Stating that they are deeply dismayed at the recent reports of large scale, state driven deforestation due to diversion of forestlands for developmental projects, the open letter cites a July 2026, reply of the Minister of State for Environment, Forest and Climate Change in response to a Parliament question. Further, the communication states that, in the five years from 2014–15 to 2018–19, a total of 74,705.68 ha of forestland was approved for diversion. In the next five-year period from 2019–20 to 2023–24, this increased, by nearly 29 per cent, to 96,112.90 hectares. If the current pace continues, forest land diversion during the next five years is likely to exceed 110,000 hectares. Besides, the increase in deforestation is most evident in the ecologically sensitive Himalayan and North Eastern states, in Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, etc. And many other proposals are in the offing, the most appalling of them being the cutting down of nearly a million trees, over 13000 hectares of rainforest in Great Nicobar Island.

The communication also emphasises that, the compensatory afforestation that is expected to be undertaken for the diversion of these forest areas is either not undertaken or if undertaken is almost never successful. The proposals are also, often, ludicrous, e.g. taking up compensatory afforestation for the rainforests of Great Nicobar in dry Haryana, 4500 km away.

Within this alarming trend, of particular concern is the fact that lands within National Parks and Wildlife Sanctuaries. I.e. Protected Areas (PAs) along with their Eco-Sensitive Zones (ESZs) are also being diverted at an alarming pace. Proposals to divert lands inside PAs require the approval of the Standing Committee of the National Board of Wildlife (SC-NBWL), a statutory body   tasked with promotion, conservation and development of wildlife and their habitats. However, it is seen that 97% of the diversion proposals placed before the SC-NBWL since 2014 have been cleared.  In just four meetings held in 2024 and 2025, as much as 5824 ha of land inside PAs and ESZs have been cleared for non-forest use with as many as 100 plus proposals getting cleared in almost every meeting.  The diversions permitted were for industrial parks, quarrying, mobile towers, tunnels, oil refineries, railway lines, synthetic organic chemical manufacturing unit, petrochemical park, temples, helipads, mining, hotels, apartment complexes, oil drilling, etc. – entities which in no way benefit wildlife and their habitats. More worryingly, an increasing trend of diversions is noted in Protected Area clearances with every passing year: from 91 projects within Protected Areas granted clearance in 2019, the number steadily increased to 378 in 2024 and 312 in 2025.  PAs make up only 5.4% of the geographic area of the country and the headwaters of many rivers originate in these PAs, providing water and ecological security to the country.  Fragmentation of forests and wildlife habitat drastically reduces the ability of these areas to perform their vital role as a green lung for the country.

How did this happen

The implementation of infrastructure development, mining, etc. through diversion of forests and Protected Areas, has been possible due to the weakening of environment and conservation laws by the government as well as through judicial rulings.  For instance, the Forest Conservation Amendment Act 2023, has   redefined forests in a way that leaves out huge tracts of forested land from legal protection and allows easy diversion of such lands.

Projects which have gone ahead without obtaining the mandatory forest clearances as required under law are being regularised on payment of nominal fines, or by the ridiculous requirement that the violator undertake three to five times penal compensatory afforestation. This is totally antithetical to environmental jurisprudence which directs that EIAs should be done prior to commencement of the project and the diversion of forest and other lands, and not as a fait accompli after the project has started.   After the Forest Conservation Act of 1980 was amended and the Van (Sanrakshan Evam Samvardhan) Adhiniyam or the Forest Conservation Amendment Act came into being in 2023, the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change  has, in just two years (2024–25 and 2025–26), already approved the diversion, for non-forestry purposes, approximately 22562 ha of forestland per year , as compared to an average of 19223 hectares per year during the five year period 2019 – 24, and 14941 hectares  per year for the preceding  five year period.

The letter also contends that, the SC-NBWL, which is constituted of mainly top government officials, unfortunately, “seems to have no hesitation in approving almost all the diversion proposals placed before it.  It is particularly condemnable that in the past decade more than 30 wildlife sanctuaries and National Parks have been de-notified or drastically reduced in area to enable easy diversions of their land for “developmental” projects.  This includes the Megapode Wildlife Sanctuary as well as the Galathea Bay Wildlife Sanctuary in Great Nicobar, despite the latter being India’s most important and the northern Indian Ocean’s largest nesting site for endangered giant leatherback turtles.”

The recent Supreme Court ruling in July 2026 stating that post-facto environmental clearances (ECs) are legally acceptable if they are authorised by a post-facto valid statutory notification under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, does nothing to improve matters, permitting the central government to regularise violations under Section 3 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986.  The Court effectively replaces the ’precautionary principle’ (preventing harm) while dealing with India’s environment with a “pollute and pay” model.  Entrepreneurs can construct big-ticket projects without taking any of the mandatory prior clearances, present the government with a fait accompli and simply pay compensation to stay operational.

Every day brings a new, foolhardy proposal to reduce forested and wildlife protected areas. One such is the recent proposal of the Assam Government to reduce the Eco-sensitive zone (ESZ) of the iconic Kaziranga National Park from 10 Kms to 1 km and allow brick kilns, stone crushers, hotels, commercial warehouses, etc., to operate much closer to the park boundary. It does not apparently matter that the rhinoceros population will be severely and adversely affected. Another such proposal is the use of 12.6 hectares of the Delhi Ridge for the President’s Bodyguard parade ground, which, if implemented, will further fragment the already degraded ridge in Delhi which serves as a green lung for the metropolis.

Do highways mean growth?

The recent push for “development” arises from a misguided understanding that roads, infrastructure, mines, etc. will ensure the growth of the country. There is no realisation that an unpolluted environment together with extensive forest cover and thriving wildlife is even more important for human well-being. Recently issued environmental, forest and wildlife laws, rules and office orders along with “development friendly” judicial rulings have weakened the earlier strong environmental and conservation approach of the country.

The over 700 signatories state that while they acknowledge that infrastructure development projects are necessary for the country, but they should not come at the cost of ecological security. This can only imperil the country as evident from the massive landslides, mudslides, alarming AQI’s, heat waves, deluges, floods, and other environmental calamities occurring across the country. Such a prioritisation is against all aspects of the “precautionary principle” and “intergeneration equity” enunciated by the Supreme Court, as well as being in contravention of Articles 48 A and 51 A of the Constitution and most importantly of Article 21, the Right to Life.

Finally, the communication urges both the government and the judiciary to prioritise the ecological security of our country and the health and life of its citizens over the false narrative of more roads, more buildings, more townships, more mines, more industries, and more destruction of the natural world that is currently seen as progress.

Constitutional Conduct Group (77 signatories as below)

Related

Swaraj India decries MoEFCC’s Forest Conservation Rules 2022 notification

Environmentalist demand withdrawal of changes to Biological Diversity Act

Palghar Adivasis decry ecologically-dangerous infrastructural projects

AIUFWP’s 2nd National Conference begins in New Delhi

The post Prioritise ecological security of country over “false narrative” of “highway development”: CCG to Govt & Courts appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The advise offered by Dhirendra Krishna Shastri (Parchiwale baba, whom Prime Minister Modi calls his younger brother) in this regard, evoked reactions in fish and meat-eating West Bengal. The state is on the eve of celebrating its biggest festival, Durga Puja. The BJP swept to power in in West Bengal in early-mid 2026. Even before this, the visibility of BJP’s political assertion in the state has been accompanied by promotion of Lord Ram (over Maa Kaali/Durga). This is a move which had previously yielded rich electoral dividends for it in North India, also affecting the electoral scenario in India as a whole.

As the BJP government settled in to ‘governance’ in the state, the season for the annual Durga Puja came. And the party in power invited Shastri of Bageshwar Dham as its passport to vegetarianism. This was a testing tactic, a well-honed technique tried by the far right sangh parivar, to test its schemes before an all-out imposition.  He visited West Bengal for a ‘Hanuman Katha’ in Howrah’s Liluah. He advised the people to keep non-vegetarian food away from Durga idols during the Puja. Similar advice was already proffered by the RSS affiliate, the Viswa Hindu Parishad (VHP). This triggered a storm among Bengali Hindus, including those calling themselves “Hindu nationalists”. There were statements and protests from prominent Bengalis that Shastri should not teach them how to celebrate Durga Puja and what to eat and what not.

The reaction was due to the fact that fish in particular but goat-meat too, during the Durga festival are almost mandatory to the menu. Many of them underlined that fish is very crucial to Bengali culture and the broad umbrella of Hindu religion has many tendencies where non-vegetarian food is part of the ritual. Many from former Tripura Governor Tathagata Roy to journalists and content creators, people from a diverse section, including those who described themselves as “Bengali Hindu nationalists”, retaliated. “Don’t tell a Bengali how to celebrate Durga Puja,” Kolkata-based content creator Shreyasi Biswas Banerjee wrote on Facebook. In the video (link attached), Biswas underlined that an “outsider” was prescribing rules for a festival embedded in Bengal’s distinct religious and culinary traditions. A few people even tore down posters of Shastri.

