While the Election Commission of India (ECI) claims that it is to update and purify the voter lists, the methodology being employed on the ground has come under intense scrutiny following the deaths of government employees and citizens.

The exercise, which involves rigorous door-to-door verification, data collection, and digitisation of voter records, has been compressed into a tight schedule. Political leaders and employee unions allege that a process that traditionally spans years has been forced into a two-month window, creating unrealistic targets. This issue has reportedly resulted in “inhuman” work pressure for the foot soldiers of the process—the Booth Level Officers (BLOs)—and ignited fears of disenfranchisement among the poor, reminiscent of the anxieties surrounding the National Register of Citizens (NRC), as per a report in Livemint.

This report details the unfolding tragedy across three states—West Bengal, Rajasthan, and Kerala—documenting the specific incidents of suicide, the allegations of harassment by supervisors, and the systemic failures that have left families in mourning.

West Bengal

West Bengal has reported the highest intensity of distress-related incidents since the enumeration exercise began. The state has witnessed fatalities among officials tasked with the work, as well as suicide attempts by citizens panicked by the sudden demand for documentation.

The suicide of Shantimoni Ekka

In the Rangamati Panchayat of Malbazar, the SIR process claimed the life of Shantimoni Ekka. A 48-year-old Anganwadi worker, Ekka had been conscripted into election duty as a BLO. On November 19, her family’s routine was shattered when they found her body hanging in the courtyard of their home.

The circumstances leading to her death reveal a systemic failure to support ground-level staff. Her family states that she was the sole BLO for her booth and was buckling under the pressure of distributing and collecting forms door-to-door.

According to the Indian Express, her son, Bishu Ekka, spoke to the media about his mother’s deteriorating mental state. He explained that the sheer volume of forms was overwhelming, and a critical language barrier made the task impossible.

“She was very disturbed mentally,” Bishu said.

“She had tremendous work pressure. There was the work pressure of the ICDS (Integrated Child Development Service) and then this BLO duty. There were too many forms, and the forms were in Bengali, and no one was able to help us” as reported

According to the report, this linguistic disconnect was corroborated by her husband, Soko Ekka. He pointed out that while the forms provided by the administration were in Bengali, their area is predominantly Hindi-speaking. This mismatch caused confusion among residents, who were unable to understand the forms or filled them out incorrectly. The burden of rectifying these errors fell entirely on Shantimoni.

“Many are not understanding and filling in wrongly,” Soko said.

He further added that “She was under tremendous pressure; she used to tell me that with the BLO work, she was unable to do any other work”

Most damning is the revelation that Shantimoni had attempted to exit the process before taking her life. Her husband revealed that she had approached officials to resign from her BLO duties. However, her request was summarily rejected. The officer in charge reportedly told her that since her name was already in the system, it could not be cancelled. Feeling trapped between an unyielding administration and an unmanageable workload, she took the extreme step.

“We thought that she had gone to cook in the morning but later, we saw her hanging,” her husband said

Previous fatalities and medical emergencies

Shantimoni Ekka’s death was not an isolated event in the state. Just days prior, on November 9, another BLO named Namita Hansdar died in Purba Bardhaman. Hansdar, who was responsible for booth number 278 in Chowk Balrampur, Memari, suffered a fatal brain stroke. Her family has alleged that the stroke was the direct result of exhaustion, stating she had been forced to work “day and night” to meet the SIR deadlines.

Citizen panic and the shadow of NRC

While officials face administrative pressure, the common citizens of West Bengal are facing a different kind of terror as the fear of statelessness. The SIR exercise involves verifying old records, a process that has inadvertently triggered trauma related to the National Register of Citizens (NRC).

As per a report in Bhaskar English, in North 24 Parganas this fear nearly killed Ashok Sardar. The 63-year-old rickshaw puller from Prafullanagar Low Land, under Kamarhati Municipality, jumped onto the railway tracks near the CCR Bridge at Belgharia. He survived the impact but sustained critical injuries, leading to the amputation of one of his limbs. He remains in a serious condition at RG Kar Hospital.

The police and his family confirmed that his suicide attempt was driven by anxiety over the SIR process. Sardar had recently discovered that he and his wife were unable to locate their names in the 2002 voters’ list. In the current political climate, where documentation is often conflated with citizenship status, this discrepancy caused him to panic.

His daughter, Chaitali Sarkar, explained his mindset that “For days, father kept saying he had no documents. He feared he might be thrown out of the country. That fear may have driven him to do this.”

According to police sources, Sardar had been living in “persistent fear” after hearing about the distribution of forms and the document requirements mandated by the SIR exercise.

Political confrontation

The rising death toll has led to a sharp confrontation between the West Bengal government and the Election Commission. Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee took to social media platform X to express her shock, stating that “28 people have already lost their lives since SIR began.”

She categorised these deaths as a result of fear, uncertainty, stress, and overload.

Deeply shocked and saddened.

Today again, we lost a Booth Level Officer in Mal, Jalpaiguri — Smt Shanti Muni Ekka, a tribal lady, an anganwadi worker who took her own life under the unbearable pressure of the ongoing SIR work.

28 people have already lost their lives since SIR…

— Mamata Banerjee (@MamataOfficial) November 19, 2025

Banerjee followed this public statement with a formal letter to Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar. In the letter, she called for an immediate halt to the SIR drive, describing it as “unplanned, chaotic, and dangerous.”

“I am compelled to write to you as the situation surrounding the ongoing Special Intensive Revision (SIR) has reached a deeply alarming stage,” Banerjee wrote.

CM Banerjee said that “The manner in which this exercise is being forced upon officials and citizens is not only unplanned and chaotic, but also dangerous… A process that earlier took 3 years is now being forced into 2 months on the eve of elections to please political masters, putting inhuman pressure on BLOs.”

“Unrealistic workloads, impossible timelines and inadequate support with online data.. BLOs are operating beyond human limits…and fearful of punitive action .. at the peak of the paddy harvest season the timing of this exercise is indefensible..I request you to halt this… pic.twitter.com/i0zkSMVKxm

— Sagarika Ghose (@sagarikaghose) November 20, 2025

She urged the ECI to “act with conscience” and stop the drive before more lives were lost.

In contrast, the Leader of the Opposition in the Bengal Assembly, Suvendu Adhikari, defended the Election Commission. He attributed the issues to local administrative mismanagement rather than the central directive. Speaking to the media, Adhikari said, “I have found out the reason is the joint BDO. The EC has no role. The TMC was to destroy the SIR, but we are happy that the SIR has begun in Bengal.”

A Strong Rebuttal to Mamata Banerjee’s desperate attempt to sabotage the Voter List Purification Drive.

I have sent a detailed letter to Hon’ble Chief Election Commissioner; Shri Gyanesh Kumar, completely exposing the politically motivated and factually bogus letter written by… pic.twitter.com/TXngNmFhTT

— Suvendu Adhikari (@SuvenduWB) November 20, 2025

He claimed that in other states where SIR is ongoing, “nothing is happening,” and that the crisis was specific to TMC-ruled Bengal.

Rajasthan

The crisis is not limited to Bengal, reports from Rajasthan indicate similar distress among government employees. In Jaipur, the pressure of the SIR exercise resulted in the suicide of a government school teacher, Mukesh Chand Jangid.

The death of Mukesh Chand Jangid

Jangid, who was serving as a BLO, died by suicide on November 16, by jumping in front of a train. Unlike the cases in Bengal where general pressure was blamed, Jangid left behind specific evidence of harassment. A suicide note recovered from his pocket accused his supervisor, Sitaram Bunkar, of mental harassment and repeated threats of suspension.

पश्चिम बंगाल के जलपाईगुड़ी में BLO शांति मुनि जी ने खुदकुशी कर ली। ये बेहद दुखद और चिंताजनक है।

इससे पहले राजस्थान, मध्य प्रदेश, केरल और तमिलनाडु से भी BLO के आत्महत्या से जुड़ी खबरें आई थीं।

ऐसे हर मामले में ये बात सामने आ रही है कि SIR के दबाव की वजह से BLO आत्महत्या कर रहे… pic.twitter.com/sjstmDOuuY

— Congress (@INCIndia) November 19, 2025

The timeline of his death, reconstructed by his family, paints a picture of a dedicated officer pushed to the brink. His younger brother, Gajanan, revealed that the suicide note was dated November 13—three days before his death. This suggests Jangid had been carrying the note while continuing to perform his duties.

According to Dainik Bhaskar, on the evening of November 15, Jangid received a long phone call from his supervisor. Following the call, at 9:30 PM, he handed a thick bundle of voter forms to his younger brother, asking him to paste passport-sized photographs on them, indicating he was still trying to complete the work.

The next morning, at 4:45 AM, he left his home in Dharampura (Kalwar) in his home clothes. At 6:45 AM, the family received a call from the Bindayka police station asking them to identify his body on the railway tracks.

Technical failures and “digital” pressure

Jangid’s son, 10-year-old Revanshu, provided insight into the technical struggles his father faced. As part of the modernisation of the electoral rolls, BLOs are required to collect data offline and then upload it to a central server. This process was reportedly fraught with glitches.

Revanshu said that his father working late into the night, struggling with the upload process, and often seeking help from colleagues who were equally helpless. When the child asked when the work would finish, Jangid replied that he did not know when it would end.

Family’s allegations of cover-up

The aftermath of Jangid’s death has been marked by conflict between the family and the police. Mukesh’s uncle, Bhanwarlal Jangid, stated that the police have refused to hand over copies of the suicide note or the FIR to the family. The investigating officer reportedly only read the note aloud to them. The family has expressed deep dissatisfaction with the investigation, though CI Vinod Kumar has assured that those named in the note will be questioned.

