The Court ruled that a person can only be convicted under Section 149 if the prosecution establishes—either directly or through credible circumstances—that the accused shared the “common object” of the assembly that committed the offence.

The bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan delivered the verdict allowing two criminal appeals filed by ten individuals who had been convicted under Sections 302 (murder) and 149 (unlawful assembly) for a violent 1988 clash in Katihar district, Bihar, arising from a dispute over government-allotted agricultural land.

The appellants had been sentenced to life imprisonment by the Katihar Sessions Court, and the Patna High Court had upheld the conviction in 2013. The Supreme Court, however, found that the evidence against the accused was “vague, omnibus, and insufficient to establish a shared common object.”

Background: The 1988 Katihar clash

The case originated from a violent altercation on November 20, 1988, in Katihar district, when two groups clashed over the harvesting of paddy on land distributed by the Bihar government. The prosecution alleged that a mob of 400–500 people armed with guns, spears, and sticks attacked the complainant Jagdish Mahato (PW-20) and his brother Meghu Mahato, killing Meghu and another villager, Sarjug Mahato.

Seventy-two individuals were named in the FIR, of whom twenty-four were charge-sheeted. The Katihar Sessions Court convicted twenty-one under Sections 302 and 149 IPC, while the Patna High Court in 2013 upheld the conviction of eleven. The remaining accused approached the Supreme Court, arguing that they were innocent villagers wrongly implicated merely for being present.

Supreme Court’s analysis

The limits of constructive liability: Justice Pardiwala, writing for the bench, clarified that Section 149 IPC cannot be invoked mechanically to hold all persons present at the scene guilty. The Court observed that presence and participation are not synonymous, and that criminal liability under Section 149 arises only when an accused shares the common object of the assembly.

“At the same time, mere presence at the scene does not ipso facto render a person a member of the unlawful assembly, unless it is established that such an accused also shared its common object. A mere bystander, to whom no specific role is attributed, would not fall within the ambit of Section 149 of the IPC. The prosecution has to establish, through reasonably direct or indirect circumstances, that the accused persons shared a common object of the unlawful assembly.” (Para 54)

The seven-factor test for determining common object: To guide future courts, the Supreme Court formulated a seven-part test to determine whether a person’s presence amounted to participation in an unlawful assembly:

1. The time and place where the assembly was formed;
2. The conduct and behaviour of its members near the scene;
3. The collective conduct of the assembly, as distinct from that of individual members;
4. The motive underlying the crime;
5. The manner in which the incident unfolded;
6. The nature of weapons carried and used; and
7. The nature, extent, and number of the injuries inflicted, and other relevant considerations.

The Court emphasised that these indicators must be objectively applied to ensure that constructive liability does not turn into collective punishment.

“Rule of Caution” in mob prosecutions: In a pointed caution to trial courts, the bench noted that cases involving large mobs often carry a risk of over-implication and require “utmost care” to distinguish between actual participants and passive onlookers.

“The law on the point can be summarized to the effect that where there are general allegations against a large number of persons, the court must remain very careful before convicting all of them on vague or general evidence. Therefore, the courts ought to look for some cogent and credible material that lends assurance. It is safe to convict only those whose presence is not only consistently established from the stage of FIR, but also to whom overt acts are attributed which are in furtherance of the common object of the unlawful assembly.” (Para 61)

Citing Masalti v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1964), the bench reiterated that in cases with numerous accused, courts should rely on at least two or three consistent and trustworthy witnesses before confirming guilt.

Justice Pardiwala underscored that this caution does not dilute the principle of constructive liability, but ensures its fair and judicious application, particularly in incidents arising from mob violence or communal tension.

“This Court, as a matter of caution, has enunciated parameters to safeguard innocent spectators or passive onlookers from being convicted merely on account of their presence. This cautionary rule, however, does not dilute the doctrine of constructive liability, under which proof of an overt act by each individual is not indispensable. Where the presence of a large number of persons is established and many are implicated, prudence mandates strict adherence to this rule of caution.” (Para 55)

Findings and acquittal

The Court found that the prosecution had failed to link the ten appellants to the common object of the mob or to any specific act of violence. The evidence, it said, was “vague, contradictory, and omnibus in nature,” insufficient to prove their participation beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court also expressed concern over the casual manner in which the investigating authorities had registered and pursued the case, noting inconsistencies between witness accounts and medical evidence.

“It cannot be said that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. A case attains that standard when all its links are firmly established and recognizable to the eyes of a reasonable person. In the present matter, the prosecution version does not appear to stem from a truthful narration of facts.” (Para 82)

Clarifying “Common Object”

The verdict further explained that the phrase “in prosecution of the common object” means that the crime must have been directly connected to or committed in furtherance of the assembly’s object. Liability arises only if members intended or knew that the offence was likely to be committed.

“While ascertaining this fact, it is of utmost importance to consider whether the assembly consisted of some persons who were merely passive onlookers who had joined the assembly as a matter of idle curiosity, without the knowledge of the common object of the assembly, since such persons cannot be said to be members of the unlawful assembly. We say so because, the nucleus of Section 149 is “common object”.” (Para 52)

Significance: A defining standard for mob liability

This judgment marks a major reaffirmation of individualised culpability in collective offences. It establishes that criminal responsibility cannot be imposed by association, and that courts must rigorously differentiate active participants from innocent spectators. The decision will have far-reaching implications for cases involving mob violence, communal clashes, and political protests, where mass arrests and omnibus charges are common.

By setting a structured evidentiary standard, the Court has not only clarified Section 149 IPC but also reinforced the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty against arbitrary criminal liability.

The complete judgment may be read here.

Related:

CJP files complaint to Maharashtra DGP, SP Jalgaon over police participation in communal rally amid Suleman Pathan lynching probe

Violence & Sanatan Dharma: Now suspended lawyer defends shoe attack on CJI Gavai, claims it was a protest against ‘bulldozer’ remark”

Calcutta High Court quashes arbitrary deportation, orders return of West Bengal families from Bangladesh

Free speech, even in bad taste, is protected if no incitement to violence: HP HC

The post Mere Presence Does Not Imply Guilt: Supreme Court defines clear test for liability under unlawful assembly appeared first on SabrangIndia.

It is five years to date, since Fr Stan Swamy, was arrested and more than four years since he was martyred for the cause of justice. The incontrovertible fact is that, though Fr Stan is no longer physically present on this earth, he continues to live in the hearts and lives of many everywhere, very particularly the poor and the marginalised, the excluded and the exploited, the Adivasis and the Dalits, anyone and everyone who are victims of injustice and inhumanity. Besides civil society members: academics and activists, civil libertarians and politicians, Jesuits, and other religious and priests, continue to miss him profoundly and still mourn his death. Despite the all-out hostility of the NIA, painstaking efforts continue on several fronts, to prove the innocence of Fr Stan (and he was innocent) and that his incarceration was unwarranted, illegal and unconstitutional.

Though Fr Stan’s death left a void in the heart of many, he did leave behind a rich legacy, which today many of those he inspired, are grappling with ways and means of how best they can internalise and actualise it. It is not easy to so, it is indeed a challenge. Fr Stan’s legacy embodies Compassion, Courage, Collaboration and Commitment. Certainly a tall order – but given the reality, we live in today, it is a path, we have no option, but to follow. In an effort to live and deepen this legacy, eighteen Jesuits of the South Asian Assitancy met for a two-day (5 &6 October, 2025) reflection at Bagaicha, Ranchi. The meeting which was organised and hosted by the Jesuit team of Bagaicha, was path-breaking on several counts: the participants shared with each other their profound experiences of living, working with Fr Stan and of being inspired by him; of the many good things (events, programmes, memorial meets) that have been taking place after his death; and of the ‘much more’ that needs to be done, if we are to genuinely live the legacy Fr Stan left us.

During the reflection, the Jesuits re-visited some key documents which included the vision and mission of Bagaicha, the Community Meetings held there, the JCSA National Consultation held in Delhi in September 2021, the subsequent meetings of the Central Zone Jesuits. These documents enunciated a clear way of proceeding with concrete points of action, in order to realise the legacy of Fr Stan. In the National Consultation of Delhi for one, the participants (Jesuits and collaborators) unanimously formulated an incisive statement, ‘Reliving the Stan Moment: A Clarion Call’. The statement had a doable action plan in order to keep alive the legacy which Stan has left us!

The recently held Bagaicha reflection in more ways than one synced with the National Consultation statement which said, “during the time together, we listened to touching insights of those who knew Fr Stan well, of how he walked the talk and of how ultimately, he had to pay the price for the people and their cause -for which he lived. We also shared in-depth spiritual conversations with one another. We emphasized the incarnational spirituality which Fr Stan internalised and actualised, as he accompanied the Adivasis, the Dalits and other sub-alterns in their relentless struggle for a more humane, just, dignified, equitable and peaceful world. He willingly embraced the Cross that was given to him.”

The key question in the very meaningful, profound and interactive process was, “are we doing enough (individually and collectively) to internalise and live Stan’s legacy today”? The answer was a unanimous, honest and heartfelt “NO!” Whilst everyone did acknowledge the plenty of good being done all over (which they felt were important and necessary), there was also the feeling, that one should transcend mere ‘cosmeticisation’ or ‘tokenism.’ What one also needs to deal with, is the fear factor that throttles both the individual and collective and prevents one from being visible and vocal where critical issues are concerned. The Jesuits also felt strongly that there must be a paradigm shift in attitudes, approaches and actions, if one truly wishes to live Fr Stan’s legacy. Indicators for this include emphasis on movement rather than on institutions, to be in the midst of the people, to accompany them in their struggles, to collaborate with like-minded individuals and groups, to engage in research based advocacy and to be courageous enough to take visible prophetic stands against the powerful and other vested interest. Fr Stan’s legacy, which is essentially the faith-justice mandate of the Society of Jesus, needs to permeate in all Jesuit ministries and initiatives today, beginning with formation.

Just before he left Bagaicha and his arrest in October 2020, Fr. Stan said, “over the last two decades, I have identified myself with the Adivasi people and their struggle for a life of dignity and self-respect… In this process, I have clearly expressed my dissent over several policies and laws enacted by the government in the light of the Indian Constitution. I have questioned the validity, legality and justness of several steps taken by the government and the ruling class. If this makes me a ‘deshdrohi’, then so be it. We are part of the process. In a way I am happy to be part of this process. I am not a silent spectator, but part of the game and ready to pay the price whatever be it…. I/we must be ready to face the consequences. I would just add that what is happening to me is not unique. Many activists, lawyers, writers, journalists, student leaders, poets, intellectuals and others who stand for the rights of Adivasis, Dalits and the marginalised and express their dissent to the ruling powers of the country are being targeted. Grateful to all who have stood in solidarity with me all these years.”

Fr. Stan today challenges us all, Jesuits and others to live the legacy he has left us, in a profound way by our presence among the people, by our participation in their struggles and joys, by partnering through a shared vision and mission, with other women and men of good will, by having the courage to play a prophetic role and above all, to be a pilgrim a hope. From Taloja jail he wrote, “my needs are limited. The Adivasis and the Society of Jesus, have taught me to lead a simple life… Listening to the life narratives of the poor prisoners is my joy in Taloja Jail… I see God in their pains and smiles… Many of such poor undertrials don’t know what charges have been put on them, have not seen their chargesheet and just remain for years without any legal or other assistance. The 16 co-accused have not been able to meet each other as we are lodged in different jails or different ‘circles’ with the same jail”; he concludes, “but we will still sing in chorus. A caged bird can still sing”.

The Bagaicha reflection has energised the Jesuit participants, to do all they can, to live Fr Stan Swamy’s legacy in an uncompromising and prophetic way, and not to be afraid whatever the consequences one may have to face!

Fr Cedric Prakash SJ is a human rights, reconciliation and peace activist/writer.

