The 2010 Memorandum between UIDAI and West Bengal when CPI-M ruled the state may be read here.

On Sunday, February 18, media reported how Mamata Banerjee, chief minister (CM), West Bengal had lashed out at the Union Government on cases of thousands of Bengal residents receiving letters from branch offices of the UIDAI “de-activating their Aadhaar cards. Sanmarg a portal had also carried reports on Saturday.

Today, Tuesday, February 20, Dr Gopalkrishna, in an open letter to Mamata Banerjee has, while welcoming her move urged how and why, after the Supreme Court’s verdict of September 26, 2018 and November 13, 2019, in the aftermath of the Aadhaar Act, 2016 (as amended in 2019), there is a logical and legal compulsion for States to un-sign their MoUs with UIDAI.

The professor points out that these MoUs were signed in the pre-Aadhaar Act era and continued to operate in the era when unconstitutional Sections like Section 57 of Aadhaar Act was recognised and declared as unconstitutional and illegitimate by the Supreme Court’s verdict of September 26, 2018 and by the deletion of Section 57 by the amendment of 2019 in Aadhaar Act. The verdict of November 13, 2019 recognised that the entire Act is unconstitutional.

Section 57 of un-amended Aadhaar Act, 2016 stated that “Nothing contained in this Act shall prevent the use of Aadhaar number for establishing the identity of an individual for any purpose, whether by the State or anybody corporate or person, pursuant to any law, for the time being in force, or any contract to this effect”.

Section 25 of the Amendment Act 2019 states that Section 57 of the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016 has been omitted with effect from July 24, 2019.

This MoU signed between the West Bengal government & UIDAI “is outdated and it imperils the autonomy of the State and the citizens. Your considered intervention will pave the way for other States to act on this MoU which is facilitating unlimited and indiscriminate mass surveillance and mass spying at the behest of World Bank’s eTransform Initiative and its partners since 2010. “

Citizens Forum for Civil Liberties (CFCL) welcomes your letter to Hon’ble Prime Minister on the subject of “Aadhaar is becoming inactive” in defence of the natural and fundamental rights of fellow citizens.

Dr Gopalkrishna’s Open Letter to CM West Bengal, Mamata Banerjee:

“I submit that a 7-judge Constitution Bench has been constituted to declare it to be so in order to adhere to judicial discipline. The fact remains no sane person will wait for formal announcement of poison to desist from consuming poison.

Aadhaar Act is a poisonous law.

“It is a black law akin to the colonial law which was bitterly resisted by Mahatma Gandhi’s first Satyagrah. Our Hon’ble Chief Justice of India has declared this law to be a fraud on the Constitution of India in his order dated September 26, 2018. He has reiterated it on at least two more occasions. In this backdrop, constitutional, legal, judicial and political imagination creates a logical compulsion to resist this law which creates an architecture of unlimited government based on 360 degree surveillance. It is eroding the constitutionally mandated autonomy of States beyond repair.

“I submit that West Bengal’s Home Department signed the attached MoU with UIDAI on July 1, 2010. Shri A.G. Ghosh, OSD & ex-officio Special Secretary signed it on behalf of Home Department, West Bengal Government and Shri Nirmal Kumar Sinha, Deputy Director General, UIDAI, Planning Commission signed it on behalf of UIDAI.

“This MoU is outdated and it imperils the autonomy of the State and the citizens. Your considered intervention will pave the way for other States to act on this MoU which is facilitating unlimited and indiscriminate mass surveillance and mass spying at the behest of World Bank’s eTransform Initiative and its partners since 2010.

“Citizens Forum for Civil Liberties (CFCL) welcomes your letter to Hon’ble Prime Minister on the subject of “Aadhaar is becoming inactive” in defence of the natural and fundamental rights of fellow citizens.

(Source: https://www.livehindustan.com/national/story-why-aadhaar-is-becoming-inactive-west-bengal-mamata-banerjee-wrote-a-letter-asking-for-reply-from-pm-9346756.html)

Reference articles by Dr Gopalkrishna:

“India’s First Metadata case: Supreme Court’s Constitution Bench to decide illegitimacy of Aadhaar Act amid Great Data Robbery” (https://mainstreamweekly.net/article13958.html), “India’s First Metadata Case and Pegasus – Part 2” (http://mainstreamweekly.net/article14053.html) and India’s First Metadata case: Mass Surveillance, Mass Spying and Unending Census Part 3 (http://mainstreamweekly.net/article14196.html) provides robust argument in this regard.

Having worked on the subject since 2010, I will be happy to share more details regarding the illegitimacy of Aadhaar Act. ”

Background provided by Dr Gopalkrishna (excerpted from his articles):

Metadata ability to redefine human existence in ways which are yet fully to be perceived. Justice DY Chandrachud, in the November 2019 judgment before he assumed office as CJI, drew on the paper of Christina Moniodis titled “Moving from Nixon to NASA: Privacy’s Second Strand- A Right to Informational Privacy”. Dr. Chandrachud cites her with approval. He states that metadata “results in the creation of new knowledge about individuals; something which even she or he did not possess. This poses serious issues for the Court. In an age of rapidly evolving technology it is impossible for a judge to conceive of all the possible uses of information or its consequences.”

Also drawing from the Yvonne McDermott’s paper “Conceptualizing the right to data protection in an era of Big Data”, Dr. Chandrachud observes, “The contemporary age has been aptly regarded as “an era of ubiquitous dataveillance, or the systematic monitoring of citizen’s communications or actions through the use of information technology”. It is also an age of “big data” or the collection of data sets. These data sets are capable of being searched; they have linkages with other data sets; and are marked by their exhaustive scope and the permanency of collection.”

The (2019) verdict refers to the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) Tele2 Sverige AB vs. Post-och telestyrelsen (2016) wherein it was seized with the issue as to whether in light of Digital Rights Ireland, a national law which required a provider of electronic communications services to retain meta-data (name, address, telephone number and IP address) regarding users/subscribers for the purpose of fighting crime was contrary to Article 7, 8 and 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The CJEU struck down the provision allowing collection of such meta data on grounds of lack of purpose limitation, data differentiation, data protection, prior review by a court or administrative authority and consent.

