In a significant judgment reinforcing the constitutional right to dissent, the Bombay High Court has ruled that a citizen cannot be externed merely because he organised protests or raised slogans against decisions of the Union Government. Quashing an externment order issued against Social Democratic Party of India (SDPI) leader Saeed Ahmad Abdul Wahid Chaudhary, Justice Madhav Jamdar held that the Maharashtra Police had misused the extraordinary power of externment by invoking it against a political activist whose alleged offences stemmed primarily from organising demonstrations and expressing opposition to government policies.
The judgment is a strong reaffirmation of the constitutional guarantees under Articles 19 and 21, recognising that the freedom to express political disagreement and the right to live with dignity cannot be curtailed through executive action unsupported by law. Rejecting the police’s justification, the Court concluded that the externment proceedings were unsupported by material, based on an erroneous application of the Maharashtra Police Act, and tainted by mala fides.
The hearing also attracted considerable public attention because of Justice Jamdar’s unusually candid oral observations questioning the increasing use of criminal law against protesters and commenting on Maharashtra’s contemporary political landscape. Although these remarks do not form part of the operative judgment, they underscore the constitutional concerns that informed the Court’s approach to the case.
Background: Externment order passed against SDPI office-bearer
The petitioner, Saeed Ahmad Abdul Wahid Chaudhary, serves as the General Secretary of the Social Democratic Party of India (SDPI), a political party registered with the Election Commission of India under Section 29A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The writ petition challenged two administrative orders: an externment order dated December 3, 2025 passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Zone VI, Chembur, Mumbai, and the appellate order dated March 27, 2026 passed by the Divisional Commissioner, Konkan Division, affirming the externment.
The externment directed that Chaudhary be removed from the area for one year under Section 56 of the Maharashtra Police Act.
According to the State authorities, several FIRs had been registered against him, principally in connection with protests organised against decisions of the Union Government. These included demonstrations concerning amendments to citizenship laws, the Gyanvapi mosque dispute, and other politically contentious issues. The police alleged that the protests had been conducted despite the denial of permission and that slogans critical of the Central Government had been raised during these demonstrations.
Represented by Advocate Payoshi Roy, the petitioner contended that the criminal cases relied upon by the authorities were overwhelmingly under Section 188 of the Indian Penal Code for alleged disobedience of prohibitory orders. These FIRs, it was argued, arose solely because the petitioner had organised morchas, dharnas and agitations in his capacity as a political office-bearer opposing governmental decisions. Such activities, the petitioner submitted, could not legitimately constitute grounds for invoking the drastic power of externment under Section 56 of the Maharashtra Police Act.
The petition further alleged that the externment proceedings reflected a mala fide exercise of power and lacked the statutory “subjective satisfaction” required under the Act. To support this challenge, reliance was placed upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India as well as the Gujarat High Court’s decision in Mohmmad Kaleem Taufiq Ahmed Siddiqui v. State of Gujarat, both of which recognised the constitutional protection afforded to peaceful democratic protest.
The State, on the other hand, defended the externment by relying upon an affidavit filed by the Deputy Commissioner of Police. The prosecution argued that the petitioner had organised demonstrations despite police refusal of permission and that the slogans raised during such protests justified preventive action under the Maharashtra Police Act.
However, the High Court found that the State’s case fundamentally misunderstood both the purpose and scope of the externment provisions.
Justice Jamdar’s Oral Remarks: ‘Citizens are being made slaves of the government’
During the hearing, as reported by LiveLaw, Justice Madhav Jamdar made a series of pointed oral observations questioning the increasing tendency to invoke criminal law against citizens who protest governmental policies.
Expressing concern over the police’s approach, the Court observed that democratic governance cannot function if citizens are prevented from voicing disagreement with the government of the day.
Questioning the rationale behind the externment proceedings, reported LiveLaw, Justice Jamdar orally remarked: “All citizens are being made slaves of the Indian Government. They cannot stage protests, they cannot agitate… What is all this? If people protest, you will slap cases. It is the right of citizens to protest.”
The Court further questioned why slogans critical of political leaders or the ruling party should invite such severe executive action.