Suvendu Adhikari who had earlier received Shastri with great warmth thereafter attended a ceremony at a Durga temple and was seen consuming ‘Fish Prasad.’ A clear mitigatory gesture! Many right-wing sympathisers and detractors even stated that the core value of fish in Bengali culture.

India is a country full of diversities in all matters, food, clothing, language and religion. Hindus also have many sects and many diverse food habits. We have Kashmiri Pandits for whom Mutton dishes are as an inalienable part of their culture. The food habits are decided by multiple factors, geographical location being an important part of that. In Coastal areas, sea food is an important part of their diet.

However, the ruling regime has persisted this vegetarian imposition.

In the recently held BRICS meeting, in the Gala dinner (mid-September 2026), only vegetarian food was served. Indecently Xi Jing Ping skipped this dinner, whatever be his reasons! While serving only vegetarian food for international guests was criticised by the opposition parties, Kiran Rijiju, the minister and loyal handyman of the most powerful in the government, defended it by saying that the guests appreciated the menu.

The Uttar Pradesh (UP) Government (its chief minister is Yogi Adityanath) recently published a map of important food items of all districts of UP. In this culinary map, the much loved and savoured Lucknow’s Tunde kabab was missing!! Only vegetarian items were presented, as if UP consumes only the vegetarian food.

In yet another incident 14 Muslims were put behind the bars (some months ago) for having chicken biryani at their private Iftar party on a boat ride in Ganga River. Interestingly some Hindus who consumed liquor during another private boat ride were left un-policed.

Despite knowing the fact that nearly 70% of Indians are non-vegetarians, vegetarianism is being promoted by the BJP Governments, and at some places successfully. In Gujarat where BJP has been in power for the past three decades, non-vegetarian joints have been selectively invisibilised. Many people go to the restaurants near Gujarat border and satisfy their craving for non-vegetarian food.

This remains a dilemma for the majoritarian BJP: a balancing act between Indian’s prevalent food habits and their agenda of imposing vegetarianism. At every possible chance they and their cohorts try to push forward vegetarianism. Somehow BJP associates’ non-vegetarianism with Muslims (and Christians) in particular, never mind what history tells us about the food habits of early India. This bypassing of non-vegetarian food, an essential part of Indian food habits, irrespective of religion of the people is facing this dilemma. They get away with this aggressive vegetarianism in places like in Gujarat, however in WB, they are facing an opposition.

Human society has evolved through various stages, and food habits have always been very diverse. The aim of RSS-BJP and their political-cultural supporters remains to glorify vegetarianism purely for ideological reasons. There may be some other reasons for promoting Veganism or vegetarianism, but respect for people’s food habits is the starting point for a democratic society.

How much does this regime believe in democracy is free for all to see.

Related:

Non veg food ‘ban’: Student group plans protest at Delhi’s Hansraj College

Most Indians Non Vegetarian; Men More Than Women, South & East Most

Can majoritarian societal pressure re-write the rulebook? The illegality behind forced non-veg shutdowns during festivals

The post Politics through a forced imposition of food habits appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Paper leaks are often treated as an examination problem. For the students involved, it becomes a much bigger problem. A cancelled examination can mean starting preparation again, spending more money, travelling again and waiting months for another opportunity. For candidates close to the age limit, a delay can even affect their eligibility for another attempt.

The scale of the problem has been visible in some of India’s biggest examinations. The NEET UG 2024 controversy brought the issue into the national spotlight. The Central Bureau of Investigation investigated allegations surrounding the leakage of the examination paper in Hazaribagh, Jharkhand. The controversy also raised questions about grace marks, examination centres and the overall conduct of the examination.

Government recruitment examinations have faced similar controversies. In 2024, allegations of a question paper leak affected the Bihar Public Service Commission’s teacher recruitment examination, with the commission cancelling the examination for candidates at one centre in Patna. Such cases show how a problem at one point in the examination system can affect thousands of young people waiting for a fair chance.

Think about an aspirant who has spent two years preparing for a government examination. They may have left a job, joined a coaching programme, borrowed money for preparation or moved to another city. On the morning of the examination, they are ready to finally see the result of that effort. Later, news breaks that the paper was leaked and the examination may have to be cancelled. For the authorities, it becomes an investigation. For the student, it can feel like another year has disappeared.

There is also a financial cost that rarely gets enough attention. Application fees, coaching, books, online courses, accommodation, travel and repeated preparation all add up. Not every aspirant comes from a family that can comfortably afford another attempt. A student from a financially weaker background may have to choose between preparing again and finding work to support the family.

Then comes the question of trust. The basic idea behind a competitive examination is simple: candidates should receive the same paper under the same conditions and compete on their preparation. If some candidates get access to the paper beforehand, that basic understanding of fairness breaks down. Students begin wondering whether hard work is enough or whether connections and money matter more.

This is especially serious in India because government jobs remain highly sought after by young people. They offer stability, regular income and social security at a time when many private sector jobs can be uncertain. A limited number of vacancies can attract a huge number of applicants. When an examination is cancelled or delayed, the competition does not disappear. It simply becomes another round of waiting for the same young people.

The responsibility for protecting an examination cannot be placed on students. They have already done their part by studying and appearing for the test. Examination agencies need stronger security systems, careful handling of question papers, better monitoring and quick action when irregularities are reported. Investigations also need to reach the people responsible instead of leaving students to carry the consequences.

There also needs to be greater transparency after a suspected leak. Students deserve to know what happened, why an examination was cancelled and when the next examination will take place. Recruitment calendars should be as predictable as possible, especially when thousands of young people plan their lives around them.

A paper leak may look like a few pages reaching the wrong hands. For a student, the loss can be much larger. It can mean lost time, lost money, another year of preparation and another period of uncertainty.

India often speaks about merit and equal opportunity. Those words only have meaning when the system protects the people who earn their place through honest effort. Young people preparing for examinations are not asking for an easier competition. They are asking for a fair one.

The exam leak crisis is therefore more than a problem of examination security. It is a youth issue. Every leaked paper raises the same question: when the system fails, who pays the price? Too often, it is the student who studied honestly.

 (Jyotiraditya Singh is a Youth Leader and Social Activist associated with Youth Forum India. He writes on youth, education, employment and public policy issues, with a focus on giving young people a stronger voice in public conversations.)

The post The youth caught in the exam leak crisis appeared first on SabrangIndia.

They discuss the meaning of words like “mastermind”, the uneven nature of the fight against state power, and why the struggle for justice and democracy must continue.

Watch the full conversation.

The post “If I Believe in Democracy, How Can I Give Up Hope?”| Umar Khalid: 2,190 Days | Banojyotsna | Teesta appeared first on SabrangIndia.

I see the same image now at a university bathroom on the corridor of the English Department, which exists to fight the very social evils that exist a few feet away from our cushioned seats of discussion. We discuss Ambedkar, and dignified labour, and then leave students to the cafeteria and teachers to their cabins in staffrooms, our break-spaces. The space the akkas receive? The bathroom floor.

Talking with a classmate who frequently interacts with the akkas, I came to know that the akkas have a designated breakroom—in the basement, far from their actual spaces of work which they need to get back to every hour. The inconvenient spacing of these break rooms, unlike the considerate accommodations students and teachers often receive, forces them to remain in the bathrooms no matter the situation. During our conversation, my classmate referred to an incident where she saw one of the akkas resting because she had a cold—by lying down on the bathroom floor.

These images, as I reflected on them, reminded me of a Dalit child made to sit on the floor while their upper-caste peers peered down at them from their benches. Space was made for individuals based on their caste. While the bathroom space of rest is not enforced the same as untouchability in schools, its logic of space has trickled down into urban institutions and spaces years after the abolition of untouchability through Article 17 in 1950.

Most of the individuals working in sanitation, and cleaning belong to the Dalit community, owing to their historic oppression and social exclusion that suppressed them into spheres of work deemed undignified or polluting for the upper class. The most adverse form of this reflected in India is manual scavenging. The workers are defined by The Prohibition of Employment as Manual Scavengers and their Rehabilitation Act, 2013 as those “engaged or employed by an individual or a local authority or an agency or a contractor for manually cleaning, carrying, disposing off, or otherwise handling in any manner human excreta…”

Despite the Prohibition of Employment as Manual Scavengers and their Rehabilitation Act, 2013, the Safai Karamchari Andolan (SKA) estimates around 1,726 worker deaths from manual scavenging since the 2013 law. The law has not prevented the continued employment of Indian citizens in such undignified jobs based on their caste. Their systematic exclusion from higher education, and jobs beyond the brooms and mops, through threats of violence, denial and lack of pay forces them back into their caste-assigned jobs. The Safai Karamchari Andolan further estimates that among the 1.2 million sanitation workers in India, over 90% of them are Dalits.

