On his birth anniversary, I would like to share my review of Madhok’s controversial book, Indianisation: What, Why and How, published in 1970. Madhok wrote this book three years before his expulsion from the party, which, according to L. K. Advani, was due to his “inflated ego” (Organiser, 1973: 13). Another reason for his expulsion was his public criticism of the party’s perceived leftward drift in economic policies. According to Madhok, the Jana Sangh’s defeats in the 1971 and 1972 elections were a direct result of this shift (Jaffrelot, 1966: 236). Madhok is also known for his role in movements advocating the full integration of Jammu and Kashmir with India, particularly through the formation of the Praja Parishad Party. Beyond politics, he also had an academic career, teaching history at the University of Delhi.

The concept of Indianisation has a long intellectual history, with some of its philosophical underpinnings tracing back to 19th-century religious revivalist movements that sought to associate ‘Hindustan’ with ‘Hindi’ and ‘Hindu’ identity. These tendencies were shaped by evolving power dynamics, particularly with the advent of the colonial British Raj. The British Raj initiated the processes of census-taking and enumeration in the second half of the 19th century, leading to the emergence of rigid identities. Additionally, the colonial historical construction of India’s past contributed to the portrayal of Hindus as the original inhabitants of the country, while Muslims were depicted as “invaders” and “foreigners.”

This notion was later adopted by the Hindu right to argue that minorities, particularly Muslims, posed a threat to the idea of the modern nation-state. As a response, several scholars, from Bankim and Savarkar to Golwalkar and Madhok, proposed ways to counter this perceived threat. In this book, Madhok argues for the Indianisation of those who, according to him, are not fully loyal to India and have “extra-territorial loyalties.” Unsurprisingly, Muslims are at the top of Madhok’s list, along with communists, Congress members, and other Indian politicians.

It was the Jana Sangh, during its plenary session in Kanpur in 1952, under the presidency of Shyama Prasad Mukherjee—whom Madhok worked with for many years—that first passed a resolution on Indianisation. In his work, Madhok was merely drawing upon this resolution. However, one might ask: why did he publish Indianisation in 1970?

One could argue that this book, representing the conservative forces within the party, was written to criticize the Jana Sangh for not being sufficiently critical of state control over the economy during Indira Gandhi’s regime. At the same time, media reports suggested that Madhok’s differences with senior leaders such as Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Nanaji Deshmukh, and L. K. Advani were growing. It is, therefore, plausible that Madhok felt compelled to reassert the Jana Sangh’s hardcore policies at a time when he was losing his grip on the party. In doing so, he likely sought to demonstrate that its current leadership had drifted away from its core ideology.

It is in this context that Madhok placed his views on Indianisation. According to him, “Indianisation, therefore, is nothing but the inculcation of a strong sense of nationalism in all Indians. It is neither something new nor anything sinister. It is something to which no patriotic Indian worth his name can take exception. Those who oppose it either do not understand what India and her heritage is or they deliberately want to create confusion and scare in some groups for political and partisan ends” (Madhok 1970: 18).

For Madhok, Indianisation is integral to nationalism. He is unwilling to accept the idea that such a process has any political motivation. Like any right-wing leader, he advocates the process of homogenisation as entirely natural. He refuses to acknowledge that society is, in fact, heterogeneous and that the right-wing agenda actively seeks homogenization—often at the cost of diversity and social harmony.

Similarly, Madhok is deliberately ignorant of the fact that the idea of nationalism is not independent of history. Like many right-wing and conservative thinkers, he attempts to discipline citizens into becoming adequately nationalist and loyal to the country. The internal divisions within society and the realities of material inequality are conveniently ignored to construct an artificially monolithic community. As he puts it, “Nationalism is not a question of political loyalties only. It demands a feeling of attachment and sense of pride for the country’s heritage and culture as well… Respect for the National Flag, National Anthem, National Language or Languages, National Heroes, and Great men, National ethos and values are part of nationalism. Aliens also can be absorbed into the national mainstream through inculcation of these feelings of oneness and identification with the national homeland, its culture and heritage” (Ibid).

It is ironic that Hindutva forces frequently distribute certificates of nationalism and loyalty to the country, yet they fail to critically examine themselves. During the anti-colonial struggle, they were either collaborating with the British Raj or disrupting national unity by stoking Hindu-versus-Muslim tensions. While they have often accused minorities, secularists, and leftists of being anti-national, historical reality shows that they themselves have criticized the Indian Constitution and the national flag, favouring the celebration of so-called Hindu culture and symbols over India’s secular national identity.

There are other critical questions that Madhok and other Hindutva leaders are not honest enough to address. For example, if he does not consider a person—be it a minority or a leftist—to be a nationalist unless they take pride in the “country’s heritage and culture,” then how can he and his fellow members of the RSS, Jana Sangh, and BJP claim to be champions of nationalism when the symbols of Hindutva nationalism exclude large sections of Indians—women, Dalits, lower castes, minorities, Tamils, and others outside the Hindi heartland?

