The Court, speaking through Justice Augustine George Masih (for a Bench also comprising Chief Justice B.R. Gavai), extended the constitutional and procedural safeguard under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India—previously emphasized in the context of special statutes such as the UAPA and PMLA—to all offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) / Indian Penal Code (IPC).

Constitutional mandate reinforced

Reaffirming that Article 22(1) is not a mere procedural formality but a binding constitutional safeguard, the Court held that the arrested person must be informed of the grounds of arrest as soon as may be, in a language and form he can understand, and such communication must be in writing.

“…mere communication of the grounds in a language not understood by the person arrested does not fulfil the constitutional mandate under Article 22 of the Constitution of India. The failure to supply such grounds in a language understood by the arrestee renders the constitutional safeguards illusory and infringes the personal liberty of the person as guaranteed under Article 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India.” (Para 44)

The Court explained that the purpose of Article 22(1) is to place the arrestee “in a position to comprehend the basis of the allegations levelled against him,” and to enable him to “seek legal counsel, challenge custody, and apply for bail.” This purpose, it said, “would not be fulfilled by merely reading out the grounds.”

Written grounds in language understood by the arrestee

Drawing from Harikisan v. State of Maharashtra and Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel v. Union of India, the Court held that written grounds must be furnished in the language understood by the person, not merely read out or translated orally.

“The mode of communicating the grounds of arrest must be such that it effectively serves the intended purpose as envisioned under the Constitution of India which is to enable the arrested person to get legal counsel, oppose the remand and effectively defend himself by exercising his rights and safeguards as provided in law. The grounds of arrest must be provided to the arrestee in such a manner that sufficient knowledge of facts constituting grounds is imparted and communicated to the arrested person effectively in a language which he/she understands. The mode of communication ought to be such that it must achieve the intended purpose of the constitutional safeguard.” (Para 45)

Reiterating this, the Bench added:

“There is no harm in providing the grounds of arrest in writing in the language the arrestee understands, this approach would not only fulfil the true intent of the constitutional mandate but will also be beneficial for the investigating agency to prove that the grounds of arrest were informed to the arrestee when a challenge is made to the arrest on the plea of non-furnishing of the grounds of arrest.” (Para 45)

Extension beyond special statutes

Rejecting the argument that earlier rulings in Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India (2024) and Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2024) were confined to PMLA or UAPA offences, the Court held that Article 22(1) applies equally to all arrests—without exception.

“Article 22(1)… casts a mandatory unexceptional duty on the State to provide the arrested person with the grounds of such arrest with the objective to enable that person to be able to defend himself by consulting a legal practitioner of his choice. This mandate of Article 22 (1) is notwithstanding any exception. This Court has made it explicit that the constitutional obligation under Article 22 is not statute-specific and it is grounded in fundamental right of life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, therefore making it applicable to all offences including those under the IPC 1860 (now BNS 2023).” (Para 39)

The Bench further clarified that the right to be informed of the grounds of arrest is fundamental, non-derogable, and absolute, and non-compliance vitiates the arrest itself:

“The requirement of informing the arrested person the grounds of arrest, in the light of and under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India, is not a mere formality but a mandatory binding constitutional safeguard which has been included in part III of the Constitution under the head of Fundamental Rights. Thus, if a person is not informed of the grounds of his arrest as soon as maybe, it would amount to the violation of his fundamental rights thereby curtailing his right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, rendering the arrest illegal.” (Para 40)

Limited exception for exigent circumstances

While declaring the arrest in the present case illegal, the Court carved out a narrow operational exception: where arresting officers are confronted with offences occurring in their presence (for instance, a murder or assault in progress), oral communication of the grounds may be permitted at the time of arrest, provided that written grounds are supplied within a reasonable time and, in any event, at least two hours before the arrestee’s production before the magistrate for remand.

“However, in exceptional circumstances such as offences against body or property committed in flagrante delicto, where informing the grounds of arrest in writing on arrest is rendered impractical, it shall be sufficient for the police officer or other person making the arrest to orally convey the same to the person at the time of arrest. Later, a written copy of grounds of arrest must be supplied to the arrested person within a reasonable time and in no event later than two hours prior to production of the arrestee before the magistrate for remand proceedings. The remand papers shall contain the grounds of arrest and in case there is delay in supply thereof, a note indicating a cause for it be included for the information of the magistrate.” (Para 52)

This two-hour threshold, the Court noted, ensures a functional balance between safeguarding personal liberty and allowing police to perform their duties without procedural paralysis.

“The two-hour threshold before production for remand thus strikes a judicious balance between safeguarding the arrestee’s constitutional rights under Article 22(1) and preserving the operational continuity of criminal investigations.” (Para 53)

Consequences of non-compliance

In unequivocal terms, the Bench held that failure to provide written grounds of arrest in a language understood by the arrestee renders both the arrest and the subsequent remand illegal, entitling the person to immediate release.

Summarising its conclusions, the Court laid down the following binding directions:

1. The constitutional mandate of informing the arrestee of the grounds of arrest applies to all offences under all statutes, including IPC/BNS.
2. The grounds must be communicated in writing and in the language understood by the arrestee.
3. If it is not possible to supply written grounds immediately, they may be communicated orally, but must be furnished in writing within a reasonable time and at least two hours before production for remand.
4. Non-compliance renders the arrest and subsequent remand illegal, and the person “shall be entitled to be set at liberty.”

Significance and Broader Impact

This ruling is one of the most significant expansions of procedural due process under Article 21 and 22 in recent years. It builds on Pankaj Bansal (2023), Prabir Purkayastha (2024), and Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana (2025), which strengthened the constitutional guarantee of being informed of arrest grounds under special statutes.

By explicitly extending these safeguards to all offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita and allied laws, the Court has now constitutionalized written notice of arrest grounds as a non-derogable fundamental right, comparable to the right to be produced before a magistrate within 24 hours.

“The Court further held that a copy of such written grounds must be furnished to the arrested person at the earliest without any exception observing that the communication provided under Article 22 and Section 50 of CrPC 1973 (now Section 47 of BNSS 2023) is not a mere procedural formality but a vital safeguard with the ultimate objective to enable the arrested person to effectively consult legal aid and be prepared to raise objections in remand hearing and apply for his/her bail. The right to life and personal liberty, safeguarded under Articles 20, 21 and 22 of the Constitution, stands as the paramount fundamental right.” (Para 45)

The Court also directed that copies of this judgment be circulated to all High Courts and State Governments for immediate implementation and compliance.

Conclusion

The Mihir Rajesh Shah ruling marks a transformative moment in India’s criminal procedure jurisprudence, ensuring that constitutional guarantees of personal liberty are not reduced to hollow ritual. It affirms that an arrest made without written grounds—especially when not communicated in a language understood by the arrestee—is no arrest in the eyes of the Constitution.

“The genesis of informing the grounds of arrest to a person flows from the Constitutional safeguard provided in Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which reads “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law”. The expression ‘personal liberty’ has been given a wide meaning through various judicial pronouncements. One of which is that personal liberty includes procedural safeguards from the abuse of power by the State agencies and scrutiny of the actions of the State.” (Para 17)

The complete judgment may be read here.

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SC intervenes for personal liberty after HC adjourns a bail application 27 times!

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Examining Jurisprudential Shifts: The Evolution of Bail Provisions Under PMLA – Part II”

The post Due Process Strengthened: Supreme Court mandates written, language-specific grounds for arrest under special laws and general laws appeared first on SabrangIndia.

According to a report by PTI, the devotees were stopped after crossing into Pakistan through the Attari–Wagah border. Officials allegedly told them, “You are Hindu, you cannot go with a Sikh jatha.” Amar Chand, one of those turned back along with six family members, said that despite having valid travel documents and clearance from Indian immigration, they were refused entry once inside Pakistan.

As per the Hindustan Times report, the jatha of around 1,900 Sikh pilgrims had crossed into Pakistan on Tuesday to participate in the Parkash Purb festivities. Chand’s family, along with seven others from Lucknow, had joined the group intending to offer prayers at prominent gurdwaras, including Nankana Sahib. However, all 14 were sent back by Pakistani officials soon after entering.

As per the HT report, a Punjab intelligence officer posted at the border confirmed the incident, saying: “Those denied entry are Hindus by faith, originally from Pakistan but settled in India for many years. They held valid Indian passports and had obtained immigration clearance from our side. Once they entered Pakistan, officials there examined their documents and returned them to the BSF.”

Interestingly, other Hindu devotees in the same jatha faced no such problems. Palwinder Singh, head of the pilgrimage department of the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (SGPC), which organises the largest pilgrim groups, clarified:

“Nearly 40 Hindus are part of our group this year, and almost all entered Pakistan without any issue. Many Hindu followers of Guru Nanak travel every year for these pilgrimages — they have never been barred on the basis of religion.”

The SGPC jatha will remain in Pakistan until November 13, visiting key Sikh shrines including Gurdwara Panja Sahib (Hasan Abdal), Gurdwara Darbar Sahib (Kartarpur, Narowal), Gurdwara Sacha Sauda (Farooqabad), Gurdwara Dehra Sahib (Lahore), and Gurdwara Rori Sahib (Gujranwala).

Amar Chand recounted that his family had even paid ₹95,000 (Pakistani rupees) for bus tickets after clearing all formalities. “Five officials came and told us to get down from the bus, saying Hindus can’t go with Sikh pilgrims. We were then sent back, and our money was not refunded,” he said. Chand, originally from Pakistan, moved to India in 1999 and obtained Indian citizenship in 2010.

Meanwhile, more than 200 other applicants were stopped at the Indian side of the border as they lacked final approval from the Union Home Ministry.

Earlier, the Indian government had initially decided against sending any jatha to Pakistan this year citing security concerns after Operation Sindoor. However, it later allowed a limited group to proceed under strict conditions.

Under the 1950 Nehru–Liaquat Pact, Sikh pilgrims are permitted to visit Pakistan’s revered shrines on four key occasions each year — Baisakhi, Guru Arjan Dev’s martyrdom day, Maharaja Ranjit Singh’s death anniversary, and Guru Nanak Dev’s birth anniversary.

Related:

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How Muslims treated non-Muslims in early Islam

The post Pakistan denies entry to 14 Hindu devotees in Sikh ‘jatha’ visiting for Guru Nanak Jayanti appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The Numbers behind the Screen

The data illustrates both advances and stagnation. On the one hand, the total number of reported cyber offences has increased, but they still account for only a tiny portion of overall (other) crimes. A 2023 Internet Freedom Foundation study found that nearly 68% of respondents who faced digital fraud or harassment did not report or seek help from the police because they did not believe the police would take action, or did not seek help due to fear of being shamed online. Even individuals who reported complaints were often turned away, told that the incident was “not serious enough” or “outside the jurisdiction” of their local police department.