Referring to the allegations against the petitioner, Justice Jamdar observed that slogans such as “BJP Government Murdabad” or “Amit Shah Murdabad” represented political expression, asking why such slogans should become grounds for externing a citizen.
The Court also reminded the State of the constitutional role of law enforcement agencies, orally remarking that: “Police are not servants of the Chief Minister or the Prime Minister. They are public servants.”
Justice Jamdar even warned that he was inclined to impose substantial costs on the officers responsible for passing such an order, reflecting the Court’s deep dissatisfaction with the manner in which the statutory power had been exercised.
These oral observations, though not forming part of the written judgment, echoed the constitutional principles ultimately embodied in the Court’s final order—that executive powers cannot be deployed to suppress legitimate political opposition or peaceful democratic activity.
‘Horse-Trading’ and the ‘Washing Machine’: Court’s sharp political commentary
The hearing also attracted national attention because of Justice Jamdar’s comments on the prevailing political climate in Maharashtra. During the proceedings, as per the LiveLaw report, after noting that the petitioner belonged to the SDPI, the Court referred to the ongoing movement of legislators between political parties.
Justice Jamdar observed that while the State Assembly was occupied with discussions regarding shifting political loyalties and the election of its Presiding Officer, more pressing public issues, including the death of a ten-year-old child in a road accident,appeared to receive comparatively little attention.
In a lighter vein, the Judge remarked that the petitioner himself might consider changing political sides, adding that “horse-trading” appeared to be occurring across Maharashtra. Referring to the criminal cases pending against the petitioner, Justice Jamdar further quipped that perhaps he should join the “washing machine“—an unmistakable allusion to the popular political expression suggesting that corruption or criminal allegations tend to disappear after politicians join the ruling establishment.
Although these comments were made humorously and do not constitute judicial findings, they quickly became among the most widely discussed aspects of the hearing because of their obvious political significance and broader commentary on contemporary public discourse.
The Court’s Legal Reasoning: Why the externment order could not stand
While the oral observations generated widespread attention, the written judgment is equally significant for its careful examination of the statutory limits governing externment powers under the Maharashtra Police Act and its reaffirmation of constitutional protections for political dissent. Justice Madhav Jamdar systematically dismantled the factual and legal basis relied upon by the police, ultimately concluding that the externment order rested on no legally sustainable foundation.
At the heart of the dispute was Section 56 of the Maharashtra Police Act, a preventive provision that empowers designated authorities to direct a person to remove themselves from a particular area under narrowly defined circumstances. Since an externment order deprives an individual of the freedom to reside and move freely within a particular territory, the provision has consistently been treated by courts as an extraordinary preventive measure that must be exercised with great caution.
The Court therefore began its analysis not with the allegations against the petitioner, but with the statutory requirements themselves.
- Section 56 of the Maharashtra Police Act: A preventive, not punitive, power
Justice Jamdar reproduced the relevant portions of Section 56(1)(a) and (b) of the Maharashtra Police Act to determine whether the authorities had satisfied the statutory conditions before directing the petitioner’s externment.
Under Section 56(1)(a), externment may be ordered only where the movements or acts of a person are causing, or are calculated to cause, alarm, danger or harm to persons or property.
Section 56(1)(b), on the other hand, authorises externment where there are reasonable grounds to believe that a person is engaged in, or is about to engage in, offences involving force or violence or offences punishable under specified chapters of the Indian Penal Code, particularly offences against the human body, coupled with an assessment that witnesses are unwilling to come forward because of fear.
The Court emphasised that these are not broad administrative powers permitting the State to remove inconvenient political opponents from a locality. Rather, they are exceptional preventive measures intended to address genuine threats to public safety.
Consequently, before an externment order can lawfully be passed, the authorities must possess objective material capable of supporting the statutory satisfaction required under Section 56.
Merely reproducing the language of the statute without factual support is insufficient.
- The allegations against the petitioner did not meet the statutory threshold
Applying these principles to the facts before it, the Court found that the police had failed to demonstrate how the petitioner’s conduct satisfied either limb of Section 56.
Justice Jamdar noted that it was an admitted position that Saeed Ahmad Abdul Wahid Chaudhary had organised protests, morchas and dharnas in his capacity as Secretary of the Social Democratic Party of India against decisions taken by the Union Government. The State itself accepted that these demonstrations constituted the basis of the proceedings.
