Stan Swamy listed all the activities that have made him a ‘Desh Drohi,’ a traitor of the country, in his open letter after he was charged with sedition. This short note was written by Fr Stan Swamy after the Jharkhand authorities filed a case of sedition against him for supporting the adivasi Pathalgadi movement. He is one of 20 activists accused of sedition, a committed Jesuit priest.

During the past two decades, I have identified myself with the Adivasi people and their struggle for a life of dignity and self-respect. As a writer, I have tried to analyse the different issues they are facing. In this process, I have clearly expressed dissent with several policies, laws enacted by the govt in the light of the Indian Constitution. I have questioned the validity, legality, justness of several steps taken by the govt and the ruling class.

As for the Pathalgadi issue, I have asked the question “Why are Adivasis doing this?” I believe they have been exploited and oppressed beyond tolerance. The rich minerals which are excavated in their land have enriched outsider industrialists and businessmen and impoverished the Adivasi people to the extent there are starvation deaths taking place.

They have had no share in what is produced. Also, the laws and policies enacted for their wellbeing are deliberately left unimplemented. So they have reached a situation where they realised ‘enough is enough’ and are seeking to re-invent their identity by empowering their Gram Sabhas through Pathalgadis. Their action is understandable.

Some questions that I have raised are as follows:

1. I have questioned the Non-implementation of the 5th Schedule of the Constitution [Indian Constitution, Article 244(1)]clearly stipulates that a ‘Tribes Advisory Council’ (TAC) composed solely of members from the Adivasi community who will advise the Governor of the State about any and everything concerning the protection, well-being and development of the Adivasi people in the State. The Governor is the constitutional custodian of the Adivasi people and he/she can make laws on his/her own and can annul any other law enacted by the parliament or state assembly always keeping in mind the welfare of the Adivasi people.

Whereas the reality is that in none of the States during all these nearly seven decades has any State Governor ever used his/her constitutional discretionary power to reach out to the Adivasi people proffering the excuse that they have to work in harmony with the elected government of the State. The meeting of the TAC takes place rarely, and it is convened by and presided over by the Chief Minister of the State and is controlled by the ruling party. TAC has thus been reduced to a toothless body. Verily a constitutional fraud meted out to the Adivasi people.

2) I have questioned why the Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act [PESA],1996 [No:40 of 1996] have been neatly ignored which for the first time recognized the fact the Adivasi communities in India have had a rich social and cultural tradition of self-governance through the Gram Sabha.
Whereas the reality is this Act of the parliament has deliberately been left unimplemented in all the nine states. It means the capitalist ruling class does not want the Adivasi people to self-govern themselves.

3) I have questioned the silence of the govt on Samatha Judgment, 1997 of the Supreme Court [Civil Appeal Nos:4601-2 of 1997] which came as a huge relief to the Adivasi communities in Scheduled Areas. It came at a time when consequent to the policy of globalization, liberalization, marketisation, privatisation national and international corporate houses started to invade particularly the Adivasi areas in central India to mine the mineral riches. The govt machinery gave its full cooperation to these companies. Any resistance by the Adivasi people was put down with an iron hand. The judgment was meant to provide some significant safeguards for the Adivasis to control the excavation of minerals in their lands and to help develop themselves economically.

Whereas the reality is the state has ignored this verdict of the highest court. Several cases have been filed by affected communities but the ‘law of eminent domain’ of the colonial rulers are invoked to alienate Adivasi land and to loot the rich mineral resources.

4) I have questioned the half-hearted action of govt on Forest Rights Act, 2006: [Act of Parliament No:2 of 2007] jal, jangal, jamin, as we know, are the basis of the economic life of the Adivasi people. Of particular importance is their traditional rights in the forest have been infringed upon systematically over the decades. At long last, the govt came to the realization that a historic injustice has been done to the Adivasi and other traditional forest-dwellers. To correct this anomaly, it enacted this Act.

Whereas the reality is far from desirable. From 2006 to 2011 of its operation, about 30 lakh applications were made all over the country for title-deeds, of which 11 lakhs were approved but 14 lakhs were rejected and five lakhs were pending. Of late the Jharkhand govt is trying to bypass the Gram Sabha in the process of acquiring forest land for industrial set up.

5) I have questioned the inaction of the govt to carry out the SC order ‘Owner of the land is also the owner of sub-soil minerals’. [SC: Civil Appeal No 4549 of 2000] wherein it has said “we are of the opinion that there is nothing in the law which declares that all mineral wealth sub-soil rights vest in the State, on the other hand, the ownership of sub-soil/mineral wealth should normally follow the ownership of the land, unless the owner of the land is deprived of the same by some valid process.”

The rich minerals in their lands are being looted by the govt and private companies. The Supreme Court has declared 214 out of the 219 Coal-Blocks in the country illegal and ordered their closure and levied a fine on them for their illegal mining. But the Central & State Govts have found a way out by re-allotting these illegal mines through auction to make it look legal!

6) I have questioned the reasons why SC observation is being ignored that ‘Mere membership of a banned organisation will not make a person a criminal unless he resorts to violence or incites people to violence or creates public disorder by violence or incitement to violence. [SC: Criminal Appeal No: 889 of 2007]. The court rejected the doctrine of ‘guilt by association’.

It is common knowledge that many young men and women are held in prison on the suspicion of being “helpers of Naxalites”. After arresting them other penal clauses are added on. It is an easy label that can be put on anyone whom the police want to catch. It does not require any proof or witness. Supreme Court says even membership in a banned organisation does not make a person a criminal. How far removed are the law and order forces from the judiciary!

7) I have questioned the recently enacted Amendment to ‘Land Acquisition Act 2013’ by Jharkhand govt which sound a death-knell for the Adivasi Community. This does away with the requirement for “Social Impact Assessment’ which was aimed at safeguarding the environment, social relations and cultural values of affected people. The most damaging factor is the govt can allow any agricultural land for non-agricultural purposes. So, any and everything can be included.
8) I have questioned ‘Land Bank’ which I see as the most recent plot to annihilate the Adivasi people.

During ‘Momentum Jharkhand’ in February 2017 the govt announced that 21 lakh acres in Land Bank of which 10 lakh acres is ready for allotment to industrialists.

Gair-Majurwa” land (uncultivated land) can be ‘khas’ (private) or ‘aam’ (common). As per tradition, individual Adivasi families or communities have been in possession and use this land [jamabandi]. Now the govt shockingly cancelled all ‘jamabandi’ titles and claims that all ‘gair-majurwa’ land belongs to the govt and it is free to allot it to anybody (read industrial houses) to set up their small and big industries.

People are in the dark about their land being written off. The TAC has not given its approval as is required by the Vth Sched., the respective Gram Sabhas have not given their consent as required by PESA Act, affected Adivasi people have not given their consent as required by Land Acquisition Act (2013).

Above are the questions I have consistently raised.

If this makes me a ‘Desh Drohi’ then so be it!

The post I raise my voice for Adivasis, am I a Traitor? appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The judgment is a strong reaffirmation of the constitutional guarantees under Articles 19 and 21, recognising that the freedom to express political disagreement and the right to live with dignity cannot be curtailed through executive action unsupported by law. Rejecting the police’s justification, the Court concluded that the externment proceedings were unsupported by material, based on an erroneous application of the Maharashtra Police Act, and tainted by mala fides.

The hearing also attracted considerable public attention because of Justice Jamdar’s unusually candid oral observations questioning the increasing use of criminal law against protesters and commenting on Maharashtra’s contemporary political landscape. Although these remarks do not form part of the operative judgment, they underscore the constitutional concerns that informed the Court’s approach to the case.

Background: Externment order passed against SDPI office-bearer

The petitioner, Saeed Ahmad Abdul Wahid Chaudhary, serves as the General Secretary of the Social Democratic Party of India (SDPI), a political party registered with the Election Commission of India under Section 29A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The writ petition challenged two administrative orders: an externment order dated December 3, 2025 passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Zone VI, Chembur, Mumbai, and the appellate order dated March 27, 2026 passed by the Divisional Commissioner, Konkan Division, affirming the externment.

The externment directed that Chaudhary be removed from the area for one year under Section 56 of the Maharashtra Police Act.

According to the State authorities, several FIRs had been registered against him, principally in connection with protests organised against decisions of the Union Government. These included demonstrations concerning amendments to citizenship laws, the Gyanvapi mosque dispute, and other politically contentious issues. The police alleged that the protests had been conducted despite the denial of permission and that slogans critical of the Central Government had been raised during these demonstrations.

Represented by Advocate Payoshi Roy, the petitioner contended that the criminal cases relied upon by the authorities were overwhelmingly under Section 188 of the Indian Penal Code for alleged disobedience of prohibitory orders. These FIRs, it was argued, arose solely because the petitioner had organised morchas, dharnas and agitations in his capacity as a political office-bearer opposing governmental decisions. Such activities, the petitioner submitted, could not legitimately constitute grounds for invoking the drastic power of externment under Section 56 of the Maharashtra Police Act.

The petition further alleged that the externment proceedings reflected a mala fide exercise of power and lacked the statutory “subjective satisfaction” required under the Act. To support this challenge, reliance was placed upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India as well as the Gujarat High Court’s decision in Mohmmad Kaleem Taufiq Ahmed Siddiqui v. State of Gujarat, both of which recognised the constitutional protection afforded to peaceful democratic protest.

The State, on the other hand, defended the externment by relying upon an affidavit filed by the Deputy Commissioner of Police. The prosecution argued that the petitioner had organised demonstrations despite police refusal of permission and that the slogans raised during such protests justified preventive action under the Maharashtra Police Act.

However, the High Court found that the State’s case fundamentally misunderstood both the purpose and scope of the externment provisions.

Justice Jamdar’s Oral Remarks: ‘Citizens are being made slaves of the government’

During the hearing, as reported by LiveLaw, Justice Madhav Jamdar made a series of pointed oral observations questioning the increasing tendency to invoke criminal law against citizens who protest governmental policies.

Expressing concern over the police’s approach, the Court observed that democratic governance cannot function if citizens are prevented from voicing disagreement with the government of the day.

Questioning the rationale behind the externment proceedings, reported LiveLaw, Justice Jamdar orally remarked: “All citizens are being made slaves of the Indian Government. They cannot stage protests, they cannot agitate… What is all this? If people protest, you will slap cases. It is the right of citizens to protest.”

The Court further questioned why slogans critical of political leaders or the ruling party should invite such severe executive action.

Referring to the allegations against the petitioner, Justice Jamdar observed that slogans such as “BJP Government Murdabad” or “Amit Shah Murdabad” represented political expression, asking why such slogans should become grounds for externing a citizen.

The Court also reminded the State of the constitutional role of law enforcement agencies, orally remarking that: “Police are not servants of the Chief Minister or the Prime Minister. They are public servants.”

Justice Jamdar even warned that he was inclined to impose substantial costs on the officers responsible for passing such an order, reflecting the Court’s deep dissatisfaction with the manner in which the statutory power had been exercised.

These oral observations, though not forming part of the written judgment, echoed the constitutional principles ultimately embodied in the Court’s final order—that executive powers cannot be deployed to suppress legitimate political opposition or peaceful democratic activity.

‘Horse-Trading’ and the ‘Washing Machine’: Court’s sharp political commentary

The hearing also attracted national attention because of Justice Jamdar’s comments on the prevailing political climate in Maharashtra. During the proceedings, as per the LiveLaw report, after noting that the petitioner belonged to the SDPI, the Court referred to the ongoing movement of legislators between political parties.

Justice Jamdar observed that while the State Assembly was occupied with discussions regarding shifting political loyalties and the election of its Presiding Officer, more pressing public issues, including the death of a ten-year-old child in a road accident,appeared to receive comparatively little attention.

In a lighter vein, the Judge remarked that the petitioner himself might consider changing political sides, adding that “horse-trading” appeared to be occurring across Maharashtra. Referring to the criminal cases pending against the petitioner, Justice Jamdar further quipped that perhaps he should join the “washing machine“—an unmistakable allusion to the popular political expression suggesting that corruption or criminal allegations tend to disappear after politicians join the ruling establishment.

Although these comments were made humorously and do not constitute judicial findings, they quickly became among the most widely discussed aspects of the hearing because of their obvious political significance and broader commentary on contemporary public discourse.

The Court’s Legal Reasoning: Why the externment order could not stand

While the oral observations generated widespread attention, the written judgment is equally significant for its careful examination of the statutory limits governing externment powers under the Maharashtra Police Act and its reaffirmation of constitutional protections for political dissent. Justice Madhav Jamdar systematically dismantled the factual and legal basis relied upon by the police, ultimately concluding that the externment order rested on no legally sustainable foundation.

At the heart of the dispute was Section 56 of the Maharashtra Police Act, a preventive provision that empowers designated authorities to direct a person to remove themselves from a particular area under narrowly defined circumstances. Since an externment order deprives an individual of the freedom to reside and move freely within a particular territory, the provision has consistently been treated by courts as an extraordinary preventive measure that must be exercised with great caution.

