Looking at her 18-month-old daughter, Ayesha said, “Nurul wanted a girl, and here she is, but he is not. We were both only children. We didn’t want our child to grow up alone, but now she will. When she was born, so much was happening. No help reached me, but rumours spread that I was living comfortably with money. My in-laws abandoned me. My parents were under strain too. Some even blamed me for Nurul’s death. Then, the worst happened—my milk dried up just a month after Ashnoor’s birth. Breastfeeding stopped completely. The child had already lost her father’s shadow, and now this.” Ashnoor babbled on, pointing at her milk bottle.

Samreen’s daughter, two years old and a few months older than Ashnoor, has seen her father, Aamir. She played with him, teased him, and tired him out. She knows his face well. But she also saw him hanging from a fan, overwhelmed by a strangers’ cruelty. She doesn’t understand what it means. She asks Samreen, “Abbu went to the village. When will he come back?” Samreen pulls her close and pats her. What else can she do? Her wound is still fresh, from May 2025. In Latur’s Maidan Chowk, Aamir was beaten, called a Pakistani. They grabbed his collar, his belt, humiliated him, and recorded it on their phones. The label “Pakistani” shattered him. The next night, after 8 p.m., he took his life. It was a Sunday. Samreen said, “Every night from 8 to 9, I feel restless. Sad. How can I sleep in that room after his death? I stayed with my in-laws for 40 days, never sleeping before 3 a.m. Now, sometimes, I feel nothing at all. No one is truly yours. You carry your pain alone. Sundays used to excite me; now they scare me. Sometimes I think it was all a bad dream, and maybe it’s better that it broke.” Her voice trembles slightly. Her eyes well up. She removes her glasses, wipes her eyes gently, and with a mix of anger and detachment, says, “No one who promised help actually helped. Not even the police. Now I think, will doing anything bring him back? No. So I’m just trying to hold myself together.” For a moment, she stares into space, as if wrestling with herself.

“The situation in Vishalgad and Gajapur has been tense for years,” said Shaheen Mujawar from Vishalgad, her voice tinged with fear. “It gets worse during festivals like Shiv Jayanti and Mahashivratri.” Aggressive sloganeering by some groups creates fear and unease. “Last year, on July 14, 2024, the violence during the so-called Vishalgad anti-encroachment campaign still haunts us. Some slogans were so offensive, it’s hard to repeat them publicly. After that, many children on the fort fell ill. Women went silent. For days, they didn’t know what was happening. Many couldn’t sleep at night. With no jobs now, even salt feels expensive, and the stress on women is immense. That day, just the news of the attack gave one of our relatives a heart attack, and he died on the spot. This year, on July 14, the same fear returned. Sixty percent of the people on the fort left voluntarily. No one wants to die bit by bit,” Shaheen said, her words vivid, as if reliving it all.

In India, a country rich with diversity, communal tensions between religious groups sometimes turn violent. In recent years, openly provocative speeches against Muslims have increased. Muslim men are targeted, attacked, and killed in the name of cow protection. Social media is used to stir public anger, and Muslim men’s lives are taken coldly. Taking a life has become as casual as throwing mud online. But the wounds from these mob attacks aren’t just physical. They deeply affect the families left behind, especially women. Ayesha and Samreen, both in their thirties, lost their husbands to hate-filled attacks. Women like Shaheen have faced the terror of violent mobs and death. These events leave lasting scars on women’s minds. Social stigma, institutional failures, and financial strain add to their burdens. These factors undoubtedly impact their mental state. This report tries to understand how.

Ayesha Shikalgar’s Story: The Pain That Can’t Be Explained

I never imagined that Hindu-Muslim hatred could reach a small village like Pusesavali. Nurul Hasan was the president of the village’s Ganpati committee. Most of his friends were Hindus. Sometimes, during my pregnancy, I’d crave something sweet at night. Nurul’s friend owned a shop, and he’d open it after hours just for me. That’s how close their friendship was. But the same people he celebrated Ganeshotsav with, the ones he called friends, are now his accused killers, Ayesha says, her voice trembling with anger. She asks some hard questions: “No matter what happened, what did anyone gain by taking an innocent life? These people who chant Shivaji Maharaj’s name—what will they tell him? They didn’t just take a life; they destroyed my entire family!” Her voice rises slightly. “Would Shivaji Maharaj approve of such killers? There’s no reason to oppose anyone’s faith, but shouldn’t devotion bring joy to others? Two minutes of rage changed my life’s struggles and sorrows. At 8 p.m., he was with me, our private life just beginning. By morning, my life, my world, became public—caught in the media’s hands. But there was no space left to express what was in my heart. I couldn’t even grieve Nurul’s death properly. The pain of losing a person, that agony, I can’t put into words. It’s a strain I still feel, and now, whenever I see a saffron flag, my heart skips a beat.” A faint tension lingers on her face, framed by her headscarf.

Nurul Hasan, 31, was one of the educated Muslim youths in Pusesavali. In a village of 1,300 families, less than 10% are Muslim. Most run small businesses—grocery stores, mobile shops, or auto parts stores. Nurul was a civil engineer, taking on construction contracts and renting out his JCB machine. He was the sole breadwinner for his parents, their only child. He and Ayesha were married in November 2022. On September 10, 2023, Hindu nationalist groups from Pusesavali and nearby villages started violence, claiming a Muslim youth’s social media post had hurt religious sentiments. They attacked Muslim homes, shops, and mosques. The youth who posted wasn’t even in the village that day. Police later found his phone was hacked, and no evidence was found against him. But by then, the mob’s attack had changed Ayesha’s life. She was five months pregnant at the time. Just the day before, they’d gone for her sonography. Nurul had wanted a girl and had chosen the name Ashnoor, blending their names together.

After her husband’s death, Ayesha faced what many Indian widows do. She was blamed for Nurul’s death. Her in-laws said she was responsible because Nurul was praying on time while living with her. They claimed his going for namaz led to his death. Their words were a huge blow to her. Ayesha, a lawyer by profession, says, “It wasn’t even four days after his death, and they started saying such things. It broke my heart. I started facing mental distress.” The government and some Muslim groups collected aid for her, but none reached her. “I was in iddat, the four-month seclusion Muslim widows observe. I heard people were helping, but nothing came to me. I thought maybe my in-laws got it. Then rumours spread that Nurul was in debt and the money went to clear it. I had to publicly clarify he had no debts. I didn’t want aid, but I wanted the rumours to stop. My in-laws even said I took the money. That led to family disputes. They turned away from me. When I gave birth, they didn’t even come to see their only granddaughter. When I went to their house, they’d left for my mother-in-law’s village for good. They cut me off completely, as if their son’s death made me a stranger. I was fighting society’s rumours the one hand and my own family on the other. It was so stressful.”

Around that time, the stress took a toll on her father. He had a heart attack, his diabetes worsened, and gangrene forced doctors to amputate part of his leg. “No one was there to help. Even my own family turned away. The women’s WhatsApp group in Pusesavali removed me. They mocked me as a ‘gold digger.’ We didn’t even have money for my father’s treatment. People thought we were rich. Some even said I was living lavishly off my husband’s death money,” Ayesha says with a bitter laugh. There’s no anger on her face, just disappointment. She continues calmly, “When I needed society’s support the most, they abandoned me. They excluded me from family functions. They attacked my character. That defamation broke me. My mental health deteriorated. I started getting dizzy. I lost track of what was happening around me. My daughter needed her mother’s milk, but the stress dried it up within a month. It was such an injustice to her. My weight shot past 100 kilos. I developed thyroid issues, diabetes, and high blood pressure. We didn’t even have money for food. My father has some farmland, but no other income. People kept saying I had so much money—well, I’m still waiting for it. Maybe someone’s words will come true,” she says, laughing at her situation. It’s clear Ayesha has found the strength to smile despite her circumstances.

Even two years later, in August 2025, when we met, the financial struggle persists. Her father was hospitalised again. To manage the back-and-forth between hospital and home, her family moved to her uncle’s place in Miraj. Her father’s sugar levels were high, and his mental health had deteriorated too. Ayesha is trying to cope. She wonders if Nurul were alive, would she have to live this nomadic life. She’s also frustrated that she hasn’t gotten enough information about her husband’s case. She had to use her contacts to even get the charge sheet.

As she tries to move forward, Ayesha faces more challenges. “If I’m happy, people say I’m enjoying life after my husband’s death because I got money. If I’m sad, they say it is only because I didn’t get my in-laws’ property. If I focus on my daughter, they say I’m not interested in my husband’s case. People talk from all sides, and I don’t have the strength to explain myself anymore. I feel so alone. I can’t even work right now. My daughter is 18 months old. She’d be alone too. I worry about her. I don’t want her to grow up hating Hindus. I don’t want her to waste her energy on hate. That’s why I’ve started preparing for the JMFC exam. The environment around Ayesha is always tense and negative. I tried to find a house in Karad or Sangli, leaving my village, Rajachi Kurle. But as soon as people hear I’m from Pusesavali or Nurul Hasan’s widow, they say no. Being Muslim and a single mother doesn’t help. I’ve been looking for a house for four months. How do I describe the pain of rejection? Some say no one rents to Muslims after the Pahalgam attack. But my husband was killed here—how dare anyone say that? These experiences have broken me. People often say if Nurul hadn’t gone to confront those people, he wouldn’t have died. So, the attackers, the violent ones, aren’t at fault, but he is to be blamed for taking to task his so-called friends? It’s such an easy blame game. Nurul was a great friend, a great partner. He helped with my work and took care of me. I lost such a person. That pain will always stay. But let me tell you…”

Ayesha takes a deep breath and says, “I’m tired of being seen as a victim or a gold digger. Pusesavali’s incident and the label of Nurul’s widow have stamped my life. I want to change that image. I may fail as a wife, but I won’t fail as a mother. People keep looking at me through that same lens. When I try to move forward, they tie that image to my feet like a burden. It causes me so much mental pain.”

