While recent media reports of serious internal dissensions within the Election Commission of India (ECI) have helped re-focus on the opacity and non-functioning of the body, this detailed examination of the past two-and-a-half years traces this trend back to at least 2024, when a refusal to release voting data, CCTV footage, 17C forms were only part of the story related to a complete capture of the electoral process.
For any real correctional institutional autonomy to emerge, each and all of these issues need addressing, substantially and procedurally
The Election Commission of India (ECI), constitutionally entrusted under Article 324 with the superintendence, direction and control of elections, has faced sustained allegations since 2024 concerning electoral transparency, voter registration, counting data, access to election records and the administration of electoral-roll revisions. The controversies have intensified with the reported dissent of two Election Commissioners over the manner of its over-centralised functioning: the large-scale SIR deletions, the hijacking of powers over the electoral roll statutorily with the local EROs and the integrity of the software employed in the SIR process.
Ten crucial pointers over the corrosion in India’s Election Commission:
1. Internal dissent within the ECI: 14 recorded objections by two Election Commissioners
On September 23, 2026, The Indian Express reported that Election Commissioners Sukhbir Singh Sandhu and Vivek Joshi had formally objected at least 14 times over ten months to decisions and orders concerning the Commission’s functioning. The objections reportedly concerned voter registration, deletion and restoration, Form 6, database access, West Bengal appeals and communications issued in the ECI’s name without their knowledge or approval. Four objections were reportedly made on one day. The report also stated that the two Commissioners approached the Cabinet Secretary over changes affecting the integrity and oversight of the IT system.
What do the Election Commission’s own records reveal about disagreements within the poll panel?@RitikaChopra__‘s latest #ExpressInvestigation examines 14 formal objections raised by two Election Commissioners — and what they reveal about decisions on electoral rolls, voter… https://t.co/vADIixRnoq
— The Indian Express (@IndianExpress) September 23, 2026
One central objection concerned the July 2026 change to Form 6, the application used by new voters. The revised form asked whether the applicant, or their parents or grandparents, appeared in the electoral roll of the last SIR. According to the report, Sandhu and Joshi had objected that the change could not be introduced without the relevant rule being amended; Sandhu later described it as “unauthorised and illegal” and sought its removal. Amending a rule requires the collective deliberations of the legislature that is Parliament.
The Commissioners also raised concerns over the centralisation of electoral-roll database. Contrary to its constant defence of actions over past months on the manipulation of electoral rolls which was to say that the process of roll preparation is decentralised, the IE probe showed that through the ERONet and thereafter ECINet software controlled centrally the ERO’s access to the list was being restricted and that both Commissioners have repeatedly questioned this centralisation. (Each constituency’s voters’ list is prepared and controlled by its Electoral Registration Officer, a statutory authority on the ground. Usually, the ERO is the Sub-Divisional Magistrate).
2. Electoral-roll software and the Goa episode: when an officer’s decision was not implemented
A follow up story for the same paper, Indian Express, revealed that this bypassing of federal principles and over-centralisation was witnessed in Goa. Electoral Registration Officers (EROs) reportedly found 97 voters eligible after examining their documents, but the software in the central ECI’s digital electoral-roll system did not provide the mechanism needed to reverse their earlier deletion! The Goa Chief Electoral Officer’s office reportedly wrote eight times between February 11 and 17 seeking a rollback facility. The facility was not enabled in time, and the 97 voters remained outside the final roll!!
The issue is not simply the number of voters involved. It is whether a statutory officer’s decision can be rendered ineffective because the central software does not permit its implementation. The reported concerns of Commissioners Sandhu and Joshi about centralised database control, access credentials and the authority of the IT division assume particular significance in this context.
The episode raises a direct accountability question: when a voter is found eligible by the officer empowered to decide the matter, who is to be held responsible if the system despite this, denies him the right to be registered as a legitimate voter?
From the ballot box to the electoral record: what VFD analysed
The sharp citizen’s scrutiny of electoral transparency did not begin with SIR. Vote for Democracy (VFD), a Maharashtra-level citizens’ platform formed in 2023, began a continuing examination of electoral data, polling, counting and electoral-roll processes, publishing a series of reports and analytical documents from 2024 onwards.