Here are some reasons for scrapping Aadhaar databases scheme and repealing Aadhaar Act (as enunciated by Dr Gopalkrishna):

1. The majority order of the Supreme Court’s 5-Judge Constitution Bench on September 26, 2018, has pointed out that the UID/Aadhaar Number project and NPR project are part of the one database convergence scheme. NPR has been mentioned at least on eight occasions in the order to underline the same. A centralized database is the most vulnerable entity in the digital world. The leakage of the database of UK’s children has revealed the old maxim, “If you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear, has been given a very public burial”. This has been thoroughly debunked. This maxim is attributed to Nazi propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels. Database State, a report from the UK, states: ‘In October 2007, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (Department) lost two discs containing a copy of the entire child benefit database.’ Only blind faith in a Utopian State can persuade people to think that they have nothing to fear after trusting their personal sensitive information to a Database State and non-State actors like Safran, Ernst & Young and Accenture.

2. One of the earliest documents that refer to UIDAI, a 14-page document titled ’Strategic Vision: Unique Identification of Residents’ prepared by Wipro Ltd for the government envisaged the close linkage that the UIDAI’s Aadhaar would have with the electoral database. The use of the electoral database mentioned in Wipro’s document remains on the agenda of the proponents of UID/Aadhaar.

3. The 41-page Wikileaked document titled ’Creating a unique identity number for every resident in India’ that declared itself to be a ’Confidential- property of UIDAI’ reveals that from day one the Union government wanted to create a file on each of “1.2 billion residents”, the division of work between Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA)’s NPR and Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MEITY)’s UID/Aadhaar was/is merely an attention diversion tactics to outwit citizen’s scrutiny.

The ongoing merger of the electoral database with UID/Aadhaar number debunks UIDAI’s claim in the confidential document that UID/Aadhaar number “will not contain intelligence” and “the location of the person. “From these disclosures, it seems that the government has adopted an adversarial role vis-a-vis Indians and acting beyond its constitutional mandate in order to pander to the interests of the commercial czars, non-state actors and foreign intelligence companies.

4. In an RTI reply dated October 25, 2013, UIDAI shared a truncated contract agreement with Ernst & Young. The contract agreement states that “the Unique ID will be a random 12-digit number with the basis for establishing uniqueness of identity being biometrics”. It announces that “we will provide a Unique Identity to over 113.9 crore people.”

This is evidently a fraudulent announcement because UIDAI with which the agreement has been signed had the mandate to provide Unique Identity to only 60 crore residents of India, and not to 113.9 crore people.

It is evident that while the government kept Ernst & Young informed about its motive, it kept states, citizens, the parliament and the Supreme Court in the dark. The contract agreement reveals that “biometric systems are not 100 % accurate” and “uniqueness of the biometrics is still a postulate.” This admission pulverizes the deceptive edifice on which MEITY’s UID/Aadhaar and MHA’s NPR rests.

5. Section 57 of un-amended Aadhaar Act, 2016 stated that “Nothing contained in this Act shall prevent the use of Aadhaar number for establishing the identity of an individual for any purpose, whether by the State or anybody corporate or person, pursuant to any law, for the time being in force, or any contract to this effect”.

It implies that UID/Aadhaar of “over 113.9 crore people” has been shared with foreign private body corporates like Ernst & Young. It is only after the horse had escaped the barn that the door was closed through Section 25 of Aadhaar and Other Laws (Amendment) Act, 2019 in compliance with the Court’s order dated September 26, 2018.

Section 25 of the Amendment Act 2019 states that Section 57 of the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016 has been omitted with effect from July 24, 2019.

6. At paragraph 8 of the majority order authored by Justice A K Sikri, it is recorded that “a Processes Committee was set up on July 03, 2006, to suggest the process for updation, modification, addition and deletion of data and fields from the core database to be created under the Unique Identification for BPL Families project.

This Committee, on November 26, 2006, prepared a paper known as ’Strategic Vision Unique Identification of Residents’. Based thereupon, the Empowered Group of Ministers (EGoM) was set up on December 04, 2006, to collate the National Population Register under the Citizenship Act, 1955 and the Unique Identification Number project of the Department “of Information Technology.

Subsequently, “a Committee of Secretaries was formed. The said Committee gave its recommendations which were discussed by EGoM. After approving the Aadhaar Scheme in principle, it instructed the Cabinet Secretary to convene a meeting to finalise the detailed organisational structure of the UID.

After considering the recommendation of the Cabinet Secretary, Notification No. A-43011/02/2009-Admn.I was issued on January 28, 2009, by the Government of India which constituted and notified the UIDAI.” Annexure 1 of this notification that constituted UIDAI deals with the Role and Responsibilities of UIDAI. The fourth point in this notification reads: “implementation of UID scheme will entail” taking “necessary steps to ensure collation of NPR with UID (as per. approved strategy)”.

7. The minutes of a meeting of the Committee of Secretaries held under Chairmanship of Cabinet Secretary November 23, 2015 talks of “integrating the twin approaches under NPR and Aadhaar.”

The “integrating the twin approaches under NPR and Aadhaar” which is referred here is the same as taking “necessary steps to ensure collation of NPR with UID (as per. approved strategy)” underlined in the notification mentioned in the Aadhaar Act.

8. A Ministry of Home Affairs communication dated July 19, 2019 states that “The National Population Register (NPR) thus prepared, was seeded with Aadhaar number during its updation exercise in 2015 along with a collection of demographic details of new household members. Approx. 60 crores Aadhaar numbers have been seeded in NPR Database.”

This communication discloses that “It has now been decided by the Ministry of Home Affairs to update the existing NPR database during April 2020 – September 2020 along with House listing & Housing Census phase of Census 2021. While updating the NPR, the Aadhaar number of all the individuals whose Aadhaar number is not available in the NPR Database will also be collected along with various other items. Necessary notification for updating NPR in 2020 will be issued shortly.”