Samreen Pathan: Holding on Through Loneliness

Samreen and Aamir had been married for three years. They have a two-year-old daughter. Samreen works as an assistant manager at a bank, while Aamir was a relationship officer at a telecom company. Both were from Latur, and both had jobs there. But eight or ten months ago, Samreen got a job at a different bank’s branch in Dharashiv. Aamir, not wanting her career to stall, didn’t care about his own job and moved to Dharashiv with her. Once Samreen settled into her routine there, he returned to Latur for work, taking their daughter along. Samreen wasn’t used to living alone, having grown up in a big family. So, she’d come to Latur every weekend, spend two days with them, and return to work. Samreen says, “I’d wake up early, go to the office, meet clients, and spend weekends together. That was our routine. For years, we heard about the growing Hindu-Muslim tension and hatred in society, but it never touched our lives. Aamir’s closest friends were Hindus. At my office, we all worked together harmoniously. No big fights, no complaints, nothing. Everything was peaceful, simple, friendly. But now, something feels different. This incident shocked us. We were happy in our own world. Why us?” she asks, her voice heavy with pain, before falling silent for a moment. Even meeting her in Dharashiv wasn’t easy—she wasn’t eager to talk. It’s understandable. Reliving those memories, retelling her story, is exhausting. The police’s mishandling of her complaint only adds to her distress. When we met at her bank’s premises, Samreen, barely looking thirty, wore simple clothes and glasses. She buries her grief in work, pulling herself forward for the next day.

Since Aamir’s suicide, sleep has been hard for Samreen. The incident left him deeply traumatized, and his suicide is clear proof of that. Samreen recalls, “That day, I was nearing Latur and called him to pick me up. The bus stops at Maidan Chowk, where I was getting off. He’d reached the chowk on his scooter, crossing the road. A local journalist was driving by. Aamir signalled to him, ‘Wait two minutes, let me cross.’ But that hurt the journalist’s ego.” Samreen starts recounting that day’s conversation. The shouting, the voices, still create a fearful tension in her mind. It was a regular Saturday, a routine return to her hometown to see her family and daughter, to recharge and go back to work. A predictable, peaceful routine. But that evening was different. Samreen continues, “The journalist got out of his car, parked it in the middle of the road, and started beating my husband. He asked, ‘What’s your name?’ Aamir said, ‘Aamir Pathan.’ The journalist sneered, ‘What, you think you’re some big Aamir? You’re a Pakistani, a Kashmiri, unfit to live in this country.’ Then he kept hitting him, yanked his pants, took photos, and recorded videos. ‘I’m a journalist,’ he said. ‘This will be in the papers.’ I was on the phone, hearing it all. I asked who he was talking to. I could hear Aamir’s voice, shouting, ‘What did I do wrong? Why are you hitting me?’” The incident happened on May 4, 2025 and was reported a few days later.

The incident left Aamir under immense stress. He was terrified the journalist would call him a terrorist or worse in the next day’s paper. He wanted to file a police complaint but lacked the courage. He called friends for help, telling them what happened. No one responded positively. They told him not to make a big deal, to let it go, or they’d see about it later. The beating had already scared him, but the fact that a stranger could threaten and humiliate him, and his close friends didn’t care, hurt him deeply. The journalist had yanked his pants so hard it caused physical discomfort. Aamir kept telling Samreen about it. She says, “Until 2 a.m., he was on his phone, searching for information about the journalist. At 6 a.m., he checked the papers, worried something was printed against him, calling him a Pakistani. He was so scared. The stress lasted till afternoon. His scooter was damaged, so he got it fixed. We were supposed to attend a reception that evening. He said, ‘Go ahead, I’ll rest and join you.’ When we got there, his phone wasn’t reachable. My mother-in-law, sister-in-law, and I returned home, only to find he’d taken his life.” Samreen, trying to stay strong, has tears in her eyes. She complains the police delayed action. The journalist was influential, connected to politicians, so they wouldn’t take her complaint. The next day, they went to the station at 9 a.m., but the police kept them waiting until 6 p.m., asking for CCTV footage and more. Samreen says, “The police said they’d register a suicide case but wouldn’t mention ‘Pakistani’ or ‘Kashmiri.’ We gave them the car’s number, but they refused to name the journalist in the complaint. We didn’t even know who he was at first. It feels like the police helped him escape by delaying. It affected me deeply. At first, it was unbearable. Now, I feel nothing. Everything’s numb. People come, ask questions, gather information, but no one truly helps. I have no expectations anymore, especially from the police. They suppressed everything. Some even accused us, saying we had political connections and were framing the journalist. The thief calling us liars! We lost our loved one, and we’re the ones filing a complaint?” Her anger peaks as she speaks, her frustration clear in every word. Recalling it chokes her up. She steadies herself and continues, “If I keep thinking about this, how willI run my home? I bury myself in work. Otherwise, I’d have collapsed completely. Evenings make me restless, especially between 8 and 9 p.m. Sundays feel unbearable now. I feel so alone. But I hold on for my daughter.”

Samreen now lives alone with her daughter in Dharashiv. Her mother helps care for the child, but Samreen expects nothing from anyone. “There’s no one to share your pain with. Sometimes, I wish it never happened, like waking from a bad dream to a normal day. Aamir was so good. He’d say, ‘Do what you want, I’m with you,’ and he proved it. Now, there’s only loneliness.”

Ayesha and Samreen, both in their thirties, were busy weaving dreams of family, children, a new life, and stability. They had little sense of the hatred and violence beyond their safe world. Even if such things existed, they felt far away. They lived in a space of harmony, believing no harm could touch them.

What to serve for dinner to men returning from work?

Vishalgad-Gajapur, in Kolhapur’s Shahuwadi taluka, is a cluster gram panchayat. It includes the fort’s village, Gajapur’s Muslimwadi, Vanipeth, Sainath Peth, Baudhwadi, Kembhurnewadi, Bhattali, and small hamlets stretching to Pavan Khindi. The road from Pandhrepani to Gajapur winds through dense forests, with the Kasari dam’s water on one side. The area is breezy year-round but remote, with poor phone connectivity. Naturally, job opportunities are scarce. The main sources of income are tourism and visitors to the local dargah. But violence causes more than just human loss—it devastates livelihoods. The tourism that sustained these remote hamlets has collapsed, and rumours about safety have spread. When the economic balance crumbles, the burden falls on women. Whether a man earns enough or not, feeding the family is a woman’s responsibility, and the stress of figuring out what to cook weighs heavily on them. Shaheen Mujawar explains, “There’s never been tension among locals in Vishalgad’s villages. Even now, communities support each other. But for the last two or three years, the atmosphere has been deliberately poisoned. There’s a court case about encroachments on Vishalgad, yet mobs from outside came and disrupted everything. Worst of all, jobs have vanished. Families have left these hamlets for work elsewhere, facing burdens from rent to household expenses. Children’s schools have been disrupted or changed. Income and expenses don’t align, making it hard for women to run households. People literally don’t have money for salt. If the gas runs out, they wonder who to turn to. Men face work stress, so women can’t tell them about grocery shortages. Every day, they wake up wondering what to cook. By evening, they hope their man comes home, but they dread him asking for food because they don’t know what to offer. Many of us aren’t used to working outside, and some families don’t allow it. If we’re not safe at home, how can we face harassment outside as Muslims?”

A fact-finding report by Salokha Sampark Gat, the Centre for Study of Society and Secularism, and Women’s Struggle for Peace details the violence in Vishalgad and Gajapur on July 14, 2024. It describes the physical, mental, and economic toll, with chilling accounts from Muslimwadi’s women. That day, most men were away for work, leaving elderly people, women, and children behind. The report notes: “Women in Muslimwadi faced terror all day. A mob armed with knives and hammers stormed in. As they pounded on doors, women barricaded them with sofas, chairs, and beds to keep them out. To stop children from crying, women stuffed cloth in their mouths to keep them quiet. Attackers broke doors, entered homes, and smashed everything—TVs, fridges, mixers, beds, chairs, mattresses. They left nothing intact. Scooters and vehicles were smashed with stones and hammers. Six scooters outside one house were piled up and burned. Fifteen to twenty men invaded each home, breaking windows, tearing roofs, burning clothes. Kitchen supplies—grain, flour, food—were thrown out. The entire settlement was destroyed. Women watched their life’s work turn to dust in moments. Attackers asked women their names, insulting those with Muslim names. One woman gave a Hindu name, but when they demanded her Aadhaar card and she didn’t have it, she locked herself inside. They broke the door, entered, and beat her. Reshma Prabhulkar, who runs a small bangle and clothing shop next to her house, didn’t open her door. The mob broke into her shop, detonated her cooking gas cylinder, and set her home’s contents ablaze.” Even without deaths, such incidents push women into a shell, layering pressure on them—worrying about their men’s safety, then their own. Women who’ve fought for freedom retreat, prioritizing others over themselves. This can lead to clinging to religious norms or societal pressures, starting a cycle of isolation, suppression, and disconnection from society, harming their mental health.

Rehana Mursal from Shantisathi Mahila Sangharsh Manch (Women’s Struggle for Peace) shared a haunting observation: “Visiting homes in Gajapur and Vishalgad, I saw children clutching their mothers’ saree ends and stuffing them in their mouths. When I asked why, the women said that during the attack, as men were beaten outside, children hiding with their mothers understood what was happening. Terrified and trembling, they wanted to scream. To keep their hiding spots secret, mothers stuffed saree or scarf ends in their children’s mouths to silence them. The kids struggled to breathe, but the cloth stayed until the chaos subsided. Now, scared children do this themselves when strangers come, stuffing their mothers’ sarees in their mouths. What kind of present and future are we giving these kids? How do we erase this trauma?”

