Khargone riots case collapses: Four years after Ram Navami violence, MP court acquits 11 accused, finds prosecution failed to establish guilt

More than four years after communal violence tore through Madhya Pradesh’s Khargone district during a Ram Navami procession, triggering widespread arrests, hundreds of criminal cases and one of India’s earliest “bulldozer justice” crackdowns, a sessions court has acquitted all 11 Muslim men accused in one of the principal riot cases, holding that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.

The judgment, delivered by Fourth Additional Sessions Judge Mukesh Nath, is significant not simply because it results in an acquittal, but because of the manner in which the prosecution’s case unravels under judicial scrutiny.

Far from identifying minor procedural lapses, the court records a chain of fundamental investigative failures: the majority of prosecution witnesses abandoned the case; the only eyewitness was introduced nearly two months after the incident without explanation and was absent from the FIR; no Test Identification Parade (TIP) was ever conducted despite the accused allegedly being part of a large mob; and forensic evidence failed to support one of the prosecution’s central allegations—that petrol bombs were used during the violence.

Read together, the findings expose a prosecution that, in the court’s assessment, failed to satisfy even the most basic evidentiary requirements necessary for a criminal conviction. The judgment also carries another uncomfortable fact. Before being acquitted, the accused had already spent between 462 and 827 days in custody, close to two years in some cases, raising broader questions about prolonged incarceration in riot prosecutions that ultimately fail for lack of evidence.

The prosecution alleged that the eleven Muslim men, along with several unidentified persons, formed an unlawful assembly during the communal violence that erupted in Khargone on April 10, 2022. According to the prosecution, the accused were part of a mob armed with stones, swords, sticks and petrol bombs that attacked Hindu homes in Bhatwadi locality, vandalised residential properties, burnt vehicles, trespassed into houses and endangered the lives of residents.

What this verdict also showcases is the frequent faultlines displayed by law enforcement during bouts of communal violence. Instead of dispassionate acts of detention and arrests, inherent majoritarian biases train actions only on males from the minority communities. In fact, Sabrangindia had on April 14, 2022 reported how it was the hate speech and provocations by offender Kapil Mishra who had been accused of inciting violence. This report may be read here. In fact Sabrangindia also reported on a viral video of hate-offender Kapil Mishra –then making the rounds on social media—in which Mishra is heard inciting communal hate in a speech he made on April 10, 2022 Ram Navami, around the same time that the Khargone violence took place 40 kms away. Reports on this brand of hate speech may be read here.

A case born out of one of 2022’s consequential communal flashpoints

The prosecution arose from the communal violence that erupted in Khargone on April 10, 2022, during a Ram Navami procession. The clashes quickly escalated into a politically charged incidents. Houses, shops and vehicles were damaged, police personnel, including the district Superintendent of Police, were injured, curfew was imposed, internet services were suspended and additional police forces were deployed across the district. What followed transformed the incident from a law-and-order issue into a national constitutional debate.

Within forty-eight hours of the violence, the Madhya Pradesh government launched a demolition drive targeting dozens of homes and commercial establishments allegedly linked to those accused of participating in the riots. Bulldozers rolled into predominantly Muslim neighbourhoods, demolishing structures that authorities claimed were illegally constructed.

Images of homes being razed spread across the country, prompting fierce criticism from civil liberties groups, constitutional scholars and opposition parties, who argued that the demolitions amounted to punishment without trial. The State, however, maintained that the structures violated municipal laws and denied carrying out any punitive exercise.

Notably, barely a day after communal clashes erupted during a Ram Navami procession in Madhya Pradesh’s Khargone, the district administration demolished 16 houses and 29 shops in five areas across the town. According to a report in Indian Express, MP’s Chief Minister Shivraj Singh Chouhan had said that “a claims tribunal” would be formed and action taken against rioters. His colleague, Home Minister Narottam Mishra issued a warning, saying, “Jis ghar se pathar aaye hain, us ghar ko hi patharon kaa dher banaenge (We will turn the houses from where the stones were pelted to a heap of rubble).”

Detailed reports from Sabrangindia may be read here, here, here, here, here, here, here and here.

The demolitions soon became one of the defining symbols of what came to be described as “bulldozer justice”—a practice that would later become the subject of repeated constitutional challenges before the Supreme Court.

Detailed report on the bulldozer judgment as well as the prevalence of the bulldozer’s misuse may be read here and here respectively.

