This piece reads the Charter seriously, which means reading it both appreciatively and critically. It has genuine strengths that deserve recognition. It also carries certain limitations that are worth naming honestly, not to undermine the effort but because the quality of the document warrants that kind of engagement.

A Decade of Stalled Policy

To understand what this Charter is trying to do, it helps to recall the political history that preceded it. In 2011, a panel led by ecologist Madhav Gadgil submitted a science-based framework for governing the Western Ghats. It proposed meaningful conservation, community-controlled decision-making through gram sabhas, and restrictions on mining, quarrying and destructive infrastructure in ecologically sensitive areas. The scientific case was widely regarded as sound.

Madhav Gadgil

The political reception was not. A coalition of church institutions, plantation interests, quarry operators and farming organisations in the Ghats districts framed the report as an anti-people agenda that threatened the livelihoods of smallholders and plantation workers. No Kerala government, regardless of political alignment, was willing to defend it. The Kasturirangan Committee, constituted in response, offered a more moderate approach: satellite-based mapping to distinguish natural from cultural landscapes, with strict protection applied only to the former. Even this considerably diluted version faced persistent resistance in the Ghats districts. Fifteen years later, Ecologically Sensitive Zone notification in Kerala remains incomplete and contested.

The environmental movement drew a clear lesson from this experience. Conservation arguments that do not attend to livelihood and development concerns are politically self-defeating in a democratic context. Meanwhile, the state had accumulated a different kind of evidence about what ecological neglect actually costs. The 2018 floods caused widespread devastation and prompted the Rebuild Kerala initiative, which for the first time embedded resilience thinking into state-level planning. The Mundakkai-Chooralmala landslide of 30 July 2024, which resulted in 373 deaths, over 200 injuries and 218 people still missing, remains the most devastating disaster in Kerala’s recorded history. These events gave ecological arguments a human weight that policy documents alone could not provide. The Charter reflects what the movement has arrived at after absorbing both lessons.

The Mundakkai-Chooralmala landslide

What the Charter Proposes

From Forest to Sea is an unusually substantive document for a civil society manifesto. It is organised around the idea that Kerala’s ecological systems form a single connected landscape running from the forests of the Western Ghats through midland hills, agricultural land, wetlands and rivers to the coast. Disturbances in any part of this system affect the whole. Upstream deforestation intensifies downstream floods. Floodplain encroachment amplifies coastal erosion. Wetland loss reduces a city’s capacity to absorb flood water. The Charter argues that governing this landscape requires not sectoral programmes operating in isolation but integrated governance across the entire continuum.

This framework is translated into proposals across eleven sectors including agriculture, forests, water, coastal ecosystems, infrastructure, mining, urban ecology, waste management, tourism and energy. For each sector the Charter offers both a situational assessment and specific commitments formatted for direct adoption by political parties. These range from structural proposals such as river basin governance and agroecological transition to specific ones such as Ecological Service Payments of at least Rs 2,500 per acre per year for wetland-conserving paddy farmers, mandatory 200-metre buffer zones for quarry blasting near residential settlements, and abandonment of the proposed coastal highway.

The governance architecture proposed is equally detailed. A Kerala Climate Action and Resilience Mission with cross-sectoral authority is the centrepiece, supported by approximately fifteen new missions and councils covering wetlands, river basins, coastal resilience and urban ecology. This is complemented by proposals for ecology-tagged budgeting, ecological fiscal transfers to local governments, and a Kerala Climate Rehabilitation Act modelled on the land acquisition law that would give climate-displaced communities enforceable rights. Taken together, the Charter represents the most detailed attempt yet made in Kerala to translate ecological governance principles into a politically addressable policy programme.

The Charter also makes a significant political choice in how it frames ecology in relation to development. Rather than presenting conservation as a constraint on growth, it argues that functional ecological systems are a precondition for it. Paddy fields buffer floods. Wetlands recharge groundwater. Mangroves protect coastlines. Forests sustain rivers. Degrading these systems generates public costs through disaster relief, infrastructure repair and agricultural losses that standard development accounting does not capture. This reframing is one of the Charter’s most important contributions.

Paddy Fields in Kerela

The Charter also ties its ecological proposals to livelihood protections in ways its predecessors did not. Ecological Service Payments for paddy farmers, wildlife damage compensation within thirty days rather than the current years-long wait, Adivasi rights to be recognised before any relocation is considered, and Free Prior and Informed Consent for fishing communities before coastal development proceeds are among the provisions that reflect this orientation. These are not decorative additions. They represent a serious attempt to sever the equation that made the Gadgil report politically indefensible: that environmental protection means taking something away from people who have little to spare.

Human-wildlife conflict receives more specific attention in the Charter than in most previous policy documents. It calls for wildlife damage compensation to be settled within thirty days, a universal insurance system for crop and livestock losses, and a statutory interstate coordination mechanism between Kerala, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu for managing shared elephant corridors. On relocation, the Charter is explicit that communities in or near elephant corridors cannot be displaced until their rights are fully recognised and fair compensation provided, acknowledging in its own language the historical injustice involved. These are more grounded provisions than earlier frameworks offered.

What the Charter Leaves Unanswered

Acknowledging what the Charter achieves does not require setting aside its limitations. The political constraints that shaped its strategic choices also produce certain silences, and some of these are worth examining carefully.

The first concerns the Western Ghats. The Charter calls for development proposals in the region to be evaluated against ecological carrying capacity, which is the right principle. But it does not specify what follows when that evaluation produces a negative answer. This is precisely the question that made the Gadgil report so difficult to defend politically. Recognising the WGEEP as legitimate science is not the same as demonstrating how its findings can be applied in practice when organised and powerful interests are opposed. The Charter proposes a Western Ghats Ecological Governance Council to manage these decisions, but it does not explain how such a body would be constituted or insulated from the same coalition of interests that stalled implementation for fifteen years. This is a significant gap, and one that future policy work will need to address directly.

The second limitation concerns what governance scholars sometimes call wicked problems. These are situations where ecological requirements and existing livelihood practices point in opposite directions and where no straightforward policy solution exists. The Charter’s call for seasonal fishing bans in wetland breeding grounds is ecologically sound, but communities dependent on inland fishing have no immediate alternative income during those periods, and the livelihood support provisions in this section remain vague. Similarly, the Charter is appropriately direct about ecological damage from unmanaged tourism in Munnar and Wayanad, but the tourism economy in those districts has become a significant source of income for large numbers of homestay operators, guides, vehicle owners and vendors. Carrying capacity limits would have real distributional consequences that the Charter acknowledges without fully working through. Where ecological and livelihood interests are compatible, the Charter is careful and detailed. Where they conflict, it tends to state the ecological position and note the livelihood concern without resolving the tension.

The third limitation is structural. The Charter documents ecological degradation with considerable authority, but it is relatively silent on the forces systematically producing it: real estate speculation, the remittance-driven construction boom, tourism promoted as a state growth strategy, and the infrastructure-led development model. These are not incidental factors. Governance prescriptions that do not engage them risk remaining parallel to the development model rather than transforming it.

Finally, the Charter’s institutional proposals are ambitious but unsequenced. Approximately fifteen new missions, councils and coordination bodies are proposed without a prioritisation logic, without an assessment of the cumulative administrative and financial demands they would place on the state, and without guidance on how jurisdictional conflicts between them would be managed. Kerala’s governance experience suggests that institutional multiplication without adequate capacity and sequencing tends to produce overlap rather than improved outcomes. The Charter would be more useful as a political document if it indicated which institutions should be established first and why.

The Charter as a Political Document

The limitations noted above do not diminish what the Charter represents as a political intervention. It is designed as a pre-election document, and its proposals are formatted as manifesto commitments precisely so that parties can adopt them and be held accountable for them. This is a legitimate and important function, and it is worth being clear about what it asks of the political process.

The question that voters and civil society organisations should be putting to the major parties is not a general one about environmental commitment. General commitments are easy to make and difficult to measure. The questions the Charter makes possible are specific. Will the party commit to abandoning the proposed coastal highway? Will ecology-tagged budgeting be introduced in the first budget? Will time-bound wildlife damage compensation be implemented? Will a climate displacement rehabilitation law be enacted? Which of the Charter’s institutional proposals will be established in the first year of government, and in what sequence?

These are questions that have concrete answers, and parties that have offered detailed positions on industrial investment, infrastructure spending and fiscal policy should be equally capable of responding to them. The Charter has done the work of translating ecological governance into politically addressable commitments. Whether that work produces accountability before and after the election depends on whether civil society organisations, journalists and voters treat these commitments as seriously as they treat other manifesto promises.

There is a broader point here as well. Kerala’s political parties have governed the state through two major flood disasters and one catastrophic landslide in less than a decade. The question of how the landscape is governed is no longer a specialist concern. It is a matter of public safety, fiscal prudence and the long-term viability of the state’s agricultural and coastal economies. The Charter makes that case carefully and in detail. The election is an opportunity to determine whether Kerala’s major parties have heard it.

After the Manifesto

The Charter’s deeper limitation is not a failure of analysis. It is a feature of the form. Manifestos identify what should happen. They are not designed to work through what happens when the communities whose livelihoods are directly affected resist, negotiate or require something different from what the policy proposes. The next phase of this work requires going beyond demonstrating that ecology and development are broadly compatible, which the Charter does effectively, to navigating honestly the cases where they are not.

Those cases involve communities with real and legitimate economic stakes in the outcome. The small farmers in forest-edge settlements whose income from marginal land is affected if quarrying is restricted. The fishing families whose wet season catches sustain them through leaner months when breeding bans apply. The homestay owners in the hill districts who have built their livelihoods around a visitor economy that carrying capacity limits would change. These are not obstacles to ecological governance. They are the communities that ecological governance most needs to engage seriously.

Human-wildlife conflict illustrates the limits of what compensation-based approaches can achieve. The Charter’s provisions on time-bound compensation and universal insurance address real and long-neglected grievances. But compensation responds to damage after it has occurred. The underlying conflict, between wildlife movement and settled farming communities in forest-edge areas, is persistent, geographically specific and carries costs that fall disproportionately on already economically marginal households. Working through it requires sustained institutional engagement with affected communities, not just a policy commitment. The Charter names this problem more honestly than its predecessors. Resolving it will take considerably more.

Doing justice to all these cases requires not just livelihood provisions appended to conservation proposals, but sustained institutional processes for working through conflicts, with affected communities participating meaningfully, with enforceable protections in place, and with enough flexibility to adjust when plans meet ground conditions that policy did not anticipate.

The Charter points toward this work without completing it. That is perhaps as much as a document of this kind can reasonably do.

What it has done is considerable. It has produced a rigorous, rights-integrated ecological framework and placed it before Kerala’s major parties on the eve of an election, addressed not to specialists but to the political process itself. In the fifteen years since the Gadgil report, Kerala’s environmental movement has learned that scientific rigour alone does not determine policy outcomes. Equally important is the capacity to translate ecological knowledge into political commitments that parties can carry and communities can demand. The Charter represents a serious attempt at that translation. Whether the translation holds through an election campaign, a government formation and the ordinary pressures of administration is the question that the next phase of this work will have to answer.

The author is grateful to Sridhar Radhakrishnan, Chair of the Drafting Committee, for conversations that informed this piece. The usual disclaimers apply.

Courtesy: The AIDEM

The post Ecology Before the Ballot Box appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Members of National Alliance for Justice, Accountability and Rights (NAJAR – Gujarat) – a pan Indian collective of progressive lawyers and law professionals and the National Alliance of People’s Movements (NAPM Gujarat), along with many civil society organizations of the state have strongly objected to the proposed amendments to the Gujarat Registration of Marriages Rules, 2006, notified on February 20, 2026. The groups have urged the State Government to withdraw the draft, citing serious concerns over constitutionality, privacy, and individual freedoms.

