Background of the case
Rupesh Kumar Singh, an independent journalist from Jharkhand, has been in custody since July 2022 under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) for allegedly having links with the Communist Party of India (Maoist) and arranging funds for them. His arrest followed his journalistic work on displacement, industrial pollution, and alleged state excesses, which many believe led to his prosecution as an act of state repression against dissenting voices.
Singh was initially not named in the FIR but was later implicated based on alleged digital evidence obtained from co-accused individuals. His previous encounters with the authorities include a 2019 arrest under similar charges, where he was eventually released on default bail due to the failure of the police to file a chargesheet in time. His arrest came days after he posted a Twitter thread on environmental degradation in Jharkhand, raising concerns over state surveillance and retaliation against critical journalism.
His case mirrors a broader crackdown on journalists, activists, and human rights defenders under UAPA. Notably, student leader Umar Khalid, Khalid Saifi and Gulfishan Fatima remain behind bars as under trials and Father Stan Swamy, an 84-year-old tribal rights activist, died in jail while facing questionable UAPA charges. These instances reflect a growing trend of using stringent anti-terror laws to silence dissent.
The United Nations Human Rights Office has also expressed concern over the misuse of UAPA in India, urging the government to review its application and ensure that it is not being used to target dissenting voices. The UN specifically called for the dropping of charges against Arundhati Roy and Sheikh Showkat Hussain, who were prosecuted under UAPA for their comments on Kashmir.
Supreme Court’s decision
On January 27, 2025, the Supreme Court, comprising Justices M.M. Sundresh and Rajesh Bindal, dismissed Singh’s Special Leave Petition (SLP) against the Jharkhand High Court’s order denying him bail. The Court stated that it was “not inclined to interfere” with the High Court’s decision, thereby upholding the denial of bail.
The apex court’s order did not provide detailed reasoning beyond affirming the High Court’s conclusions, which raises significant concerns about judicial oversight in politically sensitive cases. This decision effectively keeps Singh incarcerated without trial, reflecting the stringent nature of UAPA bail provisions and their impact on civil liberties.
Supreme Court’s decision
On January 27, 2025, the Supreme Court, comprising Justices M.M. Sundresh and Rajesh Bindal, dismissed Singh’s Special Leave Petition (SLP) against the Jharkhand High Court’s order denying him bail. The Court stated that it was “not inclined to interfere” with the High Court’s decision, thereby upholding the denial of bail.
The order may be read here:
The apex court’s order did not provide detailed reasoning beyond affirming the High Court’s conclusions, which raises significant concerns about judicial oversight in such sensitive cases. This decision effectively keeps Singh incarcerated without trial, reflecting the stringent nature of UAPA bail provisions and their impact on civil liberties.
Legal Issues Involved
- Application of UAPA’s stringent bail provisions:
- The High Court and Supreme Court relied on Section 43 D(5) of the UAPA, which mandates that bail cannot be granted if the court believes the allegations are “prima facie true.” The threshold for bail under UAPA is significantly higher than in regular criminal cases
- The courts have interpreted “prima facie true” broadly, often placing the burden of proof on the accused, rather than requiring the prosecution to demonstrate substantial evidence at the bail stage.
2. Lack of independent evidence against Singh:
The primary evidence against Singh appears to be electronic data allegedly recovered from an SSD card seized from a co-accused. His defence argues that:
- No direct incriminating evidence was found from Singh’s residence or personal devices.
- The alleged videos and photographs are inconclusive in proving any criminal intent or Maoist affiliation.
- Digital evidence can be easily manipulated, and its authenticity should be scrutinized before being treated as conclusive proof.
Violation of fundamental rights:
- Singh’s arrest and prolonged detention raise concerns under Article 19(1)(a) (freedom of speech and expression) and Article 21 (right to life and personal liberty) of the Indian Constitution.
- The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) and United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders have highlighted Singh’s case as an example of state-led suppression of press freedom
- His prosecution under UAPA fits a pattern of using anti-terror laws to target activists, journalists, and dissidents.
A slew of judgements of the constitutional courts analysed by our team below illustrate how bail under this draconian counter-terror law has been addressed. Before this, in 2020, our team had analysed how various courts dealt with the issue of bail under the stringent UAPA. That legal resource may be read here.