Talking to Ayesha, Samreen, and the women of Vishalgad-Gajapur, one thing stood out: Islamophobia and patriarchy leave Muslim women isolated. Ayesha and Samreen both lost their in-laws’ support—treated as irrelevant once their husbands died. Their Muslim identity made filing complaints difficult, and they were kept away from their cases. They’ve had to take on family responsibilities, including jobs, while raising children alone. Financial strain suffocates them. Women wearing hijabs or burqas face barriers in education and jobs. Such incidents create fear, stopping bold girls from stepping out. Muslim vendors face boycotts, crippling their businesses. Finding homes is tough, with Muslims facing discrimination. Workers endure unequal treatment. Amid these social injustices, mental health is side-lined. The fear, loneliness, and constant vigilance Muslim women face are deep scars of communalism, yet these emotional wounds are rarely discussed.

From Social Othering to Social Suffering

These incidents may seem rare, sparking debates about why discuss them. But in recent years, Muslims, especially men, have been systematically targeted. Hate speeches, calls to displace Muslims, cow vigilantism, and mob killings are rising, as shown in the 2024 India Hate Lab and Hate Crime Report: Mapping First Year of Modi’s Third Government. These reports highlight how anti-Muslim hatred is growing organised, political, and normalised. India Hate Lab recorded 1,165 hate speech incidents in 2024, with 1,050 targeting Muslims, occurring in political rallies, religious processions, and election campaigns. Of these, 266 involved BJP leaders. Terms like “love jihad,” “land jihad,” and “vote jihad” were joined by new ones like “mazar jihad,” “UPSC jihad,” “fertilizer jihad,” and “rail jihad,” spreading false narratives to fuel hatred. Uttar Pradesh saw the most incidents (242, up 132% from last year), followed by Maharashtra with 210 hate speech cases, a 78% rise from 118 in 2023. Of Maharashtra’s cases, 195 targeted Muslims, 14 targeted both Muslims and Christians, and one was anti-Christian. May’s Lok Sabha elections and November’s assembly elections saw peaks, with 32 incidents in May alone. Political leaders and Hindu nationalist groups used these periods to inflame religious sentiments. From August to November, 90 incidents were recorded.

The Hate Crime Report notes 947 hate crimes from June 2024 to June 2025, including 602 violent incidents. In 173 mob attacks, 25 Muslim men died. Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Maharashtra were particularly sensitive. Maharashtra saw 101 hate speeches, with 178 by BJP-linked leaders, including the Prime Minister, Chief Ministers, MPs, and others. Of 947 hate crimes, only 81 (13%) led to FIRs, and no political leaders faced action. These are just recorded cases—unreported ones are unknown. The data shows hate is being normalized, a worrying trend.

Mental health discussions for families affected by riots, violence, and hate speech often focus on post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), noting symptoms like depression, insomnia, or lack of focus. But the broader societal impact is ignored. The “social othering” from religious divides and its mental toll are overlooked. Mental health can’t be separated from daily life’s small and big struggles. Bebaak Collective’s report, Social Suffering in a World without Support: Report on Mental Health of Indian Muslims, highlights this. Researcher and founder Hasina Khan says, “Studying religious and social hatred, we realized Indian Muslims’ mental health reflects political oppression and societal hate. Talking to victims of hate crimes and riots, we saw that discussing emotions, habits, and relationships reveals how communalism changes Muslim lives. Mental health studies can’t stop at PTSD or depression. Violence affects daily life, so we must understand its impact on future aspirations, financial security, and health. Muslim mental health isn’t just about communalism—it underscores everyday exclusion. Some faced physical effects: one family member had a heart attack, another victim’s mother lost her sanity. Women’s mobility is restricted, they grow isolated, neighbors drift away, friends from their own and other communities shrink back. Youth face future anxiety, leading to depression. Activists feel fear and despair, grappling with helplessness and stress. Constant vigilance in public spaces harms mental health, yet it’s rarely discussed.” Mental health expert Shamima Asgar adds, “Clinical mental health approaches are individual-focused, addressing personal pain and trauma but not the root causes of violence. Instead, the focus is on coping with its effects, implying the violence will persist, and you must adapt.” In short, addressing the problem requires tackling its roots, viewing Muslim mental health as social suffering.

Hasina’s point is key: religiously motivated violence and inflammatory speeches are politically driven, a tool of oppression. When such attacks come from institutions, who takes responsibility? The institutions themselves should, as Muslims are citizens under their care. Preventing injustices, mob deaths, and attacks is their duty, as is supporting victims afterward. Otherwise, how will affected families and women stand again? Trauma needs support. Women whose lives are upended by religious hatred need space to express their pain freely and a chance to move forward. Samreen sees her busy life as healing. Mental health taboos often stop women from seeking counselling or therapy, so it should be offered at a government level. Ayesha was encouraged by Satara’s rural police superintendent to try therapy. She says, “I had no idea about counselling or therapy. I thought I was strong. The way I handled things, spoke, and acted made me think I was fine. But therapy showed me I was bottling up my pain. I didn’t even know how much I’d suppressed. I had headaches, irritability, and despair. Sometimes, I felt nothing, like I was numb. The world talked about my tragedy, but I seemed strong on the outside. Therapy taught me I hadn’t moved past the shock. It helped me accept it slowly. Five or six months later, I cried openly for the first time. My heart felt lighter. I realized I needed to think about what’s next, how to live. The stress is temporary. What’s permanent? My daughter. She’s, my anchor.” Ayesha got help, but not from the government.

Improving mental health requires concrete steps at social, political, and legal levels. Rehana Mursal and Hasina Khan suggest permanent peace committees and administrative systems in every district to prevent violence and promote unity. Civil groups should monitor justice systems, support victims, and pressure authorities to act against perpetrators. The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) and Minority Commission (NMC) should investigate alongside police to ensure justice. State governments should compensate victims of hate crimes. Local groups, women’s collectives, and organizations should offer emotional support and safe spaces. Counselling and trauma care should be available in Muslim-majority areas. Health workers need training to handle hate crime victims sensitively. Mental health experts should study the impact of class, caste, and religion on health, and mental health laws must be actively enforced.

Reflecting on Hasina’s words, we can’t ignore changes in emotions, behaviour, and relationships. How do we fix or undo them? When Samreen’s daughter asks when her father will return, what can she say? “We had our routine,” she said, hinting at the joy it brought. Yet, when she called her mother-in-law to stay with her, their avoidance hurt her. How do you compensate for the time needed to process this? Still, Samreen says, “I’ve accepted he’s not coming back. I live for my daughter.” Ayesha echoed this: “Even after marriage, I wasn’t very mature. I was a silly, carefree girl, always laughing, lost in dreams. Nurul let me be that way. Then this mountain of tragedy hit. It made me serious, wiped out my carefree nature. I struggled to accept that change, but now I have. My daughter matters most.” Should we call it good or bad that the daughters these mothers strive for are shielded from reality? Just then, Ashnoor grabbed Ayesha’s phone, pointing at her father’s photo, calling him “Abbu.” She recognizes him, but what will she think when she learns why he’s gone? Unknowingly, the system has made her part of this social suffering. What should she and other children like her do with this pain? In a society where religion overshadows humanity, it feels like we’re all casting shadows of hate. If we can, let’s pull our hands back.

Related:

CJP complains to Maharashtra DGP, Jalgaon SP over police role in Shiv Pratisthan rally amid Suleman Pathan lynching probe

Muslims, victims of targeted violence in Pusesavali, Satara: Fact-finding report

Pay compensation to Nurul Hasan Shikalgar’s family, order independent judicial inquiry: Satara Citizens to Maharashtra Govt

Why no action against hate monger, BJP leader, Vikram Pawaskar asks Bombay HC

Activists highlight decimated situation of Muslim houses, shops in Gajapur, Kolhapur post violence, deem authorities to be guilty of negligence

Violence, vandalism and arson in Kolhapur, Muslim houses and mosque targeted by mob that had gathered on the call of former RS MP Sambhaji Raje Chhatrapati

CJP flags 8 incidents of hate crime including lynchings to National Commission for Minorities

The post Silent Scars: How Muslim widows of hate crimes endure layered, unseen oppression appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The video—which has been widely circulated on social media and reported by The Wire—shows Tasing telling voters unequivocally:

“Government schemes will not go to those panchayat segments where the BJP is defeated… I do what I say.”

He reiterates the same statement moments later: “The panchayat segments where the BJP candidates lose will not get any scheme. As the panchayati raj minister, I mean what I say.”

The complaint argues that this constitutes a direct threat of withdrawal of welfare benefits, amounting to undue influence, coercion, and misuse of official position under the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (Sections 123(2) and 123(8)), as well as a serious breach of the Model Code of Conduct (MCC), which prohibits ministers from using their office to influence electors or making promises or threats linked to government schemes.

CJP, through its complaint, stresses that Tasing’s statement is not merely a political appeal, but an assertion made in his capacity as a sitting minister, explicitly invoking ministerial authority to condition access to State welfare on political loyalty. According to the complaint, this “strikes at the core of the principle of free electoral choice” and undermines the constitutional guarantee that public welfare funds belong to citizens, not to political parties or individual ministers.

It has also been noted that the Congress party in Arunachal Pradesh has already filed a separate petition with the State Election Commission, calling the remark “unlawful” and demanding Tasing’s resignation. The SEC has reportedly sought a factual report from the district administration.

CJP contextualises the issue within broader constitutional norms, stating that the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasised that elections must be insulated from state-backed inducement or intimidation, and that public schemes cannot be used as instruments for conditioning votes. It references the MCC guidelines for ministers as well as the RPA’s prohibition on “threats of injury” to voters.