In a detailed letter of objections submitted to the Additional Chief Secretary, Government of Gujarat, Health and Family Welfare Department, these organizations have stated that the proposed amendments introduce provisions requiring submission of Aadhaar details, mandatory disclosure of whether parents have been informed, and the sharing of parents’ contact information. Further, authorities would be required to notify parents of a marriage application and impose a 30-day waiting period before registration.

According to the both organisations, these provisions are unconstitutional and violate fundamental rights, particularly the right to privacy, personal liberty, and individual autonomy. They argue that the amendments go beyond the scope of the parent legislation and impose unwarranted state intrusion into personal decisions of consenting adults.

A key concern raised is the mandatory parental intimation, which undermines the legally recognised right of adults to marry a person of their choice without interference. The groups warn that such provisions could expose couples—especially those in inter-caste, interfaith, or socially sensitive relationships—to harassment, violence, and even “honour-based” crimes. The autonomy granted to adult citizens to make marriages of choice has been a factor of Indian secular life since the enactment of the Special Marriages Act of 1954.

The amendments are also being criticised for failing the proportionality test laid down by the Supreme Court in privacy jurisprudence, as they lack clear necessity, legal backing, and a rational connection to their stated objective. Civil society groups noted that there is no empirical evidence justifying such sweeping measures.

Additionally, the proposal is seen as potentially deepening caste and religious divisions, discouraging inter-community marriages, and enabling misuse of laws such as the Gujarat Freedom of Religion Act through false complaints by disapproving family members.

The impact on women’s autonomy and LGBTQIA+ individuals has been highlighted as particularly concerning. The requirement of parental involvement could reinforce patriarchal control over women’s choices and further endanger queer and transgender individuals who often face familial violence and coercion.

The groups have also expressed alarm over proposals for digitized and publicly accessible marriage records, warning that such measures could lead to misuse of personal information and threaten individuals’ safety and dignity.

In conclusion, the organisations stated that instead of addressing genuine concerns, the amendments risk discouraging marriage registration altogether, thereby undermining the very purpose of the law.

NAJAR (Gujarat) and NAPM (Gujarat) –in a joint statement issued –have both called for the immediate withdrawal of the draft amendments and urged the government to uphold constitutional values, individual freedoms, and the right to dignity and choice.

The actual communication may be read below:

To,                                                                                                       Dated: March 19, 2026

The Additional Chief Secretary,

Government of Gujarat,

Health and Family Welfare Department,

New Sachivalaya,

Gandhinagar – 382010

Subject: Objections to the Proposed Draft Amendment to the Gujarat Registration of Marriages Rules, 2006  (Notification dated February 20,  2026) and Demand for Withdrawal of Proposed Draft

Sir/Ma’am,

We, individuals, organizations and collectives associated with the National Alliance for People’s Movements Gujarat and National Alliance for Justice, Accountability, and Rights, Gujarat, would like to convey our grave worries and formal objections to the proposed amendment to the Gujarat Registration of Marriages Rules, 2006 announced by the government of the state of Gujarat vide notification No. GHY/02/HFWD/102026/5/B1 dated 20.02.2026.

The way in which the proposed amendment aims to achieve its supposed intention (according to media statements issued by the Home Minister) of cracking down on those men who misrepresent their identities to women and fraudulently marry them appears to be severely misguided and is likely to cause more damage to the personal liberties of a large segment of the state as well as a long term disintegration of the society along religious and caste lines. The new rules are in clear contravention of the Articles 19, 21 and 51A (e) of the Indian Constitution and therefore unconstitutional. With respect to this, we the undersigned, demand withdrawal of the proposed draft amendment to the Gujarat Registration of Marriages Rules, 2006.

We hereby submit the following key rule-wise objections:

1. Objection against insertion of Rule 4 (3)(b)

Rule 4(3) prescribes for the mandatory accompanied documents with the memorandum, which already included identity establishing documents in 4(3)(a) and age verifying document as per 4(3)(c). There is thus no requirement of insertion of 4(3)(b) for submission of Aadhaar card. The courts [1]have time and again held that citizens cannot be denied basic services/entitlements/benefits for mere refusal to submit Aadhaar number. Further, it acts as an invasion of privacy even more so witnesses to the marriage. 

2. Objection against insertion of Rule 4 (5)

Through the insertion of Rule 4 (5), a declaration by both parties is required stating if their parents, have or have not been informed of the marriage, which is categorically submitted to be baseless, unconstitutional and beyond the scope of rule-making power of the state.

• At the outset, the power to make rules by the State Government in Section 21 of the parent act in particular, specifically matters described in Section 21(2)(a) to (f); the requirement of information to parents does not fall under the ambit of the same.
• The Gujarat Registration of Marriages Act, 2006, The Special Marriages Act, nor the personal laws from The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937, The Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872, and The Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936, there exists no requirement for the parties to marriage to inform/show consent/witness of their parents. In fact in Hindu Marriages Act, 1955, in 1978 amendment the farthest resemblance to guardians consent was also removed.

3. Objection against insertion of Rule 4(6)

Unequivocally, the insertion of this proposed sub-rule requiring both parties to submit not only the name of their parents, but their ordinary place of residence as well as mobile number- is fundamentally capricious, manifestly arbitrary and in violation of Fundamental Rights under Art 14 and 21. While details of parents of the parties is already submitted in the Memorandum of Marriage (as expanded in the Schedule under Section 5) the requirement of mobile number violates the ‘proportionality test’ for state intrusion to privacy rights. Further, it exceeds the scope of the parent act. The preamble of 2006 Act focuses on registration for evidence, not notification for parental oversight.

4. Objection against insertion of Rule 4 (7)

The proposed rule provides for Assistant Registrar to ‘expeditiously’ within 10 days intimate the parents of the parties about the memorandum submitted by the parties to the marriage and to their concerned Registrar in that jurisdiction as well. The amendment read with Rule 4(6) is patently illegal exercise of delegated legislative power by the state.

1. The parent Act does not empower the state to change a procedural statute of an already solemnized marriage. Even though registration has been mandatory, mere non-registration cannot change the legal status of a solemnized marriage. The proposed amendment in the Rule 4(7) read with Section 8 of the Gujarat Registration of Marriages Act, 2006 and conditions laid down for a valid marriage in the Special Marriages Act, nor the personal laws can lead to unnecessary objections being raised by the family and other parties leading to delay in registration and harassment of parties to marriage.
2. The requirement to ‘send intimation to the parents expeditiously’ is a blatant discrimination against adults choosing their partners. Multiple judicial pronouncements have reaffirmed the right to marry as an integral part of the fundamental right to life and personal liberty. As the Supreme Court held in 2021[2]:-
   “We are fortified in our view by earlier judicial pronouncements of this Court clearly elucidating that the consent of the family or the community or the clan is not necessary once the two adult individuals agree to enter into a wedlock and that their consent has to be piously given primacy. It is in that context it was further observed that the choice of an individual is an inextricable part of dignity, for dignity cannot be thought of where there is erosion of choice. Such a right or choice is not is not expected to succumb to the concept of “class honour” or “group thinking”.
3. It is submitted that this proposal violates the intrinsic right to privacy of individuals, In Puttaswamy, [3]the Supreme Court held that any state restriction on privacy must satisfy the tripartite test of legality, necessity and proportionality. The proposed rule-making power fails on all three counts: it lacks legality by infringing upon the fundamental right to life and liberty under Article 21 without statutory authority; it fails to substantiate the necessity of piercing established matrimonial autonomy or settled questions of law; and it is not proportional to the alleged objective of preventing “forced conversions” which remains a speculative concern that has not been statistically substantiated by the State to justify such a sweeping and coercive intrusion.

5. Objection against insertion of Rule 4(8)

The proposed rule 4(8) provides for registration of marriage after thirty dates from receipt of memorandum; upon being satisfied’ of compliance with sub-rules (1) to (7).

• Firstly, the proposed rule fails to provide any determining principle or purpose for this moratorium period of 30 days. While the underlying requirement of parental intimation is itself unconstitutional as substantantiated above, the rules remain silent on the consequences of this notice mentioned in Rule 4(7), and in event of no prescribed procedure merely serves as a baseless procedural hurdle with no nexus with marriage registration.
• Secondly, the proposed insertion is not in conformity with the Section 8 of the Gujarat Registration of Marriages Act, 2006. It is important to remember that Gujarat Registration of Marriages Act, 2006 is the parent act under which the rules are framed that are proposed to be Section 8 of the Act provides for the power to refuse the registration of marriage. The said section provides for only three specific circumstances in which the registration may be refused. Which is (a) marriage is not performed in accordance with the personal law of the parties, (b) the identity of the parties, or the witness or the priest is not established beyond reasonable doubt or (c) the documents tendered do not prove the marital status of the parties. When the scope of the refusal of the registration of the marriage is circumscribed by the parent legislation, the rules made thereunder cannot go beyond the same.

Additional suggestions/comments: 

Unclear Objectives

At the very outset, the prima facie un-tenability of the amendments lies in the absence of any clear and coherent objectives for their introduction. Any amendment to an existing law or rules should have nexus with a legitimate state goal in public interest. The stated intention at the time of the tabling the draft of new rules in the Vidhan Sabha are rather vague in nature and are also not substantiated by any empirical evidence either. The proposed amendments do not seem to fill any legal laps previously left in the light of Sections 4 and 5 of both the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and the Special Marriage Act, 1954 which lay out the conditions of a valid marriage per the respective legislations.

Threat to Personal Liberties

The new provision whereby both sets of parents of a couple shall be informed upon their attempt to register a marriage is antithetical to the principle of an individual’s right to choose. The very reason that we have a minimum age for marriage is the underlying belief that an adult has both the right and the capacity to choose their partner.

The practice of “honour killings” of inter-caste or interreligious couples has seen a sharp increase in India as per the data of the National Crime Records Bureau released in 2025, which is itself believed to underestimation. Necessitating the involvement of the parents in the process of marriage registration can directly put people’s lives at risk. The violence is often not only limited to the couple itself, but can engulf two communities in a bitter and long-term conflict that ends up destroying several lives.

Promotion of Casteism & Religious Divisions

Caste and religious lines continue to divide our country. While the marked increase in the beneficiaries of the ‘Dr. Savitaben Ambedkar Inter-Caste Marriage Assistance Scheme’ (being the most relevant indiactor of inter-caste marriage trends in Gujarat) is a positive sign, the overwhelming majority of marital relations in our society are endogamous in nature. The general trend in this regard suggests that the younger generation i.e. those who are going to marry in the foreseeable future are relatively more open to the idea of inter-caste and interreligious marriage. Informing the parents of the marrying parties effectively creates an obstruction only for those parties whose parents would not agree to the marriage on religious or caste lines.

A form of retaliation by the parents opposed to the registration of such marriages may be by filing a false case under the Gujarat Freedom of Religion Act, 2001. Section 3A of the Act empowers a relative of the “aggrieved person” to file a complaint of attempt to convert into a religion, and Section 6A of the Act puts the burden of proof on the accused to disprove the presence of fraud, coercion or allurement, failing which the accused shall have to face criminal charges. The additional requirement of intimation to parents of individuals may lead to criminalization of bonafide marital relationships in case the parents disapprove their marriage by way of criminal complaint under the Gujarat Freedom of Religion Act – effecting inter-faith marriages between two consenting adults.

Women’s Autonomy

Empowering parents to have a say in the marital decisions of woman, or in many instances being the decision maker on the woman’s behalf has been the primary way through which the power structures of caste and religion are preserved, as has been elucidated by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar in his seminal Castes in India. Provisions like the one being advanced by the government of Gujarat tend to control the lives and choices of women at a disproportionately higher rate than men. In the case of Shafin Jahan v. Ashokan K.M. (2018), also known as the Hadiya case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India strongly asserted the right of a person to marry someone of their choice, even if their parents are explicitly against the union. The then Chief Justice of India Dipak Mishra stated in his judgement:

“In the case at hand, the father in his own stand and perception may feel that there has been enormous transgression of his right to protect the interest of his daughter but his view point or position cannot be allowed to curtail the fundamental rights of his daughter who, out of her own volition, married the appellant.”