While legally and in terms of overt oppression, workers in the housekeeping force may not be the same as manual scavengers, the occupation is a sanitised offspring of the same, which many individuals of the Dalit community are a part of owing to their historic social and economic exclusion.

The logic of a lack of spatial dignity in urban spaces for the cleaning staff contains an invisible residue of these exclusionary practices that has become normalised. This exclusion might not exist out of active caste discrimination—though it is an active practice in certain spaces. We see an institutional negligence that many spaces have arrived at that mimic the logic of a historical exclusion—here the basement and the bathroom. One must question if the normalisation of this historic exclusion has contributed to the lack of creation of dignified spaces of rest for these women. A room exists, but for whose dignity and convenience?

Now, not only has it been normalised in the minds of us privileged beneficiaries of their work, but it has also been systematically normalised in the minds of the victims through repeated practice.

A video circulating on Instagram, by the creator ‘Akash_swaroopa_,’ records him bringing in two of the housekeeping staff at a school to celebrate them. Two chairs have been set up for them at the front of the room but one of the women instinctively takes a seat on the floor before they are guided to the chairs. This instinct is a corporeal manifestation of the spatial trauma that has been ingrained into the daily lives of the workers.

These workers are often thanked and even celebrated with special days at universities and other spaces to acknowledge their work. However, that celebration of the individual becomes null and hypocritical when their work environment is undignified. No number of balloons and speeches of appreciation, while they are important, can substitute for chairs, or a convenient break room that restores dignity in everyday working conditions.

I, and others, often find ourselves touching bathroom doors with tissue paper and stepping carefully on the bathroom floor. Yet, the very spot that we are loathe to stand on is the very spot where these individuals, worthy of the break-spaces we receive, sit. It is a haunting thought to think as I sit on a cushioned chair in a Dalit Studies classroom, a few metres away from a woman who sits on the bathroom floor, just next to her disinfectants.

(The author is a Masters student of English Literature focusing on dalit studies, gender, culture and media studies based in Bangalore)

Related:

One Death Every Few Days, Zero Accountability: Sanitation workers protest at Jantar Mantar

Lucknow: Caste hierarchies & contract labour exploitation among sanitation workers

ASHA workers, Anganwadi workers and sanitation workers overlooked in India’s healthcare protection reforms

The post Sit Where We Stand: The segregated back rooms for sanitation staff in urban spaces appeared first on SabrangIndia.

At the time of these killings in 1999, Dara Singh was an active member of the Bajrang Dal (BD) and the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP), had campaigned for the Bharatiya Janata Party in the 1998 elections, and regularly attended Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) camps and rallies. He was also a central figure in the vigilante band of Bajrang Dal’s cow-protection campaign, which in his hands took the form of ambushing trucks driven by Muslim cattle traders, intercepting the vehicles, freeing the cattle, and setting the trucks ablaze.

In this detailed background piece to the whole controversy, Citizens for Justice and Peace, had, on July 22, 2026, elaborated the sequence of events. The article may be read here. It was advocate Vishnu Shankar Jain who filed a plea in the Supreme Court seeking Singh’s remission of sentence and release, in which he had argued that Dara Singh met the state government’s criteria for granting remission (i.e. 25 years). Claiming that the burning alive of Graham Staines and his two minor sons was on account of “youthful rage” (Singh was 37 years old at the time of his arrest), the Odisha State Sentence Review Board had also recommended his release from jail on ground of “good behaviour.” Thereafter, on July 14, 2026, a bench comprising of Justices Manoj Misra and Vijay Bishnoi of the Supreme Court through its order had asked the Odisha Government to take a decision on the premature release of Singh by August 19. The decision was only relayed yesterday, however.

Interesting developments, as reported by The Hindu, led to this turnaround by the authorities in Odisha. The newspaper reported that, “The Kendujhar district authority on August 28, 2026, have reported that on August 15, 2026, a congregation comprising approximately 200-250 persons associated with Dara Sena assembled in front of the District Jail, Kendujhar in connection with the proposed release of the convict, during which provocative slogans were reportedly raised,” says the proceeding copy of SSRB’s August 31, 2026, meeting.

The piece by CJP traced the three cases that Dara Singh was involved in before the killing of Staines and his two sons (January 1999). Dara Singh was also convicted for beating and burning to death Shaikh Rahaman, a Muslim garment trader. In the same year, he led the mob that hunted down and killed Arul Das, a Catholic priest, with an arrow as the priest fled a church his attackers had set alight.  Singh had been also implicated in the killing of Shaikh Imam, a Muslim cattle-truck driver’s assistant, who was beaten to death in September 1998 after his truck was looted and set on fire. Singh was acquitted in that case in 2006 for want of sufficient evidence.

Given the widespread national and international outcry, the 1999 murders hled to a CBI’s investigation after which, 14 adults including Singh, were put to trial, along with one minor who was tried in Juvenile Court. In September 2003, the Sessions Judge convicted all the accused for life imprisonment but sentenced Dara Singh to death. On appeal in 2005, the Orissa High Court commuted Dara Singh’s death sentence to life imprisonment. Thereafter, in its judgment on January 21, 2011, the Supreme Court of India upheld the High Court’s decision. The judgment notes that,

“In the case on hand, though Graham Staines and his two minor sons were burnt to death while they were sleeping inside a station wagon at Manoharpur, the intention was to teach a lesson to Graham Staines about his religious activities, namely, converting poor tribals to Christianity. All these aspects have been correctly appreciated by the High Court and modified the sentence of death into life imprisonment with which we concur.” (Para 43). The Court upheld the commuted the death sentence to life only because it did not meet the ‘rarest of rare’ threshold for capital punishment.

Related:

Dara Singh, convicted in string of 1999 communal killings, likely set for release by August 15

Odisha: Graham Staines’ Brutal Murder; Mystery Hangs Over Dara Singh’s Release

The post After some dithering, Odisha government rejects premature release of Graham Staines murder convict Dara Singh appeared first on SabrangIndia.

What led to the violent disruption of the reading circle on August 27 at the AUDA Garden in Vastrapur this year? Was it just the two books – ‘I Am Malala’ and ‘Anne Frank: The Diary of a Young Girl’ that provoked the violent mob led by the Bajrang Dal? Or was this part of a much larger pattern of violence in the Hindu version of Taliban where everything – from books, clothes, food, to films, comedy and protests – offends them?

More troubling is the role of a section of parents who brought in Bajrang Dal elements to “solve” their issues with the school management. Why would they willingly invite extremist hindutva elements into a school their wards studied in? While they sought to force changes in curriculum and administration, did these parents think that bringing in goons was the best way to do so?   

How it all started

The genesis of the reading circle was the decision of the Anand Niketan School, a private upmarket school in Ahmedabad to remove the books – the memoirs of Malala Yousafzai, the Pakistani education activist and Nobel Peace Prize winner and the diary of the German Jew and holocaust victim Anne Frank from its reading list after protests from a section of parents and right-wing groups.

But even before the books became the target of these parents and their rightwing supporters, a food safety issue at the school had pitted parents against the school administration. On August 12, a piece of glass was found in the canteen food, and the school authorities, rushed to get the student X-rayed to assure his parents that it was not swallowed.

The angry parents did not trust the report and soon the issue escalated. Other, unconfirmed reports said that a student had found worms in vegetables and   parents protested about eggs being cooked in the school canteen.

Target of Attack Shifted From Food to Books

The parents then chose to target a Muslim curriculum consultant who had been associated with the school for several years. They objected to the books ‘I Am Malala’ and ‘The Diary of a Young Girl’ being on the optional reading list. According to reports, some parents called Bajrang Dal members to fight the school administration on their behalf and on Aug 14, a mob led by Bajrang Dal leader Hiren Rabari climbed the gate and the boundary wall of the school to demand the removal of the books from the curriculum.

The issue snowballed from then on and the school administration decided to remove the books as well as terminate the contract of the consultant.

A young businessman in the city found the controversy over the books troubling and wanted to organise a silent reading in protest. He reached out to core members of the Students and Youth Collective (SYCA), Ahmedabad, and the collective co-organised the reading.

Violent Disruption of a Peaceful Reading

 The reading went on peacefully from 4 p.m. to about 6:15 p.m. at a park near the DEO office in Vastrapur. Around 6:30, as the group was dispersing, about 40 men entered the park shouting “Jai Shree Ram” and carrying thick wooden sticks, metal rods and baseball bats. Some wore saffron scarves. They had left more sticks outside the park, near the entrance.

Their body language was aggressive from the start, and the first thing they objected to was I Am Malala, though we also had books on Sardar Patel, Gandhi, Nehru and Ambedkar. They shouted, “Kya bola tha Malala ne Kashmir ke baare mein?” and “Usko padhne wale desh drohi hain.”

I was standing a little behind the group, filming. Two of them were staring at me, and I asked, “Kya hai, ghoor kyun rahe ho?” They said, “Tujhe dikkat hai to bahar chali ja, humein jo karna hai hum karenge.” Another said, “Zyada bolegi to pakad lo isko.” A second woman who was recording was told, “Kal tak gayab kar denge tujhe.” The man who appeared to be leading the mob gave his name: Hiren Rabari.

