The Supreme Court on May 27, 2026, upheld the statutory and constitutional validity of the Special Intensive Revision of electoral rolls conducted by the Election Commission of India. A division bench consisting of Chief Justice Surya Kant and Justice Joymalya Bagchi delivered the judgment in a combined batch of writ petitions that challenged the administrative process. The court determined that the procedure adopted by the commission does not violate existing legal provisions of election law and procedure and is part of the constitutional objectives and powers therein –to conduct free and fair elections –accorded to the Election Commission.
The judgment clarifies that the commission possesses the explicit authority to carry out a Special Intensive Revision under Article 324 of the Constitution, read in conjunction with the relevant provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1950, and the associated regulatory rules.
The legal dispute originated from a series of writ petitions led by Association for Democratic Reforms and Others versus Election Commission of India, filed under Writ Petition (Civil) No. 640 of 2025. The petitioners challenged an administrative notification issued by the commission in June of the preceding year, which authorised a state-wide Special Intensive Revision across the State of Bihar. The petitioners argued that the revision framework resulted in arbitrary mass exclusions and operated as an unconstitutional verification process. However, the Supreme Court rejected these contentions, ruling that the documentation rules and the deletion protocols implemented during the revision were compliant with statutory safeguards and did not violate constitutional principles.
The historical and philosophical framework of the electoral roll
In the text of the judgment, Chief Justice Surya Kant examined the historical development of public membership and democratic franchise within the Indian sub-continent to contextualise the current statutory framework. The court observed that the establishment of an accurate and verifiable record of eligible electors is a structural prerequisite for any representative government before votes can be cast or counted. The electoral roll functions as the legal definition of the political community, meaning its composition directly influences the integrity, accuracy, and credibility of the entire democratic architecture.
The judgment traced the evolution of collective governance mechanisms back to ancient historical records, referencing the administrative and social structures of Bihar during the era of the Mahajanapadas in the sixth and fifth centuries BCE. The court noted that while certain neighbouring territories such as Magadha and Anga operated under monarchical systems, the Vajji confederacy, centred at Vaishali, maintained a system of republican and quasi-republican institutions. Relying on primary historical records, including the Mahaparinibbāna Sutta, the court highlighted that the Vajjis regularised governance through frequent public assemblies, conducted their administrative affairs in institutional concord, and adhered to established customary rules. While these ancient systems did not employ modern methods of adult franchise or formalised voter registries, they established early historical precedents for defining public membership and maintaining structured processes for community deliberation.
The formal statutory formalisation of the electoral registry in modern Indian history emerged under the British colonial administration through the enactment of the Government of India Act, 1935. The Sixth Schedule of the 1935 Act introduced a structured legal system for preparing and revising electoral rolls across defined territorial constituencies based on a specific qualifying date. Although the colonial model enforced an exclusionary franchise restricted by property ownership, educational qualifications, and separate communal electorates, it standardised the administrative transition of voter registration into a formalised statutory regime.
The adoption of the Constitution of India established a complete break from the colonial administrative model. The Constituent Assembly debates held on June 15 and June 16, 1949, regarding Draft Article 289—which was subsequently enacted as Articles 324, 325, and 326—demonstrate that the framers intended to insulate the election machinery entirely from executive interference. The assembly implemented a single, general electoral roll for every territorial constituency, abolished communal electorates, and established universal adult franchise. Under Part XV of the Constitution, the electoral roll was transformed into an instrument of universal political participation, placed under the superintendence, direction, and control of an independent constitutional authority.
Background
The immediate factual basis for the litigation arose on June 24, 2025, when the Election Commission of India issued an order mandating a state-wide Special Intensive Revision of electoral rolls across all Assembly constituencies in Bihar. In its recorded statement of reasons, the commission noted that the last intensive house-to-house revision in Bihar had been executed twenty-two years prior, in 2003. In the intervening period, the state’s electoral lists had been updated exclusively through annual summary revisions. The commission determined that this prolonged interval, combined with rapid urbanisation, intra-state and inter-state migration, and unreported voter deaths, had introduced significant duplications, omissions, and inaccuracies into the existing registries.