9. The Court’s order reveals that “A core group was set up to advise and further the work related to UIDAI…The core group, inter alia, decided that it was better to start with the electoral roll database of 2009 for undertaking the UIDAI project.” If an UID/Aadhaar-enabled Biometric Attendance System is indeed a ‘digital equivalent’ of an ‘age-old attendance register,’ why did the National Human Rights Commission object to a radio collar which can also be argued by sophists to be a ‘digital equivalent’? It may be recalled that the Union Ministry of External Affairs had agreed with the NHRC’s assessment. The Union minister of external affairs informed Parliament that some 18 students were detained and released in the US with radio monitoring devices on their ankles, pending completion of investigations for possible involvement in irregularities. ’We have also strongly protested the radio collars as unacceptable, which should be removed immediately.’ If the ‘digital equivalent’ means biometric equivalent as well, then radio collar and DNA-based identity and attendance will also be deemed equivalent to ‘age-old attendance register.’ It is quite evident that such claims are deeply misleading.

10. The reference to ‘such other biological attributes’ in Section 2 (g) of Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016, and the definition of ‘biometrics’ under the Information Technology (Reasonable security practices and procedures and sensitive personal data or information) Rules, 2011 under section 87 read with section 43A of Information Technology Act, 2000 underlines that it includes ‘the technologies that measure and analyse human body characteristics, such as “fingerprints”, “eye retinas and irises”, “voice patterns”, “facial patterns”, “hand measurements” and “DNA” for authentication purposes.’ It is abundantly clear that the plan of UID/Aadhaar-based surveillance does not end with the collection of fingerprints and iris scan, it goes quite beyond it.

The confidential document of UIDAI reveals that “One way to ensure that the unique identification (UID) number is used by all government and private agencies is by inserting it into the birth certificate of the infant. Since the birth certificate is the original identity document, it is likely that this number will then persist as the key identifier through the individual’s various life events, such as joining school, immunizations, voting etc.” Notably, there has never been any occasion wherein there was an all-party meeting to seek the consent of all the political parties with regard to merger of UID/Aadhaar database with “electoral roll database”. It is evident that the provision of Electoral Bonds in the Companies Act, 2013 and the merger of Voter-ID Number and Aadhaar Number through amendment in Aadhaar Act is an exercise in merger of electoral database and Aadhaar database which will lead to extinction of political and civil rights of present and future generations.

According to Dr Gopalkrishna, Justice Sikri authored order of Supreme Court’s Constitution Bench missed the opportunity to save present and future Indians from the dictatorship of faceless donors created through Finance Act 2017 and Finance Act 2018 which has compromised national security and almost all the public institutions. He has made citizens and natural persons residing in India naked and transparent in a legal system in which artificial persons, the opaqueness of body corporates has been legalized. The order committed a Himalayan blunder by ruling that right to have natural and human rights of citizens can be made conditional. This is being done by the government at the behest of the beneficial owners of ungovernable technology companies who have turned ruling political parties into puppets through their limitless and anonymous transnational donations.

This creates a compelling reason for the States to un-sign the MoUs they have signed with UIDAI and discontinue both UID/Aadhaar and NPR exercise. This is required to resist the emergence of an unlimited government, unlimited by the Constitution of India and Constitutionalism. Aadhaar database scheme is an unlimited census in disguise. It is naturalising mass surveillance and mass spying in myriad disguises and through diverse kinds of fish baits.

There is a compelling logic for setting up a High Powered Commission of Inquiry to probe the ongoing bartering of citizen’s databases and transfer of national data assets to foreign entities. In the face of assault on citizens’ rights and the emergence of a regime that is making legislatures and judiciary subservient to automatic identification, big data mining and artificial intelligence companies, the order of Justice Sikri undermined the Constitution and the sovereignty of the citizens who framed it. If the flawed order is not reversed by the 7-judge Constitution Bench, India’s social policies will be guided by biometric and genetic determinism and eugenic thinking of beneficial owners of unaccountable and admittedly undemocratic institutions.

In a country where no intelligence chief or official has been held accountable for the assassination of three of its Prime Ministers and for betraying the nation’s secrets, can it be hoped that all those who have compromised India’s data security will be made liable for their treacherous acts of transferring the sensitive data of present and future citizens including ministers, legislators, soldiers, and judges?

(The author, Dr. Gopal Krishna is a lawyer and law and philosophy researcher. He had appeared before the Parliamentary Committee that examined the National Identification Authority of India Bill, 2010 that was withdrawn in 2016 and enacted later as Aadhaar Act 2016)

Disclaimer: The views expressed here are the author’s personal views, and do not necessarily represent the views of Sabrangindia

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The post Logical, Legal Compulsion for West Bengal, other states to un-sign MoUs with UIDAI: Expert to Mamata Banerjee appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Now, The Hindu reports that to avoid inconvenience to the public and government schemes’ beneficiaries and quell a sense of anxiety about a recent directive to cease the usage of Aadhaar as a ‘date of birth’ proof, the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) is likely to issue a clarification soon that those relying on the ID proof for age may do so after undertaking a ‘risk-based assessment’.

The controversy around reliance on Aadhaar, a biometric-linked identification proof, has become ubiquitous in recent years, with linkages to taxpayers’ PAN cards, provident fund and bank accounts, among others. The Unique ID (UID), as it is also known, is a the document, the “critical document” for effecting direct benefit transfers to millions of government welfare scheme beneficiaries, using what the Centre calls ‘the JAM (Jan Dhan bank accounts, Aadhaar, and Mobile Phones) trinity’. It was never meant to be the base data for citizenship.

High Court judgments – Jurisprudence 

The UIDAI, in a December 2023 missive, has asked all agencies that use Aadhaar to authenticate identities to delete it from the list of acceptable documents for verifying a person’s date of birth. The authority said this was an iteration of its stated position and had been underlined by different High Court judgments. Now, Aadhaar ID cards come with a prominent disclaimer that they are “a proof of identity, not of citizenship or date of birth.”

