Since its launch in early June of 2026 by the newly elected Kerala government, Operation Toofan: The Narco Hunt has received widespread public support and rapidly emerged as Kerala’s most visible anti-drug campaign, with videos of raids, arrests, and drug seizures dominating social media. Presented as a comprehensive response to the growing circulation of narcotics and synthetic drugs, Operation Toofan claims enforcement measures with preventive interventions.

Alongside coordinated operations by the police and excise departments, the campaign expectedly engages schools, parents, and civil society organisations in awareness and prevention efforts. Within a short period, thousands of arrests have been made and large quantities of narcotics and banned tobacco products have been seized in the state.

Few would disagree that substance abuse poses serious challenges and requires intervention. Yet the significance of Operation Toofan extends beyond its official objectives. Like many contemporary policing campaigns, it has developed a parallel life online. Reports of inspections, arrests, and searches circulate across social media platforms and news ecosystems alike, where they are viewed, shared, and commented upon by thousands of users. It is within this digital circulation that a more complex social narrative begins to emerge.

A closer look at hundreds of the images and videos associated with Operation Toofan in digital platform reveals a striking pattern. One place appears repeatedly: Perumbavoor. And within these representations, one group appears with particular frequency: interstate migrant workers.

Perumbavoor occupies a unique position in Kerala’s social landscape. Over the last three decades, this town in Ernakulam district has become one of the state’s most important hub of migrant workers. The presence of workers from Assam, West Bengal, Bihar, Odisha, and several other states have become indispensable to its industries, construction sector, workshops, restaurants, and numerous other economic activities. The studies suggest that the migrant population in and around the town runs into lakhs, earning Perumbavoor the popular label of Kerala’s migrant capital.

Yet Perumbavoor’s significance extends well beyond its economic role. Over time, it has come to occupy a symbolic place in Kerala’s public imagination. Debates surrounding migration, demographic change, public safety, labour, and law and order frequently converge on the town. Perumbavoor has become a site onto which broader anxieties about social transformation are projected.

Long before the launch of Operation Toofan, these anxieties had already found expression on social media. Numerous pages devoted to local news, public affairs, and neighbourhood issues regularly circulated photographs, videos, and reels portraying migrant workers through recurring themes of drug use, alleged criminality, sex work, unhygienic living conditions, and urban disorder. Individually, such posts appeared to document isolated incidents.

Collectively, however, they constructed a recurring visual narrative in which Perumbavoor itself was imagined as a city under threat, with migrant workers positioned as its principal source of decline. These representations often extended beyond the town, inviting viewers to imagine Perumbavoor as a warning about Kerala’s future if migration remained unchecked.

Operation Toofan entered an already established visual landscape and supplied it with a continuous stream of new images. Videos of police inspections in migrant settlements, searches of labour camps, checking of buses occupied significantly by migrant workers, arrests, and drug seizures rapidly circulated across various platforms. Existing accounts intensified their coverage, while new influencer pages also began producing content centered on the campaign. In some instances, the act of filming migrant settlements itself was framed as civic responsibility or courageous reporting, and such content was subsequently circulated and amplified across platforms.

The issue is not whether illegal activities exist. Drug use and trafficking are social problems that cut across communities, classes, and regions. Nor is the issue whether law enforcement should intervene. The more important question is how these interventions are represented and understood once they enter the digital public sphere.

Social media rarely reward complexity. Videos are edited into short, dramatic formats designed to maximise attention, while captions emphasise danger, urgency, and confrontation. Background music, visual effects, and selective framing transform routine enforcement activities into highly emotional spectacles. Within these compressed narratives, the broader realities of migration and the lives of migrant workers disappear. Questions about labour conditions, housing arrangements, wage insecurity, social exclusion, and economic dependence receive little attention. Instead, what remains visible is a simplified image of the migrant worker, repeatedly associated with surveillance, suspicion, and disorder. The comment sections beneath many of these contents reveal how such associations are reinforced. Alongside support for anti-drug measures are comments that directly connect migrant workers with crime, insecurity, and social decline. While these views are far from universal, the constant repetition of similar visual narratives gives them greater credibility. Images begin to function as evidence, and repeated exposure gradually transforms isolated incidents into general assumptions about entire populations.

What is equally important is what remains unseen. As claimed operation Toofan is not structured solely around raids and arrests. Officially, the campaign combines enforcement with awareness programs involving schools, parents, community organisations, and government agencies. The stated objective is not merely to identify offenders, but to address substance abuse as a broader social problem.

Yet the visibility of the campaign appears highly uneven in Perumbavoor. During the period the contents get widespread appreciation is the inspections, raids, and arrests than images of awareness sessions, community engagement, counselling initiatives, or preventive programs. This selective visibility has important consequences. Drug use is a complex social issue that cannot be addressed through punitive measures alone. Long-term responses require education, rehabilitation, public health interventions, and community participation. However, when enforcement becomes the dominant public image of a campaign, the problem itself begins to appear as something that can be solved primarily through surveillance and control.
This dynamic is particularly significant because migrant workers already occupy a vulnerable social position within Kerala. They are essential to the functioning of the state’s economy, yet they often remain socially peripheral. Many live in segregated housing clusters, work in demanding conditions, and have limited access to political representation. Linguistic differences, mobility, and weak institutional support make it difficult for them to challenge narratives constructed about them. As a result, they become highly visible to systems of surveillance while remaining relatively invisible within public debates about their own lives.

The visibility produced by Operation Toofan therefore operates unevenly. While the campaign targets drug-related activities, the public images generated by it often concentrate on particular spaces and populations. Over time, this can produce a feedback loop, as the Kozhikode city and rural police stepped-up surveillance in migrant workers settlements across the district recently. Increased surveillance in migrant-dense areas generates more images. More images generate greater public attention. Greater attention strengthens the perception that these areas are inherently problematic. The result is not simply the policing of crime, but the production of places and populations that become permanently associated with suspicion.

Perumbavoor illustrates this process clearly. The town’s association with migrant labour has increasingly merged with public concerns about law and order. In the digital environment, where visual content travels faster than context, these associations acquire new strength. A police raid becomes a reel. A reel becomes a viral post. A viral post becomes a widely shared narrative about who constitutes a threat. Through repetition, suspicion acquires the appearance of common sense.

There is a broader irony here. Kerala’s economy depends heavily on migrant workers. From construction sites and manufacturing units to hotels and service industries, migrant labour has become indispensable to everyday economic life. Yet the same workers who sustain these sectors frequently appear in public discourse not as contributors, but as subjects of concern. This reveals a deeper contradiction within Kerala’s development model: economic dependence does not automatically translate into social acceptance.

Operation Toofan was launched to address the problem of drugs. But its public afterlife raises larger questions about migration, belonging, and representation. How are particular communities made visible through policing? How does social media shape public perceptions of crime? And why do certain groups become recurring symbols of social anxiety?

Perumbavoor is not merely a geographical location where these questions arise. It has become a symbolic city in Kerala’s imagination, a place where fears about migration, crime, and social order converge. Operation Toofan did not create these anxieties. Yet the campaign has made visible the ways in which they circulate and acquire legitimacy.

The danger lies not only in misrepresentation but in normalisation. When suspicion is repeated often enough, it begins to appear natural. Migrant workers cease to be seen primarily as workers, neighbors, or residents. Instead, they become symbols within a larger narrative about risk and security.

In that sense, the most important story emerging from Operation Toofan may not simply be about drugs. It may be about how certain populations come to be recognised as the most visible suspects in Kerala’s public imagination.

Courtesy: The AIDEM

The post The Most Visible Suspects: Operation Toofan, Perumbavoor and Migrant workers appeared first on SabrangIndia.

This Ayodhya Ram Temple construction came as a part of the follow-up of the Babri Mosque’s demolition in 1992, which was destroyed as part of the Ram Janmabhoomi agitation[1].

This agitation had shaken the country with Rath Yatras led by Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) president Lal Krishna Advani, as part of the BJP-RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh) campaign to restore the Ram Temple in Ayodhya. As per their make-believe propaganda, Babar, the first Mughal emperor, had destroyed the Ram Temple in Ayodhya, the “birth place” of Lord Ram, to build a mosque in his name.

Keeping the long drawn-out debate aside, the BJP-RSS succeeded in their plan, with alleged collaboration by sections of the judiciary. Right from that time, a huge fund collection drive was going on, in parallel. After the mosque’s demolition, the Liberhan Commission opined that Advani, MM Joshi and Uma Bharati (all top BJP leaders) among others were “culprits” with regard to the demolition of the mosque. Even the Supreme Court judgement conceded that demolition of the Babri Mosque was a crime.

While finding that those who demolished the Mosque (Babri) ‘had committed a crime’, the guilty were rewarded with the land on which the mosque stood to build this Ram Temple. More funds started pouring in. Prime Minister Narendra Modi played a double role — of Chief of State and the Chief Priest — to inaugurate the temple, reported India Today. Overall; it was he who was said to be the Decider-in-Chief of all the matters related to the Ram temple.

The quality of the structure became obvious the next rainy season after the construction of the ground floor. The ceiling started leaking giving a boost to the bucket industry as those had to be used to keep the floor dry. Devotees started thronging and the PM) (Prime Minister’s Office) was said to be in control of all the arrangements for donation collection. The extent of collections can be gauged from the fact that the Vishwa Sindhi Samaj stated that it had donated nearly 200 silver bricks, weighing a kilo each, for which they did not receive any receipt. Many rich donations in different forms were made. The total amount allegedly siphoned off by the trustees is estimated to be between Rs 2,000-3,000 crore. As per a report in the News Minute.

To cut a long story short, the cat is out of the bag that the temple was the scene of plunder of wealth. The implication of this will be known in the coming times. The whole Ram Temple campaign was primarily done for political purposes. It did lead to the emergence of BJP as a ruling party; and also helped spread hate against Muslims to make its political base very solid.

We are in a democracy where fraternity has been done away with; the hatred with the orchestrated campaign of ‘Hate’ against Muslims’ in a spiral. One is reminded of kingdoms when kings used to plunder temples for their wealth. How do we contrast those temple destructions during the age of kingdoms and what is currently afoot under a semi-democratising society turning into elected autocracy? The lust for money remains the common factor while religious polarisation was not part of the kings who plundered. Now, polarisation is the main agenda of ruling communal forces.

Two major examples come to mind.

One is Raja Harshdev of 11th century Kashmir and the plunder of Somnath by Mahmud Ghazni. Temples and holy places were destroyed by other kings, too. Historian Romila Thapar in Past and Prejudice session to Khoj teachers in Mumbai (then Bombay) explained, ‘Why rulers patronised and pillaged others’ religious places. Polymath D. D. Kosambi points out, “King Harsha of Kashmir (AD 1089-1101), not to be confused with seventh-century emperor Harsha, systematically melted down all metal images through the length and breadth of his kingdom, with just four exceptions. The work was carried out by a special ‘minister of uprooting gods’ (devottapatna Nayak).

Writer Asghar Ali Engineer pointed out, “About Mahmud Ghazni too, historians are quite selective in recording the facts. We highlight the fact that he plundered and destroyed Somnath Temple. But we do not throw light on the fact that he employed Hindus in high positions in his army and administration. Among the names of Hindu generals, names of Tilak, Sondhi, Rai Hind and Harjan are mentioned in Tarokhi-bayahaqi…Coins were issued in his reign with Sanskrit inscriptions.”

