The Bombay High Court has held that merely mentioning a crime number, statutory provisions and the fact that an accused is being arrested for investigation does not satisfy the constitutional requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest. Emphasising that the safeguard under Article 22(1) of the Constitution requires a factual explanation of why a particular person is being deprived of liberty, the Court ruled that a signed arrest notice cannot cure the absence of an intelligible factual accusation.
In a significant judgment dated October 1, 2026, Justice Hiten S. Venegavkar, sitting at the Aurangabad Bench, allowed an application filed by Krushna Arun Shingare challenging the legality of his arrest and subsequent custody in a murder case. The Court held that the arrest and consequential custody were vitiated by the failure to establish that the requisite written grounds of arrest had been furnished to him.
The Court directed Shingare’s immediate release without requiring a bail bond or surety, subject to the condition that his detention was not independently required in another case under a subsisting lawful order. It also directed the Director General of Police (DGP), Maharashtra, to review existing police instructions and arrest forms and issue corrective instructions to ensure compliance with binding Supreme Court directions.
The judgment, Krushna Arun Shingare v. State of Maharashtra, also places a specific responsibility on Magistrates and other courts dealing with remand applications to examine the substance of the communication furnished to an arrested person rather than rely mechanically on signatures, printed declarations or routine entries in remand orders.
The absence of factual grounds, not the absence of paperwork
The application arose from Crime No. 01 of 2026 registered at Shrirampur City Police Station in connection with the fatal shooting of Aslam Shabbir Shaikh, also known as Bunty Jahagirdar, on December 31, 2025. The prosecution alleged that Shingare and another accused were involved in the shooting and relied on material including firearm recoveries, identification proceedings, CCTV recordings, mobile-phone material and witness statements.
Shingare did not press his application on the merits of the prosecution’s allegations. Instead, he challenged the legality of his arrest on the ground that the police had failed to communicate the factual grounds for his arrest in writing, as required under Article 22(1) of the Constitution and Section 47 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023.
The arrest notice identified the police station, crime number and penal provisions and stated that he was being arrested in connection with the investigation of a cognizable and non-bailable offence. It also bore his acknowledgment. However, it contained no account of the shooting, no identification of the deceased, no allegation explaining Shingare’s purported role and no factual basis connecting him to the offence.
The State argued that the notice had been signed, that Shingare’s brother had been informed of the arrest and that the arrest papers, station diary and Magistrate’s remand order established compliance. The prosecution also pointed to Shingare’s legal representation from his first production before the Magistrate and the absence of an immediate objection to the grounds of arrest.
The Court rejected the proposition that these circumstances, taken together, could substitute for the communication required by law. Examining the notice and accompanying documents, Justice Venegavkar observed that their collective omission of the basic facts meant that the documents conveyed no intelligible factual accusation against Shingare. They identified the proceedings in which he was being arrested but did not explain the grounds for arresting him in that case. The Court clarified that it was not insisting on a rigid, universally prescribed format for arrest notices. The deficiency was substantive, not technical: the documents relied upon by the State failed to communicate the factual basis for depriving this particular accused of liberty.
Article 22(1) requires more than awareness of the case
The judgment reiterates the distinction between informing an arrested person of the general nature of an accusation and communicating the specific factual grounds on which their arrest rests. Referring to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India and Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi), the High Court explained that the communication must convey the basic facts underlying the arrest. It need not disclose the entire case diary, every witness statement or evidence yet to be collected.
As the Court explained, an arrest memorandum, a combined notice or another document may satisfy the requirement, provided that it contains the requisite facts and is actually furnished in the manner and within the time prescribed by law. The document’s title or nomenclature is not decisive. What matters is what was communicated, to whom and when.
The Court also relied on Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, reiterating that meaningful communication must be in a language understood by the arrested person and that the State bears the burden of establishing compliance when it is challenged. A printed recital stating that the grounds were explained cannot replace proof of what was actually communicated.
The distinction between informing the arrested person and notifying a relative was equally important. The Court held that the intimation given to Shingare’s brother served a separate statutory purpose under Section 48 of the BNSS. It could not, without more, establish that the factual grounds of arrest had been communicated to Shingare himself. Nor could the presence of a lawyer cure the omission. Legal representation and communication of the grounds are complementary safeguards. An advocate’s presence does not dispense with the State’s obligation to provide the information necessary for the arrested person to understand the accusation and effectively oppose a request for custody.
Written grounds must precede remand
A significant part of the Court’s reasoning rests on the Supreme Court’s judgment in Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra, which prescribed the requirement of written grounds of arrest under ordinary penal law as well as special statutes. The High Court noted that where an exceptional situation makes immediate written communication impracticable, an oral explanation at the time of arrest must be followed by written grounds within a reasonable time and, in every event, at least two hours before production for remand. The remand papers must contain the grounds and explain any delay in supplying them.