Responding to a recent query on the issue, Finance Secretary T.V. Somanathan said: “I am certain that Central ministries will work out an appropriate arrangement to see that the public and beneficiaries of various schemes are not adversely affected.”

A senior Electronics and IT Ministry official indicated to The Hindu that the UIDAI would not withdraw the directive but would soon issue an advisory for agencies that rely on Aadhaar authentication for welfare benefits and KYC (Know Your Customer) compliance purposes.

“The UIDAI circular in question reflects and reiterates our stance that an Aadhaar number can be used to establish the identity of an individual subject to authentication and is not per se a proof of date of birth. However, the UIDAI is likely to issue a clarification, putting the onus on user agencies to accept the date entered into Aadhaar records or verify it further, with the emphasis being on risk-based assessment,” the official said, requesting anonymity owing to the sensitivity of the issue.

“The birthdate and even the address mentioned in Aadhaar are only a reasonable assessment of the age and location of an individual, based on documents provided at the time of enrolment. But it cannot be construed as fool proof evidence for either of those details… it is up to the concerned entity to decide whether to accept them or seek more documents after assessing the risks involved in their use cases for Aadhaar authentication,” the official explained.

As has been known, the date of birth can be verified by using documents such as birth certificates or school-leaving certificates, wherever knowing the precise age is critical, be it opening a bank account for a minor or a senior citizen, or transferring pension benefits, he pointed out. Even a passport or driving licence can be used to confirm a person’s age.

Following this UIDAI communiqué, some entities like the Employees’ Provident Fund Organisation (EPFO) have already scrapped Aadhaar’s use as birthdate proof, while other departments and user agencies are still evaluating the impact. Central Board of Direct Taxes chairman Nitin Gupta said Aadhaar is linked to about 59 crore PAN cards and issues arising from the UIDAI diktat would be assessed.

Revenue Secretary Sanjay Malhotra noted to The Hindu that Aadhaar is being used for registrations under the Goods and Services Tax (GST) regime as well, but the date of birth is not vital in those cases. “For date of birth, generally in government, it is the birth certificate or the class X passing certificate that works,” he said.

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The post New “advisory on Aadhaar as date of birth proof soon appeared first on SabrangIndia.

Sobhana K Nair notes that, “The Centre mandates payment of all MGNREGA wages through an Aadhaar-based system though 34.8% of registered workers and 12.7% of active workers are not eligible; 7.6 crore job cards deleted since April 2022.”

Ironically, the union government’s own data – according to the Union Rural Development Ministry – records that due to this controversial linking, as many as 34.8 % of job card holders remained ineligible for this mode of payment till as late as December 27.

The Hindu  reported that since the first direction was issued, the rate of MGNREGA job card deletions sharply rose. The Hindu report also notes that according to LibTech India, a consortium of academics and activists, 7.6 crore workers have been deleted from the system over the last 21 months.

Besides, the newspapers sources in the government, however, claimed that till December 27, 12.7% of active workers were yet unconnected to the payment system. ‘Active workers’ are recognised as those who have worked for at least a single day over the last three financial years. The MGNREGA guarantees 100 days of work to rural households. Renowned economist, Jean Dreze,  has, in an article for The Wire,  written that as far, “as recklessness goes, this is on par with a national lockdown at four hours’ notice.”

The Narendra Modi government has attempted to weaken the essential job scheme despite its popularity, reducing allocation drastically in the 2023 Budget – to Rs 60,000 crore, after the revised estimate for FY’23 was at Rs 89,400 crore. 

The fifth extension of the deadline to make the ABPS mandatory, giving State governments time to reconcile databases, ended on December 31, 2023. Since the first push in this direction, the rate of MGNREGA job card deletions has significantly risen, which activists working in the field say is directly linked to the mandatory imposition of this payment method.

The first order to enforce ABPS was issued on January 30, 2023, followed by extensions till February 1, March 31, June 30, August 31, and finally December 31. According to the Union Rural Development Ministry’s data, 34.8 % of job card holders still remain ineligible for this mode of payment as on December 27.

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The post Aadhaar-linked wages for MNREGS workers mandatory from Jan 1, 2024 appeared first on SabrangIndia.

A Supreme Court bench comprising Chief Justice of India DY Chandrachud, Justice JB Pardiwala, and Justice Manoj Misra was also informed by senior advocate Sukumar Pattjoshi, appearing for the Election Commission, that the submission of the Aadhaar number was not mandatory under Rule 26-B of the Registration of Electors (Amendment) Rules 2022. The senior counsel had submitted that nearly 66,23,00,000 Aadhaar numbers had already been uploaded in the process of finalising electoral rolls. It was added that the submission of the Aadhaar number was not mandatory under Rule 26-B of the Registration of Electors (Amendment) Rules 2022 and hence the Election Commission was looking into issuing appropriate clarificatory changes in the forms introduced for that purpose.

It is essential to note here that the said undertaking has been made by the Election Commission in a petition filed in the Supreme Court that highlighted issues with Form 6 (Application Form for new voters) and Form 6B (Letter of Information of Aadhaar number for the purpose of electoral roll authentication) of the ECI forms for registration in e-roll. The said petition had been filed by G.Niranjan, Senior Vice President, Telangana Pradesh Committee. Based on the undertaking made by the ECI, the Court disposed of the writ petition. Concerns had been raised about whether individuals who have not linked their Aadhaar with their Voter ID will face exclusion from electoral roll registration. It had been argued that that the right to vote is one of the “most sacred rights” and cannot be denied if a person does not have an Aadhaar card.

Prior to this, in December 2022, former Union Minister for Law and Justice, Kiren Rijiju, had stated in the Rajya Sabha during a Parliamentary session that linking Aadhaar with Voter ID is voluntary and consent of the elector is required to be obtained to link the same.