The tragedy has devastated the family’s future. Jangid is survived by his wife, Meena Devi, and two daughters, Annu (23) and Jyoti (21). Both daughters are engaged to be married next year. Instead of wedding preparations, the household is now in mourning, as reported

Kerala

In Kerala, the suicide of a BLO has sparked a massive mobilisation of state government employees, leading to strikes and boycotts.

The death of Aneesh George

Aneesh George, a 44-year-old BLO in the Payyannur Assembly constituency of Kannur, was found hanging in his house on a Sunday. His family immediately attributed his death to the intense pressure to complete the SIR enumeration process by the December 4 deadline.

#WATCH | Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala | BLOs across the state boycotted work in protest over the suicide of a BLO in Kannur. They marched to the office of the Chief Electoral Officer
In other districts, protests were held at the District Collectorates. The protest was jointly… pic.twitter.com/i7vhS7VEsc

— ANI (@ANI) November 17, 2025

The political reaction in Kerala mirrored the polarisation seen in other states. According to the Telegraph India, leader of the opposition V.D. Satheesan alleged that George had faced threats from CPM workers after a Congress booth-level agent accompanied him for enumeration. The CPM, however, rejected these claims, with Kannur district secretary K.K. Ragesh stating that George’s death was not an isolated incident but part of a pattern seen in Rajasthan and Bengal due to ECI targets.

Leaked audio and “dire consequences”

The allegations of coercion gained credibility when local television channels aired a leaked audio message from an electoral registration officer in Pathanamthitta district. In the recording, the officer is heard warning BLOs of “dire consequences” if they failed to meet the strict targets set for the revision process. This audio confirmed the fears of many employees that their jobs were on the line if they could not keep up with the accelerated pace, as reported

SIR में ड्यूटी करने वाले कई BLO अत्यधिक दबाव के चलते आत्महत्या कर चुके हैं.

SIR कर्मचारी इतना ज़्यादा दबाव में क्यों काम कर रहे हैं?

सरकार इतनी जल्दी में क्यों है? #BLOSuicide #SIR pic.twitter.com/1MjLuNLKfl

— Neha Singh Rathore (@nehafolksinger) November 20, 2025

Mass boycott

In response to the suicide and the threats, the trade unions of Kerala mobilised. On November 17, approximately 35,000 BLOs across the state boycotted SIR work. Under the banner of various state government employee unions, they held protests outside the Chief Electoral Office in Thiruvananthapuram and at district collectorates.

The protesting employees demanded that the authorities refrain from exerting excessive pressure and called for a postponement of the SIR process, citing the upcoming local body elections in December as a reason for the unbearable workload.

A systemic crisis

The events in West Bengal, Rajasthan, and Kerala highlight a fundamental disconnect between the claims of the Election Commission and the human capacity of its workforce.

West Bengal CM Mamata Banerjee in her letter to the CEC noted that the process suffers from “critical gaps in training, lack of clarity on mandatory documentation and the near-impossibility of meeting voters in the midst of their livelihood schedules.” The shift from a multi-year timeline to a two-month sprint has removed the necessary buffer for error correction and stress management.

In a shameless attempt to serve the @BJP4India’s political greed, the @ECISVEEP has recklessly rushed the SIR process, and is now driving people to their deaths. A BLO has died by suicide after being crushed under inhuman workloads. Will the Election Commission finally admit its… pic.twitter.com/q7zUs60fcF

— All India Trinamool Congress (@AITCofficial) November 20, 2025

Furthermore, the legal context remains complicated. The SIR process was challenged in the Supreme Court after it was launched in Bihar, and the matter remains pending. While the Court has issued directions regarding the use of Aadhaar cards for identity verification, the implementation on the ground remains chaotic.

While officials have noted that the SIR exercise concluded without such fatalities in Bihar, the rising body count in other states suggests that the “Bihar model” is not seamlessly replicable. Whether it is the language barrier in Malbazar, the digital divide in Jaipur, or the political volatility in Kannur, the “one size fits all” approach is failing.

The human cost of documentation

The climate of fear produced by the SIR drive is inseparable from the shadows cast by earlier citizenship exercises such as the NRC and the CAA. The recent death of 57-year-old Pradip Kar from Agarpara in North 24 Parganas is the latest tragic reminder of how deeply these anxieties have penetrated everyday life in Bengal. On October 28, 2025, Kar was found hanging in his home, leaving behind a note that read “NRC is responsible for my death.”

According to Sabrang India, Kar’s family said he had grown visibly distressed after the Election Commission announced the SIR across 12 states, including West Bengal—a move widely feared in the state as a precursor to an NRC-like process. Barrackpore Police Commissioner Murlidhar Sharma confirmed that while no foul play was detected, the suicide note made an explicit reference to the NRC. “The family told us he was deeply disturbed by NRC-related reports. After the SIR announcement, he appeared anxious, but they assumed it was illness,” Sharma said. Kar’s sister added that he repeatedly told the family, “They will take me away in the name of NRC.”

Kar’s death mirrored the earlier tragedy of 31-year-old Debashish Sengupta from Kolkata, who died by suicide in March 2024 after being consumed by fears induced by the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA). As reported by Sabrang India, Sengupta—who was visiting his grandparents in South 24 Parganas—was found hanging after confiding that his ailing father, a migrant from Bangladesh, could be denied citizenship due to inadequate documents. His family said he was “consumed by dread” that the newly notified CAA rules would render many stateless.

These deaths are no longer isolated cases as they are symptomatic of a broader psychological crisis in which bureaucratic exercises intended to update records instead evoke existential fears of erasure. Across Bengal, whispers that “NRC is coming through the backdoor” have gained the weight of lived experience. For vulnerable citizens, the acceleration of documentation requirements—whether through SIR, NRC, or CAA—has become indistinguishable from a threat to their very belonging.

Related:

Pregnant woman deported despite parents on 2002 SIR rolls, another homemaker commits suicide

Haunted by NRC fears, 57-year-old West Bengal man dies by suicide; Mamata blames BJP for turning democracy into a “theatre of fear”

Kolkata man commits suicide, family claims CAA rules led him to it

The post SIR exercise leaves trail of suicide across states as BLOs buckle under pressure and citizens panic over citizenship appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The decision did more than meet Kaushik’s claims for compensation. It issued far-reaching institutional directions: the creation of a committee headed by retired Justice Asha Menon to propose a model Equal Opportunity Policy (EOP) for transgender persons, and then, further ordered that the policy, following the guidelines, would be binding on all establishments, public and private, until the Union Government delivered its own. Through this action, the Court bridged the historic gap between recognition and implementation of equality, making it move from being an aspiration into an enforceable mechanism.

A Case that Became a Constitutional Reckoning

Unfortunately, Jane’s experience is not unique. After revealing her gender identity, she was forced to turn in her resignation after only eight days on the job at a school in Uttar Pradesh; a school in Gujarat later rescinded her job offer on similar grounds. She subsequently filed with the Supreme Court, under Article 32, arguing that these actions were violations of her constitutional rights and of the 2019 Act that prohibits discrimination “in any matter relating to employment.”

The court agreed. The Bench noted that discrimination on the part of private employers that is gender identity-based “strikes at the heart of the constitutional guarantee of dignity and equality” and explained that by not doing something about such exclusions by private entities state was making an “omissive discrimination.” The judges reminded the government, in the end, that the TG Act and its 2020 Rules were not too long ago, “brutally reduced to dead letters” by the government’s bureaucratic apathy.

While acknowledging the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019, and the 2020 Rules, the Court regretted that they “have been brutally rendered dead letters” (para 35, p. 29). It further criticized the “grossly indifferent approach to the transgender community,” noting that this inaction “cannot in any way be fairly regarded as inadvertent or accidental; it is deliberate and is undoubtedly rooted in societal stigma, compounded by a lack of bureaucratic will” (para 35, p. 29). This scathing indictment of bureaucratic failure was coupled with a clear finding that the petitioner’s termination constituted a violation of her dignity, livelihood, and equality.

In asserting both direct and indirect discrimination, the Court put the question of gender identity discrimination into a framework of systemic injustice, and not simply a personal grievance. The damages awarded to Kaushik were symbolic, but profound: declaring through the judiciary that dignity is not contingent on conformity.

The Constitutional Arc: From NALSA to Kaushik

The judgment in Jane Kaushik v. Union of India is not disconnected from a trajectory of equality jurisprudence over the last decade or so. Its reasoning is founded upon three separate but constitutional landmark decisions — National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India [(2014) 5 SCC 438], Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. [(2017) 10 SCC 1], and Navtej Singh Johar and Ors. v. Union of India (Ministry of Law and Justice) [(2018) 10 SCC 1] — each of which represented a point in India’s constitutional journey from recognition to dignity.

In National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India (NALSA), the Supreme Court expressly recognized transgender individuals as “the third gender,” indicating that Articles 14, 15, 16, 19, and 21 recognize the right to equality and dignity for all individuals, regardless of their gender identity. The judgment stated, “Gender identity is inherent to the concept of personhood…one of the most fundamental elements of dignity, self-determination, and freedom.” The Court also mandated that the state governments recognize self-identification and take proactive measures relating to education and employment. The Kaushik Bench cited NALSA to reaffirm that, “Articles 15 and 16 must be read in a manner that prohibits discrimination based on gender identity” (para 30, p. 26), but importantly extended this reasoning into the employment context, stating that neither public nor private employers may deny employment based on gender identity.

Three years later, in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, a nine-judge Bench recognized that the right to privacy under Article 21 includes bodily integrity, decisional autonomy, and the right to express one’s identity. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud wrote that “privacy protects individual autonomy and recognizes the right to make vital personal choices.” Kaushik recognizes this principle and extends autonomy to the workplace, contending that the right to live with dignity includes the right to livelihood without stigma.