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Why is it a peculiar attempt? It is so because, the bill threatens the very allies it seeks the support from, i.e., TDP’s Chandrababu Naidu and JDU’s Nitish Kumar. One might ask how it threatens the two big allies of the BJP. The Centre can unleash its institutional might on either of the Chief Ministers like it has done on both Arvind Kejriwal and Hemant Soren previously. Both chief ministers share their political turf with strong BJP partners (Pawan Kalyan in Andhra Pradesh and Chirag Paswan in Bihar) while BJP in itself is a formidable force in Bihar. For a party and establishment that boasts about its ability to make surprise decisions without any consultation, the BJP surely has given enough time for the parties to deliberate it, thus making it a peculiar attempt.

If it is a peculiar attempt at a peculiar law, why is it worth any discussion, especially when it has been sent to a Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC)? It is worth the discussion since such discussion will inform the views and enrich the discourse that will help in the interactions with the JPC when it invites comments over the bill.

This article presents two arguments, one that has already been well discussed and another that has been side-lined, arguably by the advent of the bill itself. The first argument is that the bill is a haphazard and harmful attempt to change the fundamental nature of criminal law and constitutionalise such harmful change while being menacingly selective, even within such harmful bounds.

The second is that the bill side-lines a crucial discussion that ought to have occupied popular discourse for a long time since governments began to topple after getting elected on a mandate: the trading of MLAs.

The Bill

The Bill proposes to amend Article 75 (by inserting clause 5A), Article 164 (by inserting clause 4A) and Article 239AA (by inserting clause 5A) of the Constitution. These articles deal with other provisions as to central ministers, other provisions as to state ministers, and special provisions with respect to Delhi, respectively.

The Bill has, essentially, four elements. One element is who comes under its scope. The Prime Minister, Central Ministers, Chief Ministers of the States and State Ministers.

Second Element is what it does. It provides that if any of the above four categories of people are arrested on charge for a serious crime for which the punishment is imprisonment for five years or more, and are detained in custody for 30 days, on the 31st day, either such person will be removed from the post or if such removal order is not given, he shall cease to hold such post from the 31st day of the custody.

The third element is how it does this. The Bill uses the high constitutional posts of the President in case of Prime Minister and Central Ministers and Governor in case of Chief Minister and State Ministers. Therefore, on the 31st day of custody, the President will have to act in the case of Prime Minister or Central Ministers, and the Governor will have to act in the case of a Chief Minister and State Level Ministers.

The fourth and final element is what happens when the person in custody gets released. The Bill essentially leaves a narrow gap for the status quo to come back. The Bill says that nothing shall prevent the person released from custody to be subsequently appointed as the Chief Minister or a Minister, by the Governor, on his release from custody.

So, simply put, if a person goes to jail for more than 30 days, they will lose their ministerial position and if they are released on the 32nd day, they will have to be appointed again.

While the bill negates all procedures for a person to be removed from office, such automated process is not there for reinstatement of those who are released from the detainment after the 31^st day!!!

Seeing through the facade of Bill’s apparent upholding of Constitutional Values

The Disproportionate Nature

This section presents, at multiple stages and as one delves deeper into the reasoning behind the bill, the disproportionate nature of arresting a Minister (State or Central) or a Chief Minister or a Prime Minister.

It sounds okay if it is seen in the context of the much popularised but a fundamentally mistaken notion that all people charged with something are wrongdoers. As much stigmatizing as getting charged on something and getting arrested is, it does not prove anything. There are two data points to support this.

Firstly, more than 75% of India’s prisoners are undertrials meaning that 75 out of every 100 people in India’s prisons do not have the mark of conviction on them and yet, they are languishing in jails.

There can be further apprehensions on this saying “if they are in jail or if the police have charged them, they must have done something wrong.” It is here that the second part of information becomes useful. If this were true, out of the 548 persons arrested between 2015 and 2020 for the offence of Sedition (Section 124A) under the now repealed Indian Penal Code, 1860, there can be an expectation that a considerable percent of people should have been convicted. However, only 12 people were convicted. Sedition was given the form of ‘Acts endangering sovereignty, unity and integrity of India’ under Section 152 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023(BNS) and it carries a punishment of imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for 7 years and fine. Therefore, if a chief minister is arrested under Section 152—the sedition equivalent—the provisions of the 130th Constitutional Amendment Bill apply if it passes through. In that case, going by how many people got arrested and thereafter convicted in similar cases, there is, at best, a chance of 2 percent for the police cases to result in conviction. And yet, going by the provisions of the bill, if they come into force, as they are now, the chief minister is ought to be removed.

Strict laws are already present

There is a chance for one more apprehension in this regard: “Isn’t that good even if 2 corrupt chief ministers do not get to be in their position?”

While the apprehension and the consequent conclusion may be a response to the eroding faith and legitimacy of the Indian political arena, the point is this: India’s laws already have provisions disallowing convicted people to contest in elections. The Representation of People Act, 1951, as a general rule provides that any person convicted of any offence, if sentenced to two years of imprisonment or more, such person shall be disqualified to stand in any election for 6 years after he/she is released from prison, after they serve their punishment. So, if a politician goes to jail as a punishment for a crime he is convicted for, not only is he restricted from standing for elections, during his period of punishment, but the restriction extends to 6 years post his release. Apart from the general rule, there are specific rules too wherein morally deplorable offences like adulteration of food, or offences under the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 attract the same restrictions even with a 6 month imprisonment conviction. Therefore, if a politician is put in jail as a convict, even for a period of 6 months under some laws, they will lose the right to stand in elections once they are released.

There are classes of offences like the offences under the laws related to Narcotics and Psychotropic substances, wherein even a fine upon conviction attracts the restriction. In that sense, the restrictions enshrined in the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951 are stricter. However, their strictness is triggered only by a conviction rather than a mere detainment.

One last apprehension is left to be dealt with before concluding argument on how selective, harmful and haphazard bills are. It is the apprehension or rather a question of “How come we have so many reports saying criminals are entering politics if the existing laws are stricter?”

This reality of people with criminal cases entering politics does not start at Chief Ministers but with MLAs and MPs. Moreover, the reports often quote the number of cases pending against the politicians rather than only convictions. While these reports would serve an argument which says that cases against political representatives need to be heard on a priority basis so that a conclusion can be attained over charges, it does not come of use to the proposition for the 130th Constitutional Amendment Bill. Additionally, this is also where the bill is being selective. MLAs and MPs are also part of Constitutional Scheme and moreover, their detainment does not affect stability of governments as much as a detainment of a chief Minister of State or a Central level Cabinet minister would. And despite this, the bill only includes in its ambit only the ministers and not all members of legislature.

Goes against entrenched Constitutional Principles

Finally, despite all this, what is the moral, constitutional and legal roadblock for the bill? It is the principle of innocent until proven guilty that not only runs at large not only throughout our criminal justice system but also our Constitution.

Where is this enshrined? Article 20 (3) of the Constitution states that no person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Article 22(5) states that when any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order.. This means that the Constitution protects an individual against the excesses of the state and places the burden on the state to prove the guilty nature of a person.

Surely, there are some situations in which the system allows for violation of liberty of individuals like remand. However, these are not the same as an automatic removal of a Constitutional post because they are not as disruptive i.e., if a person is sent to judicial custody, they can come back and resume their daily life, which is not the case with a Chief Minister who would have been removed from office. The consistent affirmation of—bail is the rule and jail is the exception— also stresses how important the liberty of an individual is when they are not convicted. In this paradigm, it is not only perplexing but also dangerous that there is a bill which will have ministers vacate their posts once they are detained for over 30 days.

One might argue saying “what good is a chief minister if she cannot claim her post back after she is released from jail?” In the material reality of electoral bonds-electoral trusts, electoral betrayals and weaponisation of investigation agencies, we have seen the nephew double crossing the uncle, loyal ministers splitting the parties, and daughters and sisters choosing their own political journeys in opposition to their prior family-run parties. It is therefore unreasonable to expect a smooth transition of power back to the CM who would have been removed from the post while in detainment.

Under these conditions, the only purpose of the 130th Constitutional amendment bill, if effectuated, would be to increase the entropy in the Indian political arena giving an undue advantage to the already powerful forces thus weakening democratic values.

The 130th Constitutional Amendment Bill may appear to address the issue of morality in politics by disqualifying ministers and chief ministers in custody, but the real constitutional betrayal lies elsewhere—in the brazen practice of horse trading. The trading of MLAs, and the consequent toppling of elected governments, represents a far deeper threat to the democratic fabric than undertrial ministers continuing in office. The bill’s failure to address this crisis is its most glaring omission.

The Real Crisis: Horse Trading of MLAs

Since the late 1960s, India has been plagued by defections that de-stabilise governments. Legislators elected on one party’s mandate have frequently crossed over, often lured by ministerial berths or financial inducements. The 10th Schedule of the Constitution, introduced through the 52nd Amendment in 1985, was meant to curb this menace. It provided for disqualification of legislators who defected. Yet, over time, political ingenuity and judicial loopholes hollowed out this protection. Mass defections have been disguised as “mergers” or orchestrated through resignations, effectively bypassing disqualification. Recent instances in Karnataka (2019), Madhya Pradesh (2020), and Maharashtra (2022) show how easily voter mandates can be overturned without an election.

This practice amounts to a constitutional betrayal because it robs citizens of the government they elected. The principle of fixed terms under Article 172 and the collective responsibility of the cabinet under Article 164 become meaningless when MLAs can be purchased or coerced into changing sides.

Why Horse Trading is More Dangerous than Imprisonment of Ministers

The bill focuses on removing ministers in custody, but that is not the core threat to democratic stability. A minister’s detention is temporary, and in most cases, they can return to office upon acquittal or release. In contrast, once a government falls due to horse trading, the mandate is lost permanently. New governments formed in this way lack legitimacy, as they do not represent the electorate’s choice but the outcome of clandestine deals.

Furthermore, horse trading weaponises money power and state machinery. Political financiers and investigating agencies become decisive players in engineering defections, corroding not just the executive but the very legitimacy of the legislature. Compared to this, ministers in custody pose a minor problem, already addressed by the Representation of People Act, 1951, which disqualifies convicted politicians from contesting elections.

The Missing Reform: Strengthening Anti-Defection Laws

The true reform needed is strengthening the 10th Schedule. Measures could include transferring adjudication of defection cases from partisan Speakers to an independent tribunal, mandating swift decisions within fixed timelines, and eliminating the “merger” loophole. Yet, recent events show that without stronger provisions, defections will continue unchecked. Genuine constitutional morality requires insulating legislatures from the corrosive influence of money and coercion.

Constitutional Morality and Silence on Defections

By remaining silent on horse trading, the 130th Amendment Bill betrays the very morality it claims to defend. Constitutional morality requires that institutions preserve the sovereignty of the people’s mandate. When elected governments are brought down through defections, the Constitution’s promise of representative democracy is subverted. By focusing on ministers in custody while ignoring defections, the bill diverts attention from the true crisis, cloaking inaction with a veneer of reform.

Conclusion
The true constitutional challenge today is not ministers under detention but the erosion of electoral mandates through horse trading. The spectacle of governments being bought and sold has disillusioned voters, hollowed legislatures, and de-stabilised governance. The 130th Amendment Bill, by ignoring this issue, amounts to a constitutional sleight of hand—a cosmetic reform that strengthens the hand of ruling powers without addressing democratic instability. Strengthening anti-defection provisions and safeguarding legislatures from inducement and coercion is the urgent constitutional reform India needs. Anything less is betrayal of the democratic spirit and the people’s trust.

(The author is part of the legal research team of the organisation)

Related:

SC acquits two men accused of rape of a minor; terms the case an example of shabby and lacklustre investigation

Liberty, Evidence and Cooperation: A legal analysis of Jugraj v. State of Punjab

A Proposal on Collegium Resolutions: Towards a single comprehensive format

The post Smoke & Mirrors, 130th Constitution Amendment Bill: Real issue is the trading of MLAs appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Social media posts suggested there was “forced conversion” or “religious mixing” happening, resulting in vigilante groups mobilising and police quickly intervening — not against the aggressors, but against individuals accused of converting others. In several districts, including Alwar, Dungarpur, and Jaipur, the people abusing Christians worked with police and other authorities, a relationship that demonstrated their collusion. The accounts below follow this trajectory — from Alwar and Dungarpur’s early raids to the violence reported in Jaipur’s Pratap Nagar — and how an entire month was essentially practice for institutionalised religious surveillance and social exclusion.

