While the Model Code of Conduct (MCC) is in force for the ongoing Bihar Assembly elections, Choubey, a senior BJP leader and sitting MP, delivered a speech that directly targeted the state’s Muslim population. In his address, he appealed to “Muslim brothers” to “reduce their population” and claimed that “ghuspaithiye (infiltrators) are coming from across the border.” The remarks, CJP noted, deliberately conflated Indian Muslims with illegal immigrants and invoked communal stereotypes to create fear and prejudice among voters.

CJP has urged immediate intervention by both the Election Commission and state authorities to safeguard the neutrality and integrity of the electoral process.

A dangerous conflation of faith and foreignness

According to the complaint, Choubey’s remarks go beyond electoral rhetoric. They represent a calculated act of hate speech, portraying Indian Muslims as demographic threats and foreign infiltrators — a narrative that has become disturbingly frequent in election campaigns.

By stating, “Our population is also declining. I appeal to my Muslim brothers as well: reduce your population. Ghuspaithiye are coming from across the border… our government is working to remove them,” the MP collapsed the boundary between citizen and non-citizen, implying that the Muslim presence itself was suspect.

CJP’s complaint underscores that such rhetoric de-nationalises Indian Muslims, recasting them as outsiders within their own country — a move that weaponises religious identity to secure electoral advantage.

Clear violations of electoral and criminal law

CJP’s complaint meticulously details how the speech violates several provisions of law:

• Under the Representation of the People Act, 1951:
  • Section 123(3) and (3A) — forbidding appeals on religious grounds and promotion of enmity between communities.
  • Section 125 — making it a punishable offence to promote hatred in connection with elections.
  • Section 123(2) — covering undue influence on the electorate through intimidation or communal fear.
• Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023:
  • Section 196 — promoting enmity between groups.
  • Section 297 — statements conducing to public mischief.
  • Section 356 — outraging group dignity.

The organisation also cited violations of the Model Code of Conduct, which explicitly prohibits appeals to religion or acts that aggravate communal tension, and constitutional breaches of Articles 14, 15, 19, 21, and 25 — which guarantee equality, dignity, and freedom of conscience to all citizens.

A pattern of Islamophobic rhetoric

Pirpainti, a constituency in Bhagalpur district, has a mixed population and a history of communal sensitivity. In this context, CJP warned that such inflammatory remarks carry “dangerous polarising potential” — alienating Muslim citizens, normalising prejudice, and reducing the election to a contest over identity rather than policy.

The complaint places Choubey’s remarks within a wider and troubling pattern of electoral Islamophobia, where demographic myths and border anxieties are repeatedly used to stigmatise India’s Muslim citizens. It warns that this form of hate-driven politics seeks to redefine citizenship itself — who belongs and who does not — through the language of religion and fear.

Calling Choubey’s statements “hate propaganda delivered under the cover of governance and nationalism,” the complaint asserts that such conduct corrodes the very spirit of democracy. It notes that communal appeals not only distort voter choice but also legitimise bigotry as a form of governance, thereby eroding India’s secular foundation.

CJP invoked key Supreme Court precedents, including Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen (2017), which forbids religious appeals in elections, and Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. Union of India (2014), which recognised hate speech as an assault on equality and fraternity.

CJP’s prayer and demands

Through the complaint, CJP has urged the Election Commission of India and Bihar’s election authorities to:

1. Take immediate cognisance of the complaint.
2. Register an FIR against Ashwini Kumar Choubey under relevant provisions of the Representation of the People Act and Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita.
3. Debar him from further campaigning pending inquiry.
4. Issue a public censure and advisory to all political parties to desist from communal appeals.

The complaint concludes by calling upon the Election Commission to ensure compliance with the constitutional mandate of free, fair, and secular elections under Article 324.

The complaint may be read here.

Related:

From Despair to Dignity: How CJP helped Elachan Bibi win back her identity, prove her citizenship

Two Hate-Filled Speeches, One Election: CJP complaints against Himanta Biswa Sarma and Tausif Alam for spreading hate and fear in Bihar elections

From ‘Tauba Tauba’ to ‘Expel the Ghuspaithiya’: The language of exclusion in Bihar’s election season

CJP urges YouTube to remove content targeting CJI Gavai from Ajeet Bharti’s channel

The post Hate Has No Place in Elections: CJP moves State EC against BJP MP Ashwini Choubey’s communal speech appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Given that most anti-Hindutva critiques in the media emerge from the more privileged Brahmin–Bania perspectives, they inadvertently reinforce this diversion—keeping the focus on “Rajput history” and “Muslim history” while avoiding deeper discussions about present-day skewed representation, social engineering, and economic power in the state.

The real project is social engineering to secure Brahmin dominance in politics, bureaucracy, and culture. Crucially, this dispensation operates in tandem with Bania corporates, who reap massive economic benefits while Brahmins provide ideological legitimacy.

Cabinet and Leadership: It is numbers that matter

In early 2024, the BJP’s elevation of Bhajan Lal Sharma as Rajasthan’s Chief Minister, C.P. Joshi as state party chief and Babulal Sharma as Jaipur prantpracharak, signaled a clear shift towards Brahmin-Raj: three top Brahmin leaders at the helm, despite Brahmins being a small fraction of the state’s population. Although, after some uproar, C.P. Joshi was replaced by Madan Rathore (from OBC Teli) as the State president.

RSS Supremacy and Institutional Capture

The RSS, dominated by Maharashtrian Brahmin leadership, directs this design.  Mohan Bhagwat, personally presided over major coordination meetings in Jodhpur held between September 5 and 7 this year, underlining Rajasthan’s importance in the evolution of a national Hindutva strategy. These gatherings link the BJP’s governance in the state directly to Sangh priorities: temple projects, Sanskritisation drives, and rewriting cultural narratives to affirm Brahmin custodianship of tradition. Rajputs, OBCs and SCs are recast as auxiliary players in a story authored by Brahmin ideologues.[1]

The increased focus on Maratha figures from the Peshwa period, despite their irrelevance or controversial relation with the state’s history. The state-level celebration of Ahilyabai Holkar, despite her irrelevance to the state’s history, illustrates this strategy. This can be contrasted with the state government’s ambivalence towards the NCERT’s recent Hindutva led revisions, although disfavouring the State’s own history which only exemplifies this attitude.

Bureaucracy: The Quiet Arm of Hegemony

It is within the bureaucracy is where the real engineering occurs. National studies confirm that Brahmins are heavily over-represented in senior IAS/IPS ranks despite being a demographic minority. Rajasthan has seen repeated controversies around promotions and selections, with Brahmin-Bania candidates favored over Rajput, SC, ST, and OBC aspirants. For instance, the chief secretary of Rajasthan, Sundhansh Pant and the Finance Secretary Vaibhav Galariya are both Brahmins. Further, nine of the 24 Officers deputed at the Chief Minister’s Office (CMO) are Brahmins — that is more than one-third. This pattern also reflects in appointments of Vice Chancellors & Judiciary. At Rajasthan University, 5 out of 8 Deans are Brahmins. Out of 32 government-run universities in Rajasthan, Brahmins were appointed as Vice-Chancellors in 11 — a striking overrepresentation for such a small demographic group.

Similarly, while several Brahmin and Bania officers currently serve as District Superintendents of Police, there is only one Rajput—and not a single Muslim—holding that position.

These administrative patterns influence which textbooks are printed, which religious boards receive funds, and which police cases are prioritised. The dominance of Brahmin officers ensures Hindutva’s agenda is implemented with sympathetic pro-Brahmin filters. For instance, both Sharma and Joshi (although no longer BJP State president but still highly influential) frequently attend events promoting Parshuram as a cultural icon — recently Sharma inaugurated a Parshuram Gyanpeeth.

Hence, institutional capture through selections ensures policy-shaping and policy enforcement in favour of the concerned castes — increased State funding towards the Vipra Boards, Vipra foundations, Brahmin-controlled Gyanpeeths, promotion of vegetarianism and selective application of cow protection laws highlight this policy-shift.

The Brahmin–Bania Axis

Recently, Shikhar Agrawal, the Additional Chief Secretary was given additional charge as chairman of RIICO. Rajasthan, particularly the Marwar region and Jaipur-Shekhawati belt, has been the traditional home of major capitalist Bania houses like the Birlas, Bajajs, Mittals, Godrejs, Jhunjhunwalas, Agrawals and Khatris. The Hindutva order in Rajasthan rests not only on Brahmin dominance in ideology and bureaucracy but also on the economic muscle of Bania corporates. Brahmins provide ideological legitimacy and administrative control; Banias provide capital, campaign financing, and media ownership.

Deregulation in mining, real estate, and energy overwhelmingly benefits Bania-controlled enterprises. Contracts in solar parks, cement, and infrastructure disproportionately go to groups like Adani, Birla, and Mittal. GST centralisation, championed by Bania networks has weakened smaller competitors while favouring large corporates.

The Adani Group’s explosive expansion into Rajasthan’s mines, solar projects, and logistics under BJP, the interests of the Birlas & Mittals in Cement, telecom, and education sectors safeguarded by policy, and Local Khatri & Mahajan networks thrive under SME-friendly reforms while enjoying bureaucratic protection, exemplify this. On the other hand, Rajasthani Muslims, historically strong in art, culture, handicrafts and local trade, are vilified to marginalise them economically. Similarly, ownership of farms and orans (grasslands) by small Rajput farmers and traditional heritage by Rajput elites is often attacked under the rhetoric of samantwad.  Thus, while the state actively promotes the economic hegemonies of Brahmins, Banias, and Jats — and popular civil society discourse normalises these — the same socio-political channels stigmatise Muslim businesses and undermine Rajput property ownership.

In short, Brahmin–Bania synergy ensures that while Muslims are scapegoated and Rajputs are historically and politically side-lined, the real beneficiaries are the Brahmin-Bania elites who monopolise both state power and wealth.

Mechanisms of Social Engineering

This institutional capture and policy favouritism, is guarded by many strategies of social engineering like controlling information, culture, and using media and cinema to mislead public discourse.

