At the heart of the ruling lies an unsettling reality: the State, through its own agencies, presented two mutually destructive accounts of the same crime. One narrative, constructed by the Maharashtra Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) and later endorsed by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), attributed the blasts to one set of accused. The second, advanced years later by the NIA, not only displaced that version but implicated an entirely different group. Faced with these “diagonally opposite” stories, the Court concluded that the prosecution had effectively reached a point where it “leads nowhere”—a finding that goes to the very legitimacy of continuing criminal proceedings.

“The diagonally opposite stories in the charge-sheet filed by the ATS and the NIA lead nowhere. The witnesses proposed by the NIA are mostly hearsay witnesses. The materials collected by the NIA regarding purchase of bicycles etc. even if found truthful and admissible, cannot be considered as incriminating material against the appellants. A further investigation does not start with recording the statement of the accused person in a case. The further investigation is carried for the purposes of recording the evidence of a few more witnesses and for collection of additional materials to add other offences or another accused person. This is a mystery why the NIA did not collect fresh materials and started recording the retracted statement of the accused persons A1 to A3 and A5 to A8. The retracted statements of a few witnesses on which the NIA seeks to lay a case against the appellants can also not be admissible evidence. A witness who gives two versions of a story and retracts his previous statement becomes an unreliable witness and his testimony is liable to be discarded.” (Para 20)

“For the foregoing reasons, we hold that there is no sufficient material on record to proceed against the appellants.” (Para 21)

 The Appellate Framework: A duty to scrutinise, not endorse

Exercising its jurisdiction under Section 21 of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008, the High Court undertook a substantive review of the order framing charges passed by the Special NIA Court. The judgment underscores that appellate scrutiny under this provision is not a limited or deferential exercise; rather, it requires a rigorous re-evaluation of both facts and law, particularly where the liberty of the accused is at stake.

The Court carefully located its inquiry within the framework of Section 227 of the CrPC, emphasising that the threshold for proceeding to trial is not a mere formality. The judge is required to sift the material on record and determine whether there exists sufficient ground to proceed. In doing so, the Court reaffirmed that a criminal court cannot act as a passive conduit for the prosecution’s claims. It must actively interrogate the evidentiary foundation before allowing the machinery of trial to be set in motion. This insistence on judicial application of mind becomes especially critical in cases involving serious offences carrying grave penal consequences.

“Unlike other statutory provisions, section 21 makes a statutory requirement to be followed by the High Court in an appeal under section 21 that the appeal so laid by the aggrieved party must be examined on facts collected by the NIA having regard to the applicable law on the subject. In the matters of discharge from the criminal liability, the High Court shall be entitled to scrutinize and assess the materials collected by the NIA to find out whether there is sufficient material to proceed against the accused person. In doing so, the High Court shall keep in mind the principles governing a discharge application under section 227 Cr.P.C. which provides that if the Judge forms an opinion upon consideration of the record of the case including the documents and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing. The expression “not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused” enjoins upon the Judge to apply his mind and not to act as mere Post Office before framing the charge against the accused person at the behest of the prosecution.” (Para 4)

The Evolution of the Case: From ATS narrative to NIA reconstruction

The judgment meticulously traces the evolution of the prosecution across three investigative regimes. The initial investigation conducted by the ATS, subsequently affirmed by the CBI, constructed a detailed narrative implicating members of the Students Islamic Movement of India. This version was not merely speculative; it was supported by confessional statements recorded under special statutes, forensic evidence indicating the presence of RDX, intercepted communications, and corroborative witness testimony. The prosecution case, at that stage, possessed a certain internal coherence, even if its ultimate veracity was later questioned.

The turning point came when the NIA assumed control of the investigation in 2011. Rather than supplementing the existing record with additional evidence, the NIA fundamentally reoriented the case. Relying heavily on a confessional statement attributed to Swami Aseemanand, as well as retracted statements of earlier accused and witnesses, the agency advanced a completely new theory of the crime. This new narrative alleged that the blasts were the result of a conspiracy involving a different set of individuals, including the present appellants, who were said to have undergone training and participated in the planning and execution of the attack.

“This is an admitted case that no person has come forward to make a statement before the NIA that he has seen any one of the appellants engaged in the bomb blasts. The case of the NIA solely rests on circumstantial evidence which is primarily in the nature of confessional statements by the appellants and Assemanand and the retracted statements of the witnesses and the first set of accused persons sent up for trial by the ATS and CBI. This is also a matter of record that on receiving the information about disclosure statement made by Assemanand the Central Government passed the orders dated 22nd March 2011 and 4th April 2011 directing the NIA to take over Crime No.07 of 2026. There seems to be considerable force in the argument that the NIA conducted a fresh and de-novo investigation inasmuch as it has relied on the retracted confessional statements of the accused persons who were sent-up for trial by the ATS and CBI.” (Para 15)

What troubled the Court was not merely the existence of an alternative theory, but the manner in which it was constructed. The NIA’s case was not built on fresh, independent evidence; instead, it drew heavily from the retraction of earlier statements and the reinterpretation of existing material. In doing so, it effectively displaced the earlier investigation without legally displacing its evidentiary record.

Contradictions at the Core: A prosecution that cannot stand together

The Court’s most forceful reasoning emerges in its analysis of the contradictions between the two investigative narratives. These were not minor discrepancies or peripheral inconsistencies; they went to the root of the prosecution’s case. The ATS and CBI had identified specific individuals as perpetrators, supported by forensic and testimonial evidence. The NIA, however, not only excluded those individuals but placed them at entirely different locations at the time of the crime. In one striking instance, an accused identified by the ATS as a key participant was described by the NIA as being nearly 400 kilometres away from the blast site.

Similarly, the question of procurement of bicycles used in the blasts was attributed to one set of accused by the earlier investigation, while the NIA assigned the same role to the appellants. These are not differences that can be reconciled through evidentiary evaluation at trial; they represent fundamentally incompatible versions of reality. The Court was categorical in observing that such “diagonally opposite stories” cannot coexist within a single prosecution, nor can they form the basis of a legally sustainable trial.

This finding has profound implications. It suggests that where the State itself advances mutually exclusive narratives, the burden cannot be shifted onto the accused to face trial and resolve those contradictions. The law does not permit a prosecution to proceed in the hope that clarity might emerge through the process of trial.

“The NIA has projected an entirely different story and states that the investigation of the case is still continuing and further evidence is being collected against the accused persons and requested the Special Court to permit it to continue further investigation of the case as per the provisions of section 173(8) Cr.P.C. The NIA completely ignored the charge-sheet laid by the ATS which gives a vivid narration of the entire planning by A1 to A13. The ATS collected incriminating materials from the place of incident and those materials were sent for forensic examination. This is the report of the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) that there were traces of RDX in the soil samples collected from the place of occurrence and the godown of A2 Shabbir Ahmed Masiullah and both the samples were found to be the same. There is another FSL report which confirmed the presence of RDX and Ammonium Nitrate, charcoal, fuel oil etc. in the samples.” (Para 18)

“The Special Judge overlooked the inherent contradiction and intrinsic improbability in the prosecution story as put forth by the NIA. There is no explanation coming forth as to how the voice samples and FSL reports collected by the ATS and CBI can be ignored by the trial Court. The things as stand today give two contradictory versions of the incident and both stories as floated by the ATS and NIA cannot be reconciled by any stretch of imagination. The evidence collected by the ATS in course of the investigation is not wiped out from the record and have to be considered by the trial Court even if the appellants are required to face the trial. There seems to be no answer in law as to how the trial Judge can deal with the materials collected by the ATS which implicates another set of accused persons. The case seems to have reached a dead end.” (Para 19)

The Evidentiary Collapse: Confessions, retractions, and hearsay

A central pillar of the NIA’s case was the reliance on confessional and disclosure statements. The Court subjected this material to close scrutiny under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, reaffirming the long-settled principle that confessions made to police officers are inadmissible, and that statements made in custody are barred unless recorded in the presence of a Magistrate. The limited exception under Section 27, which permits the use of information leading to discovery, was also found inapplicable in the present case. The alleged recoveries were made years after the incident and from locations accessible to the public, thereby severing the necessary nexus between the statement and the discovery.

The Court was equally critical of the reliance on retracted statements. It emphasised that a witness who offers inconsistent versions of events, and subsequently retracts earlier statements, cannot be considered reliable. The evidentiary value of such testimony is not merely diminished; it is fundamentally compromised. In the present case, the NIA’s narrative was constructed substantially on the basis of such retractions, rendering the entire evidentiary edifice unstable.

The same reasoning extended to the use of Test Identification Parade (TIP) evidence. The Court reiterated that TIP is not substantive evidence but only a tool of investigation. When conducted after an inordinate delay—as in this case, where it occurred several years after the incident—it loses whatever limited probative value it might otherwise have had. The Court also noted the absence of any prior description of the accused by witnesses, further weakening the reliability of identification.

In sum, the Court found that the NIA’s case rested on a combination of inadmissible confessions, unreliable retractions, delayed identification, and hearsay evidence. Such a combination, it held, cannot sustain even the threshold requirement for framing charges.

The Limits of “Further Investigation”: A veiled reinvestigation

One of the most significant doctrinal contributions of the judgment lies in its treatment of “further investigation” under Section 173(8) CrPC. The Court drew a clear distinction between permissible further investigation and impermissible reinvestigation. While the former allows an agency to collect additional evidence in support of an existing case, the latter involves a wholesale replacement of the earlier narrative—a course that is not sanctioned by law.

The NIA’s approach, in the Court’s view, amounted to precisely such a reinvestigation. By constructing an entirely new theory based on retracted statements and by ignoring the evidentiary material collected by the ATS and CBI, the agency effectively attempted to rewrite the case. The Court found this approach to be legally untenable, particularly in the absence of fresh, credible material that could justify such a departure.

Judicial Failure at the Trial Stage: Framing charges without scrutiny

The High Court also delivered a pointed critique of the Special NIA Court’s order framing charges. It held that the trial court had failed to apply its judicial mind to the material on record and had relied on evidence that was either inadmissible or inherently unreliable. The Court emphasised that the stage of framing charges is not a mechanical exercise; it requires a careful evaluation of whether the material discloses a prima facie case involving grave suspicion.

In the present case, the trial court overlooked the fundamental contradictions between the two investigative narratives and failed to address the legal infirmities in the evidence relied upon by the NIA. This, the High Court held, constituted a serious error warranting appellate intervention.

Reaffirming the Standard for Discharge: Suspicion is not enough

Drawing upon established jurisprudence, the Court reiterated that while a detailed appreciation of evidence is not required at the stage of framing charges, the material must nevertheless disclose more than mere suspicion. The distinction between “suspicion” and “grave suspicion” is not semantic; it is doctrinally significant. Where the material on record gives rise only to conjecture or weak inference, the accused cannot be compelled to undergo the rigours of a criminal trial.

Applying this standard, the Court found that the evidence against the appellants did not meet even the minimal threshold required to proceed. The absence of direct evidence, coupled with the unreliability of circumstantial material, rendered the prosecution’s case untenable.

Conclusion: A case that reaches a legal dead end

The judgment ultimately concludes that there is no sufficient material to proceed against the appellants, and accordingly sets aside the order framing charges. In doing so, it characterises the case as having reached a “dead end”—a rare but telling acknowledgment of investigative failure.

