In a striking pronouncement that cuts to the heart of India’s constitutional promise of religious liberty, the Chhattisgarh High Court has held that “conversion by inducement” by certain missionary groups constitutes a “social menace” — one that threatens the cultural identity and social harmony of indigenous communities. The Division Bench of Chief Justice Ramesh Sinha and Justice Bibhu Datta Guru, while refusing to interfere with Gram Sabha resolutions and village hoardings barring the entry of Christian pastors and “converted Christians,” has reignited a long-standing debate: where does the freedom to propagate faith end, and the State’s power to preserve cultural identity begin?
Delivered by a Division Bench of Chief Justice Ramesh Sinha and Justice Bibhu Datta Guru on October 28, the ruling attempts to establish a fierce boundary between religious propagation (protected under Article 25) and “conversion by inducement” (termed a “social menace”), but critically fails to protect the constitutional rights of a targeted minority group. The judgment’s most scathing indictment lies not in its rhetoric against exploitation, but in its procedural abdication that validated the exclusion of citizens based on their faith, thereby establishing a worrying precedent for the fragmentation of India’s secular citizenship.
“When it becomes a calculated act of exploitation disguised as charity, it undermines both faith and freedom. The so-called “conversion by inducement” by certain missionary groups is not merely a religious concern, it is a social menace that threatens the unity and cultural continuity of India’s indigenous communities. The remedy lies not in intolerance, but in ensuring that faith remains a matter of conviction, not compulsion.” (Para 26)
Context and background
The petitions arose from a series of Gram Sabha resolutions and hoardings erected at the entry points of several villages in Kanker district, proclaiming a ban on the entry of Christian pastors and those who had converted. These villages, falling under the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution and governed by the Panchayat (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 (PESA), justified the move as a safeguard against “forced” or “induced” religious conversions allegedly targeting impoverished tribal populations.
Practising Christians challenged the resolutions, arguing that they infringed upon their fundamental rights under Article 25 (freedom of religion) and Article 19(1)(d) (freedom of movement) of the Constitution. They contended that while Gram Sabhas are empowered to preserve cultural heritage, their authority remains subject to the overarching supremacy of constitutional rights. The petitioners also cited a 2025 government circular encouraging protection of “Jal, Jangal, Jameen” (water, forest, and land), alleging that this had been misused to legitimise discriminatory hoardings.
The State, however, defended the Gram Sabhas, invoking the PESA Act and the Madhya Pradesh Dharma Swatantrya Adhiniyam, 1968, whose validity had been upheld by the Supreme Court in Rev. Stanislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1977). It argued that the Gram Sabhas were merely exercising their statutory duty to protect tribal traditions and prevent conversion through “allurement, coercion, or fraudulent means.”
Court’s Findings: Faith as conviction, not compulsion
In its detailed judgment, the Bench observed that “conversion by inducement, manipulation, or exploitation of vulnerability” among illiterate and impoverished tribal populations had emerged as a “social menace.” The Court noted that while missionary activity in India had historically contributed to social welfare through education and healthcare, certain groups had, over time, allegedly used these as “platforms for proselytization.”