The control of information and culture has played a pivotal role in social engineering.
Curricula and festivals are increasingly tilted towards Sanskritic, Brahminised traditions, side-lining Rajasthan’s syncretic and regional heritage. Similarly, Rajput-Muslim syncretic culture, exemplified by Sufi-Nathjogi traditions like that of Gogapir, are disfavoured for a more Brahmin-centric orthodox traditions like that of Parshuram. Similarly, Rajput-Dalit heterodox traditions of Ramdevji Tanwar and Rani Bhatiyani remain under constant attacks of Brahminisation by the State. This helps clear more space for Brahmin social influence over other communities — normalizing both institutional capture and policy favouritism.

However, what is more discomforting is the means and strategies employed to protect this hegemony, especially the social ramifications on the communities projected as social-punchbags for narrative decoys.

Muslims and Rajputs as the Mobilising “Other”

Unlike the Persian-origin Ashraf elites of Lucknow and Hyderabad — Rajasthani Muslims are either SC and ST convert or Rajput converts. While Kayamkhanis of Marwar & Bikaner, Sindhisipahis of Jaisalmer, and Khanzadas of Mewat are Muslim Rajputs, others like the Mirasis, Rangrezs, Langhas, Meos have been part of the traditional culture of the Hindu Rajputs.

Anti-Muslim mobilisation remained difficult in most pre-accession princely states due to the Muslim proximity to the Rajputs. However, that has dramatically changed in the last few years with various social engineering strategies, particularly Sanskritisation and Kshatriyaiaation. Hence, despite being local ethnic groups and despite being well-integrated contributors to the pre-accession Rajput States, including the modern armies — the Muslims are projected as the Turkic or Mughal “other.”

Furthermore, Muslim-othering has been followed by self-contradictory anti-Rajput rhetoric — the samantwad rhetoric by Brahmin and Jat politicians on one hand, and the violent conflicts over identity of medieval-era Rajput kings and other feudal lords on the other. The militant claims by Jats and Gujjars over Mihirbhoj Pratihar, Anangpal Tomar, Prithviraj Chauhan are not spontaneous social phenomena but politically-planned social engineering, termed “Rajputisation”. In this, different historical Rajput warriors and saints are assigned to different OBC communities to create social clashes between Rajputs and various OBC castes.

Hindutva’s obsessive appropriation of Maharana Pratap serves three key objectives. First, it eclipses the broader social, economic, and cultural contributions of Rajput dynasties, from the Pratiharas of Mandore onward. Second, it casts the rest of the Rajputs as collaborators with the Muslim ‘other.’ Third, it diverts attention from Hindutva’s ongoing project of Rajputisation.

Hence, BJP-RSS’s social engineering protects its policy of allotting more political space to Brahmins and economic space to Bania corporates. However, such social engineering is further compounded by narrative decoys (eg. Haldighati inscription debates) planted in media and films.

Discourse Deflection: Karauli Riots and the Afwaah Irony

During the run-up to the 2022 State elections, the State witnessed communal tensions and riots in Udaipur, Jodhpur and Karauli.

In Udaipur, the gruesome murder of Kanhaiyalal Sahoo was milked by BJP for anti-Muslim social-tension, while Karauli witnessed communal clashes triggered by rumours during a procession. Amid the fear, Madhulika Singh Jadaun, and her relative Sanjay Singh sheltered Muslims in her home and saved lives. Being the real heroes against Hindutva polarisation, they are reported to have said “This is Hindustan and we are Rajputs, we are known to protect people and we will always do it. Irrespective of faith,”

This irony deepens when we turn to the cultural sphere. Set in a Rajasthan town, Sudhir Mishra’s film Afwaah (2023), portrayed how rumours and political manipulation escalate into violence. However, both Madhulika, a garments seller, and Sanjay, a technician, are forgotten a year later. Instead, the film starring Bhumi Pednekar and Sumit Vyas, cleverly placed Rajputs at the centre of anti-Muslim violence.

Furthermore, the obsessive discourse around the change of the Rakt-talai inscription accompanied by a complete silence over Rajput protests against NCERT’s recent revisions fuels a misleading narrative that positions Rajput history as a beneficiary of Hindutva revisionism—a claim flatly contradicted by the recurrent protests Rajputs themselves have mounted against Hindutva’s distortions of their history in recent years — which can be read here, here, here & here.

The BJP-RSS machinery in Rajasthan has pursued Brahmin dominance with remarkable consistency, yet this reality remains conspicuously absent from most critiques of Hindutva in the state — deflecting discourse towards Rajput-Muslim history and the false binary instead.

Conclusion:

The real dangers of Hindutva lies not merely in the hate it spreads, but in the social order it entrenches: a system where Brahmins and Banias, wield an outsized supremacy over Rajasthan’s politics, economy, and culture — while constantly scapegoating the Muslims and the Rajputs through popular literature and cinema.

(The author is a mechanical engineer and an independent commentator on history and politics, with a particular focus on Rajasthan. His work explores the syncretic exchanges of India’s borderlands as well as contemporary debates on memory, identity and historiography; he can be contacted on adityakrishnadeora@gmail.com)

1. https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2025/Sep/03/rss-all-india-coordination-meet-in-jodhpur-from-sept-5-to-7
2. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/jaipur/ahilyabai-holkar-statue-unveiled-on-jmc-h-initiative/articleshow/121541829.cms

Disclaimer: The views expressed here are the author’s personal views, and do not necessarily represent the views of Sabrangindia.

Related:

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Rajasthan: Civil Society demands arrests, rule of law and end to minority targeting under anti-conversion law

PUCL slams recently passed Rajasthan anti-conversion bill as “draconian and unconstitutional”

The post Hindutva’s Rajasthan Project: Brahmin-Bania Power, not just Muslim baiting appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Tharu Community and Dudhwa National Park

In the Palia Tehsil area of Lakhimpur Kheri district resides the Tharu community, known for its rich cultural heritage and deep-rooted connection to nature. Recognised as a Scheduled Tribe in 1967, most Tharu families depend heavily on forest resources for their livelihood, including bamboo, sugarcane, timber, and other forest produce.

The Tharu community inhabits around 40 villages situated in and around the Dudhwa National Park, which was established in 1977. The subsequent declaration of Dudhwa as a Tiger Reserve further intensified restrictions on land use and access to forest resources for local residents.

Section 2 of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 (Restriction on the de-reservation of forests or use of forest land for non-forest purposes) provides that:

“Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force in a State, no State Government or other authority shall make, except with the prior approval of the Central Government, any order directing—
(i) that any reserved forest (within the meaning of the expression ‘reserved forest’ in any law for the time being in force in that State) or any portion thereof, shall cease to be reserved;
(ii) that any forest land or any portion thereof may be used for any non-forest purpose.”

While this law was intended to prevent the diversion of forest land, its rigid implementation in Dudhwa effectively displaced the Tharu population from their traditional habitats. Following the creation of the National Park and Tiger Reserve, many Tharu villages found themselves enclosed within or adjacent to protected forest zones, leading to the loss of access to ancestral lands and essential resources.

Forest Rights Act, 2006 and Criminalisation of the Tharu Tribe

The Forest Rights Act, 2006 (FRA) (attached below) recognises and vests the rights of forest-dwelling communities by providing a legal framework through which they can claim ownership over land, forest resources, and livelihoods. It was enacted to undo the historical injustice faced by Adivasi and traditional forest-dependent communities who were excluded from forest governance for decades.

Section 4(2) of the FRA provides that:

“The forest rights recognised under this Act in critical wildlife habitats of National Parks and Sanctuaries may subsequently be modified or resettled, provided that no forest rights holders shall be resettled or have their rights in any manner affected for the purposes of creating inviolate areas for wildlife conservation.”

However, in practice, these provisions were ignored. The Tharu community was arbitrarily denied their forest rights, including the right to collect firewood, graze cattle, and access forest produce, despite fulfilling all statutory criteria. In 2012, when members of the Tharu tribe petitioned the court demanding recognition of their rights, the Forest Department responded by filing thousands of fabricated “forest crime” cases against them.

As reported by The Times of India, BJP MLA Romi Sahani from Palia constituency stated that “they filed cases not only against those who went into the forest, but also people who never left home, the physically incapable, and even the dead.”

Over the years, the Tharu community has continued to face bureaucratic harassment and administrative pressure, resulting in the systematic erosion of the rights guaranteed to them under the FRA. Seventy-year-old Badhana Devi recounts, “If we raise our voices or refuse to pay when officers come, we are threatened with new cases.”

In 2020, the District Level Committee (DLC) further rejected the Tharu community’s forest rights claims, disregarding the explicit provisions of the FRA, which confer rights irrespective of the revenue status of a village. (See CJP’s previous coverage: “Vested Rights under Threat: Tharu Tribe Petitions High Court against Administrative Harassment”)

These instances illustrate a clear misuse of statutory powers and administrative authority, effectively stripping the Tharu community of their constitutionally protected rights under the pretext of performing “official duties.” What was meant to be a restorative statute has instead become a tool of persecution, deepening the community’s marginalisation.

Misuse of Conservation Laws across India

Over the years, similar patterns of criminalisation of Adivasi and tribal groups have been witnessed across India. In Uttarakhand, for instance, the Van Gujjars were evicted from their homes as part of a drive to ‘clear encroachments on forest property’. They invoked their right to inhabit forest land under Section 3 of the FRA, 2006 (read below). Further, Section 4 of the Act clearly states that, in cases where these members are residing in critical wildlife areas and National Parks, it is important first to rehabilitate them, to provide them a secure livelihood.

The Uttarakhand High Court, through an interim order, upheld the Van Gujjars’ right to migrate to their summer homesteads and held that any attempt to evict them would violate Article 21 of the Constitution as well as their rights under the FRA, 2006.