This ruling is significant not only for its immediate outcome but for the principles it reinforces. It underscores that criminal prosecution must be grounded in coherent, admissible, and credible evidence. It affirms that investigative agencies cannot construct shifting narratives without legal consequence. And most importantly, it reiterates that the criminal process cannot be used as a substitute for proof.

In dismantling the NIA’s case, the Bombay High Court has sent a clear message: when the State’s own versions of a crime are irreconcilable, the law cannot sustain a prosecution built on such contradictions.

The complete judgment may be read here:

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Still Waiting in Grief: How the 2006 Mumbai train blast victims were denied closure and justice

A Spectacle of Injustice Undone: After 19 years, Bombay HC’s acquittal in the 7/11 Mumbai train blasts case recognises the (mis) use of ‘torture for confession’

Attempts to give communal turn to blasts in Kerala unsuccessful, 3 cases filed by Kerala Police, CM Vijayan urges restraint & unity

2008 Jaipur blasts: Rajasthan HC acquits all four who were given death penalty

From Cow Slaughter to “Public Order”: Allahabad High Court’s expanding use of preventive detention

The post Malegaon 2006 Blast Case: Bombay High Court rejects NIA’s ‘alternate narrative’, holds prosecution built on contradictions and inadmissible evidence appeared first on SabrangIndia.

1. Lai Mohammed rejects the claim of a Christian genocide in Nigeria, noting that Boko Haram has killed more Muslims than Christians.
2. The violence in Nigeria stems from a mix of extremism, criminality, governance failures, and socio-economic issues, not simply Muslim–Christian tensions.
3. The group began by attacking Muslims who opposed its extremist ideology, showing its takfiri
4. Its actions such as killings, kidnappings, and opposition to education go against core Islamic principles, making it an adversary rather than a representative of Islam.
5. The “genocide” narrative oversimplifies reality and can mislead international responses, highlighting the need for a more accurate and nuanced understanding.

In an era shaped by rapid information flows and polarised narratives, conflicts are often reduced to simplistic binaries; frequently framed along religious lines. Recent remarks by Lai Mohammed, former Minister of Information and Culture of Nigeria, offer a timely intervention in correcting one such narrative: the claim of a targeted “Christian genocide” in Nigeria. Speaking at Abbey College Cambridge, Lai Mohammed argued that insurgent violence, particularly by Boko Haram, has claimed more Muslim lives than Christian ones, challenging widespread assumptions about the nature of the conflict.

This assertion does not seek to minimise the suffering of any community. Rather, it compels a more comprehensive understanding of Nigeria’s security crisis: one rooted not in religious extermination, but in a complex web of extremism, criminality, governance challenges, and socio-economic distress.

The Misleading Simplicity of Religious Framing

The tendency to interpret violence in Nigeria as a straightforward Muslim-versus-Christian conflict has gained traction in global discourse, particularly in parts of the Western media and advocacy circles. Yet, as Lai Mohammed pointed out, such a framing risks distorting reality. Boko Haram, whose name loosely translates to “Western education is forbidden,” did not begin as an anti-Christian movement. Its early targets were, in fact, Muslims, particularly those who embraced modern education and rejected extremist interpretations of Islam.

This internal targeting reveals a critical truth: Boko Haram’s ideology is fundamentally takfiri, meaning it declares other Muslims as apostates and legitimate targets. In its formative years, the group’s violence was directed overwhelmingly inward, against Muslim communities that did not conform to its rigid worldview.

Over time, the group widened its scope of attacks to include Christians, driven less by theological motives and more by strategic intent. As Lai Mohammed frankly noted, assaults on Christians tend to draw greater international attention. In a media-driven age, the spectacle of interfaith violence heightens visibility, attracts funding, and enhances the notoriety of extremist organisations.

Terrorism Without Theology

To understand Boko Haram solely through a religious lens is to misunderstand its nature. As highlighted in earlier scholarly critiques, the group’s actions—from mass killings to the abduction of schoolgirls in Chibok—stand in stark contradiction to Islamic teachings. Renowned Islamic scholars and institutions worldwide have unequivocally condemned such acts as un-Islamic.

Islam’s foundational principles emphasise the sanctity of life, the pursuit of knowledge, and the dignity of women. These are the values that Boko Haram systematically violates. Its campaign against education, especially for girls, directly opposes the very first Qur’anic revelation: “Read.” Similarly, practices such as forced marriages and abductions have no legitimacy within Islamic jurisprudence.

Thus, Boko Haram is not merely a violent group operating under religious pretexts; it is, in many ways, an adversary of the very religion it claims to represent. It exploits religious language while undermining its ethical core.

Banditry and the Politics of Crime

Lai Mohammed’s remarks also addressed another critical misconception: the religious interpretation of banditry in northern Nigeria. He argued that these acts are primarily criminal, not ideological. The perpetrators and victims often share the same ethnic and religious backgrounds, predominantly Hausa-Fulani Muslims.

This observation underscores a broader point: much of Nigeria’s violence is driven by economic desperation, weak state capacity, and organised crime rather than doctrinal conflict. Cattle rustling, kidnapping for ransom, and territorial disputes are manifestations of governance gaps, not religious wars.

Reducing these issues to religious persecution not only obscures their root causes but also risks inflaming tensions that are otherwise manageable within Nigeria’s historically pluralistic society.

A Tradition of Coexistence

Despite its challenges, Nigeria has long been a model of interfaith coexistence. Lai Mohammed pointed to the example of President Bola Ahmed Tinubu and his wife, representing a Muslim-Christian household, as emblematic of the country’s social fabric. Across Nigeria, interfaith marriages, shared communities, and everyday interactions reflect a lived reality far removed from the narrative of existential religious conflict.

As Lai Mohammed aptly noted, ordinary Nigerians are more likely to disagree over economic issues than theological ones. This insight is crucial. It suggests that the primary concerns of citizens, jobs, security, and stability, transcend religious identity.

The Danger of “Fake News” in Conflict Zones

Labelling the “Christian genocide” narrative as “fake news,” Lai Mohammed raises an uncomfortable but necessary question: how do misinformation and selective reporting shape international perceptions?

In conflict zones, narratives can be weaponised. Advocacy groups, political actors, and even well-meaning observers may inadvertently amplify incomplete or skewed accounts. While highlighting human rights abuses is essential, doing so without context can lead to policy missteps and deepen divisions on the ground.

A more responsible approach requires distinguishing between targeted persecution and indiscriminate violence. In Nigeria’s case, the latter is far more representative of reality.

None of this is to deny the severity of Nigeria’s security crisis. Boko Haram remains a brutal insurgency responsible for thousands of deaths and widespread displacement. Its atrocities against Muslims and Christians alike demand urgent and sustained action.

However, effective responses must be grounded in accurate diagnosis. Mischaracterising the conflict as a religious genocide risks diverting attention from the structural issues that sustain violence: poverty, corruption, weak institutions, and lack of education.

The international community, therefore, has a responsibility to engage with Nigeria based on evidence rather than assumption. This includes supporting counter-terrorism efforts, strengthening governance, and investing in education and economic development, especially in the country’s most vulnerable regions.

The tragedy of Boko Haram is not that it represents Islam, but that it distorts it. The greater tragedy would be if the world, in its haste to categorise, fails to see this distinction. Lai Mohammed’s remarks serve as a reminder that truth in complex conflicts is rarely convenient. Nigeria’s crisis is not a story of one religion targeting another; it is a story of extremism preying on vulnerability, of criminals exploiting chaos, and of a nation striving, despite immense challenges, to preserve its pluralistic identity. Recognising this complexity is not an exercise in denial. It is the first step toward meaningful solutions.

A regular Columnist with NewAgeIslam.com, Ghulam Ghaus Siddiqi Dehlvi is a Classical Islamic scholar with a Sufi background and English-Arabic-Urdu Translator.

Courtesy: newageislam.com

The post Beyond the Narrative of “Genocide”: Understanding Boko Haram, Religion, and Reality in Nigeria appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Complaint and allegations

The application, filed under Section 175(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), was moved by Manisha Pande on behalf of six complainants, all media professionals associated with the digital platform Newslaundry. The complainants alleged that Mitra had, through a series of posts on his X handle, repeatedly used sexually derogatory language to describe them, including referring to them as “prostitutes” and characterising their workplace in deeply offensive and demeaning terms.

The complaint specifically relied on multiple tweets, including one dated April 28, 2025, containing explicit and abusive language directed at the organisation and its women employees. Another tweet dated February 8, 2025, targeted Pande individually with sexually explicit and degrading remarks. Screenshots of these posts were placed on record before the Court.

Court’s Findings: “Sexually coloured remarks” and prima facie offence

Judicial Magistrate First Class Bhanu Pratap Singh, after examining the material on record, found that the content of the tweets clearly fell within the category of “sexually coloured remarks.” The Court noted that the language used was not merely offensive but carried a clear intent to demean and insult the dignity of the complainants, particularly as one of the tweets explicitly named Manisha Pande.

On this basis, the Court held that the allegations, supported by documentary material, prima facie disclose the commission of cognizable offences under:

• Section 75(3) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), which penalises sexually coloured remarks, and
• Section 79 of the BNS, which deals with acts, intended to insult the modesty of a woman.

The Court’s reasoning underscores a recognition that online speech, when sexually abusive and targeted, can attract serious penal consequences under criminal law.

Necessity of police investigation in cyber context

The court order emphasised on the need for a police investigation, particularly given the digital nature of the alleged offences. Observing that the acts were committed in cyberspace, the Court held that investigative intervention was necessary to:

• Verify the authenticity and ownership of the X account from which the tweets originated, and
• Trace and recover the electronic devices used to publish the content.

Court criticises inadequate police response

The Court also expressed dissatisfaction with the Action Taken Report (ATR) filed by the police. It noted that the report failed to consider the specific tweets relied upon by the complainants, thereby rendering the response incomplete and inadequate.

In light of its findings, the Court directed the Station House Officer of Malviya Nagar Police Station to:

• Register an FIR against Abhijit Iyer Mitra under Sections 75(3) and 79 of the BNS, and
• File a compliance report by May 4, 2026.

The application under Section 175(3) BNSS was accordingly disposed of.

Parallel defamation proceedings before Delhi High Court

The criminal proceedings arise alongside a pending civil defamation suit before the Delhi High Court, where the complainants have sought a public apology and damages amounting to ₹2 crore. In those proceedings, the journalists have contended that Mitra’s posts were not only defamatory but also deliberately malicious and intended to harm their professional reputation and dignity.

The High Court had earlier taken note of the objectionable content and reportedly admonished Mitra, following which the posts in question were taken down. An application seeking rejection of the defamation suit remains pending adjudication.

The order may be read here:

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The post Delhi court orders FIR against Abhijit Iyer Mitra for sexually abusive posts targeting women journalists appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Though often overlooked in official narratives, Shariati remains one of the most influential intellectual figures behind the Iranian Revolution. His ideas, which linked Shi’ism with modern revolutionary theories drawn from thinkers such as Frantz Fanon and Jean‑Paul Sartre, helped shape the ideological climate that culminated in 1979.

Revisiting his legacy is essential not only for understanding Iran’s modern history but also for examining the broader intersections of religion, social justice, and political transformation in the Muslim world.