Further, while marriage registration has itself become necessary, the mere lack of registration itself does not annul the marriage. If a law like this which makes marriage registration difficult and potentially even life-threatening, many people may simply opt to not register their marriages, which can further lead to a rise in the many of the original problems that the new rules aim to solve.

Public Digital Record of Marriages

The proposal of digitizing publicly accessible marriage record being is another dangerous idea that can be used against bonafide couples/spouses. The name of a spouse is a kind of information that should not be available at the click of a button without the person’s knowledge or consent, as it can be easily used in myriad ways to target someone, from coercion to revenge. When, for example, a case is instituted in the family court, the names of the parties are redacted for the sake of privacy, recognised as a fundamental right guaranteed by the constitution by the It is therefore the right to every citizen to marry the person of their choice in as much secrecy as they may choose. Therefore, this proposed change also violates the ‘proportionality test’ laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme court in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2021).

LGBTQIA+ Community

Indian society has made significant strides towards accepting and embracing relationships between same-sex and transgender persons. Although the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Supriyo v. Union of India (2023) did not grant marriage equality to the LGBTQIA+ community, it affirmed their right to choose their partners and cohabitate without discrimination or threat of violence. The Court also validated the right of transgender individuals who have affirmed their binary gender upon transition to marry another binary-gendered person. However, the reality is such that many queer and transgender couples have no choice but to keep their union a secret even as they are subjected to routinized violence and manipulation by their families to enter into a heterosexual union. As a result, they are forced out of their homes and are rendered unhoused because of the discrimination and the threats their own families pose to their life and safety. In many such situations of estrangement, couples are tracked down with the aid of the police, and eventually coerced into heterosexual marriages.

The proposed Amendment to the Gujarat Registration of Marriage Rules makes life even more difficult for these LGBTQIA+ individuals and couples who wish to live together away from their families, and particularly those couples involving transgender persons who enter into a heterosexual marriage, as it mandates the consent of their families to register the solemnized union, and makes them vulnerable to public reprisal at best and social boycott at worst.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the proposed amendments to the Gujarat Registration of Marriages Rules, 2006, violate the fundamental rights of individuals and are manifestly arbitrary and unconstitutional as it seeks to undermine individual choice and dignity. Contrary to the objectives, this may in fact lead to individuals avoiding legal registration of marriage itself therefore setting us back to the core issue. 

In light of the above, we the undersigned citizens, strongly and emphatically suggest that the proposed amendment be withdrawn. 

Submitted by:

National Alliance for People’s Movements (Gujarat)

National Alliance for Justice, Accountability & Rights (Gujarat)

Below are the names of individuals from Gujarat, who have endorsed the above letter:

1. Smita Pandya, Social Activist, Ahmedabad
2. Meenakshi Joshi, Social- Political Activist, Ahmedabad
3. Deepak Solanki, Samarpan organization & PUCL, Ahmedabad
4. Raghavan Rangarajan, Professor, Ahmedabad
5. Jimmy C. Dabhi, Ph.d, Centre for Culture and Development, Vadodara
6. Ayesha Khan, Sanat Mehta Charitable Trust, Vadodara
7. Indira Hirway, Prof of economics, Ahmedabad
8. Neha Shah, Academic, Ahmedabad
9. Sheba George, Social Activist, Ahmedabad
10. Nirjhari Sinha, Jan Sangharsh Manch, Ahmedabad
11. Nita Mahadev, Social worker, Ahmedabad
12. Cedric Prakash, Human Rights Activist, Ahmedabad
13. Bilal Kagzi, Advocate, Surat
14. Swati Goswami, Communications Consultant, Ahmedabad
15. Sejal Dand, Feminist Activist, Ahmedabad
16. Navdeep Mathur, Faculty, Ahmedabad
17. Priyam Vadaliya, Researcher and Designer, Ahmedabad
18. Rohit Prajapati, Environment Activist, Gujarat
19. Kamal Thakar, Social worker, Vadodara
20. Swati Desai, Activist, Gujarat
21. Anand Mazgaonkar, Activist, Gujarat
22. Rohit Chauhan, Saurashtra Dalit Sangathan, Junagadh
23. Dev Desai, Human Rights activist, Gujarat
24. Heman Oza, Researcher, Ahmedabad
25. Khairunnisha pathan, Social activist, Ahmedabad
26. Gova Rathod, Saurashtra Dalit Sangathan and NAPM, Gujarat
27. Satya Oza, PhD Candidate, Ahmedabad
28. Sejal Dand, Feminist Activist, Ahmedabad
29. Prasad Chacko, National Secretary, People’s Union for Civil Liberties, Gujarat
30. Disha, National Alliance for Justice, Accountability & Rights, Surat
31. Harsh Kinger, National Alliance for Justice, Accountability & Rights, Vadodara
32. Harsh Raval, National Alliance for Justice, Accountability & Rights, Ahmedabad
33. Hozefa Ujjaini, National Alliance for Justice, Accountability & Rights, Ahmedabad
34. Subodh Kumud, National Alliance for Justice, Accountability & Rights, Ahmedabad
35. Winona D’souza, National Alliance for Justice, Accountability & Rights, Ahmedabad
36. Rakesh Vaghela, National Alliance for Justice, Accountability & Rights, Ahmedabad
37. Khush V., National Alliance for People’s Struggle (Urban Struggles Forum), Gujarat
38. Mirkhan Makrani, Peace and Justice, Himatnagar
39. Rafi Malek, Ahmedabad
40. Bhargav Oza, National Alliance for Justice, Accountability & Rights, Ahmedabad

[1] Justice KS Puttuswamy v Union of India, AIR 2017 SUPREME COURT 4161, Ganpat Dharma Mengal 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 13720

[2] Laxmibai Chandaragi B vs. State of Karnataka, (2021) 3 SCC 360

[3] Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India 2021

Related

Parental consent for marriage? Gujarat’s curious political consensus

The post Proposed Amendments to Gujarat Marriage Registration Rules Unconstitutional: NAJAR, NAPM appeared first on SabrangIndia.

In a detailed critique of the amendments, the Coalition states that the dilution and destruction of the framework outlined in the historic 2014 judgement of the Supreme Court in its historic National Legal Services Authority-NALSA v Union of India verdict has been achieved in the amendment bill

“through its proposal to narrow the definition of transgender in Section 2 (k). As per the proposed definition, transgender person is limited to ‘socio-cultural identities such as kinner, hijra, aravani, jogta or eunuch’ or those with ‘intersex variations at birth’. It also includes persons who have by ‘force’ been made to ‘present a transgender identity’. It specifically excludes, ‘persons with different sexual orientations and self perceived sexual identities’. ”

The amendment seeks to take away the right of a transgender person to self-identification.  This is made clear by the omission of Section 4 (2) of the 2019 Act which read, ‘A person recognised as transgender under sub-section (1) shall have a right to self- perceived gender identity’.

The statement of objects and reasons makes clear that the aim of the amendment is to exclude. As it notes, ‘The purpose [of the amendment] was and is not to protect each and every class of persons with various gender identities, self-perceived sex/gender identities or gender fluidities.’  The 2026 amendment will ensure that protection of the law is only extended to ‘those who face severe social exclusion due to biological reasons for no fault of their own and no choice of their own.’

This amendment instead of expanding the rights of the transgender community contracts it. Under this amendment, all the rights which transmen enjoyed will be taken away as transmen are no more considered transgender as far as the law is concerned. Moreover, under the amendment,  no person can identity as a transwoman either. The only option for a transgender person under the law is a traditional identity. Those who see their identity on a spectrum fall outside this conservative new definition proposed by the amendment. These are the strong critical arguments advanced by the Karnataka State Gender and Sexuality Minorities Coalition for Convergence (the Coalition).

Even for those who fall within the narrow definition of transgender, the ability to change one’s gender is made far more difficult. The amendment makes it mandatory for a person to get a certificate from a medical board to be appointed by the government, essential for getting identity as a transgender. However, even after getting such a certificate, the District Magistrate has the discretion to grant recognition.

The Coalition has made a strong plea and pitch that this amendment should be opposed as it strikes at the root of self-identification and is therefore completely at odds with the rights recognised under NALSA v Union of India.  Finally, the press statement says that, the transgender community strongly asserts that it will not allow the rights recognised by NALSA and the Trasngender Act, 2019 to be taken away by an amendment.  Passing this amendment will put in jeopardy the rights of thousands and lakhs of persons who are currently recognised as transgender. It will limit the right to self-identification for newer generations and represents a set-back in the struggle for transgender rights.

Strong protests are likely against the union governments move. The statement has been issued by the Members, Karnataka State Gender and Sexuality Minorities Coalition for Convergence and Akkai Padmashali Prakashi Abeda Begum Pruthvi Rakshitha Monika.

Meanwhile, the People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) has also issued a statement condemning the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Amendment Bill, 2026 as unconstitutional and demanding its immediate withdrawal. The PUCL statement says that the

amendments proposed in the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Amendment Bill, 2026 constitute a gross dilution of valuable rights provided under the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019 and shall result in exclusion of a large number of Transgender Persons from its ambit, denial of their constitutional and statutory rights and targeting their support system.

The Union Social Justice and Empowerment Minister, Dr. Virendra Kumar introduced the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Amendment Bill, 2026 (“the Bill”) in Parliament on March 13, 2026. The Bill was not released in the public domain for scrutiny and consultation. The Bill is regressive and nothing but a shocking attempt to take back the hard won rights of the transgender community. The aim of the proposed amendments, says the PUCL, also, is to destroy the framework set by the Supreme Court of India in its historic decision in  NALSA v Union of India (2014) which recognised the right to self-identification of gender by transgender persons and set in place the legal recognition of the rights of the transgender community.

Narrowing of the definition of transgender persons who are entitled to protection by the law

The Bill fundamentally alters the scope of the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019 (“the Act”) by diluting the existing definition of a transgender person under Section 2 (k) of the Act and replacing it with a reductive definition of a transgender person. This tantamount to changing the law altogether and excluding a large number of transgender citizens from the ambit of the law, which is a shocking development.

The amendment at its heart seeks to take away the right of a transgender person to self-identification, which was recognised under the 2019 Act.  This is made clear by  the deletion of  Section 4 (2) of the 2019 Act which  read, ‘A person recognised as transgender under sub-section (1) shall have a right to self- perceived gender identity’.

According to the new definition, only three groups are entitled to the protection of the law, namely

1)    Someone from the traditional socio-cultural Trans groups like Kinnars, Jogtis, Hijras, etc.

2)     Intersex people

3)     Or a person who has been “by force, allurement, inducement, deceit, or undue influence” been subject to “mutilation, castration, amputation or emasculation” and forcibly made to present “a transgender identity” can be considered a transgender person under this new bill.

A proviso has also been added to specifically exclude persons with different sexual orientations and self-perceived sexual identities.

This amendment instead of expanding the rights of the transgender community dilutes it significantly. By way of this amendment, all the rights which transmen enjoyed will be taken away as transmen are no more considered transgender as far as the law is concerned. Moreover, under the amendment, no person can exercise their right to identify as a transwoman either. The only option for a transgender person under the law is a traditional identity. Those who see their identity on a spectrum fall outside this conservative new definition proposed by the amendment. Thus the law expressly discriminates against Trans men, trans women, genderqueer and non-binary persons, because of the narrow definition of transgender persons which the proposed law adopts.

 Discriminatory intent of the 2026 amendment 

The Objects and Reasons of the Bill goes on to underline that the legislative policy has been formulated to only protect those who “face severe social exclusion due to biological reasons for no fault of their own and no choice of their own.” It then goes on to state that the purpose of the Act was not to “protect each and every class of persons with various gender identities, self-perceived sex/gender identities or gender fluidities.”