“Religious conversion has long been a sensitive issue in India’s socio-political landscape. Among the various forms of conversion, those allegedly carried out by Christian missionaries among poor and illiterate tribal and rural populations have generated particular controversy. While the Constitution guarantees every citizen the freedom to profess, practice, and propagate religion, the misuse of this liberty through coercion, inducement, or deception has become a matter of grave concern. The phenomenon of mass or motivated conversions not only disturbs social harmony but also challenges the cultural identity of indigenous communities. Missionary activity in India dates back to the colonial period, when Christian organizations established schools, hospitals, and welfare institutions. Initially, these eLorts were directed at social upliftment, literacy, and health care. However, over time, some missionary groups began using these platforms as avenues for proselytization. Among economically and socially deprived sections, especially Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes, this led to gradual religious conversion under the promise of better livelihoods, education, or equality. What was once seen as service became, in many cases, a subtle instrument of religious expansion. The menace arises when conversion ceases to be a matter of personal faith and becomes a result of inducement, manipulation, or exploitation of vulnerability. In remote tribal belts, missionaries are often accused of targeting illiterate and impoverished families, oLering them monetary aid, free education, medical care, or employment in exchange for conversion. Such practices distort the spirit of voluntary faith and amount to cultural coercion. This process has also led to deep social divisions within tribal communities. Tribals converted to Christianity often adopt new cultural practices, distancing themselves from traditional rituals and communal festivals. As a result, villages become polarized, leading to tension, social boycotts, and sometimes even violent clashes.” (Para 24)
The Bench went on to say that induced conversions among Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes under the promise of material betterment amounted to “cultural coercion” and disrupted traditional systems of belief, leading to polarization, social boycotts, and even violent clashes. The Court adopted a highly charged, prescriptive stance on conversion:
- The “social menace” finding: The Bench forcefully argued that conversion ceases to be a spiritual matter when it becomes a result of “inducement, manipulation, or exploitation of vulnerability,” particularly targeting “illiterate and impoverished families” of Scheduled Tribes (STs) and Scheduled Castes (SCs). This practice, according to the Court, is a subtle instrument of religious expansion that amounts to “cultural coercion” and directly causes social polarization, tension, and violence within tribal communities.
- Reaffirmation of Rev. Stanislaus: The Court heavily relied on the Supreme Court’s landmark 1977 decision in Rev. Stanislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh, which established that the right to “propagate” religion does not include the right to convert another person by force, fraud, or allurement. This precedent was used to justify the State’s power to prohibit conversion activities.
Quoting Article 25’s guarantee of religious freedom, the Court nonetheless emphasized that this right is “not absolute” and must be balanced against the State’s duty to preserve social order and cultural integrity. The judgment reaffirmed that the right to “propagate” religion does not include the right to convert another person, as laid down by the Supreme Court in Rev. Stanislaus.
“The Gram Sabha is a constitutionally recognized body under the PESA Act and has been conferred specific powers to manage community resources and safeguard tribal traditions. These powers, however, must operate within the limits of the Constitution of India. The expression “right to propagate religion” under Article 25 of the Constitution, as interpreted in Rev. Stainislaus (supra), does not extend to converting another person through inducement, force, or fraudulent means. The Act of 1968 prohibits such activities. Therefore, a general cautionary hoarding intended to prevent illegal conversion activities cannot, per se, be termed unconstitutional.” (Para 25)
Consequently, the Court upheld the hoardings as “general cautionary measures” intended to prevent illegal conversions. It found no violation of constitutional rights in such preventive action, terming them “precautionary” and “not discriminatory.” The Court concluded that the Gram Sabhas’ action was constitutionally permissible:
- PESA empowerment: Since the Gram Sabha is empowered under PESA to safeguard tribal tradition, a “general cautionary hoarding” intended to prevent illegal conversion activities (which are already prohibited by law) “cannot, per se, be termed unconstitutional.” The Court thus accepted the ban as a necessary precautionary measure.
- Procedural non-interference: Crucially, the Court declined to exercise its Article 226 writ jurisdiction to investigate the facts, compelling the petitioners to first avail the alternative statutory remedy under Rule 14 of the Chhattisgarh PESA Rules, 2022. This process requires them to approach the very Gram Sabha that imposed the ban, followed by an appeal to the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue).
However, it allowed petitioners the liberty to approach the Gram Sabha or higher administrative authorities under PESA if they felt aggrieved or threatened, and directed the police to provide protection if any threat to life or liberty arose.
Critical Analysis: The peril of judicial expediency
The judgment, while purporting to protect cultural integrity, is fundamentally flawed in its application of constitutional principles, making it a dangerous legal precedent.
- The Unproven Premise: Judicial assumption over fact
The most severe legal weakness is the Court’s tacit acceptance of the presumption of guilt without conducting a rigorous judicial fact-finding inquiry.
- Restriction based on suspicion: The Court validated the restriction of fundamental rights against an entire religious community based on generalized historical allegations and the potential for future wrongdoing, rather than proven evidence of coercion in the villages concerned. A constitutional court’s duty is to scrutinize restrictions, not sanction them on mere political or social apprehension.