Against this backdrop, the criminal prosecutions arising from the Khargone violence acquired significance well beyond the fate of individual accused persons. They became central to assessing whether the State’s extraordinary post-riot response rested on investigations capable of withstanding judicial scrutiny.

The present judgment offers one of the clearest judicial examinations of that question. In a detailed judgment delivered on July 27, Fourth Additional Sessions Judge Mukesh Nath concluded that while the prosecution successfully established that extensive rioting, arson and destruction of property had indeed occurred in Khargone’s Bhatwadi locality, it failed to prove that the eleven accused before the court were the perpetrators of those offences.

The judgment is significant not because it questions the occurrence of communal violence, but because it reiterates a foundational principle of criminal jurisprudence—that conviction must rest on legally admissible and reliable evidence establishing the guilt of identified accused persons, and not merely on proof that a crime took place.

Charges against the accused

As stated below the prosecution, the charge sheet, alleged that the eleven Muslim men, along with several unidentified persons, formed an unlawful assembly during the communal violence that erupted in Khargone on April 10, 2022. According to the prosecution, the accused were part of a mob armed with stones, swords, sticks and petrol bombs that attacked Hindu homes in Bhatwadi locality, vandalised residential properties, burnt vehicles, trespassed into houses and endangered the lives of residents.

Charges were framed under Sections 147, 148, 149, 336, 427, 435, 436 and 450 of the Indian Penal Code, along with Sections 3 and 4 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908. The prosecution also alleged that the accused acted in furtherance of a common object, attracting the principle of vicarious liability under Section 149 IPC.

The FIR itself was registered on April 12, 2022, on the basis of multiple written complaints submitted by residents alleging attacks on their homes during the Ram Navami procession. The complainants alleged that members of the mob hurled stones and petrol bombs, set houses and motorcycles ablaze, destroyed household articles and looted valuables.

The prosecution established the violence—but not the perpetrators

One of the most striking aspects of the judgment is the distinction drawn by the Sessions Court between proving the occurrence of the offence and proving the identity of those responsible. The Court found that the prosecution had successfully established that widespread communal violence had occurred in Bhatwadi locality. The testimony of residents, seizure memos, spot inspections and damage assessment reports consistently demonstrated that houses were attacked, windows shattered, vehicles burnt and substantial property damage caused during the violence. The defence did not seriously dispute these aspects of the prosecution’s case.

The Court therefore accepted that a violent mob had attacked several residential properties and that the complainants had suffered significant losses. However, criminal liability required considerably more. The central issue before the Court, it held, was not whether communal violence occurred, but whether the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt that these eleven accused were members of the mob responsible for those acts.

Dismantling of the evidence against the accused

Eight eyewitnesses abandoned the prosecution’s case: The prosecution examined thirteen witnesses during trial, of whom eleven were projected as eyewitnesses. The Court found that eight of those eleven witnesses completely failed to support the prosecution insofar as the identity of the accused was concerned. These witnesses, including complainants themselves, did not identify any of the accused before the Court, did not attribute any overt act to them and, according to the judgment, no incriminating material emerged against the accused even after the prosecution declared them hostile and cross-examined them.

Judge Nath observed that despite extensive questioning by the prosecution, these witnesses did not provide any evidence linking the accused persons to the alleged offences. Their testimony established only that violence had occurred—not who had committed it. This finding substantially weakened the prosecution’s case because many of these witnesses were themselves the victims whose homes had allegedly been attacked. The Court therefore held that the prosecution had failed to derive any evidentiary benefit from a substantial portion of its own witnesses.

The prosecution’s case ultimately rested on a single witness. With eight eyewitnesses failing to implicate the accused, the prosecution’s case effectively rested upon one witness—Vaishnavi Jain (PW-6). According to the prosecution, Vaishnavi witnessed the accused attacking houses, breaking doors, setting vehicles on fire and entering residential premises. She claimed to have identified all eleven accused in court and alleged that they were among those participating in the violence. The Court acknowledged that conviction can legally rest upon the testimony of a solitary witness. However, the decisive question was whether that testimony inspired confidence.

Far from treating the evidence of a sole eyewitness with suspicion merely because she was alone, the Court undertook an extensive examination of whether her testimony satisfied the standards of reliability required under criminal law. It ultimately concluded that it did not.