Election authority mandates linking of Aadhaar with Voter IDs:

The Registration of Electors (Amendment) Rules 2022 was notified by the Central Government in June 2022 to provide for linking Aadhaar number with election ID cards. Form 6B is the application form by which a voter can inform the Aadhaar number for the purpose of electoral roll authentication.

In August 2022, the Election Commission of India had launched the program to collect Aadhaar number of electors ‘on a voluntary basis’. In accordance to the Election Laws (Amendment) Act, 2021, the Electoral Registration Officers were permitted to ask the elector to provide their Aadhaar numbers for the purpose of establishing identity. However, the same was supposed to be only voluntary.

Notably, a petition remains pending in the Supreme Court which challenges the Election Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2021 and the Registration of Electors (Amendment) Rules 2022.

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The post ECI undertaking to SC: Aadhaar number not mandatory to enrol as voter appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The notification in the gazette dated June 27 states, “In pursuance of sub-clause (ii) of clause (b) of sub-section (4) of section 4 of the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016 (18 of 2016) read with rule 5 of the Aadhaar Authentication for Good Governance (Social Welfare, Innovation, Knowledge) Rules, 2020, the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology has allowed Office of Registrar General and Census Commissioner, India to perform Aadhaar authentication for registration of births and deaths.”

Section 4 (4) of the Aadhar Act states that:

(4) An entity may be allowed to perform authentication, if the Authority is satisfied that the requesting entity is—

(b)…(ii) seeking authentication for such purpose, as the Central Government in consultation with the Authority, and in the interest of State, may prescribe.

This means that the Registrar will be allowed to perform Yes or No Aadhaar authentication, on voluntary basis, for verification of Aadhaar number being collected along with other details as sought in the reporting forms of births or deaths in order to establish the identity of child, parent and the informant in case of births, and of the parent, spouse and the informant in case of deaths during registration of births or deaths.

IN November 2021, the Ministry of Home Affairs floated proposed amendments to the Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969 which entailed a national database of records of births and deaths and linking Aadhar information to the same. The MHA had also expressed its intent to use this data to update the much opposed National Population Register (NPR). The Ministry had stated that the data will be used for updating NPR, Electoral Registers, Aadhar Database, Ration card database, Passport Database as well as the driving license database.

Why is centralization of this data a problem?

The Centre has clearly stated that this data will be used for updating NPR, Electoral Registers, Aadhar Database, Ration card database, Passport Database as well as the driving license database. This means, the Centre will be able to track births, deaths,

The Centre will have a record of all the registered deaths and will use the same to update NPR which will in turn be used to make the nation wide NRC. However, the question arises, what about those births that are not registered?

Based on information received from 32 States/UTs, the share of institutional births to total registered births is 81.2 percent. This means that despite institutional births, there are loopholes whereby registration of births has been missed out.

MHA notification can be read here.

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The post MHA authorises Registrar General to authenticate Aadhar for birth and death registration appeared first on SabrangIndia.

West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee hit back at the Centre for using verification of Aadhar as a means of implementing the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) and the National Register of Citizens (NRC) in West Bengal. She has categorically refused to comply with the same.

This is in reference to the letter sent by the Central government to eight states including West Bengal instructing them to identify illegal Aadhaar cards and those people who do not have Aadhaar cards. The letter also specifies the areas where this exercise should be carried out. In Bengal, the Centre has identified the areas of North-and South-24 Parganas for implementing these checks. Banerjee said that the government was reviving the citizenship overdrive ahead of the General Election next year.

She was addressing a press conference when she said, ““I am directed to refer to ongoing exercise for verification/updation of illegal Aadhaar cards in the selected districts and to forward a list of the specific location of exact pockets of settlements of illegal foreigners in those selected districts to enable UIDAI to be more focussed in the exercise for the elimination of illegal Aadhaar cards.”

The letter was sent to the chief executive officer of the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) from an under-secretary in the Union home ministry, reported The Telegraph.

As per Census 2011 data, South 24 Parganas has 35.57% Muslim population while North 24 Paragans has 25.82% Muslim population. Banerjee further said, “They want to eliminate a particular community from their rights of citizenship through this drive. The plot is to declare all those people ‘foreigners’ if their Aadhaar card is detected as illegal with any lack (of information). It means they are again playing with the NRC card”.

They have also mentioned specific areas in South24 Parganas namely Baruipur, Canning, Sonarpur and Malikpur; also Barasat, Hasnabad, Bongaon, Petrapole, Barrackpore, Naihati, Jagatdal and Khardaha in North 24-Parganas.

“I am not going to take part in the NRC-like exercise. I will not allow them to play with the NRC card here. I think that all who live in Bengal are already citizens of our country,” she added, as reported by The Telegraph.

The nexus of CAA-NRC-NPR is not a figment of Banerjee’s imagination. Neither is it a political ploy to target the regime. It is a matter of fact which the Union government has vehemently denied from time to time.

Citizens for Justice and Peace has analysed this toxic cocktail of CAA-NRC-NPR in January 2020 when the debate on CAA was boiling (which later subdued due to COVID-19 pandemic). The analysis brought forth how this will affect not just the Muslim community but the marginalised communities at large. The detailed analysis may be read here.

How NPR was the first step towards a nation-wide NRC was clearly explained on the basis of existing legal provisions by CJP in this article, in the form of FAQs. The FAQs explain how as per the preparation methodology prescribed in Citizenship (Registration of Citizen & Issue of NC) Rules 2003, it is from the NPR that data will be taken for Updation in the Local Register of Indian Citizen (i.e. part of NRC) after Scrutiny and Verification.

The exercise of NRC in Assam whereby the (supposedly) final list was released in August 2019 left a population of 1.3 crore impoverished and socially disbarred by being interminably denied citizenship. The process of NRC has not yet culminated in Assam as there has been alot of back and forth on the finality of the August 2019 NRC thus leaving the status of citizenship of those excluded from that list in limbo as their status of citizenship has not been determined and they have no means to prove the same unless official process is started by the concerned authorities in the state. Looking at the state of the residents of Assam, the rest of the country feared its repercussions on them and hence, the opposition to CAA-NRC-NPR was so strong.

