela also produced all her own electoral records from 2006, 2010, 2021, and 2025, each showing her as a resident of Mangaldai LAC. Alongside this, she submitted a residential certificate, a linkage certificate from the Gaon Panchayat, land documents from the 1950s and 60s, Aadhaar card, PAN card, ration card, bank passbook, and several other personal IDs.

In addition to documentary evidence, her father testified before the Tribunal. His deposition — detailing the family tree, place of origin, the names of his brothers and sisters, and his movements over the years — matched perfectly with every document filed. This consistency became a decisive factor in establishing her citizenship.

Tribunal’s Detailed Findings: A clear, decisive, evidence-based victory

The Tribunal, after examining every record, deposition, and certified document, delivered a clear and categorical finding. It held that Hamela’s forefathers were genuine Indian nationals, and her family lineage from her grandfather to her father was fully supported by electoral records dating back more than six decades. Her own voting history since 2006 further reinforced her claim.

The Tribunal found the evidence “reliable, trustworthy, and sufficient,” noting that there was nothing in the record to cast doubt on her claims. Her grandfather’s name appeared in the 1960 electoral roll, her uncles in 1966 and 1977, her father and mother across multiple voter lists until 2025, and her own name in four different rolls over nineteen years. Every link in her family tree was documented, certified, and verified.

Based on this, the Tribunal concluded:

“Musstt. Hamela Khatun @ Hamela Begum… is not a Foreigner/Illegal Migrant of any stream. The reference is answered in the negative.”

It directed the Superintendent of Police (Border), Mangaldai, and the Deputy Commissioner, Darrang, to take necessary action recognising her as an Indian citizen.

It was a complete victory — built entirely on evidence, consistency, and truth.

When the Order Reached Her Home: Relief after years of fear

On November 24, 2025, a CJP team comprising State In-charge Nanda Ghosh, DVM Joinal Abedin, Advocate Abdul Hai, driver Asikul Hussain, and local community volunteers travelled nearly six hours across rough, broken roads to reach Hamela’s house.

The journey was long, but when they arrived, they saw a sight that made every hour worth it — Hamela standing with a wide, relieved smile, holding the order copy that restored her identity.

She told the team, her voice trembling with gratitude: “You saved us by fighting the case for free. You stood by us in times of trouble.”

In a gesture of humility and affection, she offered them boiled eggs from her chickens and small flower seedlings from her garden — a heartfelt expression of thanks from someone who had endured years of erasure and suffering. She added, “I was worried for so long, but today I’m happy.”

As the team left, the sun was setting over the Brahmaputra, casting a warm glow over the green fields that surround her house — a fitting end to a journey that symbolised justice, dignity, and belonging.

Why Hamela’s story matters for Assam and India

Hamela’s struggle is emblematic of the larger issues in Assam’s citizenship verification system. Her case highlights how:

• River erosion uproots entire communities, leaving them without documents.
• Poor, illiterate women are disproportionately targeted and unable to navigate legal processes.
• The burden of proof under Section 9 places crushing pressure on the accused.
• Entire families with long-established presence in Assam can be declared “suspects” based on bureaucratic doubts.

Yet her case also demonstrates the power of community support, legal aid, and sustained documentation. It shows that even in a system stacked against the poor, justice is possible when facts are presented clearly and fearlessly.

Conclusion

Hamela’s story is ultimately one of resilience. She lost her land to the river. She lost her livelihood to displacement. The state tried to take her citizenship. But she fought back — through truth, documentation, and sheer courage. The Foreigners Tribunal vindicated her, reaffirming that she belongs to this land as firmly and deeply as her ancestors did.

Her journey — from erosion and poverty to legal recognition and dignity — stands as a reminder that citizenship is not merely a bureaucratic label. For India’s poorest and most vulnerable, it is the foundation of belonging, identity, and survival.

The complete order may be read here.

Related:

From Despair to Dignity: How CJP helped Elachan Bibi win back her identity, prove her citizenship

CJP scores big win! Citizenship restored to Mazirun Bewa, a widowed daily wage worker from Assam

CJP Exclusive: Homeland to No Man’s Land! Assam police’s unlawful crackdown on residents still battling for restoration of citizenship rights?

A Long Road to Justice: CJP helps Alijon Bibi reclaim her citizenship after 2-year legal battle

The post Washed Away by Floods, Targeted by the State: Hamela Khatun’s fight for citizenship appeared first on SabrangIndia.

A broad comparative reading of speeches, videos, rallies, slogans, media patterns, complaints, and reports reveals something deeper than mere rhetorical excess. It reveals a political order that increasingly depends on the manufacture of an existential threat. The political message has fused with social fear. Social fear has fused with administrative paralysis. Administrative paralysis has fused with electoral advantage. In this fusion, the very meaning of democracy is being reconfigured: elections no longer offer competing futures but competing hatreds; political legitimacy no longer flows from representation but from the ability to summon and sustain anger.

In this transformed landscape, hate speech functions as infrastructure. It builds worlds. It shapes consciousness. It reorganises neighbourhood markets, influences police behaviour, triggers vigilante assertion, and fractures interdependence at the most micro levels. It is not ephemeral. It is lived, circulated, absorbed, and enacted. In addition, its long-term damage is not only to India’s minorities, but also to India’s democratic capacity itself. Hate becomes not only an electoral weapon but also a method of governance; not only a tactic of polarisation but also a technique of population management.

This article takes stock of this new political order. It examines the imagery and stereotypes deployed across electoral contexts; the fears they stoke; the patterns of mobilisation they generate; the administrative silences that empower them; the media networks that amplify them; and, most importantly, the differential ways in which states like Maharashtra, Delhi, and Bihar adapt this infrastructure to their own socio-political terrains. In Bihar especially, hate speech became a tool to reorder caste configurations—an extraordinary strategic shift with profound implications for the state’s political future.

The fundamental objective of this “Architecture of Polarisation” is two-fold: first, to successfully consolidate a majority (read Hindu) vote bank through the construction of an existential threat narrative; and second, to systematically blur socio-economic realities and caste equations—particularly in states like Bihar—by substituting governance failures with religious conflict. This piece argues that electoral hate speech has evolved from fringe outbursts into an essential, multi-stage campaign strategy, aiming to consolidate a majority vote bank by constructing a fear-driven narrative of existential threat to the majority community.

Notably, along with the article, documents containing communal and provocative speeches delivered during Delhi, Maharashtra and Lok Sabha elections has been attached separately.

CJP’s Election Hate Watch operates as a specialised monitoring system designed to track, document, and challenge hate speech that corrodes the fairness of India’s electoral process. During election cycles, CJP’s conduct daily scans of speeches, election rallies, roadshows, religious gatherings, local WhatsApp circulation, hyperlocal events, and media broadcasts. Every instance of communal incitement is timestamped, transcribed, archived, and assessed against the Model Code of Conduct, RPA, and hate-speech jurisprudence. The process is meticulous: the team captures not only explicit slurs or violent calls but also dog-whistles, coded conspiracies (“love jihad,” “land jihad,” “vote jihad”), ritualised slogans, vigilante mobilisation, and election-season communal rumours. The emphasis is on understanding how hate operates as a political technology—where it originates, who amplifies it, how quickly it spreads, and how it shapes the emotional climate of the constituency.

