Delimitation, in theory, is about determining the number of representatives based on population. That is the legal argument. However, what is the practical reality? If the number of representatives increases according to population, what benefit does it bring to the people? None.
More MPs, Less Debate
India’s Constitution distributes legislative sovereignty between Parliament and State Assemblies, defining powers through the 7th Schedule of the constitution – Union, State, and Concurrent Lists. Under this system, Parliament legislates on Union subjects. Bills are introduced, debated, and passed by the required majority.
But in practice:
Even in the current Lok Sabha of 543 members, the speaking time is allocated based on ‘party strength’. Individual MPs — especially those outside dominant parties — are given little to no space. Often, they are not allowed to speak for more than a minute, as repeatedly pointed out by Thol. Thirumavalavan MP. This goes against the grain of representative and inclusive democracy that should give every voice, regardless of party or political strength, the space and time to express views, even dissent.
So:
- Will increasing MPs improve deliberation?
- Will it strengthen representation?
It will only further compress individual voices.
The Real Problem: Centralisation
Why is there no time for debate? Because Parliament is overloaded.
Why is it overloaded? Because it interferes in too many subjects — especially in the name of Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS).
One Example is the Union Government’s Jal Jeevan Mission – A centrally sponsored scheme.
On April 16, 2026, DMK Member of Parliament (MP), senior advocate, P. Wilson raised a question in Rajya Sabha. He pointed, ‘Tamil Nadu has been one of the best performing states in the country providing functional household tap connection to 1.12 crore out of 1.25 crore households achieving nearly 90% but, only Rs 5914 crores have been released for funds under this scheme leaving Rs 3112 crores pending. For 2024 – 2025, while Rs 2434 crores was allotted but only Rs 732 crores have been released. Due to this unreasonable fiscal control by the regime at the centre, the Tamil Nadu government itself has to advance Rs 2550 crores. He went on to explain, how, for the Hogenakkal combined water supply scheme phase – III, the project was approved at the cost of Rs 8428 crores with the union government share of Rs 2283 crores under the Jal Jeevan mission framework but today (early 2026), the union government (unilaterally) says the project stands cancelled and suddenly informs that the assistance cannot be extended! Besides the MP exposed how, ten additional multi village drinking water schemes worth about Rs. 7590 crores proposed by Tamil Nadu for full rural coverage are also pending for approval. MP Wilson demanded an answer to this state of affairs which he has not, to date, received.
Parliament is not a one way traffic. The Union Government is answerable to states. West Bengal has raised similar concerns. However this regime steamrolls through with its undemocratic methods.
Encroaching on Schedule VII of the Constitution, Items under the State List: Entry 17 under the List II (State List) of Seventh Schedule in Constitution of India clearly marks that the ‘Water’ is a State Subject. Also the Minister of State for Jal Shakti, V. Somanna, in a written reply presented in the Rajya Sabha stated, ‘Drinking Water is a state subject, and hence, the responsibility of planning, approval, implementation, operation, and maintenance of drinking water supply schemes, including those under the Jal Jeevan Mission, lies with State/UT Governments. The Government of India supports the States by providing technical and financial assistance.’
Do the facts suggest that the Centre is really providing assistance? NO. They are promising to support and cut the rope while the state attempts to climb a mountain!
Another encroachment on State Subjects: Similarly Entry 14 of the List II states that ‘Agriculture’ is a state subject. However, we all are well aware that three farm laws favouring corporates were brought in by the Union Government, inviting months’ long protests and finally their withdrawal! The Centre has also interfered in the procurement, with the tag of price control and food safety. Due to that the paddy procurement was affected in the past month. Tamil Nadu’s request is not a dilution of procurement norms but a legitimate invocation of flexibility already embedded in the Union’s framework.