However, beyond recording that protests had been organised and slogans raised, the authorities had placed no material before the Court demonstrating that the petitioner’s activities had caused alarm, danger or harm to persons or property.
The FIRs relied upon by the State primarily alleged that demonstrations had been organised without police permission and therefore constituted offences under Section 188 of the Indian Penal Code for disobedience of promulgated orders.
Justice Jamdar observed that an alleged violation of Section 188 IPC, carrying only a relatively minor punishment, could not by itself justify invoking the extraordinary machinery of externment.
The Court stated in unambiguous terms that there was “no material on record” demonstrating that the petitioner’s movements or activities caused, or were calculated to cause, alarm, danger or harm as required by Section 56. Instead, every FIR relied upon by the authorities essentially alleged only that he had organised political protests against decisions of the Government of India and that some of these protests had taken place without prior permission. Such allegations, the Court held, simply did not satisfy the statutory requirements for externment.
“There is no material on record to show that the movements or acts of the Petitioner are causing or calculated to cause alarm, danger or harm to person or property. In all these FIR, the allegation is that the Petitioner, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Social Democratic Party of India, has arranged agitations/morchas/dharnas, opposing certain decisions taken by the Government of India. The other allegation is that such agitations/morchas/dharnas have been arranged without permission of the Police. The same is an offence under Section 188 of the IPC and maximum punishment is of simple imprisonment of one month. However, that cannot be a ground for passing the externment order under the provisions of the Maharashtra Police Act.” (Para 7)
This distinction proved decisive. The judgment makes clear that unlawful assembly or violation of regulatory conditions governing protests may attract criminal consequences under the applicable penal provisions, but such allegations cannot automatically be elevated into grounds for preventive exile under the Maharashtra Police Act.
To hold otherwise would fundamentally alter the character of Section 56, transforming a narrowly tailored preventive provision into an instrument capable of suppressing political opposition.
- The court finds the authorities’ ‘subjective satisfaction’ was vitiated
One of the most important aspects of the judgment concerns the doctrine of subjective satisfaction, which lies at the heart of preventive measures such as externment. Although externment orders involve administrative discretion, that discretion is not immune from judicial scrutiny.
The authority must genuinely arrive at the statutory satisfaction based upon relevant material. Justice Jamdar carefully examined the externment proposal and the affidavit filed by the police. While these documents repeatedly asserted that the petitioner’s activities were causing alarm, danger and harm to the public, the Court found that the supporting material did not justify these conclusions.
The FIRs themselves narrated only that the petitioner had organised agitations against decisions of the Union Government and raised political slogans. There was no evidence of violence, no evidence of intimidation, no evidence of danger to public safety, or of harm to persons or property.
The Court therefore concluded that the findings recorded by the authorities were unsupported by the factual record. Consequently, the statutory “subjective satisfaction” required under Section 56 stood vitiated because it rested upon assertions rather than evidence.
“Although the Externment Proposal, the details of which are set out in the Affidavit-in-Reply, records that the movements and acts of the Petitioner are causing or are calculated to cause, alarm, danger and harm to the public and property, perusal of the FIRs on the basis of which action is taken and the gist of which is set out in the Affidvit-in-Reply shows that the only allegation is that the Petitioner has arranged agitations/morchas/dharnas against certain decisions of the Union of India and given slogans. Thus, the subjective satisfaction recorded by the authorities that movements and acts of the Petitioner are causing or are calculated to cause, alarm, danger and harm to the public and property, is without any material to support the same. Thus, the subjective satisfaction is vitiated.” (Para 9)
Justice Jamdar held that although the authorities had formally recorded that the petitioner’s movements were causing alarm and danger, a scrutiny of the underlying FIRs revealed no factual basis capable of supporting such a conclusion. The recorded satisfaction was therefore unsupported by material and legally unsustainable. The judgment thus reiterates a long-standing principle of administrative law—that preventive powers cannot be exercised merely by reciting statutory language. The existence of objective material remains subject to judicial review.