Finally, in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, Section 377 of the IPC was invalidated, decriminalizing relations between persons of the same sex, and holding that equality is grounded in constitutional morality rather than public morality. With NALSA, Puttaswamy, and Navtej all providing a philosophical basis for the holding in Kaushik, they enforce those rights in the workplace. From recognition of identity, to protection of autonomy, to the enforcement of economic dignity, Jane Kaushik marks an evolution in India’s constitutional journey to not only a right to exist but to a right to thrive.

Equality Beyond Formalism: The Court’s Expansive Interpretation

One particularly notable aspect of the Kaushik case is its recognition of substantive equality, an embodied notion of equality that requires not just that all people be treated the same, but that normative structural barriers are eliminated so that certain groups can realize their rights.

Citing Articles 14 through 16 of the Indian Constitution, the Court validated that discrimination based on gender identity is a form of discrimination based on sex. The Court also connected this idea to the right to a dignified life and to live under Article 21 of the Constitution by stating that refusing employment based on gender identity results in “economic and social death” to an individual. The judgment invoked something called constitutional morality and reminded employers, both public and private, that the obligation of equality is not discretionary; it is a part of being a democratic citizen.

This point is significant because, as observed by CJP in its report about transgender rights in 2023, a lot of the discrimination experienced by the transgender community is not a result of outright bad intentions but rather due to inertia and ignorance by the institutional structure. The Court’s reasoning captured that in its justification by holding that to omit, or not act, can itself be a form of discrimination.

By recognizing “omissive discrimination,” the Bench also expanded and layered the idea of state obligations. As the Bench explained, equality means positive obligations. The State must ensure that the rights of transgender persons are not merely enshrined in law, but that they are realized and effective.

Strengthening Employment Protection

The first sphere of impact of the judgment for the transgender community is with respect to employment security.  The Court found expressly that the protections available under the TG Act apply equally to public and private employment, which makes it unlawful for any establishment to deny employment, promotion, or continuance for reasons relating to gender identity.

This means that where previously, major alterations to workplaces across India were difficult to put in place properly (at a general level, but increasingly across specific employment compartments governed by individual laws, such as recognition also in respect of ‘male and female’), this is now a seismic shift in practice and the obligation on employers. Employers must now make reasonable accommodation, whether borrowing the term from disability rights jurisprudence or applying the principle from the Court in respect of substantive equality, on any decision or treatment, covering everything that applies to transgender persons: recruitment forms, uniforms, leave policy, goodwill policy, and grievance procedures, also all included.

Having also ordered a compensation award to Kaushik, the Court now presents a precedent in respect of damages in fear to workplace discrimination, making it clear that discrimination is not only a negative ethic but an illicit treatment too. As earlier argued in CJP’s “The Discordant Symphony”, the work for transgender rights in India is not only about legal recognition, but within the real act, one of accessing responsible means of livelihood. This judgment helps stitch the gap between legal and lived rights responsibly, moving now toward enforceable law work.

Mandating an Equal Opportunity Policy

Arguably, one of the most progressive components of the ruling is the instruction to draft a template Equal Opportunity Policy (EOP) for transgender persons. The Court observed that Rule 12 of the 2020 Rules already imposes an obligation on every establishment to implement an EOP, designate a complaint officer, and create an environment free of discrimination, but noted that few, if any, establishments had done so.

The newly constituted Justice Asha Menon Committee is to produce a uniform EOP to be used by all establishments. Until it is formally adopted by the Union Government, the Court ruled that the guidelines of the committee will have a binding effect.

This shifts the responsibility of inclusion from a moral goal to a legal duty. The Court effectively constitutionalizes workplace inclusivity as an obligation of employers. Employers, schools, corporations, etc., now have an ongoing obligation to have trans-inclusive policies, grievance policies, and sensitization regimes.

As CJP’s earlier analysis in “From Judgments to Handbook: India’s Transformative Journey towards LGBTQIA Equality” pointed out, systemic inclusion cannot be left to goodwill; it has to be planned design. The Supreme Court has now offered precisely that design.

Ripple Effects: Recruitment Norms and Affirmative Action

Jane Kaushik’s implications transcend a single case. For the public sector, the judgment reopens discussion around reservation and affirmative action for transgender persons. Only a handful of states, including Karnataka, which offered a 1 % horizontal reservation, and Odisha, which instructed departments last month to incorporate “transgender” as a category of gender separately on forms, have taken action on inclusive hiring policies.

By calling out inaction by the state, the Supreme Court has signalled that governments cannot sit idly. Departments will have to insist on representation, reasonable relaxations, and non-discriminatory criteria in recruiting and promoting.

The implications for the private sector are equally significant. Employment discrimination based on gender identity now not only carries reputational risk, but legal risk as well. The binding EOP means private institutions will now need to modify their recruiting advertisements, the recruiting application forms, and internal HR policies to ensure inclusion. Selection committees and the Board of Directors will require mandatory sensitivity training, and failure to comply could result in judicial assessment.

In that regard, the judgement extends the ethos of equality into India’s economic systems, making sure that the transformative promise of the Constitution governs behaviour not only by the State, but the marketplace as well.

Constitutional Morality Meets the Workplace

Through Jane Kaushik v. Union of India, the Supreme Court has issued one of its most important equality decisions since Navtej Johar. It extends the Constitution into dimensions of society where discrimination can often continue without intervention. It does this by asserting the need to implement a national Equal Opportunity Policy and assigning significant responsibility to the State to respond to “omissive discrimination”, therefore transforming equality from a right to a collective responsibility of every institution.

For India’s transgender citizens, this decision substantively transforms symbolic recognition into meaningful participation – from simply existing to being able to be employed, from invisibility to the possibility of inclusion. True progress is not identified merely in laws or decisions but in the security of dignity in everyday life.

The next test is whether this landmark ruling is remembered, not as a judicial victory but as when workplaces, all over India, began to embody the values of the Constitution itself.

The judgment in Jane Kaushik v. Union of India can be read here:

The judgment in National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India can be read here:

The judgment in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India can be read here:

The judgment in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India can be read here:

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Preksha Bothara)

Related

Reflecting on Transgender Rights in 2023: Have Legal Recognition and Advocacy Efforts Broken the Cycle of Discrimination and Ostracism?

The discordant symphony: where does the transgender community go from here?

From Judgments to Handbook: India’s Transformative Journey towards LGBTQIA+ Equality

Can pride be apolitical? Perspectives from queer and trans* community

Mapping Gender-Based Violence in India: Trends, determinants, and institutional frameworks

MAT highlights state’s duty under Transgender Act 2019 for Trans inclusion

The post Beyond mere Recognition: The Jane Kaushik judgment and the next frontier of transgender equality appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In its scathing critique, the AIKS has said that the Draft Seeds Bill 2025 is poised to increase the cost of cultivation by allowing corporates to indulge in unchecked pricing of seeds; besides the all-India farmers organisation said that bringing in this law is a move to corporatise India’s seed sector and concede seed sovereignty

Elaborating further, SKM leaders said the draft Seed Bill surrendered the seed sovereignty of India and it was aimed at predatory pricing by the corporate monopolies. They have asked that the Centre should withdraw the Bill. The SKM also warned against “conceding on harmful clauses” in the summit to be held in Lima, Peru from November 24 to 29 on the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA).

Federalism, Federal rights

The campaign pitch to be launched will be all-encompassing. The leaders said the SKM would launch a national campaign with the slogan of “Strong States for Strong India” to safeguard the federal rights of States demanding increase of State share in the divisive pool (including cess and surcharge) from the current 31% to 60%. The SKM would also demand that the Goods and Services Tax Act must be amended to reinstate taxation power of States. “Financial autonomy of the States is necessary to realise minimum support price and minimum wage through augmenting public investment to modernise agriculture, build agro-industries and share the surplus out of processing, value addition and trade on all crops, thus to end agrarian crisis, peasant suicides and distress migration,” the SKM said.

The leaders said November 26, 2025 marked the fifth year of the beginning of the farmers’ struggle on the Delhi borders. “Sacrificing the lives of 736 martyrs, the protracted struggle of 380 days forced the BJP-led NDA union government to repeal the three pro-corporate and anti-people farm laws. Though five years have passed, Prime Minister Narendra Modi just formed a committee, but yet to implement the written assurances on MSP at the rate of C2+50% (as per M.S. Swaminathan Committee report), debt relief and privatisation of electricity given to SKM on December 9, 2021,” they said. The SKM would organise meetings, rallies and conventions to support its demands on November 26.

The All India Kisan Sabha (AIKS) in its condemnation of the proposed law has termed it “anti-farmer and part of the larger political project of the RSS-BJP to dispossess the small farmers and surrender India’s seed sovereignty to a handful of multinational and domestic monopolies.”

AIKS has also pointed out in a statement issued by office bearers Ashok Dhawale and Vijoo Krishnan that the RSS-BJP-led NDA government is pushing this extremely pro-corporate bill at a time when the agrarian crisis is deepening in India. Several scientific studies have established that the increasing corporate control on agriculture would intensify the agrarian crisis and farm suicides. The draft Bill has the necessary ingredients to accelerate the squeezing and looting of Indian farmers. For instance, this law would create a conducive atmosphere for monopolies to indulge in an unchecked pricing of seeds.

Besides, expanding its criticism further the AIKS ha stated that any new legislation regarding seeds — such as the draft Seeds Bill 2025 — must actively complement, not conflict with, the progressive legal safeguards already established under the PPVFR (Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers Right) Act 2001, and India’s international commitments under the CBD (Convention on Biological Diversity) and the ITPGRFA (International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture). These national and international commitments collectively uphold national sovereignty over genetic resources and protect indigenous varieties. They thus recognize farmers as breeders, conservers and rightful custodians of biodiversity with guaranteed rights to save, use, exchange and sell seeds.

