In response to serious allegations levelled by Congress MP and Leader of the Opposition Rahul Gandhi on September 18, the Election Commission of India (ECI) issued a categorical rebuttal, terming the claims as “incorrect” and “baseless.” Gandhi had accused the ECI of enabling and covering up large-scale voter deletions in Karnataka’s Aland constituency and protecting those involved in what he described as a “Vote Chori Factory.” The ECI defends its role in handling the alleged voter deletion scam but its refusal to share critical data with investigators and its silence on 18 official letters from the CID raise serious questions about transparency, institutional accountability, and whether its defence can withstand scrutiny.
“No vote can be deleted online” — ECI clarifies
In its official statement, the Election Commission emphasised that no vote can be deleted online by any member of the public, countering what it termed a “misconception” propagated by Rahul Gandhi. The ECI said that while applications for deletion of votes—through Form 7—can be submitted online via designated platforms, the actual deletion process is subject to rigorous manual verification by Electoral Registration Officers (EROs).
The ECI further stated that applications can be made online, but no direct action, including deletion, is carried out automatically or digitally without human oversight. It also confirmed that in the Aland case, the forged Form 7s were identified and rejected, ensuring that no voter was wrongfully deleted as a result of these submissions.
ECI: “votes were saved, not deleted”
The ECI asserted that 5,994 forged Form 7 applications were identified and rejected in the Aland constituency, thus preventing any deletion of actual votes. It pointed out that in the 2023 elections, B.R. Patil of the Congress party won the Aland Assembly seat, suggesting that the fraudulent attempts did not impact the electoral outcome.
However, the ECI also emphasised that the fact these attempts were thwarted does not negate the seriousness of the crime. It reiterated that criminal efforts to manipulate electoral rolls—even if unsuccessful—must be thoroughly investigated.
CEO Karnataka’s response: verification was prompt and comprehensive
The Office of the Chief Electoral Officer (CEO), Karnataka, also provided its version of events, highlighting the timeline and the scope of action taken. According to the CEO:
- 6,018 applications in Form 7 were received online through official ECI platforms (NVSP, VHA, GARUDA) in December 2022.
- Owing to the unusually high number of applications for deletions in a single constituency, ERO/ AERO/ BLOs conducted a verification process to determine the authenticity of each submission.
The CEO’s statement suggested that this verification was carried out proactively, but the context reveals that the process only began after complaints were raised by B.R. Patil and Priyank Kharge in February 2023.
ECI’s role in initiating investigation under doubts
While the CEO Karnataka’s communication may give the impression that the Election Commission initiated the inquiry independently, the FIR filed by Returning Officer Mamata Kumari paints a different picture. The FIR explicitly mentions that action began only after a formal complaint by former MLA B.R. Patil, indicating that the investigation was reactive rather than proactive.
The FIR quotes Mamata Kumari stating:
“Former MLA B.R. Patil, complained to the ECI that in 256 booths of Aland assembly constituency, 6670 votes were illegally deleted, based on which ECI directed and oral orders issued by the Deputy Commissioner, Kalaburagi district, that I should examine the complaint.”
This raises critical questions about whether the ECI acted swiftly on its own or was compelled to respond after political and public pressure.
What the ECI shared with investigators: a partial picture
According to the CEO Karnataka’s statement, on September 6, 2023, the ECI shared “all available information” with the Superintendent of Police, Kalaburagi District, including:
- Form reference numbers
- Name and EPIC numbers of objectors
- Mobile numbers used to create login IDs
- IP addresses and software application medium
- Date/time of submission
- User creation details
The ECI maintains that this data was sufficient for investigators to proceed with the probe into the forged applications. However, the CID strongly disagrees.
CID’s persistent requests for critical data ignored
While the ECI claims that it provided all relevant data in September 2023, the Karnataka CID has documented 18 subsequent requests from January 2024 onwards, seeking two crucial technical details:
- Destination IP
- Destination Port
These two data points are essential for investigators to trace the actual device and server to which the fraudulent applications were submitted. While dynamic IP addresses can be shared across hundreds of users, the Destination IP and Port help pinpoint the actual endpoint, narrowing the list of suspects significantly.
Despite these repeated and specific requests, the ECI has not responded to any of the CID’s 18 letters, according to Rahul Gandhi and official correspondence accessed.
Contradiction in ECI’s claim of cooperation
The Election Commission and CEO Karnataka maintain that they have been “providing any other assistance/information/documents” requested by investigators. However, the absence of a response to the 18 letters stands in direct contradiction to this claim.
The CID’s February 1, 2025 letter states that “During the course of investigation, the IP Logs are provided. On perusal the Destination IP and Destination Port are missing. Therefore, it is requested to direct the concerned to provide the same.”
This letter references an earlier communication from January 15, 2025, suggesting an escalating pattern of ignored requests.
Dynamic IPs shared by ECI “not useful” for investigation
The Election Commission shared dynamic IPv4 addresses, which are used temporarily by internet users and can be assigned to hundreds of individuals. According to investigators, each IP address provided was linked to over 200 users, making geolocation and identification of culprits virtually impossible. The lack of destination-specific data significantly hampers the CID’s ability to filter through the more than 8 lakh devices potentially involved.
CEO Karnataka’s “half-truth”: no mention of CID letters
The ECI and CEO Karnataka’s assertion that all required information has been shared is being challenged. While data may have been shared in September 2023, none of the subsequent requests made between January 2024 and September 2025 are acknowledged in public statements or responses.
This omission has prompted criticism that the CEO is presenting a partial truth, selectively omitting details that highlight the Commission’s inaction on follow-up queries that could aid the criminal investigation.
The ECI and CEO Karnataka’s response dated 18.09.2025 can be read here
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