Former chief election commissioner says Modi should defer the budget for the sake of his poll reform proposals to be taken seriously.
Given that Assembly elections to five states are to be held between February 4 and March 8, is the Union government’s scheduled presentation of the Budget on February 1 an issue just of propriety or a fundamental violation of the Election Commission’s model code of conduct?
This a tricky question. That a debate has been generated over the issue, and all Opposition parties are up against it, shows it is contentious. Propriety and the model code of conduct are organically interlinked, so much so that the model code of conduct is now considered a moral code. I think the presentation of the Budget on February 1 would go against the spirit of the model code.
The model code has a chapter directed specifically against the party in power. One of its clauses prohibits any authority from making any announcement of any new scheme or giving financial incentives. It would be useful to quote the relevant clauses:
“From the time elections are announced by Commission, Ministers and other authorities shall not –
a) announce any financial grants in any form or promises thereof; or…
c) make any promise of construction of roads, provision of drinking water facilities, etc;… which may have the effect of influencing the voters in favour of the party in power.”
Well, the government is an authority, the Budget is announced by a minister and the presentation of the Budget is one form of announcing financial incentives.
The Election Commission often receives references from the government about schemes it wants to announce. For instance, we once received a reference that the government wanted to increase the minimum support price for agricultural produce.
When was this?
It was exactly five years ago, just before some elections were being held. The Election Commission’s first test was to ask whether the announcement could wait, whether there was an urgency to make the announcement.
You asked this of the government (which was of the United Progressive Alliance) then?
We asked the government on what dates they had announced minimum support price in previous years. We found these were usually done much later. So we told the government, “Thank you very much, but we won’t allow the announcement.”
Therefore, the first test is: can an announcement wait or is it being done to derive a political advantage? Even if the motive is not to seek an advantage but that ends up being the eventual effect, the Election Commission intervenes. It has allowed many proposals (for announcing schemes or policies) once it determines these cannot wait. For instance, once we allowed a reduction in petrol prices in the midst of an election in the larger context. When the Opposition parties attacked the government, its defence was that it had taken the Election Commission’s prior approval.
Do you think the government can delay presenting the Budget for another 36 days, when the last phase of the Assembly elections is slated to conclude?
The Election Commission has asked the government for its reasons. But the government could take the plea that it has already announced that the Budget would be advanced as a result of the model code of conduct coming into play.
The Election Commission has been advising state governments not to present their Budgets before elections and to opt for a vote-on-account instead. They have all heeded our advice. As far as the constitutional principle goes, there is no difference between the Budget of the state and that of the Centre.
What I am asking is whether 36 days of delay in presenting the Budget would make any difference to the country?
The date for presenting the Budget has traditionally been February 28, but for one or two exceptions. Why did the government advance this date? What were its reasons? Did it have elections in mind? The Election Commission will surely ask these questions of the government, and it will then examine its response.
Can you tell us what happened in 2012 that led the United Progressive Alliance to present the Budget mid-March, after Assembly elections to five states had concluded?
The then government moved the Budget to March 16 on its own without the Election Commission coming into the picture, ostensibly, because of the Opposition’s demand. The Opposition was crying foul and…
The Bharatiya Janata Party was then in the Opposition.
I don’t remember precisely what the BJP said, but it was said that the BJP had indeed demanded that the Budget be postponed. The Election Commission did not order postponement. The government did it of its own volition. In any case, that came as a great relief to us as some phases of the elections were scheduled for the first week of March.
There are some, including your former colleagues, who claim that since national elections and state elections are two different events, the Union government should go ahead and present the Budget as it is a national event. By that logic, shouldn’t all members of the government that present the Budget be disallowed from participating in a state event – that is, Assembly elections?
I have read the statements of two of my colleagues (TS Krishnamurthy and N Gopalaswami) that you refer to. It is true that we haven’t interfered in national elections. It is also true that in 2008, when I was a member of the Election Commission, there were three states in which elections were held after the Union Budget had been presented on February 28. These were Tripura, Meghalaya and Nagaland, which went to polls on March 7 and March 8. However, in 2012, the Budget was presented on March 16. In both instances, the Election Commission wasn’t involved in taking the decision.
Why didn’t you stop the Union government from presenting the Budget in 2008?
I don’t precisely remember what kind of discussions we had. But there were no protests from the Opposition. It did not demand a postponement.
Alright, but what do you think about the statements made by your former colleagues?
They are right. The Election Commission has not interfered itself. But it’s a grey area.