In the Hoshangabad district of Madhya Pradesh, the Adivasi tribes such as the Korkus and Rajbhars have faced similar ordeals. At Itarsi, the Central Proof Range was established as a testing ground for armaments and ammunition, leading the government to acquire vast stretches of forest land and displace Adivasi and Dalit families. The concept of ‘protected forests’ was further expanded under Section 4(2) of the Forest (Conservation) Amendment Act, 2023 (attached below), to include land used for strategic or defence projects and paramilitary camps. These exemptions and definitional ambiguities are now frequently misused by the government to bypass conservation obligations and to criminalise local communities.

Perhaps the most alarming example lies in the implementation of the Wildlife Protection Act, 1972. Under the pretext of ‘conservation’, the Act has criminalised essential livelihood practices of forest dwellers, such as collecting mahua, grazing cattle, and fishing. Entry into these lands itself became a punishable offence. A report by the Criminal Justice and Public Accountability Project (CPA) reveals that most offences registered against Adivasi communities were categorised as ‘threats to ecological security and animal habitats’, often without any specific allegations.

Further, forest dwellers and Adivasis continue to face evictions through industrialisation and mining projects. The mineral-rich states of Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, and Jharkhand are particularly affected. To facilitate mineral extraction, the standard state response has been to first declare forest land as ‘protected’ under the Forest (Conservation) Amendment Act, 2023, and then evict its inhabitants in the name of ‘conservation’. This systematic process not only undermines the FRA’s purpose but also perpetuates the cycle of dispossession and displacement of forest communities.

Legal Framework: Setting a Precedent for the Tharu Position

The judicial trajectory surrounding forest rights has consistently reinforced the constitutional legitimacy and welfare-oriented purpose of the Forest Rights Act (FRA), 2006. As seen in the preceding instances, from the Tharu community in Uttar Pradesh to the Van Gujars of Uttarakhand and the Adivasi groups in Madhya Pradesh, the administrative machinery has often undermined the FRA’s intent through procedural denials and criminalisation. However, Indian courts have, on several occasions, upheld the protective spirit of the FRA and reaffirmed the rights of forest-dwelling communities.

In Wildlife First v. Union of India, 2019 (read below),  the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the FRA, recognising it as a vital mechanism for securing the livelihoods and cultural identity of Scheduled Tribes and other traditional forest dwellers. The Court underscored that the Act does not weaken forest conservation but instead democratises it by empowering local communities as custodians of the environment.

Similarly, in Orissa Mining Corporation Ltd. v. Ministry of Environment and Forests & Ors., 2013, concerning the proposed bauxite mining project in the Niyamgiri Hills, the Supreme Court upheld the Ministry’s decision to deny forest clearance. The Court found that the project violated both the FRA and the customary rights of the Dongria Kondh tribe, whose spiritual and cultural ties to the Niyamgiri Hills were constitutionally protected.
In paragraph 43 of the judgment (attached below), the Court characterised the FRA as a “social welfare or remedial statute” designed to recognise and vest forest rights. The legislative intent, it observed, is unambiguously to safeguard the customs, usages, and traditional practices of forest dwellers. The judgment further emphasised that under the Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 (PESA) (read below), particularly Section 4(d), the Gram Sabha is entrusted with the duty to preserve and protect tribal traditions, cultural identity, and community resources.

This landmark ruling thus establishes a jurisprudential framework that directly supports the claims of the Tharu petitioners. Their ongoing struggle to secure recognition of their Community Forest Resources (CFRs) in the Terai region echoes the Dongria Kondhs’ defence of their sacred landscapes. The same legal reasoning: recognition of customary rights, participatory decision-making through the Gram Sabha, and the FRA’s remedial purpose, should guide judicial interpretation in the Tharu case as well.

Constitutional Implication: Articles 14, 21, and 300A

The arbitrary usage of the Indian Forest Act and Wildlife (Protection) Act, to arrest and detain Tharu Tribe members, under the guise of ‘protecting wildlife and natural habitat’, violates equality and liberty guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution. The forest officials particularly target people belonging to Scheduled Tribes, who often lack legal and financial recourse to raise their voices. The FIRs are filed without looking at the facts of the circumstance (as in the case of Surdas Ram Bhajan), and any sort of resistance is framed as insurgency. Therefore, non-arbitrariness, which is at the heart of Article 14, is violated.

Article 21 guarantees the right to life and personal liberty. The FRA helps secure the right to life for forest-dwelling communities by protecting their ability to earn a livelihood from the forest. The petitioners argue that non-conferment of their forest rights is a violation of Article 21, and a further perpetuation of historical injustice, against which the FRA was meant to protect.

Article 300A of the Constitution protects the right of an individual to not be deprived of their property, secured by the authority of law. The Adivasis and Tharu tribe members are forced into a system of private/state property, as a result of unsettled land rights and lack of clear demarcations. The logic holds that any land that is not owned by individuals automatically becomes state property.

Thus, the 4000 cases against Tharu Community members violate their right to life, equality and property.

Conclusion and Way Forward

The core purpose of the Forest Rights Act (FRA), 2006 was to rectify the “historical injustice” committed against forest-dwelling communities, particularly Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers, whose customary rights to forest lands and resources were denied during the colonial period and, regrettably, even after independence (as reiterated in Orissa Mining Corporation Ltd. v. Ministry of Environment and Forests).

In the case of the Tharu community, the lands they had long inhabited were declared “forest land” or designated as “protected areas” for wildlife conservation, disregarding their traditional conservation practices and deep ecological dependence on forest resources.

The extensive rights guaranteed under the FRA remain largely unrealised due to the excessive control exercised by forest officials, whose discretion often renders these legal protections ineffective in practice. Furthermore, the recent Forest Conservation (Amendment) Act, 2023, has weakened the FRA’s intent by allowing the Union Government to grant forest clearances even before the rights of forest-dwelling communities are settled or their consent obtained. This legal overlap has created a dangerous precedent where conservation is invoked to justify dispossession.

These developments also highlight how state machinery, including the Police and Forest Departments, disproportionately target communities residing in and around forest areas, a significant proportion of whom belong to Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes.

The petition submitted by Santari Ram Rana and Sadai before the Allahabad High Court exposes this subtle yet pervasive bureaucratic violence embedded within law. Unlike overt forms of repression, this harm is inflicted quietly through administrative procedures, documentation, and regulatory control, reflecting a colonial mindset that continues to view forests as needing protection from the very people who have protected them for generations.

While the writ petition remains pending before the High Court, members of the Tharu community must continue asserting their legal and cultural rights, drawing inspiration from the Van Gujjars of Uttarakhand and the Adivasi movements in Hoshangabad. Only through sustained advocacy, awareness, and judicial engagement can the original spirit of the Forest Rights Act be truly realised.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Shyamli Pengoriya)

Related

Vested Rights under Threat: Tharu tribe petitions High Court against administrative harassment

Forest Conservation Amendment Act, 2023: A challenge to Adivasi land rights and environmental protections

U’khand Forest Dept admits faults in eviction notices issued to Van Gujjars

Forest Conservation Rules, 2022- An overview of changes that snatch rights of Gram Sabhas

Sokalo Gond and Nivada Rana lead the campaign for Forest Rights in SC

Tribals Allege Officials Use Forest Rights Act to Harass, Demand Money; Picket DM’s Office

The post When Conservation Becomes Coercion: The silent violence faced by the Tharus of Kheri appeared first on SabrangIndia.

According to the NCRB, suicide remains most prevalent among daily wage earners, housewives, and students. These descriptions are not only about occupational status, but reflections on India’s social hierarchies. The “daily wage earner,” who made up 26.4% of all suicide victims in 2023, is the precarious worker, buried in debt, inflation, and insecure employment. The “housewife,” at nearly 14.7%, is a symbol for unpaid domestic labour under patriarchal control and social isolation. The “student,” accounting for 8.5% of total suicides, demonstrates the systemic public and private failure to provide a humane education and mental health support. For the NCRB, these are merely descriptive occupational categories, yet they carry moral and political significance; they are indicators of whose despair is acknowledged and whose is not.

Numbers without Context

The NCRB identifies “family problems” (32%) and “illness” (18%) as primary contributors to suicide. This seems simple on paper – family dysfunction and health issues. However, these classifications conceal more than they disclose. What the Bureau calls “family problems” may include domestically violent behaviour, dowry harassment, or control related to one’s gender. “Illness” likely includes untreated depression among other illnesses, stigma related to disability, and traumatic, life-changing events. Then, stripped of the structural analysis, we easily convert the collective suffering to private pathology in the data.

There is no clearer example of this than student suicides. In 2023, India reported 13,044 student suicides, or about 36 a day, with Maharashtra (2,578) and Tamil Nadu (1,982) having the highest number, followed by Madhya Pradesh (1,668). These states have the largest educational ecosystems, or competition for schools, outside of state-controlled educational ecosystems. Similar patterns recur beneath the statistics: students migrating from rural to urban centres; that caste-based discrimination continues as students are excluded to elite institutions in various ways, if they are even included; and pressures from family about economics that bar a young person’s choice to attend school prevent their abilities to enjoy school, carry their anxieties into learning spaces when they keep “school pressures” from family. The NCRB does not ask whether “academic pressure” is systemically tilted “equal” – it is not.

In February 2024, the Supreme Court released its comprehensive Guidelines on the Mental Health of Students, citing what it referred to as an “epidemic of psychological distress” on campuses across India. The Court called upon universities and colleges to create counselling cells, train faculty to identify early indicators of distress, and implement systems that can protect students from discrimination that may take place on the basis of caste, gender, or the socio-economic status of their family of origin. These Guidelines were developed as an extension of the Court’s findings in Sukdeb Saha v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2024), in which it explained that the State has a “positive constitutional obligation” under Articles 21 and 21A to ensure mental well-being in educational and workplace environments. A detailed summary done by CHMLP can be read here. In that case, the Court condemned the State’s failure to create a coherent national framework for the prevention of student suicides, in particular to direct the states to view student suicide as a consequence of policy failure rather than a private tragedy.

