The Delhi High Court on October 23 dismissed a petition filed by All India Students’ Association (AISA) national president Neha Bora challenging a show-cause notice requiring her to explain why she should not furnish a personal bond of ₹10,000, along with one surety for the same amount, to maintain peace during an inquiry. The notice followed her detention by Delhi Police at Mandi House on October 16, amid protests against the Election Commission of India (ECI) and the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls, as well as opposition to the de-notification of Jantar Mantar as a protest site.
Justice Subramonium Prasad held that there was sufficient material before the Special Executive Magistrate (SEM) to initiate preventive proceedings under Sections 126 and 130 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023. The court, however, did not determine whether Bora had ultimately breached the law or whether she must furnish a bond. It directed the State to disclose all material relied upon in the proceedings and required the SEM to follow the principles of natural justice and independently decide whether an interim bond was necessary.
From a call to gather at Mandi House to preventive proceedings
Bora, who is also described in the judgment as a social activist, had posted an invitation on Instagram on October 16, calling people to assemble at Mandi House at 5 pm. Her post stated: “Jantar Mantar is not a site that you can denotify, it’s a symbol of our resistance! Today, all of Central Delhi has become Jantar Mantar!”
The judgment records that Bora was detained by Delhi Police at around 5:30 pm that day and released on October 17. The notice initiating preventive proceedings was issued on October 17 by Mahesh Kumar Meena, the SEM for New Delhi district. It called upon her to appear and show cause why she should not execute a personal bond of ₹10,000 with one surety for the same amount under Section 135(3) of the BNSS.
The notice alleged that Bora had created a nuisance by shouting slogans at the Mandi House roundabout, repeatedly participated in protest-related activity around Jantar Mantar despite prohibitory orders under Section 163 of the BNSS, and instigated people to join an unauthorised demonstration at Central Park in Connaught Place. It also alleged that she had called for the national flag to be hoisted without obtaining permission and that there was a likelihood of a breach of public peace and tranquillity.
The notice stated that she might commit a breach of peace or a wrongful act likely to disturb public tranquillity within the SEM’s jurisdiction. It invoked Sections 126 and 130 of the BNSS to initiate proceedings and required her to appear on October 19. The judgment noted that Bora sought exemption from personal appearance on health grounds on October 19 and was subsequently directed to appear before the SEM on October 24.
Bora challenged the notice as mechanical and based on hearsay
Senior Advocate Gopal Sankaranarayanan, appearing for Bora, argued that the notice did not satisfy the legal requirements of Section 126 of the BNSS and merely reproduced the language of the statutory provision. He submitted that the SEM was required to examine the information received, make an independent assessment of whether it disclosed a likelihood of breach of peace, and record the basis for initiating proceedings.
The challenge also questioned the reliance placed on the police kalandara, the report submitted to initiate preventive proceedings. Bora’s counsel argued that the SEM had acted on the report and the directions of senior police officers rather than forming an independent opinion. He pointed to the SEM’s order of October 17, which recorded that the kalandara had been submitted by Sub-Inspector Vaishali Tushir and that the notice should be issued after its inspection.
The petition also contested the claim that Mandi House was covered by a prohibitory order. Counsel relied on an order dated August 23, 2026, issued by the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Parliament Street subdivision, to argue that the location where Bora had called for a gathering was not within the area covered by restrictions under Section 163 of the BNSS.
Another central argument was that the information cited in the notice was hearsay and did not provide a sufficient factual basis for proceedings that could affect Bora’s liberty. Counsel maintained that a peaceful protest could not, by itself, justify preventive action and disputed the allegation that Bora had urged people to gather at Central Park, Connaught Place, where another group had called for a protest.
The petition also raised the question of whether the SEM could initiate proceedings on the material placed by police without conducting the inquiry required by law. Counsel argued that the statutory safeguards were particularly important because failure to furnish an interim bond could have consequences for personal liberty.
State relied on prohibitory orders, police records and previous cases
Opposing the petition, Additional Solicitor General Chetan Sharma argued that Section 126 of the BNSS allows an Executive Magistrate to initiate proceedings when information indicates that a person is likely to breach the peace or disturb public tranquillity and the Magistrate considers there to be sufficient grounds to proceed.
The State maintained that the SEM had relied not merely on an allegation or hearsay, but on the kalandara dated October 17 and supporting material. It argued that the SEM had considered the report and heard the investigating officer before forming an opinion. Sharma further submitted that the assessment at this stage was a matter of the SEM’s subjective satisfaction and that the High Court should not substitute its own assessment for that of the authority conducting the inquiry.