Gelota, Alwar (MIA Thana, Alwar district)

Police conducted a raid on September 3 on a hostel for children that allegedly housed approximately 25 poor children run by a missionary in Galota (Udyog Nagar locality). The police action followed a complaint filed by a VHP activist alleged that a “conversion” was underway. The police reportedly confiscated literature, a FIR was filed; the police arrested two hostel staffers—listed in the log as Amrit (a teacher) and Sonu Rai (press reports also identify her as Sonu Singh/Garasia)—and detained them in judicial custody. Reports indicate that local Sangh affiliate groups (VHP/Bajrang Dal) coerced the authorities into arresting. Media reporting addresses the arrest and the police case; civil society groups who monitor the case remark that it is the first in a spate of incidents after the anti-conversion bill was introduced.

Khetolai Village (Bhabru Thana), Kotputli-Behror District

On September 9, less than an hour after the anti-conversion legislation was introduced in the Assembly, officers arrived on the property of a house in the family of brothers Vikram and Rajendra Kanav, who host their own satsang/prayer meetings. The brothers state they were told, rather explicitly, not to hold prayer sessions with outsiders, then were brought to the police station and interrogated, finally being coerced into signing a form, or written undertaking, indicating they would not hold their satsangs and would not “invite outsiders” to their home. The brothers’ account of the incident follows a trend being run in the community by local Sangh activists (identified in the log as Shri Ram Samiti), who have consistently threatened this family in various ways. Complaints were made, in writing, not only to the SP but also to other organizations such as the PUCL.

Paota (Pragpura Thana), Kotputli-Behror district

A similar incident took place in Paota on September 9. Believer Gajanand Kuldeep stated that the next morning after the Bill passed, the SHO summoned him, stating that if he hosted prayers, meals, or called people outside again, he would be arrested. He testified that he was forced to sign a document that indicated he would stop doing this activity. Like the Khetolai incident, PUCL passed his application on to the SP, and was kept on the record as an example of coercive policing as part of wider harassment following the Bill introduction.

Jhelana, Bichiwada, Dungarpur District

Local Hindu sangathans and a Sant Samaj group protested outside a minority-run school and its church ahead of the scheduled prayer service on September 10, claiming the school was a site for the conversion of Adivasi students and parents. Police arrived in significant numbers; the school maintained that it is a minority-run educational institution and denied that there had been any conversion activity. The incident intensified tensions, but no FIR was filed in relation to the protest. The account refers to this as an incident as an event of communal mobilization involving pressure from authorities on students and staff in the school community.

In a separate case in Durgapur on the same date, an Adivasi organiser with a local mazdoor sangathan said she was stopped on the road and verbally threatened by VHP/Bajrang Dal activists who accused her organisation of “converting Adivasis.” Also, the landlord of the office supposedly threatened to evict them. The organiser described it as demoralising and reported that a formal complaint was being prepared, and civil society groups mentioned that this harassment was part of the broader campaign.

St Paul’s Hostel School, Patela, Dungarpur City

On September 11, after investigation and complaints, including a health inspection in early 2023, the district authorities responded to complaints (made by the ABVP and others) by issuing an order to close the hostel/school for alleged record-keeping and sanitation infractions. The Child Welfare Committee, in collaboration with district education and administration personnel, whisked away 230 children to their families; the authorities issued show-cause notices and initiated proceedings under the JJ Act against the school authorities. The staff contends that the closure is a result of pressure from right-wing student groups and has displaced the school kids and staff; reports are that the school is seeking legal remedies to restore the school to operation.

Chak-6P hostel school (Anupgarh, Sri Ganganagar district)

On September 16, an incident log entry reported a nocturnal attack on a hostel school for orphans: students and adult supervisors were said to be frightened by an enterprising attack on the site in the middle of the night. The log entry does not provide many public details but lists the incident as one of a multitude of attacks aimed at Christian institutions in the district. Similarly, civil society narratives identify hostel attacks as part of a continuation of incidents.

Ward No. 14, Anupgarh Thana (District: Sri Ganganagar)

A local citizen complained on September 17, stating that a person who lived in the area (whom we cannot identify in the log) had been “converted” as per missionary activity; the Vishwa Hindu Parishad filed a police complaint in support of this local citizen. The officer of the law arrested two persons, associated with a missionary prayer group, by the names of Polus Barjao and Aryan, and began an investigation to ascertain the degree of conversion processes. It was reported that a third person (the landlord) was in hiding from police arrest. The two arrested were later remanded and put into judicial custody; the case file states the Indian police were undertaking active investigations into conversion processes, as per the FIR filed by the VHP.

Pratap Nagar (Sector 08/82/625), Jaipur (Rajasthan)

On September 21, approximately 40–50 Bajrang Dal activists allegedly entered a private residence where Pastor Bobas Daniel was conducting a prayer meeting of about 15–26 people. According to local sources, the Bajrang Dal group locked the doors, broke items, and physically assaulted congregants. Neighbors, including a pregnant woman and the landlady, attempted to intervene to protect the victims, but allegedly were beaten themselves. Victims state that eight were injured; the police filed the FIR only after lengthy protests and community pressure for accountability. Locals expressed concerns over delayed police responses, no prompt documentation from medical professionals, and failure to arrest persons who assaulted congregants, despite eyewitness evidence provided by victims. Media accounts confirmed both the attack and the delay of police response.

On September 23, 2025 — Hindustan Bible Institute (HBI), Pratap Nagar, Jaipur (Rajasthan)

Almost 50 Bajrang Dal activists surrounded the campus of HBI after a visit from two visiting staff members from the head office of HBI. The protesters were targeting HBI due to accusations of “forced conversions” of members of a local church. Police officers escorted the visitors from out of state to the police station after probable cause occurred from the protests. The mobile devices, Aadhaar cards, and property documents were confiscated from visitors and some local staff, and the property of the institute was detained. Guests left the facility for the night but were there after civil society intervened, although some devices and property papers were withheld. Civil society groups described the detainment as broad and the lack of property restoration as violations of their freedom of movement and association, and also demanded the immediate restoration of property and arrest of the perpetrators. National and international news services reported on the incident; civil society organized delegations to meet with senior officers and issued joint statements condemning the attacks.

Engineered Vigilantism and the Mechanics of Fear

In September 2025, an evident and purposeful pattern of inciting violence against Christians was followed. Most incidents started with rumours of “forced conversions”, often transmitted via WhatsApp groups or VHP, Bajrang Dal, or ABVP local units, targeting schools and hostels run by Christians or prayer gatherings. These allegations served as incitement to coordinated raids, mob assemblies, and police involvement, all as a rubric of vigilance. Many of the same incidents occurred across Alwar, Dungarpur, Anupgarh, and Jaipur. Pastors in Alwar and Kotputli-Behror were summoned and pressured into signing undertakings not to pray. Groups on the right stormed educational and welfare institutions for Adivasi and Dalit children in Dungarpur and Anupgarh, accusing them of “conversion through education”. The apex of these events occurred in Jaipur’s Pratap Nagar, where a mob assaulted those attending prayer, kicked several women, and destroyed public and private property while police sat by or arrived late.

Such violence was rarely spontaneous. The same three steps were followed: rumour being spread, mob assembly, and state validation of the violence through a raid or a politically motivated delay in filing an FIR. Even if the violence ended quickly, the intimidation and coercion continued – everything from pastors suspended from conducting worship, to schools sealed, to social workers leaving in fear.

While Rajasthan represented the focal point, the scenario reflected a national agenda. When combining repeat attacks by Hindutva affiliates with the targeting of marginalized groups, this wasn’t simply random aggression, but a more comprehensive policy of surveillance and social exclusion acted along with administrative acquiescence and ideological consensus.

The Rhetoric of Conversion and Cultural Purity

At the core of these campaigns rests a control ideology – an ideology that sees religious diversity as a danger, and that views women, Dalits, and Adivasis as “vulnerable bodies” who need to be protected from conversion. The rhetoric here is reminiscent of the more familiar tropes of Hindutva propaganda: the notion that Christian charity disguises “mass conversions,” that western forces undermine Indian culture, and that Hindu identity must be “defended” under the watchful gaze of vigilantism. The word “conversion” operates much like “love jihad” in anti-Muslim rhetoric – shorthand for cultural invasion and the fear of demographic change. However, the terms of conversion are also intended to implicate Christian schools and welfare Institutions in “Westernising” India’s poor through education and through care, thus recasting social uplift as social subversion. With the most recent incidents in September as one instance, foreign and local pastors were referred to as “agents.” New believers became “traitors,” and Christian education was labelled as “mental colonisation.” Such language comes out of Far-Right narratives and foretells danger while dehumanizing the minority population. Such language, too, perversely renders violence a moral obligation.

These narratives are meant to reinforce (and reproduce) caste hierarchies, wherein Dalit and Adivasi populations are painted as “vulnerable to corruption,” while maintaining caste(s) boundaries of purity-pollution under the guise of religion. The institutional forces of religion, caste, and nationalism become a single ideological and controlling matrix, which is central to Hindutva mobilisation.

In the end, it is political, not religious. As elections approach, “conversion panic” tells the story of a group working to unite the base and distract from the failures of governance. By presenting Christians as controlling the marginalized and suspicious, those invoking conversion panic can generate both moral panic and political capital, repurposing faith-based fear into electoral gold.

Silence, Complicity, and the Erosion of Protection

If there is a pattern that is as troubling as the violence itself, it is the silence—or worse, complicity—of the machinery of the state itself. All over Rajasthan, police responded to violence against Christians with bias, siding with aggressors over victims. In Alwar and Ktputli-Behror, officers pressured Christian pastoralists to sign undertakings prohibiting worship rather than offering protective services. In Dungarpur, Christian schools and hostels were invaded by police, who conducted raids without warrants, sometimes only after complaints from VHP or Bajrang Dal workers. In Pratap Nagar, Jaipur, women were assaulted and prayer halls were vandalised without the police filing any FIRs against the perpetrators. Instead, those praying were questioned as to their “conversion motives,” effectively treating them as suspects in their own community.

This pattern demonstrates not only bureaucratic indifference but collusion between law enforcement and vigilante groups. Normative lines of state duty have blurred with the mood of majoritarian sentiments in ways that create a situation of fear, putting Christians in the position of suspicion. By repeating the language of “conversion vigilance,” police and district officials not only create confusion around maintaining civic responsibility, but they also license mob violence in the name of duty.

The overall consequence is that constitutional protection is slowly torn asunder. Article 25 protects freedom of religion; Article 21 protects dignity and freedom. But the rights are now conditional – subject to majority privilege. The events of September 2025 show that when the state becomes a mechanism of ideological enforcement rather than neutrality and fairness in justice, citizenship itself becomes stratified based on faith. Unless there is accountability and equal protection can be guaranteed under the law, the glamorized promise of secular democracy will be meaningless but abiding, while hate will continue to loom under the guise of law and order.

(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this resource has been worked on by Preksha Bothara)

Related:

A week of escalating persecution: Far-right Hindu groups target Christian gatherings in India

The Anti-Conversion Law of Rajasthan: A threat to individual liberty and religious freedom

“Anti-conversion laws being weaponised”: CJP seeks interim relief against misuse of anti-conversion laws

Everyday Atrocity: Mapping the normalisation of violence against Dalits and Adivasis in 2025

Anti-Christians Widespread hate events on the eve of X’mas, Punjab, UP, Kerala, Rajasthan

The post September of Fear: Targeted Violence against Christians in Rajasthan exposes pattern of harassment after Anti-Conversion Bill appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The Indian Express reported that the video shows a man seated on a chair gripping a young boy by his hair, tearing out handfuls of it, and throwing the hair into a dustbin — all while laughing. The boy, visibly terrified, pleads for the abuse to stop. The person seen committing the act has been identified as a sanitation worker employed at the station, while the video was allegedly filmed by a police constable posted there.

Police have now registered an FIR under multiple provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) — including Section 115(2) (voluntarily causing hurt), Section 198 (willful disobedience of law with intent to cause injury), and Section 54 (abetment while present). The case also invokes Section 75 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, which criminalises cruelty towards a child, according to The Indian Express.