A core function of the Election Hate Watch is formal accountability. Each verified violation is filed with the Election Commission as a structured MCC complaint—supported with evidence, legal references, URLs, transcripts, and explicit analysis of how the speech violates electoral norms. As complaints accumulate, CJP identifies deeper patterns: repeat offenders who face no consequences; fringe groups that act as advance agents of polarisation months before polling; the transition of hate speech from local agitators to star campaigners; the silence or selective inaction of District Magistrates; and the seasonal spike in anti-minority mobilisation whenever elections approach. The Hate Watch therefore does more than document abuse—it exposes the systemic, cyclical nature of hate-mongering during elections and highlights how institutional indifference enables its escalation.

The National Template of Hatred: How stereotypes become strategy

Across every state examined—Maharashtra, Delhi, Bihar, and during the Lok Sabha campaign—one encounters a startlingly consistent repertoire of imagery. It is a set-piece performance, travelling effortlessly from district to district, from rallies to WhatsApp forwards, from street-corner speeches to prime-time studio screens. The central character of this repertoire is the Muslim figure cast entirely outside the domain of citizenship: the eternal infiltrator, the calculating seducer, the demographic schemer, the territorial conspirator, the economic parasite, the cultural invader.

Protagonists employed to spew this hatred by the ideological majoritarian formation that most benefits from it, the RSS led-Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) are the constitutional CEOs of the party’s most polarised states (Uttar Pradesh, Assam and Uttarakhand). The carry forward or trickle down circulation of this hate is then by local level, recognised functionaries of far right formations, closely allied with the regime.

The term “infiltrator” is the axis around which this ecosystem revolves. It appears not merely as an insult but as a political doctrine. Hatred does not operate by merely expressing dislike; it operates by constructing the “Other” as an enemy so dangerous that even constitutional protections must bow before national survival. The infiltrator trope achieves this by collapsing legal categories—foreigner, migrant, refugee, citizen—into a single undifferentiated target. A Muslim man walking with his daughter to school becomes indistinguishable from a Bangladeshi terrorist. A Muslim vendor selling tomatoes becomes indistinguishable from a Rohingya infiltrator. This collapse is not a misunderstanding; it is a deliberate political intervention that renders all constitutional protections fragile.

Alongside the infiltrator, we see the proliferation of “jihad” conspiracies. These conspiratorial logics—love jihad, land jihad, population jihad, vote jihad—are a masterstroke of rhetorical engineering. They allow entirely ordinary, mundane aspects of life—love, marriage, land purchase, childbirth, voting—to be reinterpreted as part of a sinister plan. The beauty of a conspiracy theory is not that it is credible but that it is expansive. It can absorb anything, interpret everything, and justify whatever violence follows. For electoral actors, this is strategic gold.

This vocabulary is supplemented by dehumanising metaphors: termites, snakes, demons. Dehumanisation functions as the precursor to violence, lowering the psychological barrier between rhetoric and action. The use of such animalistic vocabulary across Maharashtra and Lok Sabha speeches shows a clear attempt to create a moral universe in which harming the target feels like cleansing, not cruelty.

Then there is the linguistic architecture of purity and contamination. In Delhi, vendors are forced to display saffron flags or publicly assert their Hindu identity. The underlying claim is that Muslim bodies carry impurity—social, cultural, or even culinary. If a Muslim vendor hides his identity, he is framed as deceitful; if he reveals it, he is ostracised. It is a no-win situation designed to make minority livelihoods precarious.

The repetition of identical metaphors across states shows a powerful truth: hate is being standardised.

The thematic trinity of existential threat

The communal campaign strategy relies on a narrow but potent set of themes, which are tailored locally but consistent nationally. These themes function to dehumanise the minority community, primarily Muslims, and position them as a singular, monolithic threat that transcends local governance issues.

1. The ‘Infiltrator’ and Citizenship Trope: Stoking demographic fear

Across Bihar, Maharashtra, and the Lok Sabha campaign, the core message is that the opposition parties are enabling “Bangladeshi infiltrators” and “Rohingya refugees” to undermine the nation’s security and steal local resources.

• Commonality- The threat to resources and identity: The core claim across all these elections is that “Bangladeshi infiltrators” and “Rohingya refugees” are being enabled by opposition parties to usurp local resources, jobs, and land, thereby changing the demography of border districts. This rhetoric is deployed to stoke the fears of demographic replacement and economic dispossession.

• Top-down amplification: This is not limited to local functionaries; it has been mainstreamed by the highest-ranking “Star Campaigners.” The Prime Minister, for instance, used the term ghuspaithiya (infiltrators) in Bihar, alleging demographic changes in border districts and announcing a mission to deport them to prevent the theft of livelihoods and resources from the youth of Bihar. In the Lok Sabha campaign, the same narrative was used to claim the opposition planned to redistribute the country’s wealth to these “infiltrators”.
• Targeting indigenous communities (Jharkhand): In Jharkhand, this narrative was explicitly used to divide and mobilise the Adivasi and indigenous communities. BJP leaders accused the ruling JMM-Congress coalition of enabling these “infiltrators” to settle illegally, thereby “stealing” resources, jobs, and land from the Adivasis. The rhetoric successfully frames the election not as a choice on development, but as a defense of indigenous culture and territory against an external Muslim threat.
• Delhi and Maharashtra: Local leaders in Delhi utilised the same language, warning residents that if the opposition won, the city would “turn into Dhaka” and that the opposition was busy making Aadhaar cards for these “Bangladeshis”. In Maharashtra, the demand for NRC/Janta NRC was raised with the promise to throw out all Bangladeshis/Rohingya.

The fear stoked: This theme directly stokes the fear of demographic replacement, economic dispossession, and national security compromise, making the electoral choice one of survival rather than policy.

2. The ‘Jihad’ Conspiracy Matrix: Fuelling moral panic and segregation

The term ‘Jihad’ is weaponised as a prefix to various social and economic activities to generate a state of perpetual moral panic within the majority community.

Certain instances of hate speech targeted Muslims in Bihar are as follows:

1. Raghunathpur, Bihar

Assam CM & BJP leader Himanta Biswa Sarma says, “Before I came to Raghunathpur, I thought I would see Lord Ram, Lord Lakshman and Goddess Sita, but I was told that there are many Ram, Laxman and Sita here and there is also Osama. So I asked, who is Osama? This Osama is like the earlier Osama Bin Laden. We have to ensure the elimination of all Osama Bin Ladens in the state. What was Osama’s father’s name? He was called Shahbuddin…”

2. Keoti, Darbhanga, Bihar

Top themes from Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath’s campaign speech: “Bihar’s security is being compromised by letting ghuspaithiya (infiltrators) into Bihar’s land — these are the same people who divide you on caste lines, invite ghuspaithiya (infiltrators), play with your faith, and then work to undermine national security. We must not allow these ghuspaithiya (infiltrators) to enter. Just as Article 370 was ended in Kashmir and Pakistani elements were pushed out, we will remove ghuspaithiya (infiltrators) from our border areas, seize the property of anyone involved in criminal activities, and distribute that property among the poor — the NDA government will do this. Elect NDA candidate Shri Murari Mohan Jha again; do not allow any element that shelters ghuspaithiya (infiltrators), breeds anarchy, or insults Mithila’s culture during festivals and celebrations.”