In contrast, the draft Seeds Bill 2025 introduces a heavily centralised (and corporatized) regulatory system that risks weakening farmer-centred protection and diluting India’s legal architecture for biodiversity conservation and farmers’ rights. The draft appears to favour market control and stringent formalization of seed systems, potentially marginalizing indigenous varieties, public institutions and national/international seed networks. To be precise, the new draft of the Seeds Bill 2025 deviates India’s regulatory architecture on seeds substantially away from the provisions of the PPVFR Act 2001 and actively shifts the balance in the seed sector in favour of big corporate players.

The weeks and months ahead are likely to see campaigns and agitations against this draft law build up nationally.

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Going further it reminds the public of how, in the recent past, Rahul Gandhi of the Congress provided evidence-based public exposures of deficiencies and manipulations of the electoral rolls in previous elections in Maharashtra, Karnataka and then in Haryana. This clearly required that the ECI make itself publicly accountable to explaining these discrepancies and otherwise investigate to identify the circumstances in which such frauds took place. As an independent body, it is the ECI’s responsibility to do so and certainly not that of the Central or state governments.

However, the ECI, currently headed by Gyanesh Kumar, has simply dismissed all these exposures, in effect refusing to make the ECI accountable, as it should and must be, to the Indian public. Even a former Election Commissioner, Ashok Lavasa, has criticised the current ECI on this count. No surprise then that there is the very widespread view that precisely such electoral manipulation has played a major role in determining the outcome of the Bihar assembly polls. Moreover, the ECI has failed at another level also. It has ignored a blatant violation by the Modi-led NDA of the Model Code of Conduct for parties during elections.

Towards the end of September, Modi launched a state government scheme to make bank transfers of Rs. 10,000 to women to start self-employment ventures with one instalment transferred on the date elections were announced and others made during the election process itself! More than a crore of women in different households benefitted from this. The total voter turnout, male and female, was a little over 5 crores. Previous such pre-poll cash handouts by governments have been halted by the ECI but not this time in Bihar.

This lure to women voters turned out to be particularly important for Nitish Kumar and the JD (U). The female voter turnout at around 72% was almost 10% higher than the male voter turnout and was a key factor in raising the JD (U) vote share by 4% from the last assembly elections in 2020 and enabling a seat tally increase of 42 seats to 85 in all. The BJP had roughly the same vote share at around 20% as in 2020 but increased its seat tally this time by 50 to 89 in all. Among the NDA’s other partners, the new Chirag Paswan led party the LJP, with its vote base among Dalits, got a vote share of around 4% and 19 seats. The Congress with double the LJP’s vote share dropped 13 seats from 2020 to achieve only 6 this time. The RJD got the same vote share as in the last assembly election of 23%, higher than any other party did. However, it’s seat tally dropped by 50 from 75 to 25 this time. The CPI(ML)-Liberation fell from 12 seats to 2.

Finally the statement asks, what then are the lessons to be drawn from all this? First, that in all likelihood there was significant manipulation of rolls favouring the NDA. Second, voters faced with promises of jobs and freebies of all kinds will prefer to have a bird in hand than two in the bush, i.e., a state party backed by the Central government that has already delivered a handout and is in a better position to give more, will definitely have the edge. Third, all parties share a consensus that SC Reservations must be preserved even as it may be extended to other sections. So why should Dalits prefer opposition parties to the BJP and its political allies. The material problems of lower castes remain but a small and rising Dalit elite that provides leadership is attracted to where power already lies. Moreover, in lieu of serious material improvement, the Sangh’s Hindutva ideology offers a form of cultural compensation to lower castes in recognising them and their religious deities and practices as part of a wider Hindu fold that is being seen as the natural heir of Indian-Hindu nationalism. Fourth, the Mahagathbandan (MGB) whether in Bihar or elsewhere pursues a soft Hindutva, does not directly challenge the BJP’s Islamophobia and itself reduces the number of Muslim candidates put up.

So, says the statement, it should not be surprising that in Seemanchal, where there is a higher concentration of Muslim voters, they would have preferred Owaisi’s AIMIM than to, say, the Congress. This is disturbing because it enhances religious polarisation. However, this can only change if supposedly secular parties are prepared to act in a genuinely secular manner. Fifth, apart from anti-BJPism, what does the MGB have in common? There is not and cannot be any genuine programmatic unity since apart from the Congress and the Left, the other regional parties do not have any Pan-India, let alone any international, vision or perspective.

Sixth, always a factor in the importance of cadre-based capacity of the RSS and its affiliates to entrench themselves within the pores of civil society as a matter of daily routine and not just for the purposes of periodic mass mobilisation which of course is also greatly facilitated by having this cadre base. The lesson here is for the Left and not for the other opposition parties that do not possess an ideologically committed and disciplined cadre base but have activists as part of more traditional patron-client linkages and networks that can also more easily shift their political loyalties. The Indian parliamentary left has a cadre base but one that is much smaller and more ideologically uncertain than in the past. Even for it to achieve electoral successes, the extra-electoral terrain is where the forces of the Sangh must be confronted through sustained struggles on various fronts.

Building a newer left that is internally more democratic and that sheds the shibboleths of Stalinism and Maoism for its cadres, is vital. Such a broader united front of the Left must not be sectarian within, and it must prioritise linkages with progressive movements of all kinds that continue to exist in our continental-sized country rather than with opposition bourgeois parliamentary parties. The latter are not capable of, and will never move in the direction of forging an anti-capitalist, truly democratic and deeply egalitarian society. This should be the goal of such a Left united front that is allied with a range of progressive movements. Forging a programme and practice of left populism as an intermediate stage in pursuit of that much longer-term goal is our shorter-term need.

The statement was released today.

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At the heart of the controversy is the Special Intensive Revision –SIR — a revised method of updating electoral rolls first deployed in Bihar, suddenly since June 2025. In a sharply worded joint statement, activists allege that SIR is not an administrative exercise but a tool that has disenfranchised lakhs of legitimate voters, fundamentally altering electoral outcomes. Political Economist and husband of Finance Minister Nirmala Sitaraman, Mr Parkala Prabhakar said speaking to TNIE said, `The SIR process “bears no resemblance” to the voter-roll revision system introduced in 2003. This statement by these NGOs from across the nation points out that additions and deletions were made to the voter list with “focused intent,” possibly manipulation engineered to benefit ruling-party candidates.” In a rare show of solidarity with state-level grievances, the groups declared, “We stand with the People of Bihar in rejecting the election results.”

Earlier in August 2025, the Vote for Democracy had released its preliminary analysis of discrepancies in the Bihar SIR. This may be viewed below.

This time, these groups have also directed criticism at Opposition parties, accusing them of participating in elections conducted under the SIR framework even as they protested against it. The statement argues that by doing so, Opposition parties have inadvertently lent credibility to what the groups call a “fraudulently elected government.” It further notes that despite large-scale mobilisation during movements such as the Voter Adhikar Yatra, the Opposition has failed to build durable alliances with grassroots civil society networks. The Election Commission has come under its most severe civil society criticism in recent years. The statement accuses the Commission of: firstly, “disregarding its constitutional mandate,” secondly, becoming “an assaulter, not a protector, of electoral integrity,” and thirdly of “losing its legitimacy under its current leadership.”

The signatories pledged to push for a non-partisan and transparent Commission, indicating that an organised campaign may be in the works. Civil society groups have warned that the SIR process is now slated for rollout in 12 more states, raising fears of further large-scale voter disenfranchisement. Their slogan — “No rightful voter left behind” — is emerging as a rallying point for activists preparing for legal, political and public mobilisation.

The statement has drawn support from a broad cross-section of society, including retired judges, senior civil servants, economists, farmers’ organisations, teachers’ groups, technologists, Jesuit institutions, artists and student networks. Prominent signatories include: Justice B. Sudershan Reddy (Retd., Supreme Court), Devasahayam M.G. (Retd. IAS), Dr Parakala Prabhakar, Political Economist, Tushar Gandhi, Activist, Meena Gupta (Retd. IAS), Thomas Franco, Voters Rights Movement, Justice Shankar K.G.,K. Ramachandra Murthy, Former Editor, Their combined presence signals an emerging nationwide civil society front preparing to challenge the SIR’s expansion. Senior IAS retired MG Devasahayam speaking to TNIE said, “How can we call this Bihar election fair by any stretch of imagination.”

As the ECI fends off unprecedented scrutiny, the Opposition faces questions about its strategy, and civil society groups mount coordinated pressure campaigns, India appears headed for a high-stakes confrontation over electoral integrity. The statement ends with a stark warning — and a pledge:

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Vote for Democracy: Statistical, legal and procedural irregularities dot Bihar’s controversial SIR process

Vote for Democracy: Statistical, legal and procedural irregularities dot Bihar’s controversial SIR process

The post Civil society warns, Election Commission is “Undermining Democracy” appeared first on SabrangIndia.

While the Model Code of Conduct (MCC) is in force for the ongoing Bihar Assembly elections, Choubey, a senior BJP leader and sitting MP, delivered a speech that directly targeted the state’s Muslim population. In his address, he appealed to “Muslim brothers” to “reduce their population” and claimed that “ghuspaithiye (infiltrators) are coming from across the border.” The remarks, CJP noted, deliberately conflated Indian Muslims with illegal immigrants and invoked communal stereotypes to create fear and prejudice among voters.

CJP has urged immediate intervention by both the Election Commission and state authorities to safeguard the neutrality and integrity of the electoral process.