The incident and the complaint

According to the FIR, the incident occurred last month after the boy — a minor — was detained in an assault case. The complaint, filed by his grandmother, states that he had been picked up by the police following a neighbourhood altercation that left one person injured in an alleged knife attack. The police then detained the boy and subsequently sent him to a juvenile remand home, where he remained for about 16–17 days before being released, as per Indian Express.

Initially, the youth did not disclose the abuse he suffered in custody. His grandmother told The Indian Express that he became withdrawn and fearful after being released. It was only when the video surfaced on social media several weeks later that he revealed the truth — that during his detention, he was humiliated, beaten, and had his hair forcibly pulled out while police officers looked on and one recorded the act on his phone.

The grandmother then approached community leaders for help, and together they drafted a formal complaint. This complaint named four persons: the sanitation worker, the constable, the station’s police inspector, and an Assistant Commissioner of Police (ACP).

Community intervention and representation

Mujahid Nafees, Convener of the Minority Coordination Committee (MCC), wrote to Gujarat DGP Vikas Sahay on behalf of the family, demanding immediate disciplinary and criminal action against the officers involved. The application was formally forwarded to Rajkot Police Commissioner Brajesh Kumar Jha, reported The Indian Express.

With the assistance of local community members, the youth’s grandmother also submitted a separate written representation to the Police Commissioner. However, when the FIR was finally registered, it named only two accused — the constable and the sanitation worker — omitting the senior officers originally mentioned.

According to sources close to the family, reported The Indian Express, the police presented what they described as “convincing evidence” that both the Inspector and ACP were not present at the police station when the incident occurred. This led to their exclusion from the FIR, though activists have criticised the decision as premature and lacking transparency.

Official statements and inquiry

When contacted, Rajkot City Police Commissioner Brajesh Kumar Jha was unavailable for comment. DCP Zone-2 Rakesh Desai told The Indian Express that the FIR had been filed based on the grandmother’s complaint. “In the case of the video of a minor whose hair is being pulled out, his grandmother has given a complaint and we have filed an FIR,” Desai said. “The accused police constable has been transferred to headquarters, and the sanitation worker has been removed from his job.”

When asked about the inspector and ACP who were named in the initial complaint but not in the FIR, DCP Desai said, “Our inquiry has found that they were not involved.”

The preliminary inquiry has now been assigned to ACP (West) Radhika Bharai, who confirmed to The Indian Express that she has recorded statements from all involved and will submit her final report shortly. The criminal investigation into the FIR will be handled by a Police Sub-Inspector from another chowki under the same jurisdiction to ensure impartiality.

A second case of custodial torture against a minor

This latest incident in Rajkot comes on the heels of another horrifying case from Botad district, Gujarat, where four police constables were booked for the alleged torture and sexual assault of a 17-year-old boy in custody in August 2025. The case has attracted national attention due to the boy’s critical condition and the Supreme Court’s involvement.

According to the report of LiveLaw, the sister of the victim filed a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution before the Supreme Court, seeking an investigation by a Special Investigation Team (SIT) or the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). As provided in the petition, the boy was picked up by police officers of Botad Town on August 19, 2025, from a local fair on suspicion of theft. He was illegally detained for over nine days — from August 19 to August 28 — during which he was brutally assaulted and sexually abused by four to six officers.

The plea alleged multiple violations of procedural law:

• The minor was not produced before a Juvenile Justice Board or magistrate within 24 hours,
• No medical examination was conducted,
• His grandfather was also detained and tortured, and
• Officials later attempted to coerce the family into signing false statements.

On September 1, as per Bar & Bench, police told the family that the boy was suffering from an “insect bite” and required specialised medical attention. He was transferred to Zydus Hospital, Ahmedabad, where doctors found that he had suffered severe kidney damage requiring dialysis, temporary blindness, and seizures resulting from trauma.

The petition further stated that the boy remained in the ICU, and during this time, police officials allegedly forced his signature on certain documents and compelled family members to sign papers claiming that his injuries were due to a bicycle fall. The hospital refused to share the toxicology report or medical details with the family.

Supreme Court’s directions

The matter reached the Supreme Court in early October. A bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta heard the petition on October 7, 2025. As per LiveLaw, the bench refused to entertain the case directly, directing the petitioner to first approach the Gujarat High Court for relief.

Justice Nath observed: “Our sympathy is with your case, but the proper way is to go to the High Court.” Justice Mehta added that the petitioner could return to the Supreme Court if the High Court failed to take adequate steps.

The petitioner’s lawyer, pleaded for urgent directions to preserve the CCTV footage of the police station and to constitute a medical board from AIIMS, citing fears that crucial evidence might be destroyed. The Court, however, declined to issue immediate orders, stating, “It won’t be destroyed if you go to the High Court timely.”

Civil society response and pattern of abuse

The Minority Coordination Committee (MCC), which has taken up both the Rajkot and Botad cases, has called for the immediate suspension of the accused officers, registration of additional offences under custodial violence statutes, and judicial monitoring of the investigations.

Human rights advocates and legal experts have expressed grave concern over the emerging pattern of police violence against minors, particularly Muslim youth from marginalized backgrounds. They point out that both cases involve illegal detention, denial of medical access, and attempts at cover-up, indicating a culture of impunity within the state’s policing system.

Bhatt, who represented the Botad victim’s family, told Bar & Bench that these incidents “demonstrate a systemic disregard for due process and a chilling normalisation of custodial violence against minors.”

Conclusion: The urgency of accountability

The two back-to-back incidents — in Rajkot and Botad — lay bare a disturbing continuity of abuse within Gujarat’s police system, particularly against young Muslim males. Both cases reveal a pattern of dehumanizing violence, institutional protectionism, and token disciplinary actions that stop short of real accountability.

While Rajkot police have limited their action to transferring one constable and dismissing a sanitation worker, such cosmetic measures do little to restore public faith. Rights organizations have called for:

• Independent investigations under judicial supervision,
• Immediate forensic preservation of CCTV footage and medical records,
• Prosecution of officers under sections related to custodial torture and juvenile protection, and
• Oversight by the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC)

As has been documented, these incidents are not isolated excesses — they are symptoms of a systemic crisis. Unless the Gujarat government ensures structural accountability and enforces zero tolerance for custodial brutality, these cases will fade into the familiar pattern of viral outrage followed by institutional silence.

Related:

CJP files complaint to Maharashtra DGP, SP Jalgaon over police participation in communal rally amid Suleman Pathan lynching probe

Cuttack plunged into chaos during Durga Puja, dozens injured as procession clashes spiral into violence

NBDSA pulls up India TV for communal, one-sided broadcast; upholds CJP complaint against broadcast

The Politics of Memory: Controversy over graves of Afzal Guru and Maqbool Bhatt

The post Second Case in a Month: Another minor alleges torture in Gujarat police custody, cop and sanitation worker booked appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The appellants, Putai (Accused No. 1) and Dileep (Accused No. 2), were convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Lucknow, on March 14, 2014, for offences under Sections 376(2)(g) (gang rape), 302 (murder), and 201 (destruction of evidence) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). Putai was sentenced to death for the offense under Section 302 IPC, alongside rigorous life imprisonment for gang rape and seven years of rigorous imprisonment for destruction of evidence. Dileep received rigorous life imprisonment for both murder and gang rape. The Allahabad High Court subsequently confirmed Putai’s death penalty and dismissed the appeals on October 11, 2018.

The Supreme Court’s verdict to acquit the appellants, who had spent over a decade in custody, stands as an indictment of a criminal justice process plagued by systemic frailties, procedural negligence, and some parts of evidence characterized by the apex court as being “a piece of trash paper” due to no procedure having been followed. This article conducts an analysis of the Putai case, using it as a lens to expose the collapse of the evidentiary framework and the critical need for institutional accountability, particularly in capital punishment cases resting solely on circumstantial evidence.

Section I: The Collapse of the Evidentiary Framework: Circumstantial Evidence and the Burden of Proof

The prosecution’s case against Putai and Dileep was based on circumstantial evidence. In such trials, Indian jurisprudence requires an exceptionally high standard of proof, famously articulated in the Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra precedent, which demands the establishment of five “golden principles.” These principles mandate that the circumstances forming the conclusion of guilt must be fully established, must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the accused’s guilt, must be of a conclusive nature, must exclude every hypothesis except the one to be proved, and must form a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused.

The Supreme Court, applying this rigorous standard, found that the prosecution in Putai failed to meet this high threshold at every turn. The Court recognised the critical distinction between circumstances that “may be proved” and those that “must be proved,” emphasising that the legal distance between the two “is small but has to be travelled before the prosecution can seek conviction of the accused”.[1]

A. The Failure to Establish Incriminating Circumstances

The prosecution sought to link Putai to the crime based on three core circumstantial elements: the recovery of the victim’s articles, the suspicious conduct of the accused, and the DNA evidence.

1. Dubious Recovery of Articles: The personal articles of the child victim—chappals, a water canister, and an underwear—were found in a field, which accused No. 1, Putai, was cultivating. While the State argued that this shifted the burden onto Putai to explain the circumstances under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the Court found the recovery itself doubtful.[2]

The father, Munna, in his initial complaint, mentioned finding the chappals, water canister, and blood stains, but was totally silent regarding the recovery of the victim’s underwear. The Court found it “impossible to believe” that the search party, which included the victim’s father and others would have noticed the minor details like the chappals and water canister, yet missed the underwear in the same field. This omission was deemed “far too significant to be overlooked”.[3] The Supreme Court concluded that the recovery of the underwear seemed to be a “planted recovery and a creation by the Investigating Officer intended to give succour to the prosecution case”.[4]

2. The Sniffer Dog Theory against Dileep: The prosecution’s case against accused No. 2, Dileep largely rested on the claim that a small male comb was recovered from a field, and a sniffer dog, after smelling the comb, led the police to Dileep’s house. The Court stated that this theory is “shrouded in a cloud of doubt and unacceptable on the face of record”.[5]

• Contradictory Identification: Multiple prosecution witnesses offered starkly conflicting testimonies regarding the comb’s colour: one said bluish-green, another said dirty and light red, another said sky-blue, and Investigating Officer said green. These contrasting versions made the recovery itself doubtful.
• Implausible Linkage: The claim that witnesses could identify the comb, an ordinary plastic item, as belonging to Dileep simply because they had seen him using it was found to be “absolutely farfetched and unbelievable”. The Court viewed this insistence as a “strong indicator” that the prosecution was “hell bent upon implicating the accused No. 2-Dileep in this case by hook or by crook”.[6]
• Procedural Failure: The entire sniffer dog procedure lacked contemporary documentation. Furthermore, the Investigating Officer claimed he had immediately sealed the comb at the spot, which logically meant it could not have been available for the sniffer dog to smell, rendering the entire theory unworthy of credence.

3. Suspicious Conduct of Putai: The High Court and Trial Court treated the testimony the victim’s mother, as incriminating. She claimed to have seen Putai rushing into his house, washing his hands and face, changing his clothes, and then going away on his cycle without inquiring about the commotion regarding the missing child.

The Supreme Court firmly rejected the inference of guilt. The Court observed that washing hands and changing clothes after returning from work was “absolutely natural” behaviour for a labourer or farmer, and would not raise suspicion.[7] Furthermore, Putai’s explanation in his Section 313 CrPC statement—that his parents were ill and hospitalised—provided an innocent context for his haste and preoccupation, a fact admitted by the victim’s in cross-examination.[8]

Section II: The Forensic Catastrophe: DNA Evidence and the Broken Chain of Custody

The handling of forensic evidence in the Putai case was so flawed that the Supreme Court described the resulting reports as “a piece of trash paper” and concluded they “pale into insignificance”. This systematic failure reveals catastrophic lapses in collection, preservation, and analysis that fall far short of established international standards.[9]

A. Inadmissible and Contradictory DNA Reports

The first DNA examination report dated January 18, 2014 was inconclusive, merely stating that a “male specific allele” was found in the victim’s slide and swab, with no opinion regarding the blood samples of Putai and Dileep.