The NCRB’s data on cyber offences is heavily biased towards documenting financial offences: 65% of total reported offences in 2023 were either banking or investment fraud, while non-financial classes of cyber offences – such as stalking, cyberbullying, morphing, etc. – are represented in total under 5%. Nevertheless, first-person reports from TN/NGO’s such as CyberPeace Foundation and Internet Democracy Project find that these personal and gendered violations may be even more pervasive, particularly for women, queer folks, and students. Statistically, these violations are invisible because the state cannot understand these forms of abuse as violence.

The NCRB’s Crime in India model is based on a First Information Report (FIR) registration. If a complaint is never registered as an FIR, it never appears in the Bureau’s reports. Consequently, what we have nationally is not a decrease in crime but an increase in barriers, this time bureaucratic, to counting crimes.

The Mirage of Decline: Delhi, Mumbai and the Art of Statistical Censorship

In Delhi, Mumbai, and many other large metro cities, the figures showed an abrupt decline despite the alarming figures. In Mumbai, the report shows a decline of 11.7% from the previous year in total cybercrime cases, whilst RTI data suggested that only two percent of all complaints made to the National Cyber Crime Portal were ever converted into FIRs. In Delhi, likewise, all categories show declines in clear contradiction to multiple news articles from the media presentations of data that clearly suggested increases in cyber fraud, phishing scams, and gender-based online harassment. The disconnection between the data provided through the official reports and lived human experience represents, in and of itself, a new type of censorship – a digital censorship.

The observable decrease in cybercrimes in regions such as Delhi and Mumbai illustrates how underreporting has functioned as a method of digital governance. Police officers in Mumbai, for example, privately confirmed to the Times of India (2023) that increased reports of cyber fraud were negatively affecting the public’s perception of law and order in the city, and many police stations even ceased to record phishing and fake-profile incidents as cybercrime, instead logging them as petty property offences. The entirety of the TOI report can be read here.

The situation in Delhi is paradoxically similar. The NCRB reports a slight decrease in the number of cybercrime incidents reported in 2023, yet, according to the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, the city’s cybercrime reporting helpline received over 80,000 calls. This disparity is an articulation of what one officer termed “reclassifying for efficiency,” meaning the police advised the victims to call the bank, private website, or intermediary instead of filing a FIR or police report.

This form reduces the number of FIRs filed but improves the statistical reporting; using the data as a measure no longer reveals security; it is a measure of bureaucratic discipline. The illusion of a positive or outward improvement conceals a structural refusal to document crime. Therefore, the censorship of cyberspace does not come from assertion, but comes from data.

Gender, Class, and the Digital Divide

The statistics given by the bureau also erase the social hierarchies within digital victimisation. The usual victims within a phishing scam and job fraud scheme is not the urban middle class, but rather it is low-income workers, migrant families, or elderly populations – all of whom are least literate in navigating digital bureaucracy. In 2023, the National Payments Corporation of India found that UPI-linked fraud was up by 71%, yet many victims did not feel assured or capable of making a formal complaint. The NCRB marks this crime as “banking offences” and erases the human story of systemic victimization or exploitation.

For women, queers, and minors, the stakes are different but equally severe. While image-based abuse, stalking, and cyber blackmail are on the rise, the report lists only 10,730 cases of “cyberstalking” or “cyberbullying” in 2023. That is highly impossible statistically, in a population of 1.4 billion. Experts agree that it is “ludicrously low” given the modern reach of social media and similar avenues. Ground-level studies conducted by Sabrang India and The Hindu have shown police would often, depending on the situation, suggest to women that deleting accounts was better than pursuing legal action for cyberstalking.

This gendered digital divide reproduces offline hierarchies: women and marginalized communities endure disproportionate online violence, and the state responds in a procedural and disengaged manner. In converting these experiences into codes for action, as the bureau does, the violence itself is rendered invisible — a point stripped of dignity and pain.

Invisible Harms, Invisible Justice

Cybercrime, unlike conventional crime, leaves behind traces, such as screenshots, IP logs, and chat histories, yet the Indian legal system has not adapted to utilize these for legal accountability. Data from the bureau for 2023 denotes that 22% of cybercrimes were charged, and less than 3% were convicted at trial. This poor record is compounded by the fact that there is no system for protecting victims or offering mental health services for victims of online harassment.

The NCRB’s framework also does not distinguish between cyber offences that are conducted based on economic fraud and cybercrime that is motivated by gendered violence or political ideology. Hate campaigns against journalists and activists, such as doxing or coordinated trolling, rarely go as far as registration. The India Freedom of Expression Index (IFEI) reports that 226 journalists suffered online abuse in 2023, and it seldom seems to be reflected in the observation category in the report. The very Digital Personal Data Protection Act of 2023 did focus on privacy, yet failed to discuss the accountability of platforms or intermediaries.

So, the issue is not that we lack data; rather, the data is abstract. Cybercrime is documented, but not interpreted or contextualized. Victims become statistics and records, devoid of narrative and recourse.

From Privacy to Accountability: Rethinking Digital Governance

A rights-based framework for cyber governance must move beyond the NCRB’s numerical formalism. Start with a recognition: that digital violence is not a niche technical problem, but a civic crisis that brings forward social hierarchies of power. Reforms should strengthen reporting mechanisms with a requirement of FIR registration if there is an investigation, and provide police with training to sensitively handle gendered and caste-based cyber offences.

Transparency is equally important. The bureau should report how many complaints on their portal turn into FIRs, and they should report on the data of those complaints in a disaggregated manner by gender, caste, and age. This would surface both the social pattern of online harms and expose the administrative bottlenecks to access to justice.

India’s approach towards cybercrime has primarily adopted an approach to surveillance more than safety, with broad internet shutdowns – recorded over 80 in 2023 by Access Now and SFLC.in – used as instruments for the appearance of prevention, even in the contexts of protests and communal tensions. Broad shutdowns, although often explained as security measures, mute voices and obfuscate evidence. Interventions instead of maintaining accountability for perpetrators, punish entire populations, thereby further complicating digital justice.

As the digital-acquainted world expands, so must the social governance moral imagination. Repairing safety for citizens online requires more than cybersecurity infrastructure, but accountability, empathy, and counting all the invisible victims.

Counting the Uncounted

The NCRB’s 2023 data on cybercrime showcases a contradiction within India’s digital transformation. A rise of 31.2% in reported offences demonstrates both acknowledgement of the growing threat of online crime and limitations in reporting incidents of crime. It is not that citizens are less threatened in cities such as Delhi and Mumbai; fewer offences are permitted to be documented in the first instance. The state’s digital apparatus is noting its accomplishments through denials and silence.

Gendered violence, class-based fraud, and ideological harassment thrive in the silence of non-reporting. When the NCRB records fewer incidences of crimes, it is not recognised as justice but rather accepted as erasure. In a democracy that prides itself on statistical knowledge, the absence of numbers becomes the strongest measurement of control.

Cybercrime is not, therefore, simply a technological challenge; it is a challenge to citizenship. Until every form of harm experienced in digital spaces can be translated into redress in the physical world, India’s digital democracy remains one of invisible victims, and a crisis of numbers devoid of presence.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Preksha Bothara)

Related:

Counting Crimes, Discounting Justice: The NCRB’s statistical blind spots

Mapping Gender-Based Violence in India: Trends, determinants, and institutional frameworks

State-sponsored attempts at surveillance erode right to privacy, target specific persons and expose lacunae in legislation

The Ghost of Shreya Singhal: Re-litigating digital free speech

The post Screens of Silence: What NCRB Data Misses about Cybercrime in India appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Delivering judgment in Muhammad Shareef C & Anr. v. State of Kerala & Anr., decided on October 30, 2025, Justice P.V. Kunhikrishnan declared that while Islamic personal law may permit a man to marry more than once, the law of the land and the Constitution must prevail when such a marriage is to be formally registered.

“A Muslim first wife cannot be a silent spectator to the registration of the second marriage of her husband, even though the Muslim Personal Law allow a second marriage to a man in certain situations. The 1st petitioner can marry again if his Personal Law permits him to do so. However, if the first petitioner wishes to register his second marriage with the second petitioner, the law of the land will prevail, and in such a situation, an opportunity of hearing for the first wife is necessary. In such situations, religion is secondary and constitutional rights are supreme. In other words, this is essentially the fundamental principle of natural justice. This Court cannot ignore the feelings, if any, of the first wife when her husband registers his second marriage in accordance with the law of the land. I am sure that 99.99% of Muslim women will be against their husband’s second marriage when their relationship with him is in existence. They may not disclose the same to society. However, their feelings cannot be ignored by a court, at least when their husbands attempt to register the second marriage in accordance with the Rules 2008.” the Court held. (Para 10)

Background of the case

The first petitioner, Muhammad Shareef, a 44-year-old man from Kannur, was already in a subsisting marriage with two children when he claimed to have solemnised a second marriage in 2017 with Abida T.C., the second petitioner, as per Muslim custom. The couple, who have two children together, approached the Registrar to register their marriage under the 2008 Rules, asserting that it was essential to secure property and inheritance rights for the second wife and their children.

When the Registrar declined to register the marriage, the petitioners approached the High Court contending that Muslim personal law allows up to four wives and that, therefore, the registration authority had no right to refuse.

The legal questions before the court

Justice Kunhikrishnan framed two fundamental questions:

1. Whether notice to the first wife is necessary for registering a Muslim man’s second marriage under the Kerala Registration of Marriages (Common) Rules, 2008; and
2. What remedy exists if the first wife objects to such registration on grounds of invalidity.

“Polygamy is an exception, not the rule” — The Qur’anic context

The judgment is remarkable not only for its constitutional vision but also for its interpretive depth in reading Islamic law through the lens of justice and equality. Referring to Jubairiya v. Saidalavi N. [2025 (6) KHC 224], Justice Kunhikrishnan extracted passages from the Qur’an to dispel the misconception that a Muslim man may marry multiple times at will.

Citing the verses, the Court underscored that justice, fairness, and transparency lie at the heart of Muslim marriage law — principles that align with constitutional values. Providing the same, the Court highlighted the facts of the case and held “

“In this case, admittedly, the 1st petitioner married another woman and in that relationship, he has two children. When the relationship with that woman was in existence, the first petitioner submitted to this Court that he fell in love with the second petitioner and married her. I don’t think that the Holy Qur’an or the Muslim Law permits an extramarital relationship with another lady when his first wife is alive and his first marriage with her is in existence, and that also, without the knowledge of his first wife. The principles derived from the Holy Qur’an and Hadith collectively enjoin principles of justice, fairness, and transparency in all marital dealings. However, the petitioner is relying on Muslim Personal Law to justify his marriage to the second petitioner.” (Para 6)

The Law of the Land: Rule 11 of the 2008 Rules

The Court examined Rule 11 of the Kerala Registration of Marriages (Common) Rules, 2008, which obligates the Local Registrar to verify the details furnished in the memorandum of marriage, including previous marital status (Columns 3(f) and (g) of Form I). Justice Kunhikrishnan observed that this requirement gives the registrar clear knowledge of whether a spouse is already married — and therefore, whether due notice must be given to the first wife before proceeding with registration.