I could see this would turn violent quickly. A call was made to the police helpline. Some people tried to sit the men down and talk calmly, but they had no interest in a dialogue. To buy time, some of the readers began singing the national anthem; the attackers objected to that too, claiming one person’s shoulders had moved and that this was disrespect!

Then they began pushing and beating people. They shouted, “Inke pant utar ke check karo ye Musalman hai ki nahin.” Two or three ran towards the gate and tried to shut it so no one could come in to help. I ran over and stood there so they could not, shouting, “Aapki private property nahi hai ye, jo darwaza band kar sakte ho.”

By then, they were chasing people down the street in separate groups. It was about 7 p.m., peak office hours, and the street was full of people walking and riding two-wheelers. Residents of Casa Vyoma, the society directly opposite the park, were also watching.

Despite telling the police that the mob had assembled in large numbers, only two policemen arrived in a van — one in uniform, the driver in casuals. When the officer in uniform tried to stop the assault, the attackers beat him too, in front of everyone. No one watching said or did anything.

A man came up asking questions, giving the impression that he might be able to help. In my panic, I told him we had been reading books silently and that Bajrang Dal goons had come and started hitting us. He immediately began shouting, “Aeee, gunda kisko bola?” I said, “Jo dande leke aayega aur pitai karega wo gunda hi hai,” and he turned aggressive himself, advancing on me and repeating the question multiple times.

Another woman was hit with a stick. I saw that a friend was being beaten and ran towards him. By then, the police officer was panicking and instructing us to get into the van. We tried, but the attackers kept pulling my friends back out and slapping them. Both policemen looked badly shaken. “Kaise bhi jaldi baitho van mein, hum tumhe police station le ja rahe hain. Yahan ruke to ye log tumhe maar dalenge,” they said.

We reached Vastrapur police station. Others arrived with the books, and with sticks left behind in the park to show both the range of what we had been reading and the weapons used. We gathered in one room and began explaining the sequence of events. The PI, G M Chaudhary, spoke to us but did not pay attention to the details.

She watched some of the videos we had taken and asked the writer to record our statement, who wrote a single summary paragraph that left out everything specific. Seeing this, we said we would give a written complaint instead of an oral one. Some lawyers and senior activists had reached the station by then. We went over the draft several times, since each detail could determine a corresponding criminal charge.

We gave Hiren Rabari’s name. We had also identified some other attackers by matching our videos to their Instagram accounts — after Bajrang Dal Gujarat’s official account posted a video of the attack, boasting that they had taught us a lesson in their own language. The algorithm began pushing similar accounts to us, and we identified another attacker as Jimit Rabari.

The police brought three young attackers to the station, and they sat in the same space as us, quite casually. Soon, more of them began arriving, as though they were sitting in a park. It was very intimidating and triggering. We recognised at least 20 to 25 of their faces from the park. Two or three senior Bajrang Dal men came to the station and spoke to the PI for a long time behind a closed door.

Unlike the businessman, who had protested for the first time in his life, perhaps the rest of us did not look gullible. The PI shrewdly took him aside, recorded his statement — which again left out crucial details from our written complaint — and persuaded him to sign it. The rest of us, the primary complainants, witnesses and informants, were left out of the FIR process without our consent.

The PI kept saying she would match the details later, that she needed to eat, that she wanted to go home. We left the station at 2:15 a.m. The FIR, without the details we had been promised, was uploaded at 3 a.m., and, based on the messages we received in response, all three of those arrested were released at the same time.

No arrests, no further police action against the mob

There have been no arrests since. We filed an additional complaint setting out the differences between our written complaint and the FIR, had it inwarded from the DCP office and met the DCP Harshadkumar Patel, who said action would be taken within a week. Nothing followed. We were attacked on 27th August. On 31st, we held a press conference demanding the arrest of the two primary accused, Hiren Rabari and Jimit Rabari, within 72 hours; a ban on Bajrang Dal in Gujarat and across India; and a response and apology from Home Minister Harsh Sanghvi for failing to protect us and to deliver justice.

Twenty days on, we are still waiting. We hold responsible not only Bajrang Dal, the state government and the police — for a grave violation of our safety, for rioting, and inciting religious violence — but also the section of Anand Niketan parents and the people on the street, who have let Gujarat become a factory of hate and crime over the decades. These elements have given complete impunity to state-sponsored terrorism and culture wars.

These are the people who countenance violence against Muslims and Dalits every Navratri, or behave with cowardice and hypocrisy even when their own friends are attacked by saffron-clad men. These are the Brahmin and Jain men who eat meat in private while the administrators of their children’s school claim “all the students are strictly vegetarian.” They laugh at cheap jokes on caste, gender and class. They laugh at pronouns and the Palestinian flag and blame reservation for everything.

However, there is a pushback. The reading circle itself had emerged as a coming together of two groups -one led by students and the other, by working professionals – who were undoubtedly part of privileged castes and classes and would have been otherwise invested in the status quo of a post-2002 pogrom model of a “rising” Gujarat.

What follows now is a contest between the collusion of these elite hate mongers and the persistence of not-so-privileged young people who refuse to be cowed by political and social violence. We won’t be silenced!

*(The writer, who prefers to remain anonymous, was a participant in the reading circle and a witness to the violent mob’s disruption of it.)

Courtesy: Free Speech Collective

The post Anatomy of a Censoring Mob Threatened by Book Reading in Public appeared first on SabrangIndia.

A documentary about Khalid scheduled to be screened at the National Law School of India University (NLSIU) on September 14, was suddenly postponed. The Law & Society Committee, which had organised the event, said it had taken the decision because of “logistical and security considerations” and insisted that it was not backing down because of pressure. The documentary, Prisoner No. 626710 is Present, directed by Lalit Vachani, was to be shown to mark Political Prisoners’ Day and six years since Khalid’s arrest.

However, developments around the screening tell a different story. The postponement came after opposition from the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP), which had demanded that the screening be cancelled and subsequently claimed credit for its postponement. The News Minute reported that the organisation affiliated to the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) had formally complained to the NLSIU administration about the screening. The Quint likewise reported that the organisers maintained that their decision was not a response to external pressure. Significantly, the NLSIU episode was not an isolated incident.

Just weeks earlier, Jawaharlal Nehru University had formally cancelled the booking of an auditorium for a discussion around Khalid’s book, Fractured Communities: Adivasi Histories and the Politics of Power. While the university cited the organisers’ alleged “non-disclosure of the full facts” of the programme, this was contested by the organisers and as reported in The New Indian Express and Sabrangindia, the programme went ahead with retired professors addressing the gathering just outsider the School of Social Sciences-II building. A report on this may be read here.[1]

There is an unmistakable irony to these episodes.

While universities debate whether his work can be discussed, the much larger question remains unresolved: how long can a person remain imprisoned before the criminal justice system is required to put its case to trial?

Umar Khalid was arrested in September 2020 under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) in connection with the alleged larger conspiracy behind the February 2020 North-East Delhi riots. Six years later, the trial has still not begun. That fact is no longer a footnote to the case. It is the case. Two thousand, one hundred and ninety days as an under-trial prisoner.

Six years, and still waiting for a trial

Khalid has now spent six years in custody as an under trial. The prosecution case against him is “extensive” yet key allegations have not been buffeted by adequate evidence. The Delhi Police filed a charge sheet running into 11 volumes and more than 17,000 pages in September 2020. The larger conspiracy case involves many accused and, according to an August 2026 open letter signed by more than 100 public figures, the prosecution has listed around 900 witnesses. Yet the trial has not begun.

This creates a constitutional problem that cannot simply be answered by pointing to the seriousness of the allegations. Article 21 protects the right to life and personal liberty and has long been interpreted by the Supreme Court to include the right to a speedy trial. In Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court specifically recognised that prolonged incarceration can, in appropriate circumstances, justify bail even where stringent statutory restrictions apply.

The tension between that constitutional principle and the UAPA’s stringent bail regime now sits at the centre of Khalid’s case. Six years of imprisonment without trial means that the punishment of incarceration is being experienced before guilt has been adjudicated. That distinction matters.

Khalid has not been convicted of the allegations against him. The charges remain allegations. His guilt or innocence is ultimately for a trial court to determine after evidence is tested. But the trial has not begun.

The arrest came after years of being a public dissenter

Khalid’s current incarceration cannot be understood without the political and legal history that preceded it. A former JNU student leader and research scholar, Khalid emerged as a prominent public voice on questions of communalism, citizenship, minority rights and state power.

His name first became nationally prominent during the 2016 JNU controversy. In February that year, he was arrested in connection with an event held at JNU protesting the execution of Parliament attack convicts Afzal Guru and Maqbool Bhat. He and others were accused under provisions including sedition and criminal conspiracy. The case itself became emblematic of the criminalisation of political expression on university campuses. Then, SabrangIndia had interviewed Umar Khalid, and the two-part conversation can be viewed here and here.