This goes against the historic NALSA judgement which recognised the right of transgender persons to determine one’s own gender identity as integral to lead a life with dignity as recognised  under Article 21 of the Constitution. It also emphasised that while discrimination on the ground of “sex” is prohibited under Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution, sex here does not only refer to biological attributes but also one’s self-perceived gender.

Further, states the PUCL, the Bill is premised on an entirely false assertion that the intent of the 2019 Act was not to protect all categories of transgender persons, self perceived sex/gender identities and gender fluidities, in as much as the 2019 Act categorically included all transgender persons, including self-perceived gender identities and did not make any distinction or exclusion on the basis of self-perceived gender or sexuality. This is also clear from the Statement of Object and Reasons of the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Bill, 2019, which clearly acknowledged that it was being introduced in compliance of the directions of the Supreme Court of India in the NALSA judgment and further stated under clause 4 (c) that the 2019 Bill sought to “confer right upon transgender persons to be recognised as such, and a right to self-perceived gender identity”.

Accordingly, the `Statement of Objects and Reasons’ of the 2026 amendment Bill by itself reveals the falsely-premised regressive and unconstitutional intent of the proposed law. The Bill discriminates upon a large category of transgender persons by denying them the right to be legally recognised by their gender identity.

Till date only around 37000 people have been registered on their portal in the six years since the Act came into operation. There has been little intent displayed by the government to implement the Act. Instead of ensuring that the transgender persons are legally recognised and benefit from the provisions of the Act, the law is being diluted on the excuse of this very non-implementation and claiming that the object of the Bill is that the enactment “works towards only those who are in actual need of such protection”.

The 2026 amendment also introduced a fresh set of hurdles introduced for legal recognition of transgender identity.

Even for those who fall within the narrow definition of transgender, the ability to change one’s gender is made far more difficult, by bringing in amendments to Section 6 and 7 of the Act. The amendment makes it mandatory for a person to get medical certification, for getting a certificate of (transgender) identity. However even after getting such a certificate, the District Magistrate has the discretion to grant recognition or reject it.

The point to be noted is that even if the law is meant for  the restrictive category of so called traditional identities of ‘kinnar, hijra, jogta and aravani’, those who come within this category still have to go through the  hoop of getting a medical certificate. The question of mandating even hijras to get a medical certificate does grave violence to the notion of a traditional identity itself. This provision in effect puts forward a medical test to identity if a person belongs to a socio-cultural identity which has existed even prior to the advent of modern medicine!

This will make it highly difficult for transgender persons to obtain a certificate of identity and get legal recognition of their rights. Instead of making the process easier for transgender persons, so they can avail of and assert their rights under the Act, the government has increased the obstacles for transgender persons to gain legal recognition. This is highly discouraging and will only impede the implementation of the Act, which has in any case been poor.

By removing self-identification and introducing the requirement for medical certification, the state is taking over the role of deciding the gender identity of a transgender person. This not only stands in complete violation of the NALSA judgment and upturns the fundamental basis of the 2019 Act, but infringes upon the constitutional rights guaranteed to citizens under Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution.

Criminalisation of support groups and chosen family of transgender persons

Under the Offences and Penalties chapter, the Bill proceeds to amend Section 18 of the Act. Under the proposed Section 18 (e) and (f), an offence of kidnapping and abduction has been added under the pretence of protecting adults and children. However this provision can be weaponised to target support structures and individuals that provide help to transgender individuals facing abuse and rejection by their natal families. Thus, even with respect to traditional communities, the approach of the amendment is tinged with suspicion and capable of misuse to target chosen families. The offence of kidnapping and abduction introduced by way of the amendment should be with the intention to compel the adult / child to assume, adopt or outwardly present transgender identity through ‘force, allurement, deceit, undue influence or otherwise’ by ‘emasculation, mutilation, castration, amputation or any surgical, chemical or hormonal procedure’.  The broad wordings of the section enable its misuse against any person supporting a transgender person in their attempt to undergo sex change / reassignment procedures or to outwardly present themselves as transgender. Moreover, it infringes upon the right to privacy, choice and autonomy of transgender persons, foregrounding a stereotypical understanding of transgender identity as based on coercion, inducement, fraud and violence, and not on personal choice.

Similarly under the proposed Section 18 (g) and (h) new offences have been introduced for compelling an adult/child by ‘force, threat, coercion, allurement, deception, inducement, or undue influence’ to dress, present or conduct themselves outwardly as a transgender person. The irony of this offence sought to be introduced is that, it is in fact transgender persons who are often subjected to violence, discrimination and abuse, and are compelled to hide their transgender identity rather than to assume it. The provisions are reminiscent of the colonial Criminal Tribes Act, 1871 that criminalised transgender persons for appearing dressed or ornamented as women. The provisions are capable of misuse against the support systems of the transgender person, outside of their natal families, and can put the transgender person to further risk.

The approach of the amendment is thus tinged with suspicion even towards those it unequivocally claims to protect, namely the traditional communities. The amendment in fact defines transgender to include those who are ‘forced’ or ‘induced’ to ‘present a transgender identity’ by ‘emasculation, mutilation or castration’.  It seeks to punish such persons who cause ‘mutilation, emasculation, amputation or castration’. This amendment by foregrounding ‘coercion’ as an essential dimension of the transgender identity, does violence to the element of choice and foreground a stereotypical understanding of transgender identity as based on coercion, fraud and violence not on choice.

These newly added offences which can be misused against supportive individuals and chosen families of transgender persons are punishable with rigorous imprisonment from 5 to 10 years going up to life imprisonment, the offences of physical, sexual, emotional and economic abuse of transgender persons attracts a sentence of only six months to 2 years. Meanwhile with there being no provision in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2024 for rape of transwomen, boys and men  (offence of sodomy), leaving no other recourse under criminal law for sexual assault of a transgender person. It is unfortunate that the government has lost a valuable opportunity to introduce changes in the law that were being demanded by the transgender community with a view to protect their rights, and have instead introduced this Bill curtailing their rights further and increasing the risk of criminalisation.

Passing this amendment will put in jeopardy the rights of thousands of persons who are currently recognised as transgender. It will limit the right to self-identification for newer generations and represents a setback in the struggle for transgender rights.

This amendment is a part of a wider framework of attack on rights

Related:

The discordant symphony: where does the transgender community go from here?

Transgender rights in India: stalled progress and a frustrated community

9 years since the passing of the NALSA judgment, has the cycle of discrimination and ostracism finally been broken for the transgender community?

No proposal for affirmative action in education or employment for transgenders: Govt

Madras HC issues guidelines for sensitisation of stakeholders in LGBTQIA+ matters

Telangana: Transgender individual brutally lynched by mob in Nizamabad

MAT relaxes age criteria, makes provision for grace marks for transgender community in public employment, refuses to direct state to grant reservation

How NRC further marginalises Transgender people

The post Withdraw the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Amendment Bill, 2026 NOW! appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The other day, a discussion broke out among ten friends on love marriages—a contentious issue in Gujarat following moves in the corridors of power to regulate them by making parental consent mandatory. One of us claimed that, unlike in the past, nearly 70 percent of weddings today are love marriages. Another person, who had eloped to get married years ago, remarked, “Problems exist everywhere, whether it is a love marriage or an arranged one.”

I asked my friends what they thought about the Gujarat government’s proposal to bring in such a law. The woman and her husband who had themselves run away to get married without parental consent (and are happily married ever since) insisted the proposal was meant only to curb what is described as “love jihad.” “They just want to protect Hindu girls who are lured away by Muslims,” they said.

When I suggested that if such an obligation—parental consent for marriage—were introduced, it would apply to all marriages and not just to the supposed victims of “love jihad,” the woman immediately objected. “That would be bad,” she said. “How can parental consent be made mandatory? It goes against personal freedom and the Constitution.” However, another woman insisted that the government would have to ensure that such a rule applied only to cases of “love jihad,” not to all marriages.

I could not help wondering how deeply anti-Muslim sentiment has seeped into sections of Gujarat’s middle class. Love marriages without parental consent seem acceptable as long as they are within the same religion, but not when a Muslim man seeks to marry a Hindu woman.

Be that as it may, looking at the overall socio-political atmosphere in Gujarat, there appears to be a broad consensus on parental consent. The only difference is that while the BJP rulers speak openly about “love jihad,” the two main opposition parties in the state—the Congress and the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP)—avoid using that phrase.

In a statement in the state legislature recently, Gujarat’s home minister, who is also deputy chief minister, Harsh Sanghavi declared that the Gujarat Registration of Marriages Act, 2006 might need to be amended to make parental consent compulsory for legalising any marriage. Raising the spectre of “love jihad,” he said, “There is no objection to love. But if some Salim posing as a Suresh traps a girl, we will not spare them.”

From all appearances, this seemed more for public consumption. It appeared designed to pacify recent all-male caste gatherings—especially among the numerically strong Patel and Thakor communities—which have expressed concern over a rising number of love marriages taking place without parental approval.

Not without reason. While Sanghavi claimed that in the Panchmahals district there were a very high number of “fake marriage certificates,” particularly in cases of inter-religious weddings—even in rural areas where he said there were “no Muslims or mosques”—the government itself appears reluctant to immediately amend the law.

In fact, it has shown little urgency. The government has announced a 30-day period for public suggestions and recommendations on the proposed changes, after which a review committee will be formed before any amendment is drafted. In effect, this means no immediate change to the law is likely in the coming months.

All indications suggest Sanghavi’s remarks were aimed at placating influential Patel and Thakor caste groups that provide an important electoral support to the ruling party. For quite some time, they have been approaching Gujarat authorities demanding that parental consent be made compulsory for the registration of marriages.

Early this year, a Thakor community meeting was held in Patan where a new “social constitution” was read out and oaths were administered to allegedly eliminate old customs and build a more disciplined society. The gathering announced that elopement marriages would not be accepted and introduced around sixteen new rules, including bans on DJs and sunroof cars at wedding ceremonies. The slogan “One Society, One Custom” was adopted to promote unity.

Notably, the convention was overwhelmingly male. Only one woman was present (photo): the Congress MP Geniben Thakor, who read out the so-called social constitution. A year later, she publicly supported Sanghavi’s declaration about banning marriages without parental consent, describing such a move as “meeting the demands of the current times.”

She argued that some criminal elements were “trapping” young girls into love marriages whose consequences “often prove tragic,” which is why, she said, “all communities have been demanding that the law related to love marriage be amended to make parental consent mandatory, and that villagers be included as witnesses.”

This was not a new position for her. In 2019, as a Congress MLA, she supported a decision by sections of the Thakor community to ban the use of mobile phones by unmarried girls. In 2023, she, along with BJP MLA Fatesinh Chauhan, demanded an amendment to the marriage registration law to make parental signatures mandatory when adult children chose their own partners.

Curious about whether the Congress as a party supported Sanghavi’s proposal, I called up a party spokesperson in Gujarat. Instead of offering a clear position, the spokesperson simply forwarded Geniben’s statement, which I have quoted above. “She is our esteemed MP—the only one from Gujarat,” he said. “There is little reason to believe this is not the Congress view.”

As for AAP, one of the first things its leader Gopal Italia (photo) did after winning the Visavadar assembly seat in a by-election last year was to write to the chief minister demanding a law to prevent young women from eloping with their boyfriends to get married.

Italia, a Patel and one of AAP’s most prominent leaders in Gujarat, argued that the large number of “incidents of girls running away or being made to run away at a legally adult but socially immature age” needed to be stopped. Among other things, he proposed that marriages should be registered only at the permanent residence of the bride.

Calling love marriages a “huge social problem,” he claimed that in many cases girls are “targeted and trapped in a web of love at an innocent age while still studying in school.” According to him, “a well-organised and systematic conspiracy is underway to arrange marriages for runaway couples.” He alleged that such couples are often taken to remote villages in distant districts where marriages are registered for money without proper documentation.