The Court therefore began its analysis not with the allegations against the petitioner, but with the statutory requirements themselves.

1. Section 56 of the Maharashtra Police Act: A preventive, not punitive, power

Justice Jamdar reproduced the relevant portions of Section 56(1)(a) and (b) of the Maharashtra Police Act to determine whether the authorities had satisfied the statutory conditions before directing the petitioner’s externment.

Under Section 56(1)(a), externment may be ordered only where the movements or acts of a person are causing, or are calculated to cause, alarm, danger or harm to persons or property.

Section 56(1)(b), on the other hand, authorises externment where there are reasonable grounds to believe that a person is engaged in, or is about to engage in, offences involving force or violence or offences punishable under specified chapters of the Indian Penal Code, particularly offences against the human body, coupled with an assessment that witnesses are unwilling to come forward because of fear.

The Court emphasised that these are not broad administrative powers permitting the State to remove inconvenient political opponents from a locality. Rather, they are exceptional preventive measures intended to address genuine threats to public safety.

Consequently, before an externment order can lawfully be passed, the authorities must possess objective material capable of supporting the statutory satisfaction required under Section 56.

Merely reproducing the language of the statute without factual support is insufficient.

2. The allegations against the petitioner did not meet the statutory threshold

Applying these principles to the facts before it, the Court found that the police had failed to demonstrate how the petitioner’s conduct satisfied either limb of Section 56.

Justice Jamdar noted that it was an admitted position that Saeed Ahmad Abdul Wahid Chaudhary had organised protests, morchas and dharnas in his capacity as Secretary of the Social Democratic Party of India against decisions taken by the Union Government. The State itself accepted that these demonstrations constituted the basis of the proceedings.

However, beyond recording that protests had been organised and slogans raised, the authorities had placed no material before the Court demonstrating that the petitioner’s activities had caused alarm, danger or harm to persons or property.

The FIRs relied upon by the State primarily alleged that demonstrations had been organised without police permission and therefore constituted offences under Section 188 of the Indian Penal Code for disobedience of promulgated orders.

Justice Jamdar observed that an alleged violation of Section 188 IPC, carrying only a relatively minor punishment, could not by itself justify invoking the extraordinary machinery of externment.

The Court stated in unambiguous terms that there was “no material on record” demonstrating that the petitioner’s movements or activities caused, or were calculated to cause, alarm, danger or harm as required by Section 56. Instead, every FIR relied upon by the authorities essentially alleged only that he had organised political protests against decisions of the Government of India and that some of these protests had taken place without prior permission. Such allegations, the Court held, simply did not satisfy the statutory requirements for externment.

“There is no material on record to show that the movements or acts of the Petitioner are causing or calculated to cause alarm, danger or harm to person or property. In all these FIR, the allegation is that the Petitioner, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Social Democratic Party of India, has arranged agitations/morchas/dharnas, opposing certain decisions taken by the Government of India. The other allegation is that such agitations/morchas/dharnas have been arranged without permission of the Police. The same is an offence under Section 188 of the IPC and maximum punishment is of simple imprisonment of one month. However, that cannot be a ground for passing the externment order under the provisions of the Maharashtra Police Act.” (Para 7)

This distinction proved decisive. The judgment makes clear that unlawful assembly or violation of regulatory conditions governing protests may attract criminal consequences under the applicable penal provisions, but such allegations cannot automatically be elevated into grounds for preventive exile under the Maharashtra Police Act.

To hold otherwise would fundamentally alter the character of Section 56, transforming a narrowly tailored preventive provision into an instrument capable of suppressing political opposition.

3. The court finds the authorities’ ‘subjective satisfaction’ was vitiated

One of the most important aspects of the judgment concerns the doctrine of subjective satisfaction, which lies at the heart of preventive measures such as externment. Although externment orders involve administrative discretion, that discretion is not immune from judicial scrutiny.

The authority must genuinely arrive at the statutory satisfaction based upon relevant material. Justice Jamdar carefully examined the externment proposal and the affidavit filed by the police. While these documents repeatedly asserted that the petitioner’s activities were causing alarm, danger and harm to the public, the Court found that the supporting material did not justify these conclusions.

The FIRs themselves narrated only that the petitioner had organised agitations against decisions of the Union Government and raised political slogans. There was no evidence of violence, no evidence of intimidation, no evidence of danger to public safety, or of harm to persons or property.

The Court therefore concluded that the findings recorded by the authorities were unsupported by the factual record. Consequently, the statutory “subjective satisfaction” required under Section 56 stood vitiated because it rested upon assertions rather than evidence.

“Although the Externment Proposal, the details of which are set out in the Affidavit-in-Reply, records that the movements and acts of the Petitioner are causing or are calculated to cause, alarm, danger and harm to the public and property, perusal of the FIRs on the basis of which action is taken and the gist of which is set out in the Affidvit-in-Reply shows that the only allegation is that the Petitioner has arranged agitations/morchas/dharnas against certain decisions of the Union of India and given slogans. Thus, the subjective satisfaction recorded by the authorities that movements and acts of the Petitioner are causing or are calculated to cause, alarm, danger and harm to the public and property, is without any material to support the same. Thus, the subjective satisfaction is vitiated.” (Para 9)

Justice Jamdar held that although the authorities had formally recorded that the petitioner’s movements were causing alarm and danger, a scrutiny of the underlying FIRs revealed no factual basis capable of supporting such a conclusion. The recorded satisfaction was therefore unsupported by material and legally unsustainable. The judgment thus reiterates a long-standing principle of administrative law—that preventive powers cannot be exercised merely by reciting statutory language. The existence of objective material remains subject to judicial review.

4. A finding of mala fides against the state

Perhaps the most striking aspect of the written judgment is the Court’s express acceptance of the petitioner’s allegation that the action bore the hallmarks of mala fides. After analysing the nature of the FIRs and the statutory requirements, Justice Jamdar observed that there was substance in the petitioner’s contention that the externment proceedings constituted a mala fide exercise of power.

“There is substance in the contention raised by Ms. Roy, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, that the action taken is a mala fide action.” (Para 8)

Although the judgment does not embark upon an elaborate discussion of improper motive, this finding carries considerable legal significance. Indian courts are ordinarily reluctant to attribute mala fides to executive authorities without compelling material.

The Court’s conclusion therefore reflects its view that the statutory power had been invoked for a purpose divorced from the object for which Section 56 was enacted. Externment exists to prevent imminent threats to public order—not to remove political activists whose principal activity consists of organising protests against governmental policies.

By accepting the allegation of mala fides, the Court effectively recognised that preventive policing cannot become a substitute for managing political dissent. The finding significantly strengthens the constitutional character of the judgment, indicating that the problem before the Court was not merely one of procedural irregularity but one involving the misuse of statutory authority itself.

5. The judgment as a constitutional reaffirmation of the right to dissent

Beyond the statutory shortcomings in the externment proceedings, Justice Madhav Jamdar anchored the decision firmly within India’s constitutional framework, emphasising that democratic disagreement with the government lies at the heart of constitutional governance. The judgment makes it abundantly clear that preventive policing cannot become a mechanism for punishing political expression, particularly where citizens seek to voice opposition through peaceful and organised protest.

The Court rejected the implicit premise underlying the State’s action, that repeated protests against government policies, coupled with criminal cases arising from such demonstrations, could justify the extraordinary remedy of externment. Instead, it recognised that such an approach strikes directly at the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution.

“It is settled legal position that an order of externment is an extraordinary measure and effect of such order is of depriving a citizen of his fundamental right of free movement throughout the territory of India.” (Para 10)

Referring specifically to Articles 19 and 21, Justice Jamdar observed that the Constitution protects not only the right of citizens to express their opinions but also their right to live with dignity. These guarantees, the Court held, are substantially impaired when the State seeks to remove a person from his locality merely because he has criticised governmental decisions or organised political demonstrations.

The Court unequivocally held:

“The action taken by the Respondent–State of Maharashtra of externing the Petitioner, merely for opposing certain decisions of the Government of India, affects the Petitioner’s fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression and also right to live with dignity.” (Para 12)

The observation is significant because it extends the analysis beyond the freedom of speech guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (a). By invoking Article 21, the Court recognised that an externment order has consequences that reach far beyond physical displacement. It disrupts an individual’s social existence, political participation, livelihood, community ties and personal dignity. The judgment therefore situates externment not merely as an administrative measure but as one carrying profound constitutional implications.

Political opposition cannot be converted into grounds for preventive action

One of the clearest messages emerging from the judgment is that criticism of the government, even if forceful, unpopular or politically inconvenient, does not transform a citizen into a threat to public order.

Throughout the proceedings, the State repeatedly relied upon the petitioner’s participation in protests against governmental decisions, including demonstrations concerning citizenship-related issues and other matters of public controversy. However, Justice Jamdar drew a sharp constitutional distinction between opposition to government policy and conduct that genuinely threatens public safety.

The judgment records that the petitioner’s activities consisted principally of organising agitations, morchas and dharnas against decisions taken by the Government of India. The allegations further indicated that he had raised political slogans and organised demonstrations despite refusal of police permission. Yet none of these circumstances, the Court held, established the statutory conditions necessary for externment. This distinction assumes considerable constitutional importance.

Democratic governments routinely face criticism, protests and organised political mobilisation. If such activities were sufficient to justify preventive measures like externment, the constitutional guarantee of political speech would become contingent upon executive approval. Justice Jamdar’s judgment rejects precisely such an approach. Instead, it reaffirms that disagreement with governmental decisions is not a constitutional anomaly—it is one of the defining characteristics of a functioning democracy.

Precedents invoked in the judgment

1. Reliance on Anuradha Bhasin: Democratic rights cannot be suppressed

The Court’s constitutional reasoning was reinforced by its reliance upon the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India. Although Anuradha Bhasin primarily concerned restrictions imposed under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure following the constitutional changes in Jammu and Kashmir, the principles articulated by the Supreme Court regarding democratic freedoms were considered directly relevant to the present case.

Justice Jamdar noted that the Supreme Court had clearly held that extraordinary executive powers cannot be used as instruments to suppress legitimate expressions of opinion, grievances or democratic rights.

By invoking Anuradha Bhasin, the Bombay High Court placed the present dispute within a broader constitutional jurisprudence recognising that preventive powers must always be exercised consistently with democratic freedoms.

The precedent underscores that constitutional rights cannot be displaced merely because executive authorities find political protests inconvenient or uncomfortable.

2. Support from the Gujarat High Court’s decision on political protests

The Court also relied upon the Gujarat High Court’s decision in Mohmmad Kaleem Taufiq Ahmed Siddiqui v. State of Gujarat, a case involving remarkably similar facts.

Justice Jamdar observed that the Gujarat High Court had considered a situation where an externment order had likewise been issued against a citizen for participating in protests against decisions of the Union Government. The Gujarat High Court held that such circumstances could not legally justify externment and consequently set aside the order.

Finding the reasoning directly applicable, Justice Jamdar held that the principles laid down by both the Supreme Court in Anuradha Bhasin and the Gujarat High Court squarely governed the present dispute.

The reliance on these precedents strengthens the judgment’s doctrinal foundation by demonstrating that courts across jurisdictions have consistently viewed preventive restrictions on political protest with constitutional scepticism.

3. Externment is an extraordinary measure, not an ordinary administrative tool

The judgment also draws support from the Supreme Court’s decision in Deepak s/o Laxman Dongre v. State of Maharashtra, which characterised externment as an extraordinary measure because of its direct impact on an individual’s liberty and freedom of movement.

Justice Jamdar reiterated that externment cannot be treated as a routine administrative response to alleged misconduct.

Unlike ordinary criminal prosecution, an externment order effectively banishes an individual from a particular area, restricting movement, disrupting family life, employment and political participation. Such a drastic consequence necessarily demands strict compliance with statutory safeguards and close judicial scrutiny.

The Court’s reasoning reinforces the settled principle that preventive measures must remain exceptional. Administrative convenience or political sensitivity cannot dilute the high threshold established by law.

Externment orders quashed in their entirety

Having found that the statutory conditions under Section 56 were absent, that the authorities’ subjective satisfaction lacked evidentiary support, that the proceedings were vitiated by mala fides, and that the petitioner’s constitutional rights had been infringed, the Court allowed the writ petition in full.

Justice Jamdar quashed both the original externment order dated December 3, 2025 passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Zone VI, Chembur, Mumbai, as well as the appellate order dated March 27, 2026 passed by the Divisional Commissioner, Konkan Division, thereby completely restoring the petitioner’s rights.

A judgment with wider constitutional significance

Although the immediate dispute concerned the externment of a single political activist, the judgment speaks to a much broader constitutional concern: the increasing use of preventive legal mechanisms against political dissent.

Externment laws were enacted to protect society from individuals whose conduct presents a demonstrable threat to public order or safety. They were never intended to become instruments for regulating political speech or discouraging public protest. Justice Jamdar’s decision restores that distinction.