It is clear that Madhok’s concept of Indian-ness is rooted in his narrow vision of nationalism. According to this perspective, anyone who does not conform to his own version of a Vedic, Brahminical conception of India is deemed anti-national. Once an individual or community is labelled as anti-national, the disciplinary process of Indianisation is imposed upon them. In other words, for Madhok, national culture is not based on secularism, pluralism, or unity in diversity. Instead, it is deeply sectarian, communal, exclusionary, and reactionary.

For Madhok, the canon is Brahminical/Vedic culture. He disregards the fact that India’s history extends beyond the Vedic period. The Adivasi cosmology, the Dravidian languages, Tamil culture, and the philosophical footprints of Mahavir, Buddha, Guru Nanak, and Kabir—who all challenged Brahminical traditions—are visible across the subcontinent. However, Madhok is so sectarian that he refuses to look beyond the life of the “Vedic Aryans,” who, according to him, provided the “substratum of Indian culture and civilisation” (Ibid: pp. 6-7). Here, one can observe his attempt to equate the essence of India with Vedic Aryan culture and conflate it with Hindu identity.

Instead of acknowledging that his thesis on Indianisation is sectarian, Madhok blames liberal, democratic, and Marxist forces for having “mounted a bitter attack” on his work. He argued that critics of Indianisation had misunderstood the concept. As he stated, “…they have been misinterpreting Indianisation as a means to eliminate religious minorities and re-convert Muslims and others to their ancestral faiths and faith or faiths” (Ibid: 19). In contrast, he defended his stance, asserting, “Indianisation aims at making every citizen to India a better Indians, a good patriot and a nationalist” (Ibid: 20).

As is evident once again, the concept of Indianisation serves as a tool in the hands of Hindutva forces to discipline minorities and other marginalized communities, compelling them to become adequately Indianised. This process leaves very little space for marginalized communities to assert their identities and fight for their legitimate rights. Simply put, Indianisation functions as a means to silence these communities and assimilate them into Brahminical culture under the pretext of making them loyal citizens.

For Madhok, the key terms are “good patriot” and “nationalist.” This raises an important question: what, in his view, prevents certain people from being considered good patriots and nationalists? Madhok provides several reasons. To begin with, he expresses concern over the rise of “regionalism,” arguing that “regional consciousness began to take better of national consciousness” (Ibid: 26). He is particularly critical of what he describes as the “sinister game” behind the creation of linguistic states. In other words, Madhok seeks to attack the federal structure of the Constitution and pave the way for a more centralized state.

It is important to remember that Hindutva forces have long championed a unitary state and often feel threatened by the rise of regional movements. Their discomfort with federalism underscores their broader ideological commitment to a homogenized, centralized form of governance that suppresses linguistic and cultural diversity. For Madhok, only a strong central authority could hold the nation together, and any move toward decentralization was viewed with suspicion. Yet, they failed to acknowledge even the very first article of the Indian Constitution, which defines India as a “Union of States.”

Madhok’s discomfort with regional identities is evident in his assertion: “Most Indians today are Punjabis or Bengalis or Malayalis first and Indians only next or never” (Ibid: 27). It would be a mistake to assume that such views are confined to a particular section of conservative/Hindutva forces in India. Even today, similar sentiments persist elsewhere. A notable example is the 2007 Bollywood film Chak De! India, which revolves around the Indian women’s hockey team. The film echoes these anxieties when the team’s coach, played by Shah Rukh Khan, laments that the players introduce themselves by their regional identities rather than their national identity.

Moving away from “regionalism,” Madhok discusses the danger of “casteism,” which, in his view, further justifies the need for Indianisation. As he puts it, “…casteism is tending to become as great if not greater danger to unity as regionalism. Today most Indians are either Jats, or Brahmins or Rajputs or Harijans first and Indians afterwards” (Ibid: 30). As is evident here, Madhok’s analysis of caste comes from a top-down perspective. Upper-caste scholars and elite leaders often lament that caste identity remains strong in the political domain, preventing leaders from rising above “narrow” and “sectarian” caste loyalties.

However, neither Madhok nor any Hindutva leader has ever examined the root causes of the caste system. They often claim to oppose caste divisions and insist that they treat all Indians as equals. Yet, they have never made a serious effort to dismantle the caste system. They have never launched movements promoting inter-caste marriages and inter-dining. They have never supported initiatives for proportional and effective representation of marginalized castes and communities.

As long as the lower castes silently endure their exploitation and humiliation, Hindutva leaders feel satisfied and consider everything to be in order. However, the moment Dalits, Adivasis, and lower castes organize themselves and raise the issue of caste-based discrimination, upper-caste-led Hindu right-wing organizations launch a bitter campaign against them, branding them as anti-national. This phenomenon was evident during the Mandal agitation. When the 27% reservation for OBCs was implemented, Advani initiated a nationwide Rath Yatra for the construction of the Ram Temple, attempting to drown out the voices advocating for social justice in the noise of religious nationalism. In Madhok’s work too, one can observe a deliberate attempt to obscure caste from public discourse.

After addressing internal factors such as casteism and regionalism, Madhok shifts his focus to the idea of a “glorious India,” which he associates with a Vedic, Hindu, Brahminical culture—excluding large sections of society. He writes: “India has been [a] land of freedom of thoughts and tolerance from the very dawn of her history” (Ibid: 32). However, in glorifying India’s past, Madhok overlooks the reality that a significant portion of the population—Dalits, lower castes, and women—were systematically excluded from education and knowledge. The near-total absence of materialist Charvaka philosophical texts in Madhok’s analysis, which were critical of Vedantic philosophy, raises questions about whether India’s past was truly a symbol of a free society.

Madhok’s response to this issue appears to involve placing the blame on Muslims, who, according to him, came to India and disrupted its supposed unity. He argues: “The situation changed… with the advent of Islam in this country. Apart from the fact that it came to India on the wings of foreign invaders, one of whose main motivations was [the] spread of Islam in this country, its very character was [the] anti-thesis of Indian thinking and attitude in regard to religion” (Ibid: 33). Here, one can clearly see Islam being positioned as an external disruptor. Madhok further attributes the rise of communalism to Islam, stating: “No wonder, therefore, that both the Muslim Arabs and Turks who brought Islam into India behaved towards the Indian people in a most barbaric manner” (Ibid: 34).

This is a time-tested method of Hindutva forces—using the Muslim community as a scapegoat. They conveniently blame the minority community to divert attention from the highly exploitative Hindu social order based on caste hierarchy and gender oppression. However, Madhok does not stop here. He later acknowledges that the encounter between Islam and India gradually eroded much of Islam’s supposed intolerance and exclusivity. In other words, he attempts to credit the majority community’s religion for this transformation.

For Madhok, the history of Islam—spanning several continents and spreading through the message of Prophet Muhammad—is not worth mentioning. Even Indian scholars like M. N. Roy, writing four decades before Madhok, argued that Islam brought peace and tolerance to the world while promoting rationality, the spirit of learning, and equality. Yet, Madhok deliberately obscures these historical facts, as he is eager to prove his thesis that Brahminical culture is supreme and that anyone critical of the RSS or Jan Sangh is anti-national.

It is not only Muslims but also communists who come under sharp criticism from Madhok, as he believes they have “extra-territorial loyalties.” According to him, this is why they must be Indianised and inculcated with nationalist and patriotic values. Ultimately, Madhok also turns his attention to Indian politicians, arguing that they too should be Indianised, as they are driven more by vote-bank politics than by national interests. Put simply, anyone who disagrees with the author’s sectarian, supremacist, and exclusionary vision of the RSS/Jan Sangh—or follows a culture or religion other than the Hinduism defined by the RSS—is deemed disloyal and unpatriotic and must immediately be ‘Indianised.’

In conclusion, Madhok’s book was an attempt to reassert the core of Hindutva ideology, which envisions a homogenized nation-state rooted in Vedic, Brahminical culture. This came at a time when the Jana Sangh was experimenting with certain popular economic measures during Indira Gandhi’s regime, becoming less critical of state intervention in economic affairs. The book was published when Madhok was desperate to counter his marginalisation within the party, as his relationship with senior leaders like Advani and Vajpayee was becoming increasingly bitter. However, despite Madhok being an almost forgotten name within his own party, many of the arguments presented in his book continue to be articulated in various ways by Hindu right-wing leaders. This is why a thorough reading and critique of the book remains useful in countering the menace of Hindutva nationalism, which poses a serious threat to the secular and pluralist fabric of the country.

 (This article was originally written as an assignment by the author during his postgraduate studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University from 2009 to 2011. The author took a course at the Centre for Historical Studies, taught by the late Prof. M. S. S. Pandian. The author expresses deep gratitude to Prof. Pandian for introducing him to a critical perspective. The original review has been slightly edited to improve the flow of the text.)

References

Jaffrelot, Christophe (1996). The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics. C. Hurst & Co.

Madhok, Balraj (1970). Indianisation: What, How and Why. S. Chand, New Delhi.

Organiser (1973). Mouthpiece of the RSS, 17 March issue, p. 13.

Related:

Balraj Madhok: A Pracharak-turned-Crusader against His Own ‘Parivar’

How Hindutva forces colluded with both the British & Jinnah against the historic ‘Quit India’ movement: Archives

Kannur University likely to drop works of Savarkar, Golwalkar from syllabus

The post Hindutva, Caste, and Nationhood: A Critical Review of Madhok’s book Indianisation appeared first on SabrangIndia.