An officially appointed judicial commission concludes that the IUML and other political parties are guilty of communal violence in Kerala
Twice in the past four years, first in 2002 and then again in 2003, violent clashes in Marad, a coastal town off Kozhikode in north Kerala, not only took a toll on lives but deepened communal polarisation. On January 3, 2002, communal clashes between Hindu and Muslim extremists started in the afternoon and by the next morning there were five dead and several injured (‘Massacre in Marad’, Communalism Combat, May 2003 and ‘People as Pawns’, Communalism Combat, November 2003). Two of those killed were Hindus while three were Muslims.
On May 2, 2003, a calculated one-sided attack by Muslim extremists who came armed with lethal weapons left nine dead and scores of severely injured men and women on Marad beach. Eight of those killed in cold blood were Hindus.
On the night of the attack, police arrested more than 50 people involved in the crime, some of whom were hiding in the local Juma Masjid after the carnage. A large number of weapons and explosives were also found at the mosque soon after the killings.
Fearing reprisals after the Muslim attack, more than 2,000 Muslim women and children fled Marad beach on May 3, 2003. They fled, leaving all their belongings at home, to take refuge at the three relief camps set up in the neighbouring areas of Chaliyam, Kappakkal and Payyankkal.
For six months, the AK Antony government in Kerala faced the critical problem of rehabilitation of these refugees as some Hindu organisations, who had taken control of Marad beach following the attack by Muslim extremists, resisted residents’ attempts to go back to their homes. The Hindu organisations, led by the VHP and locally spearheaded by the Araya Samajam, a caste organisation of Hindu fishermen, physically stopped all efforts at rehabilitation, demanding that the government order a CBI inquiry into the alleged larger conspiracy behind the attack.
Ultimately, the state government ordered a judicial inquiry into the communal violence in Marad after the CPI (M)-led opposition, supported by the Congress party faction led by veteran leader K. Karunakaran, raised the demand.
Now, more than three years later, the judicial report charges political parties with precipitating a minor incident into a major communal issue. Headed by Justice Thomas P. Joseph, the commission’s report was tabled in the Kerala assembly on September 27 this year but made public only recently. Communalism Combat has been able to access the report and is publishing the commission’s findings below.
While stating that there was not enough evidence to suggest any direct international involvement in the incident of May 2, 2003, the Joseph Commission recommends a multi-agency probe to investigate the larger conspiracy at work in the planning and execution of the massacre.
The report is particularly critical of the Indian Union Muslim League (IUML), a coalition partner of the Congress-led United Democratic Front government which ruled the state in 2003, holding that some IUML leaders were aware of the conspiracy behind the attack and that activists of the National Development Front (NDF), a local Muslim organisation, as well as some IUML activists were actively involved in its planning and execution.
However, the IUML is not the only party that the Marad commission report indicts. The report also accuses local leaders of the CPI (M), IUML, BJP and RSS of deliberately exploiting a minor altercation between locals in communally sensitive Marad in 2001 (which was amicably settled by local elders) to provoke the subsequent communal conflagration in 2002 that claimed five lives. Local politicians then used the 2002 riots to create a further divide between Hindus and Muslims in the area. The state government’s procrastination with regard to punishment of those accused in the 2002 riots only served to widen the communal gap. The increasing divide between Hindus and Muslims led to the attack on Marad beach in May 2003.
The report accuses the police of persistent inaction and failure to take effective steps to prevent the incident. Justice Joseph flays the then state government for refusing to order a CBI probe into the incident and points out serious lapses on the part of the Kozhikode civil and police administration during that period. Four senior officials who have been criticised by the Thomas P. Joseph Commission include the then district collector TO Sooraj, Kozhikode police commissioner, Sanjiv Kumar Patjoshi, assistant commissioner of police, M. Abdul Raheem and inspector general of police, Mahesh Kumar Singla. The state government has now initiated action against the four officers.
The following extract is excerpted from the report of the Thomas P. Joseph Commission of Inquiry appointed by the government to inquire into the incidents that occurred at Marad beach, Kozhikode on May 2, 2003, which resulted in the death of nine persons, injuries to many others and damage to property.