These pronouncements reaffirm a simple truth that the NCRB’s data failed to reveal: student suicides are not individual personal crises but expressions of collective neglect, of caste hierarchy, and of inadequate mental health infrastructure. Nonetheless, and despite these judicial interventions, implementation remains inconsistent, as most such institutions continue to treat mental health services as optional, rather than as the institutional responsibility they need to understand it as.

The Silence around Farmer Suicides and those of Workers

The way the NCRB handles farmer suicides chillingly captures the politics of omission. In 2023, 12,567 farmers and agricultural labourers died by suicide — a 5% increase from 2022. Maharashtra, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, and Madhya Pradesh made up over 60% of these suicides. Yet again, for every year, the report does not discuss structural causes: falling crop prices, shocks due to climate change, debt, and neglect in policy.

Organisations from civil society, such as the All India Kisan Sabha and P. Sainath’s People’s Archive of Rural India, have documented hundreds of farmer suicides that are absent from the NCRB report. Many suicides are coded under “other professions” or not included at all due to technical reasons of land ownership. Tenant farmers, sharecroppers, and women farmers who do the vast majority of agricultural work are missing. The NCRB’s silence about these deaths is a political act that removes the agrarian crisis from public consciousness by rendering structural violence into an absence in administrative categories.

In a similar vein, the cadre of “daily wage earners” has increased dramatically in the last five years, subsuming what was a more distinct representation of labour distress. It now includes construction workers, gig workers, sanitation workers, and small artisans who are all trapped in elements of insecurity. That nearly one in four people who commit suicide in India are daily wage earners, should not be an observation of a statistical trend, but a reproach of an economy that cares more for productivity than for people.

The Unseen Intersections of Caste, Gender, and Mental Health

By refusing to break suicide data down by caste identity, the NCRB obscures an understanding of mental distress in terms of social humiliation and exclusion. For instance, the case of Darshan Solanki, a student at IIT Bombay, who died by suicide in 2023, was widely identified in news reports as a death resulting from caste discrimination, but it would not be categorized under anything official. Likewise, the suicides of Dalit and Adivasi students across medical and technical institutions in India, who endure daily micro-aggressions from their peer groups in the form of “competition,”, also go undocumented in suicides that become of relevance to national statistics.

Gender issues exacerbate susceptibility. The relation between domestic violence, demands for dowry, and emotional abuse remains the most consistent factor for women in suicide. Yet, the label “housewife” that the NCRB has categorized those women under is a clear indication of biased and patriarchal categorization that sits below the level of humanity when suffering is reduced to a bureaucratic category. By neglecting to label intimate partner violence and coercion within marriage as a cause, the Bureau also erases the structural violence that is encountered in everyday life.

Despite the passage of the Mental Healthcare Act of 2017, mental health continues to be an undercurrent in policy and also data collected for the report. Governments allocate less than 1% of total health spending to mental health for community mental health services, which should be alarming. The NCRB noted “mental illness” as a cause for suicide in only 4.1% of suicides recorded in the annual report, and experts recognize this figure is severely understated. What this illustrates is not a rethinking of resilience, but denial. The state can measure death, rather than despair.

Disappearing the Crisis

Data manipulation encompasses not only the omission of unpleasant cases but also the reclassification of data. In 2023, several states, including Maharashtra and Telangana, reported a decline in farmer suicides due to “better welfare delivery,” although independent reports indicated a mostly correspondingly higher number. Similarly, the circumstances leading to a decline in cybercrime in Mumbai were simply reclassified to generate an 11.7% decrease in cybercrime. Suicides are often reclassified into other occupations or left unqualified to further the claims of administrative success.

The sanitization of statistics is part of a larger pattern: the act of withholding documentation to showcase progress. In Jammu & Kashmir, in 2023, the NCRB reported zero counts of communal violence and non-sedition prosecutions, while hundreds of detentions were conducted under the Public Safety Act.  Further, the NCRB stopped collecting data on lynchings and hate crimes from 2017 onwards, stating that the data collected was “unreliable”. By deciding what “counts,” the state ultimately will dictate what “counts” as a national issue.

Toward a Politics of Care

While the NCRB’s Crime in India report quantifies violence enacted by other people, Accidental Deaths and Suicides in India quantifies violence enacted by systems — by poverty, patriarchy, and policy. Still, states treat these deaths not as a social emergency, but as a statistical inevitability. A humane interpretation of the numbers insists that we view suicide not as the failing of an individual, but as the failing of governance.

There are still signs of resilience. Grassroots organizations like Kisan Mitra Helpline, Students’ Collective for Mental Health, and SNEHA have sought to offer mental health counselling, debt mediation, and legal aid to communities at risk. The Supreme Court’s latest directions to improve student mental health are also positive, but without an investment in a mental health infrastructure, these are largely symbolic.

To address India’s suicide epidemic, policy needs to shift from counting deaths to preventing deaths. This requires an acknowledgement of the structural nature of despair, deeply rooted in inequity of wealth, caste humiliation, and gendered violence, and a reimagining of the welfare state as one of care, rather than control. Until then, each number in the NCRB’s ledger will remain an indictment of a country that is still growing but not healing.

The Accidental Deaths and Suicides in India report serves a dual purpose, chronicling suffering and depoliticizing it. Each suicide occurs as an isolated act, separated from the systems that created it. The result is a perception of neutrality; the data is both the proof and the excuse.

The judgment in Sukdeb Saha v. State of Andhra Pradesh can be read here.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Preksha Bothara)

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Delivered within 24 hours of each other on November 4, 2025, these campaign speeches have been described by CJP as “a double assault on India’s constitutional morality and the sanctity of the electoral process.” One, by a sitting Chief Minister, communalises the campaign through religious vilification and genocidal language; the other, by a local candidate, turns political rivalry into a threat of physical mutilation.

The Siwan Rally: Himanta Biswa Sarma’s speech of hate and fear

At an election rally in Raghunathpur, Siwan, Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma compared RJD candidate Osama Shahab to global terrorist Osama bin Laden, telling the audience that they must “eliminate all Osama Bin Ladens” from Bihar. Sarma further warned that a victory for Shahab would be “a defeat for Hindus,” promising to watch the results from the Kamakhya temple in Assam and invoking figures like Babur and Aurangzeb to frame the election as a Hindu versus Muslim battle.

His remarks — equating a Muslim candidate with terrorism, describing Muslims as “infiltrators” who threaten women, and boasting of stopping salaries of “mullahs” — were deemed by the complaint to be “state-sponsored demonisation” and “an incitement to exterminatory politics.” Delivered by a Chief Minister under the Model Code of Conduct, they constitute, according to the complaint, “a direct assault on the secular fabric of the Constitution.”

CJP’s complaint lays out an exhaustive legal analysis: violations of Sections 123(2), 123(3), 123(3A), and 125 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and Sections 196, 297, and 356 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. Through the complaint, it has been claimed that Sarma’s speech breaches the Ministerial Code of Conduct, since he holds constitutional office and bears heightened responsibility to maintain neutrality and restraint.

Describing the speech as “hate institutionalised as political strategy,” the complaint also notes that Sarma’s words collapse the constitutional boundary between religion and citizenship — constructing Muslims as infiltrators and enemies of the nation. CJP has demanded the registration of an FIR, Sarma’s debarment from further campaigning, and a public censure from the Election Commission.

The complaint may be read here.

The Kishanganj Rally: Tausif Alam’s threats of violence

On the same day, in Laucha Naya Haat, Kishanganj, AIMIM’s Tausif Alam took the campaign stage to retaliate against RJD leader Tejashwi Yadav, who had earlier called AIMIM chief Asaduddin Owaisi an “extremist.” In a shocking display of aggression, Alam told the crowd: “Tejashwi Yadav called our leader Owaisi an extremist. Tell him — I will cut his eyes, fingers, and tongue if he dares insult Owaisi Sahab again.”

He went further, mocking Tejashwi as the “son of a fodder thief,” an evident reference to his father, Lalu Prasad Yadav.

The complaint describes these remarks as “acts of open intimidation and violent abuse that degrade democratic discourse.” It cites violations of Sections 115, 326, 349, and 356 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, along with Sections 123(2), 123(4), and 125 of the RPA, 1951, and multiple provisions of the Model Code of Conduct.

The complaint further emphasises that this is not political hyperbole but a “direct threat of grievous bodily harm” designed to intimidate a rival candidate and vitiate the atmosphere of free choice. CJP has called for an FIR against Alam, his temporary debarment from campaigning, and a public censure to reaffirm that threats of violence have no place in electoral politics.

The complaint may be read here.

A Pattern of Electoral Decay: Hate as common ground

Though ideologically opposite, the two speeches share a disturbing symmetry. Both substitute argument with aggression, civic discourse with communal or personal hostility. In Siwan, hate was religiously coded — against Muslims, invoking “infiltrators” and “Osamas.” In Kishanganj, hate was personally targeted — against a rival, invoking mutilation and humiliation.

CJP’s complaints thus expose a broader crisis: the normalisation of hate and violence in electioneering. Both incidents, as highlighted in the complaint, have the potential to trigger communal tension and retaliatory violence in Bihar’s politically sensitive districts. The Election Commission’s inaction, it argues, would erode not just the Model Code of Conduct but the very credibility of free and fair elections.

The complaints legal framing situates these speeches within the broader constitutional architecture of Articles 14, 15, 19, 21, and 25, and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen (2017) and Ziyauddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Mehra (1975), which define religious appeals and hate speech as “corrupt practices” that vitiate elections.

A call for restoring democratic dignity

Together, these complaints articulate an urgent appeal — that India’s electoral arena must not be reduced to a theatre of hate, threat, or intimidation. When political speech turns into a weapon — whether through communal vilification or violent menace — it corrodes the very spirit of democratic civility and constitutional equality. Electoral politics draws its legitimacy from civility, equality, and reasoned dissent — not from the language of fear or vengeance. The complaint reminds the Election Commission and the public alike that elections are not merely contests for power but tests of the Republic’s moral fibre.