The administrative framework established by the commission for the execution of the Special Intensive Revision included several specific components that became the primary subjects of the legal challenge. The commission designated the electoral roll compiled during the 2003 intensive revision as the baseline probative evidence for verifying residency and eligibility. Individuals currently residing in Bihar whose names were absent from the 2003 baseline roll were required to provide prescribed government documentation to confirm their status as eligible electors. The commission deployed Booth Level Officers to conduct house-to-house physical visits to distribute a standardised Enumeration Form, which electors were required to complete and submit within a specified timeframe. The administrative directive noted that failure to submit the form would result in exclusion from the initial draft electoral roll.
Upon the publication of the draft electoral roll-on August 1, 2025, the registry showed a significant mathematical decrease. Prior to the initiation of the drive, the total number of registered electors in Bihar stood at approximately 7.89 crore. The published draft roll recorded 7.24 crore electors, clearly pointing to the fact that nearly 65 lakh individuals had been omitted at the draft stage due to the non-submission or non-collection of the Enumeration Forms. This large-scale omission led to immediate legal challenges under Article 32 of the Constitution by the Association for Democratic Reforms, political activist Yogendra Yadav, and members of Parliament including Mahua Moitra, Manoj Jha, KC Venugopal, and Supriya Sule, who asserted that the procedure was structurally flawed and lacked clear statutory authorisation.
Chronology of interim judicial orders and safeguards
The Supreme Court did not stay the ongoing administrative process but instead issued a series of interim directions during July, August, and September 2025 to introduce procedural safeguards and maintain maximum inclusivity during the revision drive. In its initial order dated July 10, 2025, the court framed three core inquiries regarding the statutory basis of the drive, the specific methods used to verify eligibility, and the administrative appropriateness of the timing given the upcoming late 2025 Bihar Legislative Assembly elections. To prevent unintended exclusions, the court ordered the commission to expand its list of acceptable documents to include Aadhaar Cards, Electors Photo Identity Cards, and Ration Cards as valid proof of identity and residence.
Following the disclosure that 65 lakh individuals were absent from the draft roll, the apex court issued an order on August 14, 2025, directing the commission to compile and publicly publish the complete list of omitted names along with the specific technical or clerical reasons for each omission. The court mandated that this list be given wide publicity through print newspapers, television channels, and radio broadcasts to ensure that affected individuals could file rectification claims. To ensure field-level assistance, the court’s order dated August 22, 2025, impleaded twelve recognised national and state political parties as respondents, directing them to utilise their Booth Level Agents to canvas local areas and assist omitted individuals in navigating the claims process.
On September 1, 2025, the court recorded a formal clarification from the commission that the claims, objections, and corrections window would remain functional continuously until the final date for filing election nominations. The court also directed the Chairman of the Bihar State Legal Services Authority to deploy para-legal volunteers across all District Legal Services Authorities to provide free technological and legal assistance to individuals filing claims. In a subsequent order on September 8, 2025, the court defined the evidentiary status of the Aadhaar Card within the revision framework. The court observed that while an Aadhaar Card does not constitute proof of citizenship under the Aadhaar Act, 2016, Section 23(4) of the Representation of the People Act expressly authorises its use for establishing a voter’s identity. The court formally designated the Aadhaar Card as an additional acceptable document for electoral roll verification, while reserving the right of registration officials to seek secondary verification if the genuineness of a claim was in doubt.