Italia cited what he called data from several villages: in Panchmahal district’s Bhadrala village, he claimed, 560 such marriages were registered; in Amreli district’s Dhampur, Jamka, Mujyasar and Tulindhya villages, the numbers were 1,341, 944, 380 and 258 respectively; and in Anand district’s Sandh, Rel and Vali villages, the figures were 365, 1,193 and 113.

He alleged that these registrations were frequently based on fake documents and involved various irregularities. According to him, “private agents, ‘love mafias’ and gangs”—some allegedly from outside the state—facilitated such “fake marriages,” often exploiting young couples financially and physically in the name of providing protection.

Italia’s letter, written in Gujarati, appeared primarily aimed at reassuring dominant sections of the community he belongs to—the Patels—where, particularly in rural areas, love marriages without parental approval are often viewed with deep disapproval. Notably, neither his letter nor Geniben Thakor’s statement touched upon another pressing social issue within these communities: the skewed sex ratio.

Courtesy: Counterview

The post Parental consent for marriage? Gujarat’s curious political consensus appeared first on SabrangIndia.

“When I came to Delhi, my daughter was very young and we wanted to get her admitted into a private school through the EWS (Economically Weaker Section) quota. We tried to get her into the nearby school, but did not receive an admission call. Later, we filed an RTI to enquire about the admission. Finally, after a year, we got the admission call. I believe it was the pressure of the RTI application that made the school take my daughter in, otherwise very often, the quotas in private schools are not filled. This was during the early days of the law. My daughter got a good education, later joined college and is now working at a hospital. Magar yeh sab na hota agar yeh kanoon na hota” (all this would not have been possible without this law), she added.

Twenty years later, Vandana works as a mobiliser at the Satark Nagarik Sangathan (SNS), a citizen’s group working to promote transparency, going door to door in over 10 bastis, distributing pamphlets that read “Janne ka haq, jeene ka haq” (right to information, right to life). 

Most RTI users at Lal Gumbad basti and nearby Savitrinagar – both working class areas in Delhi’s Panchsheel Park, describe the law as their lifeline. “The RTI has been most extensively used by people at the grassroots level as a tool to seek accountability for basic rights and entitlements such as pension, ration, community toilets, construction of roads, drains, school admissions and so on.” says Amrita Johri, social activist and member of SNS.

“Our research suggested that every year nearly 6 million RTIs are filed which makes the Indian law the most extensively used law globally,” she added.

The extensive use of the RTI by the ordinary person is directly linked to the history of the Right to Information movement, which was a decades long movement led by the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) that finally culminated in the Right to Information Act in 2005. MKSS was formed in 1990 with the objective of addressing the issues of the workers, small and marginal farmers who formed the bulk of the population in five blocks of Ajmer, Rajsamand (then Udaipur), Pali and Bhilwara districts. In struggling against non-payment of minimum wages on government and contract works, the MKSS systematically arrived at the conclusion that transparency of records of work and wages were essential, in order to use ‘truth’ to fight injustice.

“Iss kanoon ko laane ke peechhe sabse badha haath gaao ke mazdooro, mahilaao ka hai. Jab ki woh mahilaye padhi likhi nahi thi, magar unhe maaloom tha ki yeh unke haq ki ladhai hai. Unn mahilaao ke wajaah se, meri beti ko achhi shiksha mili” (the fight to bring this act was mainly led by the rural workers and women. The women who participated in the struggle were not literate, but they were aware that it is a struggle for their rights. It is because of these women that my daughter got a good education), adds Vandana.

Twenty Years of undoing the RTI

The recent Digital Personal Data Protection Rules (DPDPR), 2025 (enacted as the DPDP Act, 2023) has amended Section 8 (1) (j) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 through Section 44 (3). Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI 2005 disallowed access to “personal information, the disclosure of which has no relationship to any public activity or interest, unless the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer, is satisfied that the larger public interest justifies the disclosure of such information.”

The DPDPR amendment removes the public interest test stated in the original law, creating a blanket exemption for all ‘personal data.’ There is a lack of clear demarcation between the ‘personal’ and the ‘public’ that shrouds this act, through what is seen as its deliberate ambiguity. The serious concerns raised by RTI users and activists include the hurried way in which this act was passed in the parliament.

Shailesh Gandhi, a former Chief Information Commissioner and member of National Campaign for People’s Right to Information (NCPRI) comments, “The personal has not been defined in this law, most information relates to a person in some manner, and in the case of a blanket exemption any relevant information can be denied,” he further added, “this is the death of the RTI but it is not catching enough attention because the amendment is put under the DPDPR.”

Addressing the same issue of the lack of a defined ‘personal’ domain of information, activist Nikhil Dey, one of the founders of MKSS, in a meeting on the RTI amendment organised by SNS, stated that the RTI has no contention with the Right to Privacy, however there is a key difference between ‘private’ data and ‘personal’ data, which the amendment refuses to distinguish.

Many further attest that even before the recent amendment, the RTI which had been essential for the right to life and livelihood for many, has been systemically hollowed out over the past 20 years. Several governments have attempted to amend the law multiple times.

In 2006, a year after its enactment, an amendment was proposed to the law. File noting, that documented how key legislative decisions were reached was sought to be removed from the ambit of the RTI. This triggered protests that ran across universities as many considered access to file noting to be important for enabling legislative transparency for citizens. Eventually the amendment proposal was dropped.

In 2019, an amendment altered the statutory framework by removing the earlier fixed tenure, and instead providing that “the term of office, salaries, allowances and other conditions of service of the Chief Information Commissioner and their State counterparts shall be such as may be prescribed by the Central Government.”

Similarly, under Section 21(1) of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, “the Board is empowered to appoint such officers and employees as it may deem necessary for the efficient discharge of its functions, but only with the previous approval of the Central Government,” thereby placing veto powers of appointment under executive discretion.

“This law should be called the ‘right to deny information.’ It compromises the Puttaswamy judgement of 2017,” adds Shailesh Gandhi.

Ashok Kumar, a member of the SNS, talks about his experience of filing an RTI post the 2019 amendment. Kumar had filed an RTI enquiring about the salaries of Safai Karamcharis (sanitation workers) working in public toilets in Delhi, their medium of payment and Provident Fund, if any. He was denied information citing 8(1)j, as the information sought fell under the ambit of ‘personal information.’ “I have been filing RTIs since 2005, and before the 2019 amendment, I would receive proper information on similar applications. But the quality of answers has been deteriorating each year,” he added.

Perpetual vacancies in the posts of Chief Information Commissioner (CIC) has also been a worrying trend, weakening the law substantially. The absence of a Chief Information Commissioner has serious ramifications for the effective functioning of the ICs since the RTI Act envisages a critical role for the CIC, including superintendence, management and direction of the affairs of the information commission. According to a report by SNS, assessments have shown that a large number of RTI applications come from the urban poor and from rural households seeking information about their basic entitlements. In this context, the report points out that the practice of returning a very large number of appeals and complaints without passing any orders becomes extremely problematic. It also creates an apprehension that this is perhaps a way of frustrating information seekers in a bid to reduce backlogs, since many people, especially the poor and marginalised, would feel discouraged and often give up if their appeal/complaint is returned. Over 95% of the cases returned by the CIC were not resubmitted to the commission.

Aruna Roy and Nikhil Dey, founders of MKSS in an interview by The Hindu Centre for Politics and Public Policy said, “The stories of hope still exist. However, now the anger of being stonewalled, and being frustrated by delay and denial is becoming the dominant discourse. In many cases, even when information is extracted or procured, the system is getting immune to demands of accountability. There is also now a creeping atmosphere of fear.”

Activists state that the anxiety around the need to amend the law points to the power it gives to the people, to ask questions and hold their elected representatives accountable. RTI activists have repeatedly pointed out that in a feudal political setup with entrenched hierarchies, where government officials and babus form the higher echelons of the system, the act of questioning by a Dalit, a woman, or any marginalised person, frustrates the old status quo.

“What has upset the government most about the RTI is common people using it to question the state. As part of our research we often do interviews with government officials about their experience and one thing we constantly hear is that ‘ab toh koi bhi hamse sawal poochh sakta hai, jo moongfali bechta hai woh bhi’ (now anyone can ask us questions, even the one who sells peanuts).” says Johri.

Roy and Dey further added in the same interview, “Those who had lived in an era before the RTI saw the unfolding of the wonder of what real citizenship could mean. To ask a question, and expect an answer from people occupying positions of power was a new and incredulous feeling. When these stories were reported, it was with the wonder of ‘speaking truth to power’, and power being forced to respond. It became clear that the RTI was actually the sharing of power.”

What do RTI users say?

Users say responses have become more ambiguous, and evasive. Many residents across colonies who used to receive pension under the old age pension scheme and the Delhi Pension to Women in Distress scheme state that they have not been receiving the pension amount of Rs. 2500 for months. Testimonials of those who asked about their pension through RTIs, show the nature of responses applicants have received in the past couple of months. The anonymous applicants will be addressed as Applicant A and B.

Applicant A, filed an RTI seeking information about her widow pension which she had not received for months. The application lists five queries, out of which questions regarding the name of the public officer responsible for the pension is not answered, instead the address of a complaint office is provided. The response to the query states that the pension is under process due to lack of funds. The application further enquired, “Within what time limit is a complaint regarding pension supposed to be resolved by the department as per rules? Please provide a copy of the relevant order/circular/notification/guidelines related to this” This also received no response.

Applicant B, who filed an RTI enquiring about old age pension used the same question template and received the same response citing lack of funds.

Shanti, a resident of Lal Gumbad camp, who goes by her first name, had filed an RTI application to enquire about her husband’s pension of Rs. 2500, which had been halted for four months. The response to the enquiry, yet again cited lack of funds due to which the pension was not being transferred.

“Hamare pati pehle mistry ka kaam karte the. Magar unko saas lene mein dikkat hone lagi, woh zyada chal phir nahi pate, kaam pe nahi jaa pate. Pension ke bina hamara ghar nahi chal pata” (My husband was earlier a mason. But he has respiratory problems, so he can’t walk long distances. Without the pension it is very difficult to make ends meet), said Shanti about her husband’s deteriorating health and the importance of the pension.

Veena, another resident who goes by her first name, had filed an RTI in 2024 to ask about the widow pension that she was entitled to. While she did receive Rs. 20,000 promised to families living Below Poverty Line after the death of the primary breadwinner under the Delhi Family Benefit Scheme, after filing an RTI; she is yet to receive the monthly pension amount of Rs 2500. “Pension approved dikha raha hai, magar paise nahi aa rahe. Fund ki kami hai toh fund kab aayega, yeh pata nahi” (it shows that the pension has been approved, but the funds are not available. If there is a shortage of funds when will the funds be provided, this no one knows), added Suman, who helped Veena file the RTI.

Suman, a volunteer with SNS from the basti who has been helping residents file RTI applications since 2012, says “If someone has stopped receiving the pension amount due to lack of funds, is it not the government’s responsibility to inform its citizens about when the issue would be solved. Instead, people are given vague answers, and stalled indefinitely. In this case, both Veena and Shanti have asked about their own pension. Instead, if we were to file an RTI to ask for a list of all the people with pensions pending in this area, we will be denied that information citing the amendment. ”

“Budget shortages will be affecting lakhs of people across the city. This refusal to let people organise and demand collective data will disable the ability of marginalised people to come together and fight the system,” added Amrita.

When systemic issues are treated as individual grievances rather than system level failures it reveals the larger failure of the legislative machinery. In implementing this, the government intends to deal with each citizen rather than people coming together, mobilising and collectively representing their struggles. 

How the amendment discourages collective monitoring 

Is sanshodhan ka sabse zyada prabhav un logo pe padhega jo zameeni sthar par aate hai, jinko ration, pension, shiksha, inn zaroorato ke liye RTI ka sahara milta tha” (this amendment majorly effects the people at the grassroots level, who takes the support of the RTI for needs like ration, pension and education), said Vandana.