The complaint seeks:

• Immediate cognisance by the ECI;
• Proceedings under Sections 123(2), 123(8), and 171C IPC/Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita equivalents;
• A direction to the State Election Commission to file an FIR;
• Public censure of the minister;
• And consideration of his temporary removal from campaign responsibilities until the inquiry is completed.

It further argues that allowing such statements to go unaddressed risks setting a precedent where ministers feel free to link welfare access to political compliance, weakening public trust in the neutrality of governance.

While BJP state leaders have distanced themselves from the remark—calling it Tasing’s “personal opinion”—the complaint states that the issue is not personal expression, but the misuse of ministerial authority during an active election period, a matter squarely within the jurisdiction of the Election Commission.

The complaint may be read here.

Image Courtesy: nenow.in

Related:

CJP moves NCM against surge in Hate Speech at Hindu Sanatan Ekta Padyatra

“All I Wanted Was Peace”: How 55-year-old widow Aklima Sarkar won back her citizenship

CJP files complaint over Malabar Hill incident involving Aadhaar checks and targeting of Muslim vendors

The Architecture of Polarisation: A structural analysis of communal hate speech as a core electoral strategy in India (2024–2025)

The post Complaint filed by CJP against Arunachal Minister Ojing Tasing for threatening denial of welfare schemes appeared first on SabrangIndia.

NBDSA’s review of the broadcast revealed that the anchor relied on stereotypes about Bengali-speaking Muslims—particularly the Miya community—misrepresented demographic and political data, and even connected the protest song to an entirely unrelated rape case with no causal link. The Authority noted that this narrative expansion could not be justified as news reporting; rather, it demonstrated that the anchor “had a particular agenda in mind.” By weaving isolated incidents into a communal narrative and introducing ideas like a “Jihadi syndicate” or a conspiracy to undermine Hindu traditions, the programme violated the NBDSA’s Code of Ethics and Specific Guidelines for Anchors, which bar generalisation, sensationalism, and the vilification of any community.

In its direction, the Authority has ordered Times Now Navbharat to remove all “offending portions” from the programme and submit a modified version within seven days. It also instructed that the order be circulated to all member broadcasters and uploaded on the NBDA website and in the next Annual Report. For CJP, the decision marks a significant regulatory affirmation of its consistent efforts to challenge communalised media narratives. For the wider media landscape, the order serves as a critical reminder that the authority to question and critique cannot be exercised through distortion, stereotype, or the manufacturing of communal fear.

The Complaint: CJP flags communal narrative, distortion, and fear-mongering

CJP’s complaint dated September 9, 2024 focused on a Times Now Navbharat programme titled: “Desh Ka Mood Meter: सनातन संस्कृति…कट्टरपंथियों के लिए सॉफ्ट टारगेट? | CM Himanta Biswa Sarma News” that aired on 2 September 2024. The show revolved around the arrest of Altaf Hussain, a Bengali-speaking Muslim singer from Assam, who had released a protest song highlighting discrimination against the Miya community. Following his arrest, the Chief Minister og Assam made a Facebook Live appearance calling the song “an attack” and alleging an attempt to “change Bihu into Miya Bihu”.

The Times Now Navbharat broadcast then used these remarks to spin a sweeping communal narrative.

CJP pointed out that the anchor:

• Presented the incident as part of a nationwide conspiracy against Hindu culture—linking Assam, Kerala, and Kashmir in a manufactured war-like narrative.
• Used dangerous phrases such as “Jihadi syndicate”, communal conspiracy, and “invasion”.
• Equated the term ‘Miya’ with illegal Bangladeshi immigrants, misrepresenting an entire community.
• Suggested that Muslims controlled 30 Vidhan Sabha seats and posed a demographic threat.
• Linked an isolated rape case to an entire community to insinuate collective criminality.
• Wove these disparate incidents into an overarching narrative that Hindus were under “attack”.

CJP also highlighted how the broadcast manipulated imagery, language, and tone to sharply polarise viewers and turn a cultural controversy into a nationwide Hindu-Muslim conflict.

The complete report may be read here.

Broadcaster’s Defence: ‘We only reported facts’

Times Now Navbharat denied all allegations:

• It claimed the show was only reporting the arrest and the Chief Minister’s views.
• It argued that it had differentiated between “Miya” Muslims and indigenous Assamese Muslims.
• It insisted that the depiction of demographics and electoral influence was factual.
• It refuted claims of fear-mongering, stating that the anchor was merely posing uncomfortable questions in the national interest.
• It accused the complainant of “selectively quoting snippets”.

Hearing Before NBDSA: CJP demonstrates how the anchor crafted a false national conspiracy

At the hearing held on February 22, 2025, CJP meticulously demonstrated that:

• The anchor’s opening monologue itself framed the entire show as an attack on Hindu festivals “from Assam to Kerala”.
• This was not reportage but a deliberate, pre-set narrative.
• The anchor bundled unrelated issues—the singer’s arrest, a rape case, Onam interpretations, and alleged temple name changes—to craft a false story of Hindus under siege.
• The rhetoric used was not factual journalism but fear-inducing, divisive, and ethically unsound.

NBDSA’s Findings: “Anchor had an agenda in mind”

• Reporting the arrest itself was legitimate—but the anchor went far beyond facts

The Authority noted that reporting the arrest and discussing the Chief Minister’s criticism of the song was well within the channel’s rights. But the problem was everything that followed.

• “The narrative built by the anchor went much beyond that”

NBDSA found that:

• The anchor introduced communal stereotypes, generalisations, and insinuations against a specific community.
• He linked the singer’s song to an unrelated rape case, despite “no causal connection”.
• He used the incident as an opportunity to push an agenda-driven narrative.

• “The anchor had a particular agenda in mind”

This is one of the strongest observations NBDSA has made in recent orders. The Authority stated that the anchor appeared to seize the incident as a chance to craft a pre-decided, communal storyline.

“In the process, the anchor brings a stereotype in respect of a particular community which could clearly have been avoided. The anchor also connects the song with an incident of rape, though there was no causal connection and the two things arc altogether separate and distinct. It seems the anchor had a particular agenda in mind and got this opportunity to build his narrative, bearing in mind the said agenda. It is this generalisation which falls foul of the BDSA’s Code of Ethics and Broadcasting Standards as well as the Specific Guidelines for Anchors conducting Programmes including Debates.”

• This violates the Code of Ethics and the Specific Guidelines for Anchors

NBDSA held that the broadcast breached:

• requirements of impartiality,
• fairness,
• neutrality,
• and the mandates for non-sensational, non-communal reporting.

The Direction: Remove offending content, re-publish edited version

NBDSA issued a clear directive:

• Times Now Navbharat must modulate the programme by removing all offending portions.
• The broadcaster must submit the edited link to NBDSA within 7 days.
• The order will be circulated internally to all NBDA member channels, editors, and legal heads.
• It will be hosted publicly on NBDA’s website and included in the Authority’s Annual Report.

Why this order matters

For CJP: It validates months of rigorous, evidence-driven media accountability work and strengthens future interventions against hate speech and communal propaganda.

For media regulation: The order sets a clear precedent that anchors cannot camouflage communal narratives under the guise of “uncomfortable questions”.

For newsroom ethics: The order draws a sharp line between reporting and communal agenda-setting, holding anchors accountable—not just for factual accuracy but for narrative construction.

For public discourse: It recognises how dangerous and corrosive it is when mainstream news links isolated crimes to entire communities or constructs conspiracies around minorities.

The complete order may be read here.

Image Courtesy: Youtube.com

Related:

When Erosion Stole Her Home, a Foreigners’ Notice Tried to Steal Her Citizenship: Hamela Khatun triumphs over foreigner tag

CJP files complaint over Malabar Hill incident involving Aadhaar checks and targeting of Muslim vendors

Two Hate-Filled Speeches, One Election: CJP complaints against Himanta Biswa Sarma and Tausif Alam for spreading hate and fear in Bihar elections

The post NBDSA Raps Times Now Navbharat for communal, agenda-driven broadcast; orders removal of inflammatory segments appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The Court’s perspective on this issue brings to bear a number of important constitutional issues that need to be addressed immediately. Firstly, having access to content related to “obscenity” linked to the Aadhaar number will also mean that all online anonymity will cease to be protected and, in effect, this will increase the amount of control given to the government regarding what individuals are allowed to view and/or post online. Secondly, since the meaning of “obscenity” has always been subject to personal opinion and moral bias, if the Court continues to follow a technological enforcement of this concept, it will result in an enormous increase in the amount of government control over online spaces such as YouTube and other OTT platforms and, ultimately, over independent creators.

From the Ranveer Allahabadia Matter to Systemic Control

The Court’s changing view can be traced back to a case involving Ranveer Allahabadia, a YouTuber accused of producing “obscene” and “immoral” video content. This case raised the question of whether the legal rules and regulations currently in effect were sufficient to govern such content. As stated in the Supreme Court Observer respectfully, it appeared as though the Court was more concerned with the potential risks posed by unregulated digital content than with determining whether the petitioner was harmed by the defendant’s content. A similar finding was reported in the Global Freedom of Expression case report from Columbia University, which stated that the petitioner did not present evidence of legal harm, but instead framed the issues through the lens of moral panic.

Following this, the positions taken by the Supreme Court became increasingly broad, culminating in a March 2025 request by the Court to the Union government to think about enacting a law creating a national standard for “online obscenity”. In doing so, the Court transitioned from addressing the content grievance in a singular context to calling for a systematic legislative approach to achieve the same. The Court stated that India lacked a neutral, independent regulatory authority to oversee online content.