The commission issued an official press release on September 30, 2025, marking the final conclusion of the Special Intensive Revision drive in Bihar. The final data revealed that from the 7.24 crore draft roll base, 3.66 lakh names were permanently removed following detailed statutory verification, while 21.53 lakh eligible electors (Form 6) were successfully added through the claims and objections mechanism. (Note: Form 6 is a procedural form available to first-time voters and those who have shifted from their original locations where they were registered as electors to a new address)
The addition of 21.53 lakh electors through the Form 6 procedure only partially explains the reduction from the pre-revision figure of 7.89 crore electors to the finalised roll of 7.42 crore. Even after accounting for 3.66 lakh deletions and 21.53 lakh additions (total movement: 25.19 lakh voters/electors), an unexplained variance of approximately 21.81 lakh electors still remains. Therefore, the figures disclosed do not mathematically reconcile with the final electoral database. It is necessary to specifically question and seek clarification regarding this substantial unexplained gap, as the published data presently appears internally inconsistent and incomplete.
This revised roll with 7.42 Crore electors was subsequently utilised to conduct the Bihar Legislative Assembly elections in November 2025, with the final results declared on November 14, 2025, after which the Supreme Court proceeded to resolve the outstanding constitutional questions.
(Editor’s Note: While this piece, reports on the May 27 judgement of the SC, we shall soon be carrying subsequent pieces, bringing back to our readers, the procedural flaws, inconsistencies and other lapses in the Bihar 2025 SIR process, so that the judicial adjudication does not wipe out the widespread inconsistencies in procedure and law that the Election Commission of India indulged in)
Meanwhile readers may refer and read to the articles related to the Vote for Democracy’s report on the Bihar SIR here, and here.
The actual VFD Bihar Elections 2025 report may be accessed here.
Constitutional and statutory arguments of the petitioners
The petitioners, represented by a panel of senior counsel including Kapil Sibal, Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Gopal Sankaranarayanan, Prashant Bhushan, and Vrinda Grover, mounted a broad constitutional challenge against the validity of the Special Intensive Revision. Their primary argument was that the exercise altered the statutory framework of electoral roll maintenance by turning the commission into a de facto citizenship adjudicator. They contended that existing electoral registration laws do not empower the commission to compel individuals who are already registered on the rolls to newly re-establish their citizenship through fresh documentary proof. Questions regarding nationality, they argued, must be addressed exclusively through the mechanisms provided under the Citizenship Act, 1955, rather than an electoral enumeration drive.
The petitioners characterised the Special Intensive Revision as an NRC-like exercise, asserting that it inverted established legal principles by creating a presumption of ineligibility and shifting the entire evidentiary burden onto individual voters. Counsel argued that the process created a state of suspended citizenship, wherein individuals excluded from the draft roll were effectively deprived of core democratic participation rights prior to any formal adjudication of their legal status by a competent statutory authority. They also challenged the statutory basis of the verification forms, arguing that the specific enumeration forms distributed by the commission lacked explicit backing under the Representation of the People Act, 1950, or the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960.
Regarding the geographic scope of the commission’s powers, the petitioners argued that Section 21(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1950, does not authorise a simultaneous, state-wide or multi-state intensive revision drive. They highlighted that the text of the provision explicitly allows for a special revision for “any constituency or part of a constituency,” which they interpreted as a requirement for targeted, localised, and exceptional interventions rather than broad, state-wide programs. They further argued that the commission had failed to disclose specific, localised data justifying the revision for each individual constituency, rendering the exercise arbitrary. Finally, the petitioners relied on Lal Babu Hussein v. Electoral Registration Officer, (1995) 3 SCC 100, arguing that prior inclusion in an electoral registry creates a legal presumption of eligibility that cannot be set aside without an individualised objection and a specific burden of proof placed on the objector.
Distinguishing factors and rationale for departure
The judgment distinguishes the application of the seminal Lal Babu Hussain Judgement precedent based on the following factual and structural differences:
- Adjudicatory vs. inquisitorial framework: The rules in Lal Babu Hussain were formulated to govern localised, individual deletion proceedings where specific names were singled out based on “selective objections.” In contrast, according to the SC in the present judgement, a Special Intensive Revision (SIR) under Section 21(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1950, is a systemic, inquisitorial house-to-house enumeration applied uniformly to the entire electorate.