3. Hajipur, Vaishali, Bihar

Top themes from Union Home Minister Amit Shah’s campaign speech delivered virtually at a public rally: “Should ghuspaithiya (infiltrators) have the right to be on Bihar’s electoral rolls? I know your answer — it should not be. Congress leader Rahul Gandhi took out a ‘Ghuspaithiya Bachao’ yatra in Bihar, because all these parties fighting elections against us see these ghuspaithiya (infiltrators) as their vote bank. And I believe these ghuspaithiya (infiltrators) are snatching jobs from our youth, taking a share of the poor’s grain, and making the country insecure. Rahul ji, hold as many ‘Ghuspaithiya Bachao’ yatras as you want — we will pick out every infiltrator from Bihar and the country and send them out, and we will also work to remove their names from the electoral rolls. This is the decision of the Bharatiya Janata Party, this is the decision of the NDA.”

4. Harsidhi, Purvi Champaran, Bihar

Top themes from CM Pushkar Singh Dhami’s campaign speech: “We have taken strict action against counterfeiters, religious conversion, riots, and against ‘love jihad,’ ‘land jihad,’ and ‘thook jihad.’ Additionally, to curb the operation of illegally functioning madrasas and religious extremism, we have decided to dissolve the Madrasa Board in Uttarakhand. In the coming days, only those madrasas in Uttarakhand that teach the syllabus prescribed by our education board will operate. After winning Bihar, these same measures will be implemented here to ensure its safety. Who do you stand with? Will you stand with the BJP-NDA that puts the national interest above all, or will you stand with those who support ghuspaithiya (infiltrators)? Will you stand with the Uniform Civil Code, or with those who bring Shariat laws and openly give license to the oppression of women?”

5. Chapra, Saran, Bihar

Key themes from Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s campaign speech: “Remember this — the RJD and Congress, drowned in appeasement and vote-bank politics, can do nothing except protect ghuspaithiya (infiltrators). These ghuspaithiya (infiltrators) have become their maai-baap (masters). They have invested all their political strength in saving them.”

This matrix directly translates into violence against vulnerable sections and the enforcement of social and economic apartheid. A BJP Councillor in Delhi, for instance, not only demanded a Muslim vendor display his name but also installed saffron flags on Hindu vendors’ stalls to facilitate identity-based commerce, explicitly propagating the slur that the “other community” spits on food.

3. Dehumanisation and Direct Incitement: The slur-to-violence pipeline

The final, most dangerous thematic stage involves the deployment of dehumanizing language that makes violence against the target community palatable and justified.

• Dehumanising slurs: Instances include a BJP member inside the Lok Sabha using Islamophobic and threatening slurs like “terrorist” and “pimp” against a Muslim MP. A BJP leader in Maharashtra, Nitesh Rane, threatened to burn someone and other leaders openly called for gruesome violence, threatening to “kill you like Insects” and chanting, “Danda uthao, Lande baghao“.
• Incitement to violence: Rallies in Maharashtra, led by figures like BJP MLA T Raja Singh, have featured anti-Muslim slurs and direct incitement. In one instance, a leader threatened to “burn someone,” while others openly chanted, “we will also cut people here and throw them in drains”. Another leader explicitly threatened, “we will kill you like Insects”. The CM of Assam, Himanta Biswa Sarma, while delivering a speech in Bihar, likened a person to “Osama Bin Laden” and explicitly called for their “elimination”. This constant use of extreme rhetoric (e.g., “cut people here and throw them in drains”) serves to normalise a climate of hostility, making actual violence against vulnerable sections an anticipated outcome. This rhetoric aims to condition the public to accept violent elimination as a righteous act.

The Emotional Infrastructure of Fear: How hate speech manufactures threat

Hate speech may appear to be about anger, but its true currency is fear. Anger mobilises crowds; fear sustains movements. Across states, four carefully constructed fears appear repeatedly.

The first is economic fear. In poor, agrarian states such as Bihar—or in working-class belts of Maharashtra—the rhetoric focuses on infiltrators stealing government benefits, occupying land illegally, taking jobs, receiving welfare they do not deserve. This rhetoric is powerful because it taps into real economic frustrations but diverts them away from structural inequality and towards minorities. It converts legitimate anger over unemployment or deprivation into communal resentment.

The second is cultural fear. This fear takes the form of a narrative of civilisational decline. Hindu culture is portrayed as under siege; traditions are framed as endangered; festivals are depicted as battlefields. Rituals like Chhath Puja—once shared by communities—become arenas of policing and communal signalling. What was once a festival of rivers and devotion becoming a theatre of antagonism.

The third is demographic fear. It appears most explicitly in national-level speeches during the Lok Sabha campaign. By exaggerating Muslim fertility and framing demographic change as a Muslim conspiracy, politicians create a sense of population panic. Demographic fear is one of the most potent tools of ethnic majoritarianism globally—it transforms the majority into a frightened minority in their own imagination.

The fourth is sexual fear. Women’s bodies become sites of communal anxiety. “Bahu-beti ki izzat” rhetoric casts Muslim men as sexual predators and Hindu men as protectors. It converts women’s autonomy into a communal battlefield and legitimises violent moral policing. This fear is especially weaponised in Maharashtra, where love jihad rhetoric saturates both street-level speeches and high-profile rallies.

Together, these fears produce a moral panic in which majoritarian self-defence becomes not only political strategy but civic virtue.

The operational playbook of mobilisation and division

The communal escalation follows a meticulous, three-stage operational pattern designed to build momentum while providing plausible deniability to the main political party.

The three-stage escalation model: A remarkable consistency emerges across state after state: hate speech follows a three-stage escalation pipeline. This pipeline is not theoretical. It is empirically visible across the Maharashtra file, the Delhi dossier, and Bihar’s hate-speech archive.

In the first stage, fringe actors begin the work of seeding hatred. These actors are often small, semi-obscure organisations—vigilante groups, local religious fronts, hardline cultural outfits. They operate without restraint, testing the boundaries of permissible speech. Their role is to sow the initial seeds of anxiety.

In the second stage, local political leaders elevate these narratives. Their speeches are strategically targeted, naming places, identifying supposed threats, and calling for exclusion or boycott. They do the work of translating fringe slogans into electoral messaging.