Years later, during the High Court appeal, the prosecution produced a supplementary DNA report (dated December 2, 2014) via an affidavit dated April 12, 2017. This new report, generated using Y-Filer Kit and HID Kit tests, contradictorily claimed that the material from the victim’s slide matched the allele profiles of both Putai and Dileep.

The Supreme Court found this supplementary report to be “inconsequential and inadmissible” due to a host of fatal procedural flaws:

1. Denial of Rebuttal: The supplementary DNA report was never put to the accused-appellants under Section 313 CrPC, denying them the statutory right to explain or rebut the new incriminating material.[10]
2. Unexamined Expert: The scientific expert, who issued the reports, was not recalled or re-examined on oath to prove the contradictory supplementary report.[11]
3. Improper Use of Affidavit: The supplementary report was tendered via the affidavit of an officer (Deputy Director, FSL, Lucknow) who was not connected with the issuance of the report. The Court clarified that the DNA report is a substantive piece of evidence, not merely formal, and thus could not be tendered in evidence through an affidavit under Section 293 of the CrPC (now Section 329 of the BNSS, 2023).[12]
4. Breach of Sanctity: Given that the scientific expert did not state that any forensic material was preserved for further examination after the first report, the Court presumed the samples must have been opened or consumed. Once the samples were opened, their sanctity was breached, rendering any subsequent supplementary analysis unreliable.[13]

B. The Catastrophic Breakdown of the Chain of Custody

The most critical failure was the complete absence of proof regarding the chain of custody, which is essential to guarantee that evidence has not been contaminated or tampered with.[14] The specific failures were comprehensive:

• Collection Procedure: The blood samples of the accused were collected on November 26, 2012, nearly two and a half months after their arrest on September 7, 2012. The prosecution failed to provide any oral evidence or exhibit any document to prove the procedure, date, or time of drawing these blood samples.
• Consent: Although consent of the accused-appellants was purportedly taken before drawing the samples, no document proving such consent was exhibited in evidence.
• Post-mortem Samples Discrepancy: The medical professionals provided contradictory evidence regarding the collection of samples from the victim’s body. One stated she took two vaginal swabs and two smear slides but did not mention sealing them or the date of transmission. Another stated he took eight slides of smear and swabs, and claimed they were seized, sealed, and handed over to Constables. However, he failed to prove any document pertaining to this procedure, such as a memorandum of sealing.
• Transmission and Storage: The prosecution failed to examine the official(s) who carried the samples to the FSL or the malkhana (evidence room) In-charge.

Critically, not a single document pertaining to the safe keeping or transmission of the samples—including the malkhana register, roznamcha entry, forwarding letter, or the receipt issued from the FSL—was exhibited during the trial.

The Court concluded that the failure to prove the relevant documentation for collection and the “total lack of evidence regarding the chain of custody” of the blood samples made the entire exercise “farce and frivolous.”

Section III: A System on Trial: Investigative Incompetence and the Crisis of Accountability

The final acquittal was not merely due to weak evidence, but was a direct consequence of what the Supreme Court deemed a “lacklustre and shabby investigation and so also laconic trial procedure”. This institutional failure crippled the search for truth from the very outset.[15]

A. A Catalogue of Critical Investigative Omissions

The Court identified several fundamental errors that demonstrated either gross incompetence or deliberate fabrication:

• Failure to Send Crucial Evidence to FSL: The Investigating Officer seized the victim’s clothes, including the frock and the underwear, but inexplicably did not forward these crucial articles to the FSL for scientific analysis. The Court found it surprising that in a case of sexual assault and murder, the IO did not send these articles, giving rise to a “strong suspicion that the recovery of these articles was a planted recovery”.
• Failure to Search Accused’s House: Despite the prosecution’s own theory that Putai rushed home and changed his clothes, no extensive search of the accused-appellants’ house was made to look for incriminating evidence. This omission reinforced the Court’s view that the ‘suspicious conduct’ theory was an “exaggeration”.[16]
• Failure to Examine Neighbours: The incident occurred in open fields, accessible to “all and sundry”. Although the incident happened between 7:00 PM and 8:00 PM when darkness was beginning to fall, the police did not care to examine anyone from the neighbouring fields or locality. This failure created doubt regarding the bona fides of the police actions.[17]
• Failure to Identify Material Objects: The material objects (clothes, etc.) were exhibited in the evidence of the Investigating Officer, but were never shown to the victim’s parents, Munna and Chandravati, for identification when they testified.[18]

B. Capital Punishment and the Constitutional Imperative

The fact that Putai was awarded and confirmed a death sentence on the basis of such flimsy evidence demonstrates the profound risk within India’s capital punishment regime. The irreversible nature of the death penalty demands that it only be imposed in the “rarest of rare” cases, based on unimpeachable, cogent evidence. The Putai case serves as a terrifying example of how investigative incompetence and flawed judicial scrutiny at the lower court levels can lead to the gravest miscarriage of justice by extinguishing a human life irretrievably.

C. The Double Tragedy: Denial of Justice for the Victim

While the acquittal corrected the injustice against the accused, it simultaneously constitutes a a tragic failure of justice for the minor child victim and her family. The gruesome act of rape and murder remains unsolved. The investigation not only failed to secure a conviction but also likely destroyed the possibility of ever identifying and prosecuting the actual perpetrator.

This situation results in a “secondary victimisation” of the family, who are left without closure or justice, their faith in the system shattered due to institutional incompetence. The acquittal, in this context, is not an endpoint of justice but a marker of its complete absence, proving that a flawed investigation is the antithesis of both the accused’s right to a fair trial and the victim’s right to meaningful justice.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court demonstrated that the conviction, upheld by two lower courts, rested on a foundation of conjectures and procedural violations, where the fundamental principles governing circumstantial evidence were ignored and scientific evidence, vital in such cases, was rendered “worthless” due to an absolute lack of procedural rigor.

However, the tragedy of Putai lies in its double failure: it subjected the accused to a decade-long ordeal under the shadow of the death penalty, while simultaneously failing the minor victim and her family by making the accountability of the actual assailant impossible. The judgment is an urgent call for systemic overhaul. True justice for both the innocent accused and the grieving victim can only be achieved through a system built on a bedrock of scientific integrity, rigorous adherence to procedure, and unwavering accountability for all institutional actors.

(The author is part of the legal research team of the organisation)

[1] Para 69

[2] Para 37

[3] Para 43

[4] Para 56

[5] Para 36

[6] Para 38

[7] Para 32

[8] Para 35

[9] Para 75

[10] Para 66

[11] Para 66

[12] Para 75

[13] Para 64

[14] Para 65

[15] Para 73

[16] Para 71

[17] Para 74

[18] Para 68

Related:

Liberty, Evidence and Cooperation: A legal analysis of Jugraj v. State of Punjab

A Proposal on Collegium Resolutions: Towards a single comprehensive format

Free speech, even in bad taste, is protected if no incitement to violence: HP HC

The post SC acquits two men accused of rape of a minor; terms the case an example of shabby and lacklustre investigation appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The complaint, addressed to the DGP and copied to the Maharashtra Home Department and the National Human Rights Commission, argues that such conduct represents a gross violation of the oath of office, the Maharashtra Police Conduct Rules, and the constitutional principle of neutrality that underpins policing in a secular democracy.

CJP has urged immediate suspension of the concerned officers, transfer of the Suleman Pathan investigation to an independent agency, and a state-wide directive reaffirming police impartiality in communal and hate-crime cases.

The Crime: A lynching born of hate

On August 11, 2025, 20-year-old Suleman Khan Pathan, a resident of Betawad Khurd in Jalgaon’s Jamner taluka, was brutally lynched by a mob for being seen in a café with a Hindu girl. The café stands barely a minute’s walk from the local police station.

According to reports by Scroll.in, The Wire, Article 14, and NDTV, the mob dragged Suleman out, kidnapped and assaulted him for hours across multiple locations, and finally beat him to death in front of his family. His father, mother, and sister were also attacked when they tried to intervene.

The FIR, filed promptly under Sections 103(1) and 103(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (the mob-lynching provisions), named eight accused, four of whom — Aaditya Devre, Krushna Teli, Sojwal Teli, and Rishikesh Teli — were later confirmed to be active members of Shiv Pratisthan Hindustan, a Hindutva outfit led by Sambhaji Bhide, known for his anti-Muslim rhetoric and open rejection of India’s tricolour in favour of a saffron flag.

The accused were part of a local network that frequently mobilised against what they called “love jihad,” a discredited conspiracy theory used to demonise interfaith relationships.

The outfit and its ideology

Founded by Sambhaji Bhide in 1984, Shiv Pratisthan Hindustan has over the years built a reputation for hyper-nationalist, anti-constitutional, and communal rhetoric. Bhide’s speeches — including public calls to “chop down Muslim men” and to replace the tricolour with the saffron flag — have repeatedly drawn complaints under hate-speech provisions, though he has rarely faced legal consequences.

Investigations by Scroll.in and The Wire reveal that the outfit has actively expanded its base in northern Maharashtra, with hundreds of local youth being mobilised through cultural runs, martial displays, and social media campaigns steeped in communal imagery. Its members have glorified Suleman’s killers online, labelling the victim a “jihadi” and defending the lynching as “protection of Hindu women.”

The Procession: Police and accused ideologues march together

On Dussehra (October 2025), while the investigation into Suleman’s lynching was still ongoing, Jamner witnessed the Durga Mata Maha Daud — a massive public procession organised by Shiv Pratisthan Hindustan to mark the culmination of Navratri.

Thousands marched in saffron turbans, waving tridents, swords, and lathis, chanting incendiary slogans such as: “Durga ban, tu Kali ban, kabhi na burkhe wali ban” (Become Durga or Kali, but never a woman in a burkha.)

Among them were uniformed police officers, including Inspector Murlidhar Kasar, the original investigating officer in the Suleman lynching case. Videos published on social media show Kasar leading the procession, carrying the outfit’s saffron flag, and welcoming participants with tilaks and flower petals. The flag itself bore a plaque declaring it to be India’s “true national flag”, displaying a saffron map of “Akhand Bharat” that symbolically erases India’s constitutional tricolour. At that moment, the distinction between law enforcers and ideological actors collapsed entirely.

The video may be viewed here:

A betrayal of the police oath and constitutional duty

CJP’s complaint highlights that this conduct is a direct violation of the oath of office sworn by every Maharashtra Police officer — to “bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India” and to perform duties “without fear or favour, affection or ill-will.”

It also breaches the Maharashtra Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1979, particularly:

• Rule 3(1): Every government servant shall at all times maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty, and do nothing unbecoming of a government servant.
• Rule 5(1): No Government servant shall be a member of or be otherwise associated with, any political party or any organization which takes part in politics, nor shall he take part in, or subscribe in aid of, or assist in any other manner, any political movement or activity.
• Rule 24: No Government servant shall, by writing, speech or deed, or otherwise indulge in any activity which is likely to incite and create feelings of hatred or ill-will between different communities in India or religious, racial, regional, communal or other grounds.

By marching in uniform under a communal organisation’s banner, these officers have forfeited the appearance and substance of neutrality. As the complaint notes, “No investigation can be credible when the investigator marches beside those under investigation.” The police oath, the Constitution, and the spirit of secular law enforcement stand violated.

A compromised investigation

For the Pathan family, the participation of these officers has deepened their sense of betrayal.
They had earlier complained of intimidation, deliberate omissions in the FIR, and the police’s refusal to act on their statements naming key assailants. Now, with the same officers seen celebrating alongside members of the accused’s organisation, the family’s fears of bias have turned into certainty. They have indicated their intent to seek judicial monitoring of the case to ensure impartiality.

The legal and ethical context

The Supreme Court of India in Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India (2018) laid down a binding framework to combat mob lynching, directing that all investigations must be impartial, supervised, and shielded from communal influence. It further stated that any police officer found negligent or biased in such cases would face departmental and penal action.

CJP’s complaint invokes these guidelines, arguing that the conduct of the Jamner officers is in contempt of the Supreme Court’s directives and warrants immediate disciplinary inquiry.
It also references the National Police Commission’s Code of Ethics, which demands impartial behaviour and expressly forbids allowing personal or ideological beliefs to influence official actions.