Prosecution’s sole eyewitness subjected to rigorous scrutiny: Having found that eight of the prosecution’s eleven eyewitnesses failed to implicate the accused, the Court turned to examine whether the testimony of the remaining witness, Vaishnavi Jain (PW-6), could independently sustain a conviction. The Court began by reiterating that there is no legal requirement that every criminal case must be supported by multiple eyewitnesses. Relying on the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras (AIR 1957 SC 614), Judge Mukesh Nath observed that Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act makes it clear that evidence must be weighed, not counted. A conviction can lawfully rest upon the testimony of a single witness if the Court finds that witness to be wholly reliable and trustworthy. Conversely, where the testimony is doubtful or falls into the category of “neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable,” courts are expected to seek corroboration before recording a conviction.

Thus, the Court did not reject Vaishnavi Jain’s evidence merely because she was the only eyewitness supporting the prosecution. Instead, it undertook an extensive assessment of whether her testimony inspired confidence. Ultimately, it concluded that it did not. One of the principal infirmities identified by the Court was that Vaishnavi Jain attributed a collective role to all eleven accused without identifying the specific acts allegedly committed by each individual.

According to her deposition, all eleven accused arrived armed with swords, sticks, stones and petrol bombs, vandalised houses, burnt vehicles, broke doors and entered residential premises. However, the Court observed that she did not specify which accused committed which act, nor did she distinguish the role of any individual despite attributing the entire incident to all eleven persons simultaneously.

The Court held that where criminal liability is sought to be fixed upon identified individuals, especially in a prosecution involving allegations of rioting and unlawful assembly, such sweeping and undifferentiated assertions require careful scrutiny. The absence of any individual attribution assumed greater significance when no other eyewitness corroborated her version.

Contradictions regarding the time and sequence of events: The Court also found substantial inconsistencies within Vaishnavi’s own testimony. In her examination-in-chief, she stated that around 3:00 p.m., the accused pelted stones at houses opposite her residence before leaving, and that they returned between 6:30 p.m. and 7:00 p.m., armed with weapons and petrol bombs, when they allegedly attacked houses and entered her residence. However, during cross-examination she stated that around 4:00 p.m., only three or four persons came, threw stones and left, while simultaneously admitting that she did not actually see those persons while they were throwing stones.

The Sessions Court held that these inconsistencies were not minor discrepancies arising from lapse of memory. Instead, they directly affected the prosecution’s narrative regarding when the attack occurred, how many persons were involved and whether the witness actually observed the assailants.

The Court found the basis of identification unreliable: Perhaps the most significant aspect of the judgment concerns the Court’s assessment of identification evidence. Vaishnavi claimed that although she did not know the accused by name, she recognised all eleven accused by face because she had frequently seen them sitting at a paan shop, puncture repair shop and neighbourhood square. The Court carefully examined this explanation against the surrounding evidence. It found several inconsistencies.

While Vaishnavi initially stated that the accused were residents of her locality, the evidence on record showed that the accused actually belonged to Miyaman Mohalla and Kalali Mohalla, whereas she resided in Bhatwadi locality. During cross-examination, she alternately claimed that they lived behind her house before admitting she did not know whether several accused resided in Miyaman Mohalla. She also accepted that the paan shop and puncture repair shop from which she allegedly recognised the accused were not visible from her residence and were not situated immediately adjacent to her house.

These contradictions, according to the Court, substantially weakened the very foundation of her claimed familiarity with the accused. If the witness neither knew the accused personally nor consistently established how she recognised them, the Court held that her in-court identification became difficult to accept as reliable.

Judge Nath therefore concluded that the basis of identification advanced by the witness was not sufficiently credible to safely sustain criminal conviction.

Material contradictions within the same family: The Court attached considerable importance to the fact that Vaishnavi’s testimony was contradicted by the evidence of her own father and brother, both of whom were also examined by the prosecution. According to Vaishnavi, all eleven accused participated in the attack.

Her brother Akash Jain (PW-10), however, testified that only four or five persons were involved in pelting stones at the house. More importantly, Akash stated that the assailants had covered their faces with cloth, because of which he could not identify them. He specifically stated that he was unable to recognise the persons who attacked his house.

Similarly, Vaishnavi’s father, Dinesh Jain (PW-7), admitted during cross-examination that the rioters had cloth tied over their faces. He further acknowledged that he had viewed the attackers only from a considerable distance and was unable to state who among them had thrown stones, committed arson or looted property. The Court observed that these inconsistencies were not peripheral.

If two members of the same family consistently stated that the assailants had concealed their faces, it became difficult to accept Vaishnavi’s assertion that she had clearly recognised all eleven accused by face during a rapidly unfolding riot situation. Accordingly, the Court held that these inter se contradictions among closely related witnesses significantly undermined the credibility of the prosecution’s only identifying eyewitness.