Temple destructions are attributed to having religious motives, as per the current social understanding. This was due to the implementation of the ‘divide and rule’ policy of the British, who implemented communal historiography. When Mahmud Ghazni destroyed Somnath Temple, before the act of destruction, he seized all the gold and silver idols of the temple, the total worth of these acquisitions should be more than twenty thousand gold dinars, a huge amount and big wealth. “… The King looked at idols in wonder and gave orders for seizing the spoils and appropriation of treasures. There were many idols of gold and silver and vessels set with jewels…the value of these things found in the temple exceeded twenty thousand dinars?”

Historian Romila Thapar writes, “temples were depositories of vast quantities of wealth, in cash, golden images and jewellery-the donations of the pious, these made them natural targets for non-Hindus searching for wealth in north India. The lust of Mahmud for gold was insatiable…the concentration of wealth in Somnath was renowned.” She further also points out “Religion did not count unless it could serve a definite political purpose, where it was exploited to the hilt.”

In popular perception, the novel ‘Jai Somnath‘ by Kanhaiyalal Maniklal Munshi played a major role in demonising Mahmud Ghazni and Muslims. It presented his forays to loot the temple as the one motivated by religious purpose alone, as an insult to Hindu religion. And further temple destruction by Muslim kings became the main propaganda of communal forces.

While many Muslims kings are singled out for destroying the temples, hardly attention is paid to the donations which many Muslim kings gave for Hindu temples. They received “copies of firmans (Court orders) of King Aurangzeb from great temples of Mahakaleshwar (Ujjain), Balaji Temple (Chitrakut) Umanand Temple (Gauhati), Jain temples of Shatrunjaya, and other temples and Gurudwaras scattered over North India. These farmans were issued from 1065 AH (1659) to 1095 AH (1685).”

The similarities between the temples destroyed by the likes of Ghazni and present Ram Temple Trust under the control of present dispensation is uncanny.

[1] Babri Masjid Demolition: A Point of Departure, and of Arrival; Teesta Setalvad

Social Scientist; Vol. 51, No. 1/2 (596-597) (January-February 2023), pp. 21-38 (18 pages) Published By: Social Scientist

Related:

Sanatan Shankryacharyas’ voice concerns over January 22 Ram Mandir event

Ram Mandir fundraising campaign a tool to gauge BJP’s popularity in Bengal?

Ram Mandir bhoomi-poojan: Why August 5?

The post Somnath to Ayodhya: Plunder to ‘Chanda Chori’ appeared first on SabrangIndia.

As per a report in the Indian Express, the attack took place at the residence-cum-office of a local Trinamool legislator in Kaliganj, Nadia, where Moitra had arrived to hold an internal meeting with party workers following the party’s electoral setback in West Bengal. According to Moitra, what initially appeared to be a small protest rapidly transformed into an organised mob that surrounded the premises, preventing her and other party workers from leaving safely.

Dear @NitinNabin @SamikBJP & of course @AmitShah – a mob lynch by BJP was organised yesterday. Every single person in mob has been identified, named & all are BJP workers. Please see how proudly they are flying your flag pic.twitter.com/0kqJcqYOUz

— Mahua Moitra (@MahuaMoitra) July 2, 2026

Hello @IPUparliament
please watch how police in Indian state of Bengal watch complicit as PM Modi’s ruling BJP goons in a lynch mob attack my premises & keep me confined for 4 hours. No protection for Opposition MP from @loksabhaspeaker pic.twitter.com/0d5NsGboCM

— Mahua Moitra (@MahuaMoitra) July 2, 2026

BJP worker Kalidas Pal of village Jamalpur openly standing, inciting mob to attack me for (of all things) marrying an Odia… at least I’m going to bed smiling. @MohanMOdisha @BJP4Odisha @WBPolice pic.twitter.com/APAO4BwpoU

— Mahua Moitra (@MahuaMoitra) July 1, 2026

I will stand. And this flag will stand. Till death. No BJP vermin will succeed in silencing me. pic.twitter.com/NYeFA3ed9R

— Mahua Moitra (@MahuaMoitra) July 1, 2026

Videos recorded from inside the building and later shared by Moitra on social media appeared to show eggs repeatedly striking the windows of the office while protesters outside shouted slogans. In another video, apparently recorded by persons participating in the protest, groups of men and women could be seen standing outside the premises throwing eggs towards the building while raising slogans. These videos spread rapidly across social media and became the defining images of what Moitra described as an orchestrated political assault rather than a spontaneous public protest.

Broadcasting live during the incident, Moitra repeatedly appealed to the Director General of Police and senior police officials, alleging that despite being informed of the situation, law enforcement authorities had failed to disperse the crowd. She accused the police of remaining “mute spectators” while the gathering outside became increasingly emboldened.

Addressing viewers during the live broadcast, she insisted that the attackers were not ordinary local residents expressing spontaneous anger but workers affiliated with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). She maintained that the entire episode was politically organised and intended to intimidate an elected Member of Parliament inside her own constituency. According to media reports, Moitra stated that she had no intention of leaving under police escort because doing so would expose her and others inside the office to physical assault from the crowd waiting outside.

These are no public outbursts. These are coordinated BJP attacks. See the BJP flags pic.twitter.com/yrGYoaabB9

— Mahua Moitra (@MahuaMoitra) July 1, 2026

As the confrontation continued, Moitra alleged that eggs, mud, stones and even vegetables were being thrown towards the building. She later claimed that one of the projectiles struck her, causing minor injuries. Displaying stains on her clothes during a subsequent video message, she argued that the incident demonstrated not merely political hostility but a complete breakdown of law and order.

Perhaps the most serious allegation levelled by the Trinamool MP concerned the conduct of the police. Rather than accusing the authorities of arriving late, she claimed that police personnel and Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel had reached the location but failed to intervene decisively. According to her, officers merely watched while the crowd continued pelting the premises for hours. She repeatedly questioned why the police were allegedly attempting to persuade her to leave the building instead of dispersing those allegedly committing offences outside.

Currently being attacked by @bjp4india goons with @wbpolice watching on.@MamataOfficial @RahulGandhi @akhliesh @supriya_sule @mkstalin @ArvindKejriwal pic.twitter.com/eD2gYU0NPx

— Mahua Moitra (@MahuaMoitra) July 1, 2026

Later that evening, Moitra escalated her allegations by publicly naming sixteen individuals whom she claimed had led the attack. Through posts on X, she asserted that these persons were BJP workers whose identities had been verified through video footage and local information. She also subsequently alleged that the violence had been orchestrated under the leadership of a local BJP politician who had contested the 2026 Assembly elections from Kaliganj.

Hello @DGPWestBengal @WBPolice more names .Mob attack on me today was led by these @BJP4India goons (caught on camera, verified) :
Santosh Ghosh
Hilal Mallick
Mampi Mondal
Monideepa Pramanick
Sumi Mishra
Rathin Pramanick
Ananta ghosh
Pratik Dhar
Tarun Rajak
Kamalakanto Ghosh…

— Mahua Moitra (@MahuaMoitra) July 1, 2026

Moitra was also supported by other MPs from the party, including TMC MP Dola Sen.

#WATCH | Kolkata: On an egg attack on TMC MP Mahua Moitra, TMC MP Dola Sen says, “…She is continuously doing live… As workers for Mamata Banerjee, we know how to fight; she is fighting…. Law and order isn’t our responsibility… we have faith in the public and in Mamata… pic.twitter.com/1v16LtPQqr

— ANI (@ANI) July 1, 2026

The BJP categorically rejected these allegations. As per Times of India, state BJP leaders denied that the protest had been organised by the party and suggested instead that the incident reflected growing public resentment against Trinamool Congress leaders after the Assembly elections. Some BJP leaders even claimed that internal factionalism within the Trinamool Congress could have contributed to the confrontation. They further maintained that egg pelting was not part of the BJP’s political culture and urged party workers to refrain from such conduct if they were involved.

#WATCH | Kolkata: On an egg attack on TMC MP Mahua Moitra, WB BJP President Samik Bhattacharya says, “If the general public throws an egg or the TMC throws an egg on the TMC, then what can we do about it? This isn’t the police’s job. The police only have metal detectors… There… pic.twitter.com/AiYodlHOpp

— ANI (@ANI) July 1, 2026

The West Bengal Police also disputed Moitra’s version of events. As per Times of India, Krishnanagar SP Atul V stated that officers had reached the location soon after receiving information and had repeatedly requested Moitra to leave the premises for her own safety. According to the officer, reported in TOI, discussions continued for several hours because the MP was unwilling to exit immediately, and she was eventually escorted from the premises without sustaining any serious injuries. Police authorities rejected suggestions that they had deliberately remained passive throughout the episode.

Yet irrespective of these competing narratives, one fact remained undisputed: for several hours, a sitting Member of Parliament was confined inside a political office while a hostile crowd surrounded the building, repeatedly throwing objects towards the premises. Videos from both inside and outside the building left little doubt that the confrontation had escalated far beyond ordinary political protest.

From symbolic protest to organised public humiliation

The incident also carried profound symbolic significance because it occurred against the backdrop of an increasingly visible phenomenon in West Bengal’s political landscape—what many commentators have described as the normalisation of public humiliation as a form of political protest. In recent months, eggs have become the preferred instrument through which political opponents have sought to ridicule rather than merely oppose elected representatives. While egg-throwing has often been dismissed as harmless political theatre, the cumulative pattern of incidents across the State suggested that these episodes were becoming increasingly organised, confrontational and potentially dangerous.

Mahua Moitra was not the first Trinamool leader to face such treatment. Former minister Ujjal Biswas, senior TMC leaders Kunal Ghosh, Vijay Singh, Jayprakash Majumdar, Sabyasachi Dutta and several others had reportedly faced similar attacks in recent weeks. Earlier, Abhishek Banerjee himself had allegedly been targeted with eggs and stones while visiting areas affected by political violence. Reports suggested that the practice had become so frequent that protective helmets were reportedly used during some political visits.

The attack on Moitra therefore represented something larger than an isolated confrontation between rival political workers. It appeared to reflect an emerging culture in which elected representatives are subjected to orchestrated public humiliation through organised crowds, with law enforcement increasingly being accused—rightly or wrongly—of failing to intervene promptly.

Why the Calcutta High Court was forced to intervene

What transformed the incident from merely another episode of political violence into a constitutional controversy, however, was its extraordinary timing. Barely a day before Moitra found herself under siege in Nadia, the Calcutta High Court had delivered a strongly worded order declaring that precisely such incidents of egg-pelting, mob intimidation and public humiliation could not be treated as routine political occurrences. Instead, the Court warned that these practices struck at the heart of constitutional guarantees of dignity, equality and the rule of law.

The remarkable proximity between the Court’s warning and the alleged attack on Moitra would immediately cast fresh attention on the judiciary’s intervention, raising uncomfortable questions about whether political vigilantism had already become entrenched enough to defy judicial caution itself.