Its principal Lok Sabha Elections 2024 report, “Conduct of Lok Sabha Elections 2024: Analysis of ‘Vote Manipulation’ and ‘Misconduct during Voting and Counting”, examined alleged irregularities in polling and counting, changes between initial and final turnout figures, discrepancies between EVM votes polled and votes recovered/counting figures, Form 17C-related transparency, Returning Officer conduct and selected closely contested constituencies. VFD argued that its calculations were based primarily on official ECI data and reported a cumulative increase of 4, 65, 46, 885 votes between the polling-day turnout figures and subsequently released final figures, and identified 79 Parliamentary Constituencies where its calculated increase exceeded the winning margin; it also examined discrepancies in 350+ constituencies, including seats with margins below 50,000 votes, and highlighted cases such as Mumbai North-West and Farrukhabad.
On July 19 2024, VFD and associated organisations served a notice on the ECI seeking explanations regarding turnout data, Form 17C, alleged injection of votes, counting procedures, Returning Officers and other alleged irregularities.
The inquiry continued with VFD’s November 19, 2024 Draft Report on the Haryana and Jammu & Kashmir Assembly Elections, which analysed the ECI’s refusal to release absolute voting figures before counting, changes in turnout percentages, projected/extrapolated votes in Haryana, district-wise turnout changes, alleged discrepancies between EVM votes polled and votes recovered, post-counting changes, voters remaining in queues after closure of polling, and EVM battery and vote-count issues.
In 2025, VFD expanded the examination through its report on the Maharashtra Assembly Elections 2024, analysing 95 Assembly Constituencies for mismatches between EVM votes polled and recovered, what it described as an unexplained 7.83% hike in voter turnout after 5 PM, constituencies with margins below 26,500, district-level data mismatches, seats with margins below 3,000/5,000/10,000 votes, additions of voters between 2019 and 2024, discrepancies between ECI and CEO Maharashtra elector data, and the addition of 29,219 electors in Nagpur South-West between the 2024 Lok Sabha and Assembly elections.
Its August 12, 2025 Bihar SIR analysis, followed by the expanded report, examined the deletion of approximately 65 lakh electors, the categorisation and changing granularity of deletion data, “untraceable” and deceased elector categories, district-level concentrations, the chronology of SIR data released by the ECI, and the potential impact across 243 Assembly Constituencies.
Thus, taken together, VFD’s reports present a continuing analytical thread: who can independently verify the numerical journey of the vote, the completeness of the electoral roll, and the records through which the ECI’s final figures are reached?
These are VFD’s calculations, interpretations and allegations, not judicial findings that elections were manipulated. The importance of the record, however, lies in the fact that a numerical discrepancy does not automatically establish wrongdoing; it creates a question capable of being resolved only when the underlying statutory and electoral records are sufficiently available for independent reconciliation. The 2024–25 VFD reports therefore shifted the debate from an isolated question about voting machines or turnout percentages towards a broader question of electoral traceability: whether the public record permits the vote, the voter and the final result to be independently followed and verified.
None of the questions raised in either these reports or the July 19, 2024 Notice to the ECI were answered.
3. Votes polled vs. Votes counted: unanswered questions in the ECI’s electoral data
Vote for Democracy’s (VFD) 2024 Lok Sabha election report raised concerns over discrepancies between EVM votes polled and votes counted. Separately, the Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR), in its report dated July 29, 2024, identified 5, 89,691 votes in discrepancy across 538 constituencies, based on ECI-published data. The ECI has maintained that votes recorded in EVMs are matched with Form 17C and that final turnout is reconciled by Returning Officers after scrutiny. However, these explanations leave public scrutiny focused on constituency-wise reconciliation, timely disclosure and transparent clarification of the discrepancies identified.
4. Maharashtra Assembly elections: VFD’s further allegations of data discrepancies
VFD’s 2025 report on the 2024 Maharashtra Assembly elections examined 95 constituencies for alleged mismatches between EVM votes polled and recovered, a reported 7.83% increase in turnout after 5 PM, district-level data mismatches and constituencies with narrow victory margins. It also examined additions to the electorate between 2019 and 2024, discrepancies between ECI and Chief Electoral Officer data, and the addition of 29,219 electors in Nagpur South-West between the 2024 Lok Sabha and Assembly elections.