While citing Hussain v. State of Kerala [2025 (4) KHC 314], the Court clarified that the Registrar has no power to adjudicate on the validity of the marriage, but cannot ignore procedural fairness:

“…the Registrar is not vested with the power to decide the validity of the marriage. The question is, when a muslim man marries again, when his first wife is alive and the marital relationship with her is in existence, the second marriage can be registered as per the Rules 2008 behind the back of the first wife. The Holy Qur’an is silent about the consent of the first wife for the second marriage to a muslim man when the earlier marriage is in existence. However, it does not prohibit the option of obtaining consent from the first wife, or at least informing her before he marries again. Equality in gender is a constitutional right of every citizen. Men are not superior to women. Gender equality is not a women’s issue, but it is a human issue. As I mentioned earlier, the principles derived from the Holy Qur’an and Hadith collectively enjoin principles of justice, fairness, and transparency in all marital dealings. Therefore, I am of the considered opinion that, if a Muslim man wants to register his second marriage in accordance with the Rules 2008, when his first marriage is in existence and the first wife is alive, an opportunity of hearing should be given to the first wife for the registration.” (Para 10)

Justice Kunhikrishnan: “A Muslim first wife cannot be a silent spectator”

In one of the most stirring portions of the judgment, Justice Kunhikrishnan emphasized that registration of a second marriage behind the back of the first wife would violate principles of natural justice and human dignity:

“A Muslim first wife cannot be a silent spectator to the registration of the second marriage of her husband, even though the Muslim Personal Law allow a second marriage to a man in certain situations.” (Para 10)

The Court observed that even though personal law permits polygamy, it is conditioned upon fairness and capacity — both moral and financial — to treat each wife equally. Ignoring the first wife’s perspective would amount to legalising injustice.

Gender equality as a constitutional mandate

Justice Kunhikrishnan firmly anchored his reasoning in Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution, holding that the procedural fairness demanded by the 2008 Rules flows directly from the constitutional right to equality:

“Equality in gender is a constitutional right of every citizen. Men are not superior to women. Gender equality is not a women’s issue, but it is a human issue.” (Para 10)

The judgment went beyond mere procedural compliance and addressed the emotional dimension of injustice suffered by first wives:

“I am sure that 99.99% of Muslim women will be against their husband’s second marriage when their relationship with him is in existence. They may not disclose the same to society. However, their feelings cannot be ignored by a court, at least when their husbands attempt to register the second marriage in accordance with the Rules 2008. Article 14 of the Constitution says that the state shall not deny to any person equality before the law or equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.” (Para 10)

This humane acknowledgment of emotional agency — rare in judicial discourse — underlines the Court’s empathetic understanding of women’s lived realities within personal law frameworks.

What Happens if the First Wife Objects?

The Court provided clear procedural guidance for registrars and litigants. If the first wife objects to the registration of a second marriage, the Registrar must not proceed with registration and must refer the matter to a competent civil court:

“If the first wife objects to the registration of the second marriage of her husband, alleging that the second marriage is invalid, the registrar shall not register the second marriage, and the parties should be referred to the competent court to establish the validity of the second marriage as per their religious customary law. As I mentioned earlier, there is nothing in the holy Qur’an which mandates a man to get permission from his first wife for his second marriage. However, Customary Law is not applicable when the question of registering a second marriage arises. I am not saying that the second marriage cannot be registered, but an opportunity of hearing should be given to the first wife by the statutory authorities, while a second marriage of a Muslim man is to be registered.” (Para 10)

Balancing Faith and Law: The Constitutional Synthesis

Perhaps the most profound aspect of Justice Kunhikrishnan’s judgment is the synthesis it achieves between faith and fundamental rights. While reaffirming that Islam does not mandate consent from the first wife for a second marriage, the Court held that when registration under a secular statute is sought, constitutional guarantees must take precedence:

“Customary Law is not applicable when the question of registering a second marriage arises. I am not saying that the second marriage cannot be registered, but an opportunity of hearing should be given to the first wife by the statutory authorities, while a second marriage of a Muslim man is to be registered. Muslim Personal Law states that a man can have more than one wife, provided that he has the capacity to maintain more than one wife and can give justice to his first wife. If the husband is neglecting the first wife or not maintaining the first wife, or inflicting cruelty on the first wife and thereafter contracting a second marriage, making use of his Personal Law, an opportunity of hearing to the first wife will be beneficial to her at least when the second marriage is registered in accordance with the Rules 2008. marriage registration officer can hear the first wife, and if she objects to her husband’s second marriage, stating that it is invalid, the parties can be referred to a competent civil court to establish the validity of the second marriage.” (Para 10)

Outcome and broader implications

The writ petition was dismissed as the first wife had not been made a party. Nonetheless, the Court issued a transformative directive:

“Let the Muslim women also get an opportunity of hearing when their husbands remarry, at least at the stage of registering the second marriage.” (Para 10)

The ruling thus extends procedural protection to Muslim women within a statutory framework that transcends personal law — ensuring that no woman is blindsided by a state-sanctioned act of erasure.

Why this judgment matters

1. Reasserts constitutional supremacy: Personal law cannot override statutory procedure or fundamental rights when interfacing with state authorities.
2. Advances gender justice: By recognizing the first wife’s right to be heard, the Court has extended procedural dignity to Muslim women.
3. Bridges faith and constitution: It integrates Islamic principles of justice and fairness with the Constitution’s egalitarian ethos.
4. Sets a model for inclusive procedure: The decision creates a precedent for harmonizing personal law practices with secular regulatory frameworks.

Conclusion

Justice Kunhikrishnan’s ruling is a landmark in both family law and constitutional jurisprudence. It acknowledges the validity of personal law while firmly situating all state-recognised acts within the boundaries of constitutional morality, equality, and natural justice.

In essence, the judgment transforms a narrow question of registration into a broader affirmation of women’s rights and human dignity. It is a model of judicial craftsmanship that blends empathy with principle — reaffirming that in India’s constitutional democracy, faith may guide conduct, but fairness must govern the law.

The complete judgment may be read here.

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Shah Bano Begum (1916-1992): A Socio-Political Historical Timeline

Misogyny & Faith: Extreme narratives curtailing the autonomy of women

Shubha case: Reformative Justice meets Gendered Realities

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A Question of Rights: Supreme Court backs teacher in maternity leave dispute

The post Kerala High Court: First wife must be heard before registering Muslim man’s second marriage appeared first on SabrangIndia.

As is well known, Kushinagar is one of the most important holy places for Buddhists worldwide, as the Buddha delivered his last sermon here and attained Mahaparinirvana here. Bhadant Gyaneshwar was the most senior Buddhist monk in Kushinagar and had served as President of the Kushinagar Monks’ Association since 2005. He assumed this role after the passing of Bhadant Aniruddha Mahathera of Lumbini. The Kushinagar Monks’ Association was established on December 18, 1952, with Bhadant Chandramani Mahathera as its first President, serving until May 8, 1972. Bhadant Uttikhendariya Mahathera and Achyutananda Mahathera subsequently became Presidents. Bhadant Gyaneshwar Mahathera was thus the sixth President of the Kushinagar Bhikshu Association.

Bhadant Gyaneshwar was born on November 10, 1936, in the village of Jibenji, in the Akyab district of Arakan province, Burma. Arakan is now part of Rakhine State. His childhood name was Aung Ja Wae, and his father was a farmer. Today, Burma is known as Myanmar. Rakhine State remains the most indigenous and largest Buddhist region, though in recent years the treatment of Rohingya Muslims and their plight have drawn considerable international attention.

Bhadant Gyaneshwar had publicly noted that this issue was not so polarised during his time. He recalled that Bengali Muslims had migrated to his region and exploited local people. He vividly remembered events from World War II. In conversations with me, he discussed Myanmar’s diverse ethnicities but emphasised that there was no caste system or untouchability, unlike what he encountered extensively in India. His village, a coastal area with a significant Buddhist population, shaped his early life. Bhadant Gyaneshwar’s mother died during his childhood, causing him great suffering. At a young age, he was drawn to the teachings of Dhamma. On April 12, 1949, he entered a university in Rangoon (now Yangon) to study Pali. On June 3, 1956, after six years of studying Buddhism, he became a shramana and received the name that became known in Hindi as Dnyaneshwar or Gyaneshwar.

Burma was a flourishing centre of Buddhism, and India maintained strong relations with it. In 1954, Burma hosted the Sixth Buddhist Council, attended by Bhante Dharmarakshita. Babasaheb Ambedkar and E.V.R. Periyar also participated in this historic conference in Rangoon. Though only 18 years old, Bhadant Gyaneshwar attended and met Babasaheb Ambedkar. He remembered little of the encounter, being too young to grasp Dr. Ambedkar’s socio-political significance; like other locals, he was there to listen to distinguished guests and serve. The large-scale event held special meaning for him nonetheless.

Buddhist monks from Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Myanmar have long visited India’s historical and religious sites, often saddened by their neglect and dedicating their lives to restoration. Anagarika Dharmapala of Sri Lanka played a pivotal role in reviving Buddhism in India. For context, he fought to restore Buddhist control over the Mahabodhi Temple in Bodh Gaya; his efforts helped revive Buddhism and its heritage across South Asia. He is renowned globally for advancing Buddhist ideas and practices.

Bhadant Gyaneshwar’s parents knew Bhadant Chandramani, as his father followed Buddhism. In 1962, when Bhikkhu Dharmarakshita and Bhikkhu Kittima Mahasthavir learned about Bhadant Chandramani’s declining health—one of India’s most respected monks—their concern deepened. They recognised his efforts to preserve Buddhist Dhamma in Kushinagar and sought someone to care for him while ensuring deep Dhamma knowledge and devotion for the future. By 1962, Bhadant Chandramani’s health had become a worry for the Buddhist community. Accordingly, the two bhikkhus invited 27-year-old Gyaneshwar from Burma to India, directing him to Kushinagar to live with Bhadant Chandramani. Bhadant Gyaneshwar arrived on August 5, 1963, to serve his guru and strengthen Buddhist heritage. From then on, he immersed himself in Indian Buddhist traditions, mastering the local language. He worked for the upliftment of marginalised people and counselled Dhamma practitioners from India and abroad, contributing significantly to Kushinagar’s development.