In the third stage, national leaders adopt the same rhetoric. This is the most crucial moment, where language becomes law-like, carrying the weight of authority. When senior ministers repeat terms like “infiltrator”, they confer legitimacy on the entire ecosystem. What begins as street-level rumour becomes a central campaign theme.

This pipeline ensures that hate speech does not remain marginal. It becomes mainstream political messaging, producing a nationwide vocabulary of resentment. (Read: Elections 2024: The lead up to the first two phases of voting have seen far right leaders deliver anti-Muslim hate speech across India and April: CJP’s hate watch campaign analyses several hate incidents reported across the country in the last week)

Stage 1: Fringe elements get active (the groundwork)

The process begins 3-4 months before the elections with dedicated far-right organisations laying the groundwork.

• In Maharashtra, groups like the Sakal Hindu Samaj and Hindu Janjagruti Manch organise Hindu Jan Akrosh rallies, peddling the most extreme versions of the ‘Jihad’ conspiracies, including calls to take up arms. In Bihar, it was the “I Love Mahummad” campaign that led to chaos and violence.
• In Bihar, groups like the Bajrang Dal and VHP host events where convenors openly reject slogans of communal harmony and urge Hindus to take up weapons (shastra) to defend their identity. This fringe content serves as an ‘out-of-syllabus’ test balloon for later, more moderated main-party rhetoric.

Instances from Bihar:

1. Gaya, Bihar

Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP), Matrushakti, and Durga Vahini conducted Durga Ashtami and Shastra Poojan (weapon worship) programs at multiple locations. During the event, women brandished weapons and raised religious slogans.

2. Kaimur, Bihar

Bhagwati Shukla, national president of Rashtriya Sanatan Sena, speaking at a religious conference organised by the group, promoted the anti-Muslim conspiracy theory of “love jihad” and falsely claimed that over 3 lakh Hindu girls are killed every day in its name. He also declared that they will cut those who slaughter cows.

3. Bettiah, West Champaran, Bihar

During a Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) Foundation Day event, leader Ambarish Singh made anti-Muslim remarks, claiming Muslims seek separate laws and identity. He said those who refuse to say “Bharat Mata ki Jai” “may be citizens but are not our brothers,” mocked slogans of communal harmony, and linked the VHP’s mission to ending “love jihad,” cow slaughter, and religious conversions.

4. Bhagwanpur, Vaishali, Bihar

At a Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) Sthapna Diwas event, Bajrang Dal state convenor Prakash Pandey rejected slogans of communal harmony and spread anti-Muslim conspiracy theories around “love jihad,” “land jihad,” religious conversions and cow slaughter. He also urged Hindus to take up weapons (“shastra”) to defend their identity.

Stage 2: Local leaders build-up (the designated agitators)

The next stage involves “designated agitators”—one or two individuals per state who consistently make hateful statements. These leaders test the boundaries of acceptable rhetoric and generate the initial media traction.

Instances:

1. Maharashtra- Nitesh Rane peddles conspiracy theories and threaten violence in Dongri. Caught on camera threatening to burn someone and peddled conspiracy theory of ‘land jihad’

https://cjp.org.in/nitesh-rane-peddles-conspiracy-theories-and-threaten-violence-in-dongri-thane

2. Maharashtra- CJP files complaint before Maharashtra Police against serial hate offender Kajal Hindustani. In complaint, CJP urged to take strict action and seek prosecution under sections 196, 197(1), 352 and 353 of the BNS, 2023 for communal, hate speech

https://cjp.org.in/cjp-files-complaint-before-maharashtra-police-against-serial-hate-offender-kajal-hindustani

3. Maharashtra- CJP lodges additional police complaints against Nitesh Rane and Ashwini Upadhyay for hate speeches. Incendiary remarks by Nitesh Rane and Ashwini Upadhyay span multiple locations in Maharashtra

https://cjp.org.in/cjp-lodges-additional-police-complaints-against-nitesh-rane-and-ashwini-upadhyay-for-hate-speeches

4. Maharashtra- Hindu Jan Akrosh rally in Mumbai sees conspiracy theories being peddled against Muslims. Leaders like Nitesh Rane, made speeches calling out ‘Jihadis’ and accusing people of bringing in ‘Bangladeshis’, and ‘Rohingya’ to conduct riots

https://cjp.org.in/hindu-jan-akrosh-rally-in-mumbai-sees-conspiracy-theories-being-peddled-against-muslims

Stage 3: Star campaigners take over

Once the ground is polarised and the themes are established, the main national leaders (PM Modi, Amit Shah, Rajnath Singh, Yogi Adityanath) step in, adopting the subtext of the hate speech—shifting from local incitement to national security and resource threat—to legitimize the narrative and reach a mass audience. This also involves the tactic of “catching” one or two Maulanas to make statements that fit the narrative, ensuring the rhetoric is framed as a response to minority aggression (e.g., the use of Imran Masood’s statement in Bihar).

Blurring caste equations and weaponising Dalits

A key analytical dimension in Bihar and the Lok Sabha elections is the calculated effort to fracture social justice coalitions by pitting Dalits, Adivasis, and OBCs against Muslims. A critical function of communal hate speech is the calculated effort to blur Caste Equations/Realities and divert attention from governance failures.

• The reservation theft narrative: This is achieved by framing any potential minority benefit (like reservation for backward Muslims, as done in Karnataka) as a direct theft of resources earmarked for Dalits, Scheduled Castes (SCs), and Scheduled Tribes (STs). Senior leaders, including Home Minister Amit Shah, systematically framed any potential reservation for Muslims as a direct theft from Dalits, Adivasis, SCs, and OBCs. The explicit claim that Congress would take reservations “out from the Dalits… and give it to Muslims” is designed to create a zero-sum communal conflict, fracturing the socio-political alliance built on caste-based identity and social justice.
• Diverting from joblessness and poverty: By focusing campaign energy entirely on ‘Infiltrators,’ ‘Love Jihad,’ and ‘Reservation Theft,’ the political discourse successfully diverts attention from the real issues plaguing Bihar, such as poverty, unemployment, and lack of development.

Communalising shared public and festival spaces

The strategy of division extends to hijacking shared cultural symbols and spaces.

• Festival polarisation: Festivals traditionally celebrated by both communities are being communalised, such as Chhath Puja in Bihar, where the use of VHP stickers is a new tactic to stake exclusive claim over shared cultural rituals.
• Economic segregation: The use of festivals or local gatherings to enforce economic boycotts and social separation (e.g., the paneer vendor incident in Delhi).
• Infiltrating secular institutions: Even educational institutions are being targeted, with reports of Hindutva activities like Gaushalas and Shobha Yatras being brought into college campuses like IIT-B in Mumbai, symbolically mirroring the ‘Land Jihad’ narrative in cultural and academic domains.