A dangerous conflation of faith and foreignness

According to the complaint, Choubey’s remarks go beyond electoral rhetoric. They represent a calculated act of hate speech, portraying Indian Muslims as demographic threats and foreign infiltrators — a narrative that has become disturbingly frequent in election campaigns.

By stating, “Our population is also declining. I appeal to my Muslim brothers as well: reduce your population. Ghuspaithiye are coming from across the border… our government is working to remove them,” the MP collapsed the boundary between citizen and non-citizen, implying that the Muslim presence itself was suspect.

CJP’s complaint underscores that such rhetoric de-nationalises Indian Muslims, recasting them as outsiders within their own country — a move that weaponises religious identity to secure electoral advantage.

Clear violations of electoral and criminal law

CJP’s complaint meticulously details how the speech violates several provisions of law:

• Under the Representation of the People Act, 1951:
  • Section 123(3) and (3A) — forbidding appeals on religious grounds and promotion of enmity between communities.
  • Section 125 — making it a punishable offence to promote hatred in connection with elections.
  • Section 123(2) — covering undue influence on the electorate through intimidation or communal fear.
• Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023:
  • Section 196 — promoting enmity between groups.
  • Section 297 — statements conducing to public mischief.
  • Section 356 — outraging group dignity.

The organisation also cited violations of the Model Code of Conduct, which explicitly prohibits appeals to religion or acts that aggravate communal tension, and constitutional breaches of Articles 14, 15, 19, 21, and 25 — which guarantee equality, dignity, and freedom of conscience to all citizens.

A pattern of Islamophobic rhetoric

Pirpainti, a constituency in Bhagalpur district, has a mixed population and a history of communal sensitivity. In this context, CJP warned that such inflammatory remarks carry “dangerous polarising potential” — alienating Muslim citizens, normalising prejudice, and reducing the election to a contest over identity rather than policy.

The complaint places Choubey’s remarks within a wider and troubling pattern of electoral Islamophobia, where demographic myths and border anxieties are repeatedly used to stigmatise India’s Muslim citizens. It warns that this form of hate-driven politics seeks to redefine citizenship itself — who belongs and who does not — through the language of religion and fear.

Calling Choubey’s statements “hate propaganda delivered under the cover of governance and nationalism,” the complaint asserts that such conduct corrodes the very spirit of democracy. It notes that communal appeals not only distort voter choice but also legitimise bigotry as a form of governance, thereby eroding India’s secular foundation.

CJP invoked key Supreme Court precedents, including Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen (2017), which forbids religious appeals in elections, and Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. Union of India (2014), which recognised hate speech as an assault on equality and fraternity.

CJP’s prayer and demands

Through the complaint, CJP has urged the Election Commission of India and Bihar’s election authorities to:

1. Take immediate cognisance of the complaint.
2. Register an FIR against Ashwini Kumar Choubey under relevant provisions of the Representation of the People Act and Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita.
3. Debar him from further campaigning pending inquiry.
4. Issue a public censure and advisory to all political parties to desist from communal appeals.

The complaint concludes by calling upon the Election Commission to ensure compliance with the constitutional mandate of free, fair, and secular elections under Article 324.

The complaint may be read here.

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The post Hate Has No Place in Elections: CJP moves State EC against BJP MP Ashwini Choubey’s communal speech appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Given that most anti-Hindutva critiques in the media emerge from the more privileged Brahmin–Bania perspectives, they inadvertently reinforce this diversion—keeping the focus on “Rajput history” and “Muslim history” while avoiding deeper discussions about present-day skewed representation, social engineering, and economic power in the state.

The real project is social engineering to secure Brahmin dominance in politics, bureaucracy, and culture. Crucially, this dispensation operates in tandem with Bania corporates, who reap massive economic benefits while Brahmins provide ideological legitimacy.

Cabinet and Leadership: It is numbers that matter

In early 2024, the BJP’s elevation of Bhajan Lal Sharma as Rajasthan’s Chief Minister, C.P. Joshi as state party chief and Babulal Sharma as Jaipur prantpracharak, signaled a clear shift towards Brahmin-Raj: three top Brahmin leaders at the helm, despite Brahmins being a small fraction of the state’s population. Although, after some uproar, C.P. Joshi was replaced by Madan Rathore (from OBC Teli) as the State president.

RSS Supremacy and Institutional Capture

The RSS, dominated by Maharashtrian Brahmin leadership, directs this design.  Mohan Bhagwat, personally presided over major coordination meetings in Jodhpur held between September 5 and 7 this year, underlining Rajasthan’s importance in the evolution of a national Hindutva strategy. These gatherings link the BJP’s governance in the state directly to Sangh priorities: temple projects, Sanskritisation drives, and rewriting cultural narratives to affirm Brahmin custodianship of tradition. Rajputs, OBCs and SCs are recast as auxiliary players in a story authored by Brahmin ideologues.[1]

The increased focus on Maratha figures from the Peshwa period, despite their irrelevance or controversial relation with the state’s history. The state-level celebration of Ahilyabai Holkar, despite her irrelevance to the state’s history, illustrates this strategy. This can be contrasted with the state government’s ambivalence towards the NCERT’s recent Hindutva led revisions, although disfavouring the State’s own history which only exemplifies this attitude.

Bureaucracy: The Quiet Arm of Hegemony

It is within the bureaucracy is where the real engineering occurs. National studies confirm that Brahmins are heavily over-represented in senior IAS/IPS ranks despite being a demographic minority. Rajasthan has seen repeated controversies around promotions and selections, with Brahmin-Bania candidates favored over Rajput, SC, ST, and OBC aspirants. For instance, the chief secretary of Rajasthan, Sundhansh Pant and the Finance Secretary Vaibhav Galariya are both Brahmins. Further, nine of the 24 Officers deputed at the Chief Minister’s Office (CMO) are Brahmins — that is more than one-third. This pattern also reflects in appointments of Vice Chancellors & Judiciary. At Rajasthan University, 5 out of 8 Deans are Brahmins. Out of 32 government-run universities in Rajasthan, Brahmins were appointed as Vice-Chancellors in 11 — a striking overrepresentation for such a small demographic group.

Similarly, while several Brahmin and Bania officers currently serve as District Superintendents of Police, there is only one Rajput—and not a single Muslim—holding that position.

These administrative patterns influence which textbooks are printed, which religious boards receive funds, and which police cases are prioritised. The dominance of Brahmin officers ensures Hindutva’s agenda is implemented with sympathetic pro-Brahmin filters. For instance, both Sharma and Joshi (although no longer BJP State president but still highly influential) frequently attend events promoting Parshuram as a cultural icon — recently Sharma inaugurated a Parshuram Gyanpeeth.

Hence, institutional capture through selections ensures policy-shaping and policy enforcement in favour of the concerned castes — increased State funding towards the Vipra Boards, Vipra foundations, Brahmin-controlled Gyanpeeths, promotion of vegetarianism and selective application of cow protection laws highlight this policy-shift.

The Brahmin–Bania Axis

Recently, Shikhar Agrawal, the Additional Chief Secretary was given additional charge as chairman of RIICO. Rajasthan, particularly the Marwar region and Jaipur-Shekhawati belt, has been the traditional home of major capitalist Bania houses like the Birlas, Bajajs, Mittals, Godrejs, Jhunjhunwalas, Agrawals and Khatris. The Hindutva order in Rajasthan rests not only on Brahmin dominance in ideology and bureaucracy but also on the economic muscle of Bania corporates. Brahmins provide ideological legitimacy and administrative control; Banias provide capital, campaign financing, and media ownership.

Deregulation in mining, real estate, and energy overwhelmingly benefits Bania-controlled enterprises. Contracts in solar parks, cement, and infrastructure disproportionately go to groups like Adani, Birla, and Mittal. GST centralisation, championed by Bania networks has weakened smaller competitors while favouring large corporates.

The Adani Group’s explosive expansion into Rajasthan’s mines, solar projects, and logistics under BJP, the interests of the Birlas & Mittals in Cement, telecom, and education sectors safeguarded by policy, and Local Khatri & Mahajan networks thrive under SME-friendly reforms while enjoying bureaucratic protection, exemplify this. On the other hand, Rajasthani Muslims, historically strong in art, culture, handicrafts and local trade, are vilified to marginalise them economically. Similarly, ownership of farms and orans (grasslands) by small Rajput farmers and traditional heritage by Rajput elites is often attacked under the rhetoric of samantwad.  Thus, while the state actively promotes the economic hegemonies of Brahmins, Banias, and Jats — and popular civil society discourse normalises these — the same socio-political channels stigmatise Muslim businesses and undermine Rajput property ownership.

In short, Brahmin–Bania synergy ensures that while Muslims are scapegoated and Rajputs are historically and politically side-lined, the real beneficiaries are the Brahmin-Bania elites who monopolise both state power and wealth.

Mechanisms of Social Engineering

This institutional capture and policy favouritism, is guarded by many strategies of social engineering like controlling information, culture, and using media and cinema to mislead public discourse.

The control of information and culture has played a pivotal role in social engineering.
Curricula and festivals are increasingly tilted towards Sanskritic, Brahminised traditions, side-lining Rajasthan’s syncretic and regional heritage. Similarly, Rajput-Muslim syncretic culture, exemplified by Sufi-Nathjogi traditions like that of Gogapir, are disfavoured for a more Brahmin-centric orthodox traditions like that of Parshuram. Similarly, Rajput-Dalit heterodox traditions of Ramdevji Tanwar and Rani Bhatiyani remain under constant attacks of Brahminisation by the State. This helps clear more space for Brahmin social influence over other communities — normalizing both institutional capture and policy favouritism.

