The long march of Hindutva in Karnataka

Hindutva Image: Shutterstock

The recent developments in Karnataka, like the recent open arms training given to Bajrang Dal cadres in Karnataka, or the attack by Hindutva elements, on a famous museum of the Freedom movement in Vidurashwattha, a village 70 Kms from Bangalore, considered as the Jallianwallah Bag of the South where 32 freedom fighters were killed by the British[1], or the infamous Hijab controversy where the rightist forces were successful in scoring a judicial victory against the constitutional rights of the Muslim girls, are not exceptional. They are part of a larger narrative that is taking deep roots in the state, day by day, resulting in a continuous onslaught on the state’s minority communities. There are also strong indications to believe that many more such pre-meditated attacks are in the pipeline.

For example, a few days after the Hijab judgement (March 15, 2022), many temple administrations, some voluntarily and some under pressure from the Sangh Parivar, declared that Muslim traders would not be allowed to do business in the annual celebrations of the deities. The BJP government made an official statement in the state assembly, quoting some obscure rules formed during previous Congress rule, justifying this. They stated that the ban on Muslim traders by the temple administrations is not illegal. Emboldened by such brazen state support, organisations belonging to Parivar have prepared to execute an economic boycott of Muslims in many parts of the state.

Just before these developments, of socio-economic boycott, when questioned why only the hijab was singled out for a ban on school campuses and not Hindu religious markers, many BJP legislators openly stated in the house that the question is irrelevant because India is basically a Hindu nation. Later Mr. Eshvarappa, the minister holding a cabinet rank, openly stated that the saffron flag instead of India’s tricolour could become national flag in coming days. The same person had declared during the elections that BJP did not need Muslim votes. And very recently the speaker of the house (legislative assembly), while chairing the session, openly challenged the opposition party MLAs belonging to minority religions, saying that one day they would also declare that they also belonged to Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS)!

In the last few months, the Chief Minister of Karnataka, Mr. S. Bommai, is on record repeating Modi’s pet and famous slogan that ‘every action has an equal reaction’ while condoning the attacks on Muslims. He even declared Savarkar as the real hero of the freedom movement. In the last two years, the BJP government in Karnataka, has been openly competing with the BJP governments of Assam and Uttar Pradesh in pioneering laws that curb the rights of minorities – be it the right to eat food of their choice(beef), marriage (conversion bill) or dignity (engineering changes in the text books).

Though these measures are implemented with emboldened assertion after the second coming of Modi government at the centre –and capturing state power is key– they also need to be seen as the logical development of a social-cultural-political processes that were set in motion for the past few decades in the state, which in turn also found resonance in the history of Karnataka. The process has got spectacular acceleration after Basavaraj Bommai became the chief minister. .

Karnataka has always been regarded as a progressive state, with a rich history of social harmony and egalitarian movements in the history. This is not totally untrue.

But it is also true that the ruling feudal order, deeply rooted in Brahmanical ideology was successful in co-opting these counter currents, taming these to suit its needs and thereby re-establishing the feudal order reducing the egalitarian ideals a mere show piece. This has a long history beginning with the much celebrated “Vachana Movement” of the 12th century, the Sufi-Bhakti challenge to the Vedic spiritual regime, or the brief structural changes that was brought in by Tipu-Hyder rule. In modern times, credit needs to go to a vibrant peoples’ movement that set an egalitarian agenda in the public discourse and domain, during the 1970s and 80s.

Hindutva forces have adopted different strategies for different states, region and societies to cultivate their ideal Hindu Brahmanical samaj. This is not to argue that they have always been always victorious but a flexible adaptability is evident in how they have taken learning lessons from their failures unlike other political forces.

As Ambedkar has put so succinctly, even though there were many revolutionary upsurges against entrenched hegemony in history, eventually, ruling regimes were successful in hatching a counter revolution.

Revolution and counter-revolution in the History of Karnataka:

1. Buddha, Basavanna and Brahmana

Karnataka was an abode of Buddhism and Jainism which preached knowledge with character, compassion, universal fraternity as against wisdom for individual salvation preached by the Vedic philosophers. But, as in the rest of India, Karnataka also witnessed physical and spiritual extermination of these shaman traditions at the hands of resurgent Brahmanism.