- The shift from act to person: The judgment critically fails to distinguish between the prohibition of an illegal act (coercive conversion) and the prohibition of a person (the Christian visitor/pastor). The Stanislauws ruling limits the act of propagation; the Digbal Tandi ruling limits the entry of the propounder. This constitutes a substantial, disproportionate restriction on Freedom of Movement, treating an entire class of Indian citizens as prima facie offenders.
- The abdication of writ jurisdiction
The refusal to interfere under the doctrine of alternative remedy represents a judicial evasion of responsibility in a matter involving the core rights of a vulnerable minority:
- Inadequate remedy: Directing petitioners to seek redressal from the Gram Sabha (the body that passed the exclusionary resolution) is a travesty of natural justice. The remedy is not just administrative but inherently political and majoritarian, guaranteeing a biased and ineffective outcome for the minority.
- The obligation of constitutional scrutiny: When an infringement of fundamental rights is alleged, particularly one arising from the action of a state or quasi-state body (the PESA Gram Sabha), the High Court’s writ jurisdiction is intended to be immediate and effective, not relegated to a lower, potentially partisan, forum. The Court’s decision elevates procedural expediency over constitutional protection.
- Fragmentation of citizenship and secularism
The ruling delivers a severe blow to the principles of secularism and unified citizenship:
- Sanctioning exclusion: By validating the ban on entry based on religious identity, the judgment grants quasi-judicial sanction to social boycott and exclusion, risking the normalization of internal “no-go zones” where the rights of minorities are subject to local majoritarian veto.
- Impact on cultural choice: The judgment restricts the right to receive information and the democratic space for individuals to make informed choices about faith. While opposing coercion, the Court’s action paradoxically limits the free exercise of conscience by denying access to legitimate religious discourse and pastoral care for local Christians.
Democracy, pluralism, and the burden of proof
The Court’s invocation of cultural identity resonates deeply with the sensitivities of tribal communities, but it also raises the spectre of State-sanctioned gatekeeping of belief. India’s secular fabric, as envisioned by the framers of the Constitution, hinges on the idea that faith is a matter of individual conscience, not collective control.
By upholding village-level restrictions on the movement and presence of a particular religious group, the judgment potentially sets a precedent for decentralized discrimination — where Gram Sabhas, endowed with limited judicial oversight, can unilaterally police religious identity.
The ruling’s repeated emphasis on “conversion by inducement” as a “menace” stands on rhetorical rather than constitutional footing. It conflates missionary service work with coercion and imputes motive without inquiry. This approach, while couched in the language of cultural preservation, risks normalizing suspicion-based governance in regions already vulnerable to communal polarization.
The constitutional paradox
At its core, the judgment highlights the enduring paradox of India’s constitutional secularism: the simultaneous protection of freedom of religion and the power of the State to regulate conversion. While the Supreme Court’s precedent in Rev. Stanislaus does allow such regulation, it did not endorse blanket prohibitions or collective exclusionary acts against any community.
The Chhattisgarh High Court, by treating village hoardings as benign “precautionary measures,” overlooks the symbolic violence inherent in signage that bars a specific faith group from entering. The very idea of a “Christian-free” village space contradicts the constitutional guarantee of equality and fraternity.
A truly democratic reading of Article 25 would demand proof of coercion before restriction, not the other way around. In the absence of such proof, preventive exclusion transforms into punitive discrimination, cloaked in cultural rhetoric.
Conclusion: A troubling precedent
While the Court has refused to invalidate the Gram Sabha’s resolutions, its judgment carries implications far beyond Chhattisgarh. It redefines the limits of religious freedom by allowing collective fear to override individual liberty, and elevates cultural protection over constitutional protection.
The ruling’s caution against “conversion by inducement” echoes legitimate anxieties about exploitation, but its failure to distinguish between faith and fear, prevention and prohibition, leaves India’s constitutional secularism on uncertain ground.
In a democracy that aspires to pluralism, the line between protection and persecution must be drawn with evidence — not presumption. The Chhattisgarh High Court’s decision, though couched in legal restraint, risks reinforcing precisely the kind of intolerance it cautions against.
The complete judgment may be read below.
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