However, what is more discomforting is the means and strategies employed to protect this hegemony, especially the social ramifications on the communities projected as social-punchbags for narrative decoys.

Muslims and Rajputs as the Mobilising “Other”

Unlike the Persian-origin Ashraf elites of Lucknow and Hyderabad — Rajasthani Muslims are either SC and ST convert or Rajput converts. While Kayamkhanis of Marwar & Bikaner, Sindhisipahis of Jaisalmer, and Khanzadas of Mewat are Muslim Rajputs, others like the Mirasis, Rangrezs, Langhas, Meos have been part of the traditional culture of the Hindu Rajputs.

Anti-Muslim mobilisation remained difficult in most pre-accession princely states due to the Muslim proximity to the Rajputs. However, that has dramatically changed in the last few years with various social engineering strategies, particularly Sanskritisation and Kshatriyaiaation. Hence, despite being local ethnic groups and despite being well-integrated contributors to the pre-accession Rajput States, including the modern armies — the Muslims are projected as the Turkic or Mughal “other.”

Furthermore, Muslim-othering has been followed by self-contradictory anti-Rajput rhetoric — the samantwad rhetoric by Brahmin and Jat politicians on one hand, and the violent conflicts over identity of medieval-era Rajput kings and other feudal lords on the other. The militant claims by Jats and Gujjars over Mihirbhoj Pratihar, Anangpal Tomar, Prithviraj Chauhan are not spontaneous social phenomena but politically-planned social engineering, termed “Rajputisation”. In this, different historical Rajput warriors and saints are assigned to different OBC communities to create social clashes between Rajputs and various OBC castes.

Hindutva’s obsessive appropriation of Maharana Pratap serves three key objectives. First, it eclipses the broader social, economic, and cultural contributions of Rajput dynasties, from the Pratiharas of Mandore onward. Second, it casts the rest of the Rajputs as collaborators with the Muslim ‘other.’ Third, it diverts attention from Hindutva’s ongoing project of Rajputisation.

Hence, BJP-RSS’s social engineering protects its policy of allotting more political space to Brahmins and economic space to Bania corporates. However, such social engineering is further compounded by narrative decoys (eg. Haldighati inscription debates) planted in media and films.

Discourse Deflection: Karauli Riots and the Afwaah Irony

During the run-up to the 2022 State elections, the State witnessed communal tensions and riots in Udaipur, Jodhpur and Karauli.

In Udaipur, the gruesome murder of Kanhaiyalal Sahoo was milked by BJP for anti-Muslim social-tension, while Karauli witnessed communal clashes triggered by rumours during a procession. Amid the fear, Madhulika Singh Jadaun, and her relative Sanjay Singh sheltered Muslims in her home and saved lives. Being the real heroes against Hindutva polarisation, they are reported to have said “This is Hindustan and we are Rajputs, we are known to protect people and we will always do it. Irrespective of faith,”

This irony deepens when we turn to the cultural sphere. Set in a Rajasthan town, Sudhir Mishra’s film Afwaah (2023), portrayed how rumours and political manipulation escalate into violence. However, both Madhulika, a garments seller, and Sanjay, a technician, are forgotten a year later. Instead, the film starring Bhumi Pednekar and Sumit Vyas, cleverly placed Rajputs at the centre of anti-Muslim violence.

Furthermore, the obsessive discourse around the change of the Rakt-talai inscription accompanied by a complete silence over Rajput protests against NCERT’s recent revisions fuels a misleading narrative that positions Rajput history as a beneficiary of Hindutva revisionism—a claim flatly contradicted by the recurrent protests Rajputs themselves have mounted against Hindutva’s distortions of their history in recent years — which can be read here, here, here & here.

The BJP-RSS machinery in Rajasthan has pursued Brahmin dominance with remarkable consistency, yet this reality remains conspicuously absent from most critiques of Hindutva in the state — deflecting discourse towards Rajput-Muslim history and the false binary instead.

Conclusion:

The real dangers of Hindutva lies not merely in the hate it spreads, but in the social order it entrenches: a system where Brahmins and Banias, wield an outsized supremacy over Rajasthan’s politics, economy, and culture — while constantly scapegoating the Muslims and the Rajputs through popular literature and cinema.

(The author is a mechanical engineer and an independent commentator on history and politics, with a particular focus on Rajasthan. His work explores the syncretic exchanges of India’s borderlands as well as contemporary debates on memory, identity and historiography; he can be contacted on adityakrishnadeora@gmail.com)

1. https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2025/Sep/03/rss-all-india-coordination-meet-in-jodhpur-from-sept-5-to-7
2. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/jaipur/ahilyabai-holkar-statue-unveiled-on-jmc-h-initiative/articleshow/121541829.cms

Disclaimer: The views expressed here are the author’s personal views, and do not necessarily represent the views of Sabrangindia.

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Tharu Community and Dudhwa National Park

In the Palia Tehsil area of Lakhimpur Kheri district resides the Tharu community, known for its rich cultural heritage and deep-rooted connection to nature. Recognised as a Scheduled Tribe in 1967, most Tharu families depend heavily on forest resources for their livelihood, including bamboo, sugarcane, timber, and other forest produce.

The Tharu community inhabits around 40 villages situated in and around the Dudhwa National Park, which was established in 1977. The subsequent declaration of Dudhwa as a Tiger Reserve further intensified restrictions on land use and access to forest resources for local residents.

Section 2 of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 (Restriction on the de-reservation of forests or use of forest land for non-forest purposes) provides that:

“Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force in a State, no State Government or other authority shall make, except with the prior approval of the Central Government, any order directing—
(i) that any reserved forest (within the meaning of the expression ‘reserved forest’ in any law for the time being in force in that State) or any portion thereof, shall cease to be reserved;
(ii) that any forest land or any portion thereof may be used for any non-forest purpose.”

While this law was intended to prevent the diversion of forest land, its rigid implementation in Dudhwa effectively displaced the Tharu population from their traditional habitats. Following the creation of the National Park and Tiger Reserve, many Tharu villages found themselves enclosed within or adjacent to protected forest zones, leading to the loss of access to ancestral lands and essential resources.

Forest Rights Act, 2006 and Criminalisation of the Tharu Tribe

The Forest Rights Act, 2006 (FRA) (attached below) recognises and vests the rights of forest-dwelling communities by providing a legal framework through which they can claim ownership over land, forest resources, and livelihoods. It was enacted to undo the historical injustice faced by Adivasi and traditional forest-dependent communities who were excluded from forest governance for decades.

Section 4(2) of the FRA provides that:

“The forest rights recognised under this Act in critical wildlife habitats of National Parks and Sanctuaries may subsequently be modified or resettled, provided that no forest rights holders shall be resettled or have their rights in any manner affected for the purposes of creating inviolate areas for wildlife conservation.”

However, in practice, these provisions were ignored. The Tharu community was arbitrarily denied their forest rights, including the right to collect firewood, graze cattle, and access forest produce, despite fulfilling all statutory criteria. In 2012, when members of the Tharu tribe petitioned the court demanding recognition of their rights, the Forest Department responded by filing thousands of fabricated “forest crime” cases against them.

As reported by The Times of India, BJP MLA Romi Sahani from Palia constituency stated that “they filed cases not only against those who went into the forest, but also people who never left home, the physically incapable, and even the dead.”

Over the years, the Tharu community has continued to face bureaucratic harassment and administrative pressure, resulting in the systematic erosion of the rights guaranteed to them under the FRA. Seventy-year-old Badhana Devi recounts, “If we raise our voices or refuse to pay when officers come, we are threatened with new cases.”

In 2020, the District Level Committee (DLC) further rejected the Tharu community’s forest rights claims, disregarding the explicit provisions of the FRA, which confer rights irrespective of the revenue status of a village. (See CJP’s previous coverage: “Vested Rights under Threat: Tharu Tribe Petitions High Court against Administrative Harassment”)

These instances illustrate a clear misuse of statutory powers and administrative authority, effectively stripping the Tharu community of their constitutionally protected rights under the pretext of performing “official duties.” What was meant to be a restorative statute has instead become a tool of persecution, deepening the community’s marginalisation.

Misuse of Conservation Laws across India

Over the years, similar patterns of criminalisation of Adivasi and tribal groups have been witnessed across India. In Uttarakhand, for instance, the Van Gujjars were evicted from their homes as part of a drive to ‘clear encroachments on forest property’. They invoked their right to inhabit forest land under Section 3 of the FRA, 2006 (read below). Further, Section 4 of the Act clearly states that, in cases where these members are residing in critical wildlife areas and National Parks, it is important first to rehabilitate them, to provide them a secure livelihood.

The Uttarakhand High Court, through an interim order, upheld the Van Gujjars’ right to migrate to their summer homesteads and held that any attempt to evict them would violate Article 21 of the Constitution as well as their rights under the FRA, 2006.

In the Hoshangabad district of Madhya Pradesh, the Adivasi tribes such as the Korkus and Rajbhars have faced similar ordeals. At Itarsi, the Central Proof Range was established as a testing ground for armaments and ammunition, leading the government to acquire vast stretches of forest land and displace Adivasi and Dalit families. The concept of ‘protected forests’ was further expanded under Section 4(2) of the Forest (Conservation) Amendment Act, 2023 (attached below), to include land used for strategic or defence projects and paramilitary camps. These exemptions and definitional ambiguities are now frequently misused by the government to bypass conservation obligations and to criminalise local communities.

Perhaps the most alarming example lies in the implementation of the Wildlife Protection Act, 1972. Under the pretext of ‘conservation’, the Act has criminalised essential livelihood practices of forest dwellers, such as collecting mahua, grazing cattle, and fishing. Entry into these lands itself became a punishable offence. A report by the Criminal Justice and Public Accountability Project (CPA) reveals that most offences registered against Adivasi communities were categorised as ‘threats to ecological security and animal habitats’, often without any specific allegations.