- Temporal decay of the presumption: The presumption of regularity under Section 114(e) relies on the notion of periodic accuracy of data. Where an entire state’s rolls have been carried forward exclusively through summary revisions for over two decades (since 2003 in Bihar) without a physical house-to-house audit, the empirical accuracy of the entries in the 2025 SIR under present adjudication, diminishes due to migration, demographic shifts, and unreported deaths.
- The nature of the requirement: Demanding that existing electors provide basic identity tokens or complete enumeration forms during a universal statewide audit does not alter the ultimate burden of proof or negate the presumption of validity; it operates as an administrative verification mechanism under Article 324 rather than an individual citizenship trial.
The contention that the evidentiary presumption identified in Lal Babu Hussain creates a permanent bar against a comprehensive administrative revision conflates a rebuttable procedural rule with a rule of substantive law. An entry in a published electoral roll provides an administrative checkpoint against arbitrary, selective deletions; it does not divest the Election Commission of its constitutional authority to verify database accuracy under Article 324.
Because the rules in Lal Babu Hussain were developed within the context of localised adjudicatory proceedings where individual entries were targeted without prior disclosure of the material basis, they cannot be expanded to invalidate a state-wide, inquisitorial policy exercise executed under Section 21(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1950. In the SC’s present understanding and analysis, applying an individualised dispute framework to a systemic overhaul fails to recognise the legal distinction between a localised objection and a uniform administrative response to macro-demographic inaccuracies.
Furthermore, the legal weight of an administrative presumption under Section 114(e) of the Indian Evidence Act is operationally dependent on temporal proximity to physical verification. The factual matrix of Lal Babu Hussain involved a statutory regime where intensive house-to-house revisions were conducted at regular intervals, ensuring that entries carried forward reflected contemporary data. Where the electoral data has been modified solely via summary revisions for more than twenty years without a physical audit, the factual foundation sustaining the presumption undergoes structural decay. Requiring the Commission to establish individualised doubts prior to conducting a universal verification would reduce the statutory mechanism of intensive revisions to a dead letter. Systemic verification does not reverse the burden of proof regarding citizenship, but rather satisfies the contemporary administrative criteria required for electoral representation.
The invocation of the dictum in Lal Babu Hussain to erect an unyielding procedural embargo against a comprehensive administrative revision proceeds on an erroneous conflation of a rebuttable evidentiary presumption with an immutable rule of substantive law. While an existing entry in a published roll generates a presumption of regularity under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, such an administrative tool cannot paralyse the Election Commission’s plenary constitutional obligations under Article 324 to safeguard the integrity of the political community. The protective principles established in Lal Babu Hussain were designed within a narrow matrix of individual adjudicatory proceedings where specific voters were selectively targeted without due process. They cannot be stretched to obstruct a state-wide inquisitorial policy exercise directed at restoring the comprehensive structural accuracy of an electorate whose data has languished without house-to-house verification for over two decades.
While these are the lofty presumptions used by the SC to justify the 2025 SIR, there is no reference nor detailing in the present judgement of the huge laps and gaps of operational conduct by the ECI in making available forms to electors/voters, in giving an adequate time-frame for data collection, in making these processes transport etc. In fact, during the hearings initially, the SC had “promised” to step in if there were “mass deletions.” In the end the Bihar elections 2025 were conducted with no course correction.
Read our reports here, here and here.
Statutory defence and arguments of the commission
The ECI, represented by Senior Advocates Rakesh Dwivedi, Maninder Singh, and Dama Seshadri Naidu, defended the statutory validity of the drive by arguing that the petitioners had mischaracterised the nature and scope of the Special Intensive Revision. The commission’s primary defence was that the exercise did not constitute a formal nationality adjudication under deportation or citizenship laws. Instead, it was an electoral verification process aimed solely at ensuring that only eligible individuals remained on the voter registries. The commission emphasised that because the Constitution establishes a citizen-based franchise under Article 326, it is under a continuous constitutional obligation to maintain the purity of the rolls by removing ineligible entries.