Yet another significant resistance emerged in the form Vachanakara movement like the Warkari movement of Maharashtra. Basavanna, a de-brahmnised Brahmin, who was renowned for giving this resistance a collective platform and for employing a different poetic form, called for the vachanas or free verse compositions, which are also considered as a metaphorical freedom from not only Brahmanical literary aesthetics but also from Brahmanical domination in other social spheres, too.

Decades later, Brahmanical forces were successful in liquidating the Vachana movement and even co-opted them into the feudal Brahmanical order. Now major sections of the Lingayats under the guidance of their respective Mutts, the corporate sectorial body, provide the social base for Hindutva forces in the state.

2. Sufi confluence and demonisation of love

The interface with Islam proved to be a harmonious blend of two cultures that was reflected in various facets, in Karnataka. The tenets of Islamic theology and culture faced no cultural barriers in assimilating with the non-oppressive Sudra theology. The social integration of Islamic influences in the everyday lives of the people is visible in the language, architecture and culture of the people of Karnataka. Whereas, Hindutva politics and historiography considers this syncretism as aggression and a tactful move by the Muslims to capture Hindu shrines.

3. Hindu current in Kannada nationalism

Kannada nationalism became one of the fulcrums of political mobilisation along with the anti-colonial movement in Karnataka. It was also during this period that Hindutva made a permanent imprint on Kannada nationalism. The early assertion of Kannada Nationalism was spearheaded by the Hindu upper caste business and literary leaders hailing from Mumbai Karnataka which was geographically and politically proximate to Pune, which was again, also the breeding ground of Tilak-ite and Savarkarite Hindu Nationalism.

Thus the glory of the Hindu past was constantly evoked to inculcate a sense of pride in Kannada culture by using a communal interpretation of history. The pride of the Vijayanagar empire and the supposed destructive Muslim conquest of Karnataka became an oft-repeated leitmotif of many Kannada novels of the time. One such novel is Kannadigara Karma Kathe (meaning the fatal story of Kannadigas) describing the fall of the Hindu Kannadiga empire of Vijayanagar by the Muslim Bahamanis, written in the style and inspiration of the Marathi novel, Vajaraghat which describes betrayal of Shivaji by Mughals.

Alur Venkatarao, known as ‘the kannada kulapurohita’ (the high priest of Kannada), wrote extensively about Karnatakatva, or Karnatakaism, and consistently stoked the flame of nationalist pride by igniting the sentiments attached to a destroyed Hindu past.

A brief comparison with the Tamil self-respect movement further reveals the dominant Brahminical position within the Kannada nationalist movement. There were significant differences in the class/caste composition and in the ideological positioning of the two movements – the Tamil self-respect movement veered towards an egalitarian society, questioning caste oppression and the domination of the Hindi speaking Indian nationalist struggle. Further, a comparison of the flags used by the two nationalist movements is highly revealing of their respective ideological positioning. The Tamil black and red flag signified the movement of Dalits towards an equal (communist) society whereas the yellow and the red of the Kannada nationalist movement, as described the then leaders of the movement signified Arishina (haldi) and Kumkum – symbols of Brahmin-Hindu ritualistic traditions.

If Tamil pride had a strong anti-Brahmanical tradition through its constant ridicule of Brahmin tradition, Kannada nationalism on the other hand endorsed the Brahmin superiority through its adoption of Bhuvaneshwari – a goddess who projected Brahminism in her appearance. To carry the comparison further, Tamil nationalism turned to the anti-Aryan Puranas in search of its historical roots (Ravana being the reigning deity) whereas in Karnataka it was the assertion through Hindu Puranas.

In Hyderabad-Karnataka, which was under the Nizam’s rule whose army comprised Razakars known for their plunder of the Hindu peasantry, history was rewritten as the loot and plunder of the peace-loving Hindu population by a Muslim ruler.

In old Mysore, under Tipu’s rule, Sudra ascendancy was facilitated and recorded history suggests that even the outcasts were given land and jobs in the army. The folklore of the region remembers Tipu and Hyder Ali with great reverence. This could be one of the reasons why Tipu Sultan and Hyder Ali were spared during the infancy of Kannada nationalism.