While RTIs could not fix policy level issues, it had become a powerful tool to challenge local level corruption. In many cases, even when people did not receive adequate responses through RTI, the issue that made applicants file it was addressed. RTI users thus view information as a means to secure their rights and material needs.

On January 9, in a meeting on 20 years of RTI, activist Anjali Bharadwaj spoke about the immense role of the act in unearthing local level corruptions within the system, citing the corruption in the Public Distribution System (PDS) exposed through the RTI. Women who had not been receiving ration for months filed an RTI to seek copies of sale and stock registers which revealed that while the ration in their name had reached the ration shops, they were told that there was no ration for them. Post the DPDPR amendment activists anticipate that such registers will become inaccessible for people since they carry personal information like the names of people, their signatures, their addresses and so on, making collective scrutiny difficult.

A key impact of the RTI was that it enabled collective monitoring. Activists say that the kind of documents that could be accessed earlier — the sale registers, list of beneficiaries and so on — can no longer be retrieved through the implementation of this amendment. With the new amendment’s greater emphasis on protection of ‘personal data’, such information has been deliberately concealed from the public domain. The proactive disclosure that formed the edifice of the RTI collapses with this amendment in place.

Some RTI applicants have alleged that they received calls from local authorities for raising complaints. A resident, who had filed an RTI regarding ration said under the condition of anonymity, “ration daftar se phone aaya tha, unhone poochha aapne complaint kyu daali. RTI daalte hai toh sarkaari daftar unko call karke dhamkati hai.” (We received a call from the ration office; they asked why I had filed an RTI. Sometimes, when people file an RTI, they receive calls from the offices responsible for their issues and are intimidated).

The new DPDPR amendment’s treatment of the term ‘data fiduciary’ alters its conventional definition. By the new definition, anyone who collects data becomes a data fiduciary. Very often, unions and NGOs aid workers file RTIs, and organise to build pressure on the right authorities. This is where organisational support becomes crucial and collectives such as MKSS, SNS and others help people seek transparency. Unions and organisations work with a large mass of personal data, and thus, are brought under the ambit of a ‘data fiduciary’ through this amendment.

The DPDPR imposes substantial financial penalties for non-compliance by Data Fiduciaries. The highest penalty up to Rs. 250 crore applies to failure of a Data Fiduciary to maintain reasonable security safeguards. Any other violation of the Act or Rules by a Data Fiduciary may attract penalties up to Rs. 50 crore. Such hefty fines creates a fear of breaching the law, rendering RTI activists, and collectives vulnerable to punitive action.  The state has a centralised control over the collection of data, as one of the biggest collectors of data in the country is the government itself. By this logic, the amendment should put curbs on the government’s ability to collect and use information. However, it gives it unchecked powers.

Writer and activist, Sunil Kumar explained that there are very few legislative and institutional safeguards for workers in the country and the RTI is one of the few measures through which rights can be sought. Very often, the RTI responses take time and effort, which many workers cannot afford. He further added, “A woman told me that after her contractor abused her, she decided to look for work elsewhere and did not even go back to collect the wages. Workers often do not have the time or support to demand their rights, or file RTI on their own.”

RTI activists have been routinely targeted, attacked and often killed for seeking accountability since 2005. According to the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI), 68 RTI activists have been killed between 2005 and 2017. Users and activists have faced frequent harassment, intimidation and threats, discouraging the use of the law.

The undoing of a law, that is described as a lifeline for so many people, will not only impact individuals and their immediate material needs but would define the larger ecosystem in which rights are sought and enacted.  

(Samra Iqbal is currently a Young India Fellow at Ashoka University. She recently completed her undergraduate studies in English literature from St. Stephen’s College, Delhi University. She is also a freelance journalist and has previously covered stories for The Frontline, The Quint and Maktoob Media; Tulip Banerjee is a master’s student of journalism at AJK MCRC Jamia Millia Islamia. She has previously reported for The Leaflet and Maktoob Media)

Related:

Repeal recent amendments to the RTI act, 2005: Justice A.P Shah in an Open Letter

Vacancies, Backlogs, and increased governmental involvement: How the RTI Act has lost its glory!

India’s RTI Act struggles to survive as backlog, lack of staff persists

The post “RTI Was Our Lifeline”: How the 2025 amendment impacts people at the grassroots level appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Press Statement by Indian Muslims for Secular Democracy (IMSD)

Indian Muslims for Secular Democracy (IMSD) wholeheartedly welcomes the recent observations made by the Supreme Court of India during the hearing of a petition filed by Poulomi P. Shukla. Argued by senior advocate Prashant Bhushan, the case seeks to rectify the long-standing disparity in inheritance rights for Muslim women—a move IMSD views as a vital step toward fulfilling the democratic promise of the Indian Constitution.

The Supreme Court Raises the Question of Gender Justice

A three-judge bench, led by Chief Justice Surya Kant and including Justices Joymalya Bagchi and R. Mahadevan, observed that a Uniform Civil Code (UCC) may be the “most effective answer” to removing gender bias in laws governing marriage, succession, and property rights. This observation came while examining a plea challenging the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937, which the petitioners argue forces unequal inheritance outcomes for women compared to their male counterparts.

A Constitutional Challenge to Discriminatory Laws

Appearing for the petitioner, Adv. Prashant Bhushan argued that the inferior inheritance rights granted to women under the 1937 Act are a direct violation of constitutional guarantees. He emphasized that inheritance is fundamentally a civil and property right; therefore, it cannot be insulated from constitutional scrutiny by invoking religious freedom.

Addressing the Court’s concern that striking down discriminatory portions of the Shariat Act might create a “legal vacuum,” Bhushan proposed a pragmatic and immediate remedy: including Muslim women under the ambit of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. This would provide a robust, existing legal framework to ensure parity without leaving women in a state of legal uncertainty.

Gender Bias: A Problem Beyond One Community

Crucially, the Hon’ble Bench noted that gender discrimination in inheritance is not confined to Muslim personal law alone. The Court observed that inequalities persist within the structure of Hindu Undivided Families (HUFs) and various customary or tribal practices. As highlighted in various reports, inheritance rights remain skewed in Hindu law as well, indicating that the struggle for property rights is a cross-community challenge.

The Constitutional Framework: Equality and Dignity

IMSD believes the core of this petition is rooted in Constitutional Morality. The Constitution of India clearly guarantees:

* Article 14: Equality before the law and equal protection of the laws.

* Article 15: Prohibition of discrimination on grounds including religion and sex.

* Article 21: Protection of life, dignity, and personal liberty.

These guarantees must apply fully to Muslim women as equal citizens. While Islamic jurisprudence recognized women’s property rights over fourteen centuries ago, contemporary patriarchal interpretations and social pressures often compel women to relinquish their rightful shares.

Moving Toward Reform

IMSD reiterates that the debate on the UCC has often been politicized by forces seeking to target minority communities. However, gender justice cannot be postponed indefinitely due to identity politics or communal polarization. True reform must be a collaborative effort involving women’s organizations, legal scholars, and minority voices to ensure it is rooted in justice rather than stigmatization.

The Muslim community leadership must also reflect on its historical resistance to reform. This reluctance has often denied justice to women and strengthened communal narratives.

Conclusion: A Call for Constitutional Justice

IMSD supports the ongoing Supreme Court proceedings and calls for a resolution that guarantees equal inheritance rights for Muslim women across India. We advocate for a solution that addresses gender discrimination in all personal laws, ensuring that women from all communities are treated as equal citizens entitled to dignity and justice under the law.

List of Signatories

* Adv. A. J. Jawad – IMSD, Chennai

* Amir Rizvi – Designer, IMSD, Mumbai

* Arshad Alam – Veteran Journalist, IMSD, Delhi

* Askari Zaidi – IMSD, Mumbai

* Bilal Khan – IMSD, Mumbai

* Feroze Mithiborwala, IMSD Co-Convener, Mumbai

* Guddi S. L. – Hum Bharat Ke Log, Mumbai

* Hasina Khan – Bebaak Collective, Navi Mumbai

* Irfan Engineer – CSSS, Mumbai

* Javed Anand, Convener, IMSD, Mumbai

* Jeibunnisa Reyaz – Bharatiya Muslim Mahila Andolan, BMMA, Madurai

* Khatoon Sheikh – BMMA, Mumbai

* Adv. Lara Jesani – IMSD, Mumbai

* Mariya Salim – BMMA, New Delhi

* Nasreen M – BMMA, Karnataka

* Nasreen Rangoonwala – IMSD, Mumbai

* Nishat Hussain – BMMA, Jaipur

* Niyazmin Daiya – BMMA, Delhi

* Noorjehan Safiya Niyaz – BMMA, Mumbai

* Prof. Nasreen Fazalbhoy – IMSD, Mumbai

* Rahima Khatun – BMMA, Kolkata

* Salim Sabuwala – IMSD, Mumbai

* Prof. Sandeep Pandey – Magsaysay Awardee, Lucknow

* Sandhya Gokhale – Forum Against Oppression of Women, Mumbai

* Shabana Dean – IMSD, Pune

* Shafaq Khan – Theater Personality, IMSD, Mumbai

* Shalini Dhawan – Designer, IMSD, Mumbai

* Shama Zaidi – Scriptwriter, IMSD, Mumbai

* Shamsuddin Tamboli – Muslim Satyashodak Mandal

* Prof. Sujata Gothoskar – Forum Against Oppression of Women, Mumbai

* Sultan Shahin – Editor, New Age Islam, Delhi

* Dr. Sunilam – Farmer Leader, Gwalior

* Dr. Suresh Khairnar – Former President, Rashtriya Sewa Dal, Nagpur

* Yashodhan Paranjpe – IMSD, Social Activist, Mumbai

* Zakia Soman – BMMA, New Delhi

* Zeenat Shaukat Ali – Wisdom Foundation

The post Equal Inheritance Rights for Muslim Women: Upholding Constitutional Justice and Gender Equality appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The Court was hearing a plea filed by a journalist, Geeta Seshu along with the Software Freedom Law Centre (SFLC), inter alia seeking direction or declaration quashing and setting aside Sections 7, 17(2)(a), 19(3) 24, 36, 44(2)(a), and 44(3) of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, to the extent challenged herein, as being unconstitutional, void and inoperative, and violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 19(1)(g), 21 and 21A of the Constitution of India.

A bench consisting of Chief Justice Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi and Justice Vipul M Pancholi issued notice and posted the case for hearing with the earlier petitions, on March 23. Senior Advocate Indira Jaisingh appeared on behalf of the Petitioners.

Interesting discussions took place at the time of the hearing as reported. While deliberations were on, the Bench remarked, “One is the state collecting data, and there is another matter before us. We hope that it will proceed and eventually we will decide on merits. Where our entire data of the citizens—not only of one nation, maybe a substantial part of the globe—is concerned. It is a global issue. A global issue going into the very big private entities. And that’s where the question of data sovereignty arises…Data is becoming the real, true wealth as of today.”

Indira Jaisingh then responded, “There are provisions in this Act, My Lord, which enable them to access data from other countries also. Therefore, data sovereignty issues also arise. My Lord, we are just hoping that this court will give us some guidance on all these issues.”

The Court said, “This is a very interesting point. And in any case, not only interesting, it’s an imminently required issue and one which deserves to be prioritised and determined.”

Senior Advocate Indira Jaising, appearing for the petitioners, informed the Supreme Court that the new Data Protection Act is being challenged through multiple petitions, each focusing on different facets of the statute. A primary concern raised was the removal of the “public interest” exception, which previously existed under the RTI Act. Jaising argued that this deletion severely hampers investigative journalism, as reporters may no longer be able to access data concerning public servants or matters of public importance, even when such information is vital for transparency.