Bhadant Gyaneshwar possessed a sharp memory and an extraordinary ability to share his vast experiences. He regularly met disciples and people from all walks of life, discussing socio-religious issues. Language was initially a barrier, but he soon became fluent in Hindi and Bhojpuri, travelling worldwide. He continued charitable and social activities initiated by Bhadant Chandramani Mahasthavir. Though unable to return to Myanmar, he maintained ties; the Bhadant Chandramani VIP Guest House in Kushinagar was built with Myanmar Buddhists’ support.

His life exemplified struggle. In conversations with me, he shared key experiences, including efforts to remove unauthorised occupation from land around the Mahaparinirvana site in Kushinagar. These battles—reconstructing sites and reclaiming land—form a long and inspiring story. To adapt to India, he enrolled in local schools, completing high school in 1968, intermediate in 1970, BA in 1973, and MA in 1975 from Buddha Degree College, Kushinagar. He later earned Pali Sahitya Ratna and an LLB degree, reflecting his passion for knowledge.

The Myanmar government honoured him with its highest religious award. Due to COVID-19 restrictions, he could not travel, so the Myanmar Ambassador conferred the title *Abhidhaja Maharatthaguru* in Kushinagar in June 2021. Earlier honours included *Abhidhaja Aggamaha Thaddamma Jotika* (2016), *Aggamaha Pandita* (1993), and *Aggamaha Thaddamma Jotika Daza* (2005) for his service to Buddhism. Bhadant Gyaneshwar became a legal Indian citizen in 1978 and remained President of the Kushinagar Main Temple Bhikshu Sangha until his death.

He was associated with numerous Buddhist religious and charitable organisations and served on the Bodhgaya Mahavihara Administrative Body (appointed by the Bihar government) from 1990 to 2018. 

When I had asked him if Bodh Gaya should remain a Buddhist pilgrimage site, he replied, “Shouldn’t it be handed over to Buddhists as it is the most sacred site for Buddhists.” He advocated transferring all Buddhist sites to Buddhist control. While accepting Archaeological Survey of India oversight for preservation, he noted that global visitors seek not just archaeology but Buddhist teachings. India, as the Buddha’s land, should facilitate this.

Many disciples have become prominent monks strengthening India’s Buddhist movement. Dr. Nanda Ratan Bhante Thero, head of the Sri Lanka Buddha Vihara, met him in 1995 while in Shravasti. He pursued higher education under “Guruji” (as disciples called Bhadant Gyaneshwar). In 1998, Guruji sent him to Myanmar’s International Theravada Buddhist University; he returned to Kushinagar in 1999.

Dr. Nanda Ratan Bhante says Guruji cared deeply for the poorest and most marginalised, prioritising education—especially for girls—and fought caste discrimination and untouchability. Thousands of followers in India and abroad attended his lectures and invitations. At Guruji’s request, Japan’s Maitri Association supported education for hundreds of children within a 10-kilometre radius of Kushinagar. He remained active in Kushinagar’s development.

Bhante Nand Ratan ji cared for Guruji devotedly. Days ago, at a Buddhist prayer meeting at our Prerna Kendra, he asked everyone to wish Guruji health and long life. Today, meeting him where Bhadant Gyaneshwar’s body lay for devotees’ darshan, Guruji was pensive: “We tried our best but could not save him. We wanted him for many more years. This will be my greatest regret.” I have seen Bhante Nand Ratan ji always caring for Bhadant Gyaneshwar. He did everything possible, but some things are beyond human control. Bhadant Gyaneshwar’s presence will be missed, yet his network of followers will carry his legacy forward.

Bhadant Gyaneshwar dedicated his life to Dhamma and gave Kushinagar a renewed identity. Children study in his schools; his temple attracts domestic and foreign visitors. Experiencing caste in India, he told me he had never known it in Myanmar, where ethnic differences existed without hierarchy.

Interviewing him nearly five years ago was a privilege and honour. As the Guru of Gurus, I was hesitant, unsure how to proceed. He called for a chair so I could sit beside him and converse comfortably. He answered with profound depth. Today, paying respects at the same venue, memories of that interview flooded back. At its end, he recited a Buddhist hymn for our well-being.

Throughout his long public life, he followed the Buddha’s path—the hope Babasaheb Ambedkar saw for the Bahujan Samaj, our true freedom for over 85% of the population. Bhadant Gyaneshwar’s efforts to spread Buddha’s wisdom in India and beyond will inspire generations. He loved Kushinagar, building its Buddhist identity. The Burmese Buddha Vihara and its later stupa were major contributions. Frankly, the stupa at the Burmese Buddha Vihara has become Kushinagar’s landmark.

A fitting tribute to Bhadant Gyaneshwar.

**Bhavatu Sabba Mangalam!**

Related:

Periyar: Caste, Nation and Socialism

Periyar: Caste, Nation and Socialism

The ‘Harijans’ of Bangladesh: Victims of constitutional neglect and social isolation

The post Obituary: Bhadant Gyaneshwar and his invaluable contribution to the buddhist world appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Note: Meanwhile, Shah Bano’s daughter has approached the Madhya Pradesh High Court on Tuesday (November 4) claiming that the movie ‘Haq’ starring Yami Gautam Dhar and Emraan Hashmi affects the personality rights of her mother, depicts her image in a derogatory manner and must not be released. After hearing all the parties–including the producers and the Censor board, Justice Pranay Verma reserved his verdict in the matter.

In the 1970s, Shah Bano filed a suit for maintenance from her husband. As the court proceedings ensued, just to unburden himself from paying maintenance to his separated wife, Shah Bano, he (Mr Khan) divorced Shah Bano (reportedly inside the Court itself), and argued that un-Quranic Instant Triple Talaq (ITT) didn’t provide for maintenance. The litigation reached up to the Supreme Court which ruled in favour of Shah Bano, in April 1985. This created a huge furore. Muslims and the Urdu press initially welcomed it (according to Nawaz B Mody’s essay). By August 1985, the Muslim conservatives began to massively agitate asking for upturning it through legislation. Rajiv Gandhi, the then Prime Minister of India, was persuaded/misled to oblige the Muslim conservatives. Ever since then, the Ayodhya-Babri Masjid dispute took a new, sharper turn, giving an excuse to Hindutva supremacists to influence wider Indian society and the polity.

Five years ago I wrote:

….In the 1980s, the All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB)—guided forces among Muslims made their own contributions of fodder to rising majoritarianism. On January 15, 1986, in a session of the Momin Conference at the Siri Fort Auditorium in Delhi, the then prime minister Rajiv Gandhi announced his intention to amend the law to nullify the Supreme Court’s April 1985 verdict in favour of Shah Bano. A bill was introduced in March and it became the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act in May 1986. In January 1986, there were strident Muslim protests against the progressive verdict, which had granted Shah Bano, a Muslim woman, alimony after her divorce.

The approach of the conservative Muslims became pretty clear from the Urdu memoir, Karwan-e-Zindagi, published in 1988 by Maulana Abul Hasan Ali Miyan Nadvi (1914-1999). In Volume 3, Chapter 4, Page 134, Nadvi clearly narrates that it is he who had persuaded Gandhi not to accept the proposition that many Islamic countries have already reformed their personal laws. Nadvi’s narration is triumphant; he rejoices in the successful accomplishment of his effort to stymie a similar reform in India. He says his persuasion had a particular psychological impact on Gandhi and that his “arrow precisely hit the target— woh teer apney nishaaney par baitha”.

On page 157 comes Nadvi’s candid “confession”: “Our mobilisation for protecting the Shariat in 1986 resulted into complicating the issue of Babri Masjid and vitiated the atmosphere in a big way— is ne fiza mein ishte’aal wa izteraab paida karney mein bahut bara hissa liya,” he writes.

For further substantiation, one must read Nadvi’s memoir in Nicholas Nugent’s book,  Rajiv Gandhi: Son of a Dynasty, published by BBC Books, in 1990. On page 187 Nugent writes:

“…a decision had been taken by the Congress High Command in the early 1986 to ‘play the Hindu card’ in the same way that the Muslim Women’s bill had been an attempt to ‘play the Muslim card’… Ayodhya was supposed to be a package deal… a tit for tat for the Muslim women’s bill… Rajiv played a key role in carrying out the Hindu side of the package deal by such actions as arranging that picture of Hindus worshipping at the newly unlocked shrine be shown on television.”

The lock was opened within an hour of the judgment being delivered by the district court of Faizabad on 1 February 1986. As said earlier, the deal between the Prime Minister, the Muslim clergy and the Momin Conference’s Ziaur Rahman Ansari (who died in 1992) had already been struck in January 1986. There is a reference to this in his biography, Wings of Destiny, 2018, written by his son Fasihur Rahman. Yet, a nagging question remains: who wanted to open the locks, and why? After all, the elections were four long years away and so Gandhi did not have a direct electoral stake in the event…”

This biographical timeline of Shah Bano therefore attempts at capturing the journey of the India(n) republic veering around the issue of Muslim resistance to reforms in Personal (Gender) laws and surge in Hindu majoritarian influence. This timeline also provides a significant reading list, by many including some of the dramatis personae in this saga. Many of these facts pertaining to the issue remain largely unknown even to informed readers. They provide an informed reading.

1916:  Shah Bano Begum was born; [the year when Congress-Muslim League & Moderate-Extremist Pact took place at Lucknow].

1932: Shah Bano marries Indore-based advocate Md Ahmad Khan (1913-2006), her cousin. [The year Gandhi-Ambedkar Poona Pact happened].

1937 to 1939: The Shariat Application Act was enacted. Jinnah, the pork-eating non-practicing Muslim, was the pilot of the legislation. The roles of Maulana Azad, Maulana Madani, etc., in this legislative pursuit not known, so far. A daughter (of the Punjab’s Khizr & Sikandar Hayat Khan family) asks for inheritance in landed property, as per Shariat. [Tiwana-Jinnah] deny this right, invoking cunning arguments, such as, (i) Customary laws deny daughter’s share in land, and (ii) that land & agriculture was a state Subject whereas the Shariat Act was a Central law! Thus, Muslim women are made to suffer from the Shariat Act on two fronts: the marriage-divorce issue as well as the inheritance rights in parental assets.

1938 to 1947: Muslim League & Savarkar led Hindu Mahasabha come together, ally, pushing India towards Partition, with the active support of the British colonial state.

1946: Mr Md. Ahmad Khan marries again (second marriage), with Halima Begum, a cousin of Shah Bano.