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The petitioner Masoom Raza, practicing advocate in Bihar, told the Sabrang India that the scheme as an “arbitrary sanction and timed execution” of a 2,500 Crore fund aimed at 25 lakh women beneficiaries. The petitioner further said that this action is not a “legitimate welfare measure” but a “calculated exercise in electoral inducement” designed to “destroy the ‘level playing field'” for the election.

The petition names the State of Bihar, the Election Commission of India (ECI), the Chief Electoral Officer of Bihar, the Department of Rural Development, and the Bihar Rural Livelihoods Promotion Society (JEEVIKA) as respondents.

What is the scheme and why is it being challenged?

The PIL provides a detailed timeline to support its claims. The MMRY scheme was given Cabinet approval on August 29, 2025, to provide a non-refundable grant of 10,000 rupees to one woman per family for self-employment.

The petitioner’s challenge focuses on the timing of the implementation:

September 20, 2025 – The Rural Development Department (RDD) issued a letter confirming a “high-profile online launch” for the first instalment transfer, scheduled for September 26, 2025, with the presence of the Hon’ble Prime Minister and Chief Minister.

September 29, 2025 – JEEVIKA issued an office order scheduling a “single, massive Direct Benefit Transfer (DBT) of 2500 Crore” to 25 lakh beneficiaries on October 3, 2025.

October 6, 2025 – The Election Commission of India announced the schedule for the Bihar Assembly Elections, 2025, bringing the Model Code of Conduct (MCC) into “immediate effect”. The MCC, Part VII, Clause (v), prohibits ministers and authorities from sanctioning “grants/payments out of discretionary funds” after elections are announced.

The petition alleges that despite the MCC coming into force on October 6, the state continued to execute the disbursement in a “staggered manner”. The PIL cites a Direct Benefit Transfer timeline, showing that post-MCC fund transfers were initiated on October 17, October 24, and October 31, 2025.

The petition argues this demonstrates a mala fide decision to ensure the financial grant operates as an inducement during the polling phases. It also notes that the same timeline indicates a further disbursement is scheduled for November 7, 2025, necessitating “urgent judicial intervention”.

What are the specific allegations of wrongdoing?

Beyond the timing, the petition also raises serious questions about the scheme’s implementation, alleging it was procedurally flawed and led to corruption.

The PIL argues that the scheme’s guidelines improperly delegate the core executive function of ground-level beneficiary verification to “non-governmental” and “non-statutory” functionaries known as “Community Mobilisers (CMs)”. The petition claims this delegation is arbitrary and ultra vires (an act done without legal authority), creating a fundamental flaw in the scheme’s governance.

This hurried and unchecked process, the petition alleges, has resulted in “widespread illegality and mismanagement,” including demands for bribes for application verification. The petition includes multiple news reports as evidence.

These news reports allege that irregularities and extortion demands have marred the implementation of the scheme across several districts. In Bettiah, four employees were dismissed following complaints of “illegal recovery.” In Jamui’s Chakai block, a “Jeevika Didi” (Community Mobiliser) allegedly demanded 250 rupees to process a form, while in Barhat, similar allegations surfaced of demands ranging from 100 rupees for a form to 2,000 rupees from the 10,000 rupees grant, with an audio clip of a CM allegedly seeking money reportedly going viral.

In Beldaur, women from multiple Self-Help Groups in Sukhaybasa village claimed they were denied benefits after refusing to pay a “nazarana” (offering or bribe) of 1,000 rupees per member to a Jeevika employee.

Prevent the misuse of “money of the taxpayers” and protect the “sacrosanct fundamental right of fair election

The petitioner, states that he has no “personal interest” in the case and is acting in the public interest to prevent the misuse of “money of the taxpayers” and protect the “sacrosanct fundamental right of fair election”.

The PIL prayed High Court to issue several directions:

1. Stop further payments: an order directing the State of Bihar, the RDD, and JEEVIKA to “immediately cease and desist” from all further fund disbursements under the MMRY scheme until the election process is concluded.
2. Enforce the MCC: a direction for the Election Commission of India (ECI) to take “prompt, decisive, and mandatory action” against the state for the “egregious breach” of the Model Code of Conduct. The PIL also notes the ECI’s alleged “failure to act” on a formal complaint filed by RJD Leader Shri Manoj Jha on October 31, 2025.
3. Investigate corruption: an order to constitute an “Independent Fact-Finding Committee” to inquire into the scheme’s verification process, the delegation of authority to CMs, and the “widespread allegations of illegal demands, corruption, and bribery”.
4. Demand records: a direction for the state to file a “detailed Compliance Affidavit” providing all original administrative records, including a complete list of beneficiaries sanctioned before the MCC was enforced (October 6, 2025) and a separate list of all beneficiaries who received payments after that date.

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The complaint, addressed to the Chief Electoral Officer (Telangana), the Director General of Police (Telangana), and the Chief Election Commissioner, details how Kumar used the BJP’s roadshow at Borabanda Crossroads, Jubilee Hills, to launch a series of public remarks that demeaned Islamic religious practices while glorifying Hindu identity as a test of authenticity and courage.

Among his most inflammatory statements were:

“If a day comes when I must wear a skull cap for votes, I’d rather cut off my head.”

“I’m an unapologetic Hindu — I won’t insult other faiths by faking a namaz.”

He further mocked Chief Minister Revanth Reddy and a Congress candidate for wearing skull caps, questioning their sincerity and daring them to “prove their Hindu courage” by visiting temples with Muslim leaders.

CJP’s complaint deemed these remarks to be “a textbook example of hate speech” and a direct violation of the Model Code of Conduct (MCC), the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (RPA), and the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS).

Religious mockery as political appeal

According to the complaint, Kumar’s statements do not merely express religious pride — they constitute a deliberate and divisive appeal to religion for electoral gain. By contrasting “unapologetic Hindu authenticity” with “fake Muslim gestures,” the speech urges voters to make electoral choices based on religious identity rather than policy or performance.

CJP has alleged violations under:

• Section 123(3) (appeal on religious grounds) and Section 123(3A) (promotion of enmity) of the RPA,
• Section 125 (offence of promoting enmity between classes in elections),
• and Sections 196, 297, and 356 of the BNS, which criminalise promoting enmity, public mischief, and deliberate insult to religion.

The complaint notes that these remarks, made at a public, recorded, and widely disseminated campaign event, fall squarely within the ambit of hate speech and constitute both a criminal offence and an electoral malpractice.

Erosion of Constitutional values

CJP’s complaint situates the incident within the constitutional mandate of secularism and equality, citing Articles 14, 15, 19, 21, and 25 of the Constitution. It argues that by mocking the skull cap and namaz, Kumar has not only insulted the religious sentiments of a community but has also degraded the dignity of Muslim citizens, violating their rights to equality, dignity, and free profession of religion.

Quoting the Supreme Court’s judgment in Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen (2017), CJP reminds the ECI that “religion cannot be used to influence the choice of voters — even indirectly.” Kumar’s remarks, it states, are not “expressions of faith” but “acts of public provocation designed to divide voters and delegitimise inclusivity.”

Impact on the electoral climate

The Jubilee Hills constituency, home to a diverse and interfaith electorate, has already witnessed heightened polarisation. CJP provides that Kumar’s remarks risk inflaming communal sentiments, intimidating minority voters, and damaging the fairness and integrity of the election.

The complaint further asserts that the remarks have the potential to chill interfaith coexistence by equating expressions of respect (like wearing a skull cap) with betrayal, while valorising exclusivist religious assertion as political bravery.

CJP’s demands

CJP has urged the Election Commission and state authorities to act swiftly and decisively:

1. Take cognisance of the video evidence of the Jubilee Hills roadshow and register an FIR under relevant provisions of the RPA and BNS.
2. Debar Bandi Sanjay Kumar from further campaigning pending inquiry.
3. Issue a public censure to the BJP and all political parties to refrain from religiously provocative campaigning.
4. Forward the complaint to the ECI for further constitutional action under Article 324.

Reclaiming the secular spirit of elections

CJP emphasised the dangerous descent into hate-driven politics as dangerous by providing that when a political leader declares that wearing a skull cap merits decapitation and ridicules namaz as performance, it ceases to be political speech — it becomes humiliation, hate, and a constitutional offence. Through this complaint, CJP calls upon the Election Commission to reaffirm its constitutional duty to keep elections secular, equal, and dignified — ensuring that faith remains a matter of conscience, not a tool for votes.

The Complaint can be read here:

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The NACEJ has strongly condemned, what it terms as “the abject failure of the Government in systemically addressing the air pollution crisis and the brazen, arbitrary detention of peacefully protesting citizens, students, parents, environmentalists, workers and activists, who are courageously organizing against this public health catastrophe.” The Chief Minister (Rekha Gupta) owes a public apology to the protestors and the people of Delhi for the government’s failure, unjust detentions and use of police force against peaceful citizens. The NACEJ has called for withdrawal of cases registered, if any, against the protestors.

The indiscriminate action by authorities not only violates democratic rights, but also blatantly disregards the dire health emergency faced by millions in Delhi NCR, as air pollution soared to its highest levels in four years, especially following Diwali on October 21, 2025, as confirmed by official monitoring stations. In the backdrop of the severity of the issue, the short-sighted, politicised response of the government will only exacerbate the air pollution crisis further in Delhi NCR. 

The group has also demanded that the Delhi Government, the Union Government and all authorities must immediately, without delay or evasion, recognize the magnitude of this public health emergency and the legitimate outrage of the people of Delhi NCR, instead of treating it as a ‘law and order issue’ or a political blame game. This unchecked governance failure-fuelled has directly led to record-breaking pollution, with hazardous air choking the region and pushing public health to the brink.

Besides, the NACEJ has called all for urgent, transparent, and scientifically accountable actions; not repression and diversion, to protect the lives, rights, and dignity of every Delhi NCR resident. The Government needs to initiate year-round air pollution crisis management, built on long-term policy preparedness and a prioritization of public health and justice. It is high time for political and bureaucratic authorities to address the rightful angst of the people, setting aside political calculations and vested interests.