West Bengal, under Banerjee has been the loudest voice against CAA and the Centre’s intention of bringing in NRC through NPR.

Related:

NPR-NRC – FAQs

CAA-NPR-NRC: The Law Is Being Weaponised Against …

Why the CAA+NPR+NRC is a toxic cocktail for everyone

The post Identifying fake Aadhaar, a plot to bring in CAA-NRC? appeared first on SabrangIndia.

New Delhi: According to a recent circular issued by the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI), if you don’t have an Aadhaar number or enrolment slip, you may not be entitled to avail government subsidies and benefits.

The UIDAI issued a circular to all central ministries and state governments last week.

This circular is issued on August 11 to tighten the Aadhaar rules for those who don’t have an Aadhaar number and are availing of the subsidies and benefits provided by the government.

If you want certificates by govt which are used for determining the eligibility of beneficiaries for delivery of benefits/subsidies/services under government schemes, they must have the Aadhar number, said the circular.

According to the circular issued on August 11 by UIDAI, there is an existing provision in section 7 of the Aadhaar Act to facilitate a person who has not been assigned an Aadhaar number, to avail of the benefits, subsidies, and services “through alternate and viable means of identification.”

The latest circular says that more than 99 per cent of adults in the country have been issued an Aadhaar number now.

“Thus in the above backdrop and considering the proviso to Section 7 of the Act…in case no Aadhaar number has been assigned to an individual, he/she shall make an application for enrolment and till such time Aadhaar number is assigned to such individual, he/she may avail the benefits, subsidies and services through alternate and viable means of identification along with Aadhaar Enrolment Identification (EID) number/slip,” the circular mentioned.

This means an Aadhaar Enrolment Identification (EID) number/slip would be required for availing central and state government services, benefits, and subsidies if one does not have an Aadhaar number yet.

The circular says a multitude of services and benefits are being transferred directly to the residents owing to the wide coverage of 99 per cent adults having Aadhaar identification. “Aadhaar has significantly improved the quality of resident/citizen experience in receiving welfare services,” the circular said.

UIDAI issued one more circular on August 11, which says entities may make the Virtual Identifier (VID) optional. “Some government entities may require the Aadhaar number in their respective databases for smooth implementation of the social welfare schemes. Therefore, such government entities may require beneficiaries to provide Aadhaar numbers and made VID optional,” the UIDAI has said in the circular.

Courtesy: The Daily Siasat

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On May 27, the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) issued a press release warning “the general public not to share photocopy of one’s Aadhaar with any organizations because it can be misused. Alternatively, a masked Aadhaar which displays only the last 4 digits of your Aadhaar number can be used for the purpose.”

Explaining the rationale behind the warning, the UIDAI said, “Only those organizations that have obtained a User License from the UIDAI can use Aadhaar for establishing the identity of a person. Unlicensed private entities like hotels or film halls are not permitted to collect or keep copies of Aadhaar card. It is an offence under the Aadhaar Act 2016. If a private entity demands to see your Aadhaar card, or seeks a photocopy of your Aadhaar card, please verify that they have valid User License from the UIDAI.” It said that the masked Aadhaar could be downloaded from the official website, and even went on to warn users against downloading Aadhaar using a public computer.

This advisory was however withdrawn on May 29, and in a new press release, the Ministry of Electronics and IT explained that the original advisory was issued “in the context of an attempt to misuse a photoshopped Aadhaar card.” It said, “However, in view of the possibility of the misinterpretation of the Press Release, the same stands withdrawn with immediate effect,” adding, “UIDAI issued Aadhaar card holders are only advised to exercise normal prudence in using and sharing their UIDAI Aadhaar numbers.”

As if to reiterate that all was well of the data and privacy protection front, it further said, “Aadhaar Identity Authentication ecosystem has provided adequate features for protecting and safeguarding the identity and privacy of the Aadhaar holder.”

But what does this flip-flop mean? Far from allaying fears, it has sparked fresh concerns about unauthorized people having access to Aadhaar data. Activists and civil society members took to Twitter to call out the government on this absurd about-turn:

And now government and @UIDAI adds to confusion and dishonesty by withdrawing the press release. Better to let people be robbed than deprive tech industry of convenient ‘onboarding’ of customers! Sure there was mega pressure! https://t.co/GpCaC1y427

— Sucheta Dalal (@suchetadalal) May 29, 2022

Schrödinger’s #Aadhaar https://t.co/j7vJgyjKM1

— Rethink Aadhaar (@no2uid) May 30, 2022

Just so I’m clear, UIDAI, when you “withdraw” your own press release that said photocopies of Aadhaar cards can be misused, are you now implying and guaranteeing that they *cannot* be misused?

Otherwise, what is it you are “withdrawing”? pic.twitter.com/Ok8NmimU5L

— Rohin Dharmakumar (@r0h1n) May 29, 2022

We have come a L-O-N-G way from RS Sharma sharing his Aadhaar number on Twitter and belligerently fighting with people online daring them ’cause harm’… to UIDAI cautioning people to not share it even with organizations because it can be *misused*. pic.twitter.com/OqHVxEw2LB

— Karthik ?? (@beastoftraal) May 29, 2022

Aadhaar: From inclusion to surveillance?

The Aadhar card, with its Unique Identification Number, at its inception was an identity document meant to be a means for inclusion. The Act itself is called The Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016. But as SabrangIndia has reported previously, in many cases, the programme has led to exclusion of people who need the Public Distribution System (PDS) the most. Starvation deaths were reported from Jharkhand (17) and West Bengal (7) since September 2017, as per a survey report released by the Right to Food campaign in December 2018. In many cases, the deceased had been denied foodgrains at subsidised rates as their ration cards were not linked to Aadhaar. One elderly woman’s old age pension was held up as her bank account was not linked to Aadhaar.