The events in Nadia acquired even greater significance because they did not occur in isolation. Rather, they unfolded against the backdrop of an unprecedented series of public attacks on Trinamool Congress leaders that has, over the past several weeks, fundamentally altered the nature of political protest in West Bengal. While political demonstrations have always been a part of the State’s vibrant electoral culture, the recent emergence of organised “egg attacks” has transformed symbolic protest into a recurring form of public humiliation directed at elected representatives and political functionaries. The frequency of these incidents, their increasingly coordinated nature, and allegations of police inaction have collectively raised concerns about the gradual normalisation of mob intimidation as a political tool.

One of the earliest high-profile incidents involved Trinamool Congress national general secretary Abhishek Banerjee. During a visit to Sonarpur to meet families allegedly affected by post-election violence, Banerjee was confronted by protesters who allegedly hurled eggs and stones at his convoy. Media reports suggested that he sustained minor injuries during the incident, while videos circulated widely showing protesters shouting slogans and physically confronting his security personnel. Banerjee later characterised the episode as political violence and alleged that it reflected an organised attempt to intimidate the opposition.

Thereafter, similar incidents multiplied across the State. Former minister Ujjal Biswas reportedly faced an egg attack outside his residence in Krishnanagar. Senior Trinamool leader Kunal Ghosh was targeted outside Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee’s Kalighat residence soon after leaving the premises. Minister Udayan Guha, TMC leader Vijay Singh, Kolkata councillors Bappaditya Dasgupta and Md. Jasimuddin, Jayprakash Majumdar, Sabyasachi Dutta and several other party functionaries also reportedly became targets of similar protests while appearing before courts, travelling under police escort or attending political programmes. In several cases, protesters allegedly shouted “chor, chor” while pelting eggs at politicians accused of corruption or abuse of office.

Although many initially dismissed these incidents as an unusual but relatively harmless form of political expression, the cumulative effect of repeated attacks soon raised serious concerns. Increasingly, elected representatives were being confronted not merely through slogans or demonstrations but through physical acts intended to publicly degrade and humiliate them. The symbolism was unmistakable: eggs were being weaponised as instruments of public disgrace.

It was against this backdrop that the Trinamool Congress approached the Calcutta High Court seeking judicial intervention. The petition argued that the repeated attacks were no longer isolated incidents but part of a systematic pattern of targeted violence directed against members of a particular political party. It further alleged that despite repeated complaints, the police had failed to prevent such attacks or take effective action against those responsible.

Ironically, barely a day after the High Court issued significant directions aimed precisely at preventing such incidents, Mahua Moitra herself became the latest alleged victim of the same phenomenon. The chronology made the events particularly striking.

‘Dignity Is Not a Privilege’: Inside the Calcutta High Court’s constitutional reasoning

On June 30, 2026, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court comprising Acting Chief Justice Tapabrata Chakraborty and Justice Partha Sarathi Chatterjee heard a Public Interest Litigation filed by Md. Danish Farooqui. Less than twenty-four hours later, on July 1, Mahua Moitra alleged that she had remained trapped inside a party office for nearly four hours while protesters hurled eggs, mud and stones at the building. What had until then appeared to be a broader debate about political conduct suddenly acquired immediate constitutional relevance.

The Court’s order reveals that the litigation extended far beyond isolated incidents of egg pelting. The petition presented before the Court described a disturbing pattern of public violence, mob intimidation, targeted humiliation of accused persons and alleged failures by the State machinery to protect individuals from organised attacks. The petition did not merely seek directions against throwing eggs at political leaders; it sought judicial intervention to prevent mob violence, ensure prompt registration of criminal cases, prohibit public humiliation of persons in custody, and restrain authorities from treating accused persons in a degrading or dehumanising manner.

Senior Advocate Kalyan Bandopadhyay, appearing for the petitioner, argued that despite repeated complaints regarding assaults, targeted violence and public humiliation, the State had failed to discharge its constitutional obligation to protect individuals associated with a particular political party. Referring to specific incidents detailed in the petition, he submitted that allegations of mob violence, assaults and even attacks on pregnant women had gone inadequately addressed despite police complaints having been lodged. He relied upon recent Supreme Court decisions, including Zulfiquar Halder v. State of Uttar Pradesh, In Re: Manoj Tibrewal Akash, and In Re: City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price, to argue that the State bears a positive constitutional obligation to protect citizens against mob violence and unlawful vigilantism.

The State, represented by Additional Advocate General Rajdeep Mazumdar, responded that wherever specific complaints had been filed, First Information Reports had already been registered and arrests had been made. Seeking additional time, the State requested an opportunity to place supporting records before the Court demonstrating the action already taken by law-enforcement authorities.

However, what followed constituted perhaps the most important part of the Court’s order—and one that extends well beyond the immediate politics of West Bengal. Rather than treating the controversy as a routine dispute between rival political parties, the Bench framed the issue squarely as one involving constitutional rights, human dignity and the limits of public vigilantism. The Court emphasised that the complaints before it could not simply be dismissed as everyday political incidents but had to be examined “from a fundamental viewpoint.” It declared that the constitutional guarantee of human dignity flowing from Articles 14, 19 and 21 is engaged whenever individuals are publicly dehumanised or subjected to arbitrary humiliation. The Bench further observed that dignity and security are not privileges conferred by those in power but inherent constitutional rights belonging to every individual irrespective of status, political affiliation or circumstance.

The Bench’s observations are particularly significant because they consciously moved the discussion away from the political identity of those involved. Whether the victims were members of the ruling party, the opposition, or ordinary citizens was, in the Court’s view, constitutionally irrelevant. The question before the Court was whether the State could permit a situation in which members of the public assumed the role of judge, jury and executioner by humiliating individuals outside the framework of law. In emphatic terms, the Court reminded the State that no person—even one accused of criminal misconduct—loses the protection of the Constitution merely because allegations have been levelled against them.

Mandatory directions to the state

The Court unequivocally held that the State has a positive constitutional obligation to shield accused persons from “inhumanity and barbarity.” It observed that the increasing incidents of egg-pelting, public humiliation and mob intimidation reflected a disturbing tendency of citizens taking the law into their own hands. Such conduct, the Bench held, cannot be tolerated in a constitutional democracy governed by the rule of law. Public outrage, political disagreement or allegations of corruption, however serious, cannot legitimise acts of vigilantism or justify degrading treatment of any individual. The Court therefore declared that the recurring practice of throwing eggs at accused persons and portraying them as objects of public ridicule had to be curbed through immediate administrative intervention.

Significantly, the Court did not stop at making broad constitutional observations. Recognising that repeated judicial pronouncements often remain ineffective unless translated into concrete administrative measures, the Division Bench issued a series of mandatory directions to the State machinery.

First, it directed the Director General of Police, West Bengal, to immediately formulate and circulate comprehensive guidelines across every police station in the State for preventing incidents of egg-pelting, mob violence, public disorder and lynching. These were not intended to remain abstract advisories. The Court specifically required that the guidelines be communicated with mandatory directions requiring strict compliance by all police officers throughout West Bengal.

Secondly, the Court instructed the police administration to maintain continuous vigilance so that prompt preventive and coercive action could be taken immediately upon receiving information about such incidents. This direction reflects an important shift in judicial thinking. Instead of merely requiring investigation after an incident has occurred, the Court emphasised the State’s preventive responsibility to anticipate and stop mob violence before it escalates. In constitutional terms, this aligns with the principle repeatedly articulated by the Supreme Court that the right to life under Article 21 imposes positive obligations upon the State, including the duty to protect individuals from foreseeable harm at the hands of private actors.

Thirdly, the Division Bench directed the Director General of Police to file a comprehensive affidavit before the Court detailing every step taken in compliance with its directions. This reporting requirement serves a dual purpose. It ensures judicial oversight over the implementation of the Court’s orders while simultaneously placing institutional accountability upon the highest police authority in the State rather than leaving compliance to local police stations alone.

The State Government was also directed to file an affidavit-in-opposition responding specifically to the allegations raised in the Public Interest Litigation and to furnish a complete list of criminal cases already registered in connection with the incidents referred to in the petition. By requiring disclosure of all registered cases, the Court sought to examine not merely whether FIRs had been lodged, but whether the State’s response reflected a consistent policy against mob violence or merely isolated instances of enforcement.

Beyond Mahua Moitra: Why this order matters for constitutional democracy

Viewed in isolation, these directions may appear to concern only the administration of law and order. Their constitutional significance, however, is considerably deeper. The order implicitly recognises that public humiliation itself can become a form of punishment—one imposed not through judicial process but through organised crowds acting outside the law. In doing so, the Court reaffirmed a foundational constitutional principle: punishment in a democratic society is the exclusive domain of courts established by law. Neither political supporters nor political opponents possess the authority to inflict symbolic or physical punishment upon individuals, irrespective of public opinion regarding their conduct.

This principle assumes particular importance in an era increasingly characterised by what scholars have described as “trial by crowd.” Across India, accusations of corruption, criminality or political misconduct are frequently accompanied by campaigns of public shaming, social media condemnation and, at times, physical intimidation. While such acts may not always amount to grievous violence, they nevertheless erode the fundamental distinction between lawful accountability and extra-legal punishment. The Calcutta High Court’s order is therefore best understood not as an attempt to shield politicians from criticism but as a reaffirmation, that constitutional governance cannot coexist with mob justice.

Indeed, the language employed by the Bench deliberately invokes the constitutional vocabulary of dignity, equality and liberty rather than the narrower language of public order. By grounding its reasoning in Articles 14, 19 and 21, the Court acknowledged that dignity is not merely an abstract moral value but an enforceable constitutional guarantee. Public degradation—whether by physical assault, forced parading; humiliating treatment in custody or organised acts of ridicule—strikes directly at that guarantee. The Constitution protects individuals not because they are innocent, influential or politically favoured, but because their humanity itself commands respect.

It is precisely for this reason that the timing of the alleged attack on MP Mahua Moitra is so striking. Barely a day after the High Court reminded the State of its constitutional obligation to prevent precisely such incidents, allegations emerged that a sitting Member of Parliament had remained confined inside a political office for hours while protesters repeatedly hurled eggs, mud and stones at the premises. If those allegations are ultimately found to be true, the incident would represent not merely another episode of political confrontation but an immediate test of the effectiveness of the High Court’s directions—and, more fundamentally, of the State’s willingness and capacity to translate constitutional principles into meaningful protection on the ground.

The significance of the Calcutta High Court’s order extends well beyond the immediate controversy surrounding Mahua Moitra or the recent spate of attacks on Trinamool Congress leaders. At its core, the order is an emphatic reaffirmation of a constitutional principle that is increasingly being tested across India—that the criminal justice system cannot be replaced by public spectacle, and that constitutional rights do not disappear merely because a person is politically unpopular, accused of wrongdoing, or belongs to a rival political party.

The complete order may be read below:

Can guidelines alone prevent political vigilantism?

In recent years, public humiliation has emerged as a recurring feature of India’s political and criminal justice landscape. Accused persons have been paraded before television cameras, assaulted by mobs outside courts and police stations, forced to endure public abuse while in police custody, and subjected to relentless campaigns of social media vilification. In several cases, these incidents have occurred in the presence of law enforcement personnel, raising troubling questions about whether the State has adequately discharged its constitutional obligation to protect those in its custody or under its protection.

Detailed story on public shaming may be read here and here.