Despite years of crisis and public outcry, air pollution remains a severe and escalating public health hazard, with Delhi NCR and several other Indian cities suffering the world’s worst air quality. This crisis causes millions of preventable deaths and immense economic losses, while disproportionately impacting poor and marginalized communities, outdoor and informal workers, women, elders, children and those living in congested or industrial areas. Government actions have consistently excluded the most vulnerable, widening environmental injustice.

What is most alarming this year is that, despite clear evidence and expert warnings, the government prioritised appeasement-based political interests over scientific and public health advice, specifically legalizing the sale and use of so-called ‘green’ crackers for Diwali. This move led to rampant illicit use of fireworks, ignoring the Supreme Court’s limited hours order, leading to its weak implementation. The result was record-breaking PM2.5 levels and a dangerous spike in air pollution, with Delhi reporting levels as high as 675 µg/m³ (CPCB data) – the worst in four years.In parallel, non-compliance and apparent fudging of data such as the reported use of water sprinklers near AQI monitors to artificially lower recorded pollution further erode trust and delay meaningful action. The persistent blame games over stubble burning also do not address the reality, especially since, in 2025, its contribution to Delhi’s PM2.5 was notably lower than previous years. Year-round vehicle and industry emissions remain the primary drivers. Delhi’s pollution emergency demonstrates a deeper governance failure where populist politics has been allowed to overshadow public health and science-led environmental policy.

To genuinely address the roots of Delhi’s air pollution emergency, the following immediate and structural measures are essential:

• A time-bound, transparent policy and plan of action to reduce air toxicity and fixing answerability and accountability of all statutory authorities, as per law.

• Pro-active promotion and comprehensive upgrades to Delhi’s public transport as a clear alternative to odd-even private vehicle restrictions. Odd-even schemes are not novel and have demonstrated mixed results, while similar restrictions already exist as part of GRAP. What is urgently needed is a sharp pivot away from political optics and towards policies that truly discourage the daily use of private cars and SUVs by improving public transport and reducing road congestion through measures like congestion pricing.

• Differentiate between public transport modes: A renewed emphasis is needed on both bus and metro infrastructure, as well as the neglected surface rail network, which can provide cleaner, more inclusive mass transit, if upgraded and integrated into a unified transport system.

• Implementation of Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) lanes alongside metro enhancements, for high-frequency, accessible public bus services, rather than segregated bus lanes. Upgrading, expanding, and integrating these modes is essential for sharply reducing waiting times and increasing convenience for commuters.

• When calling for tackling vehicular pollution “at source,” new concrete measures are needed: leapfrogging to BS6 fuel and emission norms and promoting EVs are steps already taken. What is needed now is a rapid phase-out and strict control of all non-BS6 diesel vehicles in Delhi NCR, combined with the elimination of diesel fuel subsidies for non-commercial vehicles. Non-BS6 diesels remain a disproportionate source of PM2.5 and PM10 compared to petrol vehicles—despite diesel’s lower price, its use for private transport is now obsolete and counterproductive for clean air.

• Highlight the persistent neglect of Delhi’s extensive surface rail infrastructure. Investments and integration with bus and metro systems are urgently needed to maximize sustainable, mass transit and reduce the reliance on polluting road vehicles.

• Reference existing scientific source apportionment studies (IIT Kanpur 2023, etc.) that establish the root sources and their respective shares – vehicles, dust, construction, waste and industry, so that measures are not misdirected.

• A clearly statement that stubble burning is not a major year-round pollution source. Recent studies confirm its limited, seasonal contribution, while vehicle and industrial emissions remain chronic drivers of Delhi’s poor air quality. Victimising and vilifying farmers while subsidizing or ignoring much larger polluters like the automobile sector is unjust and must be stopped.

• A firmly implemented year-round ban on firecrackers and a credible transition plan for firework-industry workers. WTE incinerator plants, and all unchecked construction and waste burning, must be banned or relocated beyond residential and ecologically sensitive areas, given their toxic emissions. Scientific evidence fully rejects their ‘green’ branding while they continue to drive air toxicity and perpetuate health crises.

• Recognize innovations, but emphasize their futility when major pollution sources, notably ‘green’ WTEs and vehicular fleets, remain inadequately regulated and incentivized.

• Government must set up an effective and permanent mechanism for inputs from and dialogue with environmental, civil-society organizations and collectives.

• Government must release real-time, credible and accessible air-quality data and health advisories in different formats.

• Government must respond to peaceful protest calls with dialogue and not intimidation, threats, detentions and arrests of citizens and activists.

• People at large must reject any political or religious narrative that undermines or delays urgent public health actions in response to environmental emergencies.

In conclusion, the NACEJ has also called for a scientifically informed, health-centred, long-term air quality management framework for Delhi NCR and all Indian cities. This must feature enforceable bans on new WTE plants and place existing WTEs in the Red Category. Year-round prohibition on firecrackers, strict controls on construction and vehicular emissions (with a focus on outdated diesel vehicles), and a fundamental reorientation of urban, transport and industrial policy towards safeguarding public health are equally important. ‘Innovations’ and civil society efforts cannot succeed while major polluters remain unchecked and unaccountable, especially under the guise of ‘green’ solutions.

Addressing air pollution requires an integrated, inter-sectoral, institutional accountability approach rooted in public well-being and aligned with broader environmental, economic, and development goals. India’s future depends on putting public health, social and ecological justice and constitutional rights of all citizens at the very centre of all environmental and urban policymaking.

Signatories to the Statement: NACEJ Members: 

1. Alok Shukla, Chhattisgarh Bachao Andolan, Raipur
2. Apoorv Grover, People for Aravallis, New Delhi
3. Dr. Babu Rao, Scientists for People, Telangana
4. Chythenyen Devika Kulasekaran, Centre for Financial Accountability, Selam, Tamil Nadu
5. Disha A Ravi, Fridays for Future India
6. Dr. Gabriele Dietrich, Penn Urimay Iyakkam & NAPM, Madurai, Tamil Nadu
7. John Michael, NACEJ and NAPM Telangana
8. Krithika Dinesh, Legal researcher, NAJAR, Delhi
9. Medha Patkar, Narmada Bachao Andolan and NAPM, Madhya Pradesh
10. Meera Sanghamitra, NACEJ Telangana
11. Neelam Ahluwalia, Founder Member, People for Aravallis, Haryana
12. Nirmala Gowda, Mapping Malnad, Bengaluru
13. Prasad Chacko, Social Worker, Ahmedabad, Gujarat
14. Rajkumar Sinha, Bargi Bandh Visthapit Evam Prabhavit Sangh, Madhya Pradesh
15. Ramnarayan K, Natural History Educator and Independent Ecologist, Uttarakhand
16. Ravi S P, Chalakudypuzha Samrakshana Samithi, Kerala
17. Soumya Dutta, Movement for Advancing Understanding of Sustainability and Mutuality (MAUSAM) & NACEJ, New Delhi
18. Soutrik Goswami, Environmental Researcher and Activist, New Delhi
19. Stella James, Researcher and Independent consultant, Bengaluru, Karnataka
20. Dr. Suhas Kolhekar, NAPM & NACEJ (Pune, Maharashtra)
21. Sumit (For Himdhara Environment Research and Action Collective, Himachal Pradesh)
22. Tarini, Independent Filmmaker, Delhi
23. Yash, Environmental Rights Activist, New Delhi

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The act, discovered on the morning of Saturday, October 25, 2025, was immediately seen as a deliberate communal provocation. Given the charged atmosphere in the state over the “I Love Muhammad” slogan, which had led to widespread police crackdowns in other districts, the incident was treated with extreme seriousness. Local Hindu residents and right-wing organisations were incensed. A formal police complaint (FIR) was swiftly lodged by Gyanendra Singh Chauhan, the All-India Vice President of the Karni Sena.

Based on this complaint, Aligarh police initially registered a case against eight Muslim men from the locality. The men named in the FIR were Mustaqeem, Gul Mohammad, Sulaiman, Sonu, Allahbaksh, Hameed, and Yousuf. After the incident, heavy police forces were deployed to the villages to prevent any outbreak of violence as tensions soared.

However, as investigators, led by Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP) Neeraj Kumar Jadaun, began their work, they noticed inconsistencies. According to a report in The Times of India, the officers observed that the slogans were “misspelled, and all in the same way.” This misspelling was crucial. It did not match the stencilling or lettering style of the “I Love Muhammad” banners and posters that had been seen during protests and processions in other cities, such as Bareilly. This discrepancy led investigators to suspect “mischief” and the possibility of a different motive.

Police investigation

Police teams pivoted their investigation. Shifting from the assumption of a communal motive, they employed technical surveillance and began examining local disputes. Their work led them to a group of men from the Hindu community.

On October 30, SSP Neeraj Jadaun held a press briefing to announce the arrest of four men, Zeeshanth Singh (also reported as Jishant Kumar), Akash Saraswat (or Akash Kumar), Dilip Sharma (or Dilip Kumar), and Abhishek Saraswat. A fifth accused, identified as Rahul, was reported as absconding.

Aligarh: Abhishek Saraswat (s/o Virendra Sharma, Aakash (s/o Santosh Saraswat), Dileep Kumar (s/o Ramraj Sharma) & Zeeshanth Kumar (s/o Yashpal Singh) arrested by UP’s Aligarh police for allegedly writing “I love Mohammed” on temple walls to frame Muslim neighbours due to… pic.twitter.com/f7l9DHhxQA

— Mohammed Zubair (@zoo_bear) October 30, 2025

The motive, police revealed, was not communal hatred. It was a calculated conspiracy born from a personal vendetta.

SSP Jadaun stated that the main accused, Jishant Singh, had a “personal dispute” with Mustakeem, one of the Muslim men who was initially named in the FIR. Media reports specified the conflict was related to a land-related rivalry. In a deliberate and malicious attempt to settle this score, Jishant Singh allegedly conspired with his friends to paint the inflammatory slogans on the temple walls. Their goal was to “falsely implicate” Mustakeem and his associates, leveraging the existing communal tensions surrounding the “I Love Muhammad” slogan to ensure their rivals were arrested and publicly disgraced.