In late 2025, the ongoing confusion within the legal framework surrounding Aadhaar culminated in the formulation of a very specific concept regarding how Aadhaar should be used as the basis for age verification for the purposes of preventing minors from accessing pornographic materials. This was not simply a passing comment or procedural matter but was rather a comprehensive strategy of linking an individual’s access to online material directly to an individual’s biometric identity through Aadhaar’s use as an age verification mechanism.

The March 2025 Direction and the Government’s Parallel Initiatives

The Supreme Court’s March 2025 directive to the Executive branch of the Union Government came at a time when the Executive branch had been assessing the types of control that it might use to regulate digital content. Witnesses described that the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting was looking into creating regulations that would provide new rules for the regulation of “perverse user-generated content,” which was echoed by Solicitor General Tushar Mehta, who had testified to the Supreme Court.

At the same time, there was an effort on behalf of the Central Government to push out an Influencer Code, resulting in concern over the lack of public consultation. The Internet Freedom Foundation recorded those concerns in its report and called for a consultation on the matter. The report can be read here.

Many parties were warning that the Supreme Court’s strong push for new legislative enactments could have a chilling effect on legitimate online speech, with reports in The Hindu explaining this matter and how it combined with the earlier actions by the Executive branch indicating an increasing amount of judicial interest in the regulation of social media, and the ability of the Supreme Court to regulate online speech.

Therefore, what once appeared to be one case of litigation has been seen to be braided into a more significant regulatory push. The Supreme Court and the Executive branch are seen to mutually reinforce each other’s concerns regarding digital content.

Obscenity as a Legal Category: Colonial Morality in Digital Form

India’s obscenity doctrine has its origins in the pre-constitutional era. The Interpretation of Section 292 in the IPC has been based on the moral standards of Victorian England, in how sexual expression was viewed as corruptive. Although the Supreme Court has attempted to modernize the definition of “obscene” in Aveek Sarkar v. State of West Bengal by moving from the Hicklin test to current community standards, the concept of obscenity remains the most unclear and controversial definition in Indian Law.

Traditionally, the word “obscene” has been a means to censor the expression of LGBTQ+ individuals, feminists, those providing information about reproductive health, those who produce artistic works and literature, and people who provide sex education. By using the same definition of obscenity to create and regulate content within the digital space, these definitions will encompass many types of legitimate speech, i.e., queer content, experimental art, sex education content being made on YouTube, and narratives of survivors.

Because spaces for digital creators, i.e., YouTube and OTT platforms, are some of the only ways that individuals can currently communicate with large audiences that are not already censored within the media through either governmental control or the NBDSA, independent creators possess the unique ability to produce their content on these platforms without any type of government interference. By establishing obscenity regulations, the autonomy that independent creators currently possess would be lessened, allowing the government to indirectly suppress dissent, satire, and criticisms of the established cultural/ethical norms of society, under the guise of “protecting” minors.

Aadhaar-Based Age Verification: The Constitutional Faultlines

The Court’s finding that the Aadhaar system could be used as an age gate for virtual media raises significant constitutional issues.

Article 19 (1) (a) grants individuals a right to receive information as well as to express themselves. Using Aadhaar to authenticate access to digital content destroys the ability to remain anonymous and connects people’s viewing patterns with their biometric identity. Because of this linkage, individuals may feel deterred from viewing and/or interacting with material that is sensitive in nature, including material related to political criticism, mental health, LGBTQ resource issues, and sexual education.

Article 21 requires that any encroachment upon an individual’s right to privacy must meet the proportionality tests outlined in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India. Aadhaar-based verification of an individual’s age does not meet these criteria as it is neither required nor proportionate. Alternative methods of age verification that do not require individuals to disclose their identities, such as anti-fraud age verification or token-based confirmation of age, may serve as less invasive methods.

Article 14 addresses the issue of classification. Because obscenity is a subjective classification and is inconsistently applied across jurisdictions, an identity-linked filtering system allows arbitrary and disparate restriction of content. Thus, material labelled as “immoral” or “perverse” can disproportionately affect marginalized producers of content, as well as LGBTQ related materials, political satire, or criticisms of majority morality.

Globally, similar types of legislation have been challenged and have been ruled unconstitutional in court. In the U.S., age-verification laws in Utah, Arkansas, and Texas were found to violate an individual’s right to privacy by imposing a chill on lawful speech. Additionally, the Digital Economy Act in the U.K. abandoned the use of age verification due to privacy concerns and the difficulty of implementing that scheme. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) of the EU presumes large-scale identity verification in order to access content as a violation of existing privacy law. Finally, Aadhaar-based filtering is significantly more intrusive than any other methodology described above and places India outside the realm of established international norms based on rights.

Who Classifies Obscenity?

In what is likely the most important question raised by the Court’s recent remarks, the issue of determining what constitutes obscenity remains unresolved. While the Court has suggested that a neutral and independent body should make this determination, the historical patterns of regulatory bodies in India indicate that there will be an ongoing struggle for executive supremacy over regulatory bodies. Even self-regulatory agencies are often placed under significant amounts of state pressure, as evidenced by SCObserver’s analysis of takedown jurisprudence found in Wikimedia Foundation v. ANI and pointing to the inherent risk that any regime to classify material as obscene will be manipulated by the political elite in a country where the lines between nationalism and morality have become increasingly unclear. Therefore, it is highly probable that any form of content that has been deemed ‘anti-national’, ‘anti-authority’, or ‘anti-Indian’ will likely be categorized with what is generally regarded as immoral.

The Political and Practical Risks: Can Balance Exist?

Although it is almost impossible to find a balanced approach to controlling minors from unlawful exposure to cyberspace content while at the same time protecting individuals’ right to free speech, the current regulatory developments within India indicate that finding a true balance is aspirational at best. Increasing pressure from the governing body and the continual expansion of the IT Rules, as well as significant interest in ensuring traceability of cyber content, lack of information regarding reasons for user information withdrawal, and draft regulations for influencer(s) will only serve to establish an overwhelming level of executive control over the speech and behaviour of individuals within cyberspace.

In this context, obscene content provides an excellent opportunity for state intervention by way of protecting children but ultimately provides an opening for vague state regulation of all forms of expression. Such an increase in state authority will rarely decrease, as has been pointed out by many authorities in constitutional law who cautioned against the expansion of state power.

Safeguards against a Moral-Political Regime

The Supreme Court’s development of a new anti-obscenity regime should include critical safeguards, including:

1. a transition from ‘moral’ definitions to ‘harm’ based definitions;
2. an independent and accountable regulatory authority not influenced or dominated by the Executive;
3. a requirement for all regulations to be developed with transparency and public consultations;
4. a strong commitment to continuing judicial review over takedown requests; and
5. a prohibition on access to content via Aadhar-based identity links.

If these safeguards are not implemented, India risks creating a system where the use of morality as a justification for censorship, identity as a currency for realizing one’s right to access information, and a re-definition of digital public spaces under the control of State powers occur.

The judgment in Aveek Sarkar v. State of West Bengal can be read here:

The judgment in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India can be read here:

The judgment in Wikimedia Foundation v. ANI can be read here:

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Preksha Bothara)

Related

The Sentinel and the Shift: Free speech in the Supreme Court

Free Speech in the Digital Age: A doctrinal analysis of four recent Supreme Court cases on Article 19(1)(a)

Ranveer Allahbadia: A “victim” of selective outrage?

Don’t cross the line: Courts on media trials and erring conduct of anchors

Free Speech Upheld: Bombay HC strikes down IT (Amendment) Rules, 2023 as unconstitutional

The post When Morality Meets Surveillance: The court’s push toward state-regulated digital content appeared first on SabrangIndia.

With barely months to go for assembly elections, West Bengal’s political discourse has taken a headlong communal plunge. Again. This is not the first time but this time round, the sudden recall of the ‘Babri Masjid’ –a contentious and sore issue—through a carefully curated and widely publicised “programme” for a foundation-laying ceremony of a Mosque in Murshidabad set the proverbial stone rolling. Invitations were sent out widely by an ‘ousted’ Trinamool MLA belonging to the Muslim community (Humayun Kabir) inviting physical presence of all manner of people at this “brick laying foundation ceremony scheduled for December 6”, the 32^nd anniversary of the demolition of the historic mosque in Faizabad-Ayodya in 1992. These went out in the last week of November; however clearly for the thousands gathered at Murshidabad on Saturday, December 6, the silent planning had gone on for weeks. Making strident calls for “donations for a 300 crore Mosque!” Kabir with other controversial leaders and clerics sparked nationwide coverage and controversy by laying the foundation stone for a “new” Babri Masjid in Murshidabad. The very next day –in a carefully choreographed “rebuttal”, ‘Sanatani’ Hindus gathered in huge numbers in the heart of Kolkata for a reading of the Bhagavad Gita and calling for Hindu unity!

On December 6, 1992, a staggering number of people turned up at the site — a 25-acre plot in Beldanga, a municipality town in Murshidabad — for the brick-laying ceremony, which Kabir described as a ‘prestige battle’ for Indian Muslims. According to some reports, several people had travelled from as far as North Dinajpur and Canning in South 24-Parganas, located some 240 kilometres away. Many were seen walking toward the site balancing bricks on their heads, which they wanted to use in the structure.

Split or Grab: the rush for the ‘Muslim Vote’ in West Bengal

Monetary contributions are not only being sought but unconfirmed reports of who is actually supporting this “programme” have led to widespread speculation. Clearly what is at stake in this communal battle are the 174 Assembly seats out of the total 294 with at least a 15% Muslim electorate — as per the 2011 Census, Muslims comprise 27% of the population — the BJP has made headway in terms of vote shares but has struggled to convert its growing presence into seats. According to pollsters this Hindu majoritarian party will look to “better its 2019 Lok Sabha election record” when it led in 42 of the 174 Assembly segments that have at least 15% Muslim electorate. Mamata Banerjee’s Trinamool Congress has been accused of its fair share of “appeasement” politics and the third (insignificant) player, the Indian National Congress-CPI (M) combine also accused of encouraging a Muslim communal Indian Secular Front (ISF), founded by Pirzada Abbas Siddiqui. Now the controversial Assaduddin Owaisi has threatened to throw in his hat in the West Bengal poll ring by fielding candidates of the All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (MIM). Split or grab, it’s the Muslim Vote that is in demand in West Bengal!