In one of his well-researched articles on the issue, professor Rahamat Tarikere, a well-known Kannada writer, records and analyses the folk songs about Tipu Sultan which hail him as the tragic hero betrayed by his both Hindu and Muslim Lieutenants. Barring one or two exception, in the past two hundred years, this heroic history of Tipu has been passed on to the generations until very recently.

The Shudraisation of administration and power structures of the old Mysore region, continued under Nalvadi Krishnaaraja Wodeyar in the early 20th century also. Reservations were provided for Sudras, predominantly Okkaliga s and Lingayats, in the Praja Pratinidhi Sabha the Administration Assembly.

The upward mobility of the section of these dominant castes were easily Brahmnised through their sanskritised Mathas, where learning Sanskrit and mimicking Brahmanical customs and habits became a matter of cultural pride. Though the southern part of Karnataka was comparatively less impacted by Tilak-ite nationalism, neither was it radicalised with Periyar-ist , Ambedkarite or communist ideologies like neighbour states. Though some radical Gandhians of the area dedicated themselves to the education of the Dalits challenging the Brahmanical Social order, the main ideological current during the freedom movement was a status-quoist Gandhism. The Brahmanical ethos and order served the social and cultural need of the new lords in maintaining a caste hierarchy needed in the un-altered semi-feudal economy of the post independent Karnataka. The pride and prestige of the these dominant castes in nation building was also articulated in a specific, Hindu- Brahmanical way. This Unconscious Hindutva embedded in socio-political life was prevalent as the common sense of the dominant Congress party system that ruled Karnataka till the late 1980s like elsewhere in India. Since, Karnataka did not experience the horror of Partition or Hindu-Muslim clashes in as big a way as northern and western India, Hindu Brahmanical political articulation had not much anti Muslim content until ’80s.

4. Post-1947- Lull before the wave

Karnataka witnessed a strong Karnataka Unification movement which started prior to Independence that continued for almost one decade after the freedom was achieved. Some studies suggest that the inauguration of Karnataka Unification movement was planned to coincide with 500th year of the Vijayanagar Empire!

An analysis of electoral performance of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS- the political formation previous to BJP) would be helpful in understanding the trajectory of Hindutva forces in Karnataka just after independence.

A cursory look at the election data suggests that BJS had some presence in all the regions of Karnataka. Though it could achieve its first electoral victory only in the 1967 elections, in all earlier elections it was the runner up in many constituencies of the Mumbai Karnataka region and later in old Mysore and Coastal Karnataka region. Its vote share ranged between 2 to 7% but was steady and incremental.

The factors that would have checked its further political growth in the early years could have been: The disgruntled conservative and feudal forces who later became the social base of the Hindutva, did not completely break with the Congress, and those who broke formed their own Congress and did not support the Jana Sangh, and lost their relevance as an electoral party after two elections.

The Hindutva party, therefore, had to wait for more than two decades for these forces to completely rally behind it. But even then, prior to that, both politics and society, as such, were led by Brahmnised dominant castes which did not have any ideological antagonism with the Hindu Rashtra.

5. Emergency and the organisational resurgence of RSS in Karnataka

During the Emergency period, while the entire country was awash with anti-Congress sentiments, Karnataka remained strongly with the Congress party

Though Indira Gandhi was defeated elsewhere, she was re-elected from the Chikkamaglur constituency in Karnataka. The Devraj Urs factor in strengthening the Congress party by addressing the concerns of the emerging political classes from the downtrodden community is the factor responsible for this counter current. Under Urs rule, during 1972-78, for the first time in the legislative history of Karnataka, the combined strength of OBCs, Dalits and Muslims overtook the combined strength of upper castes and dominant castes. In some parts of the state, especially in the coastal districts, land reforms were also implemented successfully breaking the hold of both upper caste and dominant castes. An effective reservation policy for the OBCs was also implemented. All these resulted in relative empowerment and upward mobility of a section among OBCs, Dalits and Muslims as against Upper caste and Dominant castes.

Nevertheless, the RSS, and the Bhartiya Jana Sangh also grew exponentially during the emergency and post emergency period under the broad umbrella of the Janata Party and anti-dictatorial sentiments among the urban middle class and the elites of the Okkaliga and Lingayat communities. They also had nurtured some base among the militant OBC trading castes in competition with Muslim traders in the cities of Mumbai Karnataka like Hubli, Vijayapura etc.