1946-1950: Constituent Assembly Debates (CAD) on Article 44, Uniform Civil Code (UCC), Articles 25 to 28 and 37.

1947: Partition happens; millions are raped, displaced, looted, amputated, mutilated. Jinnah’s goal of consolidating Muslims politically through the enacted Shariat Act gets accomplished and manifests in Partition, leaving an unending legacy of bloodshed, communal hatred. India’s Muslims are rendered ever more vulnerable.

January 30, 1948: Gandhiji was assassinated by Hindu bigots affiliated with radical Hindu outfits. Just ten days before, they had failed in their attempt to assassinate Gandhi and one of them was arrested. Yet, for many hours after the killing, on January 30, 1948, an apprehension prevailed about the identity of the assassin until then Prime Minister Nehru and Home Minister Sardar Patel clarified the situation, declared the reality.

1951-1961: Nehru led govt reforms Hindu Personal Laws; expects the religious minorities to initiate reforms at their own, from within. (For details see, Reba Som’s essay, “Jawaharlal Nehru and the Hindu Code: A Victory of Symbol over Substance?”, in the Modern Asian Studies, 28, 1, Feb 1994).

1962: Pakistan reforms Muslim personal Laws; the reforms which elude India’s Muslims even in 2025.

1972-1973: The Indira-led govt amends the Cr P C 1898 to help deserted women & abandoned old parents, with maintenance, and for adoption of child. Muslims protest across India against the essentially Hindu law reforms by coming out on streets– April 1973 the All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB) at Hyderabad, spearheads these protests.

(Despite the fact that the custody of Zayd, the son adopted by the Prophet continued with him till Zayd was martyred; Zayd’s son, Osama, also continued to enjoy utmost affection of the Prophet. The Quran doesn’t prohibit “adoption” per se, it only prohibits erasure of biological paternity.)

1975:  Mr Md Ahmad Khan drove Shah Bano out of her home; she had three sons and two daughters and one Bahu (daughter-in-law) who was said to have been in support of Mr. Khan in driving Shah Bano out of her home. [The same year Emergency was imposed in the country].

April 1978: Shah Bano went to the trial court (Indore) asking for maintenance; the Court issued an interim order for payment of maintenance.

August 1979: the local magistrate directed Khan to pay a sum of Rs. 25 (US$2) per month maintenance to Shah Bano who alleged that her former husband earned a professional income of about Rs.60,000 annually (US$4,600).

November 1979: Mr Khan protested this in the court invoking personal law; the judge said even under the existing interpretation of and codified Muslim Personal Law, a separated wife does remain entitled for maintenance. On hearing this, right inside the court, before the judge, Mr Khan pronounced the un-Quranic instant triple divorce. Simply to avoid payment of maintenance, of a meagre allowance of amount Rs 179/- per month.

1979: The Supreme Court verdict (in the Tahira Bi vs Ali Hasan) for maintenance to the divorced Muslim woman.

1980: Shah Bano filed a revised application for increased maintenance, and the High Court of Madhya Pradesh raised the amount to Rs.179.20 per month (US$14).

1980: Supreme Court verdict for maintenance in the Fazlun Bi vs Qadir Wali case.

Feb 19, 1981: Meenakshipuram (Tamil Nadu) Dalits Converted to Islam, en masse, and the village was renamed Rahmatnagar. This created furore and communal strife. [For details see, Theodre P Wright Jr (October 1982), “The Movement to Convert Harijans to Islam in South India”, The Muslim World, 72, 3-4, pp. 239-245]

February 1983: Nellie (Assam) Massacre [See Myron Weiner (June 1983), “The Political Demography of Assam’s Anti-Immigrant Movement”, Population and Development Review, vol. 9, Issue 2]

8 April 1984: “VHP gave a clarion call for the removal of the Babri Masjid”. [A G Noorani, 2019, The RSS, p. 207].

September 25, 1984: Former BJP President, Lal Krishna Advani-led Rath Yatra began

October 31, 1984: The Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was assassinated; Rath Yatra suspended.

April 23, 1985: The Supreme Court, hearing the appeal (High Court also retained maintenance), endorsed the verdict (for maintenance of Rs 500/- per month) given by the Lower & High Court. Justice Y. V. Chandrachud’s observations were not confined to Quran alone; the verdict subjected (the patriarchic aspects of Hinduism as well as Islam) to criticism.

Last Friday of Ramzan (1985) observed as Yaum-e-Tahaffuz-e-Shariat.

August 1985: Signing of the Assam accord, widely considered to be a political concession made at the cost of the immigrant Muslims.

Aug 1985: Arif M Khan, Union Minister of State in Rajiv cabinet, spoke in Parliament welcoming the Supreme Court verdict.

October 23, 1985: Rath Yatra resumed from 25 places. Deadline of Shivratri (March 8, 1986). Before this, discussions on the possibility of the locks of the Babri Masjid sought to be opened, by former PM, Rajiv Gandhi were discussed, according to Neerja Chowdhury’s report in the Statesman.

Nov 15, 1985: Succumbing under mass protests before Shah Bano”s house in Indore, she was forced to affix her thumb impression to a statement saying she disavowed the Supreme Court verdict. [Ritu Sarin, “Shah Bano: The Struggle and the Surrender”, Sunday, 1-7 Dec 1985].

December 1985 to January 1986: Five lakh Muslims came out on the streets of Bombay, Calicut.

The Hindu Mahasabha retaliated by handing out the same treatment to the effigies of Maulana Ziaur Rahman Ansari (d. 1992), Union minister of state for environment, who leads the fundamentalist pressure group within the Congress (I).

In the first few weeks after the Shah Bano verdict, most Urdu press welcomed the verdict and expected that the Muslims will introspect and will launch reforms (Nawaz B Mody’s research essay, Asian Survey, 1987).

December 1985: Ziaur Rahman Ansari (MoS Environment, in Rajiv cabinet) spoke against the verdict in a three-hour long speech in Parliament. He used casteist slurs against the judges: something like this, “Kya ab teli tamboli bhi Sharaiat mein dakhal dengey!” (Indian Express, December 21, 1985).

Muslims protested against the Supreme Court verdict and the observations recorded in the verdict (misleadingly propagating that Islam alone was targeted by the Supreme Court). Asghar Ali Engineer’s columns in Bombay’s Urdu Blitz kept appreciating the verdict and kept talking of the reformism.

December 1985: Shah Bano met Rajiv Gandhi at his invitation, in which Gandhi persuaded Bano to refuse the maintenance telling her the situation was very critical.

Post-verdict, till January 1986: Ali Miyan Nadvi (+ Syed Shahabuddin+Ibrahim Sulaiman Sait) led AIMPLB “bargained” with the Prime Minister to legislate against the verdict. “In exchange”, locks of Babri Masjid to be opened, via the Faizabad Court; the opening to be telecast on Doordarshan.

This is “confessed” by Ali MiyaN (1914-1999) in his Urdu memoir, Kaarwaan-e-Zindagi (1988; vol.3, chapter 4, pages 134-137, 157); corroborated by Nicholas Nugent’s biography (1990, p. 187) of Rajiv Gandhi. Neerja Chowdhury (Statesman, 20 April and 1 May 1986), “There is evidence of a connection between the opening of the doors of the disputed ram Janmabhoom in Ayodhya and introduction of the Muslim [Women] Bill in Parliament…”

Ali Miyan Nadvi had also promised the Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi that the Muslim clergy would make “some arrangement” for maintenance of divorced Muslim women out of the Waqf assets. This promise remains forgotten.

August 1985 to January 1986: Rallies and Protests in Bombay, Calicut, Indore, Assam, Patna, Lucknow, etc. against the Verdict— “Shariat Bachao!” Different responses of the Muslim civil society, academics, and politicians. Over 500 teachers of AMU and a good number of teachers in JMI (barring a few dozen teachers of Left-Liberal leanings) side with the Muslim conservatives and reactionaries.

19 December 1985: Vir Bahadur Singh, the Congress CM of UP visited Ayodhya’s Ramayan Mela organised by the government agencies.

January 1986: The deal to legislate against the Supreme Court Verdict was finalized/endorsed by Ziaur Rahman Ansari (& Momin Conference?), with the PM, Rajiv Gandhi. See the biography (2018) of Ansari, Wings of Destiny.

January 25, 1986: Umesh Chandra Pandey, a 28 years old local lawyer filed an application in the Munsif Court, Faizabad, seeking removal of restrictions on the puja at the disputed Babri Masjid site. The Munsif declined as the files were in the High Court since 1961.

January 31, 1985: Appeal was filed in the Babri Masjid dispute court of the District Judge, Faizabad;

February 1, 1986: The case was heard. Md Hashim’s application was rejected who was already a plaintiff. The District Judge (K M Pandey) heard the District Magistrate and the SSP Faizabad on the law-and-order situation.

February 1, 1986: Faizabad Court orders (at 4.40 pm) opening; within less than 40 minutes of the verdict, unlocking done (at 5.19 pm) & televised, “as per the deal between the AIMPLB & PM” (see Urdu memoir of Ali Miyan Nadvi, Kaarwaan e Zindagi, vol.3, chapter 4, p. 134, 135, 157; also read, Nicholas Nugent’s biography of Rajiv Gandhi, 1990, p. 187). 

Ali Miyan’s offer and the promise to the PM to institute a measure for looking after the abandoned, helpless women through Waqf or any other way, was a part of the deal which everybody including Ali Miyan chose to forget. The Qaum (community) never asked him about this, even after he wrote about the promise and deal in his Urdu memoir, Kaarwaan-e-Zindagi (1988, vol. 3, chapter 4). 

“There was a prior understanding between Indira Gandhi and later Rajiv Gandhi and VHP on the opening of the locks”, writes Noorani (The RSS, 2019, p. 207) citing Neerja’s two reports in the Statesman.

February 19, 1986: Bill tabled to nullify the Supreme Court verdict.

March 8, 1986: Shivratri, Deadline of the VHP’s Rath Yatra to open the locks.

March 29-April 4, 1986: The Eve’s Weekly quoted Arif Md Khan’s resignation who also said, within law, “Indian Muslim women will be the only women to be denied maintenance anywhere in the world”.

April 1986 (Muslim India monthly): “AMU Teachers Support the Bill”; “As for AMU, the few dozens of teachers who signed the petition against the Muslim Women’s Bill paled in comparison to the more than 500 teachers (including sixty-three women) who signed a memorandum to express their ‘whole-hearted suport’ for the Bill”, and stated that the Muslims were hurt by the Supreme Court judgement [Laurence Gautier, 2024, p. 379].

May 1986: Parliament legislated law on Muslim Women, against the Supreme Court Verdict.