FINDINGS
I. The facts and circumstances which led to the incident at Marad beach, Kozhikode on 2-5-2003 resulting in the death of 9 (nine) persons, serious injuries to many others and damage to properties.
1) A minor, insignificant incident that occurred at Marad beach, a communally divided and most sensitive area, during the New Year celebrations in the evening of 31-12-2001 and which was almost settled by the elders of the locality, transformed into a major communal riot at Marad beach on 3/4-1-2002 due to the intervention of the CPI (M), IUML and BJP/RSS activists for their gains and that resulted in the death of five persons, injuries to several others and damage to property. It is quite unlikely those activists indulged in that act without the blessings of their respective leaderships at least at the local level.
2) The communal division that existed in Marad beach, the communal riot in that area on 3/4-1-2002 resulting in the death of five persons, including Aboobacker, an NDF activist, coupled with the divisive activities of the Muslim fundamentalists and other forces also contributed to the massacre at Marad beach on 2-5-2003.
3) The unjustified delay in the state government granting sanction for prosecution of the accused involved in the crime cases relating to the incidents on 3/4-1-2002, the consequent delay in prosecuting them and their getting released on bail enabled the fundamentalist elements to ignite the fire of revenge in the minds of the close relatives of the Muslims killed on 3/4-1-2002, which also contributed to the massacre on 2-5-2003.
II. Whether there was involvement of any external/internal organisation or organisations in the planning and execution of the incident (on 2-5-2003).
1) The massacre at Marad beach on 2-5-2003 was not merely revenge for the killing of the three Muslims at Marad beach on 3/4-1-2002. Instead, that was a one-sided attack on the Hindus, without any provocation, by the Muslim fundamentalists/terrorists capitalising on the revenge the close relatives of Aboobacker, Kunhikoya and Yunus, who were killed on 3/4-1-2002, had.
2) Apart from the conspiracy reported by the CBCID (Crime Branch Central Investigation Department), Kozhikode in its final report in Cr. No. 82/03 of Beypore Police Station (Cr. No. 116/CR/03 of CBCID), there was a larger conspiracy involving Muslim fundamentalists/terrorists and other forces in the planning and execution of the massacre at Marad beach on 2-5-2003.
3) There is no sufficient evidence before the commission to show that any international agency is directly involved in the massacre at Marad beach on 2-5-2003.
4) The NDF activists are actively involved in the planning and execution of the massacre at Marad beach on 2-5-2003. It is quite unlikely that the NDF activists were thus involved without the blessings of their leadership at least at the local level.
5) The IUML activists are actively involved in the planning and execution of the massacre at Marad beach on 2-5-2003. It is quite unlikely that the IUML activists were thus involved without the blessings of their leadership at least at the local level.
6) Some members of the Mahal Committee of Marad Juma Masjid mosque (H. Party No. 1) at Marad beach were involved in that conspiracy or had prior information of that conspiracy which resulted in the massacre at Marad beach on 2-5-2003.
7) Sri PP Moideen Koya (H. Party No. 2), local leader of the IUML, is involved in the conspiracy for the massacre at Marad beach on 2-5-2003 or had prior information about that conspiracy and the impending violence at Marad beach.
8) There is every reason to think that Sri Mayin Haji s/o Kunhali, (H. Party No. 3) chairman of Calicut Development Authority and leader of the IUML, had prior information about the conspiracy, which resulted in the massacre at Marad beach on 2-5-2003.
9) The CBCID, Kozhikode had not investigated into the larger conspiracy involving other forces, the source of all explosives, the large quantity of weapons collected for the massacre and the source of the large funds used in the planning and execution of the massacre at Marad beach on 2-5-2003. A multi-agency consisting of the officers of the Central Intelligence Bureau, the Central Bureau of Investigation and the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence has to investigate into that larger conspiracy and fix liability.
III. Whether there was any lapse on the part of the police or administrative machinery in taking timely, preventive and remedial action and in dealing with the situation.
1) The Kozhikode district civil administration failed in taking timely, preventive and remedial action to prevent the massacre at Marad beach on 2-5-2003.
2) The Kozhikode city police administration failed in taking all effective steps to prevent the massacre at Marad beach on 2-5-2003.
