In July 2025, the Supreme Court (Shubha v. State of Karnataka) engaged with the uneasy intersection of gender, coercion, and criminal responsibility. In this case, Shubha, a young woman who was forced into a marriage she did not want, had conspired to kill her fiancé. The Court upheld her life sentence, but importantly, stated that coerced marriages can be “the worst form of alienation,” and that the justice system must not deny the structural conditions of women’s choices. While the conviction stood, the Court ordered that Shubha be allowed to apply for a pardon to the Governor, which represented a rare moment where punitive justice made room for a reformative and contextually aware response.
Facts, procedural history & the Court’s reformative lens
The case dates back to 2003, when Shubha (accused no. 4) was set to marry a man, a union that she did not want or choose, but one that was forced upon her by family considerations. The prosecution demonstrated that she held animosity towards the marriage and worked with others to plot the murder of her fiancé. Both the trial court and the Karnataka High Court found her guilty of Sections 302/120-B IPC and sentenced her to imprisonment for life. The case was reviewed by the Supreme Court and, after considering the record, Justices M.M. Sundresh and Aravind Kumar found the evidence of conspiracy convincing and compelling and directed that the conviction be upheld.
What made this ruling truly distinctive was not simply reinstating guilt, but the court’s articulation of social context. The court recognised that the behaviour exhibited by Shubha was a product of alienation caused by being married off against her will. An alienation that the court described as “the worst form of alienation.” While the court recognised this was not to be a defence of culpability, it emphasised that the conditions of gendered invalidation must be considered at sentencing and post-sentence relief stages, if a person was deemed to have been coerced. Consequently, while invoking Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution, it stressed that pardon powers were a constitutional vehicle of individualised justice – one that should openly consider gendered oppression as legitimate grounds for clemency. In suspending the arrest for eight weeks, to enable Shubha to seek relief from the governor, the court’s ruling indicated that processes of clemency required engagement with gendered oppression.
Social context versus retributive logic in Indian courts
The Shubha decision makes us wonder: have Indian courts consistently take into account the social context when women engage in crime under coercion, or has retributive logic been dominant? The record shows a mixed, often inconsistent, picture.
In some instances, courts invoke coercion and systemic oppression as important mitigating factors. For example, in cases involving women who commit murder or manslaughter of their abusive partners after protracted violence, some High Courts have appealed to the long-standing nature of domestic violence as an acknowledgment of provocation, by virtue of coercion. In the context of honour cases, where women kill under the pressure of the family, again, courts have articulated, at times, the coercive background as relevant to culpability. These decisions show courts are willing to place women’s actions in structural contexts of patriarchy, violence, and limited agency.
At the same time, there is more often than not, retributive reasoning. In cases of homicide where intent and planning have been established, courts have articulated that social context and coercion cannot abrogate responsibility. For example, in Kehar Singh v. State (1988), the Court held that personal or political motivation for killing could not mitigate the culpability for murder. Lastly, in many honour killings and conspiracies to murder cases, courts have been more punitive, demanding stricter sentences for deterrence and for the sanctity of life as opposed to situating context within mitigation.
The jurisprudence, then, is inconsistent: there are reformative strands, but they typically take second place to traditional retribution. Shubha is an effort to marry both currents – placing liability but allowing for reform and mercy in cases where coercive power influenced behaviour is the causation of the crime.
Reformative justice and gendered social contexts
There is no mistaking that the Shubha decision reflects a careful but significant move towards more compassionate and contextualised treatment of women in conflict with the law. The Court maintained accountability by upholding the conviction but also offered recognition of the coercive reality of forced marriage, opening the door to mercy and rehabilitation. This simultaneous emphasis illustrates an important recognition of the fact that punishment cannot be understood separately from the social systems that structure women’s behaviour, particularly in a society in which family control, patriarchy, and honour codes remain entrenched.