Chapter 7 of the Model Code of Conduct is specifically aimed at denying the party in power the incumbency advantage. It says the party in power will not misuse official machinery, men and material, and will not make any new announcements. If an incumbent government comes up with a very populist Budget, it may kill the very spirit of the model code of conduct.
For instance, a measure such as a huge reduction in income tax would certainly kill the spirit, right?
Yes, yes. If they give relief to pensioners such as me, I will probably be very happy to vote for the party giving it. To say that the Indian voter is very discerning, or that a populist measure doesn’t matter significantly, is a fallacious argument. Even if one person is influenced by a populist announcement, it matters. Not very long ago (in the 2008 Rajasthan Assembly elections), the Congress leader CP Joshi lost by a single vote. He might have become chief minister. Voters are human beings who are susceptible to the hawa (mood) created through marketing techniques and the announcements of sops.
If you were the chief election commissioner today, what would your stance have been on the government’s decision to present the Budget on February 1?
That is a question difficult to answer. The Election Commission has wise people, they have in front of them the most recent facts. Whatever I know today is what I have read in the media.
But I do feel that the Budget does influence voters, and the five states going to polls constitute one-fifth of India. If the Union Budget is presented on February 1, Chapter 7 of the model code of conduct does get affected.
That said, the prime minister has already announced new proposals in his speech on December 31 and at his Lucknow rally on January 2. If only these proposals are reiterated and fleshed out with figures in the Budget, then it is not a problem. But fresh proposals would be against the spirit of the model code of conduct.
That, unfortunately, we will know only after the Budget has been presented. The damage would have already been done by then.
That is true. Earlier, what used to happen was that the Union cabinet would approve a new scheme and the last line (of the minutes of the meeting) would say it cannot be implemented now because of the Election Commission’s model code of conduct. However, the scheme would be leaked to the media. Through this modus operandi, the government would hope to reap the benefits. We summoned the cabinet secretary two or three times, and said this cleverness wouldn’t do. We then issued an order that even a resolution regarding a new scheme cannot be brought before the cabinet for its consideration without securing the prior clearance of the Election Commission.
The model code of conduct is a gift to the nation by the political parties themselves. It is a voluntary code of conduct they devised in the 1960s and 1970s to ensure peaceful, free and fair elections with a level-playing field. The current generation has no business to dilute the spirit of the gift given by the previous generation of political leadership.
Politicians are by and large very conscious of this. I have mentioned only two politicians in my book (An Undocumented Wonder: The Making of the Great Indian Election) – one comes out negatively, the other comes out positively.
Let us first hear about the one who comes out negatively.
Former Law Minister Salman Khurshid announced an increase in reservations for minorities at the time he was campaigning for his wife. He also said he would continue to talk about pichadas (backwards). The BJP complained to us. We issued a notice to the law minister. He came to us with a team of top lawyers, but we concluded that Khurshid’s was indeed a violation of the model code of conduct. We censured him.
But censure wouldn’t have debarred him from campaigning or contesting elections.
No, it wouldn’t have. But censure has a moral dimension to it and affects public sentiment. It should not be dismissed as toothless as often alleged. Let me contrast this with an example that is positive. There was a by-election in Goa in 2012. We heard that Goa Chief Minister Manohar Parrikar (now Union defence minister) was planning to induct the BJP candidate into the ministry. Obviously, a ministerial berth would have given the candidate an advantage. We sent Parrikar a message, saying such as decision would unsettle the level-playing field and asking whether he would re-consider.
I received a call from Parrikar. He told me, rather angrily, that appointing a person as minister at a time of his choosing was his constitutional right. I said he was 100% correct, but I said I was pointing to the ethical dimension of the model code of conduct. Much to our delight, he not only postponed his decision to appoint the candidate as minister, but also issued a beautiful statement, to the effect that he was sacrificing his constitutional right to the moral authority of the model code. I thought he set a high moral standard, particularly as it was in contrast to the response of another minister – and a Union minister at that – around the same time.
If the Election Commission comes to the conclusion that the Budget shouldn’t be presented on February 1, but the government doesn’t adhere to its advice, what recourse is available?
I don’t have an answer to that.
Does the code of conduct have legal backing?
It is true that it is not a law, but, in a way, it is, because the Supreme Court has said in several judgements that the code of conduct has to be strictly enforced. For this reason, it has the force of law.
But you do think the Union government shouldn’t push the envelope as far as the model code of conduct goes, don’t you?
I won’t be surprised if the government defers the Budget because of the Opposition and public sentiment. Or it could avoid making populist announcements, which could be subsequently included in the discussion on the Budget. It’s heartening to see that perhaps for the first time, a prime minister has put electoral reforms high on the national agenda. To have his poll reform proposals taken seriously, I am hopeful that the prime minister will postpone the Budget.