Targeting religious and political spaces

• Religious sites: Speeches included promises to remove mosques from Kashi and Mathura if the BJP wins a supermajority in the 2024 Lok Sabha elections. The destruction of the Babri Mosque was openly glorified in Maharashtra.
• Parliamentary attacks: A Muslim MP, Kunwar Danish Ali, was called a “terrorist, pimp” by a BJP member, Ramesh Bidhuri, inside India’s parliament.
• Political rivalry: Assam CM Himanta Biswa Sarma made a deeply communal remark in Bihar, linking a local leader to Osama Bin Laden and his father to Shahabuddin

Instances from Bihar:

1. Gaya, Bihar

At a government event inaugurating development project, Prime Minister Narendra Modi targeted those he referred to as “ghuspaithiya” (infiltrators), alleging demographic changes in Bihar’s border districts. He asserted that infiltrators would not be allowed to steal livelihoods and resources from the youth of Bihar and Indian citizens, and announced the formation of a demography mission to deport each “ghuspaithiya” from the country.

2. Barauni, Begusarai, Bihar

Home Minister Amit Shah delivered a speech targeting those he referred to as “ghuspethiya” (infiltrators). He questioned whether they should receive voting rights, be included in voter lists, or be entitled to free food rations, employment, housing, or medical aid, claiming that Rahul Gandhi prioritises them over the people of Bihar. He further alleged that “ghuspethiyas” serve as vote banks for opposition leaders and vowed to remove each one of them.

3. Dehri, Rohtas, Bihar

Home Minister Amit Shah delivered a speech targeting those he referred to as “ghuspethiya” (infiltrators). He mocked Congress leader Rahul Gandhi’s campaign as a “Ghuspethiya Bachao Yatra” and asked attendees whether infiltrators should have voting rights, access to free rations, jobs, housing, or medical aid. He alleged that infiltrators are receiving these benefits instead of Indian youth, warning that if the opposition wins, “every house in Bihar will have only ghuspethiyas.”

4. Danapur, Patna, Bihar

Top themes from Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath’s campaign speech: “The INDI Alliance has started a new campaign– development vs ‘burqa’. When Bihar and its youth are talking about development, Congress and RJD are trying to expand their reach through ‘burqa’. Should they be allowed to conduct fake polling? Should ‘foreign ghuspaith’ (infiltrators) be given a free hand to rob the poor, Dalits, and citizens of Bihar? Anywhere in the world, one must show their identity and face, but they want to let anyone vote without revealing their faces.”

From Rhetoric to Rupture: How hate speech reorders everyday life

Across Maharashtra, Delhi, and Bihar, hate speech produces concrete, lived consequences. It reorganises public space. It transforms markets into segregated zones. It forces everyday interactions to become declarations of identity.

In Delhi, the pressure on Muslim vendors to display saffron flags is not simply symbolic. It is a form of coercion that destroys anonymity, exposes vulnerability, and renders economic life contingent on communal compliance. In Maharashtra, boycott campaigns led to assaults on shops, disruption of livelihoods, and humiliation of workers. In Bihar, rumours about “Bangladeshi vendors” have triggered spontaneous harassment of ordinary labourers. Panchayat resolutions in various states have attempted to exclude Muslim traders from local markets—a practice that mimics apartheid structures where economic participation becomes conditional on identity.

Violence follows predictably. Mob assaults, harassment of couples, vandalism of shops, threats to imams, surveillance of Muslim-majority localities—these are not “law and order incidents”. They are direct outcomes of a discursive environment engineered for hostility.

When hate speech saturates public space, violence becomes not a deviation but an expected response. A society trained to see neighbours as infiltrators is a society primed for confrontation.

The Systemic Enablers: Media and institutional inaction

The final, critical piece of the pattern is the widespread belief that the Model Code of Conduct (MCC) is a functionally dead instrument, a perception reinforced by consistent inaction on complaints against powerful figures. The piece must highlight that despite the existence of electoral laws and the MCC, enforcement remains critically weak, thus encouraging repeat offenses.).

1. The media multiplier and the digital battlefield

The media ecosystem acts as a critical force multiplier, ensuring maximum saturation of the divisive narratives.

• The role of media in propagation: The media acts as a critical force multiplier. The search results confirm that social media platforms (Facebook, YouTube, X) are key instruments for amplifying and mainstreaming hate speech, with top BJP leaders’ speeches often live-streamed across official accounts.
• AI-generated content and deepfakes: As anticipated, the Bihar election has become a test case for the use of AI Deepfakes, hate posters, and malicious Bhojpuri songs, “blurring the line between propaganda and parody”. The attempt to create an AI Deepfake targeting Colonel Sofia Qureshi and falsely linking Trishul drills to the Bihar polls is a clear example of using sophisticated technology to manufacture a crisis narrative.
• “Paid” hardliners: A crucial pattern is noted: the existence of “paid” Muslim hardliners whose provocative clips are used by the political machinery to validate the “existential threat” narrative. This creates a false equivalence, framing the majority community’s rhetoric as a justified defensive reaction. 

2. The MCC Paradox: A functional impunity

One of the most troubling revelations across states is the consistent institutional inaction. MCC complaints filed by civil society groups in Maharashtra resulted in little to no prosecution. Delhi administrators took no meaningful action against blatant hate speech. Even where the Election Commission issued notices, follow-up was weak.

The paralysis is not bureaucratic inefficiency—it is political choice. District Magistrates, legally empowered to act suo-moto, routinely fail to intervene. Police forces often behave not as neutral protectors but as silent spectators or selective enforcers. Voting-day advertisements—clearly illegal—continue year after year with complete impunity.

The absence of enforcement does not merely fail to stop hate speech. It incentivises it. (Read: From Welfare to Expulsion: Bihar’s MCC period rhetoric turns citizenship into a campaign weapon)

• Lack of consequence for star campaigners: The most damning evidence comes from the 2019 Lok Sabha elections, where the Congress party explicitly petitioned the Supreme Court, stating that the Election Commission’s (ECI) “continued silence” on complaints of hate speech and MCC violation against the Prime Minister and Home Minister amounted to a “tacit endorsement” of their statements and was a form of “invidious discrimination”. The Supreme Court was eventually forced to direct the EC to decide on these complaints.
• The DM’s suo-moto power failure: District Magistrates (DMs) possess the suo moto power to initiate action against violations of law and order, including hate speech, without waiting for the ECI’s directive. The consistent failure of DMs to utilise this power effectively creates a security vacuum and raises a fundamental question: What is the purpose of the MCC if its own local enforcement arms refuse to exercise their legal authority?
• The silence period violation: A consistent tactical violation is the use of full-page newspaper advertisements on the day of voting—a direct breach of the legally mandated “silence period”. Complaints are filed every year, yet nothing ever happens, turning a legal restraint into a predictable, unpunished final campaign flourish. Complaints were explicitly filed against the BJP, MNS, and the Shiv Sena (Shinde faction) in Maharashtra for silence period violations, specifically citing political ads in major newspapers. (Read: How BJP is accused of violating 48 Hours-Silence Period even on Poll Day?)