Identification from 500–600 metres found inherently improbable: The Court also carefully analysed the evidence of Dinesh Jain regarding identification. Although Dinesh stated that he recognised the accused in court, he simultaneously admitted that he had witnessed the incident from a distance of approximately 500 to 600 metres, had no prior personal acquaintance with the accused, and could not state who specifically had burnt the doors, thrown stones or committed looting.

Judge Nath observed that identification of persons within a large violent mob from such a distance was inherently unnatural, particularly where the witness himself admitted that the rioters had their faces covered. The Court therefore refused to treat Dinesh Jain’s testimony as reliable evidence establishing the identity of the accused. The cumulative effect of these contradictions, the Court held, was that the prosecution had failed to present a single eyewitness whose testimony could safely form the basis of conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

Unexplained delay in recording the sole eyewitness’s statement: Apart from the inconsistencies in Vaishnavi Jain’s testimony, the Court found the manner in which the investigation was conducted to be equally problematic. A significant factor that weighed against the prosecution was the unexplained delay of 51 days in recording the statement of its only eyewitness.

The incident occurred on April 10, 2022. However, Vaishnavi Jain’s statement under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was recorded only on May 31, 2022. The Court noted that the prosecution offered no explanation whatsoever as to why the statement of a witness, who was ultimately projected as the principal eyewitness to the entire occurrence, was recorded nearly two months after the incident.

The Court observed that unexplained delays in recording the statement of a material eyewitness assume considerable importance in criminal trials because they create the possibility of embellishment, tutoring or afterthought. While delay alone may not necessarily render a witness unreliable, the absence of any explanation assumes significance when the witness becomes the sole basis for seeking conviction. The Sessions Court therefore treated the delay as one more circumstance casting doubt on the prosecution’s case rather than an isolated procedural irregularity.

Absence of the sole eyewitness was absent from every contemporaneous complaint: The Court also found it significant that none of the six written complaints submitted immediately after the violence referred to Vaishnavi Jain as an eyewitness. The prosecution case originated from multiple written complaints submitted on 12 April 2022, two days after the communal violence. These complaints formed the basis of the FIR.

Despite the detailed allegations contained in those complaints, not one complaint identified Vaishnavi Jain as someone who had personally witnessed the attack. Her name did not appear as an eyewitness in any of the written complaints, nor was she mentioned in the FIR that was subsequently registered on their basis.

The Court held that where an individual is later projected as the prosecution’s only direct eyewitness, the complete absence of any reference to that witness in the earliest version of events becomes a relevant circumstance while assessing credibility. Coupled with the unexplained 51-day delay in recording her statement, the omission strengthened the Court’s conclusion that her claim of being an eyewitness appeared doubtful.

Absence of a Test Identification Parade: Perhaps the most damaging investigative lapse identified by the Court was the complete absence of a Test Identification Parade (TIP). The Court noted that although the prosecution relied heavily on identification evidence, no witness was ever asked to identify the accused during the investigation.

Vaishnavi Jain identified the accused for the first time inside the courtroom. The Court observed that first-time identification in court ordinarily carries significantly less evidentiary value, particularly where the witness had not previously known the accused personally and where the incident involved a large, violent mob. In such cases, a properly conducted Test Identification Parade serves as an important investigative safeguard by testing the witness’s ability to identify the alleged perpetrators independently and without suggestion.

In the present case, however, no such exercise was undertaken. The Court therefore held that the prosecution had failed to establish how or on what basis the investigating agency concluded that the eleven accused were among the persons who participated in the violence.

No explanation for implicating five of the accused later: The Court also scrutinised the manner in which the accused were arrayed in the charge-sheet. While six accused were named in the FIR, five additional persons were subsequently chargesheeted. However, the prosecution failed to explain how these additional accused came to be identified during investigation. The Court records in its judgment that no witness identified them, no Test Identification Parade was conducted, no documentary or electronic evidence linked them to the crime, and the investigating officer did not explain the evidentiary basis on which these additional accused were implicated.

The Court therefore observed that there was no discernible investigative foundation for prosecuting these five individuals. More broadly, the Court found that the prosecution had failed to explain how, from a crowd estimated by witnesses themselves to consist of nearly fifty persons, investigators concluded that these eleven individuals, and no others, were responsible for the offences alleged.