In January 2019, the Delhi Police filed a charge sheet against Khalid and former JNU student leader Kanhaiya Kumar in the sedition case. Then came the political upheaval surrounding the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA 2019) and the proposed National Register of Citizens (NRC). Khalid was among those who participated in and addressed protests against the CAA-NRC framework in 2019 and 2020.

On February 17, 2020, Umar Khalid spoke about peaceful protest and invoked Gandhian methods. A portion of his remarks was subsequently circulated widely on social media after BJP IT-cell head Amit Malviya posted an edited interpretation of his comments. Worse, just ahead of the 2020 Delhi Assembly elections, Kapil Mishra of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) had stated on Twitter, “Delhi mein chote chote Pakistan bane (Delhi will become mini-Pakistan)” and “Shaheen Bagh mein Pak ki entry (Shaheen Bagh will serve as entry for Pakistan) as reported by The New Indian Express and The Hindu.” Mishra was even subsequently booked under Section 125 of the Representation of People Act, 1951 (RP Act), for promoting enmity between classes to gain an advantage during the elections and thereafter in June June 2024, Mishra was summoned by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. At the time in 2020, the Delhi High Court made the Delhi Police watch four videos in court establishing hate speeches that had been made by politicians but not acted on by the police. Kapil Mishra was one of the four videos. Justice Murlidhar who came down on the police sharply for inaction was summarily transferred to the Punjab and Haryana High Court. Despite the fact that the case dwindled to naught later, there have been sharp critiques on how justice has been selectively delivered. Not just Mishra but Anurag Thakur, were recorded delivering provocative and incendiary hate speeches at election rallies in February 2020. The courts, including the Supreme Court of India were eventually lenient with them (2026) as compared to the young Muslim student leadership at the helm of the anti-CAA/NRC protests. At an election rally, Anurag Thakur, an elected official of the BJP, was heard leading a chant of “Desh ke gaddaron ko…”, to which the crowd responded, “Goli maaron saalon ko.” The slogan went viral and drew widespread criticism. Just weeks later, Delhi witnessed large-scale communal violence that claimed 53 lives, with allegations raised that such speeches contributed to the charged atmosphere. Yet it was Umar and 17 others who bore the brunt of the blame for the violence.[2]

Days later, North-East Delhi descended into brute and targeted communal violence. Fifty-three people were killed and hundreds were injured. Ignoring the deliberate provocations by elected officials of the ruling BJP, the Delhi Police chose to target on the previous, vibrant and widespread anti-CAA/NRC protest leadership, developed a theory of a “larger conspiracy”, alleging that the anti-CAA protest movement had been used to plan and orchestrate the violence. Khalid became one of the principal accused in that case. Incidentally, while the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) was in power at the time and returned to power after the state elections, the Delhi police are controlled directly by the central/union ministry for home affairs.

September 2020: The beginning of six years behind bars

Khalid was arrested on September 13, 2020, under the UAPA. The prosecution alleged that he played a central role in the conspiracy behind the riots. The case was not merely an ordinary prosecution arising from individual acts of violence. The police’s case was that Khalid, and others were part of a broader conspiracy connected to the anti-CAA protests and that the protests themselves were used as part of a plan culminating in the violence.

The prosecution has repeatedly described Khalid as one of the alleged “masterminds” of the conspiracy. Khalid has consistently denied the allegations. What followed was a prolonged battle over bail and liberty.

2021: The first long bail battle

In April 2021, a Delhi trial court granted Khalid bail in a separate IPC case relating to the Delhi riots, observing that the material against him was sketchy and that he could not be incarcerated indefinitely on such material. That did not result in his release. His UAPA case continued.

By September 2021, his lawyers were back before the court seeking bail in the larger conspiracy case. The arguments went to the heart of the prosecution’s theory. Khalid’s lawyers argued that participation in protests, membership of WhatsApp groups and advocacy of a chakka jam could not, by themselves, constitute a terrorist conspiracy.

The defence also argued that the prosecution was attempting to paint a large number of individuals with the same brush and that the charge sheet presented a narrative rather than evidence establishing Khalid’s criminal role. The prosecution disputed this and argued that the protests had been systematically organised and synchronised. The bail hearings continued for months. In March 2022, the trial court rejected Khalid’s bail application. The court found a prima facie case against him under the UAPA. Khalid remained behind bars.

2023–24: The Supreme Court route and repeated adjournments

Khalid approached the Supreme Court. Notice was issued in May 2023. What followed was another prolonged sequence of hearings and adjournments. The matter was repeatedly listed before different benches. There were adjournments because of the unavailability of counsel, constitutional bench proceedings, changes in bench composition and the recusal of a judge.

On August 9, 2023, the matter came before Justices A.S. Bopanna and Prashant Kumar Mishra. Justice Bopanna indicated that the matter would come before another bench after Justice Mishra’s recusal. On September 12, the Supreme Court admitted the bail plea but indicated that the documentary material would have to be examined in detail. The hearings continued into October and November. In January 2024, the matter was again repeatedly adjourned. There were 44 deferrals of the matter before the apex court.

Finally, on February 14, 2024, Khalid withdrew the Supreme Court petition, with his counsel telling the court that he would pursue the matter before the trial court on account of a “change in circumstances”. That change did not result in liberty.

2024: Back to the trial court

In July 2024, Khalid moved the Karkardooma court for bail. The proceedings again became protracted. On May 28, 2024, the Karkardooma court rejected his bail plea. The prosecution argued, among other things, that Khalid had amplified what it described as a “false narrative” through social media. The defence rejected the allegations and continued to challenge the evidentiary basis of the prosecution case. The central problem, however, remained unchanged. Khalid was still in prison. And there was still no trial.

2025: Another rejection, another year in custody

On September 2, 2025, the Delhi High Court rejected Khalid’s bail plea. The court accepted the prosecution’s contention that the Delhi riots were the result of a “premeditated, well-orchestrated conspiracy” rather than a spontaneous eruption of violence. The court also held that delay in trial, by itself, could not justify bail given the gravity of the allegations.

Khalid challenged the decision before the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, the years continued to accumulate. In December 2025, a Delhi court granted him interim bail for 14 days so that he could attend his sister’s wedding. It was a brief departure from a pattern otherwise defined by continued incarceration. He returned to prison.

January 5, 2026: the Supreme Court’s crucial order

The most consequential development came on January 5, 2026. The Supreme Court, in Gulfisha Fatima v. State (NCT of Delhi), granted bail to five accused in the Delhi riots larger conspiracy case: Gulfisha Fatima, Meeran Haider, Shifa-ur-Rehman, Mohammad Saleem Khan and Shadab Ahmed. But it denied bail to Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam. The distinction drawn by the court became critical (and most contested).

The bench of Justices Aravind Kumar and N.V. Anjaria said that the prosecution material prima facie disclosed what it described as a “central and formative role” for Khalid and Imam, involving planning, mobilisation and strategic direction beyond “episodic and localised acts”. The court held that the threshold under Section 43D (5) of the UAPA was attracted. It also said that the accused could renew their bail applications after the examination of the protected witnesses or after one year from the judgment, whichever was earlier. At the same time, the court directed the trial court to expedite the proceedings.

April 2026: Review rejected

Khalid sought review of the January judgment. On April 20, 2026, the Supreme Court dismissed the review petition, finding no sufficient ground to review its January 5 judgment. The door to immediate reconsideration appeared closed.

May 2026: A Supreme Court bench questions the January approach

On May 18, 2026, a separate Supreme Court bench comprising Justices B.V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan delivered the judgment in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi v. National Investigation Agency. The bench emphasised the constitutional significance of liberty and the principle that bail is ordinarily the rule and imprisonment the exception. More significantly, the bench expressed reservations about the January Gulfisha Fatima judgment’s treatment of the Supreme Court’s earlier three-judge decision in K.A. Najeeb.

The judges held that judicial discipline required the two-judge bench deciding Gulfisha to follow the binding precedent laid down by the three-judge bench in Najeeb. The issue was subsequently referred to a larger bench after another Supreme Court bench identified a “perceived conflict” in the approaches taken by different benches. That development was seized upon by Khalid and Imam in their renewed bail proceedings.

And then came the latest bail battle

Khalid and Imam approached the Delhi High Court challenging the rejection of their third bail applications. The Delhi Police has now argued that they should not even be heard at this stage. In its response before the High Court, the police described the fresh bail proceedings as “illegal”, “misconceived” and an attempt to “mislead” the court.

The Supreme Court’s January 5 order, the police says, gave Khalid and Imam liberty to renew their bail applications only after one of two events occurred: the examination of protected witnesses or the expiry of one year from the judgment. According to the prosecution, neither event had occurred when the fresh pleas were filed.