The Calcutta High Court’s intervention must therefore be understood against this wider national backdrop. Although the immediate trigger for the litigation was the repeated targeting of Trinamool Congress leaders through organised egg-pelting incidents, the principles articulated by the Bench are deliberately universal. The Court consciously refrained from limiting its observations to members of any particular political party. Instead, it repeatedly emphasised that every individual—including an accused person—is entitled to dignity, security and equal protection of the law. That emphasis is perhaps the most important aspect of the order.

By invoking Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution together, the Court underscored that the issue before it was not simply one of maintaining public order but one of preserving constitutional governance itself. Article 14 guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the laws. Article 19 protects the freedom of speech and peaceful political participation, while permitting only constitutionally permissible restrictions. Article 21 guarantees that no person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law—a guarantee that the Supreme Court has repeatedly interpreted to include the right to live with dignity, privacy, reputation and bodily integrity. The High Court’s reasoning reflects the settled constitutional position that these guarantees are not suspended because allegations have been made against an individual. Constitutional rights belong equally to the innocent, the accused, the convicted, political supporters and political opponents alike.

The Court’s reliance upon recent Supreme Court decisions reinforces this constitutional approach. In Zulfiquar Halder v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the Supreme Court reiterated that the State bears a positive obligation to protect individuals from mob violence and cannot remain a passive spectator where constitutional rights are threatened. Similarly, in In Re: Manoj Tibrewal Akash, the Supreme Court emphasised the duty of constitutional courts to intervene where executive authorities fail to protect the rule of law. By relying on these authorities, the Calcutta High Court situated the present controversy within an evolving jurisprudence that treats mob violence not merely as isolated criminal conduct but as a constitutional failure requiring institutional accountability.

Equally noteworthy is the Court’s recognition that humiliation itself can amount to a constitutional injury. Much of the public discourse surrounding the recent incidents in West Bengal has trivialised egg-pelting as a harmless form of political satire or symbolic protest. Yet the Court declined to accept that characterisation. Its observations acknowledge that when organised crowds repeatedly surround individuals, throw projectiles, prevent free movement, publicly ridicule them and seek to degrade them in full public view, the issue ceases to be one of symbolic expression and becomes one of intimidation and coercion. Constitutional democracies permit robust criticism—even harsh criticism—of political leaders. They do not, however, legitimise organised acts of public degradation that seek to replace lawful accountability with collective punishment.

This distinction is crucial. Citizens unquestionably possess the right to protest against corruption, maladministration or abuse of power. Peaceful demonstrations, slogans, criticism in the media and political campaigns all fall within the democratic process. What the Constitution does not countenance is the substitution of judicial processes with public punishment. Once crowds begin determining how accused persons should be treated, when they should be publicly shamed, or what forms of humiliation they deserve, the rule of law gradually gives way to the rule of the mob.

The Real Constitutional Question: Who punishes in a democracy?

The allegations made by Mahua Moitra acquire significance beyond partisan politics. Whether every allegation ultimately withstands judicial scrutiny remains a matter for investigation. Equally, the State’s assertion that police acted promptly and that arrests have already been made deserves fair consideration. However, the constitutional concern does not depend solely upon the outcome of competing factual narratives. Even if some details remain disputed, the repeated emergence of videos showing elected representatives surrounded by hostile crowds, projectiles being thrown at political meetings, and allegations of delayed police intervention reflects a disturbing erosion of the distinction between democratic dissent and organised intimidation.

The episode also exposes a recurring dilemma confronting constitutional democracies: the temptation to tolerate unlawful conduct when directed against politically unpopular individuals. It is often easier to defend constitutional protections in cases involving sympathetic victims. The true test of constitutional fidelity, however, lies in extending the same protections to those who may be widely criticised, politically controversial or facing criminal allegations. Courts have consistently recognised that constitutional rights are most meaningful precisely when they protect unpopular individuals from the passions of the moment. The Calcutta High Court’s order is a reminder that the Constitution does not operate selectively; it protects all persons because it is founded upon the inherent dignity of every individual.

At the same time, the order also invites scrutiny of the adequacy of institutional responses. While directing the Director General of Police to frame state-wide guidelines is an important administrative step, guidelines by themselves cannot eliminate political vigilantism. Their effectiveness will ultimately depend upon consistent implementation, prompt preventive policing, and impartial registration of criminal cases and swift prosecution of those who organise or participate in mob attacks. Unless these directions are accompanied by visible enforcement, there remains a risk that judicial pronouncements may be viewed as symbolic rather than transformative.

The timing of the Mahua Moitra incident makes this challenge particularly stark. If, as alleged, a sitting Member of Parliament remained confined inside a party office for several hours while a crowd hurled eggs, stones and mud at the premises, the incident would represent an immediate test of the State’s capacity to implement precisely the constitutional obligations that the High Court had reaffirmed only a day earlier. Conversely, if the State’s account is accepted, that police acted promptly, attempted to secure her safe exit and eventually escorted her without major injury, it nevertheless underscores the importance of transparent investigation, accountability and public confidence in law-enforcement institutions.

Ultimately, the controversy is about far more than eggs, slogans or partisan rivalry. It concerns the resilience of constitutional governance in the face of growing political polarisation. Democracies are strengthened not when governments protect only their supporters or when courts intervene only for politically convenient causes, but when institutions consistently uphold the rule of law irrespective of ideology or electoral affiliation. Public anger, however genuine, cannot become a substitute for legal process. Political disagreement, however intense, cannot justify intimidation. Constitutional democracy demands that accountability be secured through investigation, prosecution and adjudication—not through crowds gathered outside courtrooms, police stations or party offices.

The Calcutta High Court’s order is therefore best understood as a constitutional warning against the normalisation of vigilantism. By reaffirming that dignity, equality and personal security belong to every individual, including those accused of offences and those occupying contested political spaces. The Court has reiterated one of the Constitution’s most fundamental promises: that the law, and not the mob, must remain the ultimate arbiter of justice.

Related:

Public Shaming & Constitutional Courts: Guidelines without teeth?

Rajasthan’s Public Shaming: Police humiliation practices defy law and human dignity

From Fringe to Framework: How AHP’s hate ecosystem reconfigured law, society, and electoral politics

From ‘Tauba Tauba’ to ‘Expel the Ghuspaithiya’: The language of exclusion in Bihar’s election season

Right to Food: How the ban on sale of non-veg food is an issue where imposed majoritarian faith clashes with the Indian Constitution

The post Politics of Humiliation: Mahua Moitra, mob intimidation and the Calcutta High Court’s warning appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Telangana | Special Court for MPs/MLAs at Hyderabad acquitted MLA Raja Singh in a case registered under Sections 153A(a)(b), 295A, 504, 505(2) and 506 of the IPC.

Raja Singh was arrested by the Mangalhat Police. After the learned Magistrate declined to grant police remand, he…

— ANI (@ANI) June 30, 2026

The controversy that sparked nationwide outrage

The origins of the case can be traced to August 2022, when stand-up comedian Munawar Faruqui was scheduled to perform in Hyderabad. Raja Singh, then a BJP MLA representing the Goshamahal Assembly constituency, publicly opposed the event, accusing Faruqui of repeatedly insulting Hindu deities during his comedy performances. Anticipating possible law-and-order issues, the Hyderabad Police placed Singh under preventive house arrest on August 20, 2022, while providing extensive security arrangements to ensure that Faruqui’s performance could proceed peacefully.

Detailed report may be read here.

Within days, however, the controversy escalated dramatically. Raja Singh uploaded a video on his YouTube channel responding to Faruqui’s show. During the course of the video, he made a series of derogatory remarks concerning Prophet Muhammad, including references that many Muslims considered deeply offensive and blasphemous. The video spread rapidly across multiple social media platforms, provoking immediate condemnation from religious organisations, civil society groups and political leaders.

The remarks came at an especially sensitive time. Only weeks earlier, India had witnessed a diplomatic crisis after controversial comments about Prophet Muhammad by former BJP spokesperson Nupur Sharma had triggered protests across several countries and sharp criticism from governments in the Gulf and other Muslim-majority nations. Against this backdrop, Raja Singh’s statements were viewed as another flashpoint capable of inflaming already fragile communal relations.

Hyderabad witness widespread protests

Public anger against Raja Singh’s remarks was swift and intense. Thousands of people assembled across different parts of Hyderabad, particularly in the Old City, demanding his immediate arrest. Large demonstrations were organised outside the office of Hyderabad Police Commissioner C.V. Anand, while protest marches and public gatherings took place in several neighbourhoods including Shalibanda, Mangalhat and Charminar.

The protests continued for several days, with demonstrators alleging that repeated instances of hate speech by political leaders were being met with inadequate legal action. Protesters raised slogans, burnt effigies of Raja Singh and demanded strict criminal prosecution.

The demonstrations eventually turned volatile in certain areas. Reports indicated incidents of stone-pelting, clashes between sections of protesters and the police, and the use of baton charges by law enforcement to disperse crowds. Several protesters were detained. Authorities deployed additional police personnel, Rapid Action Force contingents and paramilitary forces to restore order. Educational institutions, commercial establishments and fuel stations in parts of Hyderabad remained closed as a precaution amid fears of communal violence.

The scale of the protests reflected the seriousness with which the Muslim community viewed the remarks and underscored the potential of inflammatory political speech to disturb public order in communally sensitive environments.

Criminal proceedings initiated

Following multiple complaints, the Mangalhat Police registered a criminal case against Raja Singh under several provisions of the Indian Penal Code dealing with communal hatred and public disorder.

The charges included:

• Section 153A IPC for promoting enmity between different religious groups;
• Section 295A IPC for deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings;
• Section 504 IPC for intentional insult likely to provoke breach of peace;
• Section 505(2) IPC for statements promoting hatred, enmity or ill-will between different communities; and
• Section 506 IPC relating to criminal intimidation.

These provisions constitute the principal statutory framework under which hate speech prosecutions have traditionally been pursued in India. Their application generally requires the prosecution to establish not merely that offensive words were spoken, but that the speech satisfied specific statutory ingredients such as deliberate intention, malicious conduct or promotion of communal hatred.

Arrest, release and preventive detention

Raja Singh was initially arrested on August 23, 2022. However, a magistrate declined to grant police custody owing to procedural deficiencies in the remand application, resulting in his release shortly thereafter.

The Hyderabad Police subsequently took the unusual step of invoking the Telangana Preventive Detention Act. On August 25, 2022, Singh was re-arrested under preventive detention on the ground that his repeated speeches and activities posed a continuing threat to public order and communal harmony.

The invocation of preventive detention against a sitting legislator attracted significant public attention. Preventive detention laws are ordinarily reserved for situations where authorities believe that ordinary criminal law is insufficient to prevent imminent threats to public order. Their use against an elected representative underscored the seriousness with which the administration viewed the potential consequences of Singh’s speeches.

Raja Singh remained in detention for approximately seventy-seven days before the Telangana High Court quashed the detention order in November 2022 and directed his release on bail.

BJP distances itself

The controversy also produced immediate political consequences. Within hours of Raja Singh’s arrest, the Bharatiya Janata Party suspended him from the party and issued a show-cause notice. The suspension came amid intense domestic and international scrutiny over inflammatory remarks concerning Prophet Muhammad by BJP leaders.

Party spokespersons publicly stated that the BJP did not endorse hate speech or statements capable of hurting religious sentiments. Political commentators widely viewed the suspension as an attempt to contain the growing controversy, particularly in light of the diplomatic fallout that had followed earlier controversies involving party spokespersons.