Born in 1933 in Mazinan, Shariati grew up in a religious household during a turbulent era. The 1953 overthrow of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh and the Shah’s subsequent modernization drive—perceived by many as an attempt to erase cultural and religious roots in favor of Western approval—formed the backdrop of his intellectual evolution. Shariati’s activism led to imprisonment, and later, study in Paris, where exposure to existentialist and anti‑colonial thought profoundly shaped his worldview. He rejected Marxist materialism but embraced its critique of inequality, reinterpreting Islamic history to highlight figures such as Abu Dharr al‑Ghifari as symbols of resistance and social equality.

From this synthesis emerged Shariati’s concept of “Red Shiism,” a dynamic, activist Islam rooted in sacrifice, justice, and resistance, inspired by the legacy of Karbala. His slogan “Return to the Self” urged Muslim societies to break from blind imitation of the West and rediscover their intellectual heritage. His lectures and writings reframed Islam not as a passive spiritual refuge but as a force for liberation, capable of mobilizing the masses against tyranny. By the late 1970s, his ideas circulated widely among students and activists, laying the intellectual foundations of revolution.

Shariati’s critique extended beyond Marxism to liberalism and existentialism, which he faulted for neglecting the spiritual dimension of humanity. In works such as Marxism and Other Western Fallacies: An Islamic Critique, he argued that Islam offered its own emancipatory paradigm, distinct from Western secular traditions. He did not seek to make Islam socialist but rather employed Marxist sociological tools to galvanize Muslims into revolutionary action. His criticism of Iran’s Marxist Tudeh Party underscored his insistence on adapting political thought to Iran’s cultural and religious context.

Although Shariati died in 1977, two years before the revolution, his intellectual imprint was unmistakable. Pakistani writer Mukhtar Masood recorded that Iranians across social strata identified Shariati as the architect of the movement. Yet, as the revolutionary state consolidated power, charismatic leadership overshadowed intellectual activism, and Shariati’s role receded into obscurity. His story illustrates how revolutions often celebrate political victories while neglecting the thinkers who shaped their ideological foundations.

Shariati’s legacy endures as a reminder that religion, when reinterpreted through the lens of justice and resistance, can become a powerful agent of social transformation. His vision of Islam as a force for liberation continues to resonate in debates over faith, identity, and political change across the Muslim world.

Author is freelance journalist.

Courtesy: CounterView

The post Faith recast as social justice? Revisiting Shariati’s vision of Islam as liberation appeared first on SabrangIndia.

People were astonished when Radhika from Chandan Panchayat (then part of Raipur district) was elected sarpanch. Coming from a family of former bonded laborers recently freed by Supreme Court orders, she disrupted entrenched social hierarchies. With support from an organization of released bonded workers, Radhikabai implemented development works such as deepening tanks and constructing a school building. Villagers, especially from weaker sections, testified to her contributions. She also advanced claims for land distribution recommended by the Supreme Court. Yet, she considered her greatest achievement the closure of a liquor shop, which reduced alcohol consumption and village quarrels.

In Meethiberi Panchayat (Dehradun district), Radhadevi overcame resistance from influential villagers who attempted to buy votes with liquor and money. She won her first election when the seat was reserved for women, and later secured victory even without reservation. During her two terms as pradhan, she accelerated development works, fought successfully to restore a diverted road, and ensured benefits reached needy families. Villagers praised her compassion, with child widow Ramrati Yadav noting, “She is the only person in the village who visits me regularly.” The village demonstrated confidence in women’s leadership by electing women to six of seven panchayat posts, resulting in improved development and social harmony.

In the Patha region of Chitrakut district, Uttar Pradesh, Sonia Kol’s tenure as pradhan of Nihi village was transformative. Belonging to the marginalized Kol tribal community, she ensured benefits of housing schemes, pensions, food security cards, and scholarships reached the poorest families. She enforced land rights for landless households despite opposition from powerful villagers. Her leadership inspired women in neighboring villages to field strong candidates in subsequent elections.

In Sultanpur Chilkana (Saharanpur district), Suraiya Begum and Rajjo formed a remarkable team. Suraiya, from a traditional Muslim family, and Rajjo, a Dalit from a cobbler’s household, worked together with social activists to revitalize their indebted nagar panchayat. Their efforts won recognition as a model nagar panchayat.

These examples highlight the transformative potential of women’s reservation in panchayati raj institutions since 1993, which enabled the election of nearly one million women at village, block, and district levels. While leaders like Radhikabai, Radhadevi, Sonia Kol, Suraiya Begum, and Rajjo demonstrated exceptional capability, many women pradhans remain sidelined by “pati pradhan” practices, where husbands or male relatives dominate decision-making. Sonia Kol observed, “At block meetings, I often see men attending in place of elected women. With some support, these women could play an effective role, but family pressures hold them back.”

To strengthen women’s participation, stricter enforcement of rules ensuring their active involvement is essential. Training programs can equip newly elected women with knowledge of rights and responsibilities. Voluntary organizations and grassroots movements have also played a crucial role, as seen in Radhikabai’s collaboration with bonded laborers’ groups and Sonia’s association with the newspaper Khabar Lahariya.

Women leaders often prioritize issues overlooked by men, such as closing liquor shops, resolving conflicts amicably, supporting distressed families, and addressing sanitation needs. Their focus on nutrition, health, drinking water, and environmental protection underscores the broader social impact of women’s leadership in panchayats. Moreover, their visibility encourages ordinary village women to mobilize before elections, ensuring strong candidates emerge from within their communities.

These stories illustrate how women’s participation in rural governance not only advances development but also reshapes priorities, strengthens social harmony, and empowers marginalized voices.

The writer is Honorary Convener, Campaign to Save Earth Now. His recent books include Protecting Earth for Children, Planet in Peril, Man over Machine, and When the Two Streams Met

Courtesy: CounterView

The post Beyond 33%: The inspiring rise of women in rural decentralization appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Both cases involve allegations of cow slaughter. Both result in the upholding of detention orders. But more importantly, both judgments articulate—and reinforce—a particular understanding of “public order”: one that is driven less by the intrinsic nature of the offence and more by its social meaning, communal context, and anticipated consequences. What makes these rulings especially significant is not merely their outcome, but the density of their reasoning. The Court draws extensively from on-ground facts, behavioural responses, intelligence inputs, and administrative measures, while also invoking broader assumptions about communal sensitivity, to construct a layered and multi-dimensional justification for preventive detention.

At first glance, both cases appear fact-specific: allegations of cow slaughter, local unrest, and administrative response. But a closer reading reveals something far more significant. Across both rulings, the Court systematically reorients the constitutional inquiry:

• From the nature of the offence → to its social meaning
• From proven disruption → to anticipated reaction
• From individual culpability → to collective sensitivity

Read together, these decisions reflect a clear doctrinal movement in which public order is no longer anchored solely in demonstrable disruption, but is increasingly shaped by perception, anticipation, and context.

The Shamli Case (Sameer v. State of U.P.): Public order rooted in predictable reaction

The incident and immediate aftermath: The case originates in March 2025, when police discovered dismembered remains of cows and calves in a field in Shamli district around the time of Holi. The person accused of the slaughter was detained under the National Security Act (NSA), 1980. What might ordinarily have been treated as a criminal offence under the Uttar Pradesh Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act quickly escalated into a larger law-and-order situation.

The Court records a chain of events:

• Large crowds, including members of Hindu organisations, gathered at the site
• Sloganeering and protests followed
• A major road blockade led to prolonged traffic disruption
• Police forces from multiple stations were deployed
• Authorities had to camp in several villages to restore normalcy

These consequences—particularly the collective mobilisation and disruption of everyday life—became central to the Court’s reasoning. The incident, in the Court’s view, was not contained; it radiated outward, affecting the “even tempo of life” across a wider locality.

Law and Order vs Public Order: Before the Court, the petitioner argued that the alleged offence was, at best, a violation of law and order, given that it was triable by a magistrate under ordinary criminal law. The Court, however, firmly rejected this characterisation. It held that the distinction between law and order and public order does not depend on the statutory classification of the offence, but on the extent and nature of its impact on society.

Relying on established precedents such as Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar and Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, the Court reiterated that the relevant test is whether the act disturbs the “even tempo of life” of the community. The Court reiterates that not every crime disturbs public order; only those that disrupt the life of the community at large qualify. However, in applying this test, the bench adopts a context-heavy and consequence-driven approach.

It holds that even if an act is, in itself, a standard criminal offence, its “potentiality” and “impact”—particularly in a communally sensitive context—can elevate it into a public order issue. Thus, the focus shifts from the intrinsic nature of the act to its social reverberations.

Applying this test, it concluded that the widespread disruption, mobilisation, and administrative intervention in this case clearly elevated the incident beyond a mere law-and-order issue into the realm of public order.

Cow slaughter as an inherently volatile act: The most striking aspect of the judgment lies in its categorical treatment of cow slaughter. The Court asserts that:

• Cow slaughter “spontaneously evokes strong emotions”
• It has “immediate and widespread ramifications”
• It “almost always” leads to violence

This is not framed as a case-specific finding but as a generalised social truth. By doing so, the Court effectively pre-classifies certain acts as inherently capable of disturbing public order, irrespective of the specific factual matrix.

This reasoning has two major implications:

1. It reduces the burden on the State to demonstrate actual or imminent disorder
2. It allows anticipated communal outrage to become a legally valid ground for detention

In effect, the judgment shifts the inquiry from what the accused did to how society is expected to react—a move that sits uneasily with constitutional protections of liberty.

Reaction as justification: A central tension emerges here: should unlawful or violent public reaction determine the limits of individual freedom?

The Court’s reasoning suggests that it can. By treating predictable outrage as a given, the judgment risks normalising what is often described as the “heckler’s veto”—where the threat of public disorder becomes a basis to restrict rights.

This creates a troubling inversion:

• Instead of the State being obligated to control unlawful reactions
• The individual becomes the site of pre-emptive restraint

Such an approach may inadvertently incentivise coercive or violent mobilisation, as the mere possibility of disruption strengthens the case for preventive detention.

Preventive detention of a person already in custody: The Court also addresses whether a person already in jail can be preventively detained, relying on Kamarunnissa v. Union of India. The established test requires:

• Awareness that the person is in custody
• A real possibility of release on bail
• Likelihood of engaging in prejudicial activities upon release

In this case, the Court accepts:

• Police “beat information” alleging the accused intended to reoffend
• Intelligence inputs suggesting he was seeking bail and would repeat cow slaughter

Crucially, the Court treats these inputs as “reliable material”, without demanding rigorous evidentiary scrutiny. This reflects a broader judicial pattern in preventive detention cases—deference to executive satisfaction, even when based on informal or untested intelligence.

The blurring of preventive and punitive logics: Another significant concern is the gradual erosion of the distinction between preventive detention and criminal prosecution.

The petitioner argued that:

• The offence was triable by a magistrate
• It fell within ordinary criminal law
• NSA invocation was disproportionate

The Court rejected this, holding that the public order dimension justified bypassing the ordinary criminal process.

This reasoning risks transforming preventive detention into a parallel, anticipatory criminal system—one that operates not on proof of guilt, but on projected consequences and perceived risks.

Procedural Safeguards and Judicial Deference: On procedural grounds, the petitioner challenged delays in the disposal of his representation. The Court dismissed this argument, accepting the State’s timeline as adequately explained.