Under the Fair Average Quality (FAQ) standards administered by the Food Corporation of India and the Department of Food and Public Distribution, paddy moisture is capped at 17%, but relaxations are permitted in exceptional conditions with prior approval. Citing unseasonal rains, the state has formally sought permission to procure paddy with slightly higher moisture (18–20%), even agreeing to value cuts as per official norms. The core issue is fiscal and federal: unless such procurement is accepted into the Central Pool, the burden falls on the state, effectively penalizing farmers for climatic factors—making this a case for cooperative federalism, not regulatory compromise.
The solution is clear:
- Do not interfere in the State List
- Share Union List powers with states and local bodies
- Retain only essential subjects like foreign affairs, defence, and currency at the Union level
With this, a limited number of MPs can still have meaningful discussions. However, the Union government is doing the opposite — it is centralising power further. This is not governance. This is authoritarian centralisation — fascism in practice.
What Can an MP actually do?
In reality, MPs are reduced to:
- Asking questions, mostly written — a power even citizens have through RTI
- Raising basic constituency issues like drinking water and bridges crossing railways. But should such issues even reach Parliament?
This is not governance efficiency. It is an enforced dependency.
Fiscal Centralisation
Why should states depend on Parliament for funds? If taxation powers are devolved properly, states can govern independently. Why should drinking water schemes or farmer incentives require Union approval? This is a systemic flaw — not something delimitation can fix.
Collapse of Institutional Mechanisms
MPs can also work through Parliamentary Standing Committees.
But from 2014 to 2026:
- How many committee reports have been discussed?
- How many have been implemented?
These committees have been reduced to symbolic bodies. Their reports are ignored. Without them, transparency collapses.
The solution lies in reform of the working of the constitution, Not in Delimitation:
- Redefine Union, State, and Concurrent Lists
- Except for foreign affairs, defence, and currency, powers should lie with states & local bodies.
Democracy being suffocated
What we see today:
- MPs are prevented from functioning meaningfully
- Constitutional structures are weakened
- Parliamentary democracy is being suffocated
This is not accidental. It is a deliberate project of a supremacist and fascist Union BJP government — bending institutions to concentrate power.
Unfair Delimitation and the Betrayal of Federal Justice
Delimitation, in theory, is about determining the number of representatives based on population. That is the legal argument.
The policy of population control in India was not accidental; it was a conscious national direction shaped through constitutional design and public policy. The Constitution of India (1950) distributed legislative powers through the Seventh Schedule, placing subjects across the Union, State, and Concurrent Lists. While public health and population-related matters were initially within the domain of states, a decisive shift occurred during the 42nd Constitutional Amendment of 1976, when “family planning and population control” were placed in the Concurrent List (Entry 20A), enabling both the Union and states to legislate and act.
This was followed by clear policy articulation at the national level. The National Population Policy of 1976, framed during the Emergency, and later the National Population Policy of 2000, set explicit demographic goals, including achieving replacement-level fertility. These were not symbolic declarations; they were calls for coordinated national action.
It was the South Indian states that responded with seriousness and administrative discipline. From the 1980s through the 2000s, states like Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Karnataka, and undivided Andhra Pradesh implemented population control measures effectively, bringing down fertility rates early and stabilising population growth. This was not merely a demographic achievement — it translated into better allocation of resources, improved public health systems, and higher human development outcomes.
In contrast, several North Indian states failed to implement these policies with the same urgency or effectiveness. Population growth continued at high levels well into the 2000s and even the 2010s, creating a widening demographic imbalance within the Union.
The Constitution itself recognised the risk of penalising states that performed well.
Under Article 81 of the Constitution of India, representation in the Lok Sabha is linked to population. However, to ensure that states which successfully controlled their populations were not politically disadvantaged, Parliament intervened. Through the 42nd Amendment (1976), the allocation of seats was frozen based on the 1971 Census. This freeze was later extended by the 84th Constitutional Amendment (2001) until 2026, with the 87th Amendment (2003) allowing adjustments based on the 2001 Census without altering the total number of seats.
The principle was clear: demographic responsibility should not lead to political punishment.
Today, that principle stands on the verge of being reversed.