Despite the suspension, Raja Singh remained politically influential within Telangana. Before the 2023 Assembly elections, the BJP revoked his suspension, renominated him from Goshamahal, and he successfully retained his Assembly seat. In 2025, however, he resigned from the BJP following disagreements over the appointment of the Telangana state party president.

Trial before the Special Court

The criminal proceedings continued before the Special Court designated to hear cases involving Members of Parliament and Members of Legislative Assemblies.

Over the course of nearly four years, the prosecution examined witnesses, produced documentary material and relied upon recordings of the disputed speech. The defence, on the other hand, challenged both the evidentiary basis of the prosecution and the interpretation of the statements attributed to Raja Singh.

Following the judgment, as reported by ANI, defence counsel Advocate K. Karuna Sagar stated that the complainant himself had acknowledged during cross-examination that certain portions of the disputed speech referred to material found in Islamic literature. According to the defence, after evaluating the witness testimony and documentary evidence, the court concluded that the prosecution had failed to establish the ingredients of the alleged offences. The court consequently acquitted Raja Singh of all charges after holding that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.

#WATCH | Hyderabad, Telangana: Karunasagar, High Court advocate says, “Today the Special MP/MLA Court has acquitted MLA Raja Singh from the 2022 case which was registered by PS Mangalat for allegedly commenting on the life of Prophet Muhammad. The complainant in the case has… https://t.co/Ds7zQyzt3U pic.twitter.com/YqltQwRjkE

— ANI (@ANI) June 30, 2026

Raja Singh’s response

Following the acquittal, while speaking to ANI, Raja Singh described the judgment as a “victory of truth, justice and the rule of law.”

He maintained that he had never intended to hurt the religious sentiments of any community and alleged that the criminal case, along with his preventive detention, had been initiated under political pressure exerted by the AIMIM upon the then Bharat Rashtra Samithi (BRS) government.

He further claimed that several other criminal cases registered against him under successive governments were politically motivated and expressed confidence that he would eventually secure acquittal in those proceedings as well.

#WATCH | Hyderabad, Telangana: BJP MLA Raja Singh says, “A case was registered against me in 2022, alleging that I had made comments about someone’s deity; under pressure from the AIMIM, the then BRS government and police invoked the PD Act (Preventive Detention Act) and kept me… https://t.co/Ds7zQyzt3U pic.twitter.com/9EMfAnjsvE

— ANI (@ANI) June 30, 2026

A history of inflammatory speeches

Although acquitted in this particular prosecution, Raja Singh continues to remain one of India’s most controversial political figures because of his long history of inflammatory communal rhetoric.

Over the past decade, numerous FIRs have been registered against him alleging hate speech, promotion of communal enmity and incitement. His speeches have frequently targeted Muslims and other minority communities and have repeatedly attracted criticism from civil society organisations and human rights groups.

On July 16, 2024, Citizens for Justice and Peace sent three separate complaints to relevant authorities of Maharashtra against three separate incidents of hate speeches delivered by BJP MLA Raja Singh in the month of May. In all the three incidents highlighted in the complaint, BJP MLA Raja Singh can be heard delivered provocative and inflammatory statements against the Muslim community at events organised by the Sakal Hindu Samaj.  Details may be read here.

A dedicated profile of Raja Singh may be viewed here.

The broader legal questions

The acquittal illustrates one of the most persistent challenges in hate speech litigation in India. Public outrage, widespread protests or even deeply offensive speech do not automatically translate into criminal conviction. Criminal courts remain bound by the foundational principles of criminal jurisprudence, requiring the prosecution to establish every element of the alleged offences beyond reasonable doubt through admissible evidence.

At the same time, the judgment should not be understood as judicial approval of the speech itself. The court’s conclusion is confined to the evidence presented during trial and the prosecution’s inability to satisfy the high evidentiary threshold required for conviction under the Indian Penal Code.

The case therefore exposes a broader structural issue within India’s legal framework. Existing provisions such as Sections 153A and 295A IPC—now substantially reflected in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita—continue to be the principal statutory tools used to prosecute hate speech.

Related:

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How “Khalistani” became a weaponised political label against Sikh dissent

From the Streets to the Courtroom: The constitutional battle over Maharashtra’s Public Safety Act

Court convicts seven men in 2022 cow-vigilantism lynching case; holds mob lynching proven, awards life imprisonment

The Supreme Court in 2025: When procedure trumped principle

The post From Outrage to Acquittal: The Raja Singh hate speech case comes to a close appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In a significant interim order passed by Justice S.R. Krishna Kumar at the Kalaburagi Bench, the Court stayed the endorsement issued by the Basavakalyan Tehsildar refusing permission for the event. However, while allowing the convention to proceed, the Court carefully moulded the relief by placing strict conditions upon both the organisers and the invited religious leader whose proposed participation had triggered the controversy.

Most notably, the Court directed that Kaneri Mutt seer Sri Adrushya Kadeshwara Swamiji may physically attend the event but shall not deliver any speech whatsoever, either personally or through any other individual. The restriction addresses the very basis on which the State had denied permission, namely the apprehension that his speech could provoke communal disharmony and disturb law and order.

State’s refusal based on anticipated law-and-order concerns

The petition was filed by the President of the Samavesha Utsava Samiti, challenging the Tehsildar’s endorsement dated, June 11 refusing permission for the proposed convention. Along with an accompanying procession to be held at either the Akkamahadevi College premises or the Basaveshwara ITI Auditorium.

The State justified its refusal by pointing to the invited seer’s previous public statements, alleging that he had repeatedly used derogatory, insulting and provocative language against the Lingayat community and followers of Basavanna. According to the authorities, those statements had previously led to widespread protests and objections from several Lingayat organisations, including the Karnataka Lingayat Mathadhipatigala Okkoota and the Basavanpura Association.

Given this background, the administration expressed apprehension that permitting both the event and the seer’s speech could result in serious disturbances and communal unrest.

Advocate General highlights existing injunction against seer

Appearing for the State, Advocate General Shashikiran Shetty argued before the High Court that the authorities’ concerns were not speculative but were founded upon the seer’s previous conduct.

The State further pointed out that there already exists an interim injunction restraining the seer from making defamatory statements against members of the Lingayat community. In light of that background, the Advocate General submitted that allowing the seer to publicly address a large gathering carried a substantial risk of triggering confrontation between rival religious groups and disrupting public peace.

Organisers and seer offer undertakings before Court

During the proceedings, as per LiveLaw, the High Court sought assurances from both the organisers and the invited seer.

Pursuant to the Court’s earlier directions issued on June 18, separate affidavits were filed by the organising committee and Sri Adrushya Kadeshwara Swamiji. The organisers undertook to conduct the programme peacefully, ensure compliance with any conditions imposed by the authorities, and cooperate in maintaining public order.

The seer, for his part, furnished an unconditional undertaking that he would neither deliver a speech himself nor communicate any speech indirectly through another person during the programme. These undertakings ultimately became central to the Court’s decision.

Court permits event but removes the source of apprehension

After considering the affidavits and rival submissions, the Court concluded that the principal apprehension expressed by the State related to the possibility of inflammatory speeches rather than the mere holding of the religious gathering itself.

Justice Krishna Kumar observed that the categorical undertaking furnished by the seer substantially addressed the concerns which had prompted the authorities to reject permission in the first place.

Accordingly, while staying the Tehsildar’s endorsement refusing permission, the Court allowed the convention to proceed subject to carefully crafted safeguards intended to preserve public order.

In doing so, the Court effectively separated the constitutional right to hold a peaceful assembly from the specific activity that the State feared might trigger violence.

Strict conditions imposed

The High Court made it clear that its permission was neither unconditional nor absolute. Among the most significant conditions imposed are:

• Sri Adrushya Kadeshwara Swamiji may remain physically present at the convention but shall not make any speech or address the gathering either directly or indirectly.
• Attendance at the programme shall not exceed 2,500 persons.
• No procession shall be conducted before or after the programme.
• No participant shall deliver hate speech or make statements capable of disturbing communal harmony or public order.
• No abusive language or insults directed at any political leader, religious leader, religious denomination or ethnic community shall be permitted.
• Any breach of these conditions would expose the organisers to legal consequences and liability.

The Court also took note of the State’s submission regarding limited police deployment and observed that restricting the gathering and prohibiting a procession would assist in ensuring adequate maintenance of law and order.

Judicial balancing between fundamental rights and public order

The interim order illustrates the judiciary’s attempt to reconcile two competing constitutional considerations. On one hand lies the right to peacefully assemble and organise religious or public events, protected under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution. On the other lies the State’s constitutional obligation to maintain public order and prevent violence, particularly where previous incidents and existing judicial orders indicate a real possibility of inflammatory speech leading to communal tensions.

Instead of either completely prohibiting the event or allowing it without restriction, the High Court adopted a narrowly tailored approach. By permitting the gathering while restraining the individual whose speech constituted the primary source of concern, the Court sought to preserve constitutional freedoms without ignoring legitimate public-order considerations. The order therefore reflects an exercise in judicial balancing rather than an endorsement of unrestricted executive discretion or an absolute assertion of free speech.

Significance of the order

The case also demonstrates that while prior restraints on speech are generally viewed with constitutional caution, courts may be willing to impose narrowly framed restrictions in exceptional circumstances where there exists credible material suggesting an imminent threat to public order.

Equally significant is the Court’s insistence that no participant, not merely the invited seer, shall engage in hate speech or make statements targeting political figures, religious leaders or communities. By extending responsibility to the organisers themselves, the Court reinforces the principle that those conducting large public gatherings bear a corresponding obligation to ensure that constitutional freedoms are exercised responsibly and without endangering communal harmony.

The matter has been directed to be listed again on July 1, 2026, when the High Court will consider the case further while the interim protection granted to the organisers continues to operate subject to the conditions imposed.

The complete order may be read below:

Related:

The Supreme Court blinks when it comes to Hate Speech

CJP flags ‘communal polarisation campaign’ in Bengal polls, seeks action against BJP leaders over election speeches

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CJP files complaint against BJP MLA & Minister Nitesh Rane and right-wing leaders over alleged hate speeches in Maharashtra and West Bengal

The post Karnataka HC allows Hindu convention but bars invitee seer from speaking to prevent law-and-order concerns appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In this conversation with Teesta Setalvad, Rajagopal recounts his personal ordeal and reflects on the wider implications of SIR exercises now being discussed and expanded across multiple states. The discussion explores the relationship between electoral rolls, citizenship, passport verification, welfare entitlements and democratic rights.

The conversation also raises difficult questions: Why is there so little transparency around SIR processes? What happens when administrative verification begins to determine access to rights? Where are the media and political opposition in this debate? And if this can happen to a veteran journalist with decades of documentation, what does it mean for millions of ordinary citizens?

The post SIR and the Making of a Stateless Citizen? | R. Rajagopal Speaks Out | Teesta Setalvad appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Ask Palestine. The team finished second in the second round of the Asian qualifiers, behind Australia, thus qualifying for the third round for the first time in their history. Here, they were drawn in a tough group with South Korea, Jordan, Iraq, Oman and Kuwait. They played their hearts out, drawing twice against the much stronger South Korea, and would have qualified for the next round, had it not been for a penalty awarded to Oman in stoppage time during Palestine’s final match. When Oman converted, what should have been a win became a draw, and Palestine was eliminated, just one point short of progressing.