In 2021, after an equally high-pitched (and even communal battle by the BJP), the Trinamool Congress (TMC) managed to retain power in West Bengal. The electorate rewarded Mamata Banerjee another term with a vote share of nearly 50 percent! This signalled a significant victory since it indicated of how Banerjee was chosen by not just the minority community, but all secular-minded people from different faiths. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) that ran a deeply communal campaign, openly calling Banerjee “Begum”, alluding to her alleged pro-minority bias, appears to have failed in dividing the people on the basis of religion.

Banerjee’s TMC had won not only won seats in constituencies with large population of people hailing from the minority community, like Bashirhat (Uttar and Dakshin), Deganga, Islampur, and Kasba, but also in urban centres, mixed neighbourhoods, and constituencies with a larger population from the majority community. Some of TMC’s most significant victories in such seats were, in 2021, from Dum Dum, Howrah (Uttar, Dakshin and Madhya), Jadavpur, Kharagpur, Kolkata Port among others.

“Gita” recital event

A day later, this year, on December 7, devotees in large numbers (BJP claimed 6.5 lakh) turned up at Kolkata’s iconic Brigade Parade Ground to participate in a collective recital of the Bhagavad Gita, titled ‘Panch Lakkho Konthe Gita Path’, organised by the Sanatan Sanskriti Sansad — a collective of monks and Hindutva leaders from across states and institutions. The event, attended by the likes of Dhirendra Krishna Shastri (‘Baba Bageshwar’), Sadhvi Ritambhara and Baba Ramdev, also featured BJP leaders like Samik Bhattacharya, Dilip Ghosh, Suvendu Adhikari, Dilip Ghosh, Sukanta Majumdar, Locket Chatterjee, Agnimitra Paul and others. Participants arrived in huge numbers, in crowded buses, ferries, and trucks, not only from West Bengal, but also from neighbouring states such as Bihar, Orissa, Assam, and even Bangladesh and Nepal.  Clearly underlining central government’s support for the second event, Bengal governor C V Ananda Bose, too, addressed the crowd.

Communal speeches at both events

Before the onset of the brick-laying ceremony in Beldanga on Saturday, Kabir delivered an incendiary speech, going as far as declaring that Muslims, who account for 37% of the total population in Bengal, would willingly sacrifice themselves before letting the bricks of the Babri Masjid come undone. The attendees said that he had perfectly articulated the sentiments of the Muslims in the state. Compatriots of Kabir roared from the stage, “Humayun se jo takrayega, woh choor choor ho jayega!” (Translation: Whoever clashes with Humayun will be smashed to pieces!).

This was both sudden and also planned. Local reports indicate that, Kabir had first expressed his desire to set up the mosque last year in December 2024. He had promised to make a cast of the Babri Masjid by December 6 of this year. “…With donations from everyone, we will build a new Babri Masjid in Beldanga in Murshidabad in West Bengal,” he had said. After this act on December 6, 2025, he was suspended by the Trinamool Congress, which cited communal politics as the grounds for its action. “He stays in Rejinagar and is an MLA from Bharatpur. Why then does he want to build a mosque at Beldanga? This is because Beldanga is communally sensitive, and if there are riots, it will result in polarisation and help the BJP,” Mayor Hakim was quoted as saying.

Both Kabir in Murshidabad and Shastri in Kolkata posed disquieting questions: Were they setting up their supporters for a prolonged confrontation and division?

At the Kolkata parade ground, Shastri, while calling for a Hindu Rashtra, asked: “You won’t be scared? (No) You won’t step back? (No) You won’t run away? (No).” In Beldanga, a speaker standing next to Kabir echoed a similar line of provocation: “You will not run away in fear of the police? (No) Are you ready to be beaten by the police to get what we want? (Yes).” Another compatriot of Kabir exclaimed from the podium: “Ladke lenge Babri Masjid.” (We will fight to reclaim Babri Masjid).

Divisive consequences

The unfortunate result of such verbal challenges translated into a spirit of aggressive religious posturing among the attendees. In Murshidabad, one attendee threatened to cut off the head of whoever stood in the way of the Babri Mosque and play football with it. At the Brigade Parade Ground, saffron-clad vigilantes assaulted one Sheikh Reyajul for selling chicken patties at the event. They kicked down his box of savouries, despite Reyajul pleading that it was his source of livelihood, and made him do sit-ups while holding his ears. Reports later emerged of a second incident where another Muslim vendor was allegedly assaulted for selling chicken puffs near the venue.

The Opposition, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) predictably and openly endorsed the Gita recital event and made their presence felt on the dais. However Mamata Banerjee’s Trinamool Congress is caught unawares. Forced to suspend Kabir days before the foundation laying event. Kolkata mayor Firhad Hakim referred to him as a ‘traitor’, pointedly indicating that Kabir followed in the stead of ‘Mir Jafar’, implying his history of defections, which saw him change from the Congress, to the TMC, to the BJP, and then back to TMC, before his recent suspension. Furthermore, chief minister Mamata Banerjee skipped the Gita Path events despite being invited, citing ideological differences. “How can I go to an event organised by the BJP? I am from a different party, I have a different ideology… They (the BJP) are anti-Bengali”, said Banerjee in a statement.

The BJP in West Bengal didn’t take too long to retaliate. Leader of Opposition Suvendu Adhikari said that while the party did not object to the construction of the mosque itself, they had a problem with the naming. Addressing a press conference on Monday, December 8, Adhikari alleged that Kabir had the support of the administration in celebrating “Mughal-Pathan invaders”.

Notably, one section of those who attended the Murshidabad event seemed miffed with the Bengal government. While speaking to Aaj Tak Bangla, several devotees raised allegations of corruption against the Mamata Banerjee government and underlined that nothing substantial had been done for the Muslims.

Dubious background of Humayun Kabir

This is not the first time that Kabir was expelled from the TMC. In 2015, he was expelled for 6 years over anti-party statements. After contesting and losing as an independent candidate in Murshidabad’s Rejinagar seat in 2016, he joined the BJP in 2018. After losing again in the 2019 Lok Sabha elections, he rejoined TMC in 2020 and won as MLA from the Bharatpur seat.

MLA from Goshamahal, Hyderabad, T Raja Singh, notorious for his Islamophobic hate speeches and incitements to violence, released a video reacting to the ‘new’ Babri Masjid initiative. He exclaimed: “Mai aaj challenge karta hu — ke Bharat ke Ram-bhakto ko le jaakar Babar ka naam jis prakar se Ayodhya mai mita diya gaya tha, waise hi Bangal ke Ram-bhakt jayega, aur Babar ke naam ki bani huyi masjid ki ek ek eent ko samapt bhi karega.” (I’m issuing a challenge today — in the way that the Ram-bhakts of Bharat had removed Babar’s name from Ayodhya, the Ram-bhakts of Bengal will also come together to demolish each stone used in the building of a mosque in the name of Babar.)

The Wire has this piece on the controversy that may be read here

Saffron flags at Kolkata’s Brigade Parade Ground

The sentiments against the foundation of the mosque spilt onto the Gita Path event the next day. While delivering his speech at the Brigade Ground, Dhirendra Krishna Shastri made several references to Babri Masjid. “In Bharat, should anything be named after foreign invaders? Does Bharat belong to Babur or Raghubar? (Raghubar is another name for the Hindu deity Ram.) It belongs to Raghubar or not? (A resounding yes follows) Hindus need to unite, wave the Bhagwa flag and go to villages far and near to wake the Hindus…” he says during his speech.

While calling for a Hindu Rastra, Shastri also posed several provocative questions. He said, “You have to decide if you want Ghazwa-E-Hind or Bhagwa-E-Hind, if you want tanatani (tension) or sanatani, if you want to see a moon on your flag or a flag on the moon, if you want to see a crack among the Hindus or unity…”

Sdhvi Rithambhara graced the occasion as the chief guest. Rithambara she was one of the 68 people named by the Liberhan Commission in its report on the 1992 Babri Mosque demolition and the riots that followed. Besides, she had played a key role in popularising the ‘Ram Janmabhoomi’ narrative through incendiary speeches — which would be distributed through audio cassettes, and played in public. Rithambara has been awarded a Padma Bhushan by the Narendra Modi government and in August 2014 –in a unique photo-opportunity moment was seen tying a “Raakhee” to the newly elected Modi.

Read this article on Rithambara’s Padma Bhushan here.

Re-incarnated in her role at the Kolata Gita recital assembly, she asserted: “Babar ya Babri ki koi buniyaad iss desh mai nahi hai. Koi eento ki maharat khada kar sakta hai, par hriday mai Babar ko basa nahi sakta. Ye rashtra Ram ka hai, aur Ram ka hi rahega. Yaha bhagwa hi pherahega, yahi satya hai—yai Sanatan satya hai.” (Neither Babar nor Babri has roots in this country. Let them build something out of bricks, it won’t change the fact that Babar can never reside in the heart. This nation belongs to Ram, and will only belong to him. Only the saffron shall rule. This is the truth — the Sanatan truth.”

West Bengal Governor CV Ananda Bose also addressed the crowd, quoting extensively from the Bhagavad Gita and referring to the Indian epics. Reminding the audience that “something” had transpired in Murshidabad the previous day, he urged them to end “religious arrogance” in the state. Bengal is in a sad state of affairs and is ready to usher in change, he remarked. At the very beginning of his speech, he said, “I will try to speak in Hindi, since Hindi is our national language. The national language is the mother. English is a midwife, and a midwife can never be a mother.” This is an oft-repeated piece of misinformation, fact-checked by Alt News.