Notably, there is minimal substantive scrutiny of:

• The quality of evidence underlying the detention
• The proportionality of invoking NSA
• The necessity of detention vis-à-vis ordinary law

This underscores a recurring feature of preventive detention jurisprudence: courts often prioritise procedural compliance over substantive rights review. Based on these reasonings, the bench dismissed the habeas corpus petition filed by the petitioner-Sameer challenging his detention, which was ordered by the District Magistrate of Shamli under Section 3(3) of the NSA and subsequently confirmed by the State Government.

The judgement may be read here:

The Jalaun Case (Hasnen vs Union of India and ors): Fear, timing, and administrative evidence

The incident and evidentiary detail: The second case arises from an incident on March 31, 2025, in Kalpi town, where an FIR was registered under the Uttar Pradesh Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act, the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, and the Arms Act. The prosecution alleged:

• Recovery of approximately 3 quintals of beef
• Discovery of cattle, bones, skin, and weapons
• Involvement of multiple accused, including the three petitioners

This led to the detention of the three persons under the National Security Act (NSA), 1980, who were accused of illegally slaughtering cattle. The petitioners were already in custody, and in two cases, had even secured bail. Yet, the District Magistrate invoked Section 3(2) of the NSA, citing apprehensions of future harm and communal disturbance.

The petitioners challenged their detention through habeas corpus petitions, arguing:

• absence of independent material,
• reliance solely on police witnesses,
• lack of criminal antecedents,
• and the fundamentally criminal—not preventive—nature of the allegations.

The State, however, framed the incident as one with far-reaching communal consequences, asserting that the act had disrupted social harmony and posed a real risk of violence.

From “law and order” to “public order”: At the heart of the judgment lies the classical distinction between “law and order” and “public order,” a doctrinal line developed in cases like Ram Manohar Lohia and Arun Ghosh. The Court held that the Kalpi incident clearly crossed this threshold.

Drawing from the detention record, the bench emphasized:

• “Community-wide fear and terror” (भय व आतंक),
• behavioural changes such as residents no longer leaving cattle unattended,
• perceived conspiracy narratives among the public,
• inter-community tension between Hindus and Muslims,
• and a visible administrative escalation—including riot drills, deployment of additional forces, and high-level patrolling.

The Court concluded that these factors collectively disrupted the “even tempo of life,” thereby bringing the case squarely within “public order.”

Crucially, the Court gave significant weight to the timing of the act, describing it as deliberate and “precise,” capable of fracturing communal bonds during a period of heightened religious sensitivity.

Preventive detention as “reasonable anticipation”: The judgment strongly reiterates the preventive (not punitive) nature of detention under the NSA. Relying on established jurisprudence, the Court held:

• Preventive detention is based on anticipation, not proof.
• The subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is paramount.
• Courts do not sit in appeal over such satisfaction unless it is vitiated by illegality.

Even the fact that the petitioners were already in custody or had secured bail did not deter the Court. It upheld the State’s power to detain on the ground of a “real possibility” of release and recurrence, reaffirming that preventive detention can operate parallel to criminal proceedings.

Procedural compliance: A major plank of the Court’s reasoning is strict procedural compliance:

• Detention orders were passed under Section 3(2),
• Grounds were communicated within statutory timelines,
• Representations were considered and rejected,
• The matter was referred to the Advisory Board,
• The Board affirmed “sufficient cause,”
• The State confirmed detention for one year under Sections 12–13.

The Court concluded that Article 22(5) safeguards were fully satisfied.

Yet, this formal compliance arguably obscures a deeper issue: whether procedural correctness can compensate for thin or contestable substantive grounds.

Elasticity of “public order”: The judgment’s most contentious aspect lies in its expansive reading of “public order.” Traditionally, courts have cautioned that not every criminal act—even if serious—amounts to a disturbance of public order. The distinction requires:

• a direct and proximate impact on the community,
• not merely a potential or speculative disturbance.

However, in this case, the Court relies heavily on:

• anticipated communal reactions,
• perceptions and fears, and
• administrative responses (like police deployment),

to elevate the incident into a public order issue.

This raises a troubling inversion:

• Does the intensity of public reaction—or the State’s response to it—become the basis for preventive detention?
• If so, the doctrine risks becoming self-fulfilling: State apprehension → heightened policing → evidence of “disturbance” → justification for detention.

The problem of timing and religious sensitivity: The Court repeatedly underscores that the act occurred during Navratri and Eid, treating this as a decisive aggravating factor.

While sensitivity to communal context is not misplaced, the reasoning edges toward a more problematic terrain:

• It attributes intentionality (“precise timing”) without clear evidentiary backing.
• It risks constitutionalising religious sentiment as a determinant of liberty.
• It implicitly prioritises majoritarian hurt as a ground for preventive detention.

This approach blurs the line between actual threat and perceived offence, raising concerns about the neutrality of constitutional protections.

Preventive detention and bail: Another striking feature is the Court’s endorsement of detention despite bail:

• Two petitioners had already been granted bail,
• yet were preventively detained to preclude future conduct.

This reflects a broader trend where preventive detention operates as a shadow system, effectively overriding judicial determinations in criminal law.

While doctrinally permissible, it raises structural concerns:

• Does preventive detention undermine the logic of bail jurisprudence?
• Does it allow the executive to circumvent evidentiary thresholds required in criminal trials?

The judgement may be read here:

Liberty at the edge of anticipation

When these two judgments are read together, a coherent doctrinal pattern becomes evident. Both decisions treat cow slaughter as an act with inherent potential to disturb public order, thereby lowering the threshold for invoking preventive detention. In each case, the Court places central emphasis on societal reaction, whether manifested through crowd mobilisation or behavioural fear.

At the same time, contextual factors such as festival timing and communal sensitivity are used to amplify the perceived seriousness of the act. Preventive detention is consistently justified through anticipatory reasoning, with courts accepting intelligence inputs and apprehensions of future conduct as sufficient. Additionally, the scale of administrative response is treated as indicative of the gravity of the situation, further reinforcing the conclusion that public order was at stake.

This emerging doctrine raises significant constitutional concerns. The reliance on intelligence inputs, behavioural indicators, and administrative response points toward a dilution of traditional evidentiary standards. By centring public reaction, the Court risks validating anticipated outrage as a basis for curtailing liberty, thereby shifting the burden away from the State’s responsibility to maintain order.

Furthermore, the increasing use of preventive detention in such cases suggests a blurring of the line between preventive and punitive measures, with the NSA functioning as a parallel mechanism to ordinary criminal law. The emphasis on context and symbolism, while relevant, also introduces a level of subjectivity that can make the concept of public order highly elastic.

A shift from exception to norm

These two rulings, taken together, signal a decisive transformation. Preventive detention—constitutionally conceived as an exceptional measure—is increasingly being normalised in communally sensitive majoritarian criminal contexts.

The shift is subtle but profound:

• From exceptional threat → to contextual sensitivity
• From proven disruption → to anticipated reaction
• From State responsibility → to individual restraint

At stake is not merely the interpretation of “public order,” but the future of personal liberty under the Constitution.

The critical question that emerges is this:

Can constitutional freedoms be made contingent on how society might react—or must the State bear the burden of ensuring order without pre-emptively sacrificing liberty?

In these judgments, the answer appears to lean decisively—perhaps dangerously—toward the former.

Related:

Publicly Tortured, Forced to Eat Cow Dung: No arrests in Odisha Pastor assault case

Judicial Pushback against Cow Vigilantism: Allahabad HC flags arbitrary FIRs, demands accountability from top officials

Supreme Court disposes of PIL on cow vigilantism, declines micro-monitoring of state compliance

Rampant cow vigilantism unleashes violence on Muslim truck drivers across the country

Rise in Cow Vigilantism: A leading driver of discrimination against India’s Muslim minority

The post From Cow Slaughter to “Public Order”: Allahabad High Court’s expanding use of preventive detention appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Yet, almost as quickly as the legal process began, the case moved beyond its evidentiary foundations. Across television debates, digital media platforms, and social media networks, it was reframed as something far more expansive: a coordinated religious conspiracy, a conversion racket, even what some political figures and commentators began calling “corporate jihad.” These framings did not emerge from the FIRs, nor from confirmed findings of the investigation. Instead, they were constructed through a mix of speculation, political rhetoric, and amplified media narratives.

Media coverage and television debates across channels began invoking terms like “corporate jihad” and “love jihad” shortly after the first FIR was filed on March 26, 2026, even as the investigation was still in its initial stages. The first FIR centred on a complaint filed by a 23-year-old employee at Tata Consultancy Services’ Nashik unit, who alleged that a colleague, Danish Shaikh, had induced her into a relationship on the false promise of marriage, engaged in a physical relationship with her, made derogatory remarks about Hindu deities, and spoke in praise of Islam. According to Newslaundry. she further alleged that she later discovered he was already married with two children. These framings, which did not appear in the FIRs themselves, played a key role in shifting the narrative from specific allegations to a broader, and as yet unsubstantiated, claim of organised conspiracy.

This trajectory is not without precedent. The murder of Shraddha Walkar—a case that was, at its core, one of intimate partner violence and extreme gender-based brutality—was similarly pulled into a communal frame in sections of media and public discourse. What should have remained a conversation about violence against women, coercive relationships, and systemic failures was, in many instances, recast as evidence of a larger religious conspiracy. The language of “love jihad,” which had circulated in political discourse earlier, found renewed force in Maharashtra in the aftermath of that case. It was no longer invoked as an abstract claim; it was anchored to a specific, widely publicised crime.

Detailed report may be read here.

The consequences of that shift were not merely rhetorical. The communal framing of the Walkar case fed into mobilisation on the ground, with far-right groups organising rallies and demonstrations that explicitly linked individual acts of violence to broader claims of religious targeting. These mobilisations, in turn, contributed to a political climate in which the idea of regulating interfaith relationships—particularly those involving conversion—gained renewed traction. Over time, this discourse fed into legislative developments, including the push for and eventual passage of strict anti-conversion frameworks in Maharashtra. What began as a criminal case involving one victim and one accused thus became part of a larger ideological and policy arc.

Detailed reports may be read here and here.

The pattern is instructive. Individual acts of violence or alleged wrongdoing are lifted out of their specific contexts and embedded within broader narratives about community, identity, and threat. In the process, the nature of the case itself changes. What begins as a question of individual accountability and institutional responsibility is transformed into a story about collective identity and civilisational conflict. The focus shifts away from the victim, the evidence, and the mechanisms of justice, and towards questions of community, intent, and imagined networks.

The TCS Nashik case now sits within this pattern. Its rapid reframing as a case of organised religious conspiracy echoes earlier moments where gender-based violence or criminal allegations were communalised to serve broader political narratives. To understand it fully, it must be read along two tracks—what the FIRs and investigation actually establish, and what the public narrative has turned it into. The distance between these two is not incidental; it is the story itself.

The Genesis of the FIRs: Intervention, mobilisation, and legal framing

What remains crucial—but often underexplored—in the public telling of the case is the genesis of the FIRs themselves. The trajectory from an individual complaint to the registration of nine FIRs within days raises important questions not only about the allegations, but also about how the case entered the criminal justice system.