Palestine’s World Cup qualifying campaign faced extraordinary odds. In the qualifying tournaments, each team plays a ‘home’ and an ‘away’ match. Palestine has not been able to play ‘home’ matches in either the West Bank or Gaza since October 2023. These matches are played in a neutral venue. Thus, while their opponents enjoy the ‘home’ advantage, Palestine don’t. Palestinian players routinely face harassment and travel restrictions from Israeli authorities. Even getting the whole team together for training is an achievement. Several players and staff have had family members or friends killed during the ongoing genocide in Gaza.

And then there’s the destruction of infrastructure. Gaza had around 40 football clubs affiliated with the Palestine Football Association (PFA) before the start of the genocide in October 2023. Gaza had several football facilities, including four stadiums: Palestine Stadium, Yarmouk Stadium, Khan Younis Stadium, Rafah Municipal Stadium. Today, nothing remains. All stadiums have been destroyed. All football facilities are in ruins. There is no functioning football club.

And what of the players? In early June this year, Israel abducted two women football players, Rand al-Halawani (released after a few days) and Natali Abu Dayyeh.

At least they are alive. In an official letter to FIFA, the PFA said that 99 footballers (among some 400 athletes) had been killed by Israel in Gaza between October 2023 and March 2024. That’s two athletes killed every day, and a footballer killed every second day. There are also numerous cases of athletes being ‘knee-capped’ – that is, shot in the knee or lower limbs – effectively terminating their playing careers. This is part of the deliberate Israeli effort to wipe out Palestinian social life, to obliterate anything that represents Palestinian culture and national pride.

This, by itself, should be enough to get the Israel Football Association sanctioned and expelled by FIFA. But there’s more.

Israeli settlements in the West Bank, built on land stolen from Palestinians, are illegal by international law. All activity on settlements, whether economic, social, cultural, or sporting, is also illegal. Several countries in the world explicitly prohibit conducting business with illegal settlement-based enterprises.

There are about half a dozen football clubs recognized by IFA operating from illegal settlements. These clubs play in Israeli leagues, and players move from illegal settlement-based clubs to other Israeli clubs, and vice-versa, all the time.

Not only is this in contravention of international law, it also explicitly violates FIFA’s own charter, which states, ‘Member associations and their clubs may not play on the territory of another member association without that association’s approval.’

Then there is the extreme Zionism of some Israeli clubs. The best-known is Beitar Jerusalem FC. Since its founding in 1936, it has been closely identified with Israel’s extreme right wing. Benjamin Netanyahu is a long-time Beitar supporter. The club has fan groups of the extreme right. The most notorious of these is La Familia, founded in 2005. This group of football ultras is known for its wanton violence and genocidal chants, including ‘Death to Arabs’.

Among football hooligans, Israeli fans occupy pride of place. For example, in November 2024, fans of Maccabi Tel Aviv FC went on a rampage in Amsterdam, tearing down Palestinian flags from buildings; chanting racist slogans, including ‘Death to Arabs’; indulging in acts of wanton violence; and chanting songs celebrating the Gaza genocide, including one that means ‘There are no schools in Gaza because all the children are dead’.

In typical Israeli playbook style, all this was justified with the claim that it was Maccabi fans who were first subjected to antisemitic slurs and violence. Subsequent investigations complicated the picture. While it is true that some Maccabi supporters faced public anger against the genocide in Gaza (but not antisemitism), there is no doubt that Maccabi supporters indulged in acts of hooliganism and racist provocations both before and after the match (in which Maccabi was trounced by the Dutch club Ajax 5–0), followed by retaliatory violence against some Israeli supporters.

The PFA is right in petitioning FIFA to sanction and expel IFA, of course, but for us to expect action under the present FIFA leadership would be naïve. FIFA president Gianni Infantino is Donald Trump’s poodle. Not only has FIFA not used its clout to force some degree of decency from the US in the conduct of the present World Cup, Infantino presented Trump with a completely made up ‘FIFA Peace Prize’ when Trump didn’t get his coveted Nobel. He has appeared in public wearing a red, MAGA-style hat. He pledged FIFA’s support to the ‘Board of Peace’ constituted by Trump to oversee a post-genocide plan in Gaza. During the FIFA Congress in Vancouver in April 2026, he attempted to get PFA president Jibril Rajoub to shake hands on stage with the vice president of IFA, Basim Sheikh Suliman. Rajoub refused.

FIFA’s collusion with Israel and the US is in contrast with its own stand against South Africa under apartheid. FIFA suspended South Africa in 1961 and expelled it in 1976. Today, despite a mountain of evidence against Israel, FIFA refuses to even sanction IFA, let alone suspend or expel it. Or take Russia, which was banned by FIFA just four days after its conflict with Ukraine began, in February 2022.

This, like much else, reflects geopolitical realities of the respective times. The 1960s and 70s were a time of decolonization and independence in Asia, Africa and Latin America, often inspired by socialism and Marxism; today is a time of naked racism and imperialism by the white ruling elites of the West.

When children in Gaza play football on the beach in the midst of the genocide, they are not merely escaping a terrible reality. They are also fighting to be treated with decency, dignity and self-respect. They are asserting humanity.

[This is a slightly amended version of an article that appeared on leftviews.in.]

Courtesy: Sudhanva Deshpande

The post How FIFA Colludes in the Genocide of Palestinians appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Almost immediately after Additional District and Sessions Judge Tabassum Khan sentenced the accused to life imprisonment, on June 12, 2026, the focus of public discourse shifted away from the evidence, the findings of the court and the legal reasoning contained in the judgment. Instead, the controversy was deliberately reframed around the religious identity of the judge. Rather than questioning the correctness of the verdict through legal argument, sections of the cow vigilante movement, Hindutva organisations and right-wing commentators portrayed the decision as the product of the judge’s Muslim identity. The result was the systematic communalisation of an ordinary criminal proceeding.

As reported by Newslaundry, the atmosphere outside the courtroom became tense immediately after the judgment was pronounced. Family members of the convicted men protested as the police began taking the convicts into custody. Relatives reportedly lay down in front of police vehicles in an attempt to prevent their transportation. According to Hazari Lal Gurjar, President of the local Bar Association, it was during these immediate protests that the issue first began to acquire a communal colour. What had begun as emotional reactions by the families of convicted persons quickly transformed into a larger narrative portraying the judgment itself as an attack on Hindus because the presiding judge happened to be Muslim.

The shift was significant. Criminal courts are expected to determine guilt on the basis of evidence placed before them. The personal religion, caste or background of a judge has no legal relevance to the adjudicatory process. Yet, rather than engaging with the court’s findings regarding unlawful assembly, common object, eyewitness testimony, forensic evidence and the brutality of the assault, attention rapidly shifted towards Judge Khan herself. In effect, the messenger of justice became more important than the message.

Background of the judgment

Before discussing the communal campaign against Judge Tabassum Khan, it is important to understand the significance of the judgment itself. The controversy did not arise in a legal vacuum. It followed a detailed trial concerning the brutal lynching of Nazir Ahmed, who was attacked while transporting cattle through Madhya Pradesh in August 2022. After examining eyewitness testimonies, medical evidence, forensic reports, recoveries made during investigation and other documentary material, the Sessions Court concluded that the prosecution had established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The court held that the accused had formed an unlawful assembly, intercepted the vehicle, violently assaulted the victims with deadly weapons and were collectively responsible for the murder of Nazir Ahmed and the attempted murder of the two surviving victims.

In a significant aspect of the judgment, Additional District and Sessions Judge Tabassum Khan expressly recognised the offence as one of mob lynching, observing that the prosecution had successfully established that the accused had acted as members of an unlawful assembly and had committed a brutal act of collective violence. While considering the question of sentence, the Court treated the mob nature of the crime as an aggravating circumstance. It emphasised the exceptional brutality of the assault, the fatal injuries inflicted upon Nazir Ahmed, the serious injuries suffered by the surviving victims, and the fact that the accused had acted in concert while armed with deadly weapons. The judgment thus acknowledged not merely the commission of murder but the distinct menace posed by vigilante violence carried out by organised groups.

The Court nevertheless declined to impose the death penalty. Relying on the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, Machi Singh v. State of Punjab and Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra (or as cited in the judgment, Santosh Kumar Singh), Judge Khan held that the case did not satisfy the stringent “rarest of rare” threshold governing capital punishment. Instead, the accused were sentenced to life imprisonment for murder under Sections 302 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code, along with separate sentences for rioting and the attempted murder of the surviving victims. The judgment thus represented a careful application of settled criminal law principles, balancing the gravity of the offence with the constitutional limitations governing the imposition of the death penalty. Most crucially, it upheld the path of reformative rather than retributive justice.

Far from being an arbitrary or summary decision, the verdict was a reasoned judicial determination running through the evidence in considerable detail. Yet, rather than engaging with the Court’s legal reasoning or challenging its findings before the appellate courts, the public discourse surrounding the case rapidly shifted away from the judgment itself. The evidence, legal analysis and findings of the trial court were overshadowed by a campaign that sought to question the verdict on the basis of the religious identity of the judge, setting the stage for one of the most disturbing instances of communal targeting of a serving judicial officer in recent years.

The detailed report may be read here.

Organised protests and the manufacture of a communal narrative

What initially appeared to be local dissatisfaction soon evolved into a coordinated campaign extending beyond the district in which the trial had taken place. Reports published by Newslaundry, Siasat and other news organisations indicate that several self-described cow protection organisations and Hindutva groups organised protests condemning the verdict, not primarily on legal grounds but by questioning the religious identity and impartiality of the judge.

Among the most visible organisations participating in these protests was the Gau Raksha Parishad. Demonstrations were organised in which effigies of Judge Tabassum Khan were publicly burnt while slogans branding her “anti-Hindu” were raised. Rather than calling for appellate review of the judgment, the demonstrations sought to portray the conviction itself as an act of religious discrimination against Hindus. The symbolism of burning a judge’s effigy represented a significant escalation from criticism of a judicial decision to the personal targeting of a serving judicial officer.

According to Newslaundry, these demonstrations did not remain confined to Madhya Pradesh. On June 22, members of Gau Raksha Parishad organised a ‘protest’ in Peer Muchalla in Mohali, Punjab, where demonstrators burned an effigy of Judge Khan while shouting slogans demanding the release of the convicted men. Similar protests were subsequently reported from Uttar Pradesh, where members of the Antarrashtriya Hindu Parishad-Rashtriya Bajrang Dal staged demonstrations against the judgment inside government premises! Authorities in that state allowed these unchecked. The geographical spread of these ‘protests’ suggested that the issue had acquired national dimensions, fuelled largely through coordinated organisational and social media mobilisation rather than any fresh legal developments in the case. As significantly, they signified powerful political patronage behind the acts.

Equally revealing was the language adopted by many protesters. Instead of describing the judgment as legally incorrect or identifying alleged errors in the appreciation of evidence, the demonstrations repeatedly referred to Judge Khan’s religion. Her Muslim identity became the principal basis upon which the legitimacy of the judgment was questioned. This represented a dangerous inversion of constitutional values. Judicial decisions are meant to be evaluated through legal reasoning, not through the religious identity of the individual delivering them.