With delimitation expected after 2026, the Union government is preparing to re-link parliamentary representation strictly to population. The implications are profound. States that adhered to national policy, controlled population growth, and managed their resources responsibly will see their political weight reduced. States that failed to do so will gain greater representation and influence in Parliament.
This inversion of justice is not a technical correction — it is a structural distortion.
States that cooperated with Union policy in the national interest are now being “rewarded” with a loss of rights and voice. States that disregarded the same policy are being “rewarded” with expanded political power. One is forced to ask: is this justice? And more importantly, who is being asked this question — a government that increasingly exhibits fascist tendencies in its centralisation of power?
When this contradiction is placed before constitutional forums, the deeper tensions within this approach will become evident.
At the same time, the Union government continues to repeatedly invoke the Constitution to justify delimitation. But this raises a more fundamental question: why is delimitation being pushed with such urgency, while far more pressing structural issues remain unaddressed?
The real crisis in Indian governance today is not a shortage of representatives; it is the over-centralisation of power. Parliament is burdened with subjects that rightfully belong to states. Fiscal powers remain concentrated at the Union level, forcing states to depend on central allocations even for basic welfare and infrastructure. A town should not have to wait for Union schemes for drinking water, nor should farmers depend on central approvals for incentives. These are failures of federal design — not problems that delimitation can solve.
Instead of correcting these imbalances by strengthening states and local bodies, the Union government is pursuing a path that further concentrates power. This is not administrative reform. It is authoritarian consolidation — fascism expressed through institutional control.
The consequences extend beyond federal structure into economic reality. The government that has failed to significantly improve development outcomes or quality of life in lagging regions is now attempting to extract from the more productive states. The burden of demographic imbalance is being shifted onto the South — not to uplift the North in any meaningful way, but to redistribute power and resources.
Will this extraction benefit the ordinary people of North India? There is little evidence to suggest so. Instead, the pattern increasingly points toward concentration of economic gains in the hands of a few corporate entities — most notably a select coterie.
Thus, delimitation is not merely a constitutional exercise. It is a political project — one that seeks to reconfigure representation, alter federal balance, and entrench a particular ideological dominance.
The question, therefore, is not whether delimitation is constitutionally permissible. The question is whether it is just. And in its current form, it is not.
Why Delimitation Now?
If delimitation does not solve governance issues, why push it? Because the objective is political. Southern states have identified and are exposing the fascist tendencies of the Union government. They are taking this message across India. This creates a threat to the Fascist Propaganda.
So BJP is trying to,
- Increase MPs from northern states where the BJP has stronger control
- Reduce the relative political strength of southern states
- Entrench RSS ideology structurally
Delimitation becomes a tool of political domination.
A Pattern of Imposition
This fits into a larger pattern:
- Hindi imposition through the three-language policy
- Sanskrit cultural imposition through the New Education Policy
- Sanatana imposition through schemes like Vishwakarma
- Minority property targeting through Waqf amendments
- Citizenship insecurity through CAA-type laws
- Public sector, transport, and infrastructure assets being handed over to private corporate entities
States like Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Karnataka, and Telangana have resisted all of this. Unable to handle these states politically, the Union government is attempting to weaken them structurally.
The Federal Resistance
As Telangana Chief Minister Revanth Reddy pointed out, Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M.K. Stalin was among the first to bring these issues to light. He has also pushed for unity among states. This is critical. Because this is not just policy — it is a battle over India’s federal structure.
Conclusion: What India Actually Needs
India does not need more MPs.
It needs:
- Stronger states
- Empowered local governance
- Fiscal autonomy
- Respect for federalism
Delimitation offers none of this.
Instead, it risks:
- Weakening federal balance
- Reducing real representation
- Expanding centralised, fascist control
This is not democratic reform. It is democratic distortion in the service of power.
Tamil Nadu will fight — Tamil Nadu will win. And along this path, states across India will unite and speak the truth.
(The author is an independent Tamil journalist with YouTube channels, Peralai, AranSei)
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