By insisting that the statutory prerequisites under Section 56 must be established through objective material, by recognising the chilling effect of punitive action against protesters, and by reaffirming that Articles 19 and 21 protect not merely abstract liberties but the practical ability of citizens to oppose governmental decisions, the judgment reinforces a foundational constitutional principle—that democracy cannot function without dissent.

Read alongside the Court’s striking oral observations questioning attempts to criminalise protest, criticising the misuse of police powers, and cautioning against treating political opposition as a threat to public order, the decision stands as a robust reminder that constitutional governance demands tolerance of disagreement. Governments may disagree with protesters, investigate genuine criminality where it exists, and regulate assemblies in accordance with law, but they cannot employ extraordinary preventive powers to exile citizens simply because they challenge those in authority.

In doing so, the Bombay High Court has delivered a judgment that is likely to resonate well beyond the facts of this individual case, strengthening the constitutional jurisprudence on political dissent, preventive policing and the limits of executive power.

The complete judgment may be read below:

Related:

How “Khalistani” became a weaponised political label against Sikh dissent

Silence in the Statistics: What NCRB data doesn’t say about dissent

Maharashtra Special Public Security Bill: Bogey of “urban naxals” invoked to legitimise clamping down of dissent?

Mob justice in Bengal? Mahua Moitra’s siege and the High Court’s constitutional message

The post Bombay HC condemns use of externment to silence political dissent; says opposition to government cannot be treated as a crime appeared first on SabrangIndia.

At the last INDIA bloc meeting at Delhi’s Constitution Club in June, Congress president Mallikarjun Kharge announced that the Opposition parties will send a letter to the CJI “regarding serious questions raised about the Special Intensive Revision (SIR), manipulation of the electoral rolls, and the fairness of elections.” This letter dated June 28, 2026 appears to be the first step in this direction.

While DMK and AAP’s signatures on the letter to CJI signal that the two parties come on board on key issues that affect all parties, a senior Opposition leader ruled out any deeper participation in the short term. AAP quit the mega Opposition group in 2025 after agreeing to contest only during the 2024 Lok Sabha polls. The DMK left the alliance last month after the Congress decided to support the Tamil Nadu chief minister C Joseph Vijay-led Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK) government.

Why this letter is significant

The detailed letter to the CJI flags the questionable methods by which the Election Commission (ECI) under the present Chief Election Commissioner (CEC), Gyanesh Kumar, in the name of ‘clean up’ of electoral rolls has undertaken an exercise that has had an opposite and anti-democratic outcome! On the Bihar 2025 SIR, the letter states that, “

“This massive exercise just before the assembly elections, was ill-timed and its faulty implementation a monumental disaster. This, despite the fact that electoral rolls, after they were digitized (2002) were continuously revised and updated by the Commission. But a de-novo revision, never attempted in the fashion adopted by the Commission would ordinarily have required at least a year to do, without being suspect. The documentation process, adopted for the first time, was inherently exclusionary and politically motivated. Verification of voters based on filling forms and production of documents, questioning citizenship, left voters disenfranchised. Lakhs of voters did not possess the required documents. Many of them did not have the capacity to fill forms and forward them as mandated. This was particularly true of those who are poor, uneducated, including Dalits, Adivasis, members of the minority community and migrant workers. There were instances, that the Commission was aware of, where videos circulating on the social media showed booth level officers themselves filling the forms by forging signatures, and in some instances, uploading these forms without the consent of the voters. Even deceased persons were shown to be submitting forms. There was complete lack of transparency and administrative confusion in the implementation of this process exacerbated by the timeframe within which it was required to be done. Instructions of the Commission were changed midway from time to time. There was confusion even amongst election officials.”

Besides the letter states that the “grievance redressal mechanism was inadequate and there was a massive arbitrary deletion of names without proper notice. The alleged objective of the exercise was to remove duplicate voters and the names of the deceased and migrants from the voter’s lists. But the process, as implemented, lacked not just transparency but was implemented in a manner unknown to all processes undertaken in the past. The existing updated electoral rolls were used at the time of the Lok Sabha elections (2024). Even in 2014, the then updated electoral rolls reflected an outcome that none questioned. The whole process of the SIR, according to us, was meant to favour the BJP.”

On Bengal, the letter points to the shocking and deliberate malfunctioning by the ECI. The letter alleges that it appears that the Commission “was concerned only with the outcome of that election since it raised no real issues of manipulation in other states like Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Assam where the SIR was not implemented.”

However, states the communication,

It was apparent that the West Bengal Government was under siege with the presence of 2 lakh 40 thousand CAPF personnel. To put this in context, 3 lakh 50 thousand CAPF personnel were deployed for the entire Lok Sabha election in 2024. There was also a massive deletion of names from the electoral rolls, including those arbitrarily removed, under a never-used-before-category titled ‘logical discrepancies’.

This devious ploy alone left 27 lakh people without the right to vote.

This Hon’ble Court (the Supreme Court) constituted Tribunals to dispose of the appeals where names stood deleted. One of the 19 Tribunals hearing the appeals headed by Justice T.S. Sivagnanam, found that of the 1777 names deleted for which appeals were heard by him, 1717 were wrongly deleted. This means 96% of the names were wrongly deleted. If the same proportion is applied on other pending appeals before the 19 tribunals, it would mean that more than 25 lakh voters were unable to cast their votes due to a process which was inherently flawed.

Most of the deletions were found to be in constituencies where the All India Trinamool Congress (AITC) was dominant. The SIR is an unusual process with which the ordinary voter is unfamiliar. The requirement of filling forms, forwarding them and furnishing of documents in a country where there is massive poverty and illiteracy is essentially exclusionary.

Massive deletions, non-transparent processes, the unprecedented numbers of CAPF personnel deployed, the nomination of two representatives of the Union government of their choice and the Returning Officer chosen by the blatantly biased Commission at the counting centres, with no nominee of the AITC, made for a partisan process and consequently suspect. The en masse transfer of 483 officials including the then Chief Secretary, Home Secretary and others replaced by officers posted by the Commission was an unusual exercise. Such extreme steps were not taken in any election in the past.

Stating that before launching any such exercise like an SIR, the ECI must have previous inquiries and investigations to show “the extent to which the electoral rolls in each state were polluted and why it was necessary to do this exercise for these elections and in such haste.” However, “Even many BLOs in West Bengal were deprived of their right to vote.” While the ECI has been provided enough data and information to show that public confidence in the SIR process has been eroded, the ECI remains deaf to all independent representations, assert the Opposition.

The Letter to the Chief Justice of India (CJI) Justice Surya Kant acknowledges that such a communication by the Opposition to the highest judiciary is unusual, asserts that it is warranted given the unprecedented crisis for institutional democracy and the faith of all Indians in Indian democracy. Hence, the Opposition has demanded through this letter that the “impending SIR in the states of Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat etc. be suspended” and such a process launched if at all when the next Assembly Election is five years away.

Though no details have been provided, the communication makes a brief reference to the fact that “serious questions are also being raised about the process of electronic voting, and in particular about the role of electronic voting machines,” and hence “return to paper ballots” may be the answer.”

Finally urging that “ a transparent electoral process, in which every Indian has full confidence, is essential to sustaining public trust in our democracy,” the letter also points out how law enforcement agencies like the CBI, ED and NIA “ are used not only to target those in opposition. These agencies are also used for the purpose of manipulating the outcome of results in the elections, apart from bringing down elected governments.”

Senior Opposition leader and Trinamool’s Rajya Sabha floor leader Derek O’Brien wrote, “Good going from INDIA. And yes, @AamAadmiParty @arivalayam DMK also signed the joint letter to CJI.”

The letter may be read here:

Related:

SIR and the Making of a Stateless Citizen? | R. Rajagopal Speaks Out | Teesta Setalvad

Karnataka launches SIR with 5.5 crore voters, State Govt voices transparency concerns

Karnataka launches SIR with 5.5 crore voters, State Govt voices transparency concerns

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Stan Swamy, the Martyr, is no longer around today- but if he were physically present in this world today, what exactly would he be doing?

If Stan Swamy, the Martyr, were alive today, he would be in the midst of the Adivasis. His life would be very simple and frugal. He would eat their food, sing their songs, and dance with them. He would identify with them totally. Yes, of course, he would be angry if others tried to destroy their identity, their culture and customs, their traditions, and their value systems. He would master their language and walk the talk with them.

If Stan Swamy, the Martyr, were alive today, he would accompany the Adivasis and other subalterns in their relentless quest for justice. He would have no qualms of conscience to take on the powerful, vested interests who deny the Adivasis of their legitimate jal- jungle– jameen rights. He would have been fearless in exposing the profiteers, who loot the nation of its precious natural resources for their greed in amassing scandalous amounts of wealth. He would challenge the system for destroying the environment and the fragile ecosystems in Jharkhand, in the Aravalli hills, in the Nicobar Islands, and elsewhere!

If Stan Swamy, the Martyr, were alive today, he would fight for the land rights of the Adivasis! He would join the Adivasis, the Dalits, other subalterns, and civil society members in the struggles against the violation of laws in acquiring land for mega projects, for mining (coal mining continues to be rampant in Jharkhand and in other tribal areas today), and infrastructural development, which flout the rights of the downtrodden. He would challenge all corporate encroachments. He would raise his voice in democratic, legitimate ways against the state-sponsored violations of laws and the assault on the democratic rights of people, aimed at paving the way for unrestricted exploitation of land and natural resources. He would question the non-implementation of the 5th Schedule of the Constitution, and why the Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act [PESA], which is being ignored. He would strongly express his disappointment at the silence of the Government on the landmark 1997 Samantha Judgment of the Supreme Court; he would speak out strongly against the half-hearted action of the Government on the ‘Forest Rights Act, 2006’. He would express his apprehensions at the Amendment to the ‘Land Acquisition Act 2013’ by the Jharkhand government, which was a death-knell for the Adivasi Community. He would strongly disagree with the setting up of ‘Land Banks’, which he saw as a calculated plot to annihilate the Adivasis.

If Stan Swamy, the Martyr, were alive today, he would be with the young adults! He would take seriously the letter (dated May 24, 2026) of Fr Arturo Sosa, the Superior General of the Jesuits, in which he says that we are missioned “to accompany young adults in their search for a hope-filled future. That search today is not an easy one. We are seeing a trampling on human rights, a disregard for our common home, the breakdown of international order, war, and a recklessness about human life at all its stages.” Through the ‘Persecuted Prisoners’ Solidarity Committee’, he would challenge the indiscriminate arrest of three thousand young Adivasis under the label of ‘naxals’ just because they questioned and resisted unjust land alienation and displacement. He would have supported the demands and the initiatives of the youth protesting (some even fasting) at ‘Jantar Mantar’, Delhi!

If Stan Swamy, the Martyr, were alive today, he would openly take on the Special Intensive Revision (SIR). He would regard it as a blatant attack on the country’s citizens and a gross violation of the Constitutional guarantee of the right to exercise one’s franchise. He would be concerned that thousands of Adivasis, minorities, and other poor people would be systematically disenfranchised for want of ‘legitimate’ documents. He would join civil society groups as they voice their protests on the SIR and highlight the mass disenfranchisement of citizens in West Bengal, Bihar, and elsewhere!

If Stan Swamy, the Martyr, were alive today, he would take a stand for the small farmers and the ordinary workers! He would voice his concern about how the three Central Farm Laws (which are now on hold) are patently against the small farmer. He would speak strongly against the four labour codes, which have become law today!  The small farmers and the ordinary workers are pitted against the powerful corporations.

If Stan Swamy, the Martyr, were alive today, he would have welcomed ‘Magnifica Humanitas’. The first encyclical of Pope Leo XIV makes an unequivocal and non-negotiable case for the protection and the enhancement of the dignity of the human person, the inviolability of human rights and the indispensability of justice and peace in today’s world. Pope Leo states, “human rights are inviolable, since they are “inherent in the human person and in human dignity.” Consequently, they are universal and inalienable. Precisely because they are grounded in the common dignity of every man and woman, they have practical consequences and legal effects, for “it would be vain to proclaim human rights if, at the same time, everything was not done to ensure the duty of respecting them, respect by all, in all places and for all.” Stan would say that this is exactly what the Church should be doing!

If Stan Swamy, the Martyr, were alive today, he would rededicate himself to the letter and spirit of the Constitution of India.  He would speak about the sanctity of it and that no one has the right to trample on it. He would insist that justice, liberty, equality, fraternity, dignity, unity, integrity, secularism, and pluralism are the values enshrined in our Constitution. Women should be empowered and given their rightful and equal place in Parliament. That delimitation and delisting are gross manipulations. That citizens have the right to dissent and voice their protest against corruption, communalism, and corporatisation.  He would take on the draconian Unlawful Activities Prevention Act(UAPA), which ensured his death, and which still keeps the likes of Umar Khalid and others illegally incarcerated.

