Vote for Democracy (VFD) has sought clarity from both the Election Commission of India (ECI) and Tata Consultancy Services (TCS) over their respective roles, and their nexus, in managing the country’s electoral software infrastructure, raising questions about database access, voter data security and safeguards against unauthorised changes to electoral rolls.
In a statement titled “Vote for Democracy Statement on the ECINET-TCS Nexus: Asking Some Questions”, VFD questions the nature of the arrangement between the ECI and TCS, the extent of the company’s involvement in managing electoral databases, and the oversight exercised by the constitutional body over these systems. The statement calls for transparency from both institutions on who controls access to electoral data, who authorises changes to the system and how accountability is ensured.
The statement refers to reports that TCS has been operating ERONet 2.0, the electoral registration network, since 2023, and notes that the company’s involvement reportedly came to light through its corporate disclosures to shareholders rather than a formal announcement by the ECI.
VFD also raises concerns over reports that restrictive declaration clauses were introduced in Form 6, used for fresh voter registration, during the Special Intensive Revision (SIR). It questions the legal authority under which these changes were made, alleging that they were introduced without parliamentary oversight or explicit approval from the Ministry of Law and Justice.
ECINET is the ECI’s unified digital platform intended to consolidate several existing electoral applications, including the Voter Helpline, cVIGIL and Suvidha. Against this backdrop, VFD seeks clarity on the division of responsibilities between the ECI and TCS, particularly regarding the administration of electoral databases and the authority to modify access permissions.
A central concern in the statement is the reported alteration of access rights assigned to Electoral Registration Officers (EROs), the statutory authorities responsible for decisions concerning additions to and deletions from electoral rolls. VFD questions how such changes could have occurred without the Election Commissioners’ knowledge and whether the existing system allows other users to access or modify electoral records without appropriate authorisation.
The statement warns of the risks associated with inadequate access controls, including unauthorised database modifications, compromised data integrity and the possible exposure or transfer of citizens’ personal information. It raises the possibility of privileged or specially designated user accounts operating beyond established authorisation mechanisms. These are concerns and scenarios raised by the signatories; the statement does not establish that unauthorised access or data transfers have occurred.
VFD states that it had sent questions to TCS in October-November 2025 concerning data integrity and electronic election management through software systems and databases managed by the TCS group but received no response. Its latest statement renews the demand for answers and places the onus on both the ECI and TCS to clarify the arrangement, their respective responsibilities and the safeguards governing electoral data.
Sixteen questions on database access and accountability
The statement puts forward 16 questions seeking disclosure of the technical and administrative safeguards governing electoral data. These cover the categories of users permitted to access databases, the allocation of privileges and the officials responsible for proposing, reviewing and approving changes to user permissions.
VFD asks whether TCS itself administers database access and, if so, at what level permissions are enforced: the database, individual tables, rows or specific fields. It also seeks details of whether attribute-based access control is implemented, the eligibility criteria for personnel responsible for access management, and the authority that establishes those criteria.
The signatories seek information on the database technology and access-control tools used by the ECI, the security certifications they hold and the standards with which the systems comply. They also ask when the last compliance audit was conducted, whether an independent third party has audited access administration, and whether the audit report and its findings can be made public.
Other questions concern the security of connections between electoral databases and external databases. VFD asks how such connections are inspected and monitored, whether traffic logs are maintained, and what firewall infrastructure protects the systems. It also seeks clarity on the Election Commissioners’ oversight of access controls and the authorisation of database operations.
The statement specifically asks which user category was assigned to judges in West Bengal who participated in the SIR exercise, seeking transparency about the permissions granted to them within the database system.
Concerns over voter data and electoral integrity
Invoking the principles underlying the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the statement emphasises that citizens’ personal data must be protected against unauthorised access and use. It raises concerns about whether the handling of voter information complies with applicable legal obligations and whether citizens’ data could be used or shared beyond the purposes for which it was collected.
VFD calls on TCS to answer the questions and disclose the relevant facts, arguing that the public has a right to know how electoral data is managed and protected. The statement concludes by warning that any unauthorised interference with electoral databases, if established, would have serious implications for voter rights and the integrity of India’s electoral democracy.
The statement is signed by M. G. Devasahayam, retired IAS officer and founder of the Forum for Electoral Integrity; Madhav Deshpande, a computer science expert; Dr Pyara Lal Garg, former Dean of the College of Medical Sciences at Panjab University; and Teesta Setalvad, co-convenor of Vote for Democracy, Maharashtra.
The complete statement may be read below:
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