3) The city police administration led by Sri TK Vinod Kumar, the then commissioner of police, Kozhikode acted effectively after the massacre at Marad beach on 2-5-2003 in arresting the culprits who took asylum in the Marad Juma Masjid mosque, recovering weapons from them and in preventing the spread of violence. The action taken by the then commissioner, Sri TK Vinod Kumar in that regard is quite commendable.
4) But it is quite unfortunate and disturbing that the police were not able to prevent the damaging or removal of household articles or even damaging the houses at Marad beach following the massacre on 2-5-2003.
IV. Such other matters as are incidental to and arising out of the above terms.
1) The lethargic attitude or the policy of appeasement adopted by some political parties has encouraged and emboldened religious fundamentalism and terrorism even involving external forces, which is a reality in this state.
2) The successive government after 1996 (which alone is taken into consideration here) failed in taking effective steps to prevent the growth of religious fundamentalism and terrorism in this state. That also led to communal clashes and riots in this state.
3) The state government unjustifiably refused to order investigation by the CBI into the unparalleled incident at Marad beach on 2-5-2003 or at least about the larger conspiracy involving other forces, the source of all explosives, the large quantity of other weapons collected and the funding in the planning and execution of that incident.
4) The failure/refusal of the CBCID, Kozhikode (which investigated the massacre on 2-5-2003) to investigate into the larger conspiracy involving other forces, source of all weapons and the source of the large funding in the planning and execution of the massacre at Marad beach on 2-5-2003 is quite suspicious and disturbing. The state government or other appropriate authority has to enquire into the role played by H. Party No. 7, Sri Mahesh Kumar Singla, inspector general of police (who supervised the investigation by the CBCID) in that regard.
5) Sri TO Sooraj, the then district collector (H. Party No. 4) is also responsible for the failure of the civil administration in taking all timely, preventive and remedial action to prevent the massacre at Marad beach on 2-5-2003. The allegation of communalism raised against Sri TO Sooraj cannot be ignored as baseless and is required to be enquired into by the state government or such other authority as that could have had bearing on the failure of the civil administration referred to above.
6) Sri Sanjiv Kumar Patjoshi, former commissioner of police, Kozhikode (H. Party No. 5), is also responsible for the failure of the city police administration in taking all effective steps to prevent violence at Marad beach on 2-5-2003. He did not effectively carry out many of the directions issued to him in that regard by his superior officer. He did not maintain a good relationship with the then district collector, Kozhikode who was also the district magistrate.
7) The lack of good rapport between Sri TO Sooraj and Sri Sanjiv Kumar Patjoshi, the administrative heads of the civil administration and city police administration, Kozhikode and consequent lack of coordination between the two departments affected the effective preventive and remedial action by both departments in preventing violence at Marad beach on 2-5-2003.
8) Sri M. Abdul Raheem, the then asst. commissioner of police (south subdivision), Kozhikode has not discharged his duties in preventing violence at Marad beach on 2-5-2003 sincerely and responsibly. He had not effectively, sincerely and honestly carried out the directions in that regard, issued by his superiors. His very appointment at Kozhikode south subdivision is shrouded by suspicious circumstances. The allegation that he had connections with some of the forces behind the massacre at Marad beach on 2-5-2003 cannot be ignored as baseless and hence is to be enquired by the state government.
V. To suggest suitable measures to avoid such unfortunate incidents in future.
A. Ideological measures
1) The government should, with consensus among the religious groups and without of course violating the fundamental rights if any in this regard, ensure that religious instruction is not imparted and religious symbols are not exhibited in educational institutions and at any rate ensure that the religious instruction (where it is permissible under law) is imparted beyond school hours and appropriate changes in that regard are made in the Kerala Education Act and the Rules.
2) Secularism, moral values, communal amity and religious tolerance should be taught in educational institutions. Morality and value clubs should be started in schools. Constitutional provisions, ethical principles and human rights laws required for communal amity should be part of the curriculum for TTC, BEd, MEd courses and in the in-service courses for teachers.
3) The government should, by appropriate measures, ensure that religious instruction wherever given is transparent and did not in any way violate or tend to violate public order, health and morality.