CJP’s demands

In its submission to the DGP, CJP has sought the following immediate measures:

1. Suspension and departmental inquiry against all officers who participated in the Shiv Pratisthan rally, including Inspector Murlidhar Kasar;
2. Transfer of the Suleman Pathan lynching investigation to an independent agency such as the CID;
3. Public clarification from the Maharashtra Police regarding its position on the officers’ participation;
4. Statewide circular reaffirming that police personnel are prohibited from taking part in political, communal, or sectarian processions; and
5. Protection for Suleman’s family and witnesses, who have expressed fear and loss of faith in the current probe.

The Larger Issue: Policing and prejudice

Beyond the specifics of the Suleman case, the incident reflects a larger institutional drift where sections of the police appear to blur the line between law enforcement and ideological alignment. Maharashtra has, in recent years, witnessed a sharp rise in hate speech and communal offences — second only to Uttar Pradesh, according to India Hate Lab’s 2025 report.

In this environment, the neutrality of the police is not just desirable; it is existential.
A single image of an investigating officer carrying a saffron flag can undo decades of trust built between citizens and the state.

The complete complaint may be read here.

Image Courtesy: twitter.com

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The post CJP files complaint to Maharashtra DGP, SP Jalgaon over police participation in communal rally amid Suleman Pathan lynching probe appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Friday Night, October 3: The first clash

The unrest ignited around 1:30 a.m. on October 4, during the Durga idol immersion procession near Haathi Pokhari in the Dargha Bazar area, a predominantly Muslim neighbourhood known for its tight-knit interfaith community, as per Times of India. Residents objected to the loud music and provocative slogans, including repeated chants of “Jai Shri Ram,” accompanying the procession heading towards the Kathajodi river, as reported by India Today. Traditionally this slogan has no place during Durga Puja and has been perceived to be linked to an aggressive majoritarianism.

Minor verbal disagreements quickly escalated into violence. Stones and glass bottles were hurled from rooftops, injuring at least six people, including Deputy Commissioner of Police Khilari Rishikesh Dnyandeo, ANI reported. Local grocer Mohammad Asif told reporters that while the initial scuffle had been contained, “all of them were drunk. We pacified both groups, but it later escalated”, as per Hindustan Times. Rumours of Hindu fatalities circulating in the aftermath further inflamed passions, setting the stage for larger-scale clashes.

Six police personnel were injured in the initial violence, and six individuals from both communities were arrested, NDTV report states. The situation cast a pall over the city, reviving memories of past curfews, notably the last major shutdown during the Mandal Commission protests in 1991, as noted by former MLA Pravat Tripathy, according to Moneycontrol.

Sunday, October 5: VHP rally and widespread violence

Tensions further escalated on Sunday evening, October 5, when the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) organised a large motorcycle rally—allegedly numbering over 2,000 participants on more than 1,000 bikes—to protest the earlier Dargha Bazar clashes, as per India Today. Authorities had denied permission for the rally, citing concerns over law and order, but the organizers proceeded, intending to pass through the sensitive Dargha Bazar area. The permission granted for the route of the VHP rally has been questioned by right-thinking citizens.

Initially, police allowed the rallyists to assemble near the area. However, once law enforcement attempted to redirect them, the rally escalated into rampage and vandalism. Protesters stormed a local mall, vandalized shops—including mutton stalls, food joints, and general stores—and torched roadside establishments. Stone-pelting and clashes with police followed, leaving 25 people injured, including eight police officers, according to Hindustan Times.

Videos circulating on social media before the internet suspension showed plumes of smoke rising over the narrow lanes of Dargha Bazar, with police in riot gear forming barricades amid screams and sirens, as per India Today.

Government Response: Curfew, internet suspension, and law enforcement measures

In the aftermath of Sunday’s violence, the Odisha government responded with stringent measures:

• A 36-hour curfew across 13 police station jurisdictions, including Dargha Bazar, Mangalabag, Cantonment, Purighat, Lal Bagh, Bidanasi, Markat Nagar, CDA Phase 2, Malgodam, Badambadi, Jagatpur, Bayalis Mouza, and Sadar (ANI).
• Internet and social media suspension from 7 p.m. on October 5 to 7 p.m. on October 6, covering the Cuttack Municipal Corporation, Cuttack Development Authority, and 42 adjacent Mauza areas, to prevent the spread of provocative content and rumours (NDTV).
• Continuous flag marches, drone surveillance, and enhanced patrolling across the city’s sensitive areas (PTI).

Additional Police Commissioner Narasingha Bhola confirmed that eight people had been arrested, with more under detention, and investigations involving CCTV and drone footage were ongoing, reported ANI. The authorities emphasised that arrests would follow “proper examination of evidence”.

Revenue Divisional Commissioner Guha Poonam Tapas Kumar issued a warning: “All people who have tried to take the law into their own hands will be booked… Anybody who has tried to damage the social fabric will be taken to task”, reported NDTV.

Monday, October 6: VHP bandh and a fragile peace

In response to the immersion violence, the VHP declared a 12-hour bandh on Monday, October 6. Under a heavy police presence, the bandh passed off peacefully, highlighting the effectiveness of the curfew and security measures, as reported by The Indian Express. Local officials noted that while the streets remained quiet, the city was grappling with fear and uncertainty, with residents reluctant to venture outdoors.

Mayor Subhas Singh underlined Cuttack’s “unique culture of Hindus and Muslims living as brothers for generations”, and called on all citizens to protect this communal harmony, as per NDTV. Cuttack MP Bhartruhari Mahatab, BJD Chief Naveen Patnaik, Congress MLA Sophia Firdous, and Union Minister Dharmendra Pradhan issued repeated appeals for peace, stressing that rumours and inflammatory social media posts must be avoided, reported Hindustan Times.

ANI provided that several injured individuals from Friday and Sunday, including Pintu Mahar, Mukesh Mahar, Subhashree Jena, and Sankar Biswal, were treated and discharged, with the police clarifying that no fatalities had occurred.

Background: Communal sensitivities in Odisha

While Cuttack has historically been a model of interfaith coexistence, Odisha has witnessed a rise in communal tensions in recent years. Notable incidents include:

• Attacks on Christians and harassment of nuns (SabrangIndia)
• Clashes during processions in urban centres like Bhubaneswar, Sambalpur, and Cuttack (Deccan Herald).
• Property damage and arson during festivals, often exacerbated by rumours, demographic shifts, and political tensions (Hindustan Times).

The 2008 Kandhamal riots represent the most severe anti-Christian violence, but even post-2023, Hindu-Muslim tensions have increased. In 2024 alone, Odisha recorded an 84% rise in communal riots, resulting in 13 deaths, primarily among Muslims, Moneycontrol reported. The 2025 Cuttack disturbances underscore the vulnerabilities of religious processions in multi-religious urban settings. Small disputes—such as objections to music, slogans, or immersion routes—can quickly escalate if rumours or political mobilizations intervene.

Current Situation: Towards restoration of peace

As of October 7, Cuttack remains under curfew, and internet services have been extended to 7 p.m. on the same day, as per NDTV. Flag marches and intensive patrolling continue. Authorities have stressed that public cooperation is critical for restoring full normalcy.

Civil society leaders and residents expressed hope that Cuttack’s legacy of bhaichara (brotherhood) would be preserved through:

1. Strengthening law enforcement to prevent delayed or inadequate responses
2. Community engagement during festivals to foster trust and cooperation

1. Awareness campaigns to curb rumours and misinformation
2. Long-term measures addressing any fears of demographic shifts, economic inequalities, and resolving historical grievances

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The post Cuttack plunged into chaos during Durga Puja, dozens injured as procession clashes spiral into violence appeared first on SabrangIndia.

A courtroom disrupted

The usual morning mention round in Supreme Court’s Court No. 1 turned chaotic within minutes. At around 11:35 a.m., an advocate in full courtroom attire stood, removed a shoe (or attempted to unroll a bundle), and sought to throw it toward the bench. The act was accompanied by a sharp slogan that “Sanatan Dharam ka Apmaan Nahi Sahega Hindustan.”

Lawyers present have recalled that the object barely reached the dais — security moved swiftly. The man was escorted out, the session halted briefly, and then resumed. Chief Justice Gavai, visibly composed, turned to the next advocate and said “Don’t get distracted. We are not distracted by this.” With that, the Court proceeded as though unshaken.

The man in the robe: Rakesh Kishore

The person behind the outburst was soon identified: Advocate Rakesh Kishore, aged 71, enrolled in the Bar Council of Delhi in 2009. He held multiple bar cards — including the Supreme Court Bar Association, Shahdara Bar Association, and BCD, as reported

According to the Indian Express, Kishore resides in Mayur Vihar Phase 1, Delhi, and over the years has been associated with disputes relating to his housing society. Residents say elections in his society have not been held in recent times; complaints against him include one over an alleged assault of a senior citizen in 2021. The Delhi Police that functions under the direct control of India’s dreaded Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) –and is known for its aggressive surveillance of ordinary citizens was surprisingly charitable with the offender. Charging protesting citizens with a draconian law, the UAPA, in this instance, the same force has chosen to go soft. Citing the “reason” that the SC Registry was not pressing charges, they released Kishore within hours, maintaining he had no prior criminal record. Since then, the offender has been widely interviewed by a government-friendly media.

“More offended by rule of law than religion?” Suspended advocate reacts to CJI’s Mauritius remark

Speculation was rife on the “motive” with media quick to attribute the contemptuous aggression at CJI Gavai’s reported remark to a petitioner who had prayed for “replacing” the deity of Vishnu at Khajurao, a UNESCO world site and under the jurisdiction of the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI). The CJI had later clarified his remarks in the Khajuraho case, emphasising respect for all religions and saying social media misinterpretations had amplified the controversy.

However, suspended advocate Rakesh Kishore, after being released by Delhi Police, has expressed discontent—not over any religious sentiment, but in response to a public statement made by the Chief Justice of India (CJI) during a visit abroad.

In a statement to news agency ANI, he said he was deeply hurt by what he perceived as mockery from the judiciary—especially comments by the CJI in a case involving a damaged Vishnu idol at Khajuraho. He asserted he felt “no regret” and claimed his act was a reaction to what he viewed as contempt directed at believers of Sanatan Dharma.

Referring to the CJI’s remarks in Mauritius — “The Indian legal system is governed by the rule of law, not the rule of bulldozers” — Kishore responded, stating, “…The CJI should consider that, holding such a high constitutional position, he ought to understand the significance of ‘Milord’ and maintain its dignity… You go to Mauritius and say that the country will not run with a bulldozer. I ask the CJI and those opposing me: Is the bulldozer action by Yogi ji against those who encroached on government property wrong? I am hurt and will continue to be so…”

Further, Kishore invoked “divine guidance,” saying that he could not rest after what he believed was an insult. He reiterated that he was neither drunk nor under influence, but acting from emotional distress. His reaction appears rooted more in political alignment and perceived personal affront than in any specific legal principle or religious issue.

#WATCH | Delhi: Countered on his action against the highest position holder in judiciary, suspended Advocate Rakesh Kishore, who attempted to hurl an object at CJI BR Gavai, says, “…CJI should think that when he is sitting on such a high constitutional post, he should… pic.twitter.com/6WgPZmQjO7

— ANI (@ANI) October 7, 2025

The Trigger: a temple idol, a viral remark, and Mauritius speech on ‘Bulldozer Justice’

The roots of Rakesh Kishore’s outburst appear to lie in entrenched casteist hatred and perceived ideological insult. In September 2025, the Supreme Court dismissed a public interest petition seeking the reconstruction of a damaged Lord Vishnu idol at the Javari Temple in Khajuraho. When the bench — led by CJI B.R. Gavai — rejected the plea, the Chief Justice remarked, “Go and ask the deity itself to do something.”

While intended to highlight the Court’s view that the matter fell under the jurisdiction of the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI), the comment sparked a firestorm online. It was widely seen — and misrepresented — as flippant and disrespectful to religious sentiments. Social media amplified the controversy, framing it as an affront to Sanatan Dharma, giving rise to a charged narrative of judicial insensitivity.