If Stan Swamy, the Martyr, were alive today, he would say once again those immortal words he said before his arrest on 8 October 2020. “Over the last two decades, I have identified myself with the Adivasi people and their struggle for a life of dignity and self-respect… In this process, I have clearly expressed my dissent over several policies and laws enacted by the government in light of the Indian Constitution. I have questioned the validity, legality, and justness of several steps taken by the government and the ruling class. If this makes me a ‘deshdrohi’, then so be it. We are part of the process. In a way, I am happy to be part of this process. I am not a silent spectator, but part of the game and ready to pay the price, whatever be it…. I/we must be ready to face the consequences. I would just add that what is happening to me is not unique. Many activists, lawyers, writers, journalists, student leaders, poets, intellectuals, and others who stand for the rights of Adivasis, Dalits, and the marginalised and express their dissent to the ruling powers of the country are being targeted. Grateful to all who have stood in solidarity with me all these years.”

If Stan Swamy, the Martyr, were alive today, he would have challenged ME and YOU! He would say in his own calm, gentle, unassuming way, “Wake up, now! It is high time you realise what is happening to the country and to our people! And do something about it urgently and collaboratively!”

If Stan Swamy, the Martyr, were alive today … but Stan Swamy NEVER died! He lives forever!

July 2, 2026

(The author is a human rights, reconciliation, and peace activist trainer & writer.)

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Hence, in a pro-active move, on July 2, 2026, a delegation representing ‘Mumbai for Peace’ and 24 other civil society organizations visited the Office of the Police Commissioner to submit a detailed memorandum regarding the proposed event on Sunday. The delegation also highlighted that individuals, specifically identifying Ankit Yadav—a resident of Golibar, Santacruz—and his associates, have been regularly engaging in questionable (read criminal) and hate-filled activities that pose a severe threat to the city’s law and order.

The memorandum details how these groups have been breaking in at prayer venues and using social media to disseminate false propaganda against peaceful Christian religious assemblies. These actions have included making unfounded allegations of “black magic” against members of the Christian community, which the delegation argues have led to unnecessary police pressure and the filing of cases against the very pastors and religious heads whose services were targeted. In criminal law, such actions amount, among other things to criminal trespass. The memorandum dated July 2, 2026 may be read below:

The imminent threat in Vakola

The primary concern necessitating the July 2, 2026 meeting was an inflammatory call to action circulating on social media under the banner of “Sakal Hindu Samaj”. The poster alleges that illegal religious conversions are taking place in Vakola (Gamdevi) and demands strict legal action against four unnamed pastors by July 4, 2026. It is such unfounded and misguided provocations that have been consistently indulged in by this and other outfits, often unchecked by the police and administration.

Link: https://www.instagram.com/reel/DaNcKWoIjHl/?utm_source=ig_web_button_share_sheet

The content of the poster explicitly states that if these demands are not met by the police, the group intends to assemble on Sunday, July 5, 2026, in Santacruz East to sit directly in front of a Christian prayer assembly and perform a recitation of the Hanuman Chalisa. The message characterises the potential disturbance of law and order as the responsibility of the Vakola Police Station, a framing that the delegation has explicitly labelled as criminal intimidation intended to provoke communal tension.

Background

According to the memorandum submitted by the organisations, every Sunday, groups of anti-social elements allegedly target peaceful assemblies of followers of Jesus Christ. They are accused of criminally trespassing into places of worship, assaulting and threatening those present, and creating disturbances outside police stations. The representation states that these individuals, allegedly associated with the Bajrang Dal form groups arrive in large numbers, creating law-and-order situations, and that Ankit Yadav and his associates (Manojkumar Sarva, Abhishek Omprakash Tiwari, Dhananjay Dubey, Mehul Khokardiya, Harsh Pathak, Pradeep Mishra, Aditya Upadhyay and others) allegedly raise communal slogans outside police stations as part of a planned campaign. It further alleges that they circulate videos on social media containing false and baseless allegations against Christians, with the aim of spreading hatred and communal tensions. The memorandum also claims that these groups routinely approach police stations alleging, without basis, that their religious sentiments have been hurt and that Christian pastors are practising black magic. As a result of the pressure created by these incidents and the resulting law-and-order concerns, the representation alleges that the police have, in several instances, registered cases against pastors under the provisions of the Black Magic Act and for offences relating to hurting religious sentiments.

Link: https://www.instagram.com/p/DaL2INlM-Yg/

Recent incidents highlighting a pattern of disruption and intimidation

The detailed memorandum submitted to the authorities yesterday also highlighted recent incidents that reveal a clear and alarming pattern of organised disruption and intimidation directed at the Christian community. These recurring events demonstrate how anti-social elements systematically target peaceful gatherings to create communal instability. Some of these recent incidents include the following:

• Attack on a peaceful Christian assembly in Vasai (June 12, 2026): On June 12, 2026, Ankit Yadav and members of his group allegedly travelled from Santacruz to Vasai and attacked a peaceful Christian assembly being held at Dheeraj Complex, Second Floor, Evershine, Vasai East, within the jurisdiction of Achole Police Station. They allegedly forcefully entered the hall, assaulted those present, and created a law and order situation. In connection with the incident, Achole Police Station registered FIR No. 202 of 2026 against “unknown members of Bajrang Dal” under Sections 118(1), 189(2), 190, 191(2), 351(2), and 352 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023. However, despite CCTV footage reportedly showing Ankit Yadav and his associates physically attacking those assembled, no arrests have been made. Subsequently, Ankit Yadav and his associates allegedly made false allegations that the pastor had hurt their religious sentiments and was practising black magic. According to the representation, these allegations are baseless, as the gathering consisted solely of Bible readings and prayers, which had been conducted peacefully for years. Based on these allegations, Achole Police Station registered cross FIR Nos. 204 and 205 of 2026 against one Ravi Gupta. The representation further states that CCTV footage of the entire incident was provided to the police for investigation, but no action has yet been taken against Ankit Yadav and his accomplices.

• Attempted disruption of a Christian gathering in Kandivali (June 14, 2026): On Sunday, June 14, 2026, Ankit Yadav and members of his group allegedly attempted to forcefully enter a Christian assembly being held at White House Banquet Hall, behind Golden Leaf Hotel, Kandivali East, Mumbai. After being prevented from entering the premises, they reportedly went to Charkop Police Station, created a law and order situation, and alleged that Pratik Sitaram Naik was posting content about miracles of Jesus Christ on social media and spreading false claims about miracles. Following the incident, Charkop Police Station registered FIR No. 476 of 2026 against Pratik Sitaram Naik under Section 66(D) of the Information Technology Act and Sections 3(2) and 3(3) of the Maharashtra Black Magic Act. The representation states that despite clarifications being provided to the police, no action has yet been initiated against Ankit Yadav and others.

• Similar incidents reported at multiple locations: The representation further alleges that the same group has been involved in similar incidents targeting Christian gatherings at Ghatkopar on June 7, Andheri on June 20, and several other locations, following what it describes as a recurring pattern of disrupting peaceful religious assemblies, making allegations of forced conversion or black magic, and creating law and order situations. It contends that despite repeated complaints, effective action against the alleged perpetrators has remained absent.

Engagement with police leadership

The delegation held a formal meeting with the Joint Commissioner of Police (Law & Order), Dr. Manoj Kumar Sharma, to appraise him of these developments. The delegation included diverse voices such as Sameer Wagle, Smriti Nevatia, Pastor David Tribhuvan, Fr. Frazer Mascerenhas, Neena Shah More, Elvina Gonsalves, Pastor Jomon Mathew, Dolphy Dsouza, Shakir Shaikh, Ashfaque Mohammed Yaqub, Sandhya Panaskar, Shaista Sayyed Aejaz, Lalita Deonalli, and Lara Jesani.

During the meeting, the Joint CP stated that the police force was cognisant of the incidents involving these individuals. He provided an assurance to the delegation that the police would take all necessary steps to address these concerns and uphold the rule of law within the city. The collective of organisations emphasised that their goal is to ensure the constitutional rights of all citizens—specifically Article 14 (equality), Article 15 (non-discrimination), Article 21 (life and liberty), and Article 25 (freedom of religion)—are protected against such targeted harassment.

Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP): preventive frontier

Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP) has consistently adopted a systematic, evidence-based approach to countering hate speech and communal mobilisation. Central to its strategy is the proactive filing of preventive legal complaints with district and state authorities. When events organised by groups such as the Sakal Hindu Samaj, Hindu Janajagruti Samiti and by the habitual hate offenders are announced, CJP monitors these platforms to identify potential threats to public order.

The organisation’s complaints are rooted in documented history, highlighting the recurrence of provocative rhetoric and violence at past events. By providing authorities with concrete evidence—such as social media posters, planned agendas, and the track records of scheduled speakers—CJP urges the police to invoke Supreme Court guidelines on hate speech and deny permissions for events likely to incite enmity. These filings emphasise that preventive measures are not merely discretionary but are mandated by judicial precedents to maintain peace. Furthermore, CJP’s interventions extend to scrutinising campaigns related to exclusionary narratives, such as “love jihad” or calls for economic boycotts.

By consistently engaging with administrative and police machinery, CJP advocates for the enforcement of constitutional rights, aiming to hold hate offenders accountable while compelling local administrations to fulfill their duty in preventing communal harm.

A joint demand backed by 25 civil society organisations

The representation was jointly endorsed by 25 civil society organisations, demonstrating widespread support from civil society. The signatories include the Bombay Catholic Sabha, People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL), Citizens for Justice and Peace, All India Students’ Federation (Mumbai), Centre for Study of Society and Secularism (CSSS), Pani Haq Samiti, Christian Development Association, Parcham Collective, Citizens for the Constitution, Hasrat-e-Zindagi, Mamuli, Free Speech Collective, Stree Mukti League, Platform for Social Justice, Disha Students’ Organisation, Association for Protection of Civil Rights (APCR), Bhagat Singh Jan Adhikar Yatra, Students Islamic Organisation (Mumbai), Jamaat-e-Islami Hind (Mumbai), among others.

By copying the Deputy Commissioner of Police (West Division Zone 1) and the Senior Inspector of Police at the Vakola Police Station, the delegation demands the urgency of local-level preventive measures.

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Words that Divide: BJP MP’s Bhagalpur speech targets Muslims, CJP files MCC complaint claiming violation of election laws

CJP calls for action by NCM against hate speeches at Dharam Sansad and Trishul Deekha events, files 2 complaints

CJP files complaints against the Hate Speeches delivered in Uttar Pradesh

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Since its launch in early June of 2026 by the newly elected Kerala government, Operation Toofan: The Narco Hunt has received widespread public support and rapidly emerged as Kerala’s most visible anti-drug campaign, with videos of raids, arrests, and drug seizures dominating social media. Presented as a comprehensive response to the growing circulation of narcotics and synthetic drugs, Operation Toofan claims enforcement measures with preventive interventions.

Alongside coordinated operations by the police and excise departments, the campaign expectedly engages schools, parents, and civil society organisations in awareness and prevention efforts. Within a short period, thousands of arrests have been made and large quantities of narcotics and banned tobacco products have been seized in the state.

Few would disagree that substance abuse poses serious challenges and requires intervention. Yet the significance of Operation Toofan extends beyond its official objectives. Like many contemporary policing campaigns, it has developed a parallel life online. Reports of inspections, arrests, and searches circulate across social media platforms and news ecosystems alike, where they are viewed, shared, and commented upon by thousands of users. It is within this digital circulation that a more complex social narrative begins to emerge.

A closer look at hundreds of the images and videos associated with Operation Toofan in digital platform reveals a striking pattern. One place appears repeatedly: Perumbavoor. And within these representations, one group appears with particular frequency: interstate migrant workers.

Perumbavoor occupies a unique position in Kerala’s social landscape. Over the last three decades, this town in Ernakulam district has become one of the state’s most important hub of migrant workers. The presence of workers from Assam, West Bengal, Bihar, Odisha, and several other states have become indispensable to its industries, construction sector, workshops, restaurants, and numerous other economic activities. The studies suggest that the migrant population in and around the town runs into lakhs, earning Perumbavoor the popular label of Kerala’s migrant capital.

Yet Perumbavoor’s significance extends well beyond its economic role. Over time, it has come to occupy a symbolic place in Kerala’s public imagination. Debates surrounding migration, demographic change, public safety, labour, and law and order frequently converge on the town. Perumbavoor has become a site onto which broader anxieties about social transformation are projected.

Long before the launch of Operation Toofan, these anxieties had already found expression on social media. Numerous pages devoted to local news, public affairs, and neighbourhood issues regularly circulated photographs, videos, and reels portraying migrant workers through recurring themes of drug use, alleged criminality, sex work, unhygienic living conditions, and urban disorder. Individually, such posts appeared to document isolated incidents.

Collectively, however, they constructed a recurring visual narrative in which Perumbavoor itself was imagined as a city under threat, with migrant workers positioned as its principal source of decline. These representations often extended beyond the town, inviting viewers to imagine Perumbavoor as a warning about Kerala’s future if migration remained unchecked.