VFD’s larger August 2025 report, “Dysfunctional’ Election Commission of India & Weaponisation of India’s Election System”, brought together its analysis of the 2019 and 2024 Lok Sabha elections, Maharashtra Assembly elections and Bihar SIR. It also raised questions concerning EVM/VVPAT/SLU architecture, Forms 17A and 17C, election-data publication, videography, preservation of CCTV footage and the Rule 93 amendment. The allegations collectively placed the ECI under scrutiny over the availability and consistency of the records needed to verify electoral data. The reports’ findings remain attributed to VFD; numerical discrepancies, without examination of the underlying records, do not by themselves establish deliberate wrongdoing.
5. Rule 93 amendment: reduced public access to election-related electronic records
Soon after the Lok Sabha polls of 2024 that had significantly reduced the seats of the ruling party, citizens groups had begun questioning the ECI’s functioning especially on non-release of the Form 17C data. All in all the role of the ECI was being interrogated and individual candidates of the Opposition who were victim to the deliberate lapses were demanding EVM Verification and CCTV Footage.
Unilaterally, even surreptitiously, on December 21, 2024, the Union Government amended Rule 93 (2) (a) of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961, following an ECI recommendation. The amendment changed the framework governing public inspection of election-related papers and affected access to certain electronic records, including CCTV, webcasting and video recordings. The stated rationale included preventing misuse of electronic records and protecting privacy. In fact, however, this amendment, without involving public debate or the Opposition’s view, ensured absence of scrutiny and transparency.
The concern raised in the supplied material is that restrictions on inspection can weaken the ability of candidates, political parties, researchers and citizens to independently examine the conduct of elections. The amendment narrowed the category of election records that the general public can inspect. CCTV footage, webcasting and similar electronic records are not automatically available for public inspection merely because they relate to an election. Candidates continue to have access, and courts may order disclosure where appropriate. Therefore, the concern is that independent verification by citizens, researchers and other stakeholders may become more difficult, particularly when electronic records are important for examining allegations concerning the conduct or accuracy of an election.
The criticism is directed at the transparency framework and its practical consequences, rather than establishing that the amendment itself proves manipulation.
6. Bihar SIR: an intensive revision that placed a fresh documentary burden on existing electors
On June 24, 2025, the ECI ordered a Special Intensive Revision of electoral rolls in Bihar, where the electorate stood at approximately 7.89 crore. The Commission relied on Article 324 and Section 21(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1950, citing demographic change, migration, unreported deaths and duplicate entries as reasons for revision. Unlike routine updating, the exercise required existing electors to participate in enumeration and, depending on their circumstances and earlier records, produce documents relevant to eligibility.
During Bihar’s SIR, the ECI initially prescribed (one of) 11 documents for establishing eligibility-related particulars, excluding Aadhaar from the list. On September 8 2025, the Supreme Court directed the Commission to accept Aadhaar as the twelfth identity document for consideration in the inclusion or exclusion of names from Bihar’s revised electoral roll, while clarifying that Aadhaar is not proof of citizenship and its authenticity may be verified.
The supplied material questions whether this shifted an excessive burden onto already registered voters, particularly those whose documentary trail was incomplete, whose families had migrated, whose names differed across records or who could not be located during enumeration. It also alleges that categories such as “untraceable”, “shifted” and “not found at address” disproportionately affected Muslims, Dalits, migrant labourers and economically marginalised communities, whose circumstances may make documentation and enumeration more difficult. These are serious allegations of discriminatory impact contained in the material; they require category-wise evidence and individual-level scrutiny to establish their extent.
The material further alleges that, for electors unable to satisfy the documentary demands under paragraph 5(b) of the ECI’s June 24, 2025 order, deletion was coupled with referral to a “competent authority” as suspected foreigners, without prior judicial determination. The criticism is that administrative verification risked turning documentation gaps into exclusion from the electoral roll, with immediate consequences for voting rights. The central issue is whether adequate notice, hearing, alternative-document options and timely restoration were available before the relevant election.