Further, forest dwellers and Adivasis continue to face evictions through industrialisation and mining projects. The mineral-rich states of Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, and Jharkhand are particularly affected. To facilitate mineral extraction, the standard state response has been to first declare forest land as ‘protected’ under the Forest (Conservation) Amendment Act, 2023, and then evict its inhabitants in the name of ‘conservation’. This systematic process not only undermines the FRA’s purpose but also perpetuates the cycle of dispossession and displacement of forest communities.

Legal Framework: Setting a Precedent for the Tharu Position

The judicial trajectory surrounding forest rights has consistently reinforced the constitutional legitimacy and welfare-oriented purpose of the Forest Rights Act (FRA), 2006. As seen in the preceding instances, from the Tharu community in Uttar Pradesh to the Van Gujars of Uttarakhand and the Adivasi groups in Madhya Pradesh, the administrative machinery has often undermined the FRA’s intent through procedural denials and criminalisation. However, Indian courts have, on several occasions, upheld the protective spirit of the FRA and reaffirmed the rights of forest-dwelling communities.

In Wildlife First v. Union of India, 2019 (read below),  the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the FRA, recognising it as a vital mechanism for securing the livelihoods and cultural identity of Scheduled Tribes and other traditional forest dwellers. The Court underscored that the Act does not weaken forest conservation but instead democratises it by empowering local communities as custodians of the environment.

Similarly, in Orissa Mining Corporation Ltd. v. Ministry of Environment and Forests & Ors., 2013, concerning the proposed bauxite mining project in the Niyamgiri Hills, the Supreme Court upheld the Ministry’s decision to deny forest clearance. The Court found that the project violated both the FRA and the customary rights of the Dongria Kondh tribe, whose spiritual and cultural ties to the Niyamgiri Hills were constitutionally protected.
In paragraph 43 of the judgment (attached below), the Court characterised the FRA as a “social welfare or remedial statute” designed to recognise and vest forest rights. The legislative intent, it observed, is unambiguously to safeguard the customs, usages, and traditional practices of forest dwellers. The judgment further emphasised that under the Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 (PESA) (read below), particularly Section 4(d), the Gram Sabha is entrusted with the duty to preserve and protect tribal traditions, cultural identity, and community resources.

This landmark ruling thus establishes a jurisprudential framework that directly supports the claims of the Tharu petitioners. Their ongoing struggle to secure recognition of their Community Forest Resources (CFRs) in the Terai region echoes the Dongria Kondhs’ defence of their sacred landscapes. The same legal reasoning: recognition of customary rights, participatory decision-making through the Gram Sabha, and the FRA’s remedial purpose, should guide judicial interpretation in the Tharu case as well.

Constitutional Implication: Articles 14, 21, and 300A

The arbitrary usage of the Indian Forest Act and Wildlife (Protection) Act, to arrest and detain Tharu Tribe members, under the guise of ‘protecting wildlife and natural habitat’, violates equality and liberty guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution. The forest officials particularly target people belonging to Scheduled Tribes, who often lack legal and financial recourse to raise their voices. The FIRs are filed without looking at the facts of the circumstance (as in the case of Surdas Ram Bhajan), and any sort of resistance is framed as insurgency. Therefore, non-arbitrariness, which is at the heart of Article 14, is violated.

Article 21 guarantees the right to life and personal liberty. The FRA helps secure the right to life for forest-dwelling communities by protecting their ability to earn a livelihood from the forest. The petitioners argue that non-conferment of their forest rights is a violation of Article 21, and a further perpetuation of historical injustice, against which the FRA was meant to protect.

Article 300A of the Constitution protects the right of an individual to not be deprived of their property, secured by the authority of law. The Adivasis and Tharu tribe members are forced into a system of private/state property, as a result of unsettled land rights and lack of clear demarcations. The logic holds that any land that is not owned by individuals automatically becomes state property.

Thus, the 4000 cases against Tharu Community members violate their right to life, equality and property.

Conclusion and Way Forward

The core purpose of the Forest Rights Act (FRA), 2006 was to rectify the “historical injustice” committed against forest-dwelling communities, particularly Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers, whose customary rights to forest lands and resources were denied during the colonial period and, regrettably, even after independence (as reiterated in Orissa Mining Corporation Ltd. v. Ministry of Environment and Forests).

In the case of the Tharu community, the lands they had long inhabited were declared “forest land” or designated as “protected areas” for wildlife conservation, disregarding their traditional conservation practices and deep ecological dependence on forest resources.

The extensive rights guaranteed under the FRA remain largely unrealised due to the excessive control exercised by forest officials, whose discretion often renders these legal protections ineffective in practice. Furthermore, the recent Forest Conservation (Amendment) Act, 2023, has weakened the FRA’s intent by allowing the Union Government to grant forest clearances even before the rights of forest-dwelling communities are settled or their consent obtained. This legal overlap has created a dangerous precedent where conservation is invoked to justify dispossession.

These developments also highlight how state machinery, including the Police and Forest Departments, disproportionately target communities residing in and around forest areas, a significant proportion of whom belong to Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes.

The petition submitted by Santari Ram Rana and Sadai before the Allahabad High Court exposes this subtle yet pervasive bureaucratic violence embedded within law. Unlike overt forms of repression, this harm is inflicted quietly through administrative procedures, documentation, and regulatory control, reflecting a colonial mindset that continues to view forests as needing protection from the very people who have protected them for generations.

While the writ petition remains pending before the High Court, members of the Tharu community must continue asserting their legal and cultural rights, drawing inspiration from the Van Gujjars of Uttarakhand and the Adivasi movements in Hoshangabad. Only through sustained advocacy, awareness, and judicial engagement can the original spirit of the Forest Rights Act be truly realised.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Shyamli Pengoriya)

Related

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Forest Conservation Amendment Act, 2023: A challenge to Adivasi land rights and environmental protections

U’khand Forest Dept admits faults in eviction notices issued to Van Gujjars

Forest Conservation Rules, 2022- An overview of changes that snatch rights of Gram Sabhas

Sokalo Gond and Nivada Rana lead the campaign for Forest Rights in SC

Tribals Allege Officials Use Forest Rights Act to Harass, Demand Money; Picket DM’s Office

The post When Conservation Becomes Coercion: The silent violence faced by the Tharus of Kheri appeared first on SabrangIndia.

According to the NCRB, suicide remains most prevalent among daily wage earners, housewives, and students. These descriptions are not only about occupational status, but reflections on India’s social hierarchies. The “daily wage earner,” who made up 26.4% of all suicide victims in 2023, is the precarious worker, buried in debt, inflation, and insecure employment. The “housewife,” at nearly 14.7%, is a symbol for unpaid domestic labour under patriarchal control and social isolation. The “student,” accounting for 8.5% of total suicides, demonstrates the systemic public and private failure to provide a humane education and mental health support. For the NCRB, these are merely descriptive occupational categories, yet they carry moral and political significance; they are indicators of whose despair is acknowledged and whose is not.

Numbers without Context

The NCRB identifies “family problems” (32%) and “illness” (18%) as primary contributors to suicide. This seems simple on paper – family dysfunction and health issues. However, these classifications conceal more than they disclose. What the Bureau calls “family problems” may include domestically violent behaviour, dowry harassment, or control related to one’s gender. “Illness” likely includes untreated depression among other illnesses, stigma related to disability, and traumatic, life-changing events. Then, stripped of the structural analysis, we easily convert the collective suffering to private pathology in the data.

There is no clearer example of this than student suicides. In 2023, India reported 13,044 student suicides, or about 36 a day, with Maharashtra (2,578) and Tamil Nadu (1,982) having the highest number, followed by Madhya Pradesh (1,668). These states have the largest educational ecosystems, or competition for schools, outside of state-controlled educational ecosystems. Similar patterns recur beneath the statistics: students migrating from rural to urban centres; that caste-based discrimination continues as students are excluded to elite institutions in various ways, if they are even included; and pressures from family about economics that bar a young person’s choice to attend school prevent their abilities to enjoy school, carry their anxieties into learning spaces when they keep “school pressures” from family. The NCRB does not ask whether “academic pressure” is systemically tilted “equal” – it is not.

In February 2024, the Supreme Court released its comprehensive Guidelines on the Mental Health of Students, citing what it referred to as an “epidemic of psychological distress” on campuses across India. The Court called upon universities and colleges to create counselling cells, train faculty to identify early indicators of distress, and implement systems that can protect students from discrimination that may take place on the basis of caste, gender, or the socio-economic status of their family of origin. These Guidelines were developed as an extension of the Court’s findings in Sukdeb Saha v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2024), in which it explained that the State has a “positive constitutional obligation” under Articles 21 and 21A to ensure mental well-being in educational and workplace environments. A detailed summary done by CHMLP can be read here. In that case, the Court condemned the State’s failure to create a coherent national framework for the prevention of student suicides, in particular to direct the states to view student suicide as a consequence of policy failure rather than a private tragedy.

These pronouncements reaffirm a simple truth that the NCRB’s data failed to reveal: student suicides are not individual personal crises but expressions of collective neglect, of caste hierarchy, and of inadequate mental health infrastructure. Nonetheless, and despite these judicial interventions, implementation remains inconsistent, as most such institutions continue to treat mental health services as optional, rather than as the institutional responsibility they need to understand it as.

The Silence around Farmer Suicides and those of Workers

The way the NCRB handles farmer suicides chillingly captures the politics of omission. In 2023, 12,567 farmers and agricultural labourers died by suicide — a 5% increase from 2022. Maharashtra, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, and Madhya Pradesh made up over 60% of these suicides. Yet again, for every year, the report does not discuss structural causes: falling crop prices, shocks due to climate change, debt, and neglect in policy.