- A finding of mala fides against the state
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the written judgment is the Court’s express acceptance of the petitioner’s allegation that the action bore the hallmarks of mala fides. After analysing the nature of the FIRs and the statutory requirements, Justice Jamdar observed that there was substance in the petitioner’s contention that the externment proceedings constituted a mala fide exercise of power.
“There is substance in the contention raised by Ms. Roy, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, that the action taken is a mala fide action.” (Para 8)
Although the judgment does not embark upon an elaborate discussion of improper motive, this finding carries considerable legal significance. Indian courts are ordinarily reluctant to attribute mala fides to executive authorities without compelling material.
The Court’s conclusion therefore reflects its view that the statutory power had been invoked for a purpose divorced from the object for which Section 56 was enacted. Externment exists to prevent imminent threats to public order—not to remove political activists whose principal activity consists of organising protests against governmental policies.
By accepting the allegation of mala fides, the Court effectively recognised that preventive policing cannot become a substitute for managing political dissent. The finding significantly strengthens the constitutional character of the judgment, indicating that the problem before the Court was not merely one of procedural irregularity but one involving the misuse of statutory authority itself.
- The judgment as a constitutional reaffirmation of the right to dissent
Beyond the statutory shortcomings in the externment proceedings, Justice Madhav Jamdar anchored the decision firmly within India’s constitutional framework, emphasising that democratic disagreement with the government lies at the heart of constitutional governance. The judgment makes it abundantly clear that preventive policing cannot become a mechanism for punishing political expression, particularly where citizens seek to voice opposition through peaceful and organised protest.
The Court rejected the implicit premise underlying the State’s action, that repeated protests against government policies, coupled with criminal cases arising from such demonstrations, could justify the extraordinary remedy of externment. Instead, it recognised that such an approach strikes directly at the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution.
“It is settled legal position that an order of externment is an extraordinary measure and effect of such order is of depriving a citizen of his fundamental right of free movement throughout the territory of India.” (Para 10)
Referring specifically to Articles 19 and 21, Justice Jamdar observed that the Constitution protects not only the right of citizens to express their opinions but also their right to live with dignity. These guarantees, the Court held, are substantially impaired when the State seeks to remove a person from his locality merely because he has criticised governmental decisions or organised political demonstrations.
The Court unequivocally held:
“The action taken by the Respondent–State of Maharashtra of externing the Petitioner, merely for opposing certain decisions of the Government of India, affects the Petitioner’s fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression and also right to live with dignity.” (Para 12)
The observation is significant because it extends the analysis beyond the freedom of speech guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (a). By invoking Article 21, the Court recognised that an externment order has consequences that reach far beyond physical displacement. It disrupts an individual’s social existence, political participation, livelihood, community ties and personal dignity. The judgment therefore situates externment not merely as an administrative measure but as one carrying profound constitutional implications.
Political opposition cannot be converted into grounds for preventive action
One of the clearest messages emerging from the judgment is that criticism of the government, even if forceful, unpopular or politically inconvenient, does not transform a citizen into a threat to public order.
Throughout the proceedings, the State repeatedly relied upon the petitioner’s participation in protests against governmental decisions, including demonstrations concerning citizenship-related issues and other matters of public controversy. However, Justice Jamdar drew a sharp constitutional distinction between opposition to government policy and conduct that genuinely threatens public safety.
The judgment records that the petitioner’s activities consisted principally of organising agitations, morchas and dharnas against decisions taken by the Government of India. The allegations further indicated that he had raised political slogans and organised demonstrations despite refusal of police permission. Yet none of these circumstances, the Court held, established the statutory conditions necessary for externment. This distinction assumes considerable constitutional importance.
Democratic governments routinely face criticism, protests and organised political mobilisation. If such activities were sufficient to justify preventive measures like externment, the constitutional guarantee of political speech would become contingent upon executive approval. Justice Jamdar’s judgment rejects precisely such an approach. Instead, it reaffirms that disagreement with governmental decisions is not a constitutional anomaly—it is one of the defining characteristics of a functioning democracy.
Precedents invoked in the judgment
- Reliance on Anuradha Bhasin: Democratic rights cannot be suppressed
The Court’s constitutional reasoning was reinforced by its reliance upon the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India. Although Anuradha Bhasin primarily concerned restrictions imposed under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure following the constitutional changes in Jammu and Kashmir, the principles articulated by the Supreme Court regarding democratic freedoms were considered directly relevant to the present case.