Photographic evidence failed to implicate the accused: The prosecution also relied upon photographs extracted during investigation. However, the Court held that this evidence was of little assistance.

First, the photographs were not accompanied by a certificate under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, affecting their admissibility as electronic evidence. Secondly, even assuming they were admissible, none of the accused were visible in the photographs. Accordingly, the Court held that the photographs merely depicted the aftermath of the violence and did not connect any of the accused with the commission of the offences.

Forensic evidence contradicted the prosecution’s allegation of petrol bombs: The prosecution consistently alleged that the mob had used petrol bombs to set fire to houses and vehicles. To substantiate this allegation, investigators seized broken glass bottles and burnt residue from various locations and forwarded the material to the State Forensic Science Laboratory at Sagar. However, the forensic examination did not support the prosecution’s narrative.

According to the FSL report, no residue of inflammable petroleum hydrocarbons—including petrol, diesel or kerosene—was detected in the seized material. The Court observed that this scientific evidence directly undermined one of the prosecution’s central allegations—that petrol bombs had been used during the attacks. While the Court did not hold that no arson had occurred, it concluded that the prosecution had failed to establish, through reliable scientific evidence, that explosive substances or petrol bombs had in fact been used by the accused. Consequently, the offences under the Explosive Substances Act also remained unproved beyond reasonable doubt.

Benefit of doubt and prolonged incarceration

Having analysed the evidence cumulatively, the Court concluded that the prosecution had failed to establish the identity and participation of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Judge Mukesh Nath accordingly acquitted all eleven accused of offences under Sections 147, 148, 336, 427, 435, 436 and 450 read with Section 149 IPC, as well as Sections 3 and 4 of the Explosive Substances Act, extending to them the benefit of doubt.

The judgment also records that the accused had already undergone substantial periods of incarceration during investigation and trial, ranging from 462 days to 827 days before being released on bail. Two of the accused remained in custody for over 827 days, while several others spent well over a year and a half in prison before trial concluded.

A judgment reaffirming the burden of proof in riot prosecutions

The judgment is notable for the distinction it draws between proving the occurrence of violence and proving the criminal liability of identified individuals. The Court expressly accepted that serious communal violence, arson and large-scale destruction occurred in Khargone’s Bhatwadi locality on 10 April 2022. What remained unproved, however, was whether the eleven accused standing trial were members of the mob responsible for those offences.

Rather than questioning the occurrence of the violence itself, the acquittal rests on familiar principles of criminal law: that suspicion, however grave, cannot substitute proof; that identification evidence must withstand careful scrutiny; that investigative lapses can materially weaken a prosecution; and that conviction must be founded on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The judgment also arrives against the broader backdrop of the 2022 Khargone violence, which was followed by controversial demolition drives targeting properties alleged to belong to persons involved in the riots. One such challenge, filed by a Khargone resident who alleged that his property was demolished because he belonged to the Muslim community, remains pending before the Madhya Pradesh High Court. The petitioner has contended that the demolition formed part of the State’s post-riot crackdown and relied upon public statements by senior government functionaries attributing responsibility for the violence to members of the Muslim community.

By ultimately acquitting the accused after finding fundamental deficiencies in the prosecution’s evidence, the Sessions Court’s decision underscores that even in prosecutions arising from communal violence, constitutional guarantees of fair trial and the criminal law’s insistence on proof beyond reasonable doubt remain the governing standards.

Court distinguished proof of participation from proof of guilt

An important thread running through the judgment is the distinction between establishing that communal violence occurred and proving the participation of specific individuals in that violence. The Court repeatedly observed that there was little dispute that rioting, stone-pelting, vandalism and arson had taken place in Khargone on 10 April 2022. Multiple witnesses described attacks on residential properties, damaged houses and burnt vehicles. However, the Court emphasised that these facts, by themselves, could not justify convicting the eleven accused unless their individual involvement was established through reliable evidence.

This distinction is central to criminal jurisprudence. The judgment reiterates that criminal courts are concerned not merely with whether an offence occurred, but whether the prosecution has proved, beyond reasonable doubt, that the persons standing trial committed that offence. The existence of a violent mob, therefore, did not automatically establish the culpability of every individual arraigned before the Court.

The Court found the prosecution failed to establish unlawful assembly against the accused

The prosecution invoked Sections 147 and 148 IPC (rioting), along with Section 149 IPC, which creates vicarious liability for every member of an unlawful assembly acting in prosecution of its common object. However, before Section 149 can be invoked, the prosecution must first establish that the accused were themselves members of the unlawful assembly. The Sessions Court held that this foundational requirement remained unproved.