How MCC violations become a license for electoral hate: One of the most disturbing features of India’s contemporary electoral landscape is not merely the explosion of hate speech, but the near-total collapse of institutional response to it. The Model Code of Conduct—once regarded as a moral compass and a boundary-marker—is now little more than a symbolic pamphlet. Across Maharashtra, Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and during the 2024 Lok Sabha cycle, repeated, documented, and widely circulated instances of explicit hate speech, communal incitement, and even direct calls for violence were flagged to the Election Commission of India with urgency and precision. Yet the ECI’s response oscillated between silence, non-committal notices, or bureaucratic platitudes. This selective inertia has effectively rewritten the MCC: instead of a code meant to regulate elections, it has become a code that politicians can violate with impunity once they understand that consequences are unlikely, uneven, or easily deflected. The absence of deterrence becomes a form of permission.

The judicial system’s response—especially from constitutional courts—has only deepened this institutional void. High Courts routinely dismiss or defer petitions concerning hate speech at election time, often on procedural grounds, or by sending complainants back to the very authorities that have already refused to act. Even more worrying is the Supreme Court’s posture, which has increasingly adopted a stance of non-intervention, repeatedly expressing “helplessness,” “constraint,” or “reluctance” to issue proactive directions. This judicial passivity is not neutral. By refusing to treat communal hate as an urgent constitutional injury, the courts inadvertently normalise its presence in electoral politics. When the highest court of a democracy signals that it cannot act unless someone else acts first, hate becomes embedded as an acceptable mode of political communication.

This institutional abdication has profound consequences for the democratic process. It creates a political marketplace in which the loudest, most inflammatory actors gain the greatest advantage. It rewards radicalisation, emboldens repeat offenders, and silences vulnerable communities who lose faith in the very institutions meant to protect them. The MCC becomes a decorative façade, the ECI a passive spectator, and the judiciary an absentee guardian. What remains is a hollowed-out electoral field where hate speech does not merely occur—it thrives under the protective cover of institutional silence. When the state signals that hate is politically useful and legally inconsequential, it corrodes not only public discourse but the constitutional foundation of elections themselves. In such a climate, communal propaganda is not an aberration; it becomes the new grammar of democratic participation.

Some of the MCC complaints sent by CJP during these four election cycles may be read here, here, here and here.

Bihar: The strategic communalisation of caste politics

Bihar stands out for a deeper, more consequential transformation. Unlike Maharashtra or Delhi, where communal polarisation has been cultivated for years, Bihar has historically been governed by caste equations. Political coalitions were built on OBC solidarity, Dalit assertion, and the arithmetic of caste-based identities. Muslims, though electorally significant, were integrated into caste-based alliances rather than positioned as central antagonists.

In the recent Bihar cycle, hate speech has been weaponised to redraw this landscape. The infiltrator narrative is used to redirect OBC and EBC economic frustrations toward Muslims. Hate speech in Bihar functions not merely as communal rhetoric but as caste engineering. By portraying Muslims as beneficiaries of welfare schemes, as land-grabbers, as demographic threats, hate speech fractures long-standing solidarities between marginalised castes and Muslim communities. The constructed rhetoric also blurs or diminishes issues of caste deprivation and discrimination of the most marginalised where the systemic exploiters are from the dominant ‘Hindu’ fold.

This transformation is visible in the communalisation of Chhath Puja, one of Bihar’s most syncretic cultural spaces. It is visible in the circulation of AI-generated videos designed to provoke OBC anger. It is visible in the increasing recruitment of Dalit and OBC youth by Hindutva groups seeking to expand their caste footprint.

In Bihar, like elsewhere, hate speech is not simply dividing communities. It is restructuring them.

Democracy in Decline: The erosion of rights, citizenship, and public reason

The cumulative effect of election hate speech is the erosion of India’s constitutional framework. Hate speech violates Articles 14, 15, and 21 by producing inequality, discrimination, and insecurity. It corrodes the idea of citizenship by creating a two-tier system: those who belong fully and those who must constantly prove their belonging.

The damage is not simply legal. It is epistemic. Hate speech erodes the ability of citizens to think democratically. The utter failure of constitutional institutions, conceived as safeguards –be it the constitutional courts or the infamous Election Commission of India (ECI) to act decisively and punitively ensures further impunity and normalisation. Result: hate speech and its impact, crowds out substantive debate, reduces governance to identity warfare, and delegitimises political disagreement. In such an environment, elections cease to be democratic practices and become theatres of domination.

Conclusion: Reclaiming democratic integrity

The analysis demonstrates that the current surge in electoral hate speech is neither random nor reactive; it is the product of a highly organised, multi-layered, and financially supported political architecture designed to achieve communal mobilization.

India’s contemporary elections reveal a political landscape where hate speech is not an aberration but an organising principle. It structures campaigns, mobilises voters, reorganises identities, and shapes governance. It transforms neighbours into enemies and turns public space into a battlefield. It reorders caste politics in places like Bihar. It destroys livelihoods in places like Delhi. In addition, it legitimises violence in places like Maharashtra.

Most dangerously, it normalises a new political order in which fear is the principal currency of power.

India now stands at a critical juncture. If hate remains the central grammar of elections, then elections themselves cease to be instruments of democratic renewal. They become mechanisms of social control. The future of India’s democracy depends not merely on recognising this transformation but on confronting it with legal, political, and moral urgency.

Hate is not a speech act.

It is a system.

Moreover, systems do not collapse on their own—they must be dismantled.

The pre-election hate machinery that turned Maharashtra into a communal battleground:

Capital city became a laboratory for pre-election communal polarisation:

2024’s election rhetoric and weaponisation of hate across India:

References:

https://www.outlookindia.com/elections/hate-speech-surges-in-bihar-polls-the-return-of-communal-and-caste-divides-in-campaign-rhetoric

https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/tamil-nadu/cpim-slams-pm-modi-for-remarks-against-tamil-nadu-during-bihar-poll-campaign/article70224918.ece

https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/ahead-of-bihar-polls-union-minister-and-begusarai-mp-giriraj-singh-sparks-controversy-2805440-2025-10-19?utm_source=chatgpt.com

https://news.abplive.com/elections/pm-modi-speech-purnea-congress-rjd-yatra-infiltrators-bihar-election-2025-bihar-sir-1800488?utm_source=chatgpt.com

https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2025/Oct/22/political-islam-undermined-hindu-faith-largely-overlooked-in-history-cm-yogi

https://www.newslaundry.com/2025/09/24/indian-muslims-not-equal-abp-show-allows-hate-speech-slurs-as-ragi-vs-pathan

https://www.freepressjournal.in/mumbai/mumbai-hindu-groups-call-for-restricting-non-hindus-from-garba-venues-citing-love-jihad-concerns-during-navratri

https://cjp.org.in/mtra-elections-on-cjps-complaint-on-an-mcc-violation-fir-has-been-registered-against-kajal-hindustani-for-hate-speech

https://cjp.org.in/cjp-stands-against-hate-seeks-preventive-action-against-hate-driven-events-in-maharashtra