West Bengal: Will the Communal Narrative succeed?

While Kabir finds it difficult at the moment to make political allies, there is no doubt that the two events totally captured the political discourse in the state to an extent that almost everything else have been pushed to the distant margins. A significant marker of that is what Bengali TV news channels debated in the last few days. One can see the playlist of ABP Ananda’s primetime programme ‘Ghantakhanek Sange Suman’ here.

Republic Bangla went on an overdrive in reporting the Gita Path event on Sunday. The anchors went up on the podium, personally interviewing the guests on their observations on the mass gathering. Shows were run with the tagline “When Brigade turned into Kurukshetra.” Journalist Mayukh Ranjan Ghosh also interviewed Sadhvi Rithambhara, asking her whether she felt that Bengal was ready for such a spectacle. The latter indicated, with a wry smile, “Ye prarambh hai, aage dekhiye.” (This is the beginning. Let’s see what happens next). Ghosh was also on stage with Hiranmay Maharaj, who asserted that ‘yoddhas’ or ‘sainiks’ were being created at the venue, who had picked up the mantle of fighting injustice in Bengal, and instituting a Hindu Rashtra.

Bengali mainstream media channels such as Zee 24 Ghanta and ABP Ananda ran continuous coverage on either Humayun Kabir’s actions or the Gita Path controversy, with both stories dominating their news cycles over the weekend

Article 19India traced the dubious political history of Humayun Kabir. The Video may be watched here.

In 2021, Sabrangindia had carried a series of reports/videos on the issues impacting West Bengal Polls. These may be read/watched here and here and here.

Related:

Battleground Bengal: TMC decimates BJP’s communal agenda, wins almost 50 percent vote share!

Elections 2021: Mixed bag for Future of Indian Democracy

Bengal Elections: Here’s what people had to say

The Bengal shrine where Hindus and Muslims both come to pray

The RSS started entering our spaces in the name of ‘religious celebrations’: Bansa Gopal Chowdhury

The post ‘Babri Masjid’ v/s Gita recital: In a cynical play of communal politics, pre-poll West Bengal sees active polarisation at both ends of the spectrum appeared first on SabrangIndia.

According to the minister, between 2022-23 and 2024-25, Pune, Mumbai, Chhatrapati Sambhajinagar, Nagpur, Amravati, Akola and Yavatmal districts collectively reported 14,526 child deaths. This high figure includes infants and children under five admitted to government facilities, as well as cases of severe malnutrition. The minister also said that 138 infant deaths have been recorded in the tribal-dominated Palghar district. Palghar has always been high on hunger, deprivation and infant mortality figures.

Speaking in the assembly in response to a question and citing from the state health department’s data as of November 2025, Abitkar said 203 children were identified as suffering from Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) and 2,666 from Moderate Acute Malnutrition. The proportion of underweight children was recorded at 0.23 per cent, while 1.48 per cent fell in the moderately underweight category.

The minister also referred to the Sample Registration System 2022, released by the Registrar General of India, which estimated Maharashtra’s neonatal mortality rate at 11 per 1,000 live births, lower than the national average of 23. In defence, Abitkar said the state government has adopted multiple measures under the Integrated Child Development Services programme to reduce malnutrition. These include regular health examinations, the Dr A P J Abdul Kalam Amrut Aahar Yojana for pregnant women, targeted interventions for SAM children, the Nutrition Campaign, the Pradhan Mantri Matru Vandana Yojana and the ‘Suposhit Maharashtra’ initiative.

(This is based on a report by PTI)

Related:

India ranks first in child deaths under 5 years of age: UNICEF report

5% rise in infant and child deaths in Mumbai

BRD hospital records 433 child deaths in a month. Should Kerala still follow UP?

The post Maharashtra: Seven districts saw 14,526 child deaths in three years says Govt appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The post Bettina Bäumer’s Inclusive Philosophy Is What We Need in Such Times appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The study’s findings–published by the World Inequality Lab–also found that this wealth inequality in India has shown no signs of reduction in recent years. The richest 10% hold about 65% of the total wealth, and the top 1% about 40%, the report said.

In terms of income inequality, the top 10% of earners receive about 58% of national income, it said. The bottom 50% get only 15%. The income gap between the top 10% and the bottom 50% remained stable between 2014 and 2024, according to the report.

The average annual income in India was about 6,200 euros, or Rs 6.49 lakh approximately, per capita on a purchasing power parity basis. Purchasing power parity is an economic tool that compares the value of different currencies by measuring what the same amount of money can buy in different countries. The average wealth stands at about 28,000 euros on a purchasing power parity basis.

The female labour participation was “very low” at 15.7% and had shown no improvement over the past decade, the report said.

“Overall, inequality in India remains deeply entrenched across income, wealth and gender dimensions, highlighting persistent structural divides within the economy,” it added.

Inequality outlook for India. Source: World Inequality Report 2026

Global trends

Globally, wealth has reached historic highs, but remains, like India, “very unevenly distributed”, the report said. The report noted that the top 0.001%, which is fewer than 60,000 multimillionaires, owns three times more wealth than the entire bottom 50% of humans put together.

Within almost every region of the world, the top 1% alone hold more wealth than the bottom 90% combined, it added. The report added that the global financial system continues to be rigged in favour of the rich countries. Ricardo Gómez-Carrera, the lead author of the report, stated that inequality is “silent until it becomes scandalous”.

“This report gives voice to inequality – and to the billions of people whose opportunities are frustrated by today’s unequal social and economic structures,” Gómez-Carrera added.

The World Inequality Report was launched in 2018. Third edition, published on Wednesday, was released in the context of South Africa’s presidency of the Group of 20 in November, which highlighted two crises: the explosion of global inequalities and the weakening of multilateralism, the analysis said.

The report explores the new dimensions of inequality defining the 21st century, such as climate, gender inequalities, unequal access to human capital, asymmetries in the global financial system and territorial divides that are reshaping democracies.

Figure 2.7 provides a geographic breakdown of global income groups in 1980 and 2025, highlighting how the composition of top earners and other groups has shifted over time. In 1980, the global elite was overwhelmingly concentrated in North America & Oceania and Europe, which together accounted for most of the world’s top income groups. Latin America also had some presence near the top, but China and India were almost entirely confined to the bottom half of the distribution. At that time, China had virtually no presence among the global elite, while India, Asia in general, and Sub-Saharan Africa were heavily concentrated in the very lowest percentiles.

Interpretation. These graphs show the geographical breakdown of global income groups. Between 1980 and 2025, the global income distribution has shifted, with China gaining presence in the middle and upper−middle percentiles, while Europe and North America & Oceania’s dominance in top income groups has declined, but it is still large. In 1980, 1% of the world’s top 1% income group were Chinese residents. By 2025, this figure increased to 5%. This highlights the growing global share of China and the diversification of the global elite.

Sources and series: Chancel et al. (2022) and wir2026.wid.world/methodology.

Figure 2.9 turns to the middle 40%, often considered the backbone of the middle class. Here the contrasts are equally stark. In the most unequal settings, especially in Latin America and parts of Africa, the middle 40% receive as little as 23–35% of income, reflecting a fragile middle class. By contrast, in Europe and parts of North America & Oceania, this group’s share rises to 44–50%, making them central to national income distribution. Asia shows both ends of the spectrum: India’s middle 40% remains in the lower levels, while China’s earns a larger share.

Related:

One percent of Indians own 58% of country’s wealth: Oxfam inequality report

Journalist cannot cover the labour beat without questioning extreme inequality- P Sainath

Tax Justice proposal: what are leading economists proposing on Wealth Redistribution in India

The post In India, Wealth Inequality among highest in the world, top 1% holds 40% wealth: Study appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The freedom movement was led by leaders who had imbibed values with democratic potential and they led the movement against colonial rule. The likes of Sardar Patel, Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Subhash Chandra Bose articulated values with inherent rights for the nation. They took the lead with great cost to their personal life. One of the examples was the inspiration derived by Jyotirao Phule was from Thomas Penn’s book ‘Rights of Man’. Ambedkar was an ardent follower of John Dewey who was steeped in democratic values.

Recently Mr. Narendra Modi went on to criticise Lord Macaulay for this transition to the values of rights, when he emphasised the traditional knowledge system as a dog whistle to highlight the concept of duty over rights.

Interestingly Modi and his ilk (Hindu Mahasabha-HMS, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh-RSS) and its communal counterpart, the Muslim League both expressed the values of ‘declining classes of landlords, Nawabs and Kings’. Modi’s Hindutva has harked back to an “ancient period” where ‘Dharma’ was the core, the Dhrama which followers of Hindutva claim to be very great and the core part of Hinduism. Dharma stands for religiously ordained duties, and this includes the rigidly exclusionary system of Caste! Hindu ideologues claim that there is no equivalent of Dharma in other religions. There is Shudra Dhrama, Stree Dharma, Kshatriya dharma and what have you. At core it is caste stratification and duties which dominated the scene.

The Muslim League emerged from the nawabs/landlords and their leaders eulogised the great rule of Muslim kings, starting from Mohammad bin Kasim who ruled for some time in Sind. Their model was based on feudal values, looking down on lower levels of society. Dominant sections were blessed with the ‘divine power’ trickling down to a few feudal lords etc. Pakistan saw an initial and welcome definition of secularism by Jinnah; however, in practice, it was feudal elements that were dominant around him. After Jinnah’s death they came out openly to impose their feudal-semi feudal values on Pakistani state and society.