1986: Shah Bano pressurised to refuse to take the maintenance.

1986: Ram Shila (Bricks) Pujan Rath Yatra.

1989: Kar Seva in Ayodhya and the police firings on them.

1990: Mandal Report Implemented followed by caste riots and Advani’s W(r)ath Yatra.

1991: Narasimha Rao led govt brings in neo-liberalisation

1992: Shah Bano Begum dies; hardly any obituary was published by the press.

Sunday, December 6, 1992: Babri Masjid demolished, followed by massive pogroms across the country, and then a bomb blast in Bombay on Friday 12 March 1993.

April 1994: Allahabad High Court declared Instant Triple Talaq (ITT) illegal.

BJP kept rising, expanding and consolidating to emerge soon as the dominant and hegemonic political power, transforming the society, polity, administration and every other institution.

2001: Supreme Court verdict in Daniel Latifi case (after a few months of Latifi’s death) clarifying/reiterating that the law legislated in 1986 does provide for maintenance under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code of India.

Feb 2002: Gujarat pogrom.

2006: Md Ahmed Khan died in Indore at the age of 93.

May 2014: NaMo Era comes and stays.

August 22, 2017: Supreme Court verdict (in the case of Shayera Bano of Allahabad) declared the ITT (Instant Triple Talaq) unconstitutional. The AIMPLB was respondent no. 7 in this case. It had submitted its affidavit that Court shouldn’t intervene; Parliament should. Yet, even after the verdict, the AIMPLB didn’t submit its draft proposal/bill, of reforms, in the Muslim Personal Laws.

February, 10-11, 2018: While going for its 26th plenary at Hyderabad in early February 2018, the AIMPLB announced that the session would prepare a model nikahnama, but reneged on it.

August 1, 2019: The Parliament criminalised ITT (Instant Triple Talaq). Maintenance to the divorced/abandoned women remains ignored as ever.

Feb 2024: Uttarakhand legislates for UCC; AIMPLB & Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind (JUH) contemplate challenging the legislation in the court of law, without reforming the Muslim Personal Laws.

July 10, 2024: Supreme Court upholds Telangana High Court verdict for maintenance of Rs 10 000 per month to a divorced woman.

July 14, 2024: AIMPLB resolves to find ways of protesting against the verdict.

Further Readings

• Asghar Ali Engineer (1987), The Shah Bano Controversy.
• Zoya Hasan (January 7, 1989), “Minority Identity, Muslim Women Bill Campaign and the Political Process”, Economic and Political Weekly, 24, Issue 1.
• Ziya Us Salam (2018), Till Talaq Do Us Part
• Shekhar Gupta, Inderjit Badhwar, Farzand Ahmed (January 31, 1986), “Shah Bano judgment renders Muslims a troubled community, torn by an internal rift”, India Today.
• “Secularism on the Bend”, Frontline (English Fortnightly, Madras/Chennai), 11-24 January 1986.

Disclaimer: The author is unaware of the content of the biopic, Haq scheduled to be released on Friday, November 7.

Prepared by Mohammad Sajjad, Professor, Modern & Contemporary Indian History, AMU, Aligarh.

[Biography of Shah Bano: Biography of the Indian Nation-State]. Updated on 27 Sept 2024

Hindi Rendering published in Baya, Oct 2024 to March 2025

Related:

Shah Bano Lives

How the Ulema are Perpetuating Male Hegemony in the Name of Islam

The post Shah Bano Begum (1916-1992): A Socio-Political Historical Timeline appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP) filed three separate complaints with the Election Commission of India (ECI) during the Model Code of Conduct (MCC) period, citing violations of electoral law and criminal statutes. The fourth speech—by Union Home Minister Amit Shah in Siwan—was delivered two days later and completes the arc that the complaints had already begun to document.

The four speeches, read together, construct a continuum of rhetoric that moves from ridicule to coercion to threat: the ridiculing of religious language, the coercion of loyalty tests tied to welfare benefits, and the threat of identification and expulsion directed at an entire community.

The complaint against Giriraj Singh

Dates and locations: October 18 (Arwal) and October 19 (Begusarai), 2025

Union Minister Giriraj Singh’s two speeches are at the base of this chain. In Arwal, he told a story about a “Maulvi” and the Ayushman card, asking whether the man would swear “on Khuda” to acknowledge benefits received under Modi’s government. “I don’t need votes from namakharam people,” Singh declared, transforming gratitude for welfare into a religious oath of political loyalty.

A day later in Begusarai, he manipulated the word “haram” into a slur, questioning the faith and morality of Muslims who benefited from government schemes but did not vote for the BJP. The complaint describes these statements as “coercive and communal,” arguing they violate the MCC’s ban on religious appeals and constitute “undue influence” under Section 123(2) of the Representation of the People Act (RPA), 1951.

CJP’s complaint sought immediate ECI action, including a show-cause notice, FIR registration under sections of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) relating to promoting enmity, and removal of the videos from circulation. It framed Singh’s language as “a public loyalty test administered through humiliation.”

The complete complaint may be read below.

The complaint against Ashok Kumar Yadav

Date: October 16, 2025

Location: Darbhanga (Keoti constituency)

Three days earlier, Madhubani MP Ashok Kumar Yadav addressed “Muslim brothers” at a public rally, instructing them: “Say ‘tauba tauba,’ I will not eat free grain; I will not take a gas cylinder; I will not walk on the road built by Modi ji; I will not cross the bridge built by Modi ji.”

The crowd laughed. The complaint did not. CJP’s complaint describes the speech as “mocking religious practice and publicly demanding a ritual renunciation of entitlements,” amounting to psychological coercion of a targeted group. It invokes Sections 123(2), (3), and (3A) of the RPA and Sections 196 and 297 of the BNS, which criminalise promotion of enmity and acts prejudicial to public peace.

By equating welfare use with political loyalty and faith with betrayal, Yadav’s speech redefined citizenship as conditional. It fused spiritual vocabulary (“tauba tauba”) with partisan mobilisation, turning a phrase of repentance into a performative punishment.

The complete complaint may be read below.

The complaint against Nityanand Rai

Date: October 22, 2025

Location: Hayaghat, Darbhanga

When Union Minister of State for Home Affairs Nityanand Rai took the stage in Hayaghat, the stakes rose. His speech moved beyond ridicule to overt nationalism, religion, and xenophobia. “I want to be born only as a Hindu, only in this Bharat. We live by Krishna’s teachings,” he began, before pivoting sharply: “Those wearing reshmi salwar and topi are against the message of the Gita. Some want to bring in Bangladeshi and Rohingya infiltrators and take away the livelihood of Bihar’s youth. You cannot include these infiltrators in the voter list.”

The complaint noted the gravity of a Home Ministry official using xenophobic tropes while the MCC was in force. It argued that such speech carries “the force of state policy” when uttered by a minister responsible for internal security. The complaint sought a show-cause notice, FIR registration, and referral to the Prime Minister’s Office for ministerial code violation.

In legal language, Rai’s speech blends three distinct offences: an appeal to religion for votes, the vilification of a religious group, and the use of a ministerial office to threaten administrative exclusion. In political terms, it sanctifies prejudice and embeds it within the authority of the state.

The complete complaint may be read below.

Amit Shah in Siwan: The arc completed

Date: October 24, 2025

Location: Siwan, Bihar

Speaker: Union Home Minister Amit Shah

Two days later in Siwan, Amit Shah’s campaign speech brought the narrative to its most explicit point. He invoked the Ram Mandir in Ayodhya as a triumph of faith and political will, asked voters whether they supported it, and immediately shifted to the question of “ghuspaithiya” — infiltrators.

“Rahul Baba says we should allow ‘ghuspaithiya’ in Bihar. People of Siwan, tell me — should these ghuspaithiya be removed or not? Should their names be on the voter list or not? I promise you, once the NDA wins again, the BJP will identify and expel each and every individual ghuspaithiya from the country.”

He concluded: “They are snatching our youth’s jobs and the ration of our poor. These infiltrators are involved in anti-national activities. The BJP is determined to pick them out one by one and expel them.”

In the arc that began with Giriraj Singh’s coercive mockery and moved through Rai’s sanctified nationalism, Shah’s words were the culmination: an explicit promise of identification and expulsion, tying the future of governance to the physical removal of a constructed internal enemy.

Delivered during the MCC period, it was not merely an opinion—it was a campaign pledge of state action.

A shared political logic

Across all four speeches, three interlocking strategies emerge:

1. Welfare as a political debt: Welfare schemes—rations, gas cylinders, Ayushman cards—are presented not as rights but as favours to be repaid through political allegiance. Those who refuse are branded “ungrateful” or “namakharam.”
2. Religion as a mobilising instrument: Sacred references are casually inserted into electoral appeals. “Swear on Khuda,” “tauba tauba,” “I want to be born only as a Hindu,” “Ram Mandir”—each invocation draws moral legitimacy from religion and aligns it with party identity.
3. ‘Infiltrator’ as the enemy within: The trope of the “ghuspaithiya” shifts the narrative from faith to belonging. It identifies a community—implicitly Muslim, explicitly Bengali-speaking or Rohingya—as outsiders usurping entitlements, jobs, and rations. It allows the campaign to move from gratitude and shaming to exclusion and threat.

Each strategy reinforces the next. Gratitude establishes hierarchy, religion sanctifies loyalty, and the “infiltrator” label converts political opponents into existential threats. Together, they blur the boundary between welfare policy, religious identity, and citizenship status.

Legal violations and democratic harm

The three complaints collectively invoke the Model Code of Conduct, the Representation of the People Act, and the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita. Under the Model Code of Conduct, parties are prohibited from appealing to religion, caste, or communal feelings and from using temples, mosques, or religious symbols for electoral gain. The MCC came into force in Bihar in early October 2025 after the ECI announced the poll schedule.

Under the Representation of the People Act, these speeches fall within multiple definitions of “corrupt practice”:

• Section 123(2) – Undue influence through coercion or threat.
• Section 123(3) – Appeal to religion for votes.
• Section 123(3A) – Promotion of enmity or hatred for electoral advantage.
• Section 125 – Offence of promoting enmity between classes in connection with elections.

The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), which replaced the IPC in 2023, reinforces this framework through Sections 196, 297, and 356, criminalising the promotion of enmity, insult to religion, and public mischief.

Each complaint demands that these provisions be activated: show-cause notices by the ECI, FIRs by the police, and debarment of the speakers from further campaigning.

The legal core is clear: these are not mere lapses in civility but prima facie offences that undermine the constitutional promise of free and fair elections.