Indeed, the prime minister has spoken of poll funding. On January 7, he told his party members that they should disclose the source of funds they receive. Yet, you wrote recently that you were surprised that the government has twice rejected the Election Commission’s proposal that it be given permanent powers to cancel elections on credible evidence of abuse of money. The second rejection came after the prime minister projected demonetisation as a war on black money. There seems to be a gap…
When the prime minister announced demonetisation, the very next day I wrote an article in the Hindustan Times supporting it, at least as far as elections go. It will, I said, put an end to sacks of money floating around before every election.
You have seen sacks of money. It isn’t a myth, after all.
Of course, we have. It actually goes around in boris.
Sacks containing wads of Rs 1,000 notes?
We have caught boris of money being transported on top of buses or in the boots of cars. Demonetisation will have a salutary effect on the five states going to elections now, I wrote. Why didn’t I talk beyond the elections to the five states? That is because they change their modus operandi. In my book, I detailed 40 methods of abuse of money during elections. Those 40 were what the Election Commission had unearthed till then. They (politicians) would have discovered more methods by now.
The latest method is to move money to chosen destinations before the announcement of elections. Everyone knew the five states would be going to polls around January and February. The idea is to move the money before the model code of conduct comes into operation. Demonetisation happened at the time the money would have been moving to constituencies in the five states. That money would have become worthless. I am very sure the use of money in the five states will be far less than before.
Why did the government reject the Election Commission’s proposal on the powers to cancel elections?
As I wrote, it was the law ministry that rejected it. Surely, the prime minister wasn’t aware of it. After all, he had just declared war on black money.
But isn’t this how political parties behave – they say one thing, act contrary to it?
I wouldn’t say that. Had the proposal reached the prime minister’s office, I assume he would have accepted it, given his declaration of war on black money.
What is the rationale behind allowing parties to accept donations less than Rs 20,000 in cash and not making it incumbent upon them to declare the identity of donors?
It is to enable small donations.
Money power is the only unsolved problem in the Indian election system. There is no goonda-gardi, no fraud, no booth capturing, no impersonation. But despite the Election Commission’s best efforts, money power continues to vitiate elections. Corruption in elections is the root cause of all corruption in the country. After all, if you spend crores on your election, you would want your returns.
Now, 75% to 80% of all contributions, by the declaration of political parties themselves, are in cash, with their sources unknown. This source could be crime money or the real estate mafia’s wealth or foreign money. That is why there should be transparency.
Won’t the disclosure of the identity of people donating less than Rs 20,000 go against small parties?
Why?
Because small parties like, say, the Bahujan Samaj Party, are less likely to attract corporate donations.
It is not true. Haven’t all corporations have set up their offices in Noida?
What about, say, the Aam Aadmi Party?
Theoretically, you are right, some parties are in a better position to attract corporate donations. The Aam Aadmi Party created a great model – every penny it received was disclosed on its website. In fact, I was very intrigued that out of thousands and thousands of donations, four of them were questioned for being from dubious or foreign sources. Ironically, those who were questioning the four donations out of thousands had not revealed their own sources of funds. That was hypocritical.
The Aam Aadmi Party has also said that it removed the names of donors from its website because some of them were being harassed by the government…
I don’t know about it.
But that could be the other problem of disclosing the names of small donors. They don’t have a firewall around them as, say, corporate giants have.
I don’t think people donating Rs 500 or Rs 1,000 would be harassed.
Sure, those who were harassed must have contributed a bigger amount, but a person donating Rs 1 lakh is far more vulnerable than, say, a corporation donating a few crores.
Once, NDTV’s Ravish Kumar asked me whether there was any good model of how parties should finance themselves. I said that the Aam Aadmi Party’s model was a good one. The comment nearly went viral because of the party’s activists who tweeted my comment. But critics pointed out that the list of donors has been removed from the website for six months. I re-tweeted that as well, for I am not partisan and was concerned that a good model of collecting money had been discontinued. I applauded the Aam Aadmi Party model in my book and suggested that other parties emulate it. I hope they will keep it up.
Still, I think there is a problem. A trader donates and his name is registered on the website or disclosed, he could become vulnerable to pressure.
You are right, that is possible. Let alone the Aam Aadmi Party, there was a Confederation of Indian Industry report that said there was consensus among its members that when they donate money to political parties, their identity should not be disclosed. They feared reprisals. I had questioned it, though. I said what they perhaps mean is that their quid pro quo would get disclosed!
There has been much talk of state funding of elections. What does it mean?