Organisations from civil society, such as the All India Kisan Sabha and P. Sainath’s People’s Archive of Rural India, have documented hundreds of farmer suicides that are absent from the NCRB report. Many suicides are coded under “other professions” or not included at all due to technical reasons of land ownership. Tenant farmers, sharecroppers, and women farmers who do the vast majority of agricultural work are missing. The NCRB’s silence about these deaths is a political act that removes the agrarian crisis from public consciousness by rendering structural violence into an absence in administrative categories.

In a similar vein, the cadre of “daily wage earners” has increased dramatically in the last five years, subsuming what was a more distinct representation of labour distress. It now includes construction workers, gig workers, sanitation workers, and small artisans who are all trapped in elements of insecurity. That nearly one in four people who commit suicide in India are daily wage earners, should not be an observation of a statistical trend, but a reproach of an economy that cares more for productivity than for people.

The Unseen Intersections of Caste, Gender, and Mental Health

By refusing to break suicide data down by caste identity, the NCRB obscures an understanding of mental distress in terms of social humiliation and exclusion. For instance, the case of Darshan Solanki, a student at IIT Bombay, who died by suicide in 2023, was widely identified in news reports as a death resulting from caste discrimination, but it would not be categorized under anything official. Likewise, the suicides of Dalit and Adivasi students across medical and technical institutions in India, who endure daily micro-aggressions from their peer groups in the form of “competition,”, also go undocumented in suicides that become of relevance to national statistics.

Gender issues exacerbate susceptibility. The relation between domestic violence, demands for dowry, and emotional abuse remains the most consistent factor for women in suicide. Yet, the label “housewife” that the NCRB has categorized those women under is a clear indication of biased and patriarchal categorization that sits below the level of humanity when suffering is reduced to a bureaucratic category. By neglecting to label intimate partner violence and coercion within marriage as a cause, the Bureau also erases the structural violence that is encountered in everyday life.

Despite the passage of the Mental Healthcare Act of 2017, mental health continues to be an undercurrent in policy and also data collected for the report. Governments allocate less than 1% of total health spending to mental health for community mental health services, which should be alarming. The NCRB noted “mental illness” as a cause for suicide in only 4.1% of suicides recorded in the annual report, and experts recognize this figure is severely understated. What this illustrates is not a rethinking of resilience, but denial. The state can measure death, rather than despair.

Disappearing the Crisis

Data manipulation encompasses not only the omission of unpleasant cases but also the reclassification of data. In 2023, several states, including Maharashtra and Telangana, reported a decline in farmer suicides due to “better welfare delivery,” although independent reports indicated a mostly correspondingly higher number. Similarly, the circumstances leading to a decline in cybercrime in Mumbai were simply reclassified to generate an 11.7% decrease in cybercrime. Suicides are often reclassified into other occupations or left unqualified to further the claims of administrative success.

The sanitization of statistics is part of a larger pattern: the act of withholding documentation to showcase progress. In Jammu & Kashmir, in 2023, the NCRB reported zero counts of communal violence and non-sedition prosecutions, while hundreds of detentions were conducted under the Public Safety Act.  Further, the NCRB stopped collecting data on lynchings and hate crimes from 2017 onwards, stating that the data collected was “unreliable”. By deciding what “counts,” the state ultimately will dictate what “counts” as a national issue.

Toward a Politics of Care

While the NCRB’s Crime in India report quantifies violence enacted by other people, Accidental Deaths and Suicides in India quantifies violence enacted by systems — by poverty, patriarchy, and policy. Still, states treat these deaths not as a social emergency, but as a statistical inevitability. A humane interpretation of the numbers insists that we view suicide not as the failing of an individual, but as the failing of governance.

There are still signs of resilience. Grassroots organizations like Kisan Mitra Helpline, Students’ Collective for Mental Health, and SNEHA have sought to offer mental health counselling, debt mediation, and legal aid to communities at risk. The Supreme Court’s latest directions to improve student mental health are also positive, but without an investment in a mental health infrastructure, these are largely symbolic.

To address India’s suicide epidemic, policy needs to shift from counting deaths to preventing deaths. This requires an acknowledgement of the structural nature of despair, deeply rooted in inequity of wealth, caste humiliation, and gendered violence, and a reimagining of the welfare state as one of care, rather than control. Until then, each number in the NCRB’s ledger will remain an indictment of a country that is still growing but not healing.

The Accidental Deaths and Suicides in India report serves a dual purpose, chronicling suffering and depoliticizing it. Each suicide occurs as an isolated act, separated from the systems that created it. The result is a perception of neutrality; the data is both the proof and the excuse.

The judgment in Sukdeb Saha v. State of Andhra Pradesh can be read here.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Preksha Bothara)

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The post Lives in the Margins: Reading India’s suicide data beyond the numbers appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Delivered within 24 hours of each other on November 4, 2025, these campaign speeches have been described by CJP as “a double assault on India’s constitutional morality and the sanctity of the electoral process.” One, by a sitting Chief Minister, communalises the campaign through religious vilification and genocidal language; the other, by a local candidate, turns political rivalry into a threat of physical mutilation.

The Siwan Rally: Himanta Biswa Sarma’s speech of hate and fear

At an election rally in Raghunathpur, Siwan, Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma compared RJD candidate Osama Shahab to global terrorist Osama bin Laden, telling the audience that they must “eliminate all Osama Bin Ladens” from Bihar. Sarma further warned that a victory for Shahab would be “a defeat for Hindus,” promising to watch the results from the Kamakhya temple in Assam and invoking figures like Babur and Aurangzeb to frame the election as a Hindu versus Muslim battle.

His remarks — equating a Muslim candidate with terrorism, describing Muslims as “infiltrators” who threaten women, and boasting of stopping salaries of “mullahs” — were deemed by the complaint to be “state-sponsored demonisation” and “an incitement to exterminatory politics.” Delivered by a Chief Minister under the Model Code of Conduct, they constitute, according to the complaint, “a direct assault on the secular fabric of the Constitution.”

CJP’s complaint lays out an exhaustive legal analysis: violations of Sections 123(2), 123(3), 123(3A), and 125 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and Sections 196, 297, and 356 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. Through the complaint, it has been claimed that Sarma’s speech breaches the Ministerial Code of Conduct, since he holds constitutional office and bears heightened responsibility to maintain neutrality and restraint.

Describing the speech as “hate institutionalised as political strategy,” the complaint also notes that Sarma’s words collapse the constitutional boundary between religion and citizenship — constructing Muslims as infiltrators and enemies of the nation. CJP has demanded the registration of an FIR, Sarma’s debarment from further campaigning, and a public censure from the Election Commission.

The complaint may be read here.

The Kishanganj Rally: Tausif Alam’s threats of violence

On the same day, in Laucha Naya Haat, Kishanganj, AIMIM’s Tausif Alam took the campaign stage to retaliate against RJD leader Tejashwi Yadav, who had earlier called AIMIM chief Asaduddin Owaisi an “extremist.” In a shocking display of aggression, Alam told the crowd: “Tejashwi Yadav called our leader Owaisi an extremist. Tell him — I will cut his eyes, fingers, and tongue if he dares insult Owaisi Sahab again.”

He went further, mocking Tejashwi as the “son of a fodder thief,” an evident reference to his father, Lalu Prasad Yadav.

The complaint describes these remarks as “acts of open intimidation and violent abuse that degrade democratic discourse.” It cites violations of Sections 115, 326, 349, and 356 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, along with Sections 123(2), 123(4), and 125 of the RPA, 1951, and multiple provisions of the Model Code of Conduct.

The complaint further emphasises that this is not political hyperbole but a “direct threat of grievous bodily harm” designed to intimidate a rival candidate and vitiate the atmosphere of free choice. CJP has called for an FIR against Alam, his temporary debarment from campaigning, and a public censure to reaffirm that threats of violence have no place in electoral politics.

The complaint may be read here.

A Pattern of Electoral Decay: Hate as common ground

Though ideologically opposite, the two speeches share a disturbing symmetry. Both substitute argument with aggression, civic discourse with communal or personal hostility. In Siwan, hate was religiously coded — against Muslims, invoking “infiltrators” and “Osamas.” In Kishanganj, hate was personally targeted — against a rival, invoking mutilation and humiliation.

CJP’s complaints thus expose a broader crisis: the normalisation of hate and violence in electioneering. Both incidents, as highlighted in the complaint, have the potential to trigger communal tension and retaliatory violence in Bihar’s politically sensitive districts. The Election Commission’s inaction, it argues, would erode not just the Model Code of Conduct but the very credibility of free and fair elections.

The complaints legal framing situates these speeches within the broader constitutional architecture of Articles 14, 15, 19, 21, and 25, and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen (2017) and Ziyauddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Mehra (1975), which define religious appeals and hate speech as “corrupt practices” that vitiate elections.

A call for restoring democratic dignity

Together, these complaints articulate an urgent appeal — that India’s electoral arena must not be reduced to a theatre of hate, threat, or intimidation. When political speech turns into a weapon — whether through communal vilification or violent menace — it corrodes the very spirit of democratic civility and constitutional equality. Electoral politics draws its legitimacy from civility, equality, and reasoned dissent — not from the language of fear or vengeance. The complaint reminds the Election Commission and the public alike that elections are not merely contests for power but tests of the Republic’s moral fibre.

Related:

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BJP leaders’ hate speech draws backlash ahead of Bihar elections

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The post CJP seeks action against Assam CM Himanta Biswa Sarma and AIMIM’s Tausif Alam for election code violations in Bihar appeared first on SabrangIndia.