Therefore, the police say, the applications are premature. Scroll.in, reporting on August 27, quoted the prosecution’s position that the May judgment in Andrabi, arising from another case, could not override the specific directions issued in Gulfisha. The police have also relied on the Supreme Court’s May 22 order in Tasleem Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi), which acknowledged the divergence between the Gulfisha and Andrabi approaches and referred the issue to a larger bench.

The State’s position is that until the larger bench settles the question, the January judgment continues to bind the High Court.

When does pre-trial detention become punishment?

The prosecution’s argument is this: the allegations are grave, Section 43D(5) applies, the Supreme Court has already assessed the material and Khalid’s alleged role is different from that of the accused who were granted bail. But there is another side to the equation. Khalid has spent six years in prison without trial. The prosecution has reportedly listed around 900 witnesses and there is no sign of the trial beginning any time soon.

The case involves thousands of pages of evidence and many accused. The more complicated the prosecution case becomes, the longer it can take to bring it to trial. But that cannot mean that the complexity of the prosecution’s own case becomes a reason for indefinite pre-trial incarceration. This is precisely why K.A. Najeeb matters. The Supreme Court’s three-judge bench in that case recognised that statutory restrictions on bail cannot be interpreted in a manner that makes constitutional rights meaningless. Where incarceration becomes excessively prolonged and there is no reasonable prospect of the trial being completed within a meaningful timeframe, Article 21 can acquire decisive significance. Detailed pieces may be read here, here and here.

A six-year incarceration has become a public question

On August 15, more than 100 writers, academics, activists, filmmakers, journalists and public figures wrote to Chief Justice of India Surya Kant urging intervention in the continued incarceration of Khalid and Sharjeel Imam. As reported by The Wire, the signatories invoked K.A. Najeeb and argued that nearly six years of detention without the commencement of trial demands constitutional scrutiny. Their intervention reflects a broader anxiety about what prolonged pre-trial incarceration does to the meaning of liberty itself.

Six years is a long time to spend behind bars without a verdict. Umar Khalid has not been convicted of the charges against him, yet six years of pre-trial incarceration have already become a defining fact of his case. His bail battles continue, the prosecution and defence remain locked in arguments over the scope of the UAPA, and the larger question of how long a person can remain imprisoned while awaiting trial remains unresolved.

The courts will ultimately decide the charges against Khalid. But six years of incarceration without that determination cannot be reduced to another date in a long procedural timeline. It is a measure of the extraordinary cost of prolonged pre-trial detention. For Khalid, the wait for trial is no longer simply a stage in the criminal process. It has itself become the story.

Detailed pieces may be read here, here, here and here.

A profile on Umar Khalid may be viewed here.

[1] Professor Avinash Kumar, who had submitted the requisition for the auditorium, was particularly categorical. “The stated reason for the cancellation of the booking of the SSS auditorium is false,” he said, according to Hindustan Times report. Kumar maintained that the Dean had been fully informed that the event was going to discuss Khalid’s book and that the requisition had been prepared in the format suggested by the Dean himself.

His question was simple: if the university did not know what the event was about, why was the auditorium booking approved in the first place?

[2] In 2020, prior to the Delhi riots, Parvesh Verma was a Member of Parliament (MP) in the Lok Sabha, representing the West Delhi constituency. He belonged to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

During the February 2020 Delhi Assembly elections, Kapil Mishra was a BJP candidate from the Karawal Nagar constituency (which he lost). He did not hold a formal government or party organizational position during the February 2020 riots. In early 2020, prior to the Delhi riots in February, Anurag Thakur held the designation of Union Minister of State (MoS) for Finance and Corporate Affairs in the Government of India. Simultaneously, he was a serving Member of Parliament (MP) in the Lok Sabha representing the Hamirpur constituency of Himachal Pradesh.

Related:

The Conspiracy of Silence: HC denies bail to Delhi riots accused

How free are all Indians to exercise their right to peacefully protest under Article 19?

UAPA: Delhi HC denies bail, Umar Khalid’s Incarceration to Continue

4 years onward, activist Gulfisha Fatima remains behind bars

Order denying bail to Dr. Umar Khalid, a mockery of judicial system?

Dastardly attempt to assassinate Umar Khalid

Witch hunt against Umar Khalid and Kanhaiya Kumar continues

The post Six Years Behind Bars, Still No Trial: Umar Khalid’s long wait for justice appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Sent as a personal message, Prof Ghanshyam Shah drew my attention to the fact that, at one point, the sect’s top sadhus had declared that they were not Hindus during a case in the Supreme Court. He further told me that its temples once did not allow “untouchables” to enter.

Nothing unusual, I thought, for a groundbreaking study, supported by an Ahmedabad-based Dalit rights NGO, Navsarjan Trust, “Understanding Untouchability”, had found the widespread prevalence of untouchability in 1,589 Gujarat villages it surveyed. It said that more than 90 per cent of rural Dalits reported facing “no entry” in temples during religious ceremonies. The 2009 survey became such an eyesore for the state government that the latter sponsored a parallel study to counter the Navsarjan claim.

I looked it up, and sources told me that the case was Sastri Yagnapurushdasji and Others v. Muldas Bhudardas Vaishya and Another. It so happened that in 1947, the Province of Bombay passed the Bombay Harijan Temple Entry Act—later superseded by the Bombay Hindu Places of Public Worship (Entry-Authorisation) Act, 1956—to eradicate untouchability by legally granting Dalits (then referred to as Harijans) the right to enter and worship in all Hindu public places of worship on equal terms.

Following the law’s passage, leaders and followers (satsangis) of one of the major Swaminarayan sects, operating from Ahmedabad, filed a suit seeking a permanent injunction to prevent non-satsangi Dalits—those not initiated into the spiritual teachings of Swaminarayan—from entering their temples.

The sect’s argument for exempting its temples from the social reform legislation was that the Swaminarayan faith, or Swaminarayan sampradaya, was an entirely separate and distinct religion, not part of the Hindu religion. Hence, the Bombay temple-entry laws—which applied specifically to “Hindu” places of public worship—did not apply to Swaminarayan temples.

The case, which began in Ahmedabad, went up to the Supreme Court, whose Constitution Bench, led by Chief Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar, ruled on January 14, 1966, that the Swaminarayan sect was an integral part of the Hindu religion. The court observed that Hinduism, unlike prophetic, monotheistic religions, does not depend on a single founder, a single holy book, or a uniform dogma. It described Hinduism as a broad, inclusive “way of life” capable of accommodating diverse theological views, reform movements, and sub-traditions. It went on to trace the theological foundation of Swaminarayan (Sahajanand Swami) to the Vishishtadvaita philosophy of Ramanuja. It noted that the sect accepts the authority of foundational Hindu scriptures—the Vedas, the Upanishads, the Bhagavad Gita, and the Bhagavata Purana—and worships traditional Hindu deities alongside its founder. Consequently, internal reforms or distinct sectarian practices did not sever it from the Hindu fold.

The court held that freedom of religion under Articles 25 and 26 cannot override constitutional mandates aimed at ending social evils like untouchability. Article 25(2)(b) specifically preserves the state’s power to provide for social welfare and reform by opening Hindu religious institutions to all classes and sections of Hindus.

Therefore, Swaminarayan temples fall squarely within the scope of public Hindu temples, making it unlawful to bar Dalit Hindus from entry.

Sources tell me that neither BAPS nor the Maninagar group, the two largest branches of the sect, were parties to the litigation, and that the case was fought by followers and sadhus of the original Swaminarayan sampradaya—specifically the Northern Gadi, centred at the Shri Nar Narayan Dev Temple in Kalupur, Ahmedabad.

Yet, despite claims of equality before God, the fact is that historical and sociological evidence suggests that Dalits (formerly untouchables) faced significant exclusion and separate worship practices within the Swaminarayan framework, and BAPS was no exception between the late 19th and mid-20th centuries.

While BAPS and “modern” Swaminarayan organisations emphasise spiritual equality, there have been several ways in which caste distinctions were enforced.

The primary ethical manual for all Swaminarayan followers—including BAPS—is the Shikshapatri, was written the 19th century. The Shikshapatri no doubt sought to initiate followers across caste lines and preached against outward notions of pollution in bhakti, yet it explicitly accommodated traditional Varnashrama Dharma. It referred to Slokas 17–20 and 91 in order to instruct followers not to abandon the duties and ritual observances of their own caste. In fact, there were ritual purity rules which dictated that touching members of the “lowest castes” (antyaja or outcastes) caused ritual impurity requiring purificatory bathing.

An authoritative interpretation of Shikshapatri published by the temple authorities under the title “The Epistle of Precepts” states that the caste system is “designed for effective organisation and management of society. It provides a distribution of manpower for various necessary jobs.” Comparing it with “White collar/Blue collar separation of the work force in the West”, the write-up insists that it is “enforced by birth”, and that depending on “one’s past karmas”, one is “born to endure the miseries or pleasures arising from a particular caste”. It adds: “If the caste system and the duties for each caste were followed then there is no doubt that we could return the former glory of ‘Rama Rajya’. The caste system is in no way a burden and needs to be preserved.”