4) The government should ensure by consensus among various religious groups that persons engaged in giving religious instruction are equipped with modern education so that they could give instruction regarding public order, morality, religious tolerance and secularism, which in turn would prevent the growth of religious fanaticism, fundamentalism and terrorism.
5) Films, serials, etc. promoting religious coexistence are to be encouraged. Those creating chaos and disharmony are to be banned. If necessary, appropriate changes in that regard should be made in the law relating to censorship.
6) Non-governmental organisations should be encouraged to promote religious and communal harmony. Such organisations should act in cooperation with the police authorities in this regard.
7) There should be reasonable restrictions, without affecting fundamental rights if any, in the matter of taking out processions on the basis of caste/religion etc. along public places/roads. There must be a code of conduct evolved among the religious/caste leaders in this regard, bearing in mind that any fundamental right to propagate religion is subject to public safety and order. Sufficient security deposits should be taken from the organisers of the religious festivals and processions along public places/roads. They should execute guarantee for the peaceful conduct of the processions/festivals on public roads/places. In case of disturbance by the processionists, the deposit should be forfeited and action should be taken against the organisers of the festival/procession.
8) Religious processions should be accompanied by sufficient police force to prevent disturbances. Organisers should be held liable to pay the charges for deployment of sufficient policemen.
9) Religious observances by any community in open public places so as to cause obstruction, annoyance or inconvenience to the people at large should be discouraged and action should be taken against those who defied the instruction of the police in that regard.
10) The provisions in the Manual of Guidelines to Prevent and Control Communal Disturbances and to Promote Communal Harmony regarding conduct of religious festivals/processions and religious observances should be modified as above, given statutory force and enforced strictly.
11) Religions must teach communal amity, religious tolerance and humanity. Any religion crossing the limits should be disciplined by the arms of the law.
12) There should be constant dialogues between different religions/communities, which will enable (them to) clear misunderstandings.
B. Political measures
1) Religion must be separated from state matters, politics and education. There should, if necessary, be a special enactment separating religion from state matters, politics and education.
2) Government and political parties should be strictly secular, not merely in words but also in deeds. They should desist from appearing and/or aligning with communal forces. Registration of political parties promoting or helping in any manner riots, religious ill will, etc. should be cancelled.
3) Government should conduct a deep study into the causative, developmental, control, reduction and preventive aspects of communal clashes, the growth and activities of religious fundamentalists/terrorists in the state, identify such elements and organisations and take steps to prevent such activities.
4) Government should implement the recommendations made in this regard by the judicial inquiry commissions which went into cases of communal riots.
5) Government should study the inflow of foreign funds and unaccounted money into the state, its use by fundamentalist/terrorist groups or non-governmental organisations, and take necessary steps in that regard.
6) Government should ensure the economic sustainability of people living in the coastal areas. Steps should be taken to improve and diversify the people’s means of subsistence. Kudumbasree (development) projects must be started in the coastal areas. Government should adopt measures for poverty alleviation and diversification of strategies of income and its generation in the coastal areas (especially for Marad, a fishing harbour may be established, apart from immediately enforcing and carrying out the Marad package).
7) Government should take appropriate and necessary action, step by step, to reduce the density of population in the coastal areas by rehabilitation in other areas, which will avoid/reduce problems due to scarcity of land, economic and natural resources.
8) Since eve teasing and molestation (I found some intelligence reports about eve teasing at Marad beach before 2-5-2003) have the potential for starting riots, there should be proper illumination in the lanes and by-lanes of such riot prone areas.
9) Government should provide facility in coastal areas for psychiatric counselling and treatment.
10) Attached to every medical college and district government hospital at least, crisis intervention centres consisting of psychiatrists and specially trained staff should be opened as a permanent arrangement. The police should provide psychiatric help when major incidents, which are likely to create psychiatric problems to the perpetrators of violence, victims and witnesses to such incidents, occur.
11) Government should set up a coastal security guard in the coastal areas of the state to prevent smuggling and transportation of narcotic drugs, unauthorised and unaccounted money, arms, etc. through the sea.
12) Secular bodies should be formed in coastal areas – such bodies should have the poor people of the village as its members. Such bodies can be used for resolution of conflicts in the conventional form (like the Kadalkodathi formed at Marad).