The shift toward compassionate treatment produces a clear implication for sentencing practice. The finding encourages both first instance judges and appellate judges to record social facts and any coercive pressures that influence culpability, including forced marriage, prolonged domestic abuse, or economic dependence. These narratives help courts exercise a more considered approach to punishment and provide a credible evidentiary basis for executive review of punishment proposals. This re-orientation could eventually cultivate a sentencing culture that emphasises deterrence and reformation rather than purely retributive reasoning.
The ruling also presents an altered vision for the role of executive clemency under Articles 72 and 161. By inviting Shubha to request a pardon from the Governor, the Court signalled that mercy is not just political grace but a constitutional safeguard of individualised justice. If consistently applied, this would create an expectation for state authorities to consider mercy applications in a timely and transparent manner, particularly in cases where gendered coercion has informed criminal behaviour. Related to this idea of carving out space to consider mercy is the potential for rehabilitation: if coerced marriage is structural harm, this strengthens the case for gender-responsive rehabilitation programming (counselling, vocational programming, access to legal aid, and safe housing post-release) for women in prison. In this context, rehabilitation is not only seen as a component of clemency but as a necessary precursor to successfully reintegrating into society.
Risks, criticism, and a path forward
The Shubha ruling is promising, but it is not without risks. Critics may worry that this mental health context creates different standards for women compared to men, who, similarly, may be acting under coercive pressures. Others will warn of a slippery slope: it becomes concerned with the social context at the expense of culpability, including for intentional and premeditated crimes. Finally, the effect of executive mercy varies by state and is politically driven rather than principled, and can therefore be arbitrary.
Concerns over presumptions of public policy in favour of leniency and reforms aimed at the offender’s mental state have been raised in previous cases. For example, various courts have considered leniency in cases involving “honour killings” (Shivani v. State of Haryana; State v. Rani). They recognized family coercion, societal pressures, and gendered vulnerabilities as relevant considerations in criminal conduct while also endorsing proportional sentences to ensure confidence in the joint processes of responsibility and punishment.
To mitigate prospective harms, a structure of procedural safeguards is essential. Courts must document coercive situations with factual, transparent findings so that context-driven reasoning does not degrade into irrational discretion. Executives should require uniform timelines and reasoned approaches for mercy petitions, and gender-responsive pre-sentencing reports prepared by psychologists and social workers should provide an evidentiary basis for assessing coercion claims. To maintain fairness and public safety, a rehabilitation programme should be coupled with the clemency decision.
Seen in this light, Shubha adds value to justice without undermining accountability. It requires Indian criminal law to remain firm in punishing spousal murder while expressing compassion about how coercive social structures shape culpability. If this ruling becomes standard, it could mark a significant point toward a principled, gender-sensitive, and rehabilitative justice system similar to lessons from earlier reform-oriented cases while ultimately addressing consistency and context-sensitive application.
Towards a gender-aware and reformative criminal justice
The ruling in Shubha v. State by the Supreme Court of India signifies an important moment in the history of Indian criminal law. It highlights an important departure from the strict retributive stance towards context-sensitive and reformative justice. By recognizing the coercive circumstances that led to the commission of the crime by Shubha, and allowing her to seek a pardon, the Court has brought gendered social realities into focus within criminal law–an evolution which may emerge in new sentences, clemency petitions, and rehabilitative interventions from the Courts in the future.
There will be obstacles to a continued consistent approach in practice; however, this ruling supplies an initial manual for thinking about how judges and supporting actors can weave empathy, social context, and reformative thinking into judicial reasoning. Most importantly, it is a simple reminder that justice is not merely punishment–it is understanding the human and social conditions that lead people to commit a crime, especially women who commit a crime in the face of coercion. By demonstrating this, Shubha v. State begins a liberating journey towards a more compassionate, fair, and gendered criminal justice system in India.
Judgements cited here may be read below:
Shubha v. State of Karnataka, 2025
Kehar Singh v. State (1988)
Shivani v. State of Haryana; State v. Rani, 2025
(The legal research team of CJP consists of lawyers and interns; this community resource has been worked on by Preksha Bothara)
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