The arc of escalation

When read in sequence, the four speeches trace a visible escalation in both tone and institutional proximity to power:

• Ashok Yadav’s speech begins with ridicule.
• Giriraj Singh’s adds humiliation through oaths and public shaming.
• Nityanand Rai’s brings religion and national security together, as a sitting Home Ministry official.
• Amit Shah’s completes the circle by translating rhetoric into an explicit promise of expulsion.

This progression is not accidental. It reveals a tested campaign grammar where each rung normalises the next: what begins as jest ends as policy.

The broader stakes

These episodes are not confined to Bihar. They speak to a larger transformation of Indian electoral speech where the distance between communal rhetoric and administrative policy has collapsed. When senior ministers use the language of exclusion, the threat is no longer hypothetical—it carries bureaucratic plausibility.

For voters marked by faith, language, or origin, such speeches blur the line between citizenship and suspicion. When welfare becomes conditional, religion becomes campaign currency, and “infiltrator” becomes a category of governance, the right to participate as an equal citizen is quietly replaced by a test of loyalty.

Conclusion

The complaints filed by CJP during the MCC period document more than isolated offences; they expose a deliberate strategy of electoral communication. The sequence from Ashok Yadav’s “tauba tauba” to Amit Shah’s “expel each and every ghuspaithiya” reveals how easily populist politics collapses welfare into servitude, faith into allegiance, and citizenship into a privilege contingent on identity.

If the Election Commission and the police fail to act decisively, the precedent will be set: that speeches promising the exclusion of communities can be made under the protection of the very laws meant to prevent them.

In the end, the question that echoes across these rallies in Bihar is the one Amit Shah himself asked in Siwan: “Should their names be on the voter list or not?” The answer, if democracy is to retain meaning, cannot be decided by a campaign crowd—it must remain the inalienable right of every citizen, beyond the reach of faith, fear, or political favour.

Related:

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CJP’s complaint leads to NBDSA action against India TV’s biased Bahraich broadcast

The post From Welfare to Expulsion: Bihar’s MCC period rhetoric turns citizenship into a campaign weapon appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Unveiling what he called “The H Files”, Gandhi said the data collected by his team over months reveals a centrally coordinated operation to manipulate voter lists and subvert democracy itself. “This is not an accident. This is not about one booth or one constituency. It is a centralised operation to steal elections,” he declared at the All India Congress Committee (AICC) headquarters in Delhi, a day before the Bihar Assembly elections begin.

“One in eight voters fake”: Rahul Gandhi

According to Gandhi, Haryana, with roughly two crore registered voters, had about 25.4 lakh bogus entries — meaning “one in every eight voters is fake.”

He said his team had classified the fake voters under five categories:

• 5.2 lakh duplicate voters,
• 93,174 invalid addresses,
• 19.2 lakh bulk voters (20 or more voters registered at the same address), and
• Several others linked to misuse of Form 6 (additions) and Form 7 (deletions).

“Despite clear technical capacity to detect duplicates, the ECI deliberately refused to run even a basic photo-identity matching query,” Gandhi alleged. “Why? Because they are helping the BJP.”

The ‘Brazilian Model’ case and recycled photos

Displaying a presentation with screenshots from the official voter database, Gandhi held up a photo of a woman he said is a Brazilian model, alleging that her image was used to create 22 separate voter IDs across 10 polling booths in Haryana. “What is a Brazilian woman doing on a voters’ list in Haryana?” he asked.

He further claimed that in some cases, the same photograph appeared 223 times across different constituencies. “This is just one example. There are thousands more. This is not voter error — this is organised fraud,” he asserted.

The Congress leader ridiculed Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar’s explanation that voter IDs bearing “House No. 0” are reserved for homeless citizens. “We physically went to those addresses,” Gandhi said, showing a two-storey house listed as ‘House No. 0’. “This is not homelessness. This is hiding. The CEC is lying to the people of India.”

In one instance, Gandhi said, 501 voters were registered under a single address, calling it “statistical proof of systematic rigging.”

“Operation sarkar chori”: Rahul Gandhi

Calling the alleged operation “Sarkar Chori” (Government Theft), Gandhi said the manipulation was engineered to deny the Congress victory despite exit polls and internal assessments predicting a landslide win for his party.

“The Congress was poised to win comfortably, but they converted a victory into defeat through data manipulation,” he said, noting that in at least eight key constituencies, the BJP’s margin of victory was under 23,000 votes, while over 25 lakh fraudulent entries existed across the state.

“These eight seats — Uchana Kalan, Dadri, Rai, and others — were the difference between Congress forming the government and BJP stealing it,” Gandhi said.

Allegations against Election Commission

Gandhi accused the Election Commission of being “in partnership with the Prime Minister and Home Minister” in “destroying Indian democracy.”

He alleged that the poll body not only ignored evidence of fake and duplicate voters but also destroyed CCTV footage from polling stations to erase proof.

“The ECI can remove duplicate entries in seconds. All they have to do is run a query to identify identical photos or addresses. They don’t, because they’re complicit,” he said, calling the Commission a “collaborator in vote theft.”

Responding to ECI’s earlier defence that “no voter deletion can be done online,” Gandhi retorted that his team had used the Commission’s own data to trace these irregularities. “We are not fabricating anything. We are exposing what the ECI’s own numbers reveal,” he said.

“Industrialised vote theft”: Rahul Gandhi

Terming the manipulation “industrialised”, Gandhi said the same centralised pattern was visible in Karnataka, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, and Chhattisgarh, adding that the Congress had first detected the scam in Mahadevapura and Aland Assembly constituencies in Karnataka.

“In Aland, fake login IDs and mobile numbers were used to delete voters remotely. In Mahadevapura, over one lakh names were found to be either deleted or duplicated. We saw the same pattern in Haryana — that’s when we realised this is national-scale rigging,” Gandhi said.

He added that the same strategy was now being deployed in Bihar, where 47 lakh names were deleted during the recent voter list revision. Several affected voters from Bihar’s Jamui district joined Gandhi on stage, claiming their names were removed without notice.

“Thousands of BJP Voters in Two States”

Gandhi also claimed that thousands of BJP leaders and workers were registered in multiple states. “They are voting in both Uttar Pradesh and Haryana,” he said, citing examples of party office-bearers with dual entries.

To underline this, he played a video of BJP Kerala Vice President B. Gopalakrishnan, who had in August openly stated that his party would “bring voters from other states and settle them for a year to ensure victory.”

BJP’s counter and EC’s response

The BJP dismissed Gandhi’s allegations as a “fabricated conspiracy”, timed to influence the Bihar polls. Union Minister Kiren Rijiju said, “This is a planned diversion. According to Hindustan Times, Rijiju said that the Opposition has no issue left in Bihar, so they are attacking institutions. Questioning the Election Commission and our democracy means questioning the country itself.”

Meanwhile, Election Commission officials, responding during the press conference, said there had been “zero appeals” against electoral rolls in Haryana and questioned the Congress’s polling agents for not objecting at booths. “If someone votes twice, agents can object on the spot. Why did they not?” an EC source asked.

The Commission reiterated that Gandhi’s earlier claims about voter deletions in Karnataka were “incorrect and baseless.”

Wider reactions

The explosive allegations drew backing from opposition leaders. Aditya Thackeray, leader of the Shiv Sena (UBT), said the issue “transcends party politics” and concerns “the value of every Indian’s vote.”

“Once again, Rahul Gandhi has exposed the Election Commission’s fraud that helps the BJP capture states via vote theft,” Thackeray said on X (formerly Twitter). “The world is watching how our elections are no longer free and fair. This is not about parties — this is about democracy itself.”

He added that his party had also flagged similar voter list manipulation in Maharashtra, including Worli and other constituencies, but “the EC refused to act.”

“This fight is not just for the Congress,” Thackeray said, “it’s for free and fair elections across India — for our Constitution and democracy. Vote chor, gaddi chhod (vote thieves, vacate power).”

Once again, @RahulGandhi has exposed the @ECISVEEP ’s fraud today that helps the bjp to capture States via vote theft.

The world is watching how our elections aren’t free and fair anymore… with proof!

One may agree or disagree with Rahul Gandhi, or the @INCIndia or the INDIA…

— Aaditya Thackeray (@AUThackeray) November 5, 2025

“We are protecting democracy”: Rahul Gandhi

In his closing remarks, Gandhi urged the youth to take ownership of India’s democratic future. “I want Gen Z to take this seriously. Your vote, your future, your democracy — all are being stolen in plain sight,” he said.

He invited journalists and citizens alike to independently verify his findings, saying, “We are not afraid. We are exposing the truth in front of the Supreme Court, before the people, not behind closed doors.”

Calling “vote chori” the theft of rights, employment, education, and the Constitution itself, Gandhi said: “This democracy belongs to you, not to the Election Commission or Narendra Modi. We will fight this with satya and ahimsa.”

Related:

No vote can be deleted online by the public, ECI refutes Rahul Gandhi’s claim but refusal to share data raises doubts

“Vote Chori Factory”: Rahul Gandhi accuses ECI of protecting electoral fraud, demands action in 7 days

Rahul Gandhi alleges ‘Vote Chori’ in 2024 polls, accuses BJP-ECI nexus of systematic electoral fraud

‘Election Commission involved in vote theft’: Rahul Gandhi repeats charge, now drops ‘atom bomb’ ahead of Bihar poll, also says ‘won’t spare you’

The post Rahul Gandhi alleges ‘industrial-scale vote theft’ in Haryana Polls, claims 25 lakh fake voters added with EC-BJP collusion appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The first and most pressing is the case of 26-year-old Sunali Khatun from Birbhum’s Murarai area, pregnant at the time of her arrest, who was detained in Delhi in June along with her husband and 8-year-old son and subsequently deported to Bangladesh. She is currently jailed in Bangladesh, legally battling for her return to India.

The Sunali Khatun case

Sunali and her husband, Danish Sheikh, along with their son, were apprehended in Delhi’s K.N. Katju Marg in June, labeled as illegal immigrants. Their deportation was ordered by the Foreigners Regional Registration Office (FRRO) and executed despite Sunali’s family presenting Aadhaar and PAN documents, as per a report in the Times of India.

What has triggered shock and outrage is the revelation that Sunali’s parents — Bhodu Sheikh and Jyotsna Bibi — are listed as voters in Bengal’s 2002 SIR-era electoral roll, under Murarai assembly constituency.  Under the Citizenship Act, one route to being a citizen by birth is if one parent was an Indian citizen at the time of the person’s birth. In this case, both parents appear on a list of voters deemed legitimate by the Election Commission of India (EC).

The Calcutta High Court (HC) in September quashed the FRRO deportation order, noting the haste of the process and the mismatch in Sunali’s age (26 yrs, implying birth in 2000) and the claim of illegal entry in 1998. The court directed the Centre to repatriate her and her family within four weeks — a deadline that has lapsed, The Indian Express reported.