The most problematic structural issue of the Bihar 2025 SIR and the subsequent ones held in West Bengal, Tamil Nadu and Kerala are the they were held at virtual gun-point with no adequate procedural time for imminent elections. The result was that arbitrarily excluded voters were summarily denied their constitutional right to universal franchise.
7. SIR figures: mass deletions and the failure alleged in category-wise reconciliation
The Bihar SIR began with approximately 7.89 crore electors. The ECI’s figures recorded about 65 lakh deletions at the draft stage, 21.53 lakh additions through Form 6, and a further 3.66 lakh deletions after claims and objections. The final roll published on September 30, 2025, contained approximately 7.42 crore electors—a net reduction of about 47 lakh from the pre-SIR electorate. The supplied analysis argues that the disclosed additions and later deletions do not, on their own, fully explain the movement from the original roll to the final figure.
A June 2026 SabrangIndia’s “Exclusive Investigation SIR: How many voters did the ECI actually disenfranchise? Why do final figures show inexplicable ‘additions’?” analysis of VFD’s examination of official data from 14 States and Union Territories put the pre-SIR electorate at 61.38 crore, final deletions at 5.29 crore and additions at 1.87 crore. On that arithmetic, the expected final electorate would be approximately 57.96 crore, while the published aggregate was reported as 55.17 crore—a difference of about 2.79 crore. The analysis alleges that the ECI did not publish sufficient category-wise data to reconcile the difference, including how many electors were deceased, permanently shifted, duplicates, restored or newly registered. This is an external analysis of official figures, not a judicial finding that 2.79 crore people were unlawfully disenfranchised. Its core allegation is that the public data are insufficiently reconciled to permit independent verification.
The supplied material also identifies state-level discrepancies, including Bihar and West Bengal, and questions the unexplained additions between draft and final rolls in Uttar Pradesh. The allegation is not that every deletion or addition is necessarily improper, but that the ECI’s published figures do not provide a sufficiently transparent, reproducible account of the movement of electors through the revision process. In an exercise involving crores of names, the absence of a complete, category-wise reconciliation is a substantial accountability concern.
8. West Bengal SIR: mass deletions, a huge appeals backlog and questions over authorisation
In West Bengal, around 60 lakh electors were flagged for “logical discrepancies” and examined through a judicially supervised process. Approximately 27 lakh voters were subsequently deleted. The ECI informed the Supreme Court that 38.31 lakh appeals had been filed: 22.21 lakh seeking restoration of deleted voters and 16.10 lakh seeking deletion of voters who had been included. The scale of these appeals raised concerns about the accessibility and timeliness of remedies for people whose names had been removed.
The issue was compounded by questions about who authorised appeals seeking deletion of voters included through the adjudicatory process. According to The Indian Express, Sandhu questioned the authorisation and recorded that neither he, Joshi nor the then West Bengal Chief Electoral Officer had been informed of the basis or process by which those appeals were initiated. Later reporting showed that only a small fraction of the appeals had been disposed of, leaving a substantial backlog.
The allegations against the ECI therefore concern both the initial deletion process and the effectiveness of the remedy. Where a voter must appeal to regain inclusion, an unresolved appeal can mean exclusion continues in practice. The questions are whether each deletion was supported by adequate reasons, whether appeals were properly authorised, and whether restoration could be secured before the election.
9. Electoral exclusion and its consequences: welfare concerns and the Supreme Court’s limited validation of SIR
The supplied material records concerns that deletion from electoral rolls was being linked to loss of welfare benefits. In West Bengal, government statements reportedly connected electoral-roll deletion with eligibility for certain schemes, while reporting described ration-card and cash-transfer consequences for affected beneficiaries. In Bihar, Chief Minister Samrat Choudhary reportedly stated that persons deleted from the roll would be ineligible for ration and other welfare schemes and raised the possibility of cancelling bank passbooks. Such measures raise a distinct concern: electoral-roll exclusion must not automatically be treated as a final determination of citizenship or entitlement to unrelated benefits.