Operation Toofan entered an already established visual landscape and supplied it with a continuous stream of new images. Videos of police inspections in migrant settlements, searches of labour camps, checking of buses occupied significantly by migrant workers, arrests, and drug seizures rapidly circulated across various platforms. Existing accounts intensified their coverage, while new influencer pages also began producing content centered on the campaign. In some instances, the act of filming migrant settlements itself was framed as civic responsibility or courageous reporting, and such content was subsequently circulated and amplified across platforms.

The issue is not whether illegal activities exist. Drug use and trafficking are social problems that cut across communities, classes, and regions. Nor is the issue whether law enforcement should intervene. The more important question is how these interventions are represented and understood once they enter the digital public sphere.

Social media rarely reward complexity. Videos are edited into short, dramatic formats designed to maximise attention, while captions emphasise danger, urgency, and confrontation. Background music, visual effects, and selective framing transform routine enforcement activities into highly emotional spectacles. Within these compressed narratives, the broader realities of migration and the lives of migrant workers disappear. Questions about labour conditions, housing arrangements, wage insecurity, social exclusion, and economic dependence receive little attention. Instead, what remains visible is a simplified image of the migrant worker, repeatedly associated with surveillance, suspicion, and disorder. The comment sections beneath many of these contents reveal how such associations are reinforced. Alongside support for anti-drug measures are comments that directly connect migrant workers with crime, insecurity, and social decline. While these views are far from universal, the constant repetition of similar visual narratives gives them greater credibility. Images begin to function as evidence, and repeated exposure gradually transforms isolated incidents into general assumptions about entire populations.

What is equally important is what remains unseen. As claimed operation Toofan is not structured solely around raids and arrests. Officially, the campaign combines enforcement with awareness programs involving schools, parents, community organisations, and government agencies. The stated objective is not merely to identify offenders, but to address substance abuse as a broader social problem.

Yet the visibility of the campaign appears highly uneven in Perumbavoor. During the period the contents get widespread appreciation is the inspections, raids, and arrests than images of awareness sessions, community engagement, counselling initiatives, or preventive programs. This selective visibility has important consequences. Drug use is a complex social issue that cannot be addressed through punitive measures alone. Long-term responses require education, rehabilitation, public health interventions, and community participation. However, when enforcement becomes the dominant public image of a campaign, the problem itself begins to appear as something that can be solved primarily through surveillance and control.
This dynamic is particularly significant because migrant workers already occupy a vulnerable social position within Kerala. They are essential to the functioning of the state’s economy, yet they often remain socially peripheral. Many live in segregated housing clusters, work in demanding conditions, and have limited access to political representation. Linguistic differences, mobility, and weak institutional support make it difficult for them to challenge narratives constructed about them. As a result, they become highly visible to systems of surveillance while remaining relatively invisible within public debates about their own lives.

The visibility produced by Operation Toofan therefore operates unevenly. While the campaign targets drug-related activities, the public images generated by it often concentrate on particular spaces and populations. Over time, this can produce a feedback loop, as the Kozhikode city and rural police stepped-up surveillance in migrant workers settlements across the district recently. Increased surveillance in migrant-dense areas generates more images. More images generate greater public attention. Greater attention strengthens the perception that these areas are inherently problematic. The result is not simply the policing of crime, but the production of places and populations that become permanently associated with suspicion.

Perumbavoor illustrates this process clearly. The town’s association with migrant labour has increasingly merged with public concerns about law and order. In the digital environment, where visual content travels faster than context, these associations acquire new strength. A police raid becomes a reel. A reel becomes a viral post. A viral post becomes a widely shared narrative about who constitutes a threat. Through repetition, suspicion acquires the appearance of common sense.

There is a broader irony here. Kerala’s economy depends heavily on migrant workers. From construction sites and manufacturing units to hotels and service industries, migrant labour has become indispensable to everyday economic life. Yet the same workers who sustain these sectors frequently appear in public discourse not as contributors, but as subjects of concern. This reveals a deeper contradiction within Kerala’s development model: economic dependence does not automatically translate into social acceptance.

Operation Toofan was launched to address the problem of drugs. But its public afterlife raises larger questions about migration, belonging, and representation. How are particular communities made visible through policing? How does social media shape public perceptions of crime? And why do certain groups become recurring symbols of social anxiety?

Perumbavoor is not merely a geographical location where these questions arise. It has become a symbolic city in Kerala’s imagination, a place where fears about migration, crime, and social order converge. Operation Toofan did not create these anxieties. Yet the campaign has made visible the ways in which they circulate and acquire legitimacy.

The danger lies not only in misrepresentation but in normalisation. When suspicion is repeated often enough, it begins to appear natural. Migrant workers cease to be seen primarily as workers, neighbors, or residents. Instead, they become symbols within a larger narrative about risk and security.

In that sense, the most important story emerging from Operation Toofan may not simply be about drugs. It may be about how certain populations come to be recognised as the most visible suspects in Kerala’s public imagination.

Courtesy: The AIDEM

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This Ayodhya Ram Temple construction came as a part of the follow-up of the Babri Mosque’s demolition in 1992, which was destroyed as part of the Ram Janmabhoomi agitation[1].

This agitation had shaken the country with Rath Yatras led by Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) president Lal Krishna Advani, as part of the BJP-RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh) campaign to restore the Ram Temple in Ayodhya. As per their make-believe propaganda, Babar, the first Mughal emperor, had destroyed the Ram Temple in Ayodhya, the “birth place” of Lord Ram, to build a mosque in his name.

Keeping the long drawn-out debate aside, the BJP-RSS succeeded in their plan, with alleged collaboration by sections of the judiciary. Right from that time, a huge fund collection drive was going on, in parallel. After the mosque’s demolition, the Liberhan Commission opined that Advani, MM Joshi and Uma Bharati (all top BJP leaders) among others were “culprits” with regard to the demolition of the mosque. Even the Supreme Court judgement conceded that demolition of the Babri Mosque was a crime.

While finding that those who demolished the Mosque (Babri) ‘had committed a crime’, the guilty were rewarded with the land on which the mosque stood to build this Ram Temple. More funds started pouring in. Prime Minister Narendra Modi played a double role — of Chief of State and the Chief Priest — to inaugurate the temple, reported India Today. Overall; it was he who was said to be the Decider-in-Chief of all the matters related to the Ram temple.

The quality of the structure became obvious the next rainy season after the construction of the ground floor. The ceiling started leaking giving a boost to the bucket industry as those had to be used to keep the floor dry. Devotees started thronging and the PM) (Prime Minister’s Office) was said to be in control of all the arrangements for donation collection. The extent of collections can be gauged from the fact that the Vishwa Sindhi Samaj stated that it had donated nearly 200 silver bricks, weighing a kilo each, for which they did not receive any receipt. Many rich donations in different forms were made. The total amount allegedly siphoned off by the trustees is estimated to be between Rs 2,000-3,000 crore. As per a report in the News Minute.

To cut a long story short, the cat is out of the bag that the temple was the scene of plunder of wealth. The implication of this will be known in the coming times. The whole Ram Temple campaign was primarily done for political purposes. It did lead to the emergence of BJP as a ruling party; and also helped spread hate against Muslims to make its political base very solid.

We are in a democracy where fraternity has been done away with; the hatred with the orchestrated campaign of ‘Hate’ against Muslims’ in a spiral. One is reminded of kingdoms when kings used to plunder temples for their wealth. How do we contrast those temple destructions during the age of kingdoms and what is currently afoot under a semi-democratising society turning into elected autocracy? The lust for money remains the common factor while religious polarisation was not part of the kings who plundered. Now, polarisation is the main agenda of ruling communal forces.

Two major examples come to mind.

One is Raja Harshdev of 11th century Kashmir and the plunder of Somnath by Mahmud Ghazni. Temples and holy places were destroyed by other kings, too. Historian Romila Thapar in Past and Prejudice session to Khoj teachers in Mumbai (then Bombay) explained, ‘Why rulers patronised and pillaged others’ religious places. Polymath D. D. Kosambi points out, “King Harsha of Kashmir (AD 1089-1101), not to be confused with seventh-century emperor Harsha, systematically melted down all metal images through the length and breadth of his kingdom, with just four exceptions. The work was carried out by a special ‘minister of uprooting gods’ (devottapatna Nayak).

Writer Asghar Ali Engineer pointed out, “About Mahmud Ghazni too, historians are quite selective in recording the facts. We highlight the fact that he plundered and destroyed Somnath Temple. But we do not throw light on the fact that he employed Hindus in high positions in his army and administration. Among the names of Hindu generals, names of Tilak, Sondhi, Rai Hind and Harjan are mentioned in Tarokhi-bayahaqi…Coins were issued in his reign with Sanskrit inscriptions.”

Temple destructions are attributed to having religious motives, as per the current social understanding. This was due to the implementation of the ‘divide and rule’ policy of the British, who implemented communal historiography. When Mahmud Ghazni destroyed Somnath Temple, before the act of destruction, he seized all the gold and silver idols of the temple, the total worth of these acquisitions should be more than twenty thousand gold dinars, a huge amount and big wealth. “… The King looked at idols in wonder and gave orders for seizing the spoils and appropriation of treasures. There were many idols of gold and silver and vessels set with jewels…the value of these things found in the temple exceeded twenty thousand dinars?”

Historian Romila Thapar writes, “temples were depositories of vast quantities of wealth, in cash, golden images and jewellery-the donations of the pious, these made them natural targets for non-Hindus searching for wealth in north India. The lust of Mahmud for gold was insatiable…the concentration of wealth in Somnath was renowned.” She further also points out “Religion did not count unless it could serve a definite political purpose, where it was exploited to the hilt.”

In popular perception, the novel ‘Jai Somnath‘ by Kanhaiyalal Maniklal Munshi played a major role in demonising Mahmud Ghazni and Muslims. It presented his forays to loot the temple as the one motivated by religious purpose alone, as an insult to Hindu religion. And further temple destruction by Muslim kings became the main propaganda of communal forces.

While many Muslims kings are singled out for destroying the temples, hardly attention is paid to the donations which many Muslim kings gave for Hindu temples. They received “copies of firmans (Court orders) of King Aurangzeb from great temples of Mahakaleshwar (Ujjain), Balaji Temple (Chitrakut) Umanand Temple (Gauhati), Jain temples of Shatrunjaya, and other temples and Gurudwaras scattered over North India. These farmans were issued from 1065 AH (1659) to 1095 AH (1685).”

The similarities between the temples destroyed by the likes of Ghazni and present Ram Temple Trust under the control of present dispensation is uncanny.

[1] Babri Masjid Demolition: A Point of Departure, and of Arrival; Teesta Setalvad

Social Scientist; Vol. 51, No. 1/2 (596-597) (January-February 2023), pp. 21-38 (18 pages) Published By: Social Scientist

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Ram Mandir bhoomi-poojan: Why August 5?

The post Somnath to Ayodhya: Plunder to ‘Chanda Chori’ appeared first on SabrangIndia.

As per a report in the Indian Express, the attack took place at the residence-cum-office of a local Trinamool legislator in Kaliganj, Nadia, where Moitra had arrived to hold an internal meeting with party workers following the party’s electoral setback in West Bengal. According to Moitra, what initially appeared to be a small protest rapidly transformed into an organised mob that surrounded the premises, preventing her and other party workers from leaving safely.

Dear @NitinNabin @SamikBJP & of course @AmitShah – a mob lynch by BJP was organised yesterday. Every single person in mob has been identified, named & all are BJP workers. Please see how proudly they are flying your flag pic.twitter.com/0kqJcqYOUz

— Mahua Moitra (@MahuaMoitra) July 2, 2026

Hello @IPUparliament
please watch how police in Indian state of Bengal watch complicit as PM Modi’s ruling BJP goons in a lynch mob attack my premises & keep me confined for 4 hours. No protection for Opposition MP from @loksabhaspeaker pic.twitter.com/0d5NsGboCM

— Mahua Moitra (@MahuaMoitra) July 2, 2026

BJP worker Kalidas Pal of village Jamalpur openly standing, inciting mob to attack me for (of all things) marrying an Odia… at least I’m going to bed smiling. @MohanMOdisha @BJP4Odisha @WBPolice pic.twitter.com/APAO4BwpoU

— Mahua Moitra (@MahuaMoitra) July 1, 2026

I will stand. And this flag will stand. Till death. No BJP vermin will succeed in silencing me. pic.twitter.com/NYeFA3ed9R

— Mahua Moitra (@MahuaMoitra) July 1, 2026

Videos recorded from inside the building and later shared by Moitra on social media appeared to show eggs repeatedly striking the windows of the office while protesters outside shouted slogans. In another video, apparently recorded by persons participating in the protest, groups of men and women could be seen standing outside the premises throwing eggs towards the building while raising slogans. These videos spread rapidly across social media and became the defining images of what Moitra described as an orchestrated political assault rather than a spontaneous public protest.