Because caste rules prevented low-caste followers from worshipping alongside upper-caste Patidars and Brahmins in major temples, the sampradaya is said to have historically addressed Dalit devotion by building separate shrines or requiring external worship. Sociologist Raymond Brady Williams is cited for documenting that in parts of Gujarat (such as Chhani near Vadodara), separate temples were maintained specifically for Dalit devotees, where they could manage and perform rituals themselves without entering dominant-caste shrines. Further, early colonial observers and 19th-century commentators noted that while untouchables were inducted as disciples, social conservatism among dominant-caste followers led them to build segregated shrines or sit outside during satsang assemblies.

It is within this framework that BAPS (or, for that matter, the Maninagar Gadi) never claimed to be non-Hindu. Unlike the orthodox Ahmedabad litigants in the 1948-1966 Yagnapurushdasji case—or groups like the Ramakrishna Mission, which in the 1980s famously petitioned courts for non-Hindu minority status under Article 30 to protect its schools—BAPS never made any legal, institutional, or theological claim of being a separate, non-Hindu religion.

Instead, BAPS took the opposite approach, establishing itself as an assertive, global champion of classical Hindu identity, identifying itself as a “socio-spiritual Hindu organisation” rooted in Vedic Sanatana Dharma, whatever that may mean. Today, its literature, constitutional charters, and global temples—such as the Akshardham complexes in Delhi, Gandhinagar, and Robbinsville, New Jersey—are officially branded as Hindu mandirs and centres of Hindu culture.

In fact, sources insist that BAPS protagonists have sought to justify the claim that the assertion “We are not Hindu” was primarily an expedient legal defence, not an authentic theological shift.

The 1948-1966 court plaint (Sastri Yagnapurushdasji v. Muldas Bhudardas Vaishya), originally filed on January 12, 1948, in the Civil Court at Ahmedabad, explicitly argued that the religion of the Swaminarayan sect was “distinct and separate from the Hindu religion”, just to bypass the Bombay Harijan Temple Entry Act.

Further, BAPS never sought to endorse the “non-Hindu minority” legal trend that prevailed across India during the mid-to-late 20th century, when several prominent Hindu-origin organisations filed official court petitions seeking status as distinct, non-Hindu religious minorities to protect their institutions from state control or social legislation—something the Ramakrishna Mission in West Bengal, as well as the Lingayats in Karnataka, did.

Yet, for a long time, in BAPS, while non-Brahmin dominant castes (predominantly Patidars) made up much of the sadhu leadership, Dalits were not accepted into the ascetic order. Dalit satsangis, it was claimed, historically observed customary caste restrictions as part of their caste duty (dharma), resulting in a virtual absence of Dalit ascetics. It was only beginning in the 1980s and 1990s, under Pramukh Swami Maharaj, that BAPS formally began breaking this precedent by initiating sadhus from Dalit and Adivasi backgrounds and integrating them into full temple rituals and sanctum priesthood.

And what is the Dalit status today in BAPS temples? Sources tell me that while officially there are no caste-based restrictions on Dalits in its temples, neither BAPS nor any other Swaminarayan Gadi publishes an official caste census of its monastic order. Doctrinally, the sects maintain that upon taking initiation (diksha), a sadhu renounces their worldly identity and pre-monastic caste.

However, detailed field studies and academic documentation by sociologists and historians such as Raymond Brady Williams, Rachel Dwyer, David Hardiman, and Ghanshyam Shah provide some idea, stating that while BAPS formally ended caste-based exclusions for monastic initiation in the late 20th century, the actual proportion of Dalit and Adivasi sadhus is estimated to be well under 1%—representing a tiny handful of individuals out of more than 1,100 to 1,200 living sadhus. And most of the marginalised-community inductions into the sadhu order have come from Adivasi (tribal) communities in eastern and southern Gujarat, rather than Dalits. Adivasis, in the caste-based structure of Hinduism, do not fall under the “untouchables” category.

As for other Swaminarayan sects—the Vadtal and Ahmedabad Gadi (the original sampradaya)—the proportion of those wearing saffron robes is effectively 0%. Patidars overwhelmingly rank across almost all Swaminarayan sects and are heavily concentrated among dominant landowning and mercantile castes—estimated by sociologists to make up 60% to over 80% of the sadhus, while Brahmins and Banias comprise most of the remaining portion of the ascetic order.

In several Swaminarayan establishments, the low-caste candidates who entered the monastic path were permanently relegated to the status of parshads (also called palas or bhagats). They wore white clothes, performed manual labour, and were barred from receiving full saffron renunciation (bhagwati diksha).

As for BAPS, in the 1980s–1990s, as part of its expanded youth initiatives, there was tribal/backward-class outreach. At the 1981 Swaminarayan bicentenary mega event in Ahmedabad, Pramukh Swami initiated a massive cohort of young, educated men into the monastic order, beginning a formal systematisation of the training pipeline, which included initiating youths from backward-class and tribal (Adivasi) backgrounds into saffron robes, granting them new ascetic names and the sacred thread.

According to Williams, Pramukh Swami “abolished for BAPS the caste-related category of ascetics permanently in white”. From that period onwards, the parshad (white-clad) status in BAPS ceased to be an indicator of lower caste. Instead, it became a mandatory, temporary probationary phase (typically lasting one to three years) that every novice—regardless of caste or social background—must undergo before taking full saffron vows.

David Hardiman, a prominent subaltern historian and sociologist of modern Gujarat and Professor Emeritus of History at the University of Warwick, noted in “Class Base of the Swaminarayan Sect” (Economic and Political Weekly, 1988) that while the Swaminarayan Sampradaya historically served as an ideological vehicle for the upwardly mobile Kanbi/Patidar agrarian elite, the sect incorporated lower-caste and Adivasi groups through moral reform (temperance, vegetarianism), which structurally limited Dalits from rising into spiritual leadership or ascetic power within dominant institutions.

I would like to end with the following observation by Prof Ghanshyam Shah in “Untouchability in Rural India”, co-authored with Harsh Mander, Sukhadeo Thorat, et al.:

“While the evidence … suggests that the more blatant and extreme forms of untouchability appear to have declined, discrimination continues and is most prevalent in the religious and personal spheres.”

Further:

“Removal of untouchability was on their agenda; it was however primarily confined to removing the taboo of physical touch rather than socio-economic discrimination and inequality.”

Courtesy: CounterView

The post Swaminarayan, untouchability and the ‘we are not Hindu’ argument appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The first reports of children falling ill emerged in the early phase of the crisis, with fever, rashes and other symptoms being reported from the tribal belt. The official account initially placed the number of deaths far below the figures subsequently reported by villagers and local representatives. According to Dainik Bhaskar, the government initially reported eight deaths, while the toll later rose through figures of 19, 22, 24 and 27. By September, Congress leaders were citing 30 deaths and media reports had placed the number at 31, although the administration had not released a final official figure.

Scroll, in its September 4 report, said that at least 25 Baiga and Gond children had died since May and reported that a suspected measles-malaria outbreak had remained undetected for two months in remote Adivasi habitations because of the absence of an adequate healthcare system. The report brought into sharp focus what villagers had been saying: that the crisis was not merely about an infectious disease, but about how little access these communities had to functioning public healthcare in the first place.

The Press Club of India strongly condemns the suspension of the Instagram accounts of three independent journalists following their ground reporting from Balaghat, Madhya Pradesh, on a public health crisis involving the deaths of children from the Adivasi community. pic.twitter.com/3lcjVXcbEd

— Press Club of India (@PCITweets) September 8, 2026

The deaths cannot be reduced to a single disease

The investigations have identified measles, malaria and, in some cases, possible measles-malaria co-infection. Children were also found suffering from dehydration, anaemia, respiratory complications and severe malnutrition. Officials have said that different children presented with different clinical conditions and that no single disease has been established as the cause of every reported death. Some children reportedly died at home or before reaching a healthcare facility, leaving investigators without medical records or diagnostic samples in several cases. A retrospective case-by-case review, including verbal autopsies, is consequently being undertaken.

But the absence of a single pathogen does not make the crisis any less serious. In fact, the health data emerging from the region points towards a much deeper structural failure. A Central government screening exercise covered 32,433 people. It identified 7,711 children with severe acute malnutrition, of whom 518 required admission to Nutrition Rehabilitation Centres. Another 13,406 children were treated for diarrhoea and 274 for severe pneumonia. Since July, 431 children had reportedly been admitted to hospitals, with 52 still undergoing treatment at the time of the report.

These figures make it difficult to view the deaths simply as an isolated outbreak. They reveal communities in which infectious disease, malnutrition, unsafe or inadequate water, poor sanitation and delayed access to medical treatment are interacting with one another.