Since the prosecution failed to reliably identify the accused as members of the alleged mob, the statutory presumption of collective liability under Section 149 could not be invoked. Consequently, the charges under Sections 336, 427, 435 and 436 read with Section 149 also failed. Although the judgment does not elaborate separately on the legal ingredients of Section 149, its reasoning effectively reflects the settled principle that vicarious criminal liability cannot arise unless membership of the unlawful assembly itself is first established.

The Court repeatedly criticised the investigation rather than merely the evidence

While acquitting the accused, the Court’s criticism extended beyond witness testimony to the manner in which the investigation itself was conducted.

Throughout the judgment, Judge Mukesh Nath identified several investigative deficiencies:

• failure to explain the delay in lodging the FIR;
• failure to explain the 51-day delay in recording the statement of the prosecution’s principal eyewitness;
• failure to conduct any Test Identification Parade;
• failure to explain how five additional accused were implicated despite not being named in the FIR;
• failure to produce evidence establishing the basis on which investigators selected these eleven individuals from a crowd estimated to comprise around fifty persons.

Rather than viewing these lapses in isolation, the Court assessed their cumulative effect. It held that these deficiencies substantially undermined the prosecution’s ability to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The judgment therefore illustrates how procedural shortcomings during investigation can have a decisive impact on the prosecution’s case at trial.

The judgment carefully applied the law on sole eyewitness testimony

A notable feature of the judgment is that the Court did not insist upon corroboration merely because there was only one eyewitness. Instead, it correctly applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras. The Court recognised three categories of witnesses identified in that decision:

• wholly reliable;
• wholly unreliable; and
• neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable.

Having analysed Vaishnavi Jain’s testimony in detail, the Sessions Court concluded that it fell into the third category. Her evidence was not rejected outright, but the Court found that it suffered from material inconsistencies, lacked independent corroboration and was surrounded by circumstances that rendered it unsafe to rely upon as the sole basis for conviction. The judgment therefore reflects a cautious application of established evidentiary principles rather than the creation of any new legal standard.

A reminder that criminal trials test evidence—not public narratives

Although the judgment is confined to the evidence led during trial, it inevitably unfolds against the larger backdrop of one of Madhya Pradesh’s most contentious episodes of communal violence. The Khargone violence was followed by sweeping police action, multiple criminal prosecutions and demolition drives targeting properties alleged to belong to the Muslim individuals involved in the violence.

Against this backdrop, the acquittal does not amount to a judicial finding that no violence occurred or that no offences were committed. Instead, it underscores a narrower but constitutionally significant proposition: that criminal courts adjudicate individual guilt on the basis of legally admissible evidence, and not on the basis of the broader public narrative surrounding communal violence. It also raises the fundamental issue of a taint or bias on part of law enforcement agencies that, in India, during the charged atmosphere during communal violence, bow to majoritarian state or non-state pressures and arrest or penalise only men from minority communities.

Beyond the evidentiary deficiencies that led to the acquittal, the judgment also brings into sharp focus the human cost of a prosecution that ultimately failed to meet the threshold of proof required in criminal law. The eleven accused remained in judicial custody for periods ranging from 462 to 827 days during the course of the investigation and trial before being acquitted after the prosecution failed to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The acquittal therefore raises broader constitutional concerns about the protection of individual liberty within the criminal justice system. Article 21 of the Constitution guarantees that no person shall be deprived of personal liberty except according to procedure established by law, while the presumption of innocence remains a foundational principle of criminal jurisprudence until guilt is established through a fair trial. Where individuals spend years in incarceration before a court concludes that the prosecution failed to prove even their identification beyond reasonable doubt, the case illustrates the profound consequences that deficient investigations can have on these constitutional guarantees.

The complete judgment may be read below.

Related:

2022: A year when Bulldozer became a ‘lawful’ means of punishment

Demolitions of homes of Gujjar Bakerwals in Jammu unconstitutional & violation of FRA 2006: AIUFWP

Rebuild or Compensate: Nagpur HC confronts NMC over ‘bulldozer’ demolition in riot case

Demolition of Adivasi homes at Sanjay Gandhi National Park on Republic Day

Faiz-e-Ilahi Masjid, Turkman Gate: A court-ordered demolition, midnight policing, stone-pelting, arrests, and the ongoing legal battle