6. Leaps in electoral dominance – The natural ideological affinity and the shift of social base of Janata to BJP

The feudal forces in the state, who were earlier with the Congress but disenchanted with the Indira-Urs Congress, because of its left posturing and accommodation of downtrodden castes and communities within political corridors, took shelter under the umbrella of the Janata Party. They also found in the RSS-BJS a more reliable ideological and political ally. In that sense the Janata Party was a reflection of the political consolidation of a feudal reaction to even the pretentious leftist stance of the Congress polity.

During the 1978 elections to Karnataka assembly, right after the emergency, the combination of BJS and other centrist forces under the banner of Janata party scored more than 37% vote share. The fleet of BJP and RSS rose higher in that wave. It was this period, in tandem with the rest of the country that the sangh parivar’s hold in Karnataka, too, increased.

In the 1983 Karnataka state assembly election, the Janata party was voted to power as the single largest party with Ramakrishna Hegde as the chief minister. Hegde, a Brahmin was accepted by the Lingayat community as their leader in their quest for alternative to “left leaning Congress and Devaraj Urs”.

He forged alliances with the BJP who, which on the basis of dominant caste equations, won several seats in different regions of the State. The tragic history of ‘socialists’ giving these fascist forces a new lease of life was repeated in Karnataka as it was done elsewhere. The ‘socialist’ Janata party came back to power in 1985 with a comfortable margin, thus eroding the Congress foothold in Karnataka which got further weakened after Indira Gandhi’s assassination.

Different branches of the Sangh Parivar were instrumental in attracting the unemployed youth in urban small towns during the same period. Elites from the Other Backward Classes (OBCs) and touchable Dalits sections that could not find space in Congress were also roped in. More than the anti-Muslim political articulations, it was growing Dalit assertion, the organised Dalit movement, of the 1980’s and disenchantment with the Congress that pushed the Lingayats more and more towards BJP. While North India was stoked with the fear of Sikh militancy, anti-Muslim rhetoric etc, Karnataka did not face the same. One of the reasons for this is the strong political influence of peoples movement which mobilised progressives of all the religions and also peasant castes and Dalits.

But in the late 1980s especially during the Ram Rath Yatra –led by L.K. Advani–the Sangh Parivar was successful in engineering more than 50 communal riots mostly in south, central and North west Karnataka. A cursory look at these spots reveal that these were also cities and towns facing sharp economic decline like Davanagere in central Karnataka, which was once considered the Manchester of Karnataka economically for its then thriving cotton mills as also the Moscow of Karnataka for the political orientation of the overwhelming working class population in the city.

In the southern part of Karnataka, the Sangh Parivar was also successful in instigating Masjid-Mandir kind of disputes around Bababudan Darga shrine. The shrine itself is an abode of syncretic culture where Hindus and Muslims belonging to oppressed strata of the society offer their prayers. But since the late 1980s the Sang Parivar and its organisations making claims for Hindu rituals which slowly turned into a movement for complete control of Hindus making false claims that it was a Dattatreya temple forcibly converted to a dargah by Tipu Sultan. Even though it did not attract attention of the state in the beginning, by the late 90s the issue itself was portrayed as ‘Ayodhya of south’. The opportunist and soft Hindutva politics of the Congress and other centrist parties in nurturing this otherwise non-issue is also important in understanding the linear growth of the Sang Parivar in the state post 90s.

7. Neoliberalism, communalism and BJP at the doorsteps

As in the rest of India, Karnataka also entered the 1990s exposing itself to neo-liberal economic regime introduced by the Congress Party, duly supported by others. The neo-liberal economy with its cannibalised Social-Darwinism found its natural ally in the Brahmanical Hindutva social order. This had its over expression in the changing dynamics of Coastal Karnataka which was once the bastion of left politics. The privatisation and corporatisation of economy resulted in not only the livelihood but also the complete collapse of the organised labour class hailing from OBC castes of the Hindus and the Muslims. The survival anxieties of the OBC Hindus were channelised against the Muslims, a section of which were successful in migrating to Gulf and could achieve relative social mobility. The routine bargains between the Hindu Mogaveera fishermen castes and the Muslim traders were blown out of proportion to consolidate into the Hindutva youth forces which was working in the area since independence.