The commission rejected the comparison to an NRC-style process, describing the Special Intensive Revision as a flexible, administrative verification model managed by civil election officials rather than an investigation conducted by police authorities. Addressing the petitioners’ reliance on Lal Babu Hussein, the commission argued that the precedent was factually distinguishable. It noted that the earlier case involved police involvement in the verification drive and lacked clear administrative safeguards, whereas the present drive was conducted entirely by election personnel and incorporated multiple layers of procedural review. The commission also maintained that prior inclusion on the rolls was not ignored and continued to serve as a piece of baseline evidence during the verification process.
The commission further argued that its authority under the statutory scheme is fully supported by the text of Section 21(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1950. It contended that the statutory power to conduct a special revision necessarily includes the authority to perform intensive verification when required to preserve the integrity of the electoral process. The commission rejected assertions of external motivation, stating that its actions were strictly guided by its institutional mandate to correct long-standing demographic inaccuracies in registries that had not undergone an intensive review for over two decades.
Judicial interpretation of Articles 324 and 327
The Supreme Court analysed the structural relationship between the plenary constitutional authority of the commission under Article 324 and the legislative powers of Parliament under Article 327. The court rejected the petitioners’ submission that the enactment of detailed statutory laws by Parliament entirely removes the independent regulatory authority of the commission. The bench held that Articles 324 and 327 are complementary provisions that must be interpreted in harmony with one another. While Parliament is empowered to enact laws governing the conduct and administration of elections, such statutes cannot be applied in a manner that strips the commission of its core constitutional obligation to ensure the integrity of the electoral process.
The court re-examined the legal principles established in Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405, noting that while the commission must conform to valid legislative enactments and cannot act in direct contradiction to an express statutory prohibition, Article 324 functions as a continuous reservoir of power. This power enables the commission to issue regulatory directives to address administrative gaps where the statutory law is silent or insufficient to meet operational contingencies. The bench emphasised that the terms “superintendence, direction, and control” must be interpreted broadly to fulfil their constitutional purpose. The judgment delivered by Chief Justice Surya Kant held:
“When the statute itself authorises a special revision at any time, for reasons to be recorded and in such manner as the Election Commission may deem fit, the impugned exercise cannot be invalidated merely because it does not conform in every respect to the ordinary modalities contemplated for routine revision. In our considered opinion, the impugned SIR does not supplant the Representation of the People Act and the Rules. Rather, it breathes life into the constitutional mandate under Article 324 within the precise statutory contours provided by Section 21(3). Therefore, it cannot be said that the Commission has acted in excess of its statutory powers.”
Factual harmonisation with Section 21(3) and Rule 21A
The court proceeded to analyse the specific text of Section 21 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950, to determine if the Special Intensive Revision conflicted with statutory mandates. The bench observed that while Section 21(2) outlines the standard, rule-bound annual summary revisions of voter lists, Section 21(3) operates as an independent, enabling provision designed for extraordinary demographic or administrative adjustments. The court emphasised two primary elements of Section 21(3):
- The operation of the non-obstante clause: The inclusion of the phrase “Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2)” serves to decouple the special revision process from the strict procedural limits and timelines that govern routine summary revisions under Section 21(2) and Rule 25 of the 1960 Rules.
- Procedural discretion: The statutory phrase “in such manner as it may think fit” grants the commission broad administrative latitude to design the operational methods of a special revision based on ground-level exigencies, subject to the condition that it records its reasons in writing.