Now, some if not all of these concerns were addressed by the Supreme Court judgment in the Aadhaar case, especially with respect to PDS and welfare schemes, concerns about data privacy and surveillance remain. Privacy activists and human rights groups have been raising concerns about Aadhaar’s misuse ever since the programme was introduced in India.

The biggest concerns relate to how Aadhaar is either already linked or proposed to be linked to other databases. At present one’s PAN is linked to Aadhaar, and there is a proposal to link it to Voter ID as well, in a purported bid to weed out fake voters. But this linkage also poses a great risk to voter profiling, surveillance and even possible voter suppression.

Recently, over 500 entities such as civil rights groups including Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR), Peoples’ Union of Civil Liberties (PUCL), Adivasi Women’s Network, Chetna Andolan, etc.; as well as groups working to defend digital freedoms and rights, such as Rethink Aadhaar, Article 21 Trust, the Internet Freedom Foundation (IFF), and the Free Software Movement of India, as well as activists, journalist and educators including CJP secretary Teesta Setalvad signed a statement calling the move to link Aadhaar with Voter ID “ill-thought, ill logical and unnecessary”.

The statement says that the signatories “are deeply concerned that this will almost certainly lead to mass disenfranchisement, could increase voter fraud, given the mass discrepancies in the Aadhaar database, and could violate people’s right to privacy by enabling voter profiling through the linkage of data sets.” It further elaborates, “India currently has no data protection law, and the current personal data protection bill has wide exceptions for the government. Any attempts to link Aadhaar to the voter IDs, would lead to demographic information which has been linked to Aadhaar, being linked to the voter database. This creates the possibilities for disenfranchisement based on identity, of increased surveillance, and targeted advertisements and commercial exploitation of private sensitive data.”  

A key reason cited is the violation of privacy and secrecy of vote. If the revelations of the Cambridge Analytica scandal where Facebook data of millions of users was used to allegedly rig the US elections in favour of Donald Trump by micro-targeting voters with false news is anything to go by, imagine the ramifications if it was demographic data of millions of Indians sourced from the Aadhaar database…

SC judgment on Aadhaar

In September 2018, the Supreme Court upheld Aadhaar’s constitutional validity. The Aadhaar case that was heard for a record 38 days by a bench comprising Chief Justice Dipak Misra, Justice DY Chandrachud, Justice AK Sikri, Justice AM Khanwikar and Justice A Bhushan delivered the verdict months after reserving judgment in May. There were three separate judgments from Justice Sikri, Justice Bhushan and Justice Chandrachud. CJI and Justice Khanwilkar did not pronounce a separate judgment but concurred with Justice Sikri. Justice Bhushan’s judgment was also in line with that of Justice Sikri. But Justice Chandrachud wrote a dissenting judgment.

However, in a partial victory for privacy activists, controversial sections such as those dealing with the national security exception and private players demanding Aadhaar data, were struck down. Section 33(2) of the Aadhaar Act that dealt with the National Security exception was struck down. This section permitted disclosure of information, including identity and authentication information, made in the interest of national security. Justice Sikri has also read down Section 33 (1) that enables disclosure of Aadhaar information on order of a District Judge. Now the owner of the information should be given opportunity of hearing before issuing such orders.

Additionally, Section 57 of the Aadhaar Act, that permitted private entities to use Aadhaar information to authenticate the identity of a person, was also held unconstitutional. Therefore, no private company can either demand Aadhaar information or make it mandatory for providing services. Aadhaar would not be required for opening a bank account or for getting a mobile phone connection.

Section 47 that allowed only the UIDAI to file criminal complaints in case of data breach has also been struck down. It has been held that exclusion of individuals from filing complaints was arbitrary.

Justice Chandrachud’s dissenting judgment

Justice DY Chandrachud wrote the lone dissenting judgment saying Aadhaar is liable to be declared as unconstitutional. “Violation of fundamental rights under the Aadhaar scheme fails on the touchstone of tests of proportionality,” he said. “Constitutional guarantees cannot be compromised by vicissitudes of technology,” he noted in a strongly worded dissenting judgment.

Justice Chandrachud also expressed his apprehensions about the misuse of data for profiling saying, “Biometrically enhanced identity information, combined with demographic data such as address, age and gender, among other data, when used in increasingly large, automated systems creates profound changes in societies, particularly in regard to data protection, privacy, and security. Biometrics are at the very heart of identification systems. There are numerous instances in history where the persecution of groups of civilians on the basis of race, ethnicity and religion was facilitated through the use of identification systems. There is hence an alarming need to ensure that the on-going development of identification systems be carefully monitored, while taking into account lessons learnt from history.”

It is this part that sends a shiver down the spine, given how Aadhaar data can possibly be used for voter profiling, targeting and even subsequent gerrymandering if Aadhaar is linked with Voter ID.

Related:

Aadhaar linking to Voter ID: Empowering voters or enabling surveillance?

SC upholds Aadhaar’s Constitutional Validity, but partially addresses Privacy Concerns

Understanding the Aadhaar Case

The post What does the UIDAI’s flip-flop on Aadhaar mean? appeared first on SabrangIndia.

A controversial attempt is underway to link Aadhaar to Voter IDs. This is being pitched as a part of wider electoral reforms that have all but been greenlighted. A draft bill to this effect has already been approved by a Cabinet committee.

In November, Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice, headed by Rajya Sabha member Sushil Kumar Modi, had met to discuss a variety of electoral reforms, such as:

• Remote voting

• Linking Aadhaar to Voter ID

• Common electoral roll

• Action against elected representative who file false affidavits

On Wednesday, a Cabinet committee approved the linkage of Aadhaar with Voter IDs along with a few others electoral reforms. These include:

• Allowing first time voter four opportunities in a year to enroll their name in the Voters’ list, instead of the previous provision that only allowed this if one had turned 18 before January 1 of that year.

• Making electoral law gender neutral for service voters, thereby permitting husbands of female service persons to be enrolled as service voters, along with the previous provision of just allowing wives of servicemen to be enrolled.