“The investigation found that the graffiti was not a communal act but a deliberate attempt to implicate others due to a land-related rivalry,” SSP Jadaun said, as reported

The revelation was a profound shock to the local community. It demonstrated how easily personal conflicts could be masked as communal ones, with perpetrators willing to risk widespread violence to settle a score. Even before the arrests, some had suspected a setup.

On October 25, Samajwadi Party leader Zia Ur Rehman Barq had alleged that the graffiti was part of a “well-thought-out conspiracy” and stated, “If an impartial investigation is conducted, it will be clear that no Muslim person was involved in this act.”

#WATCH | Sambhal, UP: On Moradabad Madrasa asking for a virginity certificate from girls, SP MP Zia ur Rahman Barq says, “We also found out about this through social media. However, I still believe that it has not happened at any of our Madarsa or religious institutions where a… pic.twitter.com/0f3afPBxnJ

— ANI (@ANI) October 25, 2025

Following the arrests, SSP Jadaun confirmed that the case registered against the eight Muslim men would be withdrawn, and the four arrested men were booked under relevant sections of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 for promoting enmity between groups and disturbing public peace.

Background: the “I Love Muhammad” campaign and state crackdown

The Aligarh incident did not happen in a vacuum. It was the volatile endpoint of a controversy that had been building for nearly two months, starting with a simple expression of faith.

The timeline begins on September 4, 2025, in Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh. As part of the celebrations for Eid Milad-un-Nabi, the birthday of Prophet Muhammad, some young Muslim men in the Syed Nagar locality of Rawatpur put up a decorative light board at the entrance of a lane. It bore a simple message in English: “I Love Muhammad.”

As per a report in The Wire, this act drew objections from some local right-wing groups. They claimed the banner was a “new tradition” and alleged it was a “deliberate provocation” because it was placed on a public road near a gate also used for Hindu festival processions like Ram Navami.

On September 9, police in Kanpur registered an FIR against 24 people (nine named and 15 unidentified) for allegedly “disturbing communal harmony.” A local prayer leader, Shabnoor Alam, who was named in the FIR, told The Wire that police had asked him to help convince the crowd to move the board. Another accused, Mohammad Siraj, stated, “Last year, we displayed the same message on a cloth banner, and no one raised objections. This year, we used a light board, and suddenly people started protesting. I don’t understand why.”

The flashpoint: violence in Bareilly

The police action in Kanpur transformed the slogan from a festive decoration into a symbol of protest. In response to what they saw as the criminalisation of their faith and expressions, Muslim groups in other cities began displaying the slogan as an act of religious expression and defiance.

This set the stage for a major confrontation in Bareilly. Maulana Tauqeer Raza Khan, a prominent local cleric and leader of the Ittehad-e-Millat Council (IMC), called for a large protest after Friday prayers on September 26, 2025. The protest was called to oppose the police crackdowns and alleged derogatory remarks made against the Prophet.

Despite authorities denying permission for a march, thousands gathered at the Islamia Ground. The situation quickly spiralled out of control. Clashes erupted between protesters and police. Reports from the ground described stone-pelting from the crowd and even alleged gunfire, which prompted a heavy lathi charge from security forces to disperse the gathering.

The aftermath was severe. Maulana Tauqeer Raza Khan and seven others were arrested and later sent to 14-day judicial custody. As many as ten FIRs were registered across Bareilly, each naming between 150 and 200 Muslims, with over 2,500 people accused in total. By late September, the Association for Protection of Civil Rights (APCR), a non-governmental organisation, had already documented at least 21 FIRs nationwide related to the campaign, with 1,324 Muslims named and 38 arrested. In Meerut, five men were arrested simply for putting up a poster with the slogan, as per a report in The New Indian Express.

The counter-campaign and political rhetoric

As the “I Love Muhammad” slogan became a national controversy, it triggered a counter-campaign from right-wing organisations. In Varanasi, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Lok Sabha constituency, activists from a saffron outfit called the Sanatan Sena began pasting posters with the slogan “I love Mahadev” on walls, temples, and mutts.

Jagadguru Shankaracharya Narendrananda, who led the effort, told Deccan Herald that the “saint community will respond to the fundamentalists through these posters” and that some elements were “trying to foment communal tension” with the “I Love Muhammad” posters.

This “poster war” highlighted a sharp political and social divide. Political leaders like AIMIM Chief Asaduddin Owaisi and PDP President Mehbooba Mufti publicly questioned the discrepancy.

I LOVE MOHAMMAD ﷺ @adgzonekanpur ये जुर्म नहीं है। अगर है तो इसकी हर सज़ा मंज़ूर है।

तुम पर मैं लाख जान से क़ुर्बान या-रसूल
बर आएँ मेरे दिल के भी अरमान या-रसूल

क्यों दिल से मैं फ़िदा न करूँ जान या-रसूल
रहते हैं इस में आप के अरमान या-रसूल https://t.co/8kKWY22zHC

— Asaduddin Owaisi (@asadowaisi) September 15, 2025

They asked why expressing “I Love Muhammad” was being met with FIRs, lathi charges, and arrests, while slogans like “I Love Mahadev” or “Jai Shree Ram” were seen as acceptable expressions of faith.

Jharkhand Minister Irfan Ansari remarked, “Just like people who believe in Sanatan Dharma, write ‘I love Ram’… and I don’t have any problem, I love Prophet Mohammed… I cannot understand how these three words can be the cause of arrests.”

#WATCH | Ranchi | Jharkhand Minister Irfan Ansari says, “Just like people who believe in Sanatan Dharma, write ‘I love Ram’, ‘I love Hanuman’, ‘I love Krishna’, ‘I love Sita’ or ‘I love Radha’, and I don’t have any problem, I love Prophet Mohammed and Islam as I belong to… pic.twitter.com/9s66IAMrnN

— ANI (@ANI) September 25, 2025

The controversy was further inflamed by the rhetoric of high-ranking officials. On September 28, 2025, in the wake of the Bareilly violence, Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath made a series of widely reported public statements. Speaking at an event, he warned against “vandalism in the name of faith” and promised severe retribution.

“If you trouble us, we will not spare you,” he stated, using the Hindi phrase, “chedhoge to chodenge nahi.” He promised action that would be remembered by “future generations” and said that “denting and painting must be done.”

Civil rights groups and media critics argued that this language, which was amplified by national news channels, effectively framed the display of the “I Love Muhammad” slogan not as an issue of religious freedom, but as a severe law-and-order problem. This, they argued, legitimised the harsh police crackdowns across the state.

The Aligarh incident, therefore, serves as a crucial case study. It exposed the danger of a high-tension environment where a slogan had become so loaded with political and communal baggage that individuals felt they could weaponise it to settle a personal score, confident that the blame would fall along pre-existing fault lines. It was only through a police investigation that looked beyond the obvious communal narrative that the true, and more personal, conspiracy was brought to light.

Related:

From slogan to sanction: how a Chief Minister’s words hardened into punitive policing after the “I Love Muhammad” row

Free speech, even in bad taste, is protected if no incitement to violence: HP HC

Two Hate-Filled Speeches, One Election: CJP complaints against Himanta Biswa Sarma and Tausif Alam for spreading hate and fear in Bihar elections

The post A Conspiracy of Hate: The Aligarh temple graffiti incident appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The matter might have ended at this stage requiring the respondents to file a counter affidavit. However, the matter cannot be treated to be so simple inasmuch as this Court is deluged with such matters on the basis of First Information Reports being filed left and right by the authorities and complainants under the provisions of the Act, 1955. (Para 15)

In this case, officers intercepted the transportation of nine living and healthy progeny of cows within Uttar Pradesh. Even though a slaughter or transport across state lines was not in issue, the owner of the vehicle was charged under Section 3, Section 5A, and Section 8 of the 1955 Act and Section 11 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960.

In determining that no offense had occurred, the Court ordered protection for the petitioner and went even further, directing the Principal Secretary (Home) and Director General of Police to personally file affidavits explaining this misuse pattern. The bench also asked for an explanation as to why the State has not issued a formal Government Order (GR) to carry out the Supreme Court’s binding directions from the judgment in Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India (July 2018) to prevent mob violence and cow vigilantism.

The Preventive Measures mandated by the apex court in the Tehseen S. Poonawalla  case have been encapsulated in this action-oriented pamphlet widely disseminated by Citizens for Justice and Peace that may be read here.

For over a decade, CJP has systematically documented and intervened against the abuse of the “cow protection” laws. Since 2017, CJP’s legal and advocacy teams have tracked the rise of mob vigilantism, along with its legal facilitators, all over India — fact-finding, litigation, and public education being the methods of doing this work. Investigations like India: The New Lynchdom (2018, CJP) and Cow Vigilantism: A Tool for Terrorising Minorities (2020, CJP) have mapped hundreds of instances where such laws have reportedly been used to sanction mob, extrajudicial violence, and have documented how the criminal justice system has been captured, even driven, by majoritarian agendas. Against this background, this becomes an important moment of judicial awareness of what CJP and other human rights defenders have been implementing for years.

It is important to note that this order is not limited to a single petitioner. It represents a judicial and legal recognition that the ongoing misuse of the 1955 Act occurs as part of a broader culture of impunity that encourages vigilantes, criminalizes livelihoods, and undermines the rule of law.

Statutory Background of the UP Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act, 1955

The 1955 Act was made to ban the killing of cows and their offspring and to control the transport of cows, all for the purpose of implementing Article 48 of the Constitution. The Act defines three regular aspects, where slaughter is banned under Section 3, transport within U.P. out-of-state is restricted under Section 5A, and punishment of three to ten years’ rigorous imprisonment and fine of ₹3–5 lakh is introduced under Section 8 for violations. Section 2(d) defines “slaughter” as “killing by any method whatsoever, and includes maiming and inflicting physical injury which in the ordinary course will cause death.” This definition shows that there must be some form of harm that would ultimately lead to death.