The bench rejected the petitioners’ strict geographic interpretation of the term “any constituency”. Applying Section 13(2) of the General Clauses Act, 1897—which provides that words in the singular include the plural—and drawing upon the interpretation in Prabhakaran v. P. Jayarajan (2005) 1 SCC 754, the court ruled that the word “any” can mean “all” or “many” depending on the statutory context and purpose. If the administrative reasons justifying an intensive revision apply uniformly across an entire state due to a multi-decade gap in house-to-house verification, the commission is legally authorised to issue a single consolidated order covering all constituencies within that state. The court noted that requiring individual, separate notifications for each constituency would create a fragmented administrative process that hinders the commission’s capability to fulfil its duties.
The judgment also addressed the petitioners’ arguments regarding Rule 21A of the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960, which details the procedure for deleting names due to death, migration, or disqualification. The court determined that deletions executed during a Special Intensive Revision do not stand in contradiction to Rule 21A. The bench held that because the essential procedural safeguards of notice, public display of draft lists, and the opportunity to file claims and objections remain preserved in substance, the revision framework complies with the core requirements of procedural fairness established by the rules.
Application of the proportionality test and rights balancing
The Supreme Court evaluated the SIR framework under the four prongs of the constitutional test of proportionality to determine whether the administrative measures unjustifiably infringed upon the right to vote under Article 326.
I. Legitimacy of purpose
The court ruled that the commission’s objective—ensuring that electoral registries are accurate, complete, and credible—is rooted in the constitutional mandates of Articles 325 and 326. The grounds for updating the rolls align with the statutory criteria for removal recognised by Parliament, such as voter death, changes in ordinary residence, or supervening disqualifications. Because inaccurate voter lists directly undermine the integrity of the democratic process, the initiation of the purification drive satisfies the requirement of a legitimate public purpose.
II. Rational nexus
The bench found a direct logical connection between the administrative method used and the objective pursued. A physical, house-to-house verification drive combined with standardised enumeration forms is a direct method to identify unrecorded deaths, duplicate entries, and outdated residency data that annual summary updates cannot fully resolve.
III. Necessity and least restrictive means
The petitioners argued that the commission should have utilised narrower, localised audits rather than a state-wide program. In reviewing this choice, the Supreme Court cited the constitutional bench ruling in Vivek Narayan Sharma v. Union of India (2023) 3 SCC 1, which established that evaluating the scale of a systemic administrative issue and choosing an appropriate regulatory response are tasks requiring specialised expertise. The court noted that maintaining accurate registries belongs to the exclusive constitutional mandate of the commission, involving complex logistical and demographic assessments. The judiciary will not substitute its own policy preferences for the methodology chosen by a specialised constitutional body unless that choice is demonstrated to be arbitrary or unguided. Given the pervasive nature of the inaccuracies accumulated over twenty-two years, the selection of a state-wide intensive revision was determined to be a necessary administrative step.
IV. Fair balancing
The court evaluated the balance between the administrative goals of the drive and the protection of individual franchise rights. The bench observed that while the right to vote is a key constitutional right, its operationalisation requires compliance with regulatory verification frameworks to confirm identity and residence. Procedural compliance requirements do not automatically violate the right, provided they are workable and accompanied by adequate remedies. The court noted that while the initial drop of 65 lakh names from the draft roll raised valid questions regarding potential exclusion, the subsequent integration of procedural safeguards—including the expansion of accepted identity documents, the public disclosure of the reasons for omission, and the mobilisation of legal service volunteers—ensured that the drive satisfied the test of proportionality and did not result in systemic disenfranchisement.
Scope of citizenship scrutiny and referral mandate
The Supreme Court addressed the exact boundaries of the commission’s authority regarding questions of citizenship during the compilation of electoral registries. The court rejected the submission that the commission is entirely barred from reviewing queries related to nationality. The bench pointed out that under Section 16 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950, non-citizenship functions as an express statutory disqualification from registration. Because the commission is legally required to ensure that only eligible individuals are entered onto the rolls, it possesses the ancillary authority to scrutinise documentation concerning citizenship status at the stage of voter registration. The court held that calling upon electors to furnish supporting materials during a revision drive does not negate the presumption of citizenship recognised in Lal Babu Hussein; rather, it represents the procedural mechanism through which existing qualifications are verified.
