In a significant order delivered on May 5, 2025, the Supreme Court of India strongly rebuked Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) MP Nishikant Dubey for his incendiary and derogatory remarks against the Chief Justice of India and the institution of the Supreme Court. The bench comprising Chief Justice Sanjiv Khanna and Justice Sanjay Kumar termed his statements “highly irresponsible” and attention-seeking, reflecting not only an ignorance of constitutional functioning but also a wilful attempt to scandalise and delegitimise the judiciary.
“In our opinion, the comments were highly irresponsible and reflect a penchant to attract attention by casting aspersions on the Supreme Court of India and the Judges of the Supreme Court. This apart, the statements show ignorance about the role of the constitutional courts and the duties and obligations bestowed on them under the Constitution.” (Para 5)
The observations came in response to a writ petition filed under Article 32 read with Article 129 of the Constitution by Advocate Vishal Tiwari. The petition sought the initiation of suo-moto criminal contempt proceedings against Dubey for making scandalising remarks against the Court and the CJI, and also sought directions to the Ministry of Home Affairs to register FIRs under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, against political leaders delivering provocative speeches related to the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025.
While the Court ultimately refrained from issuing notice or initiating contempt proceedings, it delivered a strong and detailed order that firmly asserted the judiciary’s role and constitutional mandate, and simultaneously condemned hate speech in the strongest terms.
Dubey’s remarks intended to scandalise, Court asserts
The Court scrutinised the content of Dubey’s public remarks, in which he accused Chief Justice Khanna of being “responsible for all the civil wars happening in India” and claimed that “it is only and only the Supreme Court that is responsible for inciting religious wars in the country.” The bench unequivocally held that such statements “tend to scandalise and lower the authority of the Supreme Court of India” and exhibit an intent to obstruct the administration of justice.
“We have examined the contents of the assertions made by respondent no. 4, which no doubt tend to scandalize and lower the authority of the Supreme Court of India, if not interfere or tend to interfere with the judicial proceedings pending before this Court, and have the tendency to interfere and obstruct the administration of justice.” (Para 4)
The Court noted that these statements amounted to a direct imputation of motives to a sitting bench of the apex court. It also clarified that the statutory exemptions under Sections 3 and 4 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971—which relate to fair and accurate reporting or innocent publication—did not prima facie apply in this case. It added with emphasis, “There is no civil war in India.”
“The statements made reflect the clear intent to impute motives to the Bench itself by naming the Chief Justice of India as “responsible for all the civil wars happening in India” and “in order to incite religious wars in this country, it is only and only the Supreme Court that is responsible”. Sections 3 and 4 of the Act carve out exceptions which, prima facie, are not attracted. There is no ‘civil war’ in India.” (Para 4)
Despite this, the Court chose not to initiate contempt proceedings, noting that judicial power must be exercised with discernment and restraint.
“We, therefore, refrain from taking any action. This Court in, In Re S. Mulgaokar,3 observed that the judiciary is not immune from criticism, but when criticism is an obvious distortion or a gross misstatement, which is made in a manner designed to lower the respect of the judiciary and destroy public confidence, it should not be ignored. However, the power to initiate contempt is discretionary in its unsheathed exercise.” (Para 6)
Referring to the landmark precedent In Re: S. Mulgaokar [(1978) 3 SCC 339], the Court acknowledged that while the judiciary is not immune from criticism, the exercise of contempt powers is a matter of judicial discretion—not compulsion.
“…we are of the firm opinion that courts are not as fragile as flowers to wither and wilt under such ludicrous statements. We do not believe that the confidence in and credibility of the courts in the eyes of the public can be shaken by such absurd statements, though it can be said without the shadow of doubt that there is a desire and deliberate attempt to do so.” (Para 5)
Judiciary draws strength from constitutional values, not coercive power
In defending its decision to not invoke contempt powers, the Court issued a profound reaffirmation of the role of courts in a constitutional democracy. It stressed that judges are guided by values, not ego, and derive legitimacy from transparency, open proceedings, and reasoned judgments—not force.
“Judges are judicious, their valour non-violent and their wisdom springs into action when played upon by a volley of values, the least of which is personal protection.” (Para 6)
The Court underlined that institutions are accountable not through suppression of criticism, but through reasoned decisions, transparency, and public trust. It observed that decisions are made in open court, subject to scrutiny, appeal, review, and even curative jurisdiction, which are all mechanisms that ensure accountability in a democratic society.