https://cjp.org.in/cjp-complaints-to-the-maharashtra-election-commission-over-communal-posters-featuring-up-cm-yogi-adityanath

https://cjp.org.in/cjp-highlights-mcc-violation-urges-maharashtra-election-commission-to-act-on-hate-speech

https://cjp.org.in/cjp-files-complaint-against-bjp-mns-and-ss-shinde-faction-silence-period-violations-in-maharashtra-elections

https://cjp.org.in/cjp-files-5-hate-speech-complaints-before-ceo-maharashtra-as-violated-mcc

https://sabrangindia.in/hindutva-enters-mumbai-college-campuses-gaushala-shobha-yatra-in-iit-b-restriction-to-freedom-of-speech-at-tiss

https://sabrangindia.in/chhattisgarh-maharashtra-sc-directs-police-to-ensure-no-hate-speech-by-bjp-mla-raja-singh-hindu-jan-jagruti-samiti-rallies

https://cjp.org.in/bjp-mla-t-raja-singh-at-mira-road-hurls-anti-muslim-slurs-incites-violence-at-rally-permitted-by-bombay-high-court

https://cjp.org.in/hindu-jan-akrosh-rally-in-mumbai-sees-conspiracy-theories-being-peddled-against-muslims

https://sabrangindia.in/is-mumbai-becoming-a-hotbed-of-hate

https://sabrangindia.in/bjp-mla-nitesh-rane-leads-hindutva-rally-in-govandi-demands-demolition-of-illegal-masjids-and-madrasa

https://sabrangindia.in/environmental-interest-converted-into-communal-tension-madras-high-court-refuses-to-quash-criminal-case-against-bjp-state-head-annamalai

https://cjp.org.in/hindu-jan-akrosh-rally-in-mumbai-sees-conspiracy-theories-being-peddled-against-muslims

https://sabrangindia.in/ground-report-protests-erupt-in-assam-after-portrayal-of-muslims-as-criminals-in-rally-by-bodoland-university

https://cjp.org.in/cjp-files-complaint-against-bjp-leader-nazia-elahi-khan-over-hate-speech-in-delhi/

https://sabrangindia.in/cjp-calls-for-electoral-action-against-bjp-leaders-hate-speech-at-rohini-chetna-event/

https://www.newslaundry.com/2025/01/21/denial-and-deflection-how-the-bjps-bidhuri-walked-off-when-asked-about-crude-remarks

https://www.indiatvnews.com/delhi/delhi-assembly-elections-2025-police-registers-over-1100-cases-of-mcc-violations-model-code-of-conduct-detained-35516-people-latest-updates-2025-02-07-975130

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Alarming scale of duplicate entries

According to Mid-Day, the SEC’s scrutiny shows that 4.33 lakh voters appear more than once in the rolls published last week. Multiple entries for the same individual range from two to an astonishing 103 repetitions, taking the total number of duplicate enrolments to 11,01,505.

The Commission attributes these anomalies to printing mistakes, migration, and failure to delete names of deceased voters. Booth-level staff have been instructed to conduct door-to-door verification, collect forms, and secure undertakings to ensure each citizen appears once and only once on the list.

A senior SEC official acknowledged, as per The New Indian Express, that the civic elections — mandated by the Supreme Court to be completed by January 31, 2026 — could face minor delays. Depending on the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation’s (BMC) progress on correcting the rolls, polls may be held by late January or pushed to early February.

Opposition-held wards show highest duplicate counts

Four of the five wards with the highest number of duplicate entries are from areas formerly represented by Opposition corporators, particularly from Shiv Sena (UBT) and the Nationalist Congress Party (SP). Two such wards fall within the Worli Assembly constituency, represented by Aaditya Thackeray.

The top five wards with duplicate voters are:

• Ward 199 (Worli) – 8,207 duplicates
• Ward 131 (Ghatkopar) – 7,741
• Ward 203 (Parel–Lalbaug) – 7,624
• Ward 205 (Kalachowki) – 7,585
• Ward 194 (Century Mill) – 7,584

As reported by TNIE, a senior BMC official emphasised that the “11 lakh figure” refers not to individuals but repeated entries, and that a citywide clean-up drive is ongoing. The rectification process, supervised by 25 Assistant Municipal Commissioners designated as nodal officers, will run from November 27 to December 5.

Aaditya Thackeray escalates charge of manipulation, flags “millions” of repeated entries

On November 24, Shiv Sena (UBT) leader Aaditya Thackeray met senior SEC officials to protest the integrity of the voter roll revision. He also submitted a formal letter to the Chief Electoral Officer.

According to the Mid-Day report, Thackeray told the media that citizens were “desperately waiting” to vote but were confronted with arbitrary delays and unexplained irregularities. The draft list — initially due on November 7 and then on November 14 — was eventually released only on November 20, which he termed a “deliberate strategy” by the government to influence upcoming local body elections.

He alleged that government-held wards witnessed minimal or no changes, while Opposition strongholds saw “disproportionate and suspicious restructuring.”

Thackeray also questioned why the list’s summary data did not match its detailed entries, and criticised the roll for not being machine-readable.

In a post on X, he described the draft as “absolutely disgraceful and unpardonable”, demanding immediate remedial action from the SEC.

Our exposé on the corrupt practices of the election commission and the vote fraud in millions has led the the election commission giving us a week more to further find the vote chori.

Our exercise is not to only speak about it or only expose it, we expect corrective action on…

— Aaditya Thackeray (@AUThackeray) November 26, 2025

Key discrepancies highlighted by Aaditya Thackeray

In a detailed public note on X, Thackeray alleged:

• Over a million duplicated entries, with some voters appearing up to seven times
• 26,319 households showing more than 10 registered voters each
• Hundreds of addresses listing over 1,000 voters
• These suspicious entries, totalling more than 8,32,000, amount to “fraud, not error”
• Nearly 7 lakh voters with no house numbers or usable addresses

He warned that such patterns hinted at systematic manipulation, insisting that “one person must have only one vote.”

His demands to the SEC included:

• Extending the suggestion-objection window from 7 to 21 days
• Allowing bulk objections by political parties
• Deploying full Commission manpower to identify possible fraud

This afternoon, we called on the State Election Commission pointing out the absolutely disgraceful and unpardonable chaos in the draft electoral roll for the BMC.

We have demanded:
1) 21 days for suggestion/ objections, instead of 7 days
2) The Election Commission accept our… pic.twitter.com/u1pycrGLCB

— Aaditya Thackeray (@AUThackeray) November 24, 2025

Growing anxiety over ‘elected unopposed’ trend in local elections

A parallel controversy has emerged over the sharp increase in candidates being declared elected unopposed, raising serious concerns about coercion and misuse of political influence.

One prominent example came from Angar municipal corporation, where:

• An NCP candidate’s nomination was abruptly declared invalid
• The daughter-in-law of a leader who recently switched from NCP to the BJP was declared elected unopposed

According to Times of India, BJP state president Ravindra Chavan then publicly announced that the party had already secured around 100 seats even before voting, triggering backlash from Opposition parties. They accused the BJP of pressuring rival candidates into withdrawing.