However, the judgment drew a clear legal distinction between the administrative findings of the commission and the formal adjudication of nationality under the Citizenship Act, 1955. The bench ruled that an adverse determination by an election officer during a Special Intensive Revision exercise is limited strictly to electoral eligibility. Chief Justice Surya Kant observed:
“Upon detailed consideration, we have come to the conclusion that, in view of the statutory requirement under Section 16 of the Representation of the People Act, the Commission, in the course of preparing or revising electoral rolls, is undoubtedly empowered to examine questions bearing upon citizenship. The consequence of such a citizenship determination is correspondingly limited. It affects the individual’s entitlement to be included in the electoral rolls and thereby the right to participate in the electoral process. It does not, however, operate to divest the individual of claims to citizenship, nor does it foreclose adjudication of that question by the competent authority under the Citizenship Act.”
The court further held that in instances where the commission determines that an individual has not produced sufficient material to satisfy the statutory criteria for inclusion on the rolls, it cannot issue a final or binding conclusion on their nationality. Instead, it is incumbent upon the commission to refer such individuals to the competent authority of the Union Government for formal adjudication in accordance with the law. Because the commission’s findings are confined to electoral purposes, any deletion executed on the grounds of doubtful citizenship remains subject to the final outcome of the adjudication conducted by the competent statutory authority under the Citizenship Act, 1955.
As a specific operational consequence of this referral mandate, the Supreme Court directed the Election Commission of India to forward to the Central Government the names of all persons deleted from the 2003 Bihar electoral rolls over doubtful citizenship. The court mandated that this list be compiled and transmitted to the Union Government within a strict timeframe of four weeks from the date of the judgment. This directive ensures that individuals whose names were removed during the purification drive due to nationality concerns are automatically placed into the appropriate legal channel for a final determination of their citizenship status by the competent central authority.
Current operational status of revisions
The judgment of the Supreme Court provides a sense of finality on the issues raised that is the statutory scope and procedural boundaries of Special Intensive Revisions conducted under Section 21(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1950. However, given the procedural flaws (and there were many) couples with the statutory gaps, there is no final clarity on the mass disenfranchisement that has been affected in the process.
By simply validating the commission’s authority to initiate state-wide intensive drives and implement standardised documentation frameworks, the court has rendered legitimacy to a faulty and non-transparent administrative mechanism used to update what is being justified as long-standing inaccuracies in voter registries. Concurrently, by limiting the legal consequence of the commission’s findings strictly to electoral eligibility, the judgment prevents the administrative process from functioning as a final determination of nationality, preserving the jurisdiction of specialised authorities under the Citizenship Act, 1955. However, given that this adjudication process under the Citizenship act, 1955 lies with the Home Ministry of a Union Government that has made political exclusion and disenfranchisement part of its stated goals, this offers little succour. What the country is likely to see is the mass distress by documented exclusions caused to vast number of Indians.
Because the Supreme Court did not stay the administrative execution of the revision drive during the pendency of the litigation, the SIR process has already transitioned through its active phases and has been completed in several states, including Bihar, Kerala, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Puducherry, and West Bengal etc. Following the reservation of the judgment on January 29, 2026, and its formal pronouncement on May 27, 2026, the legal principles established by the bench now govern the ongoing SIR drives currently being carried out by the commission in multiple other states.
The full judgement dated May 27, 2026 may be read here:
Related
“Inside the SIR”: Booklet flags ‘mechanical disenfranchisement’ in electoral roll revision
VFD’s rebuttal of the Fadnavis’ Claims on Electoral Manipulation Allegations
The Bihar Verdict 2025: How an election was engineered before votes were cast