According to statements made to Newslaundry, Nitin Gaikwad, a local leader affiliated with the Shiv Sena, acknowledged that he and members of Hindutva groups were involved from the very beginning. He stated that they met the complainant and “counselled her for at least two to three days,” after which they accompanied her to the police station to register the FIR. He further claimed that “all Hindu organisations” had come together in this process under the banner of a united “Sakal Hindu Samaj,” though he did not name specific groups.

Gaikwad also indicated that this involvement did not end with the filing of the first complaint. He stated that they continued to assist the police by identifying other individuals and sharing information, following which further action was taken. This account suggests that the case evolved not solely through institutional mechanisms, but through a combination of community mobilisation, political involvement, and police action.

The first FIR reportedly named three individuals. In the span of the following week, eight additional FIRs were registered, all at the same police station, with some filed in rapid succession, including multiple complaints in a single night. The pattern and pace of these filings point to a case that quickly expanded in scope, moving from a single complaint to a cluster of allegations involving multiple accused.

Instead, several FIRs invoke Section 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS)—the provision relating to acts done in furtherance of common intention. This suggests that the police are, at least in part, examining the allegations through the lens of possible coordinated conduct among individuals, rather than as evidence of a broader, ideologically driven conversion network.

This brings the focus back to a critical question: do allegations of workplace sexual harassment—undoubtedly grave and demanding institutional accountability—necessarily require immediate criminalisation through police intervention, particularly when workplace redressal mechanisms exist? Or does the route through which these complaints were mobilised and formalised reflect a more complex interplay of legal process, social intervention, and political framing?

Data from the Maharashtra State Commission for Women for 2023–24 provides important context for understanding how workplace-related complaints are typically registered and addressed. Out of a total of 12,019 complaints handled during the year, the overwhelming majority relate to marital disputes (4059 cases) and broader social issues, including rape (2940 cases). In comparison, complaints specifically categorised as sexual harassment at the workplace number just 69, with 44 disposed of during the same period. This indicates that while such cases are serious, they form a relatively small proportion of the overall complaints landscape.

A broader category of “harassment at the workplace” records 667 complaints, suggesting that workplace grievances are more frequently framed in terms of general harassment, hostility, or discrimination rather than strictly sexual misconduct. At the same time, the disposal rate across categories remains relatively high, with over 10,000 complaints resolved. However, sexual harassment cases show a comparatively slower rate of disposal, pointing to the complexity and sensitivity often involved in such matters, including evidentiary challenges and institutional processes.

This data also offers insight into how such complaints are usually processed. Workplace harassment cases are, in most instances, expected to be addressed through internal mechanisms such as POSH committees and institutional grievance systems, with criminal law typically invoked in more escalated or severe circumstances. The relatively low number of cases reaching the Commission under the category of sexual harassment suggests either under-reporting, reliance on internal processes, or both.

Against this backdrop, the TCS Nashik case—marked by the rapid filing of multiple FIRs within a short span—appears unusual in its trajectory. The scale and speed of criminalisation stand in contrast to broader trends, raising questions not about the seriousness of the allegations themselves, but about the process through which workplace complaints move from internal grievance to criminal prosecution, and whether that transition, in this instance, followed the typical institutional path.

The answer to that question does not diminish the seriousness of the allegations. But it does underscore that the making of the case—how it was initiated, expanded, and framed—is as important to examine as the allegations themselves.

The Legal Core: What the FIRs actually establish

The legal foundation of the case rests on nine FIRs registered between March 26 and April 3, 2026, across Deolali Camp and Mumbai Naka police stations. These FIRs, taken together, form the only formal basis on which the case currently stands, and any assessment of the matter must begin with them.

The first FIR, registered at Deolali Camp Police Station, outlines a relationship between the complainant and the primary accused that allegedly evolved from a prior acquaintance into a personal and intimate association. According to the complaint, the accused established sexual relations with the complainant under the promise of marriage, a promise that she later discovered to be deceptive when she was informed by another woman that the accused was already married and had children. The FIR further records that during the course of their interactions, discussions relating to religion took place, and certain remarks were perceived by the complainant as derogatory towards Hindu beliefs. It also alleges that the complainant faced pressure and intimidation in connection with both the relationship and its possible disclosure.

As with all FIRs, these allegations represent the complainant’s version of events. They initiate a legal process but do not constitute proof. Their veracity must be tested through investigation and, ultimately, adjudication.

In the days that followed, eight additional FIRs were registered. These complaints describe a range of alleged misconduct within the workplace, including unwanted physical contact, inappropriate remarks, coercion, and the misuse of authority by senior employees. Some FIRs also refer to behaviour perceived as affecting religious sentiments, and in at least one instance, a male complainant alleged that he was pressured in relation to religious practices. The FIR compilation indicates that these allegations span a period from 2022 to 2026 and involve multiple accused individuals, some of whom are named across more than one complaint.

The sections invoked under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita include provisions relating to sexual harassment, outraging modesty, criminal intimidation, and acts affecting religious sentiments. Taken together, the FIRs suggest the possibility of a pattern of alleged misconduct within the workplace. At the same time, they do not establish guilt, nor do they conclusively demonstrate the existence of any organised conspiracy. This distinction remains central, even as it is frequently blurred in public discourse.

The Investigation: Scope, Method, and Limits

The Nashik Police constituted a Special Investigation Team to examine the allegations. As part of the investigation, several accused individuals were arrested, statements were recorded before magistrates, and digital and documentary evidence began to be scrutinised.

What makes the trajectory of this investigation particularly unusual is its point of origin. As reported in Hindustan Times through its article dated April 13, the case did not begin with a formal workplace complaint or even an immediate allegation of harassment filed with the police. Instead, it appears to have been triggered by a complaint from a political party worker regarding a woman employee’s religious practices. In the report of Times of India dated April 16, it was provided that according to Nashik City Police, the complaint alleged that a Hindu woman in her early 20s had begun following Islamic practices under workplace influence. This led to a covert police operation, during which personnel were reportedly deployed undercover within the workplace. It was only after this phase that the first FIR was registered on March 26, followed by additional complaints.

As the investigation progressed, the SIT examined not only the allegations in the FIRs but also the functioning of internal workplace mechanisms, particularly the Prevention of Sexual Harassment (POSH) framework. The role of supervisory personnel, including HR officials, came under scrutiny in light of allegations that complaints may have been discouraged or ignored.

Crucially, police statements reported indicate that, at this stage, there is no confirmed evidence of any organised or externally funded conversion network linked to the case. While inputs have been sought from agencies such as the Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) and the National Investigation Agency (NIA), this appears to be a response to claims circulating in the public domain rather than confirmation of those claims.

This distinction—between investigating allegations and endorsing narratives—remains one of the most important, yet least emphasised, aspects of the case.

The Company Response: Institutional responsibility under scrutiny

TCS, in its official communications, has stated that it has taken the matter seriously, suspending or terminating employees named in the FIRs and cooperating fully with law enforcement authorities. The company has reiterated its commitment to a zero-tolerance policy towards harassment and has initiated an internal inquiry.

Public statement by Mr. K. Krithivasan, Chief Executive Officer and Managing Director, related to the recent matter in Nashik. All details here: https://t.co/sOEGI7jmtV pic.twitter.com/iTfu1yeCuz

— Tata Consultancy Services (@TCS) April 17, 2026

At the same time, the case raises deeper questions about institutional responsibility. Several accounts since April 14, including those reported by outlets such as NDTV, suggested that employees who experienced harassment may not have found effective redress through internal mechanisms. If complaints were indeed raised and not acted upon—or if employees felt unable to use formal channels—it would point to significant gaps in the implementation of POSH guidelines.

The role of HR personnel is particularly significant in this context, especially because one of the most widely circulated claims in the case—that Nida Khan was the HR head—has been explicitly contradicted by both company statements and subsequent reporting. In the early days of the controversy, several media reports and television debates repeatedly described Nida Khan as an “HR manager” or even the central authority responsible for handling complaints. 

A detailed report by AltNews dated April 18 showed that since April 14, 2026, NDTV reporters claimed that Nida Khan was an HR official at TCS Nashik. The same claim was made in multiple bulletins on the channel by Shiv Aroor.  

However, a report by Times of India as well as the statement of TCS of April 17 clarified that she held no leadership responsibilities, was not part of the HR structure, and had no role in recruitment or institutional decision-making. Instead, as per Hindustan Times dated April 17, she was employed as a process associate/telecaller at the BPO unit, not a senior managerial figure.

Godi Media Anchor @anjanaomkashyap says Nida Khan is the main Mastermind and was a HR Manager. But Nida Khan was an employee and not HR Manager. HR manager was Ashwini Chainani, the HR head and operations manager of the company who was arrested recently. Ashwini Chainani is… pic.twitter.com/Y3M7tHzJtf

— Mohammed Zubair (@zoo_bear) April 17, 2026

In the #Nashik #TCS case, not only Arnab Goswami’s Republic made Nida Khan a “terrorist,” even Vijeta Dahiya, script writer for Dhruv Rathee, went a step further and called her and other accused “Islamist terrorists,” dragging an entire religion into it.

From prime-time TV to… pic.twitter.com/iDBTP4pFeW

— Meer Faisal (@meerfaisal001) April 17, 2026

‘दबंग मैम’ निदा खान ऑफिस में सबको सिखाती थी बुर्का पहनना, बड़ा ही खूंखार था TCS एचआर हेड का प्लान

नासिक के TCS बीपीओ में ‘दबंग मैम’ कही जाने वाली HR मैनेजर निदा खान की तलाश तेज हो गई है. उस पर धर्मांतरण और यौन उत्पीड़न के गंभीर आरोप लगे हैं. FIR में दावा है कि वह कर्मचारियों को… pic.twitter.com/xDARj2rURy

— AajTak (@aajtak) April 16, 2026

TCS में घर्मांतरण के खुलासे का पार्ट-2
TCS में HR मैनेजर निदा खान के कारनामों की पूरी रिपोर्ट#BlackAndWhiteOnAajTak #TCS #CorporateControversy #HRManager | @anjanaomkashyap pic.twitter.com/8jZLVLSvvn

— AajTak (@aajtak) April 16, 2026

This distinction is crucial because the investigation has, in fact, identified actual HR officials—including a senior HR functionary linked to the POSH Internal Committee—whose roles are under scrutiny for allegedly ignoring or failing to act on complaints. Yet, in public discourse, the focus disproportionately shifted to Nida Khan as the “face” or even “mastermind” of the case, often accompanied by an inflated portrayal of her authority.

The result is a telling gap between institutional responsibility and narrative construction. While those with formal power within the workplace structure—particularly within HR—are central to questions of accountability, public attention has instead been redirected toward an individual whose organisational role was misrepresented, reinforcing a narrative that is not fully aligned with the evidentiary record.

Victim Narratives: Allegations of control, coercion, and silence

Accounts from complainants and witnesses, as reported in media interviews including those aired by NDTV, describe a workplace environment marked by control, coercion, and silence. One employee recounted being isolated from colleagues and made to work separately, while others described a culture in which younger employees were allegedly targeted and subjected to inappropriate behaviour.

These narratives also suggest that attempts to raise concerns internally did not lead to meaningful intervention. In some accounts, employees described a sense that even HR mechanisms were ineffective or inaccessible. Such descriptions, if borne out by investigation, would indicate not only individual misconduct but a systemic environment in which alleged abuse could persist.

