In a detailed order dated May 2, 2026, the Nashik Sessions Court declined anticipatory bail to Nida Ejaz Khan in a case arising out of allegations of sexual exploitation, caste-based harassment, and coercive religious influence within a workplace setting. Additional Sessions Judge Kedar G. Joshi characterised the case as “multi-dimensional and multi-layered,” observing that the material on record prima facie indicates a “systematic plan of brainwashing” carried out in concert with co-accused persons.
“Considering the gravity of the offence, the involvement of applicant and other accused with particular motive organized attempts, and the necessity of detailed investigation regarding undue influence on the victim, imbibing or forcing particular religion under threat or otherwise. Considering the seriousness and magnitude of the alleged offence, the role attributed to the applicant, and the settled legal principles, the court is of the opinion that this is not a fit case for granting anticipatory bail. Application is devoid of merit.” (Para 26)
The application, filed under Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, pertains to Crime No. 156/2026 registered at Deolali Police Station under provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita and the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.
Prosecution Narrative: Organised coercion and religious influence
The prosecution case is anchored in allegations that the primary accused, Danish Sheikh, induced the victim into a physical relationship under the pretext of marriage, while co-accused Tausif Attar allegedly subjected her to harassment and threats. Within this framework, the present applicant’s role is described as facilitating and reinforcing religious influence over the victim.
According to the investigation, Khan is alleged to have:
- Provided the victim with a burqa and religious literature
- Installed religious applications and shared faith-based digital content
- Instructed the victim in offering namaz and observing religious practices
- Visited the victim’s residence for such instruction
- Participated in efforts to change the victim’s name and explore relocation abroad
The prosecution further asserts that the accused contemplated sending the victim to Malaysia and engaged intermediaries in Malegaon, with the investigation examining possible financial and organisational links. Alongside these allegations are claims of caste-based humiliation in the workplace, with the victim asserting that the accused were aware of her Scheduled Caste identity and targeted her on that basis. Additionally, the Court recorded allegations that the accused made derogatory remarks about Hindu deities, which it treated as contributing to offences under Section 299 BNS relating to injury to religious sentiments.
Defence Submissions: Weak FIR, political motive, and over-criminalisation
The defence contested the applicant’s involvement on multiple grounds:
- The FIR, as originally lodged, did not contain allegations of religious conversion; such claims emerged only in subsequent statements
- The more serious penal provisions were not attributable to the applicant
- Maharashtra does not have a specific law criminalising religious conversion, raising questions about the legal framing of the allegations
- The applicant’s role was exaggerated, with primary allegations directed at co-accused
- The interactions between the parties arose out of personal relationships and cannot be criminalised
- The case was politically motivated, triggered by interpersonal disputes
The applicant also relied on her pregnancy as a ground for protection from arrest.
A detailed report of the case and its allegations may be read here.
Court’s Reasoning: Expansive reading of “brainwashing”
The Court put notable weight on the allegations of “brainwashing” as a unifying thread across disparate allegations. While it acknowledged that the more serious provisions (Sections 69 and 75 BNS) were not directly attributable to Khan, it nonetheless held that her conduct—particularly providing religious materials and instruction—was sufficient to establish prima facie involvement in a coordinated plan. The Court, thus, held that the material on record prima facie establishes her involvement in offences under Section 299 BNS and the Atrocities Act.
“No doubt, Sections 69 and 75 of the BNS are not attracted against the present applicant, but the entire investigation shows that accused Nos.1 and 2, with the help of the applicant, tried to brainwash the victim and tried to teach that the Hindu religion has objectionable stories. They have also specifically made obscene remarks against Lord Shiva, Lord Krishna, and Brahmadeva and hurt religious sentiments. The investigation also shows that applicant gave a ‘Burqa’, the accused also provided a life story book of Prophet Muhammad Paigambar. The material on record shows that the applicant used to visit the victim’s house to give training regarding ‘Namaz’ and other daily religious observations.” (Para 19)
It observed that:
- The applicant’s role is “clearly mentioned” in the FIR and subsequent statements
- The provision of a burqa, religious texts, and guidance on rituals indicates active participation
- The alleged conduct reflects an “organised attempt” rather than isolated acts
The Court concluded that these elements, taken together, indicate an organised attempt to influence the victim’s beliefs and conduct. At the same time, the Court acknowledged that the victim retains a constitutional right to profess and adopt any religion. It, however, drew a distinction between voluntary exercise of that right and what it described as “organised” or “planned” influence, holding that the latter may attract criminal scrutiny where accompanied by coercion or undue pressure.
“Prima facie, it appeared that the applicant’s role is specifically mentioned, and involvement is also seen. The magnitude of the offense is truly multi-dimensional and multi-layered. The material on record shows that the accused tried to change the victim’s name. No doubt, the victim has a Constitutional right to profess any religion and have any name of her own choice, but that does not mean she should be brainwashed for the same and that too with organised plan. The material on record shows that after changing the name, the accused wanted to send her to Malaysia. For the purpose of changing the name, they were taking the help of the Malegaon party. Admittedly, names of some cities and countries were revealed during the investigation. Considering the applicant’s involvement along with the other accused and the magnitude of the offense, custodial interrogation is necessary to go to the root of the case.” (Para 20)
“On perusal of material on record, it is clear that the investigation is complicated and multi-dimensional. In these premises, the physical custody of the accused is warranted.” (Para 21)
Custodial Interrogation: Central to denial of relief
A critical aspect of the defence—namely, the absence of conversion-related allegations in the FIR—does not receive substantial engagement in the Court’s reasoning. Instead, the Court accepts the prosecution’s position that an FIR is not an “encyclopedia” and that supplementary statements can elaborate the narrative.