13) Government should ensure that officials appointed in key posts in riot prone areas and districts are persons capable of acquiring the confidence of different communities.
14) Permanent peace committees should be set up at appropriate levels. Such committees should consist of non-controversial and respected persons of the locality belonging to all communities, professionals and social workers. The members of the peace committee shall not have political affiliations. Such peace committees should endeavour to bring peace in times of conflicts.
C. Legal measures
1) Special enactment should be made to stringently deal with communal clashes/riots. Such special enactment should provide for special rules regarding the burden of proof and acceptability of statements of accused/witnesses recorded before the judicial magistrates.
2) The provisions of the Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1988 should be strictly enforced. The concerned authorities should periodically call for information from the concerned persons about storage of weapons/use of funds etc. as stated therein and reports regarding that must be placed in the meetings of the communal harmony committee, periodically. Police should, when found necessary, search such places for tracing weapons.
3) The notification under Section 4 of the Arms Act should be issued in respect of all sensitive, politically and communally riot prone areas and strict action should be taken against the violators.
4) A state bureau of investigation at the state level and crime investigation units under it at the district level separated from the law and order maintenance wing must be established. Persons having skill, intelligence and aptitude for intelligence collection, crime detection and investigation should be posted in that bureau and its units strictly on a merit basis, after conducting aptitude tests, personality and intelligence tests. Cases involving major crimes should be investigated by the state bureau of investigation and the units under it. Modern equipment for investigation (for e.g. narco-analysis, brain(-mapping), fingerprinting, etc.) should be made available for the investigation units.
5) Special rules must be framed for the posting and transfer of officers of the state bureau of investigation, district crime investigation units and intelligence wings. An officer investigating the case shall not be transferred during the course of that investigation except for very compelling reasons. Transfer of key officers must be done only on extremely good grounds after a sufficiently long time.
6) Just as some other states now have, specified officers of the intelligence wing should be given operational powers to search places, arrest the accused, seize material objects and even register the case. This would help speedy action and prevent incorrect information being given by the intelligence wing.
7) Intelligence officers should undergo professional training under central agencies periodically to equip themselves with new methods of collection and dissemination of intelligence.
8) Separate funds should be provided for the intelligence wings to be operated by certain designated officers. Modern equipment must be made available for collection and dissemination of intelligence.
9) Special cells at the state and lower levels must be formed under senior police officers of proven integrity and ability to collect information and detect communal, fundamentalist and terrorist activities in the state. Those units should monitor potentially riot prone areas and take immediate action. Under such units there should be special operation wings with officers having secular, impartial credentials and they should be given special training to deal with communal violence. Such units must have a riot control scheme.
10) A pre-planned scheme should be made in advance for communally/politically riot prone areas earmarking places, men, officers, etc. with respect to their duties and actions to be performed in the event of a communal incident. They should have periodical simulative exercises to ensure that the system is foolproof.
11) Modern riot control equipment must be provided in the control rooms with a reserve force consisting of at least two platoons available in the control rooms round the clock. The strength of the police in the communally sensitive and notified areas should be sufficiently increased by creating new posts.
12) There should be strict and effective policing of the riot prone areas. Police picket posts/patrolling teams should necessarily have a sufficient number of local police constables for efficient policing while using the reserve policemen for reinforcement. There should be an effective checking system of the personnel detailed in the field day and night, with a system for cross-checking. Any irregularity when noticed in field duty or checking must be strictly dealt with.
13) Units of the Rapid Action Force with high mobility, striking power, fully trained to handle communal riots and equipped with appropriate weapons, equipment for communication and vehicles in top condition must be established in all the three ranges in the state.
14) Police control rooms should be equipped with computers (if this is not already there), which should contain all relevant information including intelligence information regarding riot prone areas, fundamentalist/terrorist elements, etc. so that the succeeding officers could collect such information and initiate action. There should be meticulous documentation of the inputs for effective analysis assessment and follow-up action.
15) The lethargy, indiscipline and unaccountability in the police force has to be removed by strict, intense and constant training Strict standards of physical fitness should be prescribed and enforced. Training should be given in existing legal provisions, which affect policing, and also subjects like criminology, sociological behaviour and interaction with people.