These accounts are serious and must be treated as such. At the same time, they remain part of an ongoing investigation and must be evaluated through due process rather than selectively amplified or reframed to fit broader narratives.

The Narrative Shift: From workplace crime to communal conspiracy

As the case unfolded, a significant shift occurred in how it was publicly framed. What began as allegations against specific individuals was rapidly transformed into a narrative about an entire community.

Television debates, including those hosted on prominent channels such as played a significant role in shaping the public narrative around the case. Primetime discussions on these platforms frequently moved beyond the contents of the FIRs and the scope of the police investigation, framing the allegations within broader themes of religious targeting and organised conspiracy. In several instances, the language used in these debates echoed terms such as “conversion racket” and “corporate jihad,” often without clear attribution to verified investigative findings.

Grooming Syndicate Busted

The Hindu women employees in TCS were allegedly groomed systematically through a WhatsApp group formed by their team leads. They approached TCS authorities, including the HR manager, multiple times—raising complaints of rape, forced conversion, being… pic.twitter.com/IbZxUUkEfl

— TIMES NOW (@TimesNow) April 14, 2026

This mode of coverage did not merely report on the case; it actively contributed to its reframing. By foregrounding speculative links and emphasising identity over individual conduct, these debates helped shift the focus away from the specifics of the allegations and towards a generalised communal narrative, shaping public perception in ways that extended far beyond the evidentiary record.

Political figures played a visible role in this shift. On April 17, Maharashtra Chief Minister Devendra Fadnavis publicly framed the case in broader ideological terms while responding to media queries. While noting that Tata Consultancy Services had taken the allegations seriously, he described the matter as a cause for concern, suggesting it pointed to what he termed “corporate jihad.” In his remarks to NDTV, Fadnavis linked the case to earlier narratives such as “love jihad” and “land jihad,” arguing that the present allegations reflected a new and serious manifestation of a similar pattern.

Political responses to the case extended beyond formal statements of concern and moved into broader ideological framing. Devendra Fadnavis’s spouse, Amruta Fadnavis, in remarks reported by The New Indian Express on April 18, linked the allegations to wider claims of “forceful conversion” and “love jihad,” urging women to remain vigilant and framing the issue in terms of cultural awareness and the need to reinforce traditional values among youth.

Maharashtra minister and Bharatiya Janata Party leader Nitesh Rane, speaking to the press in comments reported by Press Trust of India on April 16, described the case as indicative of a growing phenomenon he termed “corporate jihad.” He further suggested that employment spaces were being misused for religious conversion and argued that prioritising Hindus in hiring had become “the need of the hour” to counter such alleged activities.

Taken together, these statements illustrate how the case was not only treated as a matter of criminal investigation but also embedded within a larger political narrative—one that framed the allegations as part of a broader pattern of religious targeting, despite the absence of conclusive findings to that effect in the investigation at the time. These statements were subsequently amplified across television and digital platforms, contributing to the rapid communalisation of the case.

Amid the controversy surrounding the allegations at the TCS Nashik unit, The Print report dated April 21 provided that that the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), affiliated with the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, escalated the issue beyond the immediate case by reaching out to major industry bodies. Its general secretary, Bajrang Bagda, wrote to organisations such as FICCI, CII, ASSOCHAM, NASSCOM and others, urging immediate steps to address women’s safety in corporate workplaces. 

While referring to the ongoing SIT probe into multiple FIRs alleging harassment, coercion, and other offences, Bagda framed the issue as one that had eroded public trust in corporate environments. Significantly, he argued that the allegations should not be seen as isolated acts by individuals, but as part of a “collective conspiracy”, a claim that extends beyond what has been established in the investigation so far.

This transformation did not merely add a layer of interpretation; it altered the nature of the story itself, shifting the focus from individual accountability to communal identity. Even the highest court in the country was not left out of this, with Advocate Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay filing a plea in the Supreme Court on April 16, 2026, requesting that deceitful religious conversions be classified as “terrorism” and “organized crime,” following reports of forced conversions and sexual harassment of female employees at a TCS facility in Nashik. The plea calls for stringent central action, special courts, and to treat the issue as a threat to national security. Ashwini Upadhyay has formerly also been spokesperson for the Delhi unit of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). 

You may find CJP’s Hate Busters on four of Upadhyaya’s claims here, here, here, and here.  

The Making of a “Mastermind”: The case of Nida Khan

No aspect of this transformation is more illustrative than the portrayal of Nida Khan. In the FIRs, she is named as one among several accused, with allegations that relate primarily to interactions and remarks perceived as religiously offensive. There is no clear indication in the FIRs that she held a position of authority within the organisation or that she exercised control over institutional processes.

However, in media coverage and public discourse, she has frequently been described as the “mastermind” of the case. Television debates and social media commentary, as evident from the links attached above, have at times portrayed her as an HR manager or a central figure orchestrating a larger conspiracy. This portrayal stands in contrast to clarifications issued by the company, which state that she was a process associate and did not hold a managerial or HR role.

TCS Nashik case ‘mastermind’ Nida Khan’s bail hearing likely today pic.twitter.com/1bDo4yQgae

— NDTV (@ndtv) April 20, 2026

Nashik BPO Case | Who Is Nida Khan? Mastermind Behind Harassment Cover-Up Under Police Lens

Watch video: https://t.co/qWRbVPjzqc#NidaKhan #Nashik #TCS

— News18 (@CNNnews18) April 17, 2026

Nashik ‘Conversion’ Row | First picture: Nida Khan alleged mastermind of the gang is cureently absconding@sujata_dwivedi shares details with @ankit_tyagi01 pic.twitter.com/xVOINfq5Hu

— NDTV (@ndtv) April 14, 2026

In a further development, reports indicated that Nida Khan was in Mumbai and was pregnant with her first child. Even as the Nashik Police’s Special Investigation Team continued its probe and the National Commission for Women took cognisance of the matter, sections of the media continued to describe her as the “mastermind” of the case.

This characterisation, however, has been contested by her legal counsel. Advocate Baba Sayyad pointed out that her name appears in only one complaint and that the FIRs do not substantiate claims of a larger conspiracy. He further clarified that she was not part of the HR structure but worked as a process associate/telecaller, a position also reflected in company records. According to him, the primary allegation against her relates to remarks affecting religious sentiments, raising questions about the disproportionate portrayal of her role in public discourse.

According to the report by Hindustan Times dated April 17  Nida Khan is not absconding in the conventional sense being portrayed in some media narratives. She is reported to be in Mumbai, at her residence with her husband, where she had moved earlier this year after her marriage. Her family and lawyer have also claimed that police had not visited their residence looking for her at the time of reporting. This re-framing or ‘clarification’ on Nida Khan’s position in the company came several days after reports in news channels and newspapers, often showing her photographs and name, framed her as the ‘mastermind.’ The damage then, in a sense, had been done.

This discrepancy highlights how narratives can elevate certain individuals into symbolic figures, often in ways that are not supported by the evidentiary record. At the same time, individuals who may have held actual institutional authority—such as HR officials with decision-making power—have received comparatively less attention in public discourse.

It is essential to note here that on April 20, Nida Khan was denied interim relief by a Nashik court.

Media Conduct: Language, framing, and responsibility

The role of the media in shaping the trajectory of this case has been central. One of the most concerning aspects of coverage has been the frequent collapse of the distinction between allegation and fact. Reports and debates have often presented claims as established truths, omitting qualifiers such as “alleged” and thereby pre-empting the outcome of the investigation.

Equally significant has been the shift in framing from individual conduct to communal identity. Instead of focusing on specific allegations against named individuals, many narratives have generalised the case into a broader story about Muslim men targeting Hindu women. This framing transforms a legal case into a communal narrative, with implications that extend far beyond the facts of the case itself.

The amplification of unverified claims has further contributed to this distortion. Assertions about international links, funding networks, and organised conversion efforts have circulated widely across television and social media platforms, despite the absence of corroborating evidence. In some cases, even routine investigative steps—such as seeking inputs from central agencies—have been interpreted as confirmation of these claims.

This pattern reflects not just a failure of verification but a broader shift in how stories are framed and consumed.

The APCR Findings: A critical intervention in a distorted narrative

The fact-finding report by the Association for Protection of Civil Rights (APCR) stands out as one of the most detailed attempts to bring the TCS Nashik case back to its evidentiary core. Based on field visits, court observations, interactions with lawyers and families, and a close reading of FIRs alongside media coverage, the report maps a widening gap between what is formally on record and what has come to dominate public discourse.

At its heart, the report makes a crucial clarification: the case, as reflected in the nine FIRs, concerns serious allegations of workplace misconduct—including sexual harassment, coercion, intimidation, and conduct perceived as affecting religious sentiments. These allegations, spanning multiple complainants and a period of several years, are undeniably grave and warrant thorough investigation. At the same time, the report underscores that FIRs represent claims to be tested, not conclusions, and must be evaluated through due process.

What the report does not find, however, is equally significant. It notes that there is, at present, no conclusive material establishing the existence of any organised or systematic religious conversion network—a claim that has nevertheless come to dominate media and political narratives. Terms such as “corporate jihad,” widely used in television debates and public commentary, are identified as originating not from the FIRs or the investigation, but from interpretation and amplification.

The report also documents the trajectory of the investigation itself. A Special Investigation Team has been constituted, multiple arrests have been made, and police have examined each complaint individually. Even the involvement of agencies such as the ATS or NIA, it notes, has been framed as precautionary rather than confirmatory. Crucially, authorities have not, at this stage, substantiated claims of a coordinated or externally funded operation, despite the prominence of such assertions in public discourse.

At the same time, the report does not minimise the allegations made by complainants. It records accounts that point to a hostile work environment, possible targeting of employees, and a lack of effective institutional response. This is juxtaposed with the company’s position that no formal complaints were received through internal POSH mechanisms prior to the FIRs, highlighting a potential gap between lived experiences and formal reporting structures. Whether this reflects under-reporting, institutional failure, or both remains a key question.

A particularly striking aspect of the report is its focus on how individuals have been portrayed in the public sphere. It notes that Nida Khan has repeatedly been described as the “mastermind” of the case and as an HR official with significant authority—claims that are not consistently supported by the FIRs or company records. In fact, available information indicates that she held a non-managerial role, raising concerns about how her position and involvement have been reshaped to fit a broader narrative.

More broadly, the report highlights the role of media ecosystems—particularly television debates and social media—in amplifying unverified claims, including assertions of international links, funding networks, and coordinated targeting. It identifies a dual media landscape, where factual reporting based on police statements coexists with speculative and often hyperbolic commentary, creating confusion and polarisation.

The report ultimately calls for a return to evidence-based investigation and responsible public discourse. It urges authorities to clearly distinguish between criminal allegations and unverified labels, recommends closer scrutiny of workplace grievance mechanisms, and cautions political and media actors against communalising the issue. Its core message is straightforward but significant: that the integrity of the investigation—and the possibility of justice—depends on maintaining a clear boundary between what is being investigated and what is being imagined.

Voices of Dissent and Solidarity: A counter-current emerges

Amid the dominant narrative that has framed the case in sharply communal terms, a quieter but significant counter-current has begun to emerge—one that calls for restraint, due process, and a return to facts. Across social media platforms, independent commentators, academics, and civil society voices have expressed concern not only about the allegations themselves, but about the manner in which the case has been publicly framed.