The electoral reforms bill is likely to be introduced in the ongoing Winter Session of the Parliament. This could enable for the bill to be passed in time for the upcoming state assembly elections in Uttar Pradesh, Manipur, Goa and Punjab.

Purpose of linkage, and concerns about misuse

The linking is ostensibly to enable weeding out of fake voters or duplications from electoral rolls. The bill narrowly avoids violating a Supreme Court judgment by making the linking “voluntary” and says that the Aadhaar information will only be used “for authentication purposes.”

It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court had, in its judgment, allowed use of Aadhaar only for availing government schemes, shooting down the requirement to provide Aadhaar data to private players such as banks, telephone companies etc. Thus, the provision in the proposed bill for linking Aadhaar to Voter ID voluntarily and only for authentication, allows for a bit of a gray area, given how this could be argued by some to provide a smoother experience for the voter hoping to get enrolled or update their information, and thus exercise their Right to Vote.

But it is at this point, one must remember the words of Justice DY Chandrachud, the sole judge on the Supreme Court Bench, to write a dissenting judgment. He had expressed his apprehensions about the misuse of data for profiling saying, “Biometrically enhanced identity information, combined with demographic data such as address, age and gender, among other data, when used in increasingly large, automated systems creates profound changes in societies, particularly in regard to data protection, privacy, and security. Biometrics are at the very heart of identification systems. There are numerous instances in history where the persecution of groups of civilians on the basis of race, ethnicity and religion was facilitated through the use of identification systems. There is hence an alarming need to ensure that the on-going development of identification systems be carefully monitored, while taking into account lessons learnt from history.”

It is this part that sends a shiver down the spine, given how Aadhaar data can possibly be used for voter profiling, targeting and even subsequent gerrymandering if Aadhaar is linked with Voter ID.

Renewed concerns about linking Aadhaar and Voter ID

SabrangIndia had reported previously on how over 500 entities such as civil rights groups including Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR), Peoples’ Union of Civil Liberties (PUCL), Adivasi Women’s Network, Chetna Andolan, etc.; as well as groups working to defend digital freedoms and rights, such as Rethink Aadhaar, Article 21 Trust, the Internet Freedom Foundation (IFF), and the Free Software Movement of India, as well as activists, journalist and educators including CJP secretary Teesta Setalvad signed a statement calling the move to link Aadhaar with Voter ID “ill-thought, ill logical and unnecessary”.

The statement says that the signatories “are deeply concerned that this will almost certainly lead to mass disenfranchisement, could increase voter fraud, given the mass discrepancies in the Aadhaar database, and could violate people’s right to privacy by enabling voter profiling through the linkage of data sets.” It further elaborates, “India currently has no data protection law, and the current personal data protection bill has wide exceptions for the government. Any attempts to link Aadhaar to the voter IDs, would lead to demographic information which has been linked to Aadhaar, being linked to the voter database. This creates the possibilities for disenfranchisement based on identity, of increased surveillance, and targeted advertisements and commercial exploitation of private sensitive data.”  

A key reason cited is the violation of privacy and secrecy of vote. If the revelations of the Cambridge Analytica scandal where Facebook data of millions of users was used to allegedly rig the US elections in favour of Donald Trump by micro-targeting voters with false news is anything to go by, imagine the ramifications if it was demographic data of millions of Indians sourced from the Aadhaar database…

Response to Cabinet decision

Ever since the story broke, responses have started trickling in. Different rights groups and civil society members have reiterated their apprehensions. The Free Software Movement of India released a statement saying, “The use of Aadhaar for voting process is not a proportionate exercise and has (sis) the potential threat to the entire idea of secret ballot.”

FSMI statement on Council of Cabinet Ministers proposal to link Aadhaar with VoterID.#FSMI #Aadhaar @ECISVEEP pic.twitter.com/Hf8p1KUIee

— Free Software Movement of India (@fsmi_in) December 16, 2021

Related:

Aadhaar linking to Voter ID: Empowering voters or enabling surveillance?

SC upholds Aadhaar’s Constitutional Validity, but partially addresses Privacy Concerns

Understanding the Aadhaar Case

The post Cabinet clears draft bill on linking Aadhaar with Voter ID appeared first on SabrangIndia.

The provision of Aadhaar is not mandatory for the registration of births and deaths, the Registrar General of India (RGI) has clarified in a recent reply to an RTI request to a Vishakhapatnam-based lawyer. If Aadhaar is provided voluntarily, it must not be printed on any document or stored in any database of births and deaths in full form, according to an RGI circular cited in the RTI response.

Visakhapatnam-based advocate M.V.S. Anil Kumar Rajagiri had filed an RTI request asking whether Aadhaar was mandatory for the registration of death or not. In its reply last week, posted on Twitter by LiveLaw, the RGI referred to an April 2019 circular to clarify that “the requirement of Aadhaar number is not mandatory for the registration of birth and death.”

The circular in response also  noted that registration of births and deaths was done under the Registration of Births and Deaths (RBD) Act, 1969, which was a Central law. “However, the implementation of the provisions of the said Act lies with the State/UT governments,” it added.

SC Judgement

In 2017, the RGI had decreed that Aadhaar number would be required for the purpose of establishing the identity of the deceased for the purpose of death registration. However, a 2018 Supreme Court judgement on the issue reversed this.

In its 2019 circular, the RGI noted that “the portion of Section 57 of the Aadhaar Act which enables body corporate and individual to seek authentication was held to be unconstitutional” by the Supreme Court. The RBD Act also had no provision “which permits the use of Aadhaar for establishing the identity of an individual for the purpose of registration of birth and death”, it said.

The circular was sent to the Chief Registrars of births and deaths of all States directing them to ensure that local registering authorities did not demand Aadhaar as a mandatory requirement. They could accept Aadhaar as one of the acceptable documents, if provided on a voluntary basis. However, the first eight digits of the Aadhaar number were to be masked with black ink. The full number was not to be stored in any database of births and deaths or printed on any document, added the circular.

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