Social media as a vehicle for intimidation

The campaign rapidly migrated from public demonstrations to social media, where it assumed an even more disturbing form. An extensive online campaign filled with communal abuse, personal attacks and threats directed specifically at Judge Khan.

Numerous social media posts reportedly described her as “anti-Hindu” and questioned her ability to dispense impartial justice because she was Muslim. Others employed openly derogatory communal slurs directed at Muslim women. These posts did not merely criticise the verdict; they sought to delegitimise Judge Khan’s authority as a judicial officer by reducing her identity to her religion. Gender dimensions of targeted majoritarian abuse have been increasingly common phenomenon witnessed by Muslim women in public life at multiple levels.

Several videos circulated widely across social media platforms, amplifying these narratives before large audiences. One of the most disturbing videos reportedly featured an individual using deeply offensive communal language while referring to the judge and warning that there would be a “bloodbath” if the convicted men were not released within ten days. The individual threatened violence extending beyond Madhya Pradesh and attempted to portray the judicial verdict as justification for communal mobilisation.

Judge: ADJ Tabassum Khan

14 गौ रक्षकों को सुनाई उमर क़ैद की सजा

ADJ Tabassum Khan जैसे लोग कितना भी
पढ़ ले मक़सद इनका एक ही रहता है हिंदू काफिर है

जो पहले अपने मजबह को देखते बाद में संविधान
को वो कभी न्याय नहीं कर सकते

हिंदुओं ऐसे लोगो से देश से भगाना जरूरी है pic.twitter.com/mNHeVWSbvQ

— Amrendra Bahubali (@TheBahubali_IND) June 17, 2026

Hindutva Scum calls for killing of a judge who sent 7 criminals to jail for lynching a Muslim

Instead of arresting the scum,MHA
Cyber Cell sent me a notice to remove the video or face action

Only in India,a criminal goes scot free while the whistleblower faces intimidation pic.twitter.com/VKcLJRLUDL

— Nehr_who? (@Nher_who) June 26, 2026

Another widely circulated video showed a self-described cow protector standing beside a truck transporting cattle. Rather than discussing the legal findings of the Sessions Court, he argued that cow protection groups should no longer intercept vehicles because those who had done so in the present case had been sentenced to life imprisonment. He went further by declaring that Judge Tabassum Khan would have to reverse her decision and called upon cow protection groups from Agra and other regions to organise protests against her.

Such statements represented an outright attack on India’s constitutional structure governing criminal justice. Judicial orders are not reversed because of public demonstrations or threats of violence. They are challenged through appeals before superior courts. The repeated demands that the judge herself “reverse” the judgment fundamentally misunderstood—and arguably rejected—the institutional framework of the Indian judiciary.

Amplification by influential public figures

The controversy received additional momentum when influential right-wing personalities publicly endorsed the campaign against the judgment. Among the most prominent was Sudarshan News editor Suresh Chavhanke.

14 गौ रक्षकों को उम्रक़ैद.. जज तबस्सुम ख़ान के फैसले पर न्याय संग्राम

देखें #बिंदास_बोल मेरे साथ @DrMohanYadav51 https://t.co/4gJZkzlUfh

— Dr. Suresh Chavhanke “Sudarshan News” (@SureshChavhanke) June 19, 2026

As reported by Newslaundry, Chavhanke described the Sessions Court’s judgment as “judicial lynching” during a televised programme. Declaring his solidarity with the convicted men and their families, he stated: “We stand with all the gau-rakshaks and their families. This fight is not yours alone; it is ours too.”

The significance of such statements lies not merely in their criticism of the verdict but in the authority and reach of the platform from which they were delivered. When prominent media personalities portray judicial decisions as manifestations of religious bias without engaging with the reasoning contained in the judgment, they contribute to the erosion of public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. Such narratives risk encouraging audiences to view judges not as neutral adjudicators but as representatives of religious communities.

Police intervention and criminal investigation

As the campaign intensified, law enforcement authorities eventually intervened. According to Newslaundry, the Seoni Malwa Police registered a First Information Report after taking suo- motu cognisance of the communal and threatening material circulating online.

Station House Officer Sudhakar Bhaskar confirmed that the FIR had been registered against individuals responsible for communal posts and videos under relevant provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita. He further stated that the cyber cell had been tasked with identifying the origin of the viral videos, tracing those responsible for their circulation and continuously monitoring social media platforms for additional inflammatory content.

The registration of the FIR reflected official recognition that the controversy had moved beyond ordinary criticism of a judicial verdict. The campaign contained elements capable of promoting communal hostility, intimidating a judicial officer and potentially disturbing public order. Police intervention therefore became necessary not to suppress legitimate criticism but to investigate conduct that allegedly crossed the threshold into criminal intimidation and hate speech.

Concern within the legal community

The developments also generated widespread concern among members of the legal fraternity. Hazari Lal Gurjar, President of the Bar Association, questioned why stronger institutional measures had not been initiated despite the communal targeting of a serving judicial officer. Speaking to Newslaundry, he expressed concern that a woman judge was facing communal abuse, gendered insults and threats of violence while the higher judiciary had not initiated suo motu contempt proceedings or taken more visible action to protect judicial independence.

Former Chief Judicial Magistrate Pawan Kumar similarly emphasised that the rule of law provides an established remedy for any litigant dissatisfied with a judgment. The correctness of judicial decisions is examined by appellate courts through structured legal procedures, not by personal attacks directed at judges. Public confidence in the judiciary depends upon preserving this distinction.

Several lawyers also reportedly observed that many of those criticising the judgment had not actually read it. According to Advocate Sumit Gehlot, quoted by Newslaundry, much of the outrage appeared to stem from hearsay rather than any informed engagement with the evidence analysed by the court.

Senior Congress leader Pawan Khera also spoke out on social media in support of Judge Tabassum Khan, and said “On June 12, 2026, First Additional Sessions Judge Tabassum Khan sentenced seven men to life imprisonment for the 2022 lynching of Najir Ahmed. All the convicts are indeed Hindu men. But they were not convicted because of their religion; they were convicted because the investigation found them guilty of rioting, attempted murder and murder. Yet our Hindu brother in the video is not outraged by their behaviour. His outrage is reserved for one fact alone: that the judge who convicted them is a Muslim woman. In any civilised society, such bigotry would invite swift legal action. In Modi’s India, however, this man spewing hate walks free while notices are sent to those questioning his conduct. Jai ho!”

On June 12, 2026, First Additional Sessions Judge Tabassum Khan sentenced seven men to life imprisonment for the 2022 lynching of Najir Ahmed.

All the convicts are indeed Hindu men. But they were not convicted because of their religion; they were convicted because the… https://t.co/xzccM88CHv

— Pawan Khera ಪವನ್ ಖೇರಾ (@Pawankhera) June 26, 2026

An attack on judicial independence

The events following Judge Tabassum Khan’s verdict raise constitutional concerns extending far beyond the facts of one criminal case. Judicial independence forms part of the basic structure of the Constitution and requires judges to decide cases without fear, favour, affection or ill will. This principle necessarily includes protection from organised campaigns of communal intimidation.

Public criticism of judicial decisions is entirely legitimate in a constitutional democracy. Courts are not immune from scrutiny, and judgments are frequently debated, criticised and overturned by appellate courts. However, there exists a profound distinction between criticising judicial reasoning and attacking a judge because of her religion.

The campaign against Judge Khan sought to erase this distinction. Rather than analysing the evidence relied upon by the Sessions Court or identifying legal errors warranting appellate interference, sections of the protest movement suggested that the judgment itself lacked legitimacy because it had been authored by a Muslim judge. Such narratives threaten to transform the judiciary into another arena of communal polarisation, where judicial authority depends not upon constitutional office but upon religious identity.

The implications extend well beyond one individual judge. If judges are made to fear organised campaigns of vilification whenever they deliver decisions against politically influential groups, the independence of the judiciary itself is weakened. The message conveyed is that legal reasoning may become secondary to identity-based mobilisation and that adverse judgments may invite not merely appeals but sustained communal intimidation. In a legal system governed by the rule of law, judges must be assessed on the strength of their reasoning and the legality of their decisions; not on the basis of their religion, gender or personal identity. Preserving that principle is essential not only for the safety of individual judges but for maintaining public confidence in the impartial administration of justice itself.

Related:

Mob lynching: Three separate incidents surface, even minors and partially disabled Muslims not safe

Another cow lynching in Nashik, one dead

Maharashtra’s shame: Cow lynching episode reported in Nashik

Allahabad HC points out misuse of cow slaughter law

K’taka: Bail to cow vigilante, Puneeth Kerehalli, accused of killing Muslim man

Cow vigilantism casts its ugly shadow on Maharashtra

Allahabad HC calls out misuse of law in cow slaughter case as only cow dung recovered from scene

The post Judging the Judge: The communal backlash against a lynching verdict appeared first on SabrangIndia.

For months, anti-SIR campaigners have urged the state government to ensure that eligible voters are not excluded from electoral rolls by simplifying the issuance of PRCs, caste certificates and family certificates—documents recognised by the Election Commission of India (ECI) for SIR verification.

However, Revenue Minister Priyank Kharge said the state had written to the ECI over a month ago seeking recognition of Karnataka’s family certificate, but the Commission has yet to respond.

Obtaining caste certificates also remains difficult despite government claims. Applicants must still produce several documents relating to their father’s lineage, making the process particularly challenging for marginalized communities. As a result, lakhs of applications remain pending, casting doubts on Chief Minister D.K. Shivakumar’s assertion that 5.4 crore of Karnataka’s 5.5 crore voters already possess caste certificates.

People-Friendly PRC Rules, but…

Initially, the government had instructed Panchayat Development Officers (PDOs) to issue ordinary residence certificates through Gram Panchayat offices. Activists have pointed out that these certificates would not satisfy SIR requirements because they did not establish permanent residence. Following sustained criticism, the government has now introduced fresh guidelines and eligibility criteria for issuing Permanent Resident Certificates through a significantly simplified process.

Thus, the revised rules represent an important victory for anti-SIR activists and are considerably more citizen-friendly than the earlier framework.

Applicants may establish permanent residence through criteria such as ten years of residence in Karnataka, ten years of schooling in the state, or ownership of immovable property. To prove these conditions, they may submit Aadhaar, ration cards, revenue records, electoral rolls and similar documents. The guidelines also empower officials to conduct local inquiries, seek reports from village accountants and even consider oral testimony as supporting evidence.

Perhaps most significantly, applications cannot be rejected solely because a particular document is missing. Authorities must provide written reasons for any rejection, introducing greater transparency and accountability into the process.

Taken together, the new rules are clearly more inclusive than their predecessors.

Read SabrangIndia’s analyses of the Karnataka government’s intervention here.

The Bigger Question: Will the ECI accept them?

The central question, however, is whether Permanent Resident Certificates issued under such a simplified and inclusive framework will actually be accepted under the SIR process.

The answer is far from certain.

Lessons from West Bengal

The West Bengal example, along with the ECI’s approach and directives regarding such inclusiveness makes it clear that the ECI will not permit this level of inclusiveness.

When the Union government initiated the SIR process in Bihar, the Trinamool Congress government in West Bengal proactively simplified the issuance of domicile certificates in July 2025 to make them easier for citizens to obtain.