Broadcasting live during the incident, Moitra repeatedly appealed to the Director General of Police and senior police officials, alleging that despite being informed of the situation, law enforcement authorities had failed to disperse the crowd. She accused the police of remaining “mute spectators” while the gathering outside became increasingly emboldened.

Addressing viewers during the live broadcast, she insisted that the attackers were not ordinary local residents expressing spontaneous anger but workers affiliated with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). She maintained that the entire episode was politically organised and intended to intimidate an elected Member of Parliament inside her own constituency. According to media reports, Moitra stated that she had no intention of leaving under police escort because doing so would expose her and others inside the office to physical assault from the crowd waiting outside.

These are no public outbursts. These are coordinated BJP attacks. See the BJP flags pic.twitter.com/yrGYoaabB9

— Mahua Moitra (@MahuaMoitra) July 1, 2026

As the confrontation continued, Moitra alleged that eggs, mud, stones and even vegetables were being thrown towards the building. She later claimed that one of the projectiles struck her, causing minor injuries. Displaying stains on her clothes during a subsequent video message, she argued that the incident demonstrated not merely political hostility but a complete breakdown of law and order.

Perhaps the most serious allegation levelled by the Trinamool MP concerned the conduct of the police. Rather than accusing the authorities of arriving late, she claimed that police personnel and Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel had reached the location but failed to intervene decisively. According to her, officers merely watched while the crowd continued pelting the premises for hours. She repeatedly questioned why the police were allegedly attempting to persuade her to leave the building instead of dispersing those allegedly committing offences outside.

Currently being attacked by @bjp4india goons with @wbpolice watching on.@MamataOfficial @RahulGandhi @akhliesh @supriya_sule @mkstalin @ArvindKejriwal pic.twitter.com/eD2gYU0NPx

— Mahua Moitra (@MahuaMoitra) July 1, 2026

Later that evening, Moitra escalated her allegations by publicly naming sixteen individuals whom she claimed had led the attack. Through posts on X, she asserted that these persons were BJP workers whose identities had been verified through video footage and local information. She also subsequently alleged that the violence had been orchestrated under the leadership of a local BJP politician who had contested the 2026 Assembly elections from Kaliganj.

Hello @DGPWestBengal @WBPolice more names .Mob attack on me today was led by these @BJP4India goons (caught on camera, verified) :
Santosh Ghosh
Hilal Mallick
Mampi Mondal
Monideepa Pramanick
Sumi Mishra
Rathin Pramanick
Ananta ghosh
Pratik Dhar
Tarun Rajak
Kamalakanto Ghosh…

— Mahua Moitra (@MahuaMoitra) July 1, 2026

Moitra was also supported by other MPs from the party, including TMC MP Dola Sen.

#WATCH | Kolkata: On an egg attack on TMC MP Mahua Moitra, TMC MP Dola Sen says, “…She is continuously doing live… As workers for Mamata Banerjee, we know how to fight; she is fighting…. Law and order isn’t our responsibility… we have faith in the public and in Mamata… pic.twitter.com/1v16LtPQqr

— ANI (@ANI) July 1, 2026

The BJP categorically rejected these allegations. As per Times of India, state BJP leaders denied that the protest had been organised by the party and suggested instead that the incident reflected growing public resentment against Trinamool Congress leaders after the Assembly elections. Some BJP leaders even claimed that internal factionalism within the Trinamool Congress could have contributed to the confrontation. They further maintained that egg pelting was not part of the BJP’s political culture and urged party workers to refrain from such conduct if they were involved.

#WATCH | Kolkata: On an egg attack on TMC MP Mahua Moitra, WB BJP President Samik Bhattacharya says, “If the general public throws an egg or the TMC throws an egg on the TMC, then what can we do about it? This isn’t the police’s job. The police only have metal detectors… There… pic.twitter.com/AiYodlHOpp

— ANI (@ANI) July 1, 2026

The West Bengal Police also disputed Moitra’s version of events. As per Times of India, Krishnanagar SP Atul V stated that officers had reached the location soon after receiving information and had repeatedly requested Moitra to leave the premises for her own safety. According to the officer, reported in TOI, discussions continued for several hours because the MP was unwilling to exit immediately, and she was eventually escorted from the premises without sustaining any serious injuries. Police authorities rejected suggestions that they had deliberately remained passive throughout the episode.

Yet irrespective of these competing narratives, one fact remained undisputed: for several hours, a sitting Member of Parliament was confined inside a political office while a hostile crowd surrounded the building, repeatedly throwing objects towards the premises. Videos from both inside and outside the building left little doubt that the confrontation had escalated far beyond ordinary political protest.

From symbolic protest to organised public humiliation

The incident also carried profound symbolic significance because it occurred against the backdrop of an increasingly visible phenomenon in West Bengal’s political landscape—what many commentators have described as the normalisation of public humiliation as a form of political protest. In recent months, eggs have become the preferred instrument through which political opponents have sought to ridicule rather than merely oppose elected representatives. While egg-throwing has often been dismissed as harmless political theatre, the cumulative pattern of incidents across the State suggested that these episodes were becoming increasingly organised, confrontational and potentially dangerous.

Mahua Moitra was not the first Trinamool leader to face such treatment. Former minister Ujjal Biswas, senior TMC leaders Kunal Ghosh, Vijay Singh, Jayprakash Majumdar, Sabyasachi Dutta and several others had reportedly faced similar attacks in recent weeks. Earlier, Abhishek Banerjee himself had allegedly been targeted with eggs and stones while visiting areas affected by political violence. Reports suggested that the practice had become so frequent that protective helmets were reportedly used during some political visits.

The attack on Moitra therefore represented something larger than an isolated confrontation between rival political workers. It appeared to reflect an emerging culture in which elected representatives are subjected to orchestrated public humiliation through organised crowds, with law enforcement increasingly being accused—rightly or wrongly—of failing to intervene promptly.

Why the Calcutta High Court was forced to intervene

What transformed the incident from merely another episode of political violence into a constitutional controversy, however, was its extraordinary timing. Barely a day before Moitra found herself under siege in Nadia, the Calcutta High Court had delivered a strongly worded order declaring that precisely such incidents of egg-pelting, mob intimidation and public humiliation could not be treated as routine political occurrences. Instead, the Court warned that these practices struck at the heart of constitutional guarantees of dignity, equality and the rule of law.

The remarkable proximity between the Court’s warning and the alleged attack on Moitra would immediately cast fresh attention on the judiciary’s intervention, raising uncomfortable questions about whether political vigilantism had already become entrenched enough to defy judicial caution itself.

The events in Nadia acquired even greater significance because they did not occur in isolation. Rather, they unfolded against the backdrop of an unprecedented series of public attacks on Trinamool Congress leaders that has, over the past several weeks, fundamentally altered the nature of political protest in West Bengal. While political demonstrations have always been a part of the State’s vibrant electoral culture, the recent emergence of organised “egg attacks” has transformed symbolic protest into a recurring form of public humiliation directed at elected representatives and political functionaries. The frequency of these incidents, their increasingly coordinated nature, and allegations of police inaction have collectively raised concerns about the gradual normalisation of mob intimidation as a political tool.

One of the earliest high-profile incidents involved Trinamool Congress national general secretary Abhishek Banerjee. During a visit to Sonarpur to meet families allegedly affected by post-election violence, Banerjee was confronted by protesters who allegedly hurled eggs and stones at his convoy. Media reports suggested that he sustained minor injuries during the incident, while videos circulated widely showing protesters shouting slogans and physically confronting his security personnel. Banerjee later characterised the episode as political violence and alleged that it reflected an organised attempt to intimidate the opposition.

Thereafter, similar incidents multiplied across the State. Former minister Ujjal Biswas reportedly faced an egg attack outside his residence in Krishnanagar. Senior Trinamool leader Kunal Ghosh was targeted outside Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee’s Kalighat residence soon after leaving the premises. Minister Udayan Guha, TMC leader Vijay Singh, Kolkata councillors Bappaditya Dasgupta and Md. Jasimuddin, Jayprakash Majumdar, Sabyasachi Dutta and several other party functionaries also reportedly became targets of similar protests while appearing before courts, travelling under police escort or attending political programmes. In several cases, protesters allegedly shouted “chor, chor” while pelting eggs at politicians accused of corruption or abuse of office.

Although many initially dismissed these incidents as an unusual but relatively harmless form of political expression, the cumulative effect of repeated attacks soon raised serious concerns. Increasingly, elected representatives were being confronted not merely through slogans or demonstrations but through physical acts intended to publicly degrade and humiliate them. The symbolism was unmistakable: eggs were being weaponised as instruments of public disgrace.

It was against this backdrop that the Trinamool Congress approached the Calcutta High Court seeking judicial intervention. The petition argued that the repeated attacks were no longer isolated incidents but part of a systematic pattern of targeted violence directed against members of a particular political party. It further alleged that despite repeated complaints, the police had failed to prevent such attacks or take effective action against those responsible.

Ironically, barely a day after the High Court issued significant directions aimed precisely at preventing such incidents, Mahua Moitra herself became the latest alleged victim of the same phenomenon. The chronology made the events particularly striking.

‘Dignity Is Not a Privilege’: Inside the Calcutta High Court’s constitutional reasoning

On June 30, 2026, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court comprising Acting Chief Justice Tapabrata Chakraborty and Justice Partha Sarathi Chatterjee heard a Public Interest Litigation filed by Md. Danish Farooqui. Less than twenty-four hours later, on July 1, Mahua Moitra alleged that she had remained trapped inside a party office for nearly four hours while protesters hurled eggs, mud and stones at the building. What had until then appeared to be a broader debate about political conduct suddenly acquired immediate constitutional relevance.

The Court’s order reveals that the litigation extended far beyond isolated incidents of egg pelting. The petition presented before the Court described a disturbing pattern of public violence, mob intimidation, targeted humiliation of accused persons and alleged failures by the State machinery to protect individuals from organised attacks. The petition did not merely seek directions against throwing eggs at political leaders; it sought judicial intervention to prevent mob violence, ensure prompt registration of criminal cases, prohibit public humiliation of persons in custody, and restrain authorities from treating accused persons in a degrading or dehumanising manner.

Senior Advocate Kalyan Bandopadhyay, appearing for the petitioner, argued that despite repeated complaints regarding assaults, targeted violence and public humiliation, the State had failed to discharge its constitutional obligation to protect individuals associated with a particular political party. Referring to specific incidents detailed in the petition, he submitted that allegations of mob violence, assaults and even attacks on pregnant women had gone inadequately addressed despite police complaints having been lodged. He relied upon recent Supreme Court decisions, including Zulfiquar Halder v. State of Uttar Pradesh, In Re: Manoj Tibrewal Akash, and In Re: City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price, to argue that the State bears a positive constitutional obligation to protect citizens against mob violence and unlawful vigilantism.

The State, represented by Additional Advocate General Rajdeep Mazumdar, responded that wherever specific complaints had been filed, First Information Reports had already been registered and arrests had been made. Seeking additional time, the State requested an opportunity to place supporting records before the Court demonstrating the action already taken by law-enforcement authorities.

However, what followed constituted perhaps the most important part of the Court’s order—and one that extends well beyond the immediate politics of West Bengal. Rather than treating the controversy as a routine dispute between rival political parties, the Bench framed the issue squarely as one involving constitutional rights, human dignity and the limits of public vigilantism. The Court emphasised that the complaints before it could not simply be dismissed as everyday political incidents but had to be examined “from a fundamental viewpoint.” It declared that the constitutional guarantee of human dignity flowing from Articles 14, 19 and 21 is engaged whenever individuals are publicly dehumanised or subjected to arbitrary humiliation. The Bench further observed that dignity and security are not privileges conferred by those in power but inherent constitutional rights belonging to every individual irrespective of status, political affiliation or circumstance.

The Bench’s observations are particularly significant because they consciously moved the discussion away from the political identity of those involved. Whether the victims were members of the ruling party, the opposition, or ordinary citizens was, in the Court’s view, constitutionally irrelevant. The question before the Court was whether the State could permit a situation in which members of the public assumed the role of judge, jury and executioner by humiliating individuals outside the framework of law. In emphatic terms, the Court reminded the State that no person—even one accused of criminal misconduct—loses the protection of the Constitution merely because allegations have been levelled against them.

Mandatory directions to the state

The Court unequivocally held that the State has a positive constitutional obligation to shield accused persons from “inhumanity and barbarity.” It observed that the increasing incidents of egg-pelting, public humiliation and mob intimidation reflected a disturbing tendency of citizens taking the law into their own hands. Such conduct, the Bench held, cannot be tolerated in a constitutional democracy governed by the rule of law. Public outrage, political disagreement or allegations of corruption, however serious, cannot legitimise acts of vigilantism or justify degrading treatment of any individual. The Court therefore declared that the recurring practice of throwing eggs at accused persons and portraying them as objects of public ridicule had to be curbed through immediate administrative intervention.