One such intervention came from Sumathi, whose widely circulated post reflected a tone markedly different from the prevailing discourse. Addressing Nida Khan directly, she wrote from the standpoint of shared humanity rather than communal identity, expressing remorse for the suffering faced and emphasising that fear and isolation are not burdens any individual should be made to carry. The post underscored a key point often missing in louder debates—that regardless of the outcome of the investigation, the dignity and rights of individuals must remain central.

Dear Nida Khan,

As an Indian Hindu woman, I lower my head in deep remorse for the suffering you have faced. Such pain cannot be confined to one faith; it resonates within the shared conscience of us all. When a woman is forced to carry fear along with the life she nurtures, it… https://t.co/j8cMhy4Pmz

— Prof Sumathi (@ProfSumathi) April 19, 2026

Similar sentiments have been echoed by other users and commentators who have questioned the speed with which the case was communalised. Some have pointed out inconsistencies in media reporting, others have highlighted the lack of verified evidence for sweeping claims, and many have simply urged that the investigation be allowed to proceed without prejudice. These voices do not deny the seriousness of the allegations; rather, they resist their transformation into a broader indictment of an entire community.

Nida Khan, 26, is pregnant, is in Mumbai, as per her family.

She has been witch hunted as mastermind of running religious conversion racket at TCS bpo in Nashik by many media houses.

TCS clarified she was working as a tellecaller n not in any leadership role to have influence…

— Varsha Torgalkar (@varshasuman) April 18, 2026

This emerging strand of solidarity is important for what it represents. It signals that even within a highly polarised media environment, there remains space—however limited—for empathetic engagement, critical questioning, and a refusal to collapse individual cases into communal narratives.

What Is at Stake: Justice, truth, and public harm

The stakes in this case are both immediate and far-reaching. If the allegations are substantiated, the victims are entitled to justice, and the accused must be held accountable in accordance with the law. Institutions must also answer for any failures that allowed such conduct to occur.

At the same time, the communalisation of the case carries its own risks. When narratives outpace evidence, investigations can be distorted by public pressure, due process may be compromised, and entire communities may be subjected to collective suspicion.

Perhaps most importantly, the pursuit of justice itself may be undermined. When cases are reframed through communal lenses, the focus shifts away from evidence and accountability and towards identity and ideology.

Conclusion: The danger of stories that outrun evidence

The TCS Nashik case remains under investigation. The facts are still being established, and the outcome is yet to be determined. Yet, in the public sphere, a conclusion has already been constructed—one that extends far beyond the evidence currently available.

This is the central danger. When allegations are transformed into narratives, and narratives into communal truths, the space for careful, evidence-based inquiry begins to shrink. In such an environment, justice is no longer the outcome of a process; it becomes collateral damage.

There is no contradiction in insisting that serious allegations be investigated thoroughly while also rejecting their communalisation. On the contrary, both are necessary.

Because without accuracy, there can be no accountability. And without accountability, there can be no justice.

Related:

Allahabad High Court flags surge in “false” conversion firs, seeks accountability from UP government

Censorship and the Drumbeats of Hate: Mapping the state of free speech ahead of the 2026 polls

Maharashtra’s Anti-Conversion Bill: Legislating suspicion in the name of “love jihad”

The post From FIRs to “Corporate Jihad”: How the TCS Nashik case was transformed from an investigation into a communal narrative appeared first on SabrangIndia.

be a tree sated with fertility, be a tree.

And if you are not a tree, my love, 

be stone saturated with humidity, be stone.

And if you are not a stone, my love, 

be a moon in the dream of your beloved one, be a moon.

(So spoke a woman to her son at his funeral.)

 Mahmoud Darwish, State of Siege (2002)

Mahmoud Darwish

To sit with these lines for five years is to realise that Mahmoud Darwish was not writing a poem. He was drafting an ontology of indestructibility. Written during the 2002 Siege of Ramallah, when Israeli forces confined him to his apartment under tanks and demolition orders, these verses are not an elegy. They are a war manual for the soul. A mother at her son’s funeral refuses to grieve as the world expects. Instead, she issues commands. She transforms her dead son into a landscape that cannot be evicted. This is the purest expression of “Sumud” (refusing to be erased or to leave one’s home), the Palestinian art of remaining, not as an act of passivity but as a furious, creative, and elemental refusal to vanish. The Arabic word “Sumud” is a crucial concept in Palestinian identity and resistance. It is often simply translated as “resilience”; it carries a much deeper meaning that bridges the gap between endurance and political defiance. At its core, “Sumud” is the act of maintaining a normal life under abnormal conditions, and refusing to be erased.

The repetition of “be” (the Arabic imperative kun) is not just a request; it is a command of creation. In the Quran, God creates the universe with the phrase “Kun fa-yakun” (“Be, and it is”).

By having a mother use this imperative at a funeral, Darwish is portraying a subversive act of creation. She is refusing to let her son vanish into nothingness. If he cannot exist as a human, his soul will be refashioned into the landscape by the power of language.

The Anatomy of a Siege: Beyond the Blockade

A siege is not merely a military act or tactic. It is a slow erasure of a people’s future. In Palestine, the “plight” is concrete. In the Palestinian context, this “plight” manifests as the systematic and brutal killing of children and young people, the uprooting of ancient olive groves, the restriction of water (the “rain” of the poem), the fragmentation of families by concrete walls, and the fragmentation of bodies by checkpoints. But Darwish teaches us that a siege is also metaphysical. It aims to reduce the human being to bare life, a hungry, terrified, statistically invisible creature stripped of history, name, and narrative.

For the Iranian people, the siege wears a different mask: economic sanctions and diplomatic strangulation. It is a blockade of medicine, knowledge, and global conversation. Yet the Zionist logic is identical: isolate, impoverish, and make the people beg for their own humanity. In both cases, the besieged are told they are temporary. Darwish’s mother replies: You have confused death with disappearance.

Global Sumud Flotilla For Palestine

The Alchemy of Elements: Resistance as Metamorphosis

When the human form is rendered illegal, when a son can be shot and his name erased from a registry, the mother refuses nothingness. She performs alchemy. She reincarnates her son into three elemental forms, each a higher degree of defiance.

The Tree (Rootedness as Land Title):

When the Zionist regime uproots ancient groves to plant Jewish settlements, the mother says: Be a tree. Not just any tree, but one “sated with fertility”, heavy with olives, with memory, with the sweat of ancestors. This is the ultimate rebellion. The tree does not hold a deed; it is the deed. Its roots argue with the bulldozer in a language that predates all modern borders. To become a tree is to say: You cannot deport geography.

The Stone (The Pulse Beneath the Weapon):

The stone is the icon of the Intifada. But Darwish does something extraordinary. He adds, “saturated with humidity.” Humidity is the breath of the living earth, the sweat of the farmer, the moisture that turns dust into clay. This is not the dry, dead stone of a ruin. It is the wet, resistant stone that grows moss and holds the coolness of the morning. For the Palestinian youth facing a military tank, or the Iranian student enduring a morality squad, the stone is the hard reality they throw back at power. But the humidity is their poetry, their cinema, their whispered jokes in the back of a taxi, the life that persists within the hardness.

The Moon (The Unreachable Sovereignty):

If the tree is cut and the stone shattered, the mother sends her son to the moon. Not the moon of astronomy, but a moon in the dream of your beloved one. This is the interior fortress. You can occupy a city, but not a dream. You can sanction a country, but not a lover’s memory. The moon represents a light that requires no passport, no fuel, no permission. It is the sovereignty of the inner life, the space where a displaced family still sings the old songs, where a Tehran artist paints in a basement, and where a refugee draws the key to a house that exists only in the mind.

Aftermath of a bombed area in Palestine

From Ramallah to Tehran: The Shared Geography of the Soul

What unites the Palestinian and Iranian resistance is not a shared history but a shared architecture of survival. Both people have learned that when the external world is blocked, you build inward and downward.

For Palestine, “Sumud” is literal: staying on the land, harvesting the olives under a military curfew, planting a sapling where a home was demolished. It is the insistence that even if the map is redrawn by force, the poetry remembers the original names.

For Iran, resilience takes the form of a cultural fortress. Facing decades of sanctions and ideological isolation, Iranians have turned to a deep well: Rumi, Hafez, and the cinema of Kiarostami and Panahi. They produce art that does not seek Western validation. They prove that their humanity is not a commodity to be granted or withheld by embassies, but a historical fact, an unbroken civilisation that has outlasted every invader, from Alexander to the narcissist Trump.

In both cases, the besieged become metamorphic. They change shape faster than the siege can adapt.

Image from the 2026 Protests in Iran

Art as the Final Frontier: The Ghazal as a Weapon

Darwish weaponises the traditional ghazal, a form of love poetry, for a funeral. He addresses a dead son as “my love”. This is not sentimentality. It is a radical humanisation. The occupier wants the dead son to be a number, a martyr statistic, a security threat even in the grave. The mother says: No. He was the rain I waited for. He was the moon in someone’s dream.

By using the intimate, erotic language of the ghazal, Darwish smuggles tenderness into a war zone. He reminds the world that every political casualty is first a beloved person. The siege cannot calculate grief, and that is its fatal weakness.

The Invincible Landscape

The final reveal: (So spoke a woman to her son at his funeral)- is the most devastating line. It reframes the entire poem as a whisper over a grave. But it is also the ultimate act of defiance. The mother tells the occupier: You have killed a man, but you have given birth to a landscape.

The son is no longer a body that can be buried. He is a tree that will keep fruiting, a stone that will keep striking, a moon that will keep haunting every dream. The siege, for all its military tanks and sanctions, cannot kill what can become something else.

Whether it is the farmer in Gaza planting saplings under drone surveillance, or the student in Tehran memorising Hafez in a blacked-out apartment, they are all following the mother’s command. They are becoming the rain, the tree, the stone, the moon. They are proving that the architecture of survival is not made of concrete and steel. It is made of metamorphosis. And that is why they are impossible to ignore and even more impossible to conquer. The mother in the poem is not just a mourner; she is the custodian of a history the occupier can’t erase. She is the pillar of strength and the stream of the nation’s collective sorrow. The poem is ultimately about refusing the silence of death. In a “State of Siege”, where people are threatened with erasure, the mother performs a ritual of metamorphosis. She ensures her son is never gone, but simply translated into the rain, the trees, and the stone of the home they are defending.

Courtesy: The AIDEM

The post The Metamorphic Resistance: Mahmoud Darwish, Resilience (Sumud), and the Architecture of Survival appeared first on SabrangIndia.

These demands have surfaced following concerns “regarding rights violations of this community

 In the context of the Amrabad Tiger Reserve, in Nagarkurnool district of Telangana; both the Adivasis and activists-in-solidarity have strongly asserted the legal and democratic rights of the Chenchu community in the Nallamalla forests. 

According to a press note issued by a solidarity forum, a series of actions last week – including 

1. The letters sent to various Central and state authorities and meetings with senior state officials, 
2. The Hyderabad civil society round table, on April 17, in which a large number of Chenchu Adivasis spoke resolutely against involuntary relocation and 
3. In the Prajavani meeting with Mr. Chinna Reddy, (Vice-Chairman of State Planning Board), where Chenchu adivasis were assured that their rights would be safeguarded and district forest officials were asked to comply with law. 