Jaisingh submitted, “Your Lordships have issued notice in three previous petitions challenging analogous provisions of this Act. However, the emphasis of each of the petitions is slightly different from the other. So I thought… the statute itself is new, because it talks of data protection for the first time in the country…I may briefly just tell you: one is the journalistic exception. Public interest has been deleted from the RTI Act and also from the Data Protection Act. So, therefore, a journalist cannot access data which is in the public interest. My Lord, we concede that we can’t have personal data. A journalist need not have personal data, but if it’s in the public interest—for example, if you’re writing about a public servant, etc.”

Chief Justice Kant said, “Ultimately, the interesting question that will have to be determined is: what is public data and what is personal data?”

Senior Advocate Jaisingh replied, “Yes, My Lord, that’s a critical question. The Act does not clarify that. Therefore, My Lord, it will require judicial interpretation. And there is no definition of what is information and what is personal.”

“One interesting point can be whether data with respect to a person, so long as he holds a public office, can be termed as personal data or can it be termed as private data…Madam, at the time of hearing, you will have to suggest different hypothetical situations. And then, probably, we will be able to have a better analysis,” Justice Kant remarked.

She submitted, “not only hypothetical, but we can take cases that have actually gone to court under the RTI Act, where either the information has been allowed or disallowed, because these will be analogous provisions. My Lord, in the RTI Act, there was an exception saying you can ask for information which is in the public interest. That has been deleted from the Data Protection Act. Actually, that’s what’s causing the trouble. Otherwise, there would be no other problem. Then, My Lord, the second is that the state has a right to call for any information. Of course, there are certain categories and sovereignty of the country, but they are overbroad. For example, they can call for information which is related to public order. Now, public order, as we all know, is a very broad category.”

The Court observed that the core of the matter lies in distinguishing between public and personal data. He questioned whether information regarding an individual holding public office could truly be classified as “private.” The Bench also stressed the need for a balanced approach, requesting that the petitioners suggest specific measures to protect individual privacy without compromising the right to information. Justice Kant noted that neither right should act as an impediment to the effective exercise of the other.

Justice Kant said, “But also, Madam, we will request you to also suggest the measures to protect the individuals also. In a given case, if there are sweeping provisions permitting to have the complete information and where the right to privacy and this conflict comes, then how to protect some individuals also?…So, what can be the measures which can be taken without affecting the right to have this information?”

Singh responded, “Now, especially now, My Lord, we have a right to privacy in this country. So that right also has to be protected. That balancing measure—yes, that is what you [mean]—between the right to privacy and the right to public information.”

Chief Justice Surya Kant observed, “None of the rights should compromise with the other, and none of the rights should become an impediment in the effectivity of the right.”

The discussion also touched upon the doctrine of proportionality and the “overbroad” nature of the Act’s provisions. Jaising highlighted concerns regarding state surveillance, noting that the government has exempted itself from several provisions of the Act. Additionally, she pointed out the removal of the right to compensation for individuals whose data is illegally accessed—a right that existed under the previous IT Act—noting that any penalties would now be directed to the Data Protection Board rather than the victim.

Senior Advocate Jaisingh further submitted, “The doctrine of proportionality, over breadth—all those issues will arise for consideration by the court. And My Lord, last but not the least, the state exempts itself from the provisions of this Act. So, therefore, we’ll have to see that they can collect any data about us. There is a certain fear of surveillance also, which emerges from the reading of the provisions of this Act. So we are hoping that this honourable court will give some direction, some enlightenment on these issues. These will be the four issues, My Lord: whether there is a danger of surveillance, whether the state can exempt itself, and whether journalists can write about it.”

She further said, “You will have to look at actually all the provisions of the Act. My Lord, one more issue: earlier under the IT Act, we had a right to get compensation if our data was illegally accessed. Now they’ve deleted that right to compensation if data is illegally accessed. And they’ve said the compensation, if any, will go to the state. It will go to the Board. It will go to the Data Protection [Board].”

The Court acknowledged the global significance of the issue, describing data as the “true wealth” of the modern era. Justice Kant noted that the case involves broader questions of data sovereignty, especially concerning large private entities and the cross-border access of citizen data. Recognizing the urgency and the “imminently required” nature of the judicial interpretation of these laws, the Court issued notice, returnable on March 23rd, to be heard alongside related petitions.

The Petitioners who have filed this petition, have, according to Verdictum, which prayed for the following reliefs, “a) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction or declaration quashing and setting aside Sections 7, 17(2)(a), 19(3) 24, 36, 44(2)(a), and 44(3) of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, to the extent challenged herein, as being unconstitutional, void and inoperative, and violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 19(1)(g), 21 and 21A of the Constitution of India…b) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction, or declaration quashing and setting aside Rules 5, 6, 17, 18, 21 and 23, and the Second Schedule, Fifth Schedule, Sixth Schedule and Seventh Schedule of the Digital Personal Data Protection Rules, 2025, to the extent challenged herein, as being unconstitutional, void and inoperative, and violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 19(1)(g), 21 and 21A of the Constitution of India.”

Further, it was also prayed, “c) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction, or declaration quashing and setting aside Section 17(2) of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, insofar as it empowers the Central Government to exempt any of its instrumentalities from the application of the provisions of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 and the Digital Personal Data Protection Rules, 2025…d) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction, or declaration quashing and setting aside the Second Schedule of the Digital Personal Data Protection Rules, 2025.”

The Plea also sought a direction for quashing and setting aside Section 44 (2) (a) of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, insofar as it extinguishes the right of affected persons to seek compensation or civil remedy for unlawful processing of personal data and/or data breach and for setting aside Section 44(3) of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 insofar as it dilutes the right to information of the citizens of India.

“Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction, or declaration quashing and setting aside Section 19(3) and Section 24 of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 read with Rules 17, 18 and 21 and the Fifth and Sixth Schedules of the Digital Personal Data Protection Rules, 2025, insofar as they relate to the constitution, appointment, service conditions and functioning of the Data Protection Board of India…Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction, or declaration directing the Respondent No. 1 to frame a constitutionally 103 compliant mechanism for appointment, tenure and service conditions of the Data Protection Board of India, ensuring its independence from executive control”, it further prayed.

The petition has also sought the setting aside Section 36 of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 read with Rule 23 and the Serial No. 1 of the Seventh Schedule of the Digital Personal Data Protection Rules, 2025 and sought directions to Union of India to incorporate and notify a specific and proportionate exemption under the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 and the Digital Personal Data Protection Rules, 2025 for processing of personal data for journalistic, editorial, investigative and public interest reporting purposes, including protection of journalistic sources. Alternatively, issue an appropriate writ, order or direction, or declaration quashing and setting aside Section 7 of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, insofar as it fails to provide an exemption for processing of personal data for journalistic purposes.

The Court had previously issued notice in the plea seeking the validity of the DPDP Act, 2023, as unconstitutional for being violative of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. The digital news platform The Reporters’ Collective and journalist Nitin Sethi approached the Supreme Court of India to challenge key provisions of the Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Act, 2023. Right to information activist Venkatesh Nayak has also challenged some provisions of the DPDP Act, 2023.

Related:

Serious flaws in the Digital Personal Data Protection Act

In Garb of Data Protection Bill, Centre Attacking RTI, Allege Information Commissioners

A surveillance regime that violates both Privacy & Right to Life: Digital Personal Data Protection Bill, 2002

Digital Personal Data Protection Bill seeks to amend RTI Act to bar disclosure of personal information

The post Data is real, true wealth: SC issues notice in yet another plea challenging DPDP Act; highlights privacy concerns appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Excerpts from the India section of the 2026 Annual Report:

“In 2025, religious freedom conditions in India continued to deteriorate as the government introduced and enforced new legislation targeting religious minority communities and their houses of worship. Several states undertook efforts to introduce or strengthen anti-conversion laws to include harsher prison sentences. Indian authorities also facilitated widespread detention and illegal expulsion of citizens and religious refugees and tolerated vigilante attacks against religious minority communities.

“Throughout the year, Hindu nationalist mobs across several states harassed, incited, and instigated violence against Muslims and Christians with impunity. In March, violence erupted in Maharashtra after a hard-line Hindu nationalist group, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), called for the removal of the tomb of Aurangzeb, a 17th-century Mughal ruler. Subsequent riots injured dozens of people and resulted in a curfew, fuelled by rumours from Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) officials that Qur’ans were desecrated in VHP-led protests. In June, a Hindu nationalist mob attacked 20 Christian families in Odisha after they refused to convert to Hinduism. The attacks, which did not prompt police intervention, left eight people injured and hospitalised.

“In April, three gunmen attacked a group of predominantly Hindu tourists in the Muslim-majority territory of Kashmir, killing 26 people. The perpetrators reportedly asked the victims to recite the Kalma, an Islamic verse, and killed those who were unable to do so. The attack sparked a five-day conflict between India and Pakistan and intensified anti-Muslim sentiment in India, including targeted attacks. Muslims were reportedly killed in Karnataka and Uttar Pradesh in alleged hate crimes following the attack.

“In Uttar Pradesh, self-professed members of a Hindu nationalist group reportedly shot and killed a Muslim restaurant worker, vowing to avenge those killed in the Kashmir attack. The Indian government also seized the aftermath of the attack to justify deportations of religious minorities it considers “illegal” migrants.

“In May, Indian authorities detained 40 Rohingya refugees, including 15 Christians, all of whom were transported into inter-national waters near the coast of Burma and forced to swim to the Burmese shore with nothing more than life vests. In July, Indian authorities expelled hundreds of Bengali-speaking Muslims from Assam to Bangladesh despite being Indian citizens. Officials from the ruling BJP accused those expelled of being Muslim “infiltrators” from Bangladesh, threatening India’s national identity. To further facilitate the crackdown in alleged “illegal migration,” the government passed a new set of rules and orders for the Foreigners Act in September.

“The order expands the authority of Foreigner Tribunals to issue arrest warrants and send those suspected of being “foreigners” to holding centres without due process.

Throughout the year, the government also continued to target houses of worship to bring them under state control.

“In May, India’s Parliament passed the Waqf Bill, which adds non-Muslims to the boards that manage Waqf land endowments that are traditionally staffed by Muslims. These endowments include religious sites, such as mosques, seminaries, and graveyards. In response to the bill, deadly protests erupted in the state of West Bengal, leaving three people dead. In September, the Supreme Court suspended key provisions of the bill, including one in which the government can decide whether a disputed property is Waqf or not. The court further limited the number of non-Muslim members of the federal board to four. The same month, Uttarakhand’s legislative assembly passed the State Authority for Minority Education (USAME) Act, which dissolves the Madrasa Board and brings madrasas and other educational institutions for Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis, and Christians under state control.

The USCIRF has made the following recommendations to the US government:

• Designate India as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging in and tolerating systematic, ongoing, and egregious religious freedom violations, as defined by the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);
• Press India to allow US government entities such as USCIRF and the U.S. Department of State to conduct in-country assessments of religious freedom conditions;
• Impose targeted sanctions on individuals and entities, such as India’s Research and Analysis Wing and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), for their responsibility and tolerance of severe violations of religious freedom by freezing those individuals’ or entities’ assets and/or barring their entry into the United States;
• Link future U.S. security assistance and bilateral trade policies with India to improvements in religious freedom; and
• Enforce Section 6 of the Arms Export Control Act to halt arms sales to India based on continued acts of intimidation and harassment against S. citizens and religious minorities.

The U.S. Congress should:

• Reintroduce and pass the Transnational Repression Reporting Act of 2024 to require the annual reporting of acts of transnational repression by the Indian government targeting religious minorities in the United

Related:

USCIRF signals alarm in India’s ‘Increased Transnational Targeting’ of religious minorities 

Umar Khalid’s incarceration: USCIRF Commissioner expresses concern over use of anti-terrorism laws to silence activists

USCIRF recommends India be designated Country of Particular Concern for third straight year!

The post Religious Freedom: How the USCIRF continues to designate India as a Country of Particular Concern (CPC) appeared first on SabrangIndia.