Significantly, the Court did not stop at making broad constitutional observations. Recognising that repeated judicial pronouncements often remain ineffective unless translated into concrete administrative measures, the Division Bench issued a series of mandatory directions to the State machinery.

First, it directed the Director General of Police, West Bengal, to immediately formulate and circulate comprehensive guidelines across every police station in the State for preventing incidents of egg-pelting, mob violence, public disorder and lynching. These were not intended to remain abstract advisories. The Court specifically required that the guidelines be communicated with mandatory directions requiring strict compliance by all police officers throughout West Bengal.

Secondly, the Court instructed the police administration to maintain continuous vigilance so that prompt preventive and coercive action could be taken immediately upon receiving information about such incidents. This direction reflects an important shift in judicial thinking. Instead of merely requiring investigation after an incident has occurred, the Court emphasised the State’s preventive responsibility to anticipate and stop mob violence before it escalates. In constitutional terms, this aligns with the principle repeatedly articulated by the Supreme Court that the right to life under Article 21 imposes positive obligations upon the State, including the duty to protect individuals from foreseeable harm at the hands of private actors.

Thirdly, the Division Bench directed the Director General of Police to file a comprehensive affidavit before the Court detailing every step taken in compliance with its directions. This reporting requirement serves a dual purpose. It ensures judicial oversight over the implementation of the Court’s orders while simultaneously placing institutional accountability upon the highest police authority in the State rather than leaving compliance to local police stations alone.

The State Government was also directed to file an affidavit-in-opposition responding specifically to the allegations raised in the Public Interest Litigation and to furnish a complete list of criminal cases already registered in connection with the incidents referred to in the petition. By requiring disclosure of all registered cases, the Court sought to examine not merely whether FIRs had been lodged, but whether the State’s response reflected a consistent policy against mob violence or merely isolated instances of enforcement.

Beyond Mahua Moitra: Why this order matters for constitutional democracy

Viewed in isolation, these directions may appear to concern only the administration of law and order. Their constitutional significance, however, is considerably deeper. The order implicitly recognises that public humiliation itself can become a form of punishment—one imposed not through judicial process but through organised crowds acting outside the law. In doing so, the Court reaffirmed a foundational constitutional principle: punishment in a democratic society is the exclusive domain of courts established by law. Neither political supporters nor political opponents possess the authority to inflict symbolic or physical punishment upon individuals, irrespective of public opinion regarding their conduct.

This principle assumes particular importance in an era increasingly characterised by what scholars have described as “trial by crowd.” Across India, accusations of corruption, criminality or political misconduct are frequently accompanied by campaigns of public shaming, social media condemnation and, at times, physical intimidation. While such acts may not always amount to grievous violence, they nevertheless erode the fundamental distinction between lawful accountability and extra-legal punishment. The Calcutta High Court’s order is therefore best understood not as an attempt to shield politicians from criticism but as a reaffirmation, that constitutional governance cannot coexist with mob justice.

Indeed, the language employed by the Bench deliberately invokes the constitutional vocabulary of dignity, equality and liberty rather than the narrower language of public order. By grounding its reasoning in Articles 14, 19 and 21, the Court acknowledged that dignity is not merely an abstract moral value but an enforceable constitutional guarantee. Public degradation—whether by physical assault, forced parading; humiliating treatment in custody or organised acts of ridicule—strikes directly at that guarantee. The Constitution protects individuals not because they are innocent, influential or politically favoured, but because their humanity itself commands respect.

It is precisely for this reason that the timing of the alleged attack on MP Mahua Moitra is so striking. Barely a day after the High Court reminded the State of its constitutional obligation to prevent precisely such incidents, allegations emerged that a sitting Member of Parliament had remained confined inside a political office for hours while protesters repeatedly hurled eggs, mud and stones at the premises. If those allegations are ultimately found to be true, the incident would represent not merely another episode of political confrontation but an immediate test of the effectiveness of the High Court’s directions—and, more fundamentally, of the State’s willingness and capacity to translate constitutional principles into meaningful protection on the ground.

The significance of the Calcutta High Court’s order extends well beyond the immediate controversy surrounding Mahua Moitra or the recent spate of attacks on Trinamool Congress leaders. At its core, the order is an emphatic reaffirmation of a constitutional principle that is increasingly being tested across India—that the criminal justice system cannot be replaced by public spectacle, and that constitutional rights do not disappear merely because a person is politically unpopular, accused of wrongdoing, or belongs to a rival political party.

The complete order may be read below:

Can guidelines alone prevent political vigilantism?

In recent years, public humiliation has emerged as a recurring feature of India’s political and criminal justice landscape. Accused persons have been paraded before television cameras, assaulted by mobs outside courts and police stations, forced to endure public abuse while in police custody, and subjected to relentless campaigns of social media vilification. In several cases, these incidents have occurred in the presence of law enforcement personnel, raising troubling questions about whether the State has adequately discharged its constitutional obligation to protect those in its custody or under its protection.

Detailed story on public shaming may be read here and here.

The Calcutta High Court’s intervention must therefore be understood against this wider national backdrop. Although the immediate trigger for the litigation was the repeated targeting of Trinamool Congress leaders through organised egg-pelting incidents, the principles articulated by the Bench are deliberately universal. The Court consciously refrained from limiting its observations to members of any particular political party. Instead, it repeatedly emphasised that every individual—including an accused person—is entitled to dignity, security and equal protection of the law. That emphasis is perhaps the most important aspect of the order.

By invoking Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution together, the Court underscored that the issue before it was not simply one of maintaining public order but one of preserving constitutional governance itself. Article 14 guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the laws. Article 19 protects the freedom of speech and peaceful political participation, while permitting only constitutionally permissible restrictions. Article 21 guarantees that no person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law—a guarantee that the Supreme Court has repeatedly interpreted to include the right to live with dignity, privacy, reputation and bodily integrity. The High Court’s reasoning reflects the settled constitutional position that these guarantees are not suspended because allegations have been made against an individual. Constitutional rights belong equally to the innocent, the accused, the convicted, political supporters and political opponents alike.

The Court’s reliance upon recent Supreme Court decisions reinforces this constitutional approach. In Zulfiquar Halder v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the Supreme Court reiterated that the State bears a positive obligation to protect individuals from mob violence and cannot remain a passive spectator where constitutional rights are threatened. Similarly, in In Re: Manoj Tibrewal Akash, the Supreme Court emphasised the duty of constitutional courts to intervene where executive authorities fail to protect the rule of law. By relying on these authorities, the Calcutta High Court situated the present controversy within an evolving jurisprudence that treats mob violence not merely as isolated criminal conduct but as a constitutional failure requiring institutional accountability.

Equally noteworthy is the Court’s recognition that humiliation itself can amount to a constitutional injury. Much of the public discourse surrounding the recent incidents in West Bengal has trivialised egg-pelting as a harmless form of political satire or symbolic protest. Yet the Court declined to accept that characterisation. Its observations acknowledge that when organised crowds repeatedly surround individuals, throw projectiles, prevent free movement, publicly ridicule them and seek to degrade them in full public view, the issue ceases to be one of symbolic expression and becomes one of intimidation and coercion. Constitutional democracies permit robust criticism—even harsh criticism—of political leaders. They do not, however, legitimise organised acts of public degradation that seek to replace lawful accountability with collective punishment.

This distinction is crucial. Citizens unquestionably possess the right to protest against corruption, maladministration or abuse of power. Peaceful demonstrations, slogans, criticism in the media and political campaigns all fall within the democratic process. What the Constitution does not countenance is the substitution of judicial processes with public punishment. Once crowds begin determining how accused persons should be treated, when they should be publicly shamed, or what forms of humiliation they deserve, the rule of law gradually gives way to the rule of the mob.

The Real Constitutional Question: Who punishes in a democracy?

The allegations made by Mahua Moitra acquire significance beyond partisan politics. Whether every allegation ultimately withstands judicial scrutiny remains a matter for investigation. Equally, the State’s assertion that police acted promptly and that arrests have already been made deserves fair consideration. However, the constitutional concern does not depend solely upon the outcome of competing factual narratives. Even if some details remain disputed, the repeated emergence of videos showing elected representatives surrounded by hostile crowds, projectiles being thrown at political meetings, and allegations of delayed police intervention reflects a disturbing erosion of the distinction between democratic dissent and organised intimidation.

The episode also exposes a recurring dilemma confronting constitutional democracies: the temptation to tolerate unlawful conduct when directed against politically unpopular individuals. It is often easier to defend constitutional protections in cases involving sympathetic victims. The true test of constitutional fidelity, however, lies in extending the same protections to those who may be widely criticised, politically controversial or facing criminal allegations. Courts have consistently recognised that constitutional rights are most meaningful precisely when they protect unpopular individuals from the passions of the moment. The Calcutta High Court’s order is a reminder that the Constitution does not operate selectively; it protects all persons because it is founded upon the inherent dignity of every individual.

At the same time, the order also invites scrutiny of the adequacy of institutional responses. While directing the Director General of Police to frame state-wide guidelines is an important administrative step, guidelines by themselves cannot eliminate political vigilantism. Their effectiveness will ultimately depend upon consistent implementation, prompt preventive policing, and impartial registration of criminal cases and swift prosecution of those who organise or participate in mob attacks. Unless these directions are accompanied by visible enforcement, there remains a risk that judicial pronouncements may be viewed as symbolic rather than transformative.

The timing of the Mahua Moitra incident makes this challenge particularly stark. If, as alleged, a sitting Member of Parliament remained confined inside a party office for several hours while a crowd hurled eggs, stones and mud at the premises, the incident would represent an immediate test of the State’s capacity to implement precisely the constitutional obligations that the High Court had reaffirmed only a day earlier. Conversely, if the State’s account is accepted, that police acted promptly, attempted to secure her safe exit and eventually escorted her without major injury, it nevertheless underscores the importance of transparent investigation, accountability and public confidence in law-enforcement institutions.

Ultimately, the controversy is about far more than eggs, slogans or partisan rivalry. It concerns the resilience of constitutional governance in the face of growing political polarisation. Democracies are strengthened not when governments protect only their supporters or when courts intervene only for politically convenient causes, but when institutions consistently uphold the rule of law irrespective of ideology or electoral affiliation. Public anger, however genuine, cannot become a substitute for legal process. Political disagreement, however intense, cannot justify intimidation. Constitutional democracy demands that accountability be secured through investigation, prosecution and adjudication—not through crowds gathered outside courtrooms, police stations or party offices.

The Calcutta High Court’s order is therefore best understood as a constitutional warning against the normalisation of vigilantism. By reaffirming that dignity, equality and personal security belong to every individual, including those accused of offences and those occupying contested political spaces. The Court has reiterated one of the Constitution’s most fundamental promises: that the law, and not the mob, must remain the ultimate arbiter of justice.

Related:

Public Shaming & Constitutional Courts: Guidelines without teeth?

Rajasthan’s Public Shaming: Police humiliation practices defy law and human dignity

From Fringe to Framework: How AHP’s hate ecosystem reconfigured law, society, and electoral politics

From ‘Tauba Tauba’ to ‘Expel the Ghuspaithiya’: The language of exclusion in Bihar’s election season

Right to Food: How the ban on sale of non-veg food is an issue where imposed majoritarian faith clashes with the Indian Constitution

The post Politics of Humiliation: Mahua Moitra, mob intimidation and the Calcutta High Court’s warning appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Telangana | Special Court for MPs/MLAs at Hyderabad acquitted MLA Raja Singh in a case registered under Sections 153A(a)(b), 295A, 504, 505(2) and 506 of the IPC.

Raja Singh was arrested by the Mangalhat Police. After the learned Magistrate declined to grant police remand, he…

— ANI (@ANI) June 30, 2026

The controversy that sparked nationwide outrage

The origins of the case can be traced to August 2022, when stand-up comedian Munawar Faruqui was scheduled to perform in Hyderabad. Raja Singh, then a BJP MLA representing the Goshamahal Assembly constituency, publicly opposed the event, accusing Faruqui of repeatedly insulting Hindu deities during his comedy performances. Anticipating possible law-and-order issues, the Hyderabad Police placed Singh under preventive house arrest on August 20, 2022, while providing extensive security arrangements to ensure that Faruqui’s performance could proceed peacefully.

Detailed report may be read here.

Within days, however, the controversy escalated dramatically. Raja Singh uploaded a video on his YouTube channel responding to Faruqui’s show. During the course of the video, he made a series of derogatory remarks concerning Prophet Muhammad, including references that many Muslims considered deeply offensive and blasphemous. The video spread rapidly across multiple social media platforms, provoking immediate condemnation from religious organisations, civil society groups and political leaders.

The remarks came at an especially sensitive time. Only weeks earlier, India had witnessed a diplomatic crisis after controversial comments about Prophet Muhammad by former BJP spokesperson Nupur Sharma had triggered protests across several countries and sharp criticism from governments in the Gulf and other Muslim-majority nations. Against this backdrop, Raja Singh’s statements were viewed as another flashpoint capable of inflaming already fragile communal relations.