Precedents
Observations of the Supreme Court in Thwaha Fasal v. Union of India (2021)
The Supreme Court in Thwaha Fasal v. Union of India (2021) clarified the necessity of an independent judicial assessment in bail matters under the UAPA. The Court observed that:
- Mere membership in a banned organisation does not amount to criminal activity: The Court ruled that the prosecution must establish a direct and substantial connection between the accused and the alleged unlawful activities. A person cannot be denied bail solely on the basis of association.
On plain reading of Section 38, the offence punishable therein will be attracted if the accused associates himself or professes to associate himself with a terrorist organisation included in First Schedule with intention to further its activities. In such a case, he commits an offence relating to membership of a terrorist organisation covered by Section 38. The person committing an offence under Section 38 may be a member of a terrorist organization or he may not be a member. If the accused is a member of terrorist organisation which indulges in terrorist act covered by Section 15, stringent offence under Section 20 may be attracted. If the accused is associated with a terrorist organisation, the offence punishable under Section 38 relating to membership of a terrorist organisation is attracted only if he associates with terrorist organisation or professes to be associated with a terrorist organisation with intention to further its activities. The association must be with intention to further the activities of a terrorist organisation. The activity has to be in connection with terrorist act as defined in Section 15. Clause (b) of proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 38 provides that if a person charged with the offence under sub-section (1) of Section 38 proves that he has not taken part in the activities of the organisation during the period in which the name of the organisation is included in the First Schedule, the offence relating to the membership of a terrorist organisation under sub-section (1) of Section 38 will not be attracted. The aforesaid clause (b) can be a defence of the accused. However, while considering the prayer for grant of bail, we are not concerned with the defence of the accused. (Para 13)
2. Independent judicial scrutiny is essential: Courts cannot mechanically accept the prosecution’s claims under Section 43D (5) of the UAPA. The judiciary must conduct a thorough review of the material evidence before concluding that the allegations are “prima facie true.”
“..By virtue of the proviso to sub-section (5), it is the duty of the Court to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true or otherwise..” (Para 21)
3. The Court emphasised that the offences under Sections 38 and 39 require mens rea (guilty intent). Mere association or possession of Maoist literature does not satisfy the requirement of intention unless there is active participation or acts showing furtherance of terrorist activities.
“Thus, the offence under sub-section (1) of Section 38 of associating or professing to be associated with the terrorist organisation and the offence relating to supporting a terrorist organisation under Section 39 will not be attracted unless the acts specified in both the Sections are done with intention to further the activities of a terrorist organisation. To that extent, the requirement of mens rea is involved. Thus, mere association with a terrorist organisation as a member or otherwise will not be sufficient to attract the offence under Section 38 unless the association is with intention to further its activities.” (Para 15)
4. The Court reiterated that constitutional courts retain the power to grant bail despite the strict conditions in UAPA, especially when prolonged incarceration violates fundamental rights. The accused had already been in custody for over 570 days, and the trial was unlikely to conclude soon. The Court restored the Special Court’s order granting bail to the accused.
“As held in the case of K.A. Najeeb (supra), the stringent restrictions imposed by sub-section(5) of Section 43D, do not negate the power of Constitutional Court to grant bail keeping in mind violation of Part III of the Constitution. It is not disputed that the accused no. 1 is taking treatment for a psychological disorder. The accused no. 1 is a student of law. Moreover, 92 witnesses have been cited by the prosecution. Even assuming that some of the witnesses may be dropped at the time of trial, there is no possibility of the trial being concluded in a reasonable time as even charges have not been framed. There is no minimum punishment prescribed for the offences under Sections 38 and 39 of the 1967 Act and the punishment can extend to 10 years or only fine or with both. Hence, depending upon the evidence on record and after consideration of relevant factors, the accused can be let off even on fine. As regards the offence under Section 13 alleged against accused no. 2, the maximum punishment is of imprisonment of 5 years or with fine or with both. The accused no. 2 has been in custody for more than 570 days.” (Para 42)
The judgement in Thwaha Fasal v. Union of India (2021) may be read here:
Observations in Javed Ghulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra (2024)
- The appellant has been in custody as an undertrial prisoner for four years. The trial court has not yet framed charges. The prosecution intends to examine at least 80 witnesses, making the conclusion of the trial uncertain.
“Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, we are inclined to exercise our discretion in favour of the appellant herein keeping in mind the following aspects:
(i) The appellant is in jail as an under-trial prisoner past four years;
(ii) Till this date, the trial court has not been able to even proceed to frame charge; and
(iii) As pointed out by the counsel appearing for the State as well as NIA, the prosecution intends to examine not less than eighty witnesses.” (Para 7)
2. The court emphasized that howsoever serious a crime may be, an accused has a fundamental right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution.
“Having regard to the aforesaid, we wonder by what period of time, the trial will ultimately conclude. Howsoever serious a crime may be, an accused has a right to speedy trial as enshrined under the Constitution of India.” (Para 8)
3. The appellant remains an accused, not a convict. The fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence—that an accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty must not be ignored.
“We may hasten to add that the petitioner is still an accused; not a convict. The over-arching postulate of criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty cannot be brushed aside lightly, howsoever stringent the penal law may be.” (Para 20)
4. The court noted that jails are overcrowded, and undertrial prisoners suffer due to delayed trials. It referred to Mohd Muslim @ Hussain v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2023 INSC 311), highlighting that prolonged incarceration has severe social and psychological consequences. (Para 14)
5. The court referred to Section 19 of the National Investigation Agency Act, which mandates that trials must be conducted on a day-to-day basis.
“The requirement of law as being envisaged under Section 19 of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 (hereinafter being referred to as “the 2008 Act”) mandates that the trial under the Act of any offence by a Special Court shall be held on day-to-day basis on all working days and have precedence over the trial of any other case and Special Courts are to be designated for such an offence by the Central Government in consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court as contemplated under Section 11 of the 2008.” (Para 15)
6. In Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021) 3 SCC 713, the court held that statutory restrictions on bail (like UAPA’s Section 43-D (5)) cannot override constitutional rights. The court reiterated that when trials are excessively delayed, bail should not be denied solely based on the severity of the offence. (Para 16)
7. The judgment noted that criminals are made, not born, and the criminal justice system should consider social and economic factors that may influence crime. The court emphasized that justice should be tempered with humanity, quoting the principle that “Every saint has a past, and every sinner a future.”
“Criminals are not born out but made. The human potential in everyone is good and so, never write off any criminal as beyond redemption. This humanist fundamental is often missed when dealing with delinquents, juvenile and adult. Indeed, every saint has a past and every sinner a future. When a crime is committed, a variety of factors is responsible for making the offender commit the crime. Those factors may be social and economic, may be, the result of value erosion or parental neglect; may be, because of the stress of circumstances, or the manifestation of temptations in a milieu of affluence contrasted with indigence or other privations.” (Para 18)
The judgement in Javed Ghulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra (2024) may be read here:
Observations in Jahir Haq v. State of Rajasthan (2022)
- The appellant had been in custody as an undertrial for almost 8 years (since 08.05.2014). Only 6 out of 109 witnesses had been examined so far, indicating an unreasonably delayed trial. The trial court estimated that the case might take 2-3 more years for completion.
- The Supreme Court had directed priority examination of three prosecution witnesses who had raised concerns about threats to their lives.
Among these witnesses: One (Devendra Patel) was declared hostile. The other two (Hemant and Pappuram) did not provide any deposition implicating the appellant. The State’s case was largely based on the appellant’s alleged communication (31 conversations) with a co-villager, who was accused of being a sleeper cell module head of the Indian Mujahideen.
“We are of the view that in the facts of this case, when the petitioner has already spent nearly 8 years in custody, the appropriate order to pass would be to first direct the examination of the three witnesses who have raised concerns about threat to their lives from the accused and the matter should receive attention of this Court after their evidence is adduced. However, these witnesses must be examined on a priority basis.” (Para 8)
3. The court relied on Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021) 3 SCC 713, where bail was granted in cases of long incarceration. It noted that UAPA’s bail restrictions (Section 43D (5)) are comparatively less stringent than NDPS Act provisions, which demand a prima facie case of innocence before granting bail. (Para 12)
4. One co-accused, Adil Ansari, had already been granted bail by the Supreme Court in 2020. The State argued that the role of the appellant was different, but the court acknowledged this factor in deciding bail.