The State also argued that the petition was premature. Under the statutory scheme, it said, the person receiving the notice would have an opportunity to appear, contest the information and participate in the inquiry. If the allegations were not substantiated, the person could be discharged under Section 137 of the BNSS and would not be required to furnish a bond, or any bond already furnished could be discharged. The State submitted that the law provided remedies at subsequent stages and that the High Court should not interrupt the proceedings merely because a show-cause notice had been issued.
On the question of the restrictions in force at Mandi House, the State relied on a prohibitory order dated August 24, 2026, issued under Section 163 of the BNSS by the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Barakhamba Road subdivision. According to the State, the order covered the jurisdictions of Barakhamba Road and Tilak Marg police stations, including Mandi House.
The police kalandara alleged that Bora arrived at the Mandi House roundabout at around 5:10 pm with approximately 40 to 50 protesters and began moving towards Barakhamba Road while raising slogans. It claimed that police repeatedly announced over a loudspeaker that Section 163 was in force and that gatherings of five or more people, demonstrations, processions and dharnas were prohibited in the area. The report alleged that Bora continued moving forward and raising slogans, including “Reclaim Jantar Mantar”, “Gyanesh Kumar, resign” and “We do not accept any Section 163 BNSS, nor do we accept any such law”, before police stopped the group after considerable effort.
The kalandara also alleged that Bora had repeatedly participated in demonstrations around Jantar Mantar despite prohibitory orders, had encouraged people through her language and social-media posts to violate the law, and had called upon supporters and members of the Cockroach (CJP) to gather at Connaught Place and hoist the national flag without permission.
The police report sought to justify the restrictions by referring to Connaught Place’s commercial character, traffic movement, the presence of banks, offices, hotels, showrooms and vendors, the high footfall at Rajiv Chowk Metro Station, and the potential for crowding to obstruct emergency services. It also referred to the area’s proximity to Parliament and the Central Secretariat and argued that a gathering could affect public safety, traffic and livelihoods.
The report further alleged that previous events involving AISA and CJP had seen violence and property damage, that Bora had previously been detained under Section 65 of the Delhi Police Act, 1978, and that several FIRs had been registered against her. It claimed that she might again attempt to gather people at prohibited locations and provoke demonstrations, creating a risk to public and government property.
The police report stated that the matter had been brought to the attention of senior officers and that preventive action had been considered necessary on their directions. This aspect was significant to Bora’s challenge, which argued that the proceedings reflected a command from senior officers rather than an independent decision by the SEM.
Court found material for initiating proceedings, but did not decide the allegations finally
After examining the record, the High Court noted that the material placed before the SEM included three General Diary entries relating to different incidents and dates, the kalandara dated October 17, and information relating to six FIRs registered at Parliament Street, Barakhamba Road and Connaught Place police stations. The record also included information under Section 65 of the Delhi Police Act.
The judgment identifies General Diary entry No. 19A dated October 17, relating to information under Section 65 of the Delhi Police Act; entry No. 20A dated October 17, recorded at Barakhamba Road police station under Sections 126 and 169 of the BNSS; and entry No. 111A dated September 25, recorded at Parliament Street police station in relation to Section 65 of the Delhi Police Act.
The court also recorded that three witnesses had been examined in connection with the material, including Sub-Inspector Vaishali Tushir. It concluded that the SEM had considered the kalandara, the General Diary entries and the accompanying material before initiating proceedings.
Importantly, the High Court said it would not rely on additional video material handed over by the State because it was unclear whether those videos had been placed before the SEM when the decision to initiate proceedings was made. The court confined its assessment to the material that could be shown to have been before the Magistrate.
The court rejected the argument that the notice was based on no material or merely on hearsay. It held that the notice had identified the alleged conduct at Mandi House and the alleged attempt to mobilise people for a demonstration at Central Park, Connaught Place. It also noted that the prohibitory order dated August 24 covered Mandi House, rejecting Bora’s argument that the location fell outside the restrictions.
The court distinguished the present case from Sumitra Dhal v. State of Odisha, in which the notice had not disclosed even a summary of the information or incidents said to justify apprehension of a breach of peace. It also distinguished Anuj Suhag v. State (NCT of Delhi), where the proceedings were based on a single incident, noting that the material in Bora’s case included multiple General Diary entries, FIRs and the prohibitory orders.
The High Court held that a notice under Sections 126 and 130 of the BNSS need not read like a judicial judgment. It must convey the substance of the information received and the reasons for the Magistrate’s opinion. It also accepted that the two statutory requirements could be conveyed through a composite notice rather than separate documents, relying on the Bombay High Court Full Bench ruling in Farhan Nasir Khan v. State of Maharashtra.