Thus, by the early 90s, coastal Karnataka and the Malnad region of the Karnataka became the ideological base of the RSS and the BJP. The RSS and its Parivar also provided the social base and the security to the new business of education, commerce, real estate etc.

Along with this structural changes, the Congress’ political hara-kiri in Karnataka also gave the BJP and Hindutva forces a chance to multiply their influence. For example, when Veerendra Patil, the unquestioned leader of the Lingayat Community, was unceremoniously removed from the post of Chief Minister by Rajiv Gandhi, in 1989, the drifting away of the Lingayat community from the Congress reached a new height.

Along with this the main non-congress formation in Karnataka Janata Dal split in 1999. The JD (Sesular) faction under Devegowda, was more or less completely identified with the Okkaliga community. The Okkaligas and the Lingayats had historical animosity and political competition to dominate state politics. Thus JDS was not an option to Lingayats. Hence the BJP became a natural choice for the elites of Lingayat community who were searching for non-Congress alternative. This opportunity was scrupulously used by the BJP. It crowned the Lingayat leader Yeddyurappa as their party chief which gave paid them a handsome dividend. Thus these developments further consolidated the Linagayat support to BJP. The RSS also started working with the seers of the many sub sects of the Lingayat mutt on the agenda of universal unity of Hindus under the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) during the same period.

After the Brahmins it was the upper strata of the Linagayats and the Okkaligas who were urbanised and reaped the benefits of patronage from the administration and also from the limited benefits of neoliberal service economy. They were also social and intellectual leaders of the community advocating meritocracy and aggressively opposed to state-led affirmative action towards the Dalits. They readily subscribed to The Brahminical Culture packaged as great Hindu civilisation and as its extension Hindu State and Hindu Nationhood. Over the past two decades RSS has seen exponential growth of it shakhas among these sections. This hatred was politically articulated in anti-Congress, anti-Communist terms and as a corollary, pro-BJP. After Modi came to power, this has developed into strong sentiments against reservation and other welfare benefits.

Thus by the 2004 elections, The whole Lingayat support base of erstwhile Janata Party was usurped by the BJP which still remains with the party, unchallenged. Apart from these political bonuses, the ideological mobilisation of the masses by the Parivar continued unabated with a renewed aggression acquired after the Babri Masjid demolition in Mumbai Karnataka and coastal Karnataka.

Congress on the other hand instead of opposing communalism, capitulated to their agenda and provided legitimacy to their illegal demands like observing Hindu rituals in Bababudan Darga atc.

In coastal Karnataka the attacks on Muslims in the name of rescuing cows, moral policing, Love Jihad etc started very early, in the late 1990s. The Suratkal attack on Muslims in 1997, heralded a new polity in which Coastal Karnataka became the bastion of the Hindutva republic, all within a span of two decades. RSS mastered the cultural politics of co-opting all the Shudra and anti-Brahmanical icons into the Hindu pantheon and thereby constructed a strong Hindutva mass base in the coastal Karnataka region. All these developments was cautiously and programmatically monitored by the highest level of the RSS and patronised by the BJP from the micro to macro levels. Now coastal Karnataka is hopelessly polarised and the hegemony of Hindu agenda can be seen in opposition parties, too.

8. Lotus bloomed in the mire of secular opportunism

Meanwhile, the sheer opportunism of the JDS party (which has ‘secularism’ within its nomenclature) and its unholy alliance with BJP for power, brought the BJP into an alliance within the ruling coalition for the first time in Karnataka. This was in 2006.

Later, in 2008, the BJP came to power through Operation Kamala, financed by the Reddy brothers of Bellary. Even though the next five years of BJP rule was marred with internal squabbles, the RSS agenda, at the wider political and social levels, was scrupulously implemented.

After wielding power for first time in the state, the BJP government under Yedurappa, started nurturing different and small OBC castes by helping to establish their own Mutts and catering to the business and political interest of their elite devotees thereby expanding the base of BJP deep into other non-dominant OBCs. The BJP and RSS also resorted to smaller caste conferences and formed development boards for each caste/community. Many historical and mythical leaders of major communities were commemorated by either declaring holidays or unveiling the statue of the representative figures like Sangolli Rayanna hailing from Kuraba (shepherd Community comprising of 8 % population ) etc.