Some of the key demands in all these meetings and representations include 

1. An immediate end to issuing cheques and forcible relocation, in violation of law, 
2. Pursuing the harmonious co-existence model in Amrabad Tiger Reserve and ensuring the democratic participation of communities in forest governance 
3. Withdrawal of fabricated cases against Chenchu Adivasi leaders and 
4. Full compliance with all the relevant laws including the Forest Rights Act, 2006; especially community forest rights and habitat rights of Chenchus, Wildlife Protection Act, 1972 (as amended in 2006), Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 and the Land Acquisition and Rehabilitation Act, 2013. 

As is well known, Chenchus are a Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Group (PVTG) residing in the Nallamalla forests of Telangana, since generations. They are recorded as one of the ancient food gathering communities with rich traditional knowledge of forest produce, medicinal plants and live in close association with nature. As also recommended by Sir Christoph Von Haimendorf in 1940, their cultural significance with Nallamala forest should be rightly recognized, by declaring the region as a ‘Chenchu Conservation Bio-Reserve’, in order to protect their socio-cultural rights and their natural habitats. 

However, states the press release, the introduction of ‘Project Tiger’, has resulted in persistent efforts to forcibly relocate them from their natural habitats. The latest threat to their co-existence in the forest has been by way of cheques being issued in March 2026, by senior ministers of the state government, as part of Amrabad Tiger Reserve ‘Relocation package’. It is a gross injustice that without appropriate consultation and consent, as mandated by law, the Chenchu Adivasis are sought to be removed and relocated outside the Schedule-V Area, where they would have no access to wild foods or forest produce and where they will lose all their Scheduled Area constitutional safeguards. 

In this context, many Chenchu community members from affected villages of Sarlapally, Vatwarlapally, Kollampenta, Rayuletupenta, Uppununtala, Kudichintalabayalu came to Hyderabad on April 17, 2026 to submit petitions to the Chief Minister, through the Prajavani Grievance Cell, against the involuntary relocation and excesses of the Forest Department. They also shared their struggles and perspectives with many civil society and citizens groups, during a well-attended round table consultation on the same day. The youth and women gave very clear and cogent reasons as to why they do not want to leave their forest and how there was no proper consent or consultation with their Gram Sabhas. As Chiguru Nagamma of Kommanipenta said, “We have seen how our forefathers were displaced for other projects and whatever money came was wasted on liquor, so we do not want any money or land somewhere else. We will survive in the forest that has sustained us”. 

For example:

Tirupathaiah of Sarlapally gave examples of how basic development activities are not being allowed in their villages and how even the banks or government departments are refusing to give them loans or benefits of schemes because they are under ‘relocation’. Mallikarjun, the ex-Sarpanch, spoke about how their forest rights under the RoFR Act are pending and that shifting them outside the Scheduled Area would make them lose all their constitutional entitlements under PESA, FRA, LARR and LTR Acts. Guravaiah stated that he filed several detailed RTIs and appeals seeking information about the relocation details, but did not receive proper responses. 

The youth expressed their anguish that they are being criminalised with false cases for speaking out for their rights. They said that, along with state officials, some ‘pro-conservation groups’ are also creating a false narrative of ‘voluntary relocation’. They claimed that most of the people whose consent was taken so far, are not Adivasis and they are non-local people, who want to benefit from the package. The Chenchu women said that their men are being given petty jobs (such as forest watchers) to put pressure on their families for giving consent to relocate. This is a deliberate attempt to divide the Chenchus and create friction among them. However, they very clearly conveyed that they will not give consent to any relocation package and would continue to co-exist with the wildlife in harmony, as that is how the Chenchus always survived in the forest.

Speakers at the consultation also raised many legal concerns including non-implementation of the Forest Rights Act, non-recognition of community forest rights and habitat rights of Chenchus. They spoke on the deliberate misinterpretation of the Wildlife Protection Act to displace Chenchus in the name of making the forests ‘inviolate’, violations under PESA and lack of prior informed consent procedures, non-implementation of the Land Acquisition Act of 2013 (LARR). The recent relocation of Adivasis from Mysampet and Rampur in Kawal tiger reserve where the displaced community became landless wage labour still awaiting the promised land and cash compensation is a classic example of non-compliance with legal and statutory accountability mechanisms in relocation.  

Veteran civil rights activist Prof. Haragopal said that the State wants Chenchus out of the forest, both because Adivasi regions are mineral resource rich, but also because the capitalist order wants to extinguish the selfless and community way of living of Adivasis. Other activists who were present and spoke at the Consultation in solidarity include Usha Seethalakshmi, K. Satyavathi, Sajaya K, Dr. Ramkishan, Sandhya V, Ashalatha S, Bhanu Kalluri, Girija, Ravi Kanneganti, Shankar, Kalpana, Meera Sanghamitra, Sanjeev, Soumitri, Ravichander etc.  

The efforts over the past three months, by the Community Forest Rights Working Group of Telangana also resulted in the formation of the Chenchu Solidarity Forum (CSF), on the eve of Earth Day. As an independent citizens’ collective to support the struggles of the Chenchu Adivasi communities, co-existence and democratic governance in Nallamalla forests and ensure their rights, guaranteed by various laws and the Constitution, are not violated. 

Key demands submitted to the Telangana government are:

• Immediately stop issuing cheques and stop the process of unconstitutional relocation of the Chenchus living in Amrabad tiger reserve area.
• Implement the Forest Rights Act including recognition of Community Forest Rights and Habitat Rights, settlement of pending IFR claims and resurvey of claims rejected and pending.
• The forest department has to place in public domain the mandatory report as per WLPA (with 2006 amendment) of the scientific study conducted in consultation with the Chenchus, that proves ‘irrevocable damage to wildlife’ by the Chenchus.
• The forest department should make public the details of core and buffer zone demarcations, details of consultations conducted with concerned Gram Sabhas and details of conditions on which consent was obtained, including details of Social Impact Assessment report, R&R Plan, Gram Sabha resolutions and consent letters.
• Government must share the details of notifying villages in core and buffer zones in Amrabad Tiger Reserve. 
• Strengthen the governance of forests through co-existence of Chenchus with their forests and wildlife using the Constitutional and legal mechanisms of the PESA, FRA, LARR for community centred conservation which is globally recognized as the most sustainable form of Conservation and Climate Protection. 
• Withdraw all the false criminal cases on the Chenchu youth, community leaders and intimidation tactics to prevent them from voicing their concerns. 
• Safeguard the Nallamalla ecosystem and declare the Nallamalla forests as Chenchu Conservation Bio-Region Reserve.

Related:

Thousands of Adivasis demand the implementation of FRA 2006

Breaking: All Intervention Applications defending FRA, 2006 admitted by SC

Woman, Van Gujjar, Forest Dweller – the roles & intersectionalities in Mariam’s life

Mass protests & Sansad Gherao against continued Adivasi evictions

Compilation of Forest Rights Act, Rules, and Guidelines

Frequently Asked Questions on the Forest Rights Act, 2006

Counter Affidavit filed by MoTa in support of tribal rights in the FRA

The post Telangana: Stop forcible ‘re-location of Chenchu Adivasis from Amrabad Tiger Reserve appeared first on SabrangIndia.

A bench of Justice Shekhar B Saraf and Justice Abdhesh Kumar Chaudhary thus quashed a 2021 order passed by the District Level Committee, Lakhimpur, refusing to finalise the claims of 107 ‘Tharu’ community members for forest rights, specifically the right to collect and use minor forest produce for their livelihood. The Order of the High Court was passed on April 9, 2026.

In sum, in its order, the Committee, constituted under the Schedule Tribe and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Rules, 2007, had relied on an interim order passed by the Supreme Court in the year 2000 under the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, to reject the claim of the petitioners. The petition was filed by the NGO Udasa and 101 members of the Tharu community. The petitioners, residents of the Palia Kalan area in Lakhimpur Kheri and members of a Scheduled Tribe, had challenged a March 15, 2021, order that dismissed their claims to community forest rights.

The petitioners moved the High Court seeking the quashing of the district-level committee’s rejection of their claims. They argued that as forest-dwelling Scheduled Tribes, they are entitled to specific rights under the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006.

It was the case of the petitioners that the Forest Rights Act 2006 was enacted specifically for the benefit of the Scheduled Tribes and traditional forest dwellers. They contended that under Section 3 of the Act, their rights include the ownership, access, and use of minor forest produce traditionally collected within or outside village boundaries.

Furthering this argument, the petitioners also relied on a 2013 Ministry of Tribal Affairs circular clarifying that the 2006 Act, being a subsequent statute, supersedes all preceding court judgments or orders of prior date. The Lucknow bench of the Allahabad High Court found justification in their stance and noted that the 2006 Act aims to recognize and vest the forest and occupation in forest land to these forest dwelling Scheduled Tribes and to ensure their livelihood and food security.

On a close reading of the case, the High Court observed that the district-level committee had fundamentally erred in its approach. The court noted that the committee failed to properly consider the intent and specific provisions of the Forest Rights Act, 2006. Instead, the authority had relied solely on an interim order passed by the Supreme Court in the year 2000 to justify the rejection of the claims. The bench emphasized that the primary objective of the 2006 Act is to recognise the traditional rights of forest-dwelling communities and to secure their livelihood and food security. Explaining this further, the Court clarified that with the enactment of this Act, the legislature had not created any new rights for these forest dwellers, rather it had recognized the existing rights and occupation of these people, who had been traditionally restricted to this place of dwelling in forest owing to various historical reasons.

The court noted in its Order that:

“The objective of the Act is to recognise the traditional rights of forest-dwelling communities and ensure their livelihood and food security, which cannot be overlooked.”

The judges also pointed out that the 2006 legislation was enacted specifically to address historical injustices and to provide a legal framework for the rights of these communities, making it imperative for committees to apply the Act’s provisions rather than relying on outdated interim orders It was against this backdrop that the Court found fault with the impugned order, which the bench said had not taken into account the relevant provisions of the 2006 Act and had only dealt with the Supreme Court interim order passed in 2000, prior to the enactment of the Act.

Following this, the court quashed the March 15, 2021, order and directed the concerned district authority to rehear the matter. The bench mandated that the petitioners be provided a full opportunity for a hearing and that a “reasoned order” be passed within a reasonable timeframe after a thorough examination of all relevant facts and records.

Furthermore, the court provided interim protection to the Tharu community members, clarifying that until the fresh decision is reached, the petitioners will continue to enjoy their existing forest rights without disruption.

In its Order, the Court highlighted that Section 4 of the Act begins with a non-obstante clause, meaning that the central government recognizes and vests these rights notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force.

Advocates Nandini Verma, Desh Deepak Singh and Rajat Srivastava apeared for the petitioners. The judgement in Udasa and 106 others vs Union of India, Thru.the Secy. Ministry of Tribal Affairs New Delhi and 5 others may be read here:

Related:

MoEFCC subverting the Forest Rights Act, 2006: 150 Citizens groups

Independent experts, not government servants must be part of the CEC while deciding the challenge to Forest Conservation Act: Former bureaucrats to SC

Destruction of forest in Kancha Gachibowli, Telangana violation of Congress party manifesto: CCG Statement

AIUFWP submits letter LoP Rahul Gandhi, calls for action as forest rights remain in limbo

Adivasi Land Rights Erosion: The effects of the 2023 Forest Conservation Amendment Act

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