This matters deeply.

For years, those of us who have spoken out against Hindutva have been told that we are overreacting, being divisive, or unfairly naming an ideology and its institutions. But what communities on the ground, journalists, scholars, and human rights advocates have documented again and again is that the assault on religious freedom in India is not random. It is not marginal. It is not merely the work of a few extremists acting alone. It is structural, ideological, and sustained. USCIRF’s naming of the RSS makes clear that this reality can no longer be dismissed as rhetorical excess or partisan framing.

The RSS is not a fringe body. It is one of the central engines of Hindu nationalist ideology and organizing in India. Its influence has helped shape a political climate in which Muslims, Christians, Dalits, Adivasis, Sikhs, and dissenters of many kinds face deepening exclusion, fear, and vulnerability. When a U.S. government body focused on religious freedom calls for sanctions on the RSS by name, it is acknowledging something many have paid a high price to say aloud: that religious freedom violations in India are being enabled and normalized by powerful institutions, not just individual bad actors.

It is important to be precise. USCIRF is an independent, bipartisan advisory body; its recommendations are not automatic policy. But that does not make this symbolic or disposable. These reports shape policy conversations, public understanding, and the terms of international scrutiny. The fact that USCIRF now recommends targeted sanctions on the RSS marks a new threshold in how the crisis in India is being recognized.

There is also a deeper moral truth here. Religious freedom is too often invoked selectively, stripped of context, or reduced to a talking point. But religious freedom means very little if it does not include the courage to name systems that terrorize minorities while wrapping themselves in the language of tradition, nation, and civilization. What is at stake in India is not simply abstract pluralism. It is whether people can live, worship, organize, speak, love, and dissent without fear. It is whether democracy can survive the steady sanctification of exclusion.

For those committed to a liberatory, plural, and ethical vision of Hinduism, this moment should not be read as an attack on Hindus. It is a warning about the consequences of allowing Hindu identity to be captured by supremacist politics. Hindutva does not speak for all Hindus, and the RSS does not represent the only possible Hindu public life. Many of us have spent years insisting that a faith rooted in dignity, interdependence, and moral courage must stand against domination, not sanctify it.

USCIRF’s recommendation does not deliver justice on its own. But it does mark something important: a widening refusal to look away. It tells us that the stories communities have carried, the abuses people have risked so much to document, and the warnings advocates have repeated for years are breaking through denial.

Now the real question is whether policymakers will act, whether media will take this seriously, and whether international civil society will finally reckon with the scale of what religious minorities and democracy defenders in India have been facing.

This should not pass quietly. It should be read, shared, and understood for what it is: a major acknowledgment that the machinery of religious freedom violations in India includes powerful institutions that must be named and challenged.

Read the report here:https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/2026-03/USCIRF_2026_AR_3326_NEW.pdf

Related:

USCIRF signals alarm in India’s ‘Increased Transnational Targeting’ of religious minorities 

Umar Khalid’s incarceration: USCIRF Commissioner expresses concern over use of anti-terrorism laws to silence activists

USCIRF recommends India be designated Country of Particular Concern for third straight year!

The post USCIRF’s Call for Sanctions on the RSS Is a Major Moral and Political Marker appeared first on SabrangIndia.

As for the ‘Gujarat Freedom of Religion Act, 2003’, it is easily one of the most draconian ones in the history of any democracy in the world. Modi piloted this bill! During his election campaign in 2002, he ranted and raved against the Muslims and Christians and promised to bring in an anti-conversion law. True to his promise, he did so a few months later. At that time, the entire Opposition, in total disagreement with the bill, walked out of the Gujarat Assembly! It then took a full five years, until 2008, for the Gujarat Government to frame the necessary rules for the implementation of that law!

In February 2006, in keeping with letter and spirit of his anti-Constitutional law, at a Shabri Kumbh (a mass gathering of Hindus) programme in the Dangs (supported by the Gujarat Government), Modi warned the Christians “It is my constitutional duty to prevent conversions.  Our Constitution disapproves of them, and yet some people turn a blind eye.” Morari Bapu accused the Christians of bringing in planeloads of missionaries from the Vatican “who come here to carry out conversion activities but when we organise a ‘ghar wapsi’ why should it be termed as bad?”  Both Modi and Morari Bapu, unequivocally also endorsed the ‘ghar wapsi’ programmes, which were part of that Kumbh!

In 2009, the ‘Gujarat United Christian Forum for Human Rights’ and several other eminent citizens challenged the constitutional validity of the Gujarat Freedom of Religion Law, in the Gujarat High Court. A notice was sent by the Court to the Government to respond, they did not do so (obviously, they could not).The petitioners later withdrew their petition with an intention of making it stronger. In August 2021, the Gujarat High Court did not allow the Gujarat Government to make amendments to the already draconian law.

The bogey of ‘forced’ conversion and the introduction of anti – conversion laws (strangely called ‘Freedom of Religion’) are part of a well-oiled strategy of the ‘Sangh Parivar’ .These laws are blatantly unconstitutional. The States of Arunachal Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Odisha, Rajasthan, Uttarakhand, and Uttar Pradesh already have these laws in place. On March 5, Maharashtra became the 13^th State to do so, when the Government of Maharashtra approved a draft anti-conversion bill requiring prior permission from a designated authority for religious conversion. Called the ‘Dharma Swatantrya Adhiniyam 2026 (Religious Freedom Act, 2026), the proposed law specifically aims to prevent individuals or organizations from carrying out forced or unlawful religious conversions. It seeks to protect individuals’ freedom of religion by prohibiting coercive or deceptive practices and imposing stringent penalties for violations.

On March 11, a collective of the Peoples Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL), Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP) and the Bombay Catholic Sabha(BCS) among thirty civil society and human rights organisations held a well-attended media conference at the Press Club in Mumbai. At the Conference, several well-known citizens lambasted the Maharashtra Government for introducing this draconian legislation and without due process.

In a detailed statement released on the day, the signatory organisations said, “the text of the draft law has not yet been made public, raising serious concerns about transparency, democratic process, and the potential implications of the legislation for fundamental rights. The participating civil society organisations emphasise that legislation with far-reaching implications for religious freedom, privacy, and personal liberty cannot be drafted and introduced without public consultation, scrutiny, and debate. A growing pattern of anti-conversion laws framed around “love jihad” The proposed Maharashtra law appears to follow the pattern of anti-conversion legislation already enacted in several states under the banner of “freedom of religion” laws. While framed as measures to prevent coercion or fraudulent religious conversions, these statutes have frequently been justified politically through the narrative of “love jihad”—a conspiracy theory alleging that Muslim men systematically lure Hindu women into marriage in order to convert them. This claim has no legal basis.” 

Further, the statement said, “The Maharashtra proposal also comes at a time when the constitutional validity of similar anti-conversion laws across several states is already under challenge before the Supreme Court of India. A batch of writ petitions –first filed by Citizens for Justice and Peace (CJP), Mumbai that is the lead petitioner in the Supreme Court– has been pending before the Supreme Court since 2020, raising fundamental constitutional questions about the scope of freedom of conscience, personal liberty, equality before the law, and the limits of State power in regulating religious conversion and interfaith relationships. Hearings in the matter that have happened intermittently with pressing demands made by CJP for an interim stay on the most egregious provisions are also scheduled today” 

The ‘bogey’ of forced conversion is once again being made into an issue! There is absolutely no evidence to substantiate this frivolous claim. It is a manipulative ploy, used by the Sanghis to defocus from the real issues, which grip the nation. India has proved to have a spineless Government, literally being held to ransom by the United States. We have lost our long-cherished identity as a non-aligned nation. The ordinary citizen is suffering due to a terrible scarcity of LPG (Smriti Irani seems to have done the disappearing trick instead of protesting!). The Epstein files have revealed names of some prominent Indians- a great shame to the nation. The Election Commission has proved to be a ‘caged parrot’ of the ruling regime! Corruption is the DNA of a Government, which has abdicated its responsibility to govern. Prices are skyrocketing, even as the poor become poorer and the crony capitalists friends of the regime continue to amass scandalous amounts of wealth. The common person is denied the legitimate right of ‘roti-kapda-makaan’ and Adivasis of ‘jal-jungle- jameen’.  The country is in the doldrums as never before! Besides, the ‘hindutvadis’ are a frightened group: they are aware that their so -called brand of ‘religiosity’ goes against human nature: the rights and freedoms, which are inalienable to every citizen.  Therefore, the ‘forced conversion’ gimmick is a convenient way to change the narrative and deflect from burning issues, which literally throttle the country today!

On November 14, 2022, a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court consisting of Justice M.R. Shah and Justice Hima Kohli observed that forced conversions may “ultimately affect the security of nation and freedom of religion and conscience of citizen.” The bench directed the Central Government to inform the Apex Court what steps it intends taking to curb deceitful or compulsory religious conversions. The bench was hearing a PIL by Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay, who has been filing several petitions of this kind in the past.  Upadhyay wants a law against ‘fraudulent religious conversion’ and ‘religious conversion by intimidation’, threatening, deceivingly luring through gifts and monetary benefits, as it offends Articles 14, 21, and 25.

Significantly, in April 2021, a three-judge bench of Justices Rohinton F Nariman, B.R. Gavai and Hrishikesh Roy had dismissed a similar petition by the Upadhyay himself and had even threatened to impose heavy costs if he persisted with the petition. The bench at that time had opined that any religious conversion law would be violative of the constitution as the constitution clearly allows joining of any religion of one’s choice and that is why the word “propagate” is in the Constitution. The bench termed “very harmful” the petition that asked a strict central law to check religious conversion and observed that adults are free to choose their faith. The bench also cautioned senior advocate Gopal Sankaranarayan, who represented Upadhyay in the matter, “What kind of a petition is this? This is a very harmful petition. If you are going to argue this, we are going to impose a heavy cost on you”, said Nariman; he added, “There is a reason why the word ‘propagate’ is there in the Constitution. You have to have some meaning for that word. There is no reason why somebody above 18 cannot choose one’s own religion or somebody else’s religion,” The petition was immediately withdrawn!

The point therefore is not whether one has the right ‘to convert another’; but whether a citizen of India, has the right to choose a religion of one’s choice. Article 25 of the Constitution of India unequivocally “guarantees the freedom of conscience, the freedom to profess, practice and propagate religion to all citizens”. Besides, Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, asserts that “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance”.

As early as 1935, Dr. B. R.  Ambedkar made the most daring and path-breaking speech of his career, announcing that, because of the intransigence of privileged caste Hindus and the failure of a decade of nonviolent protests, he had decided to abandon Hinduism and to seek another faith. He urged the leaders at the Yeola Depressed Classes conference to consider their religious identity a choice, not a fact of destiny. In a highly emotional voice he said, “If you want to gain self-respect, change your religion. If you want to create a cooperating society, change your religion. If you want power, change your religion. If you want equality, change your religion. If you want independence, change your religion. If you want to make the world in which you live happy, change your religion”. About twenty years later, on 14 October 1956 (apparently the date on which King Ashoka became a Buddhist) Ambedkar together with his wife and at least 365,000 of his followers, mainly Dalits, decided to exit Hinduism and embrace Buddhism.

Is then an adult citizen of India free to choose the religion of one’s choice? The Supreme Court has to act with alacrity, maintaining the unconstitutionality of these draconian laws and strike them down in toto once and for all! Will it have the courage to take on the ‘hindutva’ brigade? That perhaps is another matter! 

March 14, 2026 

(The author is a human rights, reconciliation & peace activist and writer. Contact: cedricprakash@gmail.com )

Related:

35 civil society groups oppose Maharashtra’s proposed anti-conversion law, warn of threat to women’s autonomy and constitutional freedoms

Maharashtra’s Anti-Conversion Bill: Legislating suspicion in the name of “love jihad”

The post Draconian Law! appeared first on SabrangIndia.