Even as Hindu Nationalism (read supremacism) today appears dominant in India, what is being undermined in this onward march of Hindutva politics is the concept of ‘rights’ inherent in our national movement and embodied in the Indian Constitution. This is where the non-biological Narendra Modi begins the journey to achieve the goal of undermining rights and highlighting duties.

The call for the dumping of the education system introduced by Lord Macaulay was a subtle attempt in this direction. He put it more overtly (brazenly) on Constitution Day, November 26, 2025. Modi said, “In a recent letter to Indian citizens on Constitution Day (November 26, 2025), Prime Minister Narendra Modi heavily emphasised the importance of citizens fulfilling their Fundamental Duties. He argued that performing these duties is the foundation for a strong democracy and national progress towards his “Viksit Bharat” (Developed India) vision for 2047. Modi urged citizens to place their “duties towards the nation foremost in our minds”. This aligns with his previous statements where he suggested that “rights are embedded in duties” and that “real rights are a result of the performance of duty”.

Besides, he also tweeted “On Constitution Day, I wrote a letter to my fellow citizens in which I’ve highlighted the greatness of our Constitution, the importance of Fundamental Duties in our lives…” Shravasti Dasgupta writes “While this is not the first time that Modi has laid emphasis on citizens duties, or interlinked them with rights to suggest that duties correspond to rights, the Constitution shows that such interlinking is incorrect. According to constitutional experts and political scientists, an invocation of duties, placing primacy on them above rights, is a subtle attempt to recast the Constitution, ensure compliance in a manner seen in authoritarian regimes, and signals a danger to democratic principles”

Modi went on to invoke Gandhi on this. “…and that “real rights are a result of the performance of duty,” Invoking Gandhi is totally off the mark as Prof Zoya Hasan (Prof. Emerita, JNU) says, “Gandhi often spoke of duties, but he never treated them as a substitute for rights; duties did not supersede rights. For him, duties were a moral path for individuals, while Fundamental Rights remained essential and must be protected by the state. Gandhi’s commitment to duties did not diminish rights in any way,”

Incidentally to emphasise the concept of rights, many of these were underlined during the UPA regime (2004-2014). This was through a series of enactments, long overdue. The first and major amongst these was “Right to Information Act 2005”, a mechanism to root democracy in a deeper way. This was followed by Right to Education Act 2009, Right to Food (National Food Security Act, 2013). With the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government losing power in 2014, it is the National Democratic Alliance (NDA)—dominated by the RSS-driven Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Today, in 2025 it is the third term of the NDA, today a minority government supported from the outside. With this change in power at the centre in 2014, the constitutional, rights’-based approach to public policy has gone into cold storage and duties are being made the major part of our national policies.

Even our Constitution emphasises on rights in itself. In fact, Article 21 of our Constitution, that guarantees the ‘Right to Life’ incorporates within it, the right to health, the right to education for example. The UPA Government underlined –albeit belatedly — in an appropriate way.

Today Hindu Nationalism is totally suppressing rights, like freedom of religion, freedom of expression, freedom of expression among others. Many of these are incorporated in the wider concept of Human rights as well.

What Mr. Modi is conveying in his November 26 s letter is authenticating the suppression of the concept of ‘rights’ for all and through this relegating religious minorities to second class status, derogating questioning and dissenting citizens, academics and activists to being “Urban Naxal”. Incidentally and not surprisingly, it is the Constitutions of authoritarian states that emphasise on “duties” at the cost of rights.

Disclaimer: The views expressed here are the author’s personal views, and do not necessarily represent the views of Sabrangindia.

Related:

Sectarian nationalism and god men: Sri Sri Ravishankar attends the 75th Birthday of the RSS chief

Emergency regime and the role of RSS

Understanding the growth of European-style nationalism in India

The post Hindu Nationalism’s sectarian nationalism and its concept of ‘duties and rights’ appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The complaint highlights how the padyatra—led by Dhirendra Krishna Shastri of Bageshwar Dham and traversing 422 village panchayats—was framed as a campaign for “Hindu unification” and the creation of a “Hindu Rashtra,” while repeatedly othering non-Hindu communities, especially Muslims, through charged rhetoric. CJP notes that these speeches did not remain confined to religious or cultural expression but crossed into fearmongering, exclusion, conspiracy theories, and open provocation, creating an environment ripe for hostility and public disorder.

Escalation of Hate Rhetoric across States

The complaint presents a chronological mapping of the speeches and categorises them into direct hate speech, exclusionary hate speech, and fearmongering, with further indicators like economic boycotts, conspiracy theories, and threats of vigilante violence.

In Ghaziabad, the yatra began with explicit demographic fearmongering—claims of Hindus supposedly “declining” and standing on the “brink of becoming minorities.” Statements insinuating that communities associated with “chadar” and “father” should decrease in number were highlighted as clear exclusionary attacks. The recurring invocation of “love jihad” further entrenched conspiracy theories weaponised against Muslims.

At the next major stop in Delhi, the rhetoric intensified. One speaker warned that in twenty years Hindus would be fighting for their very existence, and accused Muslims and Christians of adopting “foreign identities.” The praise of “bulldozer justice” and insinuations that Muslims would seize Hindu property were documented as statements bordering on direct incitement.

In Faridabad, a communal rhyme—“tel lagao Dabur ka, naam mita do Babur ka”—was used to evoke historical resentment, while the line “Jo Ram ka nahi wo kisi kaam ka nahi” blatantly ostracised minorities. A later Faridabad event referred to fears of India turning into “Bangladesh,” invoking imagery of dispossession and persecution to generate panic.

In Palwal, speeches openly demanded daily commitment to building a Hindu Rashtra and framed all conversions to Islam or Christianity as inherently “illegal,” merging conspiracy with ideological exclusion. Another speaker urged audiences to “buy from Hindus, employ only Hindus,” amounting to an explicit call for an economic boycott of Muslims.

The complaint documents how, on November 12, Dhirendra Shastri made sweeping insinuations that “only Non-Hindus are terrorists,” blamed madrassas for producing extremism, and warned of “bomb blasts in every street” if Hindus did not unite. CJP flags this as a combination of direct hate speech, fearmongering, and misinformation designed to criminalise an entire community.

In Banchari, speakers told people who disagreed with Vande Mataram or the worship of Ram to “go to Pakistan or Afghanistan,” directly equating religious identity with foreignness. References to Kashmiri Pandit displacement were used to justify the idea that Hindus could soon be driven from their homes.

At Chhatarpur, the rhetoric leaned on mockery and conditional belonging, suggesting that those who refuse to chant Vande Mataram should “book a ticket to Lahore.” Proposals for DNA testing of those who disagree with Hindu practices added an additional layer of derision and pseudo-scientific exclusion.

The speech in Mathura invoked the violent mobilisation of the Babri Masjid demolition and called for reclaiming the Shahi Idgah Mosque, evoking historical tensions and encouraging crowds toward aggressive action.

Legal Implications Outlined in the Complaint

CJP’s complaint does not merely document hate speech but sets out the legal provisions under which the incidents fall.

The organisation notes violations of:

• Article 14 (equality before law), due to calls for segregation and economic exclusion
• Article 15 (non-discrimination), owing to open appeals to religious discrimination
• Article 19(1)(a) read with 19(2), as the speeches constitute incitement and threats to public order
• Article 25, by delegitimising and attacking the religious practices of minorities

The complaint also lists specific offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023:

• Section 196 – promoting enmity between groups
• Section 197 – assertions prejudicial to national integration
• Section 299 – deliberate insult intended to outrage religious feelings
• Section 352 – intentional insult likely to provoke breach of peace
• Section 353 – statements causing public fear, alarm, or inciting communities

The organisation further references the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on hate speech, including Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan, Shreya Singhal, Amish Devgan, and the Tehseen Poonawalla lynching guidelines, to underline the constitutional and judicial standards violated during the padyatra.

A section of the complaint underscores the “extremity of speech,” the authority wielded by speakers like Dhirendra Shastri and Devkinandan Thakur, and the massive audience sizes—factors that amplify the potential for mobilisation, disorder, and violence.

CJP alerts NCM on the situation

One of the most urgent concerns raised by CJP is the scale and influence of the padyatra. With an estimated 3,00,000 participants, celebrity spiritual leaders with millions of followers, and openly majoritarian slogans gaining traction, the organisation warns that unchecked hate campaigns could lead to real-world violence, as seen in Dhutia, Madhya Pradesh, where a crowd attempted to burn Shastri’s effigy and the situation escalated into a police lathi charge.

The complaint emphasises that this is not a communal dispute, but a “systematic campaign of hate speech meant to serve political purposes” and capable of triggering targeted violence against vulnerable groups.

Prayers before the NCM

CJP has requested the NCM to:

• Take cognisance of the complaint under Section 9(1)(d) of the NCM Act
• Initiate a fact-finding mission on the padyatra
• Direct administrations to monitor rallies, record speeches, and ensure safeguards
• Protect targeted communities through nodal officers per Tehseen Poonawalla guidelines
• Ensure immediate FIRs for hate speech
• Recommend strong social media regulation to curb the circulation of hateful content

Reiterating that the complaint is not against any religion or religious exercise, CJP concludes that the issue at hand concerns the rule of law and the constitutional guarantee of equal citizenship, now under strain due to repeated, organised calls for a religious nationhood project.

The Complaint may be read here:

Image Courtesy: tv9hindi.com

Related

Sanatan Ekta Padyatra – Unmasking the March of Majoritarianism

Targeted as ‘Bangladeshis’: The hate speech fuelling deportations

Words that Divide: BJP MP’s Bhagalpur speech targets Muslims, CJP files MCC complaint claiming violation of election laws

CJP files complaints against the Hate Speeches delivered in Uttar Pradesh

The post CJP Files complaint with NCM over escalating Hate Speeches during Hindu Sanatan Ekta Padyatra appeared first on SabrangIndia.