16) The government should ensure that the police force is non-political and communally neutral. The political affiliation of the police should be stopped. The government should consider whether police associations should continue, at any rate in the present form affecting its discipline and accountability.
17) Provisions in the Kerala Police (Amendment) Act regarding conduct of training in weapons by organisations/persons should be strictly implemented. Violation of the provision must be made a non-bailable offence.
18) The government shall not permit withdrawal from prosecution of communal offences, which results in demoralisation of the police and gives wrong signals to the offenders that they can somehow escape the arms of the law.
19) There must be proper interaction and coordination between the civil/police administrations at district levels. The special branch DySP/asst. commissioner can be posted as liaison officer to the district administration for the purpose.
20) Guidelines issued by government regarding communal harmony should be strictly followed. Participation of all members of the committee in its meetings must be strictly ensured. State level officers should conscientiously examine the minutes of the meeting on communal harmony and ensure that the meetings are not an empty formality.
21) Police should have public relations machinery (if it is not already there) at appropriate levels through which authentic versions and information regarding incidents or such other matters connected with the investigation should be revealed to the media. This is required to prevent publication of rumours and contradictory statements. Investigating police officers should be prevented from making public statements or informing the media on incidents or matters under investigation.
22) There must be appropriate restraint on the media against publishing unauthenticated information regarding incidents which tend to promote violence.
23) Special courts must be set up for speedy trial of cases arising from communal clashes/riots. There must be a time frame for the investigation, trial and completion of such cases. Law officers with integrity, impartiality, efficiency and knowledge of law should be appointed in the special courts to conduct the prosecution of cases.
Parties to the inquiry proceedings
PARTY – A
1. Hindu Aikya Vedi, Kerala, represented by state organising secretary, Sri M. Radhakrishnan.
2. Marad Araya Samajam, represented by secretary, Sri T. Suresan.
3. Vishwa Hindu Parishad, Kozhikode Khadakom, represented by president, Sri PV Karunakaran, Agrasala Kshethram, Court Road, Kozhikode.
4. Matsya Pravarthaka Sangham, represented by state secretary, Sri NP Radhakrishnan.
5. Bharatiya Janata Party District Committee, Kozhikode, represented by president, Sri Chettoor Balakrishnan Master.
6. Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) Kerala Khadakom, represented by general secretary, Sri AR Mohanan.
7. Sri GK Suresh Babu, chief subeditor, Mathrubhumi Printing & Publishing Company Ltd., Kollam.
PARTY – B
1. Janata Dal District Committee, Kozhikode, Gandhi Bhavan, Town Hall Road, Kozhikode – 673 001, represented by president, Sri MK Premnath.
2. National Development Front, (NDF) Kerala Unity House, 17/569, Rajaji Road, Kozhikode – 673 004, represented by:
i. The chairman – Sri A. Sayeed, s/o Alavi, 17/589, Unity House, Rajaji Road, Kozhikode – 673 004.
ii. The general secretary – Sri VP Nazarudheen, s/o Mohammed, 17/589 Unity House, Rajaji Road, Kozhikode – 673 004.
3. Kerala Women’s Front, Malabar House, Kuthukkal Road, Manjeri, Malappuram district, represented by president, Dr Febina Salam.
4. CPI (M) (Communist Party of India (Marxist)) Beypore Local Committee, represented by acting secretary, Sri Peroth Prakasan.
5. Sri Puthenpeedikakkal Beeran Koya, president, Beypore Grama Panchayat.
6. Seemamuntakath Aboobacker Koya, Beypore.
7. Sri C. Moideen Koya, s/o Sri Koyatti, Seemamuntakath Veedu, Naduvattom amsom, desom, Arakkinar post, Kozhikode taluk.
8. Sri C. Beerankoya, s/o Abdulla, Moolachintakath, Arakkinar PO, Marad, Kozhikode.
9. Sri T. Devadasan, s/o Sri Sukumaran, Thekkethodi Veedu, Arakkinar post, Beypore amsom, Naduvattom desom, Kozhikode taluk.