Since Shingare’s arrest took place on January 1, 2026, the Court held that the applicable directions governed his arrest. The first remand order recorded that the accused had been informed of the grounds of arrest and their right to legal representation, and that they understood the information provided. The High Court did not find it necessary to disbelieve that judicial record. It instead distinguished between an oral exchange in which the accused indicates that they understand the situation and the separate requirement to furnish written factual grounds before remand.
The remand order did not identify any written communication containing those grounds, while the documents relied upon by the State contained no factual account of the accusation. Even if an oral explanation had been given and understood, the Court held, that would not establish compliance with the applicable requirement for written grounds.
The Court also rejected the argument that the absence of an immediate objection or the availability of legal representation established compliance. Shingare had raised the objection on January 9, 2026, eight days after his recorded arrest. The investigating officer’s response asserted compliance but did not identify any written communication containing the requisite factual grounds. Importantly, the High Court held that subsequent remand orders and the filing of the charge sheet could not retrospectively validate custody founded on an arrest that violated Article 22(1).
Supreme Court directions govern the consequences of an unlawful arrest
The Court considered the Supreme Court’s decision in Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol v. State of Punjab, which clarified the legal consequences of a breach of the requirement to communicate grounds of arrest. Rejecting the argument that the decision could not apply because it arose from a prosecution involving different penal provisions, the High Court emphasised that the constitutional safeguard under Article 22(1) is not confined to any particular category of offence.
It held that an established breach of the applicable constitutional requirement vitiates the resulting custody and requires release without making proof of further prejudice a precondition for relief. The Court also rejected the State’s contention that such relief could be granted only in writ jurisdiction and not in an application brought under Section 483 of the BNSS. The form in which the application was filed could not prevent the Court from giving effect to an established constitutional infirmity in custody.
At the same time, the Court carefully distinguished the legality of the arrest from the merits of the criminal prosecution. It did not pronounce Shingare innocent, assess the ultimate evidentiary value of the prosecution’s material or quash the FIR, charge sheet or trial. The prosecution proceedings were to continue in accordance with law.
The judgment further clarified that any subsequent request for custody must comply with the Supreme Court’s directions. The police cannot simply issue a corrected notice and immediately re-arrest the accused. If custody is still sought, the authorities must furnish written grounds after release and move the competent court with an application explaining the earlier failure and the present necessity for custody, endorsed by the immediate superior authority. The court must independently scrutinise the explanation and the need for renewed custody after giving the accused an opportunity to be heard.
Magistrates must verify compliance, not merely record it
Beyond the individual relief, the judgment addresses the institutional responsibility of courts authorising detention. Justice Venegavkar observed that remand proceedings can become routine exercises in which Magistrates ask standard questions about custody, ill-treatment or complaints against the prosecution, without adequately examining whether the statutory safeguards governing arrest have actually been followed.
The Court held that Magistrates and other courts dealing with remand applications are duty-bound to verify substantive compliance. They must examine the communication furnished to the arrested person, the language in which it was provided, its date and time of delivery, and the material establishing that it was delivered. The Magistrate must determine whether the communication conveys grounds specific to the arrested person and enables an intelligible response to the request for custody. Where the police rely on exceptional circumstances to explain why written grounds could not be furnished immediately, the explanation and subsequent compliance must also be examined.
A signature or a printed declaration that the grounds were communicated may be relevant, but neither automatically establishes compliance. The Court clarified that this exercise does not require a preliminary trial or disclosure of the entire body of prosecution evidence. It requires a focused examination of the material necessary to establish that the constitutional and statutory safeguards have been respected.
The Court also directed that police documentation should reliably record the actual grounds communicated, the language and mode of communication, and the date and time of delivery. Any exceptional inability to provide immediate written grounds, subsequent delivery, or refusal or inability to acknowledge receipt must be recorded contemporaneously.
Accordingly, the Registrar (Judicial) was directed to forward the judgment to the Maharashtra DGP and all Principal District and Sessions Judges for circulation and compliance. The DGP must review the instructions and forms currently in use and issue corrective instructions, where necessary, to secure compliance with Mihir Rajesh Shah and Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol.
A constitutional safeguard cannot be reduced to a procedural formality
The significance of the judgment lies in its insistence that the legality of arrest cannot be established through paperwork that records the existence of a criminal proceeding but fails to explain the factual basis for arresting the individual concerned.
Article 22(1) protects more than a formal right to be told that an arrest has taken place. Its purpose is to enable the arrested person to understand why their liberty has been curtailed and to challenge the grounds on which the State seeks to justify continued detention. Without an intelligible factual account, the ability to instruct counsel and oppose remand risks becoming merely formal.
The Bombay High Court’s ruling places the burden where it belongs: on the State to demonstrate that the constitutional safeguard has actually been honoured. It also makes clear that judicial oversight cannot stop at accepting a signed notice or recording that an accused appeared to understand the accusation. By directing a review of police forms and requiring meaningful verification at remand, the Court has underscored that constitutional protections must operate at the point when liberty is taken away, not merely appear as declarations in official records.
The complete judgment may be read below:
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