Her father told The Indian Express that “Now our names are on the list. What more do I need to have my pregnant daughter and her family back home?”

The ruling party in Bengal, the All India Trinamool Congress (TMC), has seized on these facts to accuse the opposition and the Centre of weaponising the SIR process and targeting poor Bengali-speaking migrants. In a post on X (formerly Twitter), the TMC declared:

“To brand an expectant mother as an illegal infiltrator when her parents stand documented as Indian citizens in the 2002 electoral rolls, is not administrative oversight; it is a moral collapse orchestrated in the name of nationalism” as per a report in the Shillong Times.

Meanwhile, the Centre has moved the matter to the Supreme Court, resisting immediate compliance with the HC’s order.

A suicide amid SIR fears

In a parallel but separate another incident, Kakoli Sarkar, a 32-year-old homemaker originally from Dhaka, married and living in Titagarh for 15 years, ended her life by self-immolation. According to her mother-in-law, Kakoli had valid Indian documents, had voted in multiple elections, yet she lived with anxiety that her name was not on the 2002 voters’ list and that the SIR/NRC process might render her a suspect.

According to reports, on the night of her death she left a note stating that “No one is responsible for my death … I don’t feel well here … Please take care of my two daughters…”

Local police have detained her husband Sabuj Sarkar and her in-laws for questioning to determine if family pressure and documentation fears contributed to the tragedy, as reported

Impact and broader anxieties

These two cases are emblematic of a heightened climate of uncertainty across Bengal, where the SIR rollout and the spectre of the National Register of Citizens (NRC) continue to loom large. The EC’s announcement of SIR-drives across multiple states and Union Territories, including West Bengal, has reignited fears of exclusion, statelessness, and the sense that one’s right to remain is provisional, reported Sabrang India.

For Sunali’s family, the fact that her parents are on the 2002 roll should — in principle — secure her legitimacy. Yet she remains in a Bangladeshi prison and the deadlines set by the court remain unmet. For Kakoli, despite voting and living in India for years, the absence of a listing on the 2002 roll and the ongoing SIR process appears to have triggered existential dread.

Kakoli Sarkar’s suicide is not the only one

The fear that drove Kakoli Sarkar, to end her life amid growing panic over the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls is not an isolated tragedy. Her death joins a disturbing pattern of despair spreading across Bengal — where citizenship and belonging have become matters of fear rather than procedure.

Haunted by NRC and citizenship fears

The recent death of 57-year-old Pradip Kar from Agarpara, North 24 Parganas, once again exposes the deepening distress among Bengal’s citizens over ongoing citizenship verification exercises. On October 28, 2025, Kar was found hanging in his home, leaving behind a suicide note that “NRC is responsible for my death.”

According to SabrangIndia’s report, his family said he had grown increasingly anxious after the Election Commission announced the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls across 12 states, including West Bengal — a move widely feared to be a prelude to an NRC-like process.

According to Barrackpore Police Commissioner Murlidhar Sharma, there were no signs of foul play, but Kar’s note made an explicit reference to the NRC. “The family told us he was deeply disturbed by NRC-related reports. After the SIR announcement, he appeared anxious but they assumed it was illness,” Sharma said. Kar’s sister recalled, “He used to tell us he would be taken away in the name of NRC.”

Kar’s death mirrors the earlier tragedy of 31-year-old Debashish Sengupta from Kolkata, who died by suicide in March 2024 after being gripped by fears linked to the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA). As reported by Sabrang India, Sengupta—visiting his grandparents in South 24 Parganas—was found hanging after confiding that his ailing father, a migrant from Bangladesh, could be denied citizenship for lack of documents. His family said he was “consumed by dread” that the new CAA rules would render many stateless.

These deaths are no longer isolated incidents but reflections of emerging fears consuming ordinary citizens where bureaucratic exercises meant to verify identity instead provoke panic about erasure. Across Bengal, whispers of “NRC coming through the backdoor” now carry the weight of lived fear, not mere speculation.

Related:

Haunted by NRC fears, 57-year-old West Bengal man dies by suicide; Mamata blames BJP for turning democracy into a “theatre of fear”

Kolkata man commits suicide, family claims CAA rules led him to it

Selective & discriminatory, CAA notification likely to be followed by NPR-NRC

The post Pregnant woman deported despite parents on 2002 SIR rolls, another homemaker commits suicide appeared first on SabrangIndia.

For Indian audiences, Mamdani’s victory carries significance that extends far beyond New York’s five boroughs. His win represents a complex convergence of identity, ideology and generational change that challenges established political narratives on both sides of the Atlantic.

Seven dimensions of his triumph deserve particular attention, particularly in India.​

1) A modern Muslim identity

Mamdani embodies a form of Muslim political identity that defies the stereotypes that the Bharatiya Janata Party and similar forces rely upon to paint Muslims as fundamentalist or separatist.

He is a practicing Muslim who openly discusses his faith while simultaneously championing secular democratic socialism, feminist causes and LGBTQ rights. This combination directly contradicts the caricature of Muslims as backwards looking Islamists.

His emotional speech outside a Bronx mosque about the humiliations Muslims have endured in New York since 9/11 demonstrated vulnerability and civic commitment rather than religious extremism. He married a Syrian American artist in a relationship that bridges cultural divides, and campaigns in multiple languages including Urdu and Spanish while maintaining his Muslim identity as central rather than hidden.

This presents a progressive Muslim political figure who is comfortable in his faith without being defined solely by it, a model that undermines narratives equating Muslim identity with Taliban style Islamist fundamentalism, as seen from the welcome given to the Taliban leader by the Modi government in Delhi last month.​

2) Mixed heritage and transnational roots

Mamdani’s parentage tells a story of cosmopolitan belonging that resonates across the global South.

Born in Kampala to Mira Nair, the acclaimed Hindu filmmaker from Delhi, and Mahmood Mamdani, a Gujarati Muslim scholar raised in Uganda, Mamdani carries Indian, African and American identities simultaneously. His family was part of the Asian diaspora expelled by Idi Amin in 1972, experienced apartheid-era South Africa, and eventually settled in New York when he was seven.

This background gives him an intuitive understanding of colonialism, displacement and minority experience that informs his politics. For Indians familiar with the complexities of diasporic identity and the lingering effects of British colonial divide and rule strategies, Mamdani’s mixed heritage represents a repudiation of narrow ethnic nationalism. His father’s scholarship explicitly critiques the tribalisation of politics, a pattern visible in both Uganda under Museveni and India under Modi. The son can be considered to have absorbed these lessons.​

3) Youth and generational change

At 34, Mamdani is the youngest New York mayor in 112 years, younger even than the legendary “Boy Mayor” John Purroy Mitchel elected in 1913. His age matters not merely as biography but as political force. He galvanised young voters, winning those under 50 by a two to one margin, precisely the demographic that feels locked out of home ownership, burdened by debt and alienated from establishment politics. His rapid rise from unknown state assemblyman polling at one percent just months before the primary to decisive victor reflects how quickly generational change can upend entrenched power structures.

For India, where Modi’s BJP has dominated national politics for over a decade, Mamdani’s trajectory offers evidence that insurgent campaigns built on youth energy and grassroots organising can overcome entrenched political figures like the Cuomos.

His campaign demonstrates that age and inexperience, typically framed as liabilities, can become assets when voters hunger for change.​

4) Socialist economic policies

Mamdani’s democratic socialism, often dismissed as radical or unworkable, formed the core of his appeal. He proposed rent freezes on stabilised apartments, free bus service, universal childcare, city run grocery stores and raising the minimum wage to 30 dollars, all funded by taxing corporations and the wealthy. These policies directly address the affordability crisis strangling working people in expensive cities. His message resonated because it named the problem clearly and offered concrete solutions rather than technocratic adjustments.

For Indian audiences familiar with the welfare state legacies of pre-liberalisation era, now being dismantled through privatisation, Mamdani’s unapologetic embrace of state intervention in markets to secure basic needs recalls an older social democratic tradition. His success suggests that economic populism focused on redistribution still wins elections when articulated with clarity and passion, a lesson relevant for opposition parties in India struggling to counter Modi’s Hindu nationalism with an economic alternative.​

5) Stance on Gaza and moral consistency

His vocal support for Palestinian rights, unusual for a major American mayoral candidate, cost him support among some Jewish voters but energised others, particularly younger Jews and the broader progressive coalition. He condemned Hamas’s October 7 attack as a war crime while also accusing Israel of genocide in Gaza, pledging to arrest Netanyahu if given the chance and maintaining his criticism despite intense pressure.

This moral consistency, refusing to moderate his position for political convenience, functioned as proof of authenticity for voters exhausted by politicians who say different things to different audiences.

The likes of Modi and his cohort of RSS leaders have mastered this to an art form. Mamdani’s willingness to alienate powerful constituencies rather than compromise on principles he formed during his college activism with Students for Justice in Palestine shows a robust political calculus, one that prizes moral clarity over coalition management.​

6) Criticism of Modi’s Hindutva politics

Mamdani has repeatedly criticised Modi, calling him a war criminal and accusing the BJP of pursuing a vision of India that only has room for certain kinds of Indians. During his Diwali outreach to Hindu voters, he explained that he grew up with a pluralistic vision of India where everyone belonged regardless of religion, contrasting this with what he sees as Modi’s exclusionary Hindutva ideology.

He also attacked New York Mayor Eric Adams for backing Modi’s violent approach.

These statements, unusual for an American politician seeking office, reflect his family background. His father’s scholarship analyses how political leaders use ethnic and religious divisions to maintain power, a dynamic visible in both Uganda and India.

For Indian audiences, particularly those troubled by the erosion of secular pluralism under Modi, Mamdani’s willingness as a Muslim politician to defend a pluralistic vision of India while simultaneously claiming his Muslim identity offers a model. He refuses the choice between assimilation and separatism, instead asserting that diversity itself should be celebrated and protected.​

7) Implications beyond New York

Mamdani’s victory will reverberate beyond the United States. National Democrats will study his combination of social media savvy, grassroots organising and economic populism for lessons applicable to their own campaigns. Republicans will use his democratic socialism as a wedge issue in swing districts.

But for observers in India, the significance lies elsewhere. His win demonstrates that that an authentic progressive position has political rewards even in a city identified with capitalism, that youth can overcome entrenched political leaders, that economic redistribution still motivates voters, and that moral consistency on difficult issues can be rewarded rather than punished.

He will judged on his record at governance when he comes for re-election, but his election itself challenges assumptions about what kinds of politicians can win and what kinds of coalitions are possible in increasingly diverse democracies.

Courtesy: The Wire

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