Justice Jamdar noted that the Supreme Court had clearly held that extraordinary executive powers cannot be used as instruments to suppress legitimate expressions of opinion, grievances or democratic rights.
By invoking Anuradha Bhasin, the Bombay High Court placed the present dispute within a broader constitutional jurisprudence recognising that preventive powers must always be exercised consistently with democratic freedoms.
The precedent underscores that constitutional rights cannot be displaced merely because executive authorities find political protests inconvenient or uncomfortable.
- Support from the Gujarat High Court’s decision on political protests
The Court also relied upon the Gujarat High Court’s decision in Mohmmad Kaleem Taufiq Ahmed Siddiqui v. State of Gujarat, a case involving remarkably similar facts.
Justice Jamdar observed that the Gujarat High Court had considered a situation where an externment order had likewise been issued against a citizen for participating in protests against decisions of the Union Government. The Gujarat High Court held that such circumstances could not legally justify externment and consequently set aside the order.
Finding the reasoning directly applicable, Justice Jamdar held that the principles laid down by both the Supreme Court in Anuradha Bhasin and the Gujarat High Court squarely governed the present dispute.
The reliance on these precedents strengthens the judgment’s doctrinal foundation by demonstrating that courts across jurisdictions have consistently viewed preventive restrictions on political protest with constitutional scepticism.
- Externment is an extraordinary measure, not an ordinary administrative tool
The judgment also draws support from the Supreme Court’s decision in Deepak s/o Laxman Dongre v. State of Maharashtra, which characterised externment as an extraordinary measure because of its direct impact on an individual’s liberty and freedom of movement.
Justice Jamdar reiterated that externment cannot be treated as a routine administrative response to alleged misconduct.
Unlike ordinary criminal prosecution, an externment order effectively banishes an individual from a particular area, restricting movement, disrupting family life, employment and political participation. Such a drastic consequence necessarily demands strict compliance with statutory safeguards and close judicial scrutiny.
The Court’s reasoning reinforces the settled principle that preventive measures must remain exceptional. Administrative convenience or political sensitivity cannot dilute the high threshold established by law.
Externment orders quashed in their entirety
Having found that the statutory conditions under Section 56 were absent, that the authorities’ subjective satisfaction lacked evidentiary support, that the proceedings were vitiated by mala fides, and that the petitioner’s constitutional rights had been infringed, the Court allowed the writ petition in full.
Justice Jamdar quashed both the original externment order dated December 3, 2025 passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Zone VI, Chembur, Mumbai, as well as the appellate order dated March 27, 2026 passed by the Divisional Commissioner, Konkan Division, thereby completely restoring the petitioner’s rights.
A judgment with wider constitutional significance
Although the immediate dispute concerned the externment of a single political activist, the judgment speaks to a much broader constitutional concern: the increasing use of preventive legal mechanisms against political dissent.
Externment laws were enacted to protect society from individuals whose conduct presents a demonstrable threat to public order or safety. They were never intended to become instruments for regulating political speech or discouraging public protest. Justice Jamdar’s decision restores that distinction.
By insisting that the statutory prerequisites under Section 56 must be established through objective material, by recognising the chilling effect of punitive action against protesters, and by reaffirming that Articles 19 and 21 protect not merely abstract liberties but the practical ability of citizens to oppose governmental decisions, the judgment reinforces a foundational constitutional principle—that democracy cannot function without dissent.
Read alongside the Court’s striking oral observations questioning attempts to criminalise protest, criticising the misuse of police powers, and cautioning against treating political opposition as a threat to public order, the decision stands as a robust reminder that constitutional governance demands tolerance of disagreement. Governments may disagree with protesters, investigate genuine criminality where it exists, and regulate assemblies in accordance with law, but they cannot employ extraordinary preventive powers to exile citizens simply because they challenge those in authority.
In doing so, the Bombay High Court has delivered a judgment that is likely to resonate well beyond the facts of this individual case, strengthening the constitutional jurisprudence on political dissent, preventive policing and the limits of executive power.
The complete judgment may be read below:
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