However, once SIR began in West Bengal, the BJP objected to domicile certificates issued after July 2025, arguing that they should not be accepted. The Election Commission subsequently subjected those certificates to additional scrutiny and, according to the author, later declined to accept domicile certificates altogether before issuing fresh notices even to applicants who had previously submitted them.

Only after widespread protests led by Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee did the Commission agree to accept domicile certificates again, but with several additional conditions.

Hence, through its February 8 order, the ECI asserted that:

• domicile certificates conform strictly to West Bengal’s Government Order dated November 2, 1999;
• they be issued only by the designated competent authority; and
• Electoral Registration Officers independently verify that every prescribed procedure had been followed before accepting them.

Verification was reportedly assigned to Micro Observers.

With regard to domicile certificates, West Bengal’s Government Order dated November 2, 1999, is available here:

The order prescribes limited eligibility criteria for obtaining a domicile certificate and requires that, in addition to documentary evidence, every applicant undergo verification of citizenship and police verification before the certificate can be issued. This calibration and aggressive re-assertions by the ECI demonstrate how the Commission did not accept the simplified certification process introduced by the West Bengal government. The process may be read about here.

What this could mean for Karnataka

Since the same Election Commission oversees electoral process across India, the Karnataka’s simplified PRC rules may face similar scrutiny. In that case, only PRCs issued in accordance with standards accepted by the Commission—not merely under Karnataka’s revised procedures—would qualify for SIR.

This creates fundamental contradiction: the more citizen-friendly the PRC rules become, the less likely they are to satisfy the requirements of the SIR process. This, then, again underlines the very nature and orientation of the SIR, which is designed as an exclusionary mechanism rather than an inclusive one.

For now, attention will turn to how the Election Commission responds to Karnataka’s new rules.

Moreover, the state government itself has indicated, though indirectly, that the revised PRC rules are intended solely to address SIR requirements and do not create any broader legal rights. Existing rules, it says, will continue to apply in all other contexts.

The ECI, meanwhile, is under no obligation to accept Karnataka’s amendments. As it did in West Bengal, it could reject them altogether or impose additional verification requirements through its own officials.

With the Supreme Court having upheld the Commission’s broad authority in such matters, Karnataka’s battle over PRCs is far from over.

‘Logical Discrepancies’ remain a concern

The author further notes that Karnataka’s Chief Electoral Officer has rejected demands from civil society groups and the state government to suspend the use of “Logical Discrepancy” criteria in the state. The CEO has already identified six categories of logical discrepancies in Karnataka and has indicated that more could emerge once completed Enumeration Forms are received.

For anti-SIR activists, and the campaign in general, this demands greater vigilance, avoidance of premature celebration and a continued and intensification of the struggle, both in positioning and manoeuvre

Related:

To Karnataka’s Anti-SIR Movement: A note of caution and concern

Anti-SIR Activists Beware: A mere Residential Certificate does not satisfy SIR requirements

Exclusive Investigation SIR: How many voters did the ECI actually disenfranchise? Why do final figures show inexplicable ‘additions’?

The Biopolitical Anatomy of Hindutva Fascism: Part II: SIR, EVMs and the Judiciary

The post Karnataka’s new PRC rules are people-friendly, but will the ECI accept them? appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In these places, people from diverse backgrounds and different faiths stepped forward to actively participate in local customs that have been preserved for generations.

Uttar Pradesh: a Dalit family’s 35-year-old Muharram tradition in Balrampur

In Chahatwa village, under the Gumdi Gram Panchayat in the Shridattganj block of Balrampur district, Uttar Pradesh, a unique tradition has been alive for over 35 years. Here, a Dalit Hindu family prepares and installs a Tazia every single year for Muharram. The tradition started with the family elder, Asharam. It was later passed down to his son, Shiv Prasad, and is now being carried forward by his grandson, Kamal Kanojia. Three generations of this family have kept the practice going without a single break, making it a key part of the village’s Muharram activities.

The dedication of the family has been covered by local journalists and media platforms, showing how a personal family promise turned into a symbol of community unity.

35 साल से मुहर्रम पर ताजिया रख रहा बलरामपुर का दलित परिवार, बना सांप्रदायिक सौहार्द की मिसाल –#BreakingNews #Muharram #Dalit https://t.co/MrNL20PFiT

— Journo Mirror (@JournoMirror) June 29, 2026

According to Kamal Kanojia, the practice started because of a personal milestone. Decades ago, the elders made a vow to honour a special family wish. When that wish came true, they promised to install a Tazia every year during the holy month of Muharram. Since then, the family has followed this custom with deep faith, as reported by Dainik Bhaskar.

Every year, the Kanojia family works together to build the Tazia. Once it is ready, people from nearby villages visit Chahatwa to see it and pay their respects. What began as a private family vow has grown into a major regional event that brings different communities together.

Asharam often tells visitors that the family believes this tradition brings peace, blessings, and well-being to their home. His son, Shiv Prasad, agrees, noting that the family saw good changes in their farming, business, and daily life after starting this practice. For them, continuing the custom is a way to respect their elders’ faith and keep the village’s identity alive. Local neighbours say the family is a living example of how mutual respect keeps harmony alive in rural areas, as reported

Bihar: a century-old legacy led by a Hindu family in east Champaran

In Bihar’s East Champaran district, the village of Patahi has followed a unique Muharram tradition for more than a century. As soon as the month of Muharram begins, the entire village gets ready. The most unique part of the procession is that it is led by members of the Singh family, who are Hindus.

For generations, this family has held the responsibility of leading the Tazia procession through the village streets. The community spirit of this annual event has been recorded on video, showing the close bonds between the neighbours.

During Muharram, the courtyard of Shiv Shankar Singh’s house becomes the main centre for preparations. Family members gather to build and decorate the Tazia before taking it out through the village. As the procession moves along, participants perform traditional lathi (bamboo staff) displays to remember the historic events of Karbala. Shah Mohammed, a resident of nearby Padumker village, remembers watching the Singh family lead the procession every year of his life. Other locals also see the family as an essential part of the town’s history, as reported

When asked how it all started, current members of the Singh family say the exact details have been lost over time. However, they know the practice dates back to their great-grandfather, Devi Singh, during British rule. Back then, official permits were needed for public processions, and the license for this Muharram event was issued directly in the name of the Singh family.

Today, the younger generation hopes to keep this tradition alive for years to come. One family member shared that while people may follow different religions in private, when they stand together for the procession, they represent the true spirit of India.

Bihar: crafting traditions in Gaya’s Atri village

In Atri village of Bihar’s Gaya district, community cooperation is visible through local art. During Muharram this year, five out of the seven Tazias in the village’s main procession were built and carried by local Hindu families. According to village elders, these families are simply following a practice they inherited from their ancestors. Making a Tazia takes time, patience, and team effort. Families spend several days shaping bamboo frames, cutting colored paper, and assembling the decorative structures.

Even though the event marks an important chapter in Islamic history, participation in Atri goes beyond just one community. Residents describe it as a normal, long-standing social tradition rather than something unusual. For these families, building the Tazia is a shared responsibility passed down from one generation to the next.

Madhya Pradesh: five generations of devotion in Vidisha

In the town of Vidisha, Madhya Pradesh, the Kushwaha family is central to the annual Muharram activities. For decades, this Hindu family has served at the shrine of Bawdi Waale Baba, which sits right across from a Hanuman temple in Khai Mohalla. Because the shrine and the temple face each other, people regularly visit both places to pay respects, showing the shared heritage of the town.

Every year during Muharram, the Kushwahas manage the arrangements for the Baba’s procession. Today, the fifth generation of the family is continuing this work with deep dedication. The sacred symbol of the Baba is carried on the head of the oldest male member of the family. Decorated with fresh flowers and garlands, the symbol is carried through the main market, drawing thousands of people from Vidisha and nearby areas.

“I have seen my elders serving Baba since I was a child, and the same tradition continues today. There was a time when our family was very poor, but our service never stopped. With Baba’s blessings, our family prospered, and today our children and grandchildren are carrying on this legacy.” — Chhoti Bai Kushwaha, oldest family member. As a report in ETV.

Bihar: a century of unity in Gurdaspur, Begusarai

While news stories about unity often focus on big cities, the small village of Gurdaspur in Bihar’s Begusarai district has spent nearly a century showing how brotherhood works in daily life. The Hindu and Muslim residents of this village, which has about 500 families, celebrate Muharram together as one large family.

For nearly 100 years, a small village in Bihar has quietly done what the rest of the country still struggles to achieve.

Every Muharram, Hindus and Muslims come together to keep an extraordinary tradition alive.

The story of Gurdaspur, Begusarai, is one every Indian should… pic.twitter.com/XabdDJDlVK

— FOEJ Media (@FoejMedia) June 26, 2026

The foundation of this tradition was laid by the late Bal Govind Mahto. Decades ago, he became the President of the Muharram Committee and took care of all the arrangements. From the first day of Muharram to the tenth day (Ashura), he managed the rituals and got the official permits for the procession. When he grew old, he handed the responsibility to his grandson, Vishnudev Mahto, who served the committee for nearly 30 years. Today, his nephew, Pankaj Kumar Mahto, carries on the work.

Evolution of the Gurdaspur Muharram committee Leadership

The ritual side of this tradition has also been kept alive by a local woman named Kushma Devi. The daughter of Bal Govind Mahto, she performed the Muharram rituals with care for years. When her health declined, she passed the duties to her daughter, Urmila Devi. Today, along with her daily housework, Urmila Devi performs all the traditional ceremonies from the first to the tenth of Muharram according to local customs.

Assam and Jammu & Kashmir: regional expressions of solidarity

Further east, in the tea town of Margherita in Assam, Muharram draws many different communities together. The annual procession sees active participation from local Muslim families, Assamese Hindus, Bengali residents, and tribal communities living near the tea estates. The procession moves through the green landscape with local instruments, making the day a shared reflection on justice and regional unity.

Meanwhile, in Srinagar, Jammu & Kashmir, Muharram focuses on community service and mutual support. Along with the traditional mourning processions, people from different communities work together to set up Sabeels (free stalls offering water, milk, and tea) for the public.

Joint blood donation camps are also organised across the city, where youth from various backgrounds donate blood side by side to honor the message of humanity.

Shared traditions passed across generations

The long-standing Muharram traditions across India show that harmony is kept alive through the simple, daily actions of regular families. Whether it is the Kanojia family in Uttar Pradesh keeping a 35-year vow, the Singh family in East Champaran holding a century-old license, the Kushwahas in Vidisha managing a shrine, or the Mahto family in Begusarai leading a committee, these practices continue because of mutual respect.

By treating these customs as a shared responsibility, these villages have kept close ties over the years. Passed down from parents to children, these old rituals continue to thrive, showing that respect and humanity are the true elements of their shared culture. Given the high voltage hate generated by politicians and political outfits holding power, this simple yet powerful assertion by ordinary Indians stands out. And sends a strong message.

Related:

Hindus, Muslims Unite to Protect Rajasthan Border Mosques

When Citizens Say No: The quiet revolt against hate in India’s streets

CJP’s 2025 intervention against ‘Digital Hate’: Holding television news channels accountable before the NBDSA

The post Shared Muharram Heritage: Hindus lead Tazias, Sikhs serve water appeared first on SabrangIndia.