During the same period, both the parent, RSS and the BJP manipulated the issue of internal reservation among the Dalits to divide an existing unity between major Dalit communities namely Holeys and Madigas who are traditional voters of Congress party. A committee under retired Justice Sadashiva was formed during the Congress government in 2006 which gave its report to the then BJP government in 2012, recommending an internal reclassification of reservation.

Even though the state government can only present its recommendations to Parliament, raising the issue itself has created a significant division among Dalits and an antagonism against the Congress party. This was manipulated by the BJP and the RSS to increase their support among them by assuring re-classification. Karnataka also faces a peculiar situation where many touchable castes like Lambanis, Bhovis and, Vaddas are also classified under the SC category right from independence. BJP has expanded its base among them catering to both their pride and anxiety by providing both tickets and political representation. While the BJP was thus expanding its electoral base, the RSS started working among them meticulously by amplifying their anxiety against Christians and Muslims basically stemming from trade rivalry and conversion among the Lambanis. Of late, the BJP government has also resorted to provide lands generously to form Mutts for all the castes!

Thus the Brahmanisation of dominant castes through the Sanskritisation of their religious leadership and catering to the pride and prestige of their socio-political leadership, expanding into intermediary castes and Dalits by amplifying their anxieties against (religious) minorities and the working of RSS at the grass root level with these communities at an ideological level has, put together, consolidated Hindu support to the RSS which is manifest in the growing electoral vote share of BJP which reached from 4% in 1989 to 36 % in 2018.

After the successful experiment of the Modi Model of Crony Capitalism and communal polarisation by the blatant declaration of the goal of Hindu Rashtra and othering Muslims and Christians as the sworn enemies in Gujarat, and its successful replication in 2014 at the national level, there is a consensus within the Parivar to implement the same model all over India. The ideological aim is Hindu Rashtra, the electoral goal is consolidation of Hindu votes by constantly othering the Muslims as the national enemy. Hence the scale and scope of communal attacks increased in severity, frequency and dimension covering food, dress, marriage, trade and faith.

The attacks on Churches, Bajrang Dal excesses on Muslim traders alleging illegal cattle transport for slaughter, moral policing-Love Jihad, bringing cattle slaughter bill, strengthening religious Mutts and Hindu- Brahminical codes, liberal and extraordinary patronage for RSS institutions, saffronisation of text books etc have been going on, unchecked. Meanwhile, different organs of the RSS have also carried out their other, blatant and latent activities of communal polarisation with full state support. This has allowed them to expand their tentacles to all over the state.

There was almost no effective political opposition to these measures either by the Congress or JDS. On the other hand the omissions and commissions that favoured the Hindutva agenda and activities by the police, bureaucracy, the legislative, the mainstream media and last but not the least, the judiciary in the last two decades not only provided legitimacy to Hindutva propaganda but also normalised this violence led by them. In turn, this also helped them increase their social base. The complete absence or skeletal presence of ideologically disoriented and tired and retired movements also helped the ascendancy of Hindutva forces within Hindu society.

Hence, even though BJP lost the 2013 elections, it did not lose sight of its agenda nor its ideological support. Its temporary electoral defeat could be attributed to the vertical split of the BJP engineered by Yeddyurappa and the anti-incumbency that crept in hugely against the government due to mismanagement and corruption (but not against acute communalism) epitomised by the Reddy brothers of Bellary republic.

The rightward shift of the Karnataka polity in spite of the electoral defeat of the BJP in 2013, saw expression in political developments just a year later: just a year after Congress was elected to the state assembly, 19 BJP MPs, out of 28 Lok Sabha constituencies in Karnataka, the highest till then, were elected to Parliament by the people of Karnataka.

One analysis of the results, suggest that the upper castes and the dominant castes consolidated themselves against the smaller backward castes, Dalits and Muslim coalition put forward by the Congress. The Left and other parties had become totally irrelevant electorally long back.

9. Karnataka under Modiraj and the Hindu Rashtra

The ascendency of Moditva-Hindutva in 2014, and its blatant proposition of the Hindu Rashtra, with its polarisation politics in the name of ‘security of the nation’, portraying the Muslims as the permanent enemy is a process that Ambedkar had always seriously cautioned against: the cultivation of a permanent electoral communal majority within “Indian democracy”.