The Court emphasised that this requirement is routinely overlooked. It quoted Kaliya v. State of U.P. (2024 126 ACC 61), in which the Allahabad High Court cautioned that the conveyance of cows or calves in Uttar Pradesh does not invoke Section 5A since it only prohibits transport outside of that state. It also relied on the case of Parasram Ji v. Imtiaz (AIR 1962 All 22), a 1962 decision from the Allahabad High Court, which held that there is a difference between mere preparation and an attempt to slaughter. Preparation does not constitute an offence under the Act if the cow is tied up, for example. By citing Parasram Ji, the Bench emphasized that there was more than sixty years of settled law that the police were ignoring.

In this case, where slaughter, maiming, or interstate transportation was not charged, none of the violations applied. The judgment reminded us again of the Court’s own earlier warnings. In Rahmuddin v. State of U.P.(Criminal MISC. Bail Application No. – 34008 of 2020), the Court noted that the Act was being “misused against innocent persons” when it mentioned the meat was recovered, but often claimed all the meat to be cow meat without a laboratory test. In Jugadi Alias Nizamuddin v. State of U.P. (Criminal MISC Anticipatory Bail Application U/S 438 CR.P.C. No. – 182 of 2023), bail was granted before an arrest, as only cow-dung and a rope were recovered, but it was branded a “glaring example of misuse of penal law.” These rulings serve the greater purpose of demonstrating the number of mechanical FIRs that are being registered, even before investigation, and the abuse and incarceration that innocent people continue to experience.

Ambiguous legal provisions and ineffective procedural safeguards enable police overreach and selective police power against certain communities, mostly Muslims and Dalits. Consequently, the findings of the Allahabad High Court lend judicial authority to what human-rights defenders have been calling, for a long time, a systematic abuse of “cow-protection” laws.

This detailed legal explainer prepared by CJP in 2018 de-constructs how such laws have become a source of victimization.

The Court’s reasoning: From Casual FIRs to Vigilantism

After concluding that there was no offence made out, the Bench stated it was “deluged with such matters” resulting from indiscriminate First Information Reports (FIRs) under the 1955 Act (para 15). It directed the Principal Secretary (Home) and the DGP to show cause why the officers continue to lodge these FIRs in spite of the clear judicial precedent, in particular, the cases of Kaliya and Parasram Ji refer to cases in para 15. The Court required that the affidavits submitted by the officers included relevant affidavit material as to the taking of proposed disciplinary action by the State against the complainants and police personnel for making unwarranted FIRs, and if not, the Court required explanation for why the State did not issue a formal “Government Order” to legally preclude any such future FIRs, which served, in proportion, to undue disadvantage of cost in furthering the FIR towards frivolous case of prosecution.

In a serious observation, the Bench did not merely engage in procedural fault-finding; it also uncovered a more pervasive social consequence:

Yet another connected aspect of the matter under the garb of the Act, 1955 is vigilantism which is being practiced by various persons. Why we say this is because a few days back, a Bench of this Court was seized of a matter in which the car of the person was stopped by vigilantes and thereafter, it was not traceable. (See- Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 9152 of 2025 Inre; Bablu Vs. State of U.P and Ors). In the said writ, instructions have been called for by the Court. Violence, lynching and vigilantism is the order of the day. (Para 30).

The Court relied on Bablu v. State of U.P. (W.P. No. 9152 of 2025), where vigilantes encircled a vehicle, which later went missing, to illustrate how misuse of the statute invites disorder. Moreover, it established the illustration of occurrence within the wider phenomenon of “mob violence” by linking directly with the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India that “vigilantism cannot, by any consideration, be allowed to take shape… it ushers in anarchy, chaos and disorder.”

National Legal Framework: The Tehseen S. Poonawalla Mandate

In the case of Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India, the Supreme Court remarked on the very real and concerning increase in lynchings and violence related to cows. The Court, speaking through Chief Justice Dipak Misra, A.M. Khanwilkar, and D.Y. Chandrachud, found that lynching was “a failing of the rule of law and of the lofty ideals of the Constitution itself.” The Court noted that State agencies have the “primary responsibility” to protect against cow-vigilantism or any type of mob violence.

In paragraph 40 of the judgement, the Supreme Court gave a thorough set of preventative, remedial, and punitive directions: every district must appoint a nodal police officer (not below the rank of Superintendent) for oversight for prevention of mob violence; identify sensitive areas; establish fast-track courts for lynching cases; develop compensatory schemes for victims under Section 357A of the CrPC; and identify negligent officials and hold them accountable.

Despite these unequivocal mandates, however, the Allahabad High Court found that Uttar Pradesh had taken no action to meaningfully operationalise the Supreme Court directions. It found that a circular issued by the DGP on 26 July 2018 could not substitute for a Government Order issued under Article 162 of the Constitution, as such an order would reflect Government policy. The Bench thus required an explanation for the non-compliance and required affidavits showing compliance, on the basis that the lack of the Government Order undermined the prevention and punishment framework contemplated by the Supreme Court.

Notwithstanding these clear directions, the Allahabad High Court noticed that Uttar Pradesh had taken no decisive steps toward operationalizing the guidelines. Its finding was that a circular issued by the DGP on 26 July 2018 was not an adequate alternative to a Government Order issued pursuant to Article 162 of the Constitution. Only a Government Order could adequately reflect the policy of the Government. The Bench mandated a rationale of non-compliance and required affidavits evidencing compliance, noting that, absent an order from the Government, the preventive and punitive framework envisaged by the Supreme Court simply could not be accomplished.

Constitutional Implications: Articles 14, 19, and 21

The aggressive and arbitrary usage of the 1955 Act violates the equality, liberty, and due-process guarantees of the Constitution. Article 14 guarantees equality before the law, and this equality is violated when FIRs are lodged with no basis in fact or when officers exercise their discretion to target only particular communities. The equal protection principle is breached when FIRs are lodged “left and right” (para 15) when there are no fundamental elements of an offence. Therefore, non-arbitrariness, which is at the heart of Article 14, is violated.

Article 19 protects against arbitrary seizure of vehicles or criminalizing intra-State cattle transport, colloquially known as the “anti-cow slaughter provisions,” which interfere with unreasonable restrictions on the lawful trade, profession, and movement of citizens. Kaliya v. State of U.P. explicitly clarified that intra-State transport is not an offence. It is clear how restrictions on engaging in an occupation, profession, or trade when they are established directly restrict citizens’ economic liberty.

Under Article 21, the arbitrary actions are a further deprivation of liberty and dignity without due process of law. In Rahmuddin, the Court noted that accused persons languish in prison because meat samples are rarely sent for analysis and dispose of the need for due process. The combination of legal negligence and social malice undermines the conception of equal citizenship and uses the protection of cows as an excuse to persecute people. The High Court, accepting that using the 1955 Act has “wasted precious judicial time” (para 41) and that citizens should not have to “spend valuable money and time” to seek relief, demonstrates that this violation is both an individualized violation and a burden on the judiciary.

As CJP’s analyses have frequently stated, police impunity and informally inflicted violence contribute to the sense that “there are two sets of citizens: one protected by the law and the other punished by law.”

The judgment’s call for the most senior officials to be held individually accountable brings back an important idea behind constitutional governance: that executive negligence in the enforcement of the fundamental rights of every citizen cannot be excused by the silence of an institution. When the authorities of the State ignore orders made by the Supreme Court and allow vigilantes to act, the authorities of the State cease to execute their constitutional duty to uphold the rule of law.

Misuse, Vigilantism, and the Rule of Law

The Allahabad High Court’s ruling in Rahul Yadav exposes that the U.P. Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act has transitioned from a regulatory instrument to a tool for arbitrary prosecution. The Court explicitly points out that “under the garb of the Act is vigilantism,” giving judicial voice to what human-rights reporting has documented for some time—that the selective enforcement of cow-protection laws legitimizes mob violence to the detriment of threatened communities.

In reports like Divide and Rule in the Name of the Cow, CJP documents how false charges of cow slaughter/transport have been aimed at Muslims and Dalits. Sabrang’s investigations show that even after Tehseen Poonawalla, most States have not yet implemented mandatory measures as required, such as putting in place effective nodal officers or monitoring hate crimes regularly. This collection of ground reports gives both the socio-legal context to what the High Court has now acknowledged formally: the misuse of the 1955 Act has become institutionalized.

The Bench’s instruction that the Principal Secretary (Home) and DGP provide personal affidavits marks a moment when the judiciary will demand institutional accountability, not just individual relief. Whether this results in real change will depend on what the State does, if it finally issues the long-overdue Government Order required by Tehseen S. Poonawalla and takes corrective action with respect to the errant officials.

The abuse of the 1955 Act, therefore, remains a legal and moral paradox—a law intended to protect life but used under circumstances that inhibit liberty, equality, and the viability of constitutional democracy.

The judgment in Rahul Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh can be read here

The judgment in Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India can be read here

The judgment in Kaliya v. State of U.P. can be read here

The judgment in Parasram Ji v. Imtiaz, can be read here

The judgment in Rahmuddin v. State of U.P. can be read here

The judgment in Jugadi Alias Nizamuddin v. State of U.P can be read here

The judgment in Bablu v. State of U.P. can be read here

Related:

Cow Vigilantism: The primary cause of persecution of Muslim minority in India

India: The new Lynchdom

Right wing groups indoctrinate Hindu youth to wield Trishuls to protect religion, cows

Cow vigilantism, a tool for terrorising minorities?

SC urged to formulate guidelines to curb Cow Vigilantism

Cow Slaughter Prevention Laws in India

Divide and Rule in the Name of the Cow

28 States and UTs have appointed nodal officers to curb hate speech in compliance with 2018 Tehseen Poonawalla verdict :Union Home Ministry to Supreme Court

“Vigilantism is not permissible, needs to be checked”: SC, following up Tehseen Poonawalla case

Several steps forward but miles to go in the battle for a hate-free India: Supreme Court in 2023

The post Judicial Pushback against Cow Vigilantism: Allahabad HC flags arbitrary FIRs, demands accountability from top officials appeared first on SabrangIndia.