“No doubt, in the said case, as pointed out by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State, the Court was dealing with an order passed by the High Court granting bail, whereas, in this case, the converse is true, that is, the impugned order is one rejecting the application for bail. The fact remains that the appellant has been in custody as an undertrial prisoner for a period of nearly 8 years already. The appellant, it may be noted, is charged with offences, some of which are punishable with a minimum punishment of 10 years and the sentence may extend to imprisonment for life. Learned counsel for the appellant also points out that one of the co-accused namely Shri Aadil Ansari has been released on bail on 30.09.2020 by this Court. No doubt, in this regard, we keep in mind the submission of the State that the role attributed to the said accused is different.” (Para 13)
5. The impugned High Court order rejecting bail was set aside. The appellant was granted bail, subject to conditions imposed by the trial court. The judgment made it clear that these observations were only for the purpose of deciding bail and would not affect the merits of the case during trial.
The judgement in Jahir Haq v. State of Rajasthan (2022) may be read here:
Observations in Mukesh Salam v. State of Chhattisgarh (2024)
- The Court noted that 12 out of 14 accused persons in the case had already been granted bail, either by the High Court or the Supreme Court. The number of prosecution witnesses had been reduced from 114 to 100, and only 40 witnesses had been examined so far.
Bearing in mind the above circumstances and the nature of the alleged case, we are of the considered view that the continued detention of the petitioner would not subserve the ends of justice. There is no likelihood of the early conclusion of the trial. The petitioner is in custody since 6 May 2020. We accordingly order and direct that the petitioner be released on bail, subject to such terms and conditions as may be imposed by the Special Judge (NIA Act), Kanker, in connection with FIR No 9 of 2020. (Para 5)
This ruling highlights the importance of parity in bail matters, considering that a majority of the co-accused had already been granted bail, and the prolonged trial delay was a factor in the decision.
The judgement in Mukesh Salam v. State of Chhattisgarh (2024) may be read here:
Observations in Jalaluddin Khan v. Union of India (2024)
- The charge sheet did not contain specific material proving that the appellant participated in, abetted, or incited unlawful activities or terrorist acts. There was no evidence to suggest that the appellant was a member of a terrorist gang or organization under the meaning of Section 2(m) of the UAPA.
“We may note here that, assuming that the appellant knew that co- accused Athar Parvez was associated with PFI, it is not listed as a terrorist organisation within the meaning of Section 2(m) of UAPA. Moreover, the charge sheet does not contain any material to show any connection of the appellant with PFI before letting out first floor premises to accused no.1.” (Para 6)
2. The Court found that the statement of a protected witness (Z) had been misrepresented in the charge sheet, raising concerns about the fairness of the investigation.
“Thus, paragraph 17.16 purports to reproduce the statement of protected witness Z. In terms of our earlier order, the translated version of the statement of protected witness Z, recorded before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna, has been produced in a sealed envelope. We find that the statement substantially differs from what is narrated in paragraph 17.16 of the charge sheet.” (Para 10)
3. The Court reiterated that “bail is the rule and jail is an exception”, emphasizing that even under stringent statutes like UAPA, bail should not be denied when statutory conditions are met.
“…when a case is made out for a grant of bail, the Courts should not have any hesitation in granting bail. The allegations of the prosecution may be very serious. But, the duty of the Courts is to consider the case for grant of bail in accordance with the law. “Bail is the rule and jail is an exception” is a settled law. Even in a case like the present case where there are stringent conditions for the grant of bail in the relevant statutes, the same rule holds good with only modification that the bail can be granted if the conditions in the statute are satisfied. The rule also means that once a case is made out for the grant of bail, the Court cannot decline to grant bail..” (Para 21)
4. The Court held that unjustly denying bail in deserving cases would violate the fundamental right to personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution.
“…If the Courts start denying bail in deserving cases, it will be a violation of the rights guaranteed under Article 21 of our Constitution.” (Para 21)
The judgement in Jalaluddin Khan v. Union of India (2024) may be read here:
Observations in Yedala v. State (2024)
The case was related to the murder of two politicians by members of the CPI (Maoist), a terrorist organization notified under UAPA. The National Investigation Agency (NIA) took over the investigation and filed a chargesheet against 79 accused. The appellants had been in custody for over four years and seven months without the framing of charges.