Further CJI Gavai’s recent speech in Mauritius, where he invoked his 2024 ruling on illegal demolitions, reminding the world that the highest court in the land stands against injustice. In that judgment, the Court had clearly held that the executive cannot act as judge, jury, and executioner.

SC Judgment A Clear Message That India Governed By Rule Of Law & Not Rule Of Bulldozer : CJI BR Gavai In Mauritius#SupremeCourt #CJIBRGavai https://t.co/vxQzhxm2ir

— Live Law (@LiveLawIndia) October 3, 2025

Citing this principle abroad, the CJI said, “The Indian legal system is governed by the Rule of Law, not by the rule of the bulldozer.” Though meant to reaffirm constitutional values, this statement became another flashpoint. Critics like Kishore interpreted it as an indirect attack on certain state-level actions — particularly in Uttar Pradesh. Amid these twin provocations, Kishore claimed he acted out of emotional distress and divine compulsion, viewing both statements as cumulative insults to his faith and belief system.

There is a further twist to the tale. During the Dussehra vacation of the Supreme Court Bareilly in Uttar Pradesh (a state that has been one of the prime offenders in aggressive demolitions of minority properties and places of worship) saw a series of demolitions, including the ancestral home of Olympic Gold Medallist and Padma Shri Mohd. Shahid demolished in Varanasi Road widening drive, end September.

Online Hate Build-Up against CJI Gavai

The attack on CJI Gavai and his august office as also his identity did not happen in isolation. Weeks before far right platforms were airing interviews instigating violence against India’s first Buddhist Chief Justice. Right wing “influencer”, Ajeet bharti with Kaushlesh Rai and Editor of Opindia (another instigator rightwing digital platform), Anupam Singh can be heard inciting people to violence against the CJI. During the conversation, Kaushlesh says, “I’m a Gandhian. I don’t support violence. If I did, I would have said, ‘Look, if Gavai ji gets into a fight, he lives in the courthouse, and there are Hindu lawyers there. At least one Hindu lawyer should grab Gavai ji’s head and hit him hard against the wall, so that it breaks into two pieces. But I don’t support violence at all.’ During the conversation, Ajit Bharti had also suggested surrounding Justice Gavai’s car. Kaushlesh Rai goes on to say, “Oct 2nd is coming, what Godse did is beyond your capability, but you can become Gandhi. What is the max punishment for spitting in Gavai’s face under the IPC? Not more than Six months? It’s nothing more than that. Hindus can’t even do this?”

Bar Council of India suspends lawyer

Within hours of the shocking display of hate and contempt, the Bar Council of India (BCI) issued an interim suspension of Kishore’s license to practice. The BCI’s order — under the Advocates Act, 1961 — called his conduct “prima facie inconsistent with the dignity of the Court.”

#BREAKING| BCI suspends practice of Advocate Rakesh Kishore, who attempted to attack CJI BR Gavai today

The Council has also initiated disciplinary proceedings against Kishore #SupremeCourt #cjibrgavai pic.twitter.com/Pv4lvPYTaV

— Live Law (@LiveLawIndia) October 6, 2025

According to order, he has been barred from appearing, pleading, acting or practising in any court or tribunal across India. Courts, tribunals and bar associations were to be informed. A show-cause notice was issued, requiring Kishore to explain in 15 days why the suspension should not continue.

Courts and its pesky choices

To date, the Supreme Court Registrar General opted not to initiate criminal proceedings. The Delhi Police, after questioning Kishore for a few hours, released him, citing lack of a case file from the Court, as per reports

The Court itself stayed silent in public. It neither issued a press release nor filed an FIR. Some legal observers interpreted this as a strategic restraint—refusing to magnify the act by escalating it. Yet many felt a full judicial revulsion or contempt action would have better affirmed the Apex Court’s institutional strength.

Legal fraternity condemnation

Leading bar bodies and senior advocates were quick to speak out. The Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association (SCAORA) called the act “unbecoming” of a lawyer and urged suo moto contempt proceedings. They argued the gesture threatened to “scandalise the office of the CJI” and damage public faith in the court.

Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association (SCAORA) passes resolution condemning the “unwarranted and intemperate gesture” of an advocate who allegedly disrespected the Chief Justice of India and companion judges, calling it an assault on judicial independence.#SupremeCourt pic.twitter.com/0PWFOq1lCl

— Bar and Bench (@barandbench) October 6, 2025

The Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA) condemned the act in strong terms, stressing institutional dignity, decorum and constitutional duty.

It was senior counsel, Kapil Sibal’s tweet on X at around 5 p.m. yesterday, October 6 that pushed the moral bar high, commenting on the absence of any condemnation from either the Prime Minister, Home Minister or Law Minister.

CJI

The uncivilised behaviour of a member of the Supreme Court Bar must be publicly condemned by one and all since it is affront to the majesty of the court

The silence of the PM , the Home Minister and the Law Minister is to say the least surprising

— Kapil Sibal (@KapilSibal) October 6, 2025

Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA) has unanimously condemned the “reprehensible act” by an advocate inside the courtroom of CJI Justice B.R. Gavai on Oct 6. Calling the conduct “utterly unbecoming of an officer of the court,” the SCBA said it strikes at the foundation of mutual… pic.twitter.com/VHcF3RNovh

— Bar and Bench (@barandbench) October 6, 2025

Senior advocate Indira Jaising went further, labelling the act “ideological and casteist” and calling upon the Attorney General to initiate contempt of court action. She urged the Supreme Court judges to issue a united statement rejecting ideological attacks on secular courts.

Attorney General should take action for contempt of court for an ideological castest attack on a secular court https://t.co/Fk4XrWTGOX

— Indira Jaising (@IJaising) October 6, 2025

The Solicitor General, Tushar Mehta, offered a more tempered take. He condemned the act as a product of misinformation and social media frenzy, praised the CJI’s composure, and warned that his restraint must not be mistaken for institutional weakness.

Attack on the CJI is an assault on the dignity of our judiciary and the spirit of our Constitution: Rahul Gandhi

Rahul Gandhi, Leader of the Opposition, took to X to lambast the attack, “The attack on the Chief Justice of India is an assault on the dignity of our judiciary and the spirit of our Constitution.”

The attack on the Chief Justice of India is an assault on the dignity of our judiciary and the spirit of our Constitution.

Such hatred has no place in our nation and must be condemned.

— Rahul Gandhi (@RahulGandhi) October 6, 2025

Congress directed criticism at Prime Minister Narendra Modi, noting that for hours the PM’s office remained silent. In a post, Congress taunted the PM: “Your silence is deafening — it screams complicity.”

“India’s Chief Justice B.R. Gavai was brazenly attacked in the Supreme Court today. Yet, not one word of condemnation from the Prime Minister so far. Mr. Modi, your silence is deafening and screams of complicity. You must speak up.”

India’s Chief Justice B.R. Gavai was brazenly attacked in the Supreme Court today.

Yet, not one word of condemnation from the Prime Minister so far.

Mr. Modi, your silence is deafening and screams of complicity.

You must speak up. pic.twitter.com/vodFnPjMye

— Congress (@INCIndia) October 6, 2025

Sonia Gandhi, former party president, expressed “profound distress,” calling the act an “assault not just on the CJI, but on the Constitution.”

“No words are adequate to condemn the attack on the Honourable Chief Justice of India in the Supreme Court itself. It is an assault not just on him, but on our Constitution as well. Chief Justice Gavai has been very gracious but the nation must stand in solidarity with him unitedly with a deep sense of anguish and outrage” she said

Statement of CPP Chairperson Smt. Sonia Gandhi Ji

No words are adequate to condemn the attack on the Honourable Chief Justice of India in the Supreme Court itself. It is an assault not just on him, but on our Constitution as well.

Chief Justice Gavai has been very gracious… pic.twitter.com/3FgEk2q5gV

— Congress (@INCIndia) October 6, 2025

There is no place for such reprehensible acts in our society, utterly condemnable: PM Modi

Pressure mounted. Late evening on October 6, PM Modi posted a condemnation. He wrote, “Spoke to CJI BR Gavai. The act is utterly condemnable. Such reprehensible behaviour has no place in a civilised society.” He hailed the CJI’s composure as a testament to judicial dignity.

Despite this, critics noted that the PM’s response came only after public pressure escalated. The delay was spun as political hesitation.

“I appreciated the calm displayed by Justice Gavai in the face of such a situation. It highlights his commitment to values of justice and strengthening the spirit of our Constitution” PM Modi said

Spoke to Chief Justice of India, Justice BR Gavai Ji. The attack on him earlier today in the Supreme Court premises has angered every Indian. There is no place for such reprehensible acts in our society. It is utterly condemnable.

I appreciated the calm displayed by Justice…

— Narendra Modi (@narendramodi) October 6, 2025

Underlying currents: caste, religion & polarisation

The act was not merely a shocking security breach — it looked like a violent manifestation of ideological, religious and caste bias.

CJI Gavai is a practising Buddhist from the Dalit community, and some spokespeople observed that targeting him via religious slogans—Sanatan Dharma—had distinct caste overtones. The fact that a lawyer in the name of religious pride attempted assault on a Dalit judge stirred discomfort.

In legal circles, there is now renewed urgency around access control as how did a man with a proximity card enter the courtroom and bring an item?

The attacker was in full uniform , wearing a proximity card and was carrying a bag as well along with a rolled up bundle of some papers. He apologized to J. Chandran saying that “it” was only for J. Gavai.

— Anas Tanwir (@Vakeel_Sb) October 6, 2025

The unflinching bench: how the chief justice responded

What has drawn admiration across the board is CJI Gavai’s restraint during the moment. As chaos briefly erupted, he paused, remained still, and directed his courtroom not to be distracted. That calmness — amid a surprise attack — was lauded inside and outside legal circles.

Senior Advocate Sanjay Hegde, commenting on an unusual incident, praised the CJI Gavai for maintaining a calm and composed demeanour throughout. He noted that such odd events are not unprecedented in the Indian judiciary. Recalling a similar episode from the past, he mentioned that CJI Hidayatullah, who was also from Nagpur, once had a shoe thrown at him by a disgruntled litigant.

Displaying remarkable composure and wit, Justice Hidayatullah reportedly said, “The man has lost his case, he should not lose his shoe as well.”

Full marks to the calm and composed demeanour with which the CJI continued the proceedings. Such odd events have happened before as well. CJI Hidayatullah, also from Nagpur had a shoe thrown by a disgruntled litigant. He ordered the shoe to be returned saying, “The man has lost… https://t.co/9XXfBjOwDV

— SANJAY HEGDE (@sanjayuvacha) October 6, 2025

Inside the court, no visible disruption followed the incident. The CJI continued hearing cases scheduled for the day, according to sources. His poise came to symbolise institutional durability in the face of provocation.

What comes next — contempt proceedings? Will the court act?

Legal bodies like SCAORA and senior advocates have urged the Supreme Court to take suo moto contempt notice, emphasising that any attempt to assault or scandalise the highest seat of justice cannot go unchecked.

While the CJI displayed remarkable composure, the judiciary now faces a crucial moment, whether to continue exercising restraint or to respond firmly to uphold its institutional authority.

Beyond contempt proceedings, the Court should consider imposing some penalty, and setting a clear precedent against courtroom misconduct—especially when it’s cloaked in ideological justification. Such steps would necessary for public trust, protect judicial dignity, and send a strong message that the sanctity of the courtroom is inviolable. The need for a unified condemnation of the incident by the whole of the Supreme Court is also the need of the hour.

The nation now watches: will the Supreme Court let the moment pass — or rise to define it?

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The post Violence & Sanatan Dharma: Now suspended lawyer defends shoe attack on CJI Gavai, claims it was a protest against ‘bulldozer’ remark” appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The consistent tension between the state’s power to investigate crime and the individual’s fundamental right to liberty forms a fundamental pillar of criminal jurisprudence in any constitutional democracy. Within this dynamic, the judiciary serves as the final arbiter, tasked with balancing the imperatives of law enforcement with the sacrosanct principles of personal freedom. The Supreme Court of India’s decision in Jugraj Singh v. State of Punjab stands as an illustration of this tradition.[1] A bench comprising of Justices Manoj Misra and Ujjal Bhuyan, in its judgement stated that merely because nothing incriminating could be discovered would not mean that there is non-co-operation on the part of accused. While the case itself presents a common factual scenario—an individual implicated solely on the disclosure statement of a co-accused and the subsequent opposition to bail on grounds of non-cooperation—the Court’s treatment of these issues offers an important reaffirmation of established constitutional safeguards.