This process does not stop, whether the BJP is in power or not. This is because the RSS has created a Hindu electoral samaj for the BJP over the past one hundred years. This has been the coalition of Upper castes-dominant castes-disgruntled OBC and Dalits, all under the Hindutva ideology fighting against the Muslims, the permanent enemy.

The second coming of Modi and the capture of power by manipulation by the BJP in Karnataka state have fuelled present developments over Hijab, the Conversion Bill, Cattle slaughter bill , moral policing, thereby empowering the ‘fringe elements’ to take law into their hands. Besides, the Parivar has managed to capture many societal organisations like academies and literary-cultural bodies, to continue its tirade against Muslims as never before.

During the 2019 elections, even though the two major opposition parties in Karnataka, Congress and the JDS, fought in a coalition, Karnataka elected 25 BJP MPs out of a total of 28. This was in par with the northern Hindu states. Even the vote share of the BJP crossed 50% for the first time in the electoral history of Karnataka. Those BJP candidates who had assured the electorate of changing the Constitution if voted to power like Aanant Kumar Hegde, or the MP who has now given a call for a “final solution to the Mulsim question” (Tejasvi Surya) were elected with huge margins, much more than their predecessors. The Sangh Parivar and its ideology now has its social base ranging from the upper castes to the Madigas from the Dalit community.

The Parivar has been successful in targeting the susceptible new middle class of the oppressed communities and has co-opted them. It has meticulously used the issue of internal re-classification of SC reservation issue to split Dalit identity and mobilise the Madigas against the Congress and in favour of BJP.

It has been using the tactics of consolidating smaller caste support through the acknowledgement of their icons or declaring grants to their Mutts. The Parivar is also using the influence of Mutts in taking their agenda to the last man (or woman) in each community.

10. Permanent Hindu Majority and the 7th Hindu Reich

Now, it does not require great political analyses to understand that Hindutva forces lead by Modi, with the full support of the ideologically inclined state machinery, including the judiciary and the army, cherished and hailed by a Brahmanised civil society, has declared an open political, economic and cultural war against the Muslim community. It is also waging a not so very secret war against the welfare-ist and egalitarian ideals of the freedom movement embedded in the Constitution of India. They want to usher in a ruthless Hindutva-corporate regime which has parallel to only third Reich under the Hitler in Germany.

Savarkar, in his last book “Six glorious epochs of Indian History” grants the glory to only six regimes in the long history of India, like Pushyamitra who killed Buddhists to restore Brahmanism. In that order Modi Raj is considered to be the 7th glorious epoch.

The BJP-RSS combine is not just an electoral challenge to Indian democracy. It is a political, ideological and a civilisational challenge to Indian democracy. At present there is no force in the established political arena that can understand the gravity of challenge leave alone defeating it.

Dr. Hedgewar the founder of RSS, unlike Savarkar of the Hindu Maha Sabha, was not in favour of the immediate establishment of Hindu Rashtra but for the rejuvenation and consolidation of the Hindu Samaj. Now, in the last hundred years, they have been more than successful in achieving the goal. They could achieve it by identifying the fault lines in Indian history, within the Indian Constitution and of course, Indian Society. The Sangh, is relatively successful in exploiting the same for reconstructing what they describe as Hindu Samaj.

The Parivar has also, therefore, been successful in creating a majority Hindu Samaj even in Karnataka, has broken these barriers by breaking adversaries, and followed many of the myriad strategies explained above.

In hindsight, it looks like Gandhian Gujarat, Lohia-ite Karnataka and UP are relatively more susceptible to Hindutva Nationalism than the Dravidian Tamilnad or Communist Kerala.

Or is it only a matter of time?

Recent statistics suggests that during the 2019 elections even in Kerala, 35% percent of the Hindus of Kerala opted BJP.

Is it not also a fact that the second coming of Modi has emboldened the Hindutva organisations and the upper castes of Tamilnad who are now attacking Periyar, the father of Dravidian Politics, in the open? And what about the legitimacy this is getting within the Media and upper caste civil society?

This Hindu samaj is a permanent electoral Hindu majority which elects and re-elects Hindu Rasthtra within modern democracy.

Unless a democratic samaj is built on sound democratic values, this majority and hence the Hindu Rashtra cannot be broken.

[1] The objection of the ultra right-wing aggressors is that the museum did not feature Savarkar among national leaders and for portraying Godse as a murderer (!)