“Ld. DGP further submitted that the applicant used to visit the victim’s house to give training of her religion. The investigation shows that the victim’s name was to be changed to Haniya, and she was to be sent to Malaysia. The documents were to be prepared with the help of the Malegaon Party. In these circumstances, custodial interrogation is necessary to investigate whether any international syndicate is involved and whether the applicant is connected to the same. An FIR is not an encyclopedia. The supplementary statement and the statement under Section 183 of the BNSS speak about the same. The applicant also tried to convert the family members by making threats and using dominant position in the office. She also asked the victim to observe the fast of Ramadan (Roza). The accused, including the applicant, tried to change the victim’s name, and some city and country names were revealed during the investigation. Foreign funding and the money trail need to be investigated. Therefore, custodial interrogation is necessary.” (Para 9)
A decisive factor in the rejection of anticipatory bail was the Court’s conclusion that custodial interrogation was necessary. It noted that:
- The investigation is ongoing and involves multiple accused
- Digital evidence, communication trails, and alleged external links require further examination
- The applicant may need to be confronted with co-accused and witnesses
Relying on established precedent, the Court reiterated that anticipatory bail is an extraordinary remedy and should not be granted where investigation is at a crucial stage and custodial interrogation is required.
“Admittedly, the applicant is seeking anticipatory bail on the ground that she has not committed any offence, as alleged and she is falsely implicated. It is settled legal principle that the power under Section 482 of BNSS being an extraordinary remedy has to be exercised sparingly. The alleged offence seems to be systematic plan of brainwashing of the victim with organized attempts. It is also settled legal principle by way of catena of judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court and Hon’ble High Court in various bail matters that the pre-arrest bail should be granted only in exceptional cases.” (Para 24)
“Needless to say that grant of anticipatory bail to some extent, would cause interference in the sphere of investigation of an offence. Anticipatory bail is not to be granted as a matter of rule and has to be granted only when there are convincing, exceptional circumstances exist to resort that extraordinary remedy.” (Para 25)
While this is doctrinally correct, the order does not meaningfully address the implications of such post-FIR “improvements,” especially when they introduce entirely new dimensions such as international relocation, organised conspiracy, and religious conversion. At the anticipatory bail stage, where the test is prima facie satisfaction rather than proof, courts are still expected to scrutinise material for consistency and credibility—an exercise that appears relatively thin here.
Criminalising religious conduct?
One of the more troubling aspects of the order is its treatment of religious acts—such as giving a burqa, sharing religious literature, or teaching prayer—as indicators of criminal intent. In the absence of a specific anti-conversion statute in Maharashtra, the Court effectively reads these acts into offences relating to religious insult and coercion.
This raises a broader doctrinal concern: can acts of religious propagation, absent clear evidence of force, fraud, or inducement, attract criminal liability? The order does not articulate a clear standard. Instead, it relies on the cumulative narrative of “brainwashing,” a term that carries strong moral connotations but lacks precise legal definition.
Custodial Interrogation: Justified or assumed?
The denial of anticipatory bail ultimately turns on the Court’s conclusion that custodial interrogation is necessary. The Court cites the complexity of the investigation, the need to explore digital evidence, and possible international links.
However, the justification appears somewhat speculative:
- References to “foreign funding” and “international syndicate” are based on investigative assertions rather than concrete material
- The necessity of custodial interrogation for recovering digital evidence—such as messages or app installations—could arguably be achieved through less intrusive means
The reliance on precedents like State v. Anil Sharma and Jai Prakash Singh is doctrinally sound, but their application here appears formulaic rather than tailored to the specific facts.
Pregnancy argument rejected without nuanced consideration
The Court summarily rejects the applicant’s plea based on pregnancy, observing that the law does not distinguish between a “normal person” and a pregnant woman in matters of criminal liability.
While technically correct, this reasoning overlooks established jurisprudence that courts may consider humanitarian factors, including pregnancy, when exercising discretionary powers in bail matters. The absence of any balancing exercise here reflects a rigid approach.
Conclusion
The Sessions Court’s order is undeniably forceful in its tone and clear in its outcome: anticipatory bail is denied in light of the seriousness and complexity of the allegations. It underscores the judiciary’s increasing sensitivity to cases involving coercion, caste-based harm, and workplace exploitation.
At the same time, the order leaves several critical legal questions insufficiently addressed:
- What is the threshold for criminal liability in cases involving religious influence?
- How should courts treat significant improvements in prosecution narratives at the bail stage?
- To what extent can speculative elements—such as international links—justify custodial interrogation?
By relying heavily on the language of “brainwashing” and “organised influence,” the order risks blurring the line between constitutionally protected religious interaction and criminal conduct.
The complete order may be read below:
Related:
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Censorship and the Drumbeats of Hate: Mapping the state of free speech ahead of the 2026 polls
Maharashtra’s Anti-Conversion Bill: Legislating suspicion in the name of “love jihad”