The Supreme Court’s May 27, 2026 judgment upheld the ECI’s authority to conduct Bihar SIR under the constitutional and statutory framework. However, the Court distinguished the ECI’s limited inquiry into electoral eligibility from a formal citizenship determination under the Citizenship Act, 1955. It also directed referrals to the competent authority in specified cases and required notice and an opportunity of hearing. The Court’s decision therefore affirmed the Commission’s authority to revise rolls; it did not judicially certify every individual deletion or establish that every excluded elector was ineligible.
The supplied material criticises the judgment for not adequately resolving the practical consequences of exclusion before final citizenship adjudication, and invokes Lal Babu Hussein v. Electoral Registration Officer (1995) in support of procedural fairness and the presumption attaching to existing electoral registration. These are criticisms of the judgment and the SIR framework, not the Court’s own conclusions. The concern remains that an elector may lose the opportunity to vote while a separate determination or appeal is still pending.
10. Expansion of SIR and the unresolved accountability test
The ECI’s SIR exercise has expanded beyond Bihar to a much larger electorate. The supplied material identifies Phase III as covering 16 States and three Union Territories, involving approximately 36.73 crore electors. It argues that this expansion is taking place while questions from earlier phases—including unexplained data movements, deletion categories, restoration mechanisms and the practical burden on voters—remain unresolved.
Taken together, the controversies since 2024 concern more than any single election or revision exercise. VFD’s reports raised questions about the traceability of turnout and counting data. The Rule 93 amendment narrowed aspects of public inspection of electronic election records. SIR brought scrutiny of documentation, deletions, appeals and the reconciliation of electoral-roll figures. The Goa episode and the reported objections of two Election Commissioners added questions about who controls the software and whether decisions taken by statutory officers can actually be implemented.
The central allegation running through these episodes is that the ECI has not consistently provided a sufficiently transparent, verifiable and accountable record for consequential electoral decisions.
The allegations do not all have the same evidentiary status, and not every discrepancy establishes manipulation or illegality. But in the absence of transparency and accountability or any consultation with citizens or the Opposition, the Commission’s conduct remain suspect. The Commission’s constitutional responsibility requires more than a general assertion that procedures were followed. It requires records that identify the authority for a decision, explain the basis for it, permit an affected elector to challenge it, and make correction possible when an error is established.
The latest reported internal objections make this demand especially pressing. When two of the three Election Commissioners reportedly question decisions concerning voter registration, deletion, database access and institutional authorisation, the issue is no longer confined to criticism from political parties or civil-society organisations.
It concerns the functioning of the constitutional body itself. The essential test is whether the ECI can account for every consequential change to the electoral roll and every stage of the electoral process through records that are complete, accessible and capable of independent scrutiny.
ECI’s Defence of Unanimity: A Press Note That Seeks to re-assure, but Leaves Critical Questions Open
In response to The Indian Express investigation, which reported that Election Commissioners Sukhbir Singh Sandhu and Dr. Vivek Joshi had recorded objections on at least 14 occasions over 10 months, the Election Commission of India (ECI), through its Press Note dated 23.09.2026 (No. EC/PN/119/2026), asserted that it functions under Article 324 of the Constitution, statutory rules and established institutional conventions as a multi-member constitutional body.
Official Press Note pic.twitter.com/xIQvXHqMSt
— Election Commission of India (@ECISVEEP) September 23, 2026
The Commission stated that written notes, observations, technical suggestions and internal checks and balances are standard practices intended to ensure transparency, legal compliance and operational rigour; that all official orders, decisions and administrative directions carry legal sanction and follow statutory procedures under the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023; and that operational queries or inputs raised during draft stages are routine measures aimed at safeguarding voters’ rights and improving electoral processes. It further maintained that differing views are a normal part of deliberation, that every Commission officer is authorised to offer suggestions, and that highlighting selected internal notes over 10 months presents only “one part of the picture.”
The ECI emphasised that it had taken numerous decisions, introduced around 40 initiatives, undertaken electoral reforms—including SIR—and conducted major election-related exercises in Bihar, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Puducherry, Assam and West Bengal, asserting that all decisions during the preceding year were unanimous decisions of the full Commission. It also defended ECINet and other digital platforms as operating under strict data-security protocols, while affirming that Electoral Registration Officers and District Election Officers exercise their statutory powers under law.
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