The court examined whether there were reasonable grounds to believe that the accusations were prima facie true. After analysing the entire prosecution case, the court concluded that there was no strong material linking the accused to the crime. Since the prima facie case was weak, the statutory bar on bail under UAPA did not apply.
“…Taking the material against the appellants as it is and without considering the defence of the appellants, we are unable to form an opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations against the appellants of commission of offence under the UAPA are prime facie true. Hence, the embargo on the grant of bail under proviso to subsection (5) of Section 43D will not apply in this case. We, however, make it clear that the findings recorded in this Judgment are only prima facie observations recorded for the limited purposes of examining the case in the light of the proviso to sub section (5) of Section 43D of the UAPA. The trial shall be conducted uninfluenced by these observations.” (Para 21)
The judgement in Yedala v. State (2024) may be read here:
Observations in Sushesh Kedia v. Union of India, 2021
1. The Court emphasized that under Section 43-D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), an accused is not entitled to bail if there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations are prima facie true. However, upon scrutiny of the material placed before the Court, it was found that the primary accusation against the appellant was that he paid levy/extortion money to the terrorist organization Tritiya Prastuti Committee (TPC). The Court held that payment of extortion money does not amount to terror funding.
A close scrutiny of the material placed before the Court would clearly shows that the main accusation against the Appellant is that he paid levy / extortion amount to the terrorist organization. Payment of extortion money does not amount to terror funding. It is clear from the supplementary charge-sheet and the other material on record that other accused who are members of the terrorist organization have been systematically collecting extortion amounts from businessmen in Amrapali and Magadh areas. The Appellant is carrying on transport business in the area of operation of the organization ((Para 11 (A))
2. The Court noted that the charge sheet alleged that other accused persons, who were members of the terrorist organization, had been systematically collecting extortion amounts from businessmen in the Amrapali and Magadh areas. The appellant was in the business of coal transportation in that region and had made payments under duress. It could not be said prima facie that the appellant conspired with the other members of TPC or raised funds to promote the organization.
“…It is alleged in the second supplementary charge- sheet that the Appellant paid money to the members of the TPC for smooth running of his business. Prima facie, it cannot be said that the Appellant conspired with the other members of the TPC and raised funds to promote the organization.” ((Para 11 (A))
3. The prosecution argued that the appellant had been in constant touch with members of the terrorist group. The Court noted that the appellant had stated in his Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement that he was summoned to meet A-14 and other members in connection with the payments. The Court held that merely meeting the members of TPC, without further evidence of conspiracy, does not establish a prima facie case of involvement in a terrorist conspiracy.
“Another factor taken into account by the Special Court and the High Court relates to the allegation of the Appellant meeting the members of the terror organization. It has been held by the High Court that the Appellant has been in constant touch with the other accused. The Appellant has revealed in his statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.PC that he was summoned to meet A-14 and the other members of the organization in connection with the payments made by him. Prima facie, we are not satisfied that a case of conspiracy has been made out at this stage only on the ground that the Appellant met the members of the organization.”((Para 11 (B)))
4. The Court referred to National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (2019) 5 SCC 1, which set the parameters for granting bail under Section 43-D (5) of the UAPA. The Court held that while prima facie satisfaction of allegations is sufficient to deny bail under UAPA, in this case, the material did not meet the threshold to establish a clear case against the appellant.
“After a detailed examination of the contentions of the parties and scrutiny of the material on record, we are not satisfied that a prima facie case has been made out against the Appellant relating to the offences alleged against him. We make it clear that these findings are restricted only for the purpose of grant of bail to the Appellant and the trial court shall not be influenced by these observations during trial.” ((Para 12))
The judgement in Sushesh Kedia v. Union of India, 2021may be read here:
Singh’s case underscores the precarious state of press freedom and the judiciary’s cautious approach in UAPA matters. While national security concerns must be addressed, an overbroad application of UAPA risks eroding fundamental rights. The denial of bail in Singh’s case, despite the legal precedents favouring a more balanced approach, raises significant questions about the selective and inconsistent application of UAPA laws. The courts must ensure that stringent bail conditions do not serve as a mechanism for prolonged incarceration without trial, which contradicts the very principles of justice enshrined in the Indian Constitution.
(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this legal resource has been worked on by Shailendar Karthikeyan)
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