The court’s conclusion was that the material was sufficient to cross the threshold for issuing a show-cause notice. It expressly refrained from deciding the truth of the allegations or whether the SEM’s assessment would ultimately justify requiring Bora to furnish a bond.
Preventive proceedings are not punishment, court says
A substantial part of the judgment examines the purpose and limits of preventive proceedings under Chapter IX of the BNSS, which deals with security for keeping the peace and good behaviour. The court reiterated that proceedings under these provisions are preventive rather than punitive. Their purpose is to avert a possible breach of peace, not to punish a person for an offence already committed. Under Section 126, an Executive Magistrate may require a person to show cause why a bond should not be ordered if information indicates that the person is likely to breach the peace or disturb public tranquillity and the Magistrate considers there to be sufficient grounds to proceed. The period of a bond under that provision cannot exceed one year.
The court held that, at the stage of a challenge to a show-cause notice, the High Court’s inquiry is generally limited to whether there was material before the SEM and whether the SEM applied his mind to it. The writ court should not ordinarily replace the Magistrate’s assessment with its own, unless the case involves a complete absence of material or an exceptional ground for interference.
For this proposition, the judgment relied on Supreme Court rulings including Special Director v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghoushe, Union of India v. Vicco Laboratories and J. Sri Nisha v. Special Director, Adjudicating Authority, Directorate of Enforcement. These decisions recognise that show-cause notices should not routinely be quashed before the authority has had an opportunity to conduct the prescribed proceedings, while also acknowledging exceptions where a notice is without jurisdiction, reflects non-application of mind, is pre-determined, constitutes an abuse of process or violates natural justice.
The court observed that preventive action may be based on the circumstances and nature of the alleged conduct rather than the number of incidents alone. It said even a single incident may, in appropriate circumstances, support apprehension of a future breach of peace. In Bora’s case, however, the court relied on its view that the record contained multiple entries and other material, rather than a solitary allegation.
The judgment also stated that the SEM was not required to conduct a full fact-finding investigation before issuing the notice. The court considered the initial examination of the information and the recording of the three witnesses sufficient to meet the threshold for initiating proceedings. It did not, however, dispense with the requirement of a proper inquiry before any final decision or interim order affecting Bora’s liberty.
Court emphasises safeguards under Madhu Limaye
The court devoted particular attention to the Supreme Court’s five-judge Bench decision in Madhu Limaye v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Monghyr, which stresses that preventive powers must be exercised with care because personal liberty is at stake. The Supreme Court had held that a Magistrate cannot demand an interim bond or place a person in jeopardy of detention without making the inquiry required by law into the truth of the information. The safeguards governing preventive proceedings must be strictly followed, and reasons must be recorded in writing. The power is judicial in character and cannot be exercised as a purely administrative measure.
The State relied on other passages in Madhu Limaye recognising that preventive provisions are intended to address reasonable apprehensions of conduct likely to disturb public peace. The Delhi High Court concluded that the principles laid down in that decision had not been violated at the stage then before it, but made clear that the SEM must continue to comply with those safeguards in the later proceedings.
Police directed to disclose all material; bond cannot be automatic
Despite dismissing Bora’s petition, the High Court issued specific directions to safeguard her rights during the inquiry. First, the State must provide Bora with all the material on which it intends to rely when she appears before the SEM. The court directed that the principles of natural justice must be followed before any order requiring her to furnish a bond is passed.
Second, the court specifically addressed Section 135(3) of the BNSS, which permits an interim bond during the pendency of an inquiry in circumstances where the statutory requirements are met. It left the question of whether to insist on a bond at the first instance to the SEM, emphasising that the provision concerns an apprehension of breach of peace or disturbance of public tranquillity arising after the inquiry has commenced and before it is completed. The SEM must therefore independently apply his mind to the material and decide whether an interim bond is necessary. The court directed him to take into account the safeguards laid down in Madhu Limaye and the Delhi High Court’s decision in Aldanish Rein v. State (NCT of Delhi).
Third, the court made clear that Bora would retain the right to pursue remedies at subsequent stages of the proceedings, including after a final order is passed at the conclusion of the inquiry. Its observations were expressly limited to the question of whether the High Court should interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution at the stage when only a show-cause notice had been issued. The writ petition was dismissed along with any pending applications.
The ruling leaves the preventive proceedings against Bora to continue before the SEM. It upholds the initiation of those proceedings, but leaves the substantive questions, including whether the allegations warrant a bond and whether an interim bond is necessary, for independent determination in accordance with the law.
The complete judgment may be read below:
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