“Surely, courts and judges have shoulders broad enough and an implicit trust that the people would perceive and recognize when criticism or critique is biased, scandalous and ill-intentioned.” (Para 6)
Judicial review is a constitutional mandate, not judicial activism
Responding to the broader climate of political criticism targeting judicial review—particularly in the context of the Waqf Amendment Act—the Court categorically stated that constitutional courts are not acting beyond their remit. Judicial review is not merely a power but a constitutional duty, expressly enshrined under Articles 32 and 226.
“Each branch of the State in a democracy, be it the legislature, executive or the judiciary, especially in a constitutional democracy, acts within the framework of the Constitution. It is the Constitution that is higher than all of us.” (Para 7)
The Court reaffirmed that the role of constitutional courts is to test the legality and constitutionality of statutes and executive actions, not on political, religious or community grounds, but strictly according to legal principles. It cautioned that to deny this role would be tantamount to rewriting or nullifying the Constitution itself.
“To deny the power of judicial review to the courts would be to rewrite and negate the Constitution, as the power of judicial review is one of the cornerstones of democracy. This power is conferred in express terms by Articles 32 and 226 by the framers of the Constitution and hinges on the system of checks and balances.” (Para 9)
Reasserting the foundational role of constitutional courts in a democracy, the Supreme Court emphasised that judicial decisions are grounded in legal reasoning, not influenced by political, religious, or communal considerations. The Court clarified that when citizens approach it seeking the exercise of judicial review, they do so to vindicate their fundamental or legal rights—not to invite the judiciary into political debates. In entertaining such pleas, the Court is not overstepping its role but performing its constitutional duty. This clear articulation serves as a reminder that judicial review is a core element of the constitutional structure—intended not to oppose the legislature or executive, but to ensure that all state action adheres to constitutional mandates.
“Judicial decisions are made in accordance with legal principles and not in keeping with political, religious or community considerations. When citizens approach the court praying for exercise of the power of judicial review, they do so in furtherance of their fundamental and/or legal rights. The court’s consideration of such a prayer is the fulfilment of its constitutional duty.” (Para 9)
Hate speech must be dealt with an ‘iron hand’
While the petition was dismissed, the Court did not leave the issue of hate speech unaddressed. In a pointed and unambiguous observation, the bench declared that any attempt to incite communal disharmony through hate speech must face resolute legal consequences.
“While we are not entertaining the present writ petition, we make it clear that any attempt to spread communal hatred or indulge in hate speech must be dealt with an iron hand. Hate speech cannot be tolerated as it leads to loss of dignity and self-worth of the targeted group members, contributes to disharmony amongst groups, and erodes tolerance and open-mindedness, which is a must for a multi-cultural society committed to the idea of equality. Any attempt to cause alienation or humiliation of the targeted group is a criminal offence and must be dealt with accordingly.” (Para 10)
Such speech, the Court affirmed, is not protected expression. Rather, it causes alienation and humiliation, making it a criminal offence that the State must deal with “accordingly” and decisively.
Conclusion: A judicious defence of Constitutional authority in divisive times
Though the Supreme Court ultimately chose not to initiate criminal contempt proceedings against Nishikant Dubey, the gravity and clarity of its reasoning left little ambiguity. The judgment stood as a powerful affirmation of judicial strength—not through punitive reaction, but through principled restraint. The Court made it clear that while it will not dignify absurd provocations with prosecution, it equally will not allow such provocations to go unanswered when they attempt to delegitimise the judiciary or inflame public sentiment through falsehood and communal rhetoric.
By firmly denouncing the baseless allegations against the Chief Justice and the institution of the Supreme Court, the bench sent an unmistakable signal: constitutional courts are neither weak nor indifferent. They are resilient, guided by law and reason, and capable of distinguishing between fair criticism and deliberate attempts to undermine the judiciary’s credibility. Crucially, the Court’s strong condemnation of hate speech—and its declaration that such divisive rhetoric must be met with an iron hand—also reflects its acute awareness of the growing threats to social cohesion and democratic integrity.
At a time when public discourse is increasingly polluted by communal polarisation and institutional mistrust, the judgment reinforced the judiciary’s dual role: as a guardian of constitutional values and as a bulwark against intolerance and authoritarianism. In choosing wisdom over outrage and clarity over confrontation, the Court not only upheld its dignity but reminded the nation that the rule of law, not the rule of noise, remains the bedrock of Indian democracy.
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