Supriya Sule flags “deeply worrying” pattern

As reported by TOI, NCP (SP) MP Supriya Sule has written to SEC Chief Dinesh Waghmare expressing grave concern about this trend. She said Maharashtra has a long tradition of robust local democracy, rooted in the legacy of Yashwantrao Chavan, which is being undermined.

Her letter states:

• Capable candidates are being discouraged from filing nominations
• This climate is undemocratic, weakens local self-government, and violates the spirit of decentralised democracy
• In areas with no alternative candidates, citizens are effectively denied choice
• The SEC must conduct serious investigations wherever allegations of pressure or intimidation arise

Congress also seeks extension, flags ward-wise discrepancies

Following similar moves by Uddhav Thackeray and Raj Thackeray, according to TOI, the Maharashtra Congress has written to the SEC demanding a 15-day extension for filing objections to the BMC draft rolls.

In their letter,

• State president Harshavardhan Sapkal,
• CLP leader Vijay Wadettiwar, and
• MLC group leader Satej Patil,

stated that in several municipal areas, draft rolls were not properly divided ward-wise, and many names were erroneously shifted to other localities.

Related:

The Deadly Deadline: “I Can’t Do This Anymore”—India’s electoral revision turns into a graveyard for BLOs/teachers

SIR exercise leaves trail of suicide across states as BLOs buckle under pressure and citizens panic over citizenship

Haunted by NRC fears, 57-year-old West Bengal man dies by suicide; Mamata blames BJP for turning democracy into a “theatre of fear”

Pregnant woman deported despite parents on 2002 SIR rolls, another homemaker commits suicide

The post Massive duplicate entries in Mumbai voter rolls trigger political uproar; opposition flags “fraudulent patterns” and pressures SEC for action appeared first on SabrangIndia.

A Bench of CJI Surya Kant and Justice Joymalya Bagchi made the observation while hearing the Union’s challenge to a Calcutta High Court order directing the repatriation of six persons who were pushed across the border in June 2025. Representing the petitioners, Senior Advocates Kapil Sibal and Sanjay Hegde argued that the Union had delayed compliance and initiated its challenge only when the families moved for contempt.

During the hearing, Hegde pointed out that the Union had allowed the High Court order to “lie in defect” for nearly a month. “These are Indian citizens who have been thrown across,” he submitted, according to a report of LiveLaw.

“What prevents you?” — CJI questions Union’s resistance

After examining the record, the CJI noted that substantial documentary material had emerged: birth certificates, land records, Aadhaar and PAN details of the deportees or their family members. These, he said, constituted “evidence of probability” that warranted a proper enquiry — something the authorities had “hardly” undertaken before deportation.

According to the LiveLaw report, the CJI observed: “If somebody has something to show you — that wait, I belong to India, I am born and brought up here — he has a right to plead before you. Earlier you hardly held any enquiry. The allegation is that the deportee was never heard.”

He then posed the central question to the Union: “So what prevents you? Why don’t you, at least as a temporary measure, bring them back, give them an opportunity of hearing, verify all these documents and take a holistic view?”

The Court directed the Union to obtain instructions by Monday, indicating that the government may consider facilitating their return while the enquiry is reopened.

Background of the case

The High Court order the Union has not complied with: This Supreme Court hearing stems from the Calcutta High Court’s September 26, 2025 judgment in Bhudu Sheikh v. Union of India, which quashed the deportation of six persons, including:

• Eight-month pregnant Sunali (Sonali) Khatun,
• Her husband Danish Sheikh,
• Their eight-year-old son Sabir,
• Sweety Bibi, and
• Her two minor sons.

The individuals had been picked up in Delhi during an “identity verification drive” and deported within 48 hours, allegedly without inquiry or notice to the West Bengal authorities. The petitioner — Sunali’s father, Bhudu Sheikh, a resident of Birbhum — maintained that all six were Indian citizens.

HC finds “hot haste,” disregard of MHA rules: The Division Bench of Justice Tapabrata Chakraborty and Justice Reetobroto Kumar Mitra held that:

• The deportation violated the MHA memo dated May 2, 2025, which requires a 30-day verification through the home State.
• Statements allegedly made by the detainees admitting they were Bangladeshis were inadmissible, since statements to police “without procedural safeguards” carry no presumption of voluntariness.
• Aadhaar and PAN records established that Sunali was born in 2000, making it impossible for her to have “entered India illegally in 1998,” as claimed.

Observing that “suspicion, however grave, cannot replace proof,” the Court declared the deportation unconstitutional and held that the executive’s conduct had “crippled the constitutional grant of fairness and reasonableness.”

HC ordered repatriation in 4 weeks: The High Court directed the Union, FRRO Delhi, and Delhi Police to repatriate the six individuals within four weeks, via the Indian High Commission in Dhaka. It refused to stay its own order, noting that:

“Liberty once lost must be swiftly restored.”

The four-week deadline expired on October 24, 2025, without compliance. Instead, the Centre filed a Special Leave Petition in the Supreme Court on October 22 — two days before the deadline.

Bangladesh Court also found them to be Indian citizens: In a development with diplomatic implications, the Senior Judicial Magistrate, Sadar Court, Chapainawabganj (Bangladesh) on September 30, 2025, also held that all six deportees were Indian citizens.

The Magistrate cited:

• Their Aadhaar details,
• Proof of residence in Birbhum,
• And the absence of evidence that they were Bangladeshi nationals.

The Court concluded that they had been “wrongfully pushed across the border,” directing that its order be transmitted to the Indian High Commission in Dhaka for appropriate action.

This created an extraordinary situation: both Indian and Bangladeshi courts had recognised the deportees’ Indian citizenship, while the Union government declined to bring them back.

Union’s defence of jurisdiction, suppression, and “confessional” statements: Before the Supreme Court, the Union contended that:

• The Calcutta High Court lacked jurisdiction as similar matters were pending before the Delhi High Court.
• The petitioner had allegedly suppressed this fact.
• The detainees had confessed to being Bangladeshi nationals during interrogation.

However, the High Court had already rejected these assertions, holding that:

• Jurisdiction for a habeas petition lies where the petitioner resides or where the effect of the detention is felt.
• Statements to police cannot form the basis of deportation under Articles 14, 20(3), and 21.

Detailed report on this may be read here.

Related:

Calcutta High Court strikes down arbitrary deportations of West Bengal residents, orders return from Bangladesh

Gauhati High Court seeks Centre’s May 2025 deportation notification as legality of re-detention of Abdul Shiekh and Majibur Rehman is scrutinised

Another Pushback Halted: SC stays deportation of woman declared foreigner, issues notice on challenge to Gauhati HC order

CJP Win! Gauhati HC stays deportation of Ajabha Khatun, will address bail demand on April 4

Assam’s New SOP Hands Citizenship Decisions to Bureaucrats: Executive overreach or legal necessity?

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