10. Sri M. Ramesan, s/o Swami, Mannadath House, Arakkinar PO, Marad, Kozhikode.
11. Smt Assara, w/o Erajootty, Erajuvintaketh, Arakkinar PO, Marad, Kozhikode.
12. Smt T. Sulochana, w/o Sukumaran, Thekkethodi House, Arakkinar PO, Marad, Kozhikode.
13. Smt K. Leela, w/o Balaraman, Kommadath House, Koyavalappu Parambu, Arakkinar PO, Marad, Kozhikode.
14. Sri MI Mohammed, member, Beypore Panchayat Board.
15. Muslim League Committee (IUML), Beypore Assembly Constituency, represented by secretary, Sri Ummer Pandikasala.
16. Confederation of Human Right Organisation, Kerala, represented by:
i. The chairman, Prof P. Koya.
ii. The secretary general, Sri Mukundan C. Menon.
17. All India Milli Council, Kerala Chapter, represented by the chairman, Dr P. Sayeed Marickar, s/o Marickar Haji, Kattiparuthi amsom, Valancherry, Tirur taluk, Malappuram district.
18. Indian Union Muslim League (IUML) District Committee, Kozhikode, represented by the general secretary, Sri PKK Bava, MLA.
19. CPI (M) District Committee, Kozhikode, represented by district secretary. Sri VV Dakshina Moorthy.
20. DYFI (Democratic Youth Federation of India) Arakkinar Unit, represented by area secretary, Sri Ponnath Peethambharan, s/o Unnipperavan, Sagara Sarani, PO Arakkinar.
21. NCP (Nationalist Congress Party) District Committee, Kozhikode, represented by president, Sri M. Alikoya.
22. Sunni Yuvajana Sangham (SYS) Beypore Mandalam Committee, represented by general secretary, Sri PT Ashraf Bakhavi, s/o Ali Mohammed, Chaliyam.
23. Sri Muhammed Koya, s/o Aboobacker, Musliyarakathu. Mathottam desom, Naduvattom amsom, Kozhikode taluk.
24. Sri KP Hassan Koya, s/o Amed, Kuniyedath House, Mathottam desom, Naduvattom amsom, Kozhikode.
25. Samastha Kerala Sunni Yuvajana Sangham (SKSYS) State Committee, Markaz Complex, Mavoor Road, Calicut, represented by the executive member, Sri NP Ummer, s/o NP Koya, Cherikkunnummal Thazham, Vengeri PO, Kozhikode.
26. District Congress (I) Committee, represented by president, Sri M. Veerankutty, advocate.
27. Communist Party of India (CPI) Kozhikode District Council, Krishna Pillai Mandiram, Kozhikode – 673 001, represented by secretary, Sri EK Vijayan.
28. Sri KV Moinkutty @ Moin Bappu, s/o Muhammed Haji Koyappathodi, Rahath Manzil, Kaimangalm, Palazhi, Kozhikode.
PARTY – C: Commission
PARTY – D: Sri KPA Rasheed, s/o Mammed Koya, Tharammal, Nallalam PO, Kozhikode.
PARTY – E: Civil administration, Kozhikode, represented by district collector, Kozhikode.
PARTY – F: City police administration, Kozhikode, represented by commissioner of police, Kozhikode.
PARTY – G: Sri AM Kassim
PARTY – H
1. The Mahal Committee, Marad Juma Masjid.
2. Sri PP Moideen Koya (Accused No. 141), s/o Abdu Rehiman, Pareechintakath Veedu, Neermoochil Paramba, Beypore.
3. Sri MC Mayin Haji, s/o Kunhali, Cheruvannur, Kozhikode.
4. Sri TO Sooraj, former district collector, Kozhikode.
5. Sri Sanjiv Kumar Patjoshi, former commissioner of police, Kozhikode.
6. Sri M. Abdul Raheem, former asst. commissioner of police (south), Kozhikode.
7. Sri Mahesh Kumar Singla, inspector general (crime), Trivandrum.
8. The home secretary, government of Kerala, Trivandrum.
(Thomas P. Joseph Commission Of Inquiry, Report – Volume I, dated February 18, 2006, Lakshadweep Building, Court Complex, Kozhikode – 673 032.)
Archived from Communalism Combat, October 2006 Year 13 No.119, Special Report