Balaghat was not an unexpected health-risk zone

The crisis also did not emerge in an epidemiological vacuum. Balaghat has been identified as a major malaria hotspot. According to the health data, of the 2,126 malaria cases reported in Madhya Pradesh in 2025, 685 came from Balaghat. By July 2026, the district had already recorded 174 of the State’s 583 reported malaria cases.

The question, therefore, is not simply why children contracted malaria, measles or other infections. It is why children living in communities already known to face severe deprivation were allowed to reach such critical levels of illness before an adequate response was mounted.

That question becomes more pointed when viewed against the Union government’s own welfare architecture. The Pradhan Mantri Janjati Adivasi Nyaya Maha Abhiyan, or PM-JANMAN, was created specifically to improve the socio-economic conditions of PVTG communities. The scheme carries an outlay of ₹24,104 crore over three years and includes interventions intended to address basic services and infrastructure in PVTG habitations. Yet a Parliamentary Standing Committee, as reported by The Hindu, subsequently questioned why there were still no clear answers about the causes of the deaths months after the first cases had appeared.

The contradiction is difficult to ignore: government schemes may report near-complete sanctions and high aggregate levels of “saturation”, but the reality on the ground was children falling severely ill in settlements where access to basic healthcare remained precarious.

The protests exposed what official figures did not

As the number of deaths became increasingly contested, anger grew in the affected communities. One of the most disturbing allegations concerned the death of four-year-old Luvkush in Baigatola. Villagers alleged that the administration arranged his cremation without a post-mortem while his parents were away in Hyderabad looking for work. The allegation was followed by villagers blocking the Balaghat-Baihar road. The protests were not simply expressions of grief. They were also demands for recognition, accountability and answers.

The issue deepened when the administration issued an order restricting photography and media coverage in hospitals. The order was withdrawn within hours following protests, as per Scroll. The Collector subsequently clarified that it had been issued in haste and was intended to prevent demonstrations rather than restrict media coverage. But in a crisis already marked by conflicting death figures and allegations that cases were not being adequately recorded, even a short-lived attempt to restrict what could be documented inevitably raised questions about transparency.

There was another serious institutional controversy. According to The Hindu, then Chief Medical and Health Officer Dr Paresh Uplab continued to describe the illnesses as seasonal ailments even as the reported death toll had risen substantially. He was subsequently removed, with Dr Manoj Pandey taking charge, followed later by Dr Shatrughan Singh Dahiya.

The issue, therefore, was no longer simply whether the children had died from measles, malaria, malnutrition or a combination of conditions. It was also whether the State had accurately recognised the crisis while it was unfolding.

The State’s response came in stages

The government has since substantially expanded its response. The 50-bed paediatric facility at the district hospital was expanded to 150 beds, while a Covid ward was temporarily converted into a paediatric ward. Mobile Medical Units were deployed in Birsa and Baihar to provide fever screening, outpatient consultations, maternal and child healthcare, tuberculosis and non-communicable disease screening, medicines and primary diagnosis in remote areas.

According to the Dainik Bhasker report, more than 600 drinking-water sources were purified, insecticide spraying was carried out in 4,338 households and fogging was undertaken in affected and adjoining areas. More than 14,000 children aged between one and ten received an additional Measles-Rubella vaccine dose.

The government also expanded surveillance to around 50 villages, increased sanitation interventions and strengthened treatment and referral arrangements. As reported by The Sun Today, the Chief Minister visited Balaghat on August 30, met affected families and announced ₹2 lakh assistance for each family of a deceased child. The government also announced a ₹225-crore development plan covering 100 villages formerly affected by Naxal activity.

These interventions are necessary. But they also raise an uncomfortable question: why did many of these measures become visible only after the deaths, protests and national attention?

Parliament asks the question the villages had already been asking

The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Social Justice and Empowerment questioned representatives of the Tribal Affairs Ministry, the Jal Shakti Ministry and the Department of Telecommunications about the Balaghat deaths, The Hindu reported. Members asked why, months after the first cases, there were still no clear answers regarding the causes of death. The Committee also questioned the implementation of PM-JANMAN and sought village-wise saturation data rather than aggregate figures.

A scheme cannot be considered successful merely because projects have been sanctioned on paper. A health intervention cannot be judged by the number of mobile units deployed after an outbreak. And a welfare programme cannot be called saturated while children in the communities it targets remain severely malnourished and struggle to reach medical care.

Political intervention followed public outrage

The Opposition also intervened. Times of India reported that Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha Rahul Gandhi described reports of 30 tribal children dying in Balaghat as extremely concerning and distressing, and called on Chief Minister Mohan Yadav to ensure immediate investigation, treatment and relief. Madhya Pradesh Leader of Opposition Umang Singhar separately wrote to Prime Minister Narendra Modi seeking a high-level medical inquiry and questioning how children could die from illnesses that may be treatable with timely intervention.

LoP @RahulGandhi Ji Writes- “बालाघाट, मध्य प्रदेश में 30 आदिवासी बच्चों की मौत की खबर बेहद चिंताजनक और पीड़ादायक है। इस घातक बीमारी के साथ पीने के पानी, पोषण, और समय पर इलाज जैसी बुनियादी सुविधाओं का अभाव बच्चों की जान ले रहा है।

ये सरकार की पूर्ण विफलता है। मुख्यमंत्री स्वयं… https://t.co/dUc5of2PSl pic.twitter.com/hrAlC0J2wD

— Mumbai Congress (@INCMumbai) September 5, 2026

बालाघाट, मध्य प्रदेश में 30 आदिवासी बच्चों की मृत्यु की खबर बेहद चिंताजनक और पीड़ादायक है।

इस घातक बीमारी के साथ पीने के पानी, पोषण, और समय पर इलाज जैसी बुनियादी सुविधाओं का अभाव बच्चों की जान ले रहा है।

ये सरकार की पूर्ण विफलता है। मुख्यमंत्री स्वयं इसका समाधान करें और क्षेत्र… pic.twitter.com/1fkfehcdnN

— Rahul Gandhi (@RahulGandhi) September 5, 2026

Recently, Cockroach Janata Party founder Abhijit Dipke also visited Balaghat.

I’m on my way to Balaghat, MP, where 30 Tribal children have died.

I’ve received information from one of the Tribal activists that MP Police is now moving to detain some of the Tribal students coordinating my visit.

Why is it always a BJP-ruled state that seems so afraid of the…

— Abhijeet Dipke (@abhijeet_dipke) September 11, 2026

The Gondwana Gantantra Party went further, giving the administration 15 days to provide ₹50 lakh compensation to the family of every deceased child and demanding a CBI investigation. These interventions have ensured that the deaths cannot simply disappear into the administrative language of “seasonal illness”, “surveillance” or “ongoing investigation”.

The High Court steps in

The Madhya Pradesh High Court sought a response from the State government on a public interest litigation concerning the deaths of more than 30 tribal children. As reported by LiveLaw, the petition alleged inadequate medical care and pointed to around 400 children being treated in a facility that initially had only 50 beds. The petition was filed after media reports brought the deaths to public attention.

The Court initially directed the petitioner to personally visit the affected areas and verify the claims rather than proceed solely on newspaper reports. After the petitioner submitted a ground report, the Court issued notices to the State Health Department, Women and Child Development Department, the Balaghat Collector and other authorities. The ground report alleged that handpumps in affected areas were producing yellow-coloured water, that children and women had not received nutritious food on time for months, and that poor sanitation was contributing to infections. It further alleged that significant administrative action followed only after the number of deaths had crossed 30.

What does Balaghat reveal?

The most disturbing feature of the Balaghat crisis may ultimately be that none of its individual components is entirely new. Malaria was already a known problem. Malnutrition was already present. The affected communities were already among India’s most vulnerable tribal populations. Remote settlements already faced difficulties accessing healthcare. Yet the crisis escalated to the point where dozens of children were reported dead and hundreds became ill before the State response reached the scale now being described.

Whether the final death toll is 25, 30 or another number, whether individual deaths are ultimately attributed to malaria, measles, malnutrition, respiratory complications or combinations of these, the underlying failures remain visible: severe malnutrition, inadequate healthcare access, sanitation concerns, difficulties with transportation and referral, questions around drinking water, delayed detection and serious disagreement between communities and the administration over the scale of the crisis.

The tragedy in Balaghat is therefore not only about how these children died. It is about how long they were allowed to remain vulnerable before the State responded with urgency.

Related:

Satya Niketan Collapse: When students and neighbours had to rescue students from a system that had failed them

‘Forum for Electoral Integrity’ petitions NHRC over mass voter disenfranchisement under SIR

‘Forum for Electoral Integrity’ petitions NHRC over mass voter disenfranchisement under SIR

Beaten to Death Outside His Own Home: What Delhi owes Chongtham Vikram Singh

Midnight Arrest, Daylight Questions: Why was Santosh Pandit taken into custody?

The post Deaths, Denials and Delayed Action: The Balaghat crisis appeared first on SabrangIndia.