Hyderabad witness widespread protests

Public anger against Raja Singh’s remarks was swift and intense. Thousands of people assembled across different parts of Hyderabad, particularly in the Old City, demanding his immediate arrest. Large demonstrations were organised outside the office of Hyderabad Police Commissioner C.V. Anand, while protest marches and public gatherings took place in several neighbourhoods including Shalibanda, Mangalhat and Charminar.

The protests continued for several days, with demonstrators alleging that repeated instances of hate speech by political leaders were being met with inadequate legal action. Protesters raised slogans, burnt effigies of Raja Singh and demanded strict criminal prosecution.

The demonstrations eventually turned volatile in certain areas. Reports indicated incidents of stone-pelting, clashes between sections of protesters and the police, and the use of baton charges by law enforcement to disperse crowds. Several protesters were detained. Authorities deployed additional police personnel, Rapid Action Force contingents and paramilitary forces to restore order. Educational institutions, commercial establishments and fuel stations in parts of Hyderabad remained closed as a precaution amid fears of communal violence.

The scale of the protests reflected the seriousness with which the Muslim community viewed the remarks and underscored the potential of inflammatory political speech to disturb public order in communally sensitive environments.

Criminal proceedings initiated

Following multiple complaints, the Mangalhat Police registered a criminal case against Raja Singh under several provisions of the Indian Penal Code dealing with communal hatred and public disorder.

The charges included:

• Section 153A IPC for promoting enmity between different religious groups;
• Section 295A IPC for deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings;
• Section 504 IPC for intentional insult likely to provoke breach of peace;
• Section 505(2) IPC for statements promoting hatred, enmity or ill-will between different communities; and
• Section 506 IPC relating to criminal intimidation.

These provisions constitute the principal statutory framework under which hate speech prosecutions have traditionally been pursued in India. Their application generally requires the prosecution to establish not merely that offensive words were spoken, but that the speech satisfied specific statutory ingredients such as deliberate intention, malicious conduct or promotion of communal hatred.

Arrest, release and preventive detention

Raja Singh was initially arrested on August 23, 2022. However, a magistrate declined to grant police custody owing to procedural deficiencies in the remand application, resulting in his release shortly thereafter.

The Hyderabad Police subsequently took the unusual step of invoking the Telangana Preventive Detention Act. On August 25, 2022, Singh was re-arrested under preventive detention on the ground that his repeated speeches and activities posed a continuing threat to public order and communal harmony.

The invocation of preventive detention against a sitting legislator attracted significant public attention. Preventive detention laws are ordinarily reserved for situations where authorities believe that ordinary criminal law is insufficient to prevent imminent threats to public order. Their use against an elected representative underscored the seriousness with which the administration viewed the potential consequences of Singh’s speeches.

Raja Singh remained in detention for approximately seventy-seven days before the Telangana High Court quashed the detention order in November 2022 and directed his release on bail.

BJP distances itself

The controversy also produced immediate political consequences. Within hours of Raja Singh’s arrest, the Bharatiya Janata Party suspended him from the party and issued a show-cause notice. The suspension came amid intense domestic and international scrutiny over inflammatory remarks concerning Prophet Muhammad by BJP leaders.

Party spokespersons publicly stated that the BJP did not endorse hate speech or statements capable of hurting religious sentiments. Political commentators widely viewed the suspension as an attempt to contain the growing controversy, particularly in light of the diplomatic fallout that had followed earlier controversies involving party spokespersons.

Despite the suspension, Raja Singh remained politically influential within Telangana. Before the 2023 Assembly elections, the BJP revoked his suspension, renominated him from Goshamahal, and he successfully retained his Assembly seat. In 2025, however, he resigned from the BJP following disagreements over the appointment of the Telangana state party president.

Trial before the Special Court

The criminal proceedings continued before the Special Court designated to hear cases involving Members of Parliament and Members of Legislative Assemblies.

Over the course of nearly four years, the prosecution examined witnesses, produced documentary material and relied upon recordings of the disputed speech. The defence, on the other hand, challenged both the evidentiary basis of the prosecution and the interpretation of the statements attributed to Raja Singh.

Following the judgment, as reported by ANI, defence counsel Advocate K. Karuna Sagar stated that the complainant himself had acknowledged during cross-examination that certain portions of the disputed speech referred to material found in Islamic literature. According to the defence, after evaluating the witness testimony and documentary evidence, the court concluded that the prosecution had failed to establish the ingredients of the alleged offences. The court consequently acquitted Raja Singh of all charges after holding that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.

#WATCH | Hyderabad, Telangana: Karunasagar, High Court advocate says, “Today the Special MP/MLA Court has acquitted MLA Raja Singh from the 2022 case which was registered by PS Mangalat for allegedly commenting on the life of Prophet Muhammad. The complainant in the case has… https://t.co/Ds7zQyzt3U pic.twitter.com/YqltQwRjkE

— ANI (@ANI) June 30, 2026

Raja Singh’s response

Following the acquittal, while speaking to ANI, Raja Singh described the judgment as a “victory of truth, justice and the rule of law.”

He maintained that he had never intended to hurt the religious sentiments of any community and alleged that the criminal case, along with his preventive detention, had been initiated under political pressure exerted by the AIMIM upon the then Bharat Rashtra Samithi (BRS) government.

He further claimed that several other criminal cases registered against him under successive governments were politically motivated and expressed confidence that he would eventually secure acquittal in those proceedings as well.

#WATCH | Hyderabad, Telangana: BJP MLA Raja Singh says, “A case was registered against me in 2022, alleging that I had made comments about someone’s deity; under pressure from the AIMIM, the then BRS government and police invoked the PD Act (Preventive Detention Act) and kept me… https://t.co/Ds7zQyzt3U pic.twitter.com/9EMfAnjsvE

— ANI (@ANI) June 30, 2026

A history of inflammatory speeches

Although acquitted in this particular prosecution, Raja Singh continues to remain one of India’s most controversial political figures because of his long history of inflammatory communal rhetoric.

Over the past decade, numerous FIRs have been registered against him alleging hate speech, promotion of communal enmity and incitement. His speeches have frequently targeted Muslims and other minority communities and have repeatedly attracted criticism from civil society organisations and human rights groups.

On July 16, 2024, Citizens for Justice and Peace sent three separate complaints to relevant authorities of Maharashtra against three separate incidents of hate speeches delivered by BJP MLA Raja Singh in the month of May. In all the three incidents highlighted in the complaint, BJP MLA Raja Singh can be heard delivered provocative and inflammatory statements against the Muslim community at events organised by the Sakal Hindu Samaj.  Details may be read here.

A dedicated profile of Raja Singh may be viewed here.

The broader legal questions

The acquittal illustrates one of the most persistent challenges in hate speech litigation in India. Public outrage, widespread protests or even deeply offensive speech do not automatically translate into criminal conviction. Criminal courts remain bound by the foundational principles of criminal jurisprudence, requiring the prosecution to establish every element of the alleged offences beyond reasonable doubt through admissible evidence.

At the same time, the judgment should not be understood as judicial approval of the speech itself. The court’s conclusion is confined to the evidence presented during trial and the prosecution’s inability to satisfy the high evidentiary threshold required for conviction under the Indian Penal Code.

The case therefore exposes a broader structural issue within India’s legal framework. Existing provisions such as Sections 153A and 295A IPC—now substantially reflected in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita—continue to be the principal statutory tools used to prosecute hate speech.

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The post From Outrage to Acquittal: The Raja Singh hate speech case comes to a close appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In a significant interim order passed by Justice S.R. Krishna Kumar at the Kalaburagi Bench, the Court stayed the endorsement issued by the Basavakalyan Tehsildar refusing permission for the event. However, while allowing the convention to proceed, the Court carefully moulded the relief by placing strict conditions upon both the organisers and the invited religious leader whose proposed participation had triggered the controversy.

Most notably, the Court directed that Kaneri Mutt seer Sri Adrushya Kadeshwara Swamiji may physically attend the event but shall not deliver any speech whatsoever, either personally or through any other individual. The restriction addresses the very basis on which the State had denied permission, namely the apprehension that his speech could provoke communal disharmony and disturb law and order.

State’s refusal based on anticipated law-and-order concerns

The petition was filed by the President of the Samavesha Utsava Samiti, challenging the Tehsildar’s endorsement dated, June 11 refusing permission for the proposed convention. Along with an accompanying procession to be held at either the Akkamahadevi College premises or the Basaveshwara ITI Auditorium.

The State justified its refusal by pointing to the invited seer’s previous public statements, alleging that he had repeatedly used derogatory, insulting and provocative language against the Lingayat community and followers of Basavanna. According to the authorities, those statements had previously led to widespread protests and objections from several Lingayat organisations, including the Karnataka Lingayat Mathadhipatigala Okkoota and the Basavanpura Association.

Given this background, the administration expressed apprehension that permitting both the event and the seer’s speech could result in serious disturbances and communal unrest.

Advocate General highlights existing injunction against seer

Appearing for the State, Advocate General Shashikiran Shetty argued before the High Court that the authorities’ concerns were not speculative but were founded upon the seer’s previous conduct.

The State further pointed out that there already exists an interim injunction restraining the seer from making defamatory statements against members of the Lingayat community. In light of that background, the Advocate General submitted that allowing the seer to publicly address a large gathering carried a substantial risk of triggering confrontation between rival religious groups and disrupting public peace.

Organisers and seer offer undertakings before Court

During the proceedings, as per LiveLaw, the High Court sought assurances from both the organisers and the invited seer.

Pursuant to the Court’s earlier directions issued on June 18, separate affidavits were filed by the organising committee and Sri Adrushya Kadeshwara Swamiji. The organisers undertook to conduct the programme peacefully, ensure compliance with any conditions imposed by the authorities, and cooperate in maintaining public order.

The seer, for his part, furnished an unconditional undertaking that he would neither deliver a speech himself nor communicate any speech indirectly through another person during the programme. These undertakings ultimately became central to the Court’s decision.

Court permits event but removes the source of apprehension

After considering the affidavits and rival submissions, the Court concluded that the principal apprehension expressed by the State related to the possibility of inflammatory speeches rather than the mere holding of the religious gathering itself.

Justice Krishna Kumar observed that the categorical undertaking furnished by the seer substantially addressed the concerns which had prompted the authorities to reject permission in the first place.

Accordingly, while staying the Tehsildar’s endorsement refusing permission, the Court allowed the convention to proceed subject to carefully crafted safeguards intended to preserve public order.

In doing so, the Court effectively separated the constitutional right to hold a peaceful assembly from the specific activity that the State feared might trigger violence.

Strict conditions imposed

The High Court made it clear that its permission was neither unconditional nor absolute. Among the most significant conditions imposed are:

• Sri Adrushya Kadeshwara Swamiji may remain physically present at the convention but shall not make any speech or address the gathering either directly or indirectly.
• Attendance at the programme shall not exceed 2,500 persons.
• No procession shall be conducted before or after the programme.
• No participant shall deliver hate speech or make statements capable of disturbing communal harmony or public order.
• No abusive language or insults directed at any political leader, religious leader, religious denomination or ethnic community shall be permitted.
• Any breach of these conditions would expose the organisers to legal consequences and liability.

The Court also took note of the State’s submission regarding limited police deployment and observed that restricting the gathering and prohibiting a procession would assist in ensuring adequate maintenance of law and order.

Judicial balancing between fundamental rights and public order

The interim order illustrates the judiciary’s attempt to reconcile two competing constitutional considerations. On one hand lies the right to peacefully assemble and organise religious or public events, protected under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution. On the other lies the State’s constitutional obligation to maintain public order and prevent violence, particularly where previous incidents and existing judicial orders indicate a real possibility of inflammatory speech leading to communal tensions.

Instead of either completely prohibiting the event or allowing it without restriction, the High Court adopted a narrowly tailored approach. By permitting the gathering while restraining the individual whose speech constituted the primary source of concern, the Court sought to preserve constitutional freedoms without ignoring legitimate public-order considerations. The order therefore reflects an exercise in judicial balancing rather than an endorsement of unrestricted executive discretion or an absolute assertion of free speech.

Significance of the order

The case also demonstrates that while prior restraints on speech are generally viewed with constitutional caution, courts may be willing to impose narrowly framed restrictions in exceptional circumstances where there exists credible material suggesting an imminent threat to public order.

Equally significant is the Court’s insistence that no participant, not merely the invited seer, shall engage in hate speech or make statements targeting political figures, religious leaders or communities. By extending responsibility to the organisers themselves, the Court reinforces the principle that those conducting large public gatherings bear a corresponding obligation to ensure that constitutional freedoms are exercised responsibly and without endangering communal harmony.

The matter has been directed to be listed again on July 1, 2026, when the High Court will consider the case further while the interim protection granted to the organisers continues to operate subject to the conditions imposed.

The complete order may be read below:

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The post Karnataka HC allows Hindu convention but bars invitee seer from speaking to prevent law-and-order concerns appeared first on SabrangIndia.