It has been debated for a good two to three decades as a counter to corruption in elections. It means that the state gives parties money for contesting elections. The Election Commission’s stand, as well as mine, has been that state funding of elections is not feasible or desirable as it is difficult to implement and requires internal democracy in the political parties as a pre-requisite.
Why is it difficult to implement?
It will be difficult to monitor. It is not white money but black money that is a problem. For instance, a candidate in a Vidhan Sabha constituency is allowed to spend Rs 28 lakhs. Suppose the state writes him a cheque of Rs 28 lakhs. What about the crores he would spend to bribe voters? Thus, good money would only supplement black money.
But I do favour state funding of political parties (not elections) after the voting. For instance, the state can decide to pay Rs 100 for every vote that a party polls.
In the last election, 55 crore votes were cast. So Rs 100 for every vote would mean a total payment of Rs 5,500 crores. No party can fudge the number of votes it polled.
Will political parties consider Rs 5,500 crores adequate?
They will. All parties together have shown that they collected around Rs 4,000 crore over the last five years (preceding the 2014 elections). However, private funding will then be stopped and the accounts of parties will be publicly audited. But this is what they all dread.
There is also the problem of funding independents. If the state starts funding independents, then many non-serious candidates would enter the fray only because there is money to be made. There is also the issue of dummy candidates. Still, I would not rule out giving money to an independent candidate based on his performance. If you get one vote, you take home Rs 100.
Nearly 70% of European countries have adopted state funding. If it is working well there, there is no reason why it wouldn’t work here.
But do they access corporate finance there?
It is banned in most countries.
That apart, there is also the question of why the state should pay so much to political parties.
I think paying Rs 1,000 crore per annum to keep the country honest is peanuts. We could even create a national election fund to which corporates and individuals could contribute. The money collected could be distributed to the political parties post-vote.
But corporates won’t donate then.
No, no, they will. Many have created funds for this very purpose. To tempt them to do so, you can give them tax exemptions.
What about political parties entering the fray for the first time?
Well, when you float a new venture, you have to invest your own money, don’t you? After they contest, their share can be determined according to the number of votes they poll. Some advance could also be considered. Let the proposal be accepted in principle first, the details can be worked out.
Don’t you think simultaneous polls, which the prime minister has been talking about, would create constitutional issues?
It is very desirable but has constitutional issues. If the prime minister creates consensus, it will be very good, as to do so would require constitutional amendments. The prime minister has mentioned two reasons for simultaneous polls – one, that there is a lot of repeated cost, and two, there is a repeated disruption of normal activity.
I would like to add two more points. Three, since corruption in elections is the root cause of all corruption in the country, a perpetual cycle of elections perpetuates corruption. Four, caste and communal tensions are triggered before every election. Since we are in a perpetual mode of elections, we perpetuate social tension and divisive tendencies as well.
The counter-point to it is that local and national elections shouldn’t get mixed up. Say, if panchayat elections are being held with national elections, then it is possible that having a sewage drain connection is more important to a person than, say, India’s Pakistan policy. So, foreign policy can get subordinated to an issue of local concern.
Or the other way around?
Yes, the other way around, too, could be a problem.
But there is also the problem of governments losing their majority.
Remember former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee lost his majority in the Lok Sabha in 1999 by a vote. Had there been simultaneous polls, what would have happened to the 29 Assemblies? (A few states came into existence in 2000 and after). Would they too have gone to polls with the Lok Sabha?
There is also the possibility of a state government losing its majority.
Well, there they can impose President’s rule.
That would be undemocratic.
Yes, but at the national level, you don’t even have a provision for President’s rule. If a government loses it majority in the Lok Sabha, what do you do then? A parliamentary standing committee on this issue submitted its report in 2015. There were two important things it said. One, it said the idea of simultaneous polls is diluted by not talking about panchayat elections altogether. What is simultaneous about elections if one of the three tiers – national, state, village – is excluded.
Apart from this, it said simultaneous polls for national and state elections might be difficult to hold once every five years. Alright, it can be done once every two and a half years. But, to achieve this, you will have to curtail the tenure of some of the Vidhan Sabhas. The Constitution has provided a term of five years. But some Assemblies will have to be dissolved beforehand. Which party would allow that? On the other hand, some parties will have their tenure in government extended beyond five years. Niti Ayog came out with a good document on the proposal summarising the arguments for and against to enable debate without making any comment itself.
This issue is serious enough for a national debate.
Ajaz Ashraf is a journalist in Delhi. His novel, The Hour Before Dawn, has as its backdrop the demolition of the Babri Masjid
This article was first published on Scroll.in