This article argues that the judgment in Jugraj is a crucial restatement of liberal bail jurisprudence, reiterating the foundational principles through a three-pronged analytical approach. First, it shows the inherent weakness of a co-accused’s confession as a basis for criminal implication, thereby demanding a higher threshold of prima facie evidence from the prosecution at the bail stage. Second, it narrowly and correctly defines the scope of “cooperation with the investigation,” aligning it with the constitutional right against self-incrimination under Article 20 (3) of the Constitution of India. Third, by scrutinising the investigative agency’s own diligence, the judgment implicitly critiques prosecutorial overreach and investigative inertia, reinforcing the judiciary’s role as a check on the executive’s power to curtail liberty.

The significance of Jugraj lies not in the creation of new legal doctrine. It is in its function as a necessary course correction. In an era where even politicians in power are being targeted on the pretext of not cooperating with the investigation by agencies like the ED, the Supreme Court’s decision serves as an important reminder to lower courts and law enforcement agencies. It shows that the foundational principles of liberty, articulated decades ago in landmark cases such as Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, remain undiluted and must be rigorously applied against any procedural practice that seeks to undermine them. This article will deconstruct the Jugraj judgment by analysing its factual and legal underpinnings, situating it within the broader jurisprudential context of evidence law and anticipatory bail, and exploring its implications for the rights of the accused and the obligations of the state.

The Judgment in Focus: Factual Matrix and Ruling in Jugraj v. State of Punjab

The case of Jugraj Singh presented a set of circumstances that are frequently encountered in trial courts across the country, making the apex court’s intervention particularly instructive.

Facts

The appellant, Jugraj Singh, sought anticipatory bail in connection with a case registered at Police Station Sadar Patti, District Tarn Taran. His implication in the case was not based on any direct evidence or recovery of incriminating material from his person or premises. Instead, the entire basis for his arraignment was a disclosure statement made by a co-accused, Rashpal Singh, from whom a recovery had been affected. This singular fact formed the crux of the appellant’s plea for pre-arrest bail.

Compounding the matter was a crucial detail that the Supreme Court found particularly relevant: the appellant had been “similarly implicated” in a prior case, also on the basis of a co-accused’s disclosure statement, and had been granted the protection of anticipatory bail in that instance. Despite this history and the nature of the evidence, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh rejected his anticipatory bail application on April 3, 2025, prompting the appeal to the Supreme Court. Recognising the tenuous nature of the implication, the Supreme Court, on June 23, 2025, granted the appellant interim protection from arrest. This protection was made conditional upon a standard and vital requirement which states that he joins the investigation as and when called upon to do so by the Investigating Officer.

Arguments advanced by the Parties

The arguments before the Supreme Court centred on whether this interim protection granted on June 23, 2025, should be made absolute. The appellant’s case was straightforward, resting on fundamental principles of criminal law. He argued that his implication was false and malicious, stemming solely from the inadmissible statement of a co-accused. He emphasised that nothing incriminating had been recovered from him and pointed to the past instance of similar implication as evidence of a pattern of harassment. Implicitly, he contended that he had complied with the interim order by joining the investigation.

The State of Punjab, in its counter-affidavit, did not dispute the foundational premise. It conceded that Jugraj Singh’s implication was indeed based on the confessional statement of the co-accused. However, to oppose bail, the State levelled the allegation of non-cooperation. The sole basis for this serious charge was the appellant’s statement during questioning that he had thrown his mobile phone into a river.

The Supreme Court’s reasoning deconstructed

The Court first addressed and defined the concept of cooperation, holding that “Merely because nothing incriminating could be discovered would not mean that there is non-co-operation on the part of accused”. This observation delinks the outcome of an interrogation from the process of cooperation itself. The absence of a discovery cannot be retrospectively used to label the accused as non-cooperative.

Second, the court noted a glaring omission in the State’s counter-affidavit i.e., there was no mention of any independent effort made by the police to verify the appellant’s claim or to pursue alternative leads. The Court pointedly observed that the State had not stated “that any effort was made to trace out the mobile number of the appellant and collect the call detail records or that any raid was carried to find out whether he is in possession of any incriminating material”.

This is instructively significant. It establishes a direct relationship between the quality of the foundational evidence and the credibility of the prosecution’s subsequent procedural objections. The prosecution’s case rested exclusively on a co-accused’s statement, a form of evidence legally recognized as weak. Faced with this fragile foundation, the State’s only recourse to deny bail was the allegation of non-cooperation. The Court perceived this as an attempt to secure custody to compensate for the lack of substantive evidence. It was insufficient for the State to merely allege it; the State had to first demonstrate that it had exhausted its own investigative avenues. This implies a judicial principle: the weaker the prima facie case against an accused, the less weight a court will give to generic and unsubstantiated allegations of non-cooperation used to deny bail.

Ultimately, considering the nature of the evidence, the precedent of the appellant receiving similar protection, and the lack of substance in the non-cooperation claim, the Supreme Court made the interim bail order absolute, subject to standard conditions.

Foundation of implication: Deconstructing evidentiary value of a co-accused’s statement

The Supreme Court’s decision in Jugraj was heavily influenced by the evidentiary quality of the material used to implicate the appellant. A look into the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, reveals why a case built solely on the statement of a co-accused is considered fundamentally weak.

Legislative framework

The Indian Evidence Act treats confessions made to police with extreme caution, born from the recognition of the power imbalance between the accused and the state.

• Sections 25 and 26: Section 25 states that no confession made to a police-officer, shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence. Section 26 states that no confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a magistrate, shall be proved as against such person. These sections create an absolute bar on proving confessions made to a police officer or by a person in police custody, unless made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. This is a safeguard against coercion.
• Section 27: This Section creates a narrow exception wherein when a fact is discovered as a consequence of information from an accused in custody, “so much of such information.as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.” The discovery lends credibility to the information. In Jugraj, the State made no claim that any fact was discovered based on information from the appellant.
• Section 30: This is the most pertinent provision. It states that when multiple persons are tried jointly, a confession by one affecting himself and others can be “taken into consideration” against the others. However, jurisprudence is clear: such a statement is not substantive evidence. It is not given under oath, nor is it subject to cross-examination. As established in the landmark case of Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, the confession of a co-accused is a matter of the highest caution and can only be used to lend assurance to other evidence.[2] It cannot be the sole basis for conviction. The rationale is that an accused person has a powerful incentive to implicate others to exculpate themselves or to receive a lighter sentence.

Connecting legislative framework to Jugraj

The implication of Jugraj Singh rested exclusively on Rashpal Singh’s disclosure statement. There was no independent corroboration, no recovery, and no other material linking him to the offence. This reliance on the weakest form of evidence, legally insufficient to sustain a conviction, made the State’s opposition to anticipatory bail untenable. The decision provides u and affirms a vital principle for bail jurisprudence: the court must examine the prima facie quality and admissibility of the evidence.

Shield of Liberty: anticipatory bail, the enduring legacy of Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia

The legal instrument through which Jugraj Singh sought freedom was anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). His case is rooted in the jurisprudential history of this provision, benchmarked by Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab.[3]

Jurisprudential evolution of section 438 CrPC

Introduced in 1973 based on the 41st Law Commission Report, anticipatory bail was designed to protect individuals from harassment and wrongful incarceration through malicious accusations. It is a pre-arrest legal remedy, giving substance to the right to personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution.

The Sibbia doctrine: Magna Carta of Anticipatory Bail

The scope of Section 438 was settled by a five-judge Constitution Bench in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab (1980). The Supreme Court emphatically rejected the restrictive approach taken by the Punjab and Haryana High Court, which had sought to impose rigid conditions, such as limiting it to “exceptional cases” and importing the restrictions of regular bail under Section 437.

The key principles laid down in Sibbia are:

• Liberal Interpretation: The provision must be interpreted liberally in favour of personal freedom.
• No Inflexible Rules: The Court refused to lay down a “straitjacket formula.” The decision must be based on the specific facts of each case.
• Wide Discretion: The discretion vested in the higher courts is wide and should not be fettered by self-imposed, restrictive conditions.
• Reasonable Apprehension: The “reason to believe” an arrest is imminent must be based on reasonable grounds, not vague fears.

Modern Application and Jugraj

The pro-liberty ethos of Sibbia has been consistently reaffirmed, notably in Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra (2010)[4] and the Constitution Bench decision in Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2020), which held that anticipatory bail is not by default time-bound.[5]

The judgment in Jugraj is a textbook application of the Sibbia doctrine. The Court faced a classic scenario Section 438 was designed to address: an individual facing arrest based on weak, potentially inadmissible evidence. By looking past the State’s procedural objections to the substantive merits, the Court exercised its wide discretion to protect the appellant’s liberty. The decision fulfils the very purpose for which Section 438 was enacted, acting as a vital shield for individual freedom.

Defining the Line: “Cooperation with Investigation” versus the Right against Self-Incrimination

The State’s primary argument against Jugraj Singh was his alleged “non-cooperation.” The Supreme Court’s handling of this issue firmly situates the concept of cooperation within the framework of the fundamental right against self-incrimination.

The Constitutional Bedrock: Article 20(3)

Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India provides that “No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.” This right ensures that the burden of proving guilt lies squarely on the prosecution, which must gather evidence through its own independent efforts, not by coercing the accused. It represents a fundamental departure from an inquisitorial system of justice, where the accused can be questioned to extract truth, to an accusatorial system, where the state must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.

Judicial Interpretation of “Cooperation”

Cooperation involves an accused person adhering to the legal process: joining the investigation when summoned and making oneself available for questioning. Crucially, it does not mean admitting guilt or making a confession. The right to remain silent is a vital facet of the right against self-incrimination, and its exercise cannot be construed as non-cooperation.

Applying the Standard to Jugraj

The appellant had complied with the core requirement of the interim bail order: he joined the investigation. The State’s entire allegation of non-cooperation hinged on his statement about his mobile phone. Demanding that the appellant produce his phone, which could contain evidence against him, would be a textbook violation of Article 20(3).

Instead of focusing on the veracity of the appellant’s statement, the Court shifted the focus to the investigative agency’s own responsibilities. Its pointed observation about the State’s failure to trace the phone number or collect Call Detail Records (CDRs) is critical. This judicial manoeuvre implicitly redefines “non-cooperation.” It is not merely the accused’s silence but the prosecution’s failure to investigate. By highlighting what the police did not do, the Court reframed the issue. The State’s argument was, “The accused is not cooperating because he won’t give us the evidence.” The Court did not consider this because the State is supposed to find the evidence and not imply on the basis of someone’s acts or omissions.

It is important to distinguish this from genuine non-cooperation, such as absconding, tampering with evidence, or intimidating witnesses, which would warrant denial of bail. The appellant had done none of these; his refusal to self-incriminate was the exercise of a fundamental right.

Synthesis and Concluding Analysis

The judgment in Jugraj v. State of Punjab is a synthesis of three fundamental pillars of Indian criminal law: the rules of evidence, the principles of anticipatory bail, and the constitutional right against self-incrimination. The case began with a weak evidentiary foundation, necessitating the protective remedy of anticipatory bail. The State’s attempt to defeat this claim rested on an allegation of non-cooperation that was constitutionally impermissible. The Supreme Court, by seeing through this procedural gambit, wove these three threads together, affirming that liberty cannot be curtailed on weak evidence, and the shield of pre-arrest bail cannot be pierced by a flawed interpretation of cooperation.

Its value lies in its clear-headed application and forceful restatement of foundational principles. In a legal system where the process can often become the punishment, the judgment provides a much-needed reinforcement of the delicate balance between effective crime detection and the protection of constitutional rights.

(The author is part of the legal research team of the organisation)

[1] 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 837

[2] MANU/SC/0031/1952

[3] MANU/SC/0215/1980

[4] MANU/SC/1021/2010

[5][5] MANU/SC/0100/2020

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