bangladesh pakistan war | SabrangIndia News Related to Human Rights Fri, 17 Aug 2018 10:01:26 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.2.2 https://sabrangindia.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Favicon_0.png bangladesh pakistan war | SabrangIndia 32 32 Pakistani jailer remembers incarcerated Bangabandhu https://sabrangindia.in/pakistani-jailer-remembers-incarcerated-bangabandhu/ Fri, 17 Aug 2018 10:01:26 +0000 http://localhost/sabrangv4/2018/08/17/pakistani-jailer-remembers-incarcerated-bangabandhu/ An account of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s time spent in prison   It was a long war / BIGSTOCK   Three years ago, a retired Pakistani police officer named Raja Anar Khan appeared on Pakistani television to reflect on the duties he performed as an intelligence officer between April 1971 and early January 1972.  Those duties […]

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An account of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s time spent in prison

 

It was a long war

It was a long war / BIGSTOCK
 
Three years ago, a retired Pakistani police officer named Raja Anar Khan appeared on Pakistani television to reflect on the duties he performed as an intelligence officer between April 1971 and early January 1972. 

Those duties related to guarding and keeping watch on Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, once the chief of the Awami League had been flown to erstwhile West Pakistan and lodged in solitary confinement in Mianwali.

Khan’s remarks were made before the well-known Pakistani media personality, Mujibur Rehman Shami, who I have had the pleasure of meeting on some of my trips to Pakistan. I have always found Shami to be a pleasant personality, keen on interacting with media people from the sub-continent. 

In his conversation with Khan in December 2015, Shami was able to ferret out some rich information about the dark times Bangladesh’s leader spent in Pakistani incarceration during the entire period of our War of Liberation.

Khan was placed in Mianwali jail in the guise of a prisoner, but really to keep watch on Bangabandhu. This strategy was adopted in order for Bangabandhu not to know that his movements were to be recorded by this officer. Khan told Shami that the Bengali leader, who was in a cell without access to newspapers, radio, and television, asked him why he too was in prison. 

Khan told him a lie. He was there, he said, on charges of abducting a woman. But, as he made it known, something told him Sheikh Mujibur Rahman did not believe him, and indeed knew somehow that he had been planted there to keep an eye on him.

Much of what we don’t know about Bangabandhu’s imprisonment by the Yahya Khan junta in 1971 came to light in the course of Khan’s reflections. When the regime placed Bangabandhu on trial before a secret military tribunal, he appeared before it, but after a few days refused to go there. 

He had already made it known that he did not recognize the court. For four or five days he stayed away from the tribunal, but was eventually persuaded by Khan and a couple of other officers to return. 

For the first three months or so, Bangabandhu remained guarded in his conversations with Khan. But then he began to be at ease in his company, at one point telling him after a court appearance that a Bengali brigadier, who had been testifying against him through telling the tribunal of his meetings with Mujib, was lying. 

He had never seen that officer in his entire life, Bangabandhu told Khan. 

At one point, once war broke out between India and Pakistan in early December 1971, the junta decided to shift Mujib from Faisalabad to Mianwali. The vehicle in which he was taken to Mianwali was stacked with pillows and quilts, with barely any space for Bangabandhu and his jailer, so that an observer along the route would not know if anyone other than the driver was in the vehicle. 

The windows of the vehicle were daubed in mud. Bangabandhu asked Khan why all that mud was there. Khan could not possibly let him know that a war was going on, but mumbled a response which the Bengali leader did not buy or could not follow. The vehicle sped to its destination.

In Sahiwal jail, Bangabandhu began keeping a diary into which he made daily entries.

Late in the evening of December 16, 1971, hours after the Pakistan army surrendered in Bangladesh, a senior prison official named Khwaja Tufail knocked loudly on the gate of the corridor leading to Bangabandhu’s cell in Mianwali prison. 

Khan, whose quarters were near the gate, initially refused to open it out of fear that doing so would lead to his prisoner coming to harm in light of the news from Dhaka. But Tufail persisted. 

When Khan let him in, both men unlocked the door to Bangabandhu’s cell and asked him to follow them out of the place. One recalls that a sentence of death had already been pronounced against Bangabandhu. 

Being woken up in the middle of the night somehow convinced him that he was being led to his execution. Indeed, he asked Khan and Tufail calmly if he was being led to the gallows. 

The two men told the Bengali leader his life was in danger in the cell and so they had to move him out of the prison. Information had reached them that the junta had been provoking jail inmates to assault and kill Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in reprisal for the surrender in Dhaka. Bangabandhu was put in a car and speedily moved out of Mianwali jail and to a safe house in town.

On the day Pakistan’s new President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto came to see Bangabandhu at Sihala rest house outside Rawalpindi, where he had been moved on December 22, Anar Khan, unbeknownst to both men, concealed himself behind a curtain to listen to their conversation. 

Bangabandhu was surprised at Bhutto’s arrival, and once the latter gave him some idea of the change that had occurred, expressed his indignation that power had been transferred not to the majority leader — which he was — but to the minority leader. Bhutto did not inform Mujib that East Pakistan had become Bangladesh.

On January 5, 1972, as Bangabandhu prepared to fly to freedom, Raja Anar Khan, who addressed Bangabandhu as Baba, asked him for a parting gift. By then, Bangabandhu had been given newspapers and a radio. 

He had a copy of Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s Crime and Punishment. He autographed it for Khan: “In the long war between the falsehood and the truth, falsehood wins the first battle and truth the last.”

Two days later, the Father of the Nation flew to freedom. 

In February 1974, in Lahore for the Islamic summit, Bangabandhu enquired after Raja Anar Khan and asked Pakistani officials to have him brought over. Conveyed Bangabandhu’s wish, Khan decided not to see him. 

He was afraid such a reunion would lead to his persecution by his own government in future. 

Syed Badrul Ahsan is a journalist.

First Published on Dhaka Tribune

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Why Pakistan cannot say sorry to Bangladesh https://sabrangindia.in/why-pakistan-cannot-say-sorry-bangladesh/ Sat, 28 Apr 2018 05:27:11 +0000 http://localhost/sabrangv4/2018/04/28/why-pakistan-cannot-say-sorry-bangladesh/ Any apology to Bangladesh would imply that Pakistan’s use of terror was self-destructive An army-dominated deep state Photo: REUTERS For some time now, Bangladesh has been pressing Pakistan to apologize for the genocide of the Bangali population in 1971. The occupation army showed no compunction in butchering an estimated three million of their (mostly unarmed) […]

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Any apology to Bangladesh would imply that Pakistan’s use of terror was self-destructive

Pakistan
An army-dominated deep state Photo: REUTERS

For some time now, Bangladesh has been pressing Pakistan to apologize for the genocide of the Bangali population in 1971. The occupation army showed no compunction in butchering an estimated three million of their (mostly unarmed) fellow citizens over a nine-month period to quell a liberation struggle in its then eastern wing.

In reply, Pakistan has urged Bangladesh to forget the unfortunate incidents of the past and move on to a new, better relationship. Well short of an apology, its utterly inadequate response glosses over what remains the most shameful blot in Pakistan’s less-than-stellar history.

However, given Pakistan’s gradual morphing into a terror-sponsoring state from its theocratic origins, beginning from its intervention in the Afghan civil war, its refusal to apologize to Bangladesh is not surprising. Countries with a firmer commitment to a democratic system and minimal respect for established norms of governance would have found it easier to offer a brief, heartfelt apology.

A dignified regret would have helped Islamabad get rid of a permanent embarrassment in a civilized manner. If anything, by demanding an apology instead of adequate reparations, Bangladesh had prepared the ground for a graceful ending to a painful episode of history and for a new beginning in bilateral ties.

Evidently, the army-dominated deep state in Pakistan has little concern for either the country’s international image, its place in world history, to say nothing of the damaging legacy it leaves behind for its younger generations.

So far so bad — yet it is possible to see the signs of a major political change for the better among the younger Pakistani citizens, which augurs well for South Asia.

From Pakistan’s point of view, any apology to Bangladesh would have implied that its use of terror as an instrument of state policy had proved self-destructive. Its exploitative policy towards its eastern province was morally reprehensible and utterly wrong.

More importantly, to disavow terror as an acceptable political tactic would have significantly reduced Pakistan’s acceptability among organizations like the Jaish-e-Mohammad, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, the Lashkar–e-Toiba (some of which are internationally blacklisted), and their shadowy underworld backers.

    Pakistan’s refusal to apologize to Bangladesh even in 2018 indicates how little the country has changed since 1971

So there could be no apology to anyone on the break-up of 1971, because that would have meant a loss of face for the India-hating Pakistani ruling establishment. For the military hawks, drug lords, and Islamic extremists running Islamabad’s foreign policy, it was preferable to go along with international Muslim terrorism and maintain a pro-Jihadi image post-1971.

After the emergence of Bangladesh, Pakistan became blindsided on the east. It opted wholeheartedly to concentrate on and participate in developments more closely in the deeply disturbed West Asian region. If this meant inviting unrest and chaos, there were compensations too.

So long as the US and the EU continued to use Islamabad as their ally in the battle against Islamic terrorism, the dollars kept coming — never mind the international revulsion and the moral opprobrium, which can be borne better when people are well-fed and elections are a joke.

It is another matter that the US and the West have gradually become wiser to the implications of Pakistan’s running with the hares and hunting also with the hounds, in the matter of fighting Islamic extremism.

Pakistan’s refusal to apologize to Bangladesh even in 2018 indicates how little the country has changed since 1971.

And yet, it is not fair to condemn Pakistan as a country for the shocking killing of nearly three million people in 1971. There are any number of ordinary, decent Pakistani citizens who deeply regret the breaking up of their country and the loss of its eastern wing. Mostly these are younger generation Pakistanis who have no direct experience of the Liberation War in Bangladesh.

But there are elder citizens too, including senior people in the administration, in different political parties, not to mention journalists and members of the commentariat who are bitterly critical of the 1971 break-up.

There are several Pakistani TV channels where the younger set are shown discussing how Bangladesh has left Pakistan well behind in creating better health facilities for the people, in women empowerment, poverty reduction, family planning, and general education.

Pakistan may boast of having more cars than Bangladesh and smartphones, but the former eastern province enjoys better forex reserves ($32 billion as against $14bn), more mobiles (84% of people as against 68%), registers a better GDP growth, and less foreign debt, despite receiving only a fraction of Pakistan’s level of foreign aid.

The average Pakistani is marginally healthier than the Bangladeshi, but joblessness in Pakistan is much more than pronounced, not to mention the terrorism-related violence and the socio/political cost thereof. The fact that Bangladesh is poised to reach a GDP of over $273bn by end 2018 and overtake Pakistan’s GDP by 2021 at present rates is highly appreciated.

Bangladesh does not suffer crippling power cuts like Pakistan, consuming around 16,000 megawatts daily, a figure expected to touch 22,000 MWs in the 2020s. In garments exports, it ranks second in the world.

By 2021, along with Myanmar and Laos, Bangladesh is poised to join the ranks of middle-income countries, an elevation from the ranks of 47 least developed countries, at its present rate of growth — in the sectors of personal income, economic vulnerability, and human assets creation.

It needs stressing here that the present writer has taken these figures mostly covering the 2016-17 period, from Pakistani print and electronic media. Especially on TV channels, it has been heartening to see young Pakistanis listening with interest to the Bangladeshi national anthem and wishing their “brothers in the East all well.”

It was also encouraging to see similar programs related to the present status and growth of major Indian cities like Kolkata on some Pakistani channels where most people expressed their appreciation. Their obvious interest in the economic growth of Bangladesh and India was a healthy sign for the political future of South Asia as a whole.

As for reactions in India to developments in Bangladesh and Pakistan, especially among the young, this writer can personally confirm that there exist a matching interest and curiosity to learn more about their (former compatriots and current) neighbours with whom they have so much in common in terms of food, language, culture, and religion.

As analyst Charubrata Ray puts it: “When today’s young generation assumes power in all three countries of the sub-continent, who knows what new possibilities may open up? Maybe Pakistan will unhesitatingly apologize to Bangladesh and India, and Pakistan may well apologize to each other — and a new era of hope may prevail in South Asia?”

An added point of interest is that of late, even blaming India for “having taken advantage of the problems in Bangladesh” is no longer done by the older generation of Pakistanis with the anger and vigour of the past. Col Sabyasachi Bagchi says, “they agree that if they were in Mrs Indira Gandhi’s place, they would have done exactly the same in Bangladesh, in a world dominated by realpolitik.”

Ashis Biswas writes from Kolkata, India.

This article was first published on Dhaka Tribune
 

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By marking Genocide Day, Bangladesh seeks to remember what Pakistan wants to forget https://sabrangindia.in/marking-genocide-day-bangladesh-seeks-remember-what-pakistan-wants-forget/ Sat, 25 Mar 2017 06:07:05 +0000 http://localhost/sabrangv4/2017/03/25/marking-genocide-day-bangladesh-seeks-remember-what-pakistan-wants-forget/ March 25, the day before Bangladesh's Independence Day, will commemorate the genocide during the 1971 liberation war.   Earlier this month, Congress MP Shashi Tharoor boldly declared that Britain was suffering from “historical amnesia”. By censoring its colonial past, it was ensuring that younger generations grew up without an inkling of the atrocities committed by […]

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March 25, the day before Bangladesh's Independence Day, will commemorate the genocide during the 1971 liberation war.

bangladesh
 

Earlier this month, Congress MP Shashi Tharoor boldly declared that Britain was suffering from “historical amnesia”. By censoring its colonial past, it was ensuring that younger generations grew up without an inkling of the atrocities committed by their ancestors. Britain’s attempt to shove its colonial past under the carpet is not unique. Belgium has gone through a similar process, reconstructing itself as a neutral country, and thereby becoming the prime candidate for hosting the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation headquarters, institutions believed to promote peace and stability. The country works hard to avoid exploring its dark colonial past in Congo and it is not alone.

But it is not only colonisers that have ugly histories. Many nations around the world have violent pasts that they long to forget. Some choose to access those histories in order to heal and move on, while others diligently work to not only reconstruct their present self-image but also manipulate their histories in the process. Newer, purer versions are offered, carefully tailored and packaged to fit the state narratives. Pakistan’s engagement – or lack thereof – with its past perfectly encapsulates this process.
 

Genocide Day

This March 26, Bangladesh will celebrate its 46th Independence Day. The date commemorates the fateful proclamation of separation from West Pakistan in March 1971. The night before, the Pakistan Army had launched Operation Searchlight in East Pakistan. As the name suggests, Operation Searchlight aimed to hunt down any Bengali who wanted a separate homeland, after decades of struggling for basic human rights under oppressive governments, dominated by West Pakistan. It was alleged that India had unleashed its agents in East Pakistan, converting Bengalis into anti-state elements that must be eliminated in order to ensure stability within Pakistan. West Pakistanis were told that it was a handful of troublesome Hindu Bengalis who were working under the directives of India and wanted to destabilise the country. A swift army operation would curb this unnecessary agitation and crush the negligible miscreants. The reality was that millions of East Pakistanis were exasperated by economic, political and cultural repression and had come to realise that independence was the only solution.

Under Operation Searchlight, terror spread like wildfire in East Pakistan. Innocent and unarmed Bengalis were targeted and eliminated one by one. The army used the support of Islamist parties and their paramilitary wings, the likes of Al Badr and Al Shams, to launch an accompanying jihad with the goal of purifying the Bengalis of Hindu influences and making them true Muslims and, hence, true Pakistanis. Mass killings and rape marked every street and corner. Though figures are contested, it is estimated that anywhere between 300,000 to 3 million Hindus and Muslims, Bengalis and non-Bengalis were killed from March 1971 onwards. Operation Searchlight ignited an all-out war that served a huge blow to the West Pakistani establishment. By the end of the year, Pakistan stood utterly defeated both politically and militarily. On December 16, 1971, East Pakistan became Bangladesh. Those who had fought for their independence stood victorious but also deeply wounded by the months of killings, rape and bloodshed.

On March 11, the Bangladeshi Parliament unanimously passed a motion declaring March 25, the night Operation Searchlight was launched, as Bangladesh’s Genocide Day, to commemorate the brutalities committed by West Pakistan.
 

Selective memory

Meanwhile, Pakistan has used these 46 years to ensure that people forget the bloody and humiliating past. The defeat was not taken well in Pakistan. Not only had the state managed to lose the most populated wing of the nation barely two decades after independence, it had lost out to its greatest nemesis, India. Every effort was made to silence the narratives of the 1971 Partition. Compared to the Partition of 1947, which is owned as a huge victory, 1971 is viewed as a great loss. This is rather similar to how Indians often view the creation of Pakistan as the break-up of the holy motherland, a bitter loss hard to stomach. In Pakistan, this loss was swallowed whole and then hardly ever spoken about. And it was easy to do so, especially once the Partition of 1971 was cast away as an Indian conspiracy.

Today, just as Britain resists acknowledging its exploitative and violent colonial past, Pakistan too remains mum on the issue. Perhaps the best way to ensure that the silence is maintained is by strategically eliminating any alternative discourse. This butchered history taints the pages of state textbooks. The Class 9 and Class 10 Pakistan Studies textbook of the Federal Textbook Board of Islamabad portrays all bloodshed and instability as propagated by Indian-backed Bengalis, who have been painted as unruly, uncontrollable and violent. An excerpt reads:
 

“Raging mobs took to streets… banks were looted and the administration came to a halt. Public servants and non-Bengali citizens were maltreated and murdered. Pakistan flag and Quaid’s portraits were set on fire… reign of terror, loot and arson was let loose. Awami League workers started killing those who did not agree with their Six Points Programme. Members of Urdu-speaking non-Bengali communities were ruthlessly slaughtered. West Pakistani businessmen operating in East wing were forced to surrender their belongings or killed in cold blood, their houses set on fire. Pro-Pakistan political leaders were maltreated, humiliated and many of them even murdered. Armed forces were insulted; authority of the state was openly defied and violated. Awami League virtually had established a parallel government and declared independence of East Pakistan.”
 

Meanwhile, Pakistani leaders of that time, such as General Yahya Khan, are shown as making desperate attempts to negotiate with these “out-of-control” Bengalis. At one place, the book states, “Yahya flew to Dhaka, in a hurry; he wanted to make a last effort”, but he was received by “obviously unacceptable” demands put forward by Mujibur Rehman. The leader of the Awami League is dismissed as impractical and his requests as unrealistic. Further, far from acknowledging the atrocities committed by the Pakistan Army and paramilitary groups, the textbook states that on the night of March 25 and March 26, “the Awami League militants committed a large scale massacre of West Pakistani families living in East Pakistan”. Later, the textbook complains, “Indians and Bengalis charged Pakistan Army with wholesale massacre and desecration of women. On December 19, 1971, world media teams were shown the dead bodies of Bengali professors, intellectuals and professionals who were allegedly killed during the said unrest. Large-scale killings were publicized in the media to defame Pakistan Army.”
 

Ideology, not history

No mention is made of the rape and murder of thousands of East Pakistani families. No mention is made of the brutality of West Pakistanis. Just as Hindus are portrayed as the sole instigators of violence in 1947, East Pakistanis are depicted as the perpetrators in 1971. The narrative becomes all the more powerful when they are equated with the impure Hindu “other”, funded and fuelled by the Indian state. India’s hand in the break-up of Pakistan is enforced and reinforced repeatedly in the chapter. At one place, the textbook states, “The Bangladesh crisis had provided India with an opportunity of the century to destroy her number one enemy, Pakistan.”

As state policy, Pakistan has always done an exceptional job at eradicating, distorting and denying its history. Roads or street signs that signify a non-Muslim past are hastily renamed, archeological sites that are meant to serve as evidence of history are shunned of their historical past; Hindu sites are recast as only Buddhist, painted over to denote selected and more acceptable versions of history. History as a discipline is replaced by Pakistan Studies in schools so that it is ideology – and that too of the Islamic Republic – and not history that is taught. The Partition of 1971 is just another victim in this process. As Bangladesh celebrates its Independence Day and, from this year onwards, also commemorates Genocide Day, a deafening silence will engulf the country. The “historical amnesia” of its coloniser will be embraced tightly as one of the most powerful legacies left behind by the British.

Anam Zakaria is the author of Footprints of Partition: Narratives of Four Generations